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# Overview on Blockchain-based Academic Certificate Handling

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


# Blockchains in Education

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- ❑ Academic certificate handling
  - Creation (issuance), revocation, and verification
- ❑ Interesting blockchain (BC) features
  - Data **immutability**, *i.e.*, data cannot be changed
  - Data **replication**, *i.e.*, availability, no single point-of-failure
  - Data **trust**, *i.e.*, no need for a Trusted Third Party (TTP)
- ❑ BC can act as a **public and distributed** ledger of academic certificates
  - Still necessary to **trust the institutions** that are **issuing certificates** are **accredited**
- ❑ BC-based Smart Contracts (SC)
  - **Automated** and **immutable** code execution

# Blockchain Deployment Types



# Stakeholders and Roles

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## ❑ Issuers

- Accredited education institutions, *e.g.*, UZH or ETH
- BC permissions: write and read


## ❑ Recipients

- Certificate owners, *e.g.*, students
- BC permissions: read

## ❑ Verifiers


- Interested parties, *e.g.*, companies, universities
- BC permissions: read

# Mapping Stakeholder Permissions to BC



Based on  
K. Wüst, A. Gervais

# Foreseen EduChain Architecture



# Landscape of Blockchain in Education

Work	BC Type	BC	Certificate Storage	Permissions to Issue Certificates
<b>Blockcerts</b>	Permissionless	Bitcoin, Ethereum	Traditional DB	Off-chain Overlay
<b>Disciplina</b>	Permissionless	Own Blockchain	Own Blockchain	Smart Contract
<b>UZHBC</b>	Permissionless	Ethereum	Traditional DB	Smart Contract
<b>BCDiploma</b>	Permissionless	Ethereum	Traditional DB	Smart Contract
<b>Edgecoin</b>	Permissionless	Ethereum	IPFS	Smart Contract
<b>OS University</b>	Permissionless	Ethereum	IPFS	Smart Contract
<b>Gräter et al.</b>	Permissionless	Ethereum	IPFS	Smart Contract
<b>Sony Global Education</b>	Permissioned	IBM HyperLedger	Traditional DB	Selected institutions
<b>GRNET</b>	Permissioned	Cardano	Traditional DB	Selected institutions
<b>CredenceLedger</b>	Permissioned	MultiChain	Traditional DB	Selected institutions

Based on: B. Rodrigues, M. Franco, E. Scheid, B. Stiller, S. Kanhere: A Technology-driven Overview on Blockchain-based Academic Certificate Handling.


# Approaches for BC Certificate Handling

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- ❑ Proof of Existence
  - BC used as time-stamping solution, providing integrity
- ❑ Vendor as Notary
  - Intermediator providing access to the information on the BC
- ❑ Know your customer (KYC)
  - Allow recipients to demonstrate the ownership of their certificates
  - Vendor-dependent validation
- ❑ Digital Self-Sovereign (Identity)
  - Individuals control the sharing of certificates
  - Vendor-independent



# Classification of Work



# Challenges

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## ❑ Privacy

- Data in the BC (e.g., certificate hash) is personal data?
- GDPR Compliance → cannot remove data from the BC

## ❑ Integrity

- Prevent certificates issued by recognized and accredited institutions from being modified

## ❑ Access Control / Organizational

- Prevent unrecognized and unaccredited institutions from issuing certificates

## ❑ Novelty

- Skepticism of BC adoption
- Price volatility

# Opportunities

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- ❑ BC conceived to promote **disintermediation**
- ❑ However, stakeholders operate in different BC networks that are closed in their own ecosystem
  - Standards → fundamental aspect to make these different isolated networks to communicate, *i.e.*, interoperability
- ❑ User-centric Data Control
  - Allow verifiable claims in Curriculum Vitae (CV) independently of a vendor or educational institution
  - Secure sharing of CV/certificate data (control of data access)

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**Thank you for your attention.**

