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Say "PubKeys" not "PublicKeys"
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The extension name uses "PubKeys" but some of the structures said
"PublicKeys". Be consistent.
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Adam Langley committed Nov 15, 2023
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Expand Up @@ -7123,17 +7123,17 @@ The weight that [=[RPS]=] give to the presence of a signature from a supplementa

: Client extension input
:: <xmp class="idl">
dictionary AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPublicKeysInputs {
dictionary AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPubKeysInputs {
required sequence<DOMString> scopes;
DOMString attestation = "indirect";
sequence<DOMString> attestationFormats = [];
};

partial dictionary AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputs {
AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPublicKeysInputs supplementalPubKeys;
AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPubKeysInputs supplementalPubKeys;
};
</xmp>
<div dfn-type="dict-member" dfn-for="AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPublicKeysInputs">
<div dfn-type="dict-member" dfn-for="AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPubKeysInputs">
: <dfn>scopes</dfn>
:: This required member specifies the scopes of supplemental public keys that the [=[RP]=] requests. Values are taken from the `scope` group in the CDDL below (i.e., currently defined values are `provider` and `device`); authenticators silently ignore unrecognized values. Specifying the scopes that a [=[RP]=] can use allows an [=authenticator=] to avoid the work of generating superfluous supplemental keys.

Expand All @@ -7159,12 +7159,12 @@ The weight that [=[RPS]=] give to the presence of a signature from a supplementa
: Client extension output
:: A sequence of {{ArrayBuffer}}s containing the signatures returned as the [=unsigned extension output=].
<xmp class="idl">
dictionary AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPublicKeysOutputs {
dictionary AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPubKeysOutputs {
sequence<ArrayBuffer> signatures;
};

partial dictionary AuthenticationExtensionsClientOutputs {
AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPublicKeysOutputs supplementalPubKeys;
AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPubKeysOutputs supplementalPubKeys;
};
</xmp>

Expand All @@ -7184,15 +7184,15 @@ The weight that [=[RPS]=] give to the presence of a signature from a supplementa
```

: Authenticator extension output
:: The supplemental public key attestation objects, defined by the `attObjForSupplementalPublicKey` type:
:: The supplemental public key attestation objects, defined by the `attObjForSupplementalPubKey` type:

```
$$extensionOutput //= (
; This array of supplemental public keys MUST be ordered
; lexicographically by scope and MUST NOT include more than one element
; with a given scope.

supplementalPubKeys: [+ attObjForSupplementalPublicKey],
supplementalPubKeys: [+ attObjForSupplementalPubKey],
)

scope = (
Expand All @@ -7217,7 +7217,7 @@ The weight that [=[RPS]=] give to the presence of a signature from a supplementa

; This object conveys an attested supplemental public key and is analogous
; to \`attObj\`.
attObjForSupplementalPublicKey = {
attObjForSupplementalPubKey = {
aaguid: bstr, ; AAGUID (16 bytes fixed-length)
; https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn/#aaguid

Expand All @@ -7238,7 +7238,7 @@ The weight that [=[RPS]=] give to the presence of a signature from a supplementa
; Attestation statement formats define the \`fmt\` and \`attStmt\` members of
; $$attStmtType.
; Note that \`fmt\` and \`attStmt\` are top-level members of
; \`attObjForSupplementalPublicKey\`.
; \`attObjForSupplementalPubKey\`.
;
; In summary, the \`attStmt\` will (typically) contain:
; (1) a SIGNATURE value calculated (using the attestation private key)
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -7274,7 +7274,7 @@ The weight that [=[RPS]=] give to the presence of a signature from a supplementa
:: For both [=authenticatorMakeCredential=] and [=authenticatorGetAssertion=] operations:
1. Create or select the [=public key credential source=] as usual (see [[#sctn-op-make-cred]], or [[#sctn-op-get-assertion]] as appropriate).

1. Let |scopes| be the [=set=] of all supplemental public key scopes that the [=authenticator=] supports. Update |scopes| to be the [=set/intersection=] of itself and {{AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPublicKeysInputs/scopes}}. If |scopes| is empty, terminate these processing steps with no extension output.
1. Let |scopes| be the [=set=] of all supplemental public key scopes that the [=authenticator=] supports. Update |scopes| to be the [=set/intersection=] of itself and {{AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPubKeysInputs/scopes}}. If |scopes| is empty, terminate these processing steps with no extension output.

1. Let |spks| and |spkSigs| be empty arrays.

Expand All @@ -7284,17 +7284,17 @@ The weight that [=[RPS]=] give to the presence of a signature from a supplementa

1. If a supplemental key with scope |scope| does not already exist for this {[=public key credential source/id|Credential ID=], [=public key credential source/rpId|RP ID=], [=public key credential source/rpId|userHandle=]} tuple on the [=authenticator=], create it using the same public key algorithm as that used by the [=user credential=]'s [=credential key pair=], otherwise locate the existing supplemental key.

1. Let |attFormat| be the chosen [=attestation statement format=], and |attAaguid| be a 16-byte value, based on the value of {{AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPublicKeysInputs/attestation}} in the extension input:
1. Let |attFormat| be the chosen [=attestation statement format=], and |attAaguid| be a 16-byte value, based on the value of {{AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPubKeysInputs/attestation}} in the extension input:

<dl class="switch">
: none
:: |attFormat| is "none" or "self", at the authenticator's discretion, and |attAaguid| is 16 zero bytes. (Note that, since the [=supplemental public key=] is already exercised during {{CredentialsContainer/create()|navigator.credentials.create()}} calls, the proof-of-possession property provided by "self" attestation is superfluous in that context.)

: indirect, direct
:: |attFormat| is an [=attestation statement format=] appropriate for this [=authenticator=] based on {{AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPublicKeysInputs/attestationFormats}}, and |attAaguid| is the corresponding [=AAGUID=], which MAY be the [=authenticator's=] AAGUID. (Since the [=supplemental public key=]'s scope is different from the [=user credential=], it will often have a different attestation. For example, the attestation for a [=supplemental public key=] with &ldquo;device&rdquo; scope can be tied to hardware roots of trust, although it does not have to be.)
:: |attFormat| is an [=attestation statement format=] appropriate for this [=authenticator=] based on {{AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPubKeysInputs/attestationFormats}}, and |attAaguid| is the corresponding [=AAGUID=], which MAY be the [=authenticator's=] AAGUID. (Since the [=supplemental public key=]'s scope is different from the [=user credential=], it will often have a different attestation. For example, the attestation for a [=supplemental public key=] with &ldquo;device&rdquo; scope can be tied to hardware roots of trust, although it does not have to be.)

: enterprise
:: The [=[RP]=] wants to receive an [=attestation statement=] that may include uniquely identifying information. This is intended for controlled deployments within an enterprise where the organization wishes to tie registrations to specific authenticators. [=Authenticators=] MUST NOT provide such an attestation unless the user agent or authenticator configuration expressly permits it for the requested [=RP ID=]. If <i>not</i> permitted, then follow the steps for `direct` attestation. Otherwise |attFormat| is an [=attestation statement format=] appropriate for this [=authenticator=] based on {{AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPublicKeysInputs/attestationFormats}}, and |attAaguid| is the corresponding [=AAGUID=], which MAY be the [=authenticator's=] AAGUID.
:: The [=[RP]=] wants to receive an [=attestation statement=] that may include uniquely identifying information. This is intended for controlled deployments within an enterprise where the organization wishes to tie registrations to specific authenticators. [=Authenticators=] MUST NOT provide such an attestation unless the user agent or authenticator configuration expressly permits it for the requested [=RP ID=]. If <i>not</i> permitted, then follow the steps for `direct` attestation. Otherwise |attFormat| is an [=attestation statement format=] appropriate for this [=authenticator=] based on {{AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPubKeysInputs/attestationFormats}}, and |attAaguid| is the corresponding [=AAGUID=], which MAY be the [=authenticator's=] AAGUID.

Note: CTAP2 does not currently provide for an <a href="https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.1-ps-20210615/fido-client-to-authenticator-protocol-v2.1-ps-20210615.html#makecred-enterpriseattestation">enterpriseAttestation</a> signal during an <a href="https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.1-ps-20210615/fido-client-to-authenticator-protocol-v2.1-ps-20210615.html#authenticatorGetAssertion">authenticatorGetAssertion</a> call. Until that is changed, <a href="https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.1-ps-20210615/fido-client-to-authenticator-protocol-v2.1-ps-20210615.html#platform-managed-enterprise-attestation">platform-managed enterprise attestation</a> will not work in that context with CTAP2 [=authenticators=].
</dl>
Expand All @@ -7307,7 +7307,7 @@ The weight that [=[RPS]=] give to the presence of a signature from a supplementa

Note: |randomNonce|'s purpose is to randomize the [=attestation signature=] value for [=supplemental public keys=]. If this is not done, then an [=attestation signature=] value remains constant for all such signatures issued on behalf of this [=user credential=], possibly exposing the [=authenticator=]'s [=attestation private key=] to side-channel attacks. The randomness-generation mechanism should be carefully chosen by the authenticator implementer.

1. Let |supplementalPubKey| be a [=CBOR=] map as defined by `attObjForSupplementalPublicKey` above, with keys and values as follows:
1. Let |supplementalPubKey| be a [=CBOR=] map as defined by `attObjForSupplementalPubKey` above, with keys and values as follows:

Note: as with all CBOR structures used in this specification, the [=CTAP2 canonical CBOR encoding form=] MUST be used.

Expand All @@ -7323,7 +7323,7 @@ The weight that [=[RPS]=] give to the presence of a signature from a supplementa

Note: The details of the `$$attStmtType` values are dependent upon the particular [=attestation statement=] format. See [[#sctn-attestation-formats]].

1. If the `$$attStmtType` [=group socket=] contains uniquely identifying information then let `epAtt` be [TRUE]. Otherwise omit the `epAtt` field. (This field can only be [TRUE] when the {{AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPublicKeysInputs/attestation}} field of the extension input is "enterprise" and either the user-agent or the authenticator permits uniquely identifying attestation for the requested RP ID.)
1. If the `$$attStmtType` [=group socket=] contains uniquely identifying information then let `epAtt` be [TRUE]. Otherwise omit the `epAtt` field. (This field can only be [TRUE] when the {{AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPubKeysInputs/attestation}} field of the extension input is "enterprise" and either the user-agent or the authenticator permits uniquely identifying attestation for the requested RP ID.)

1. Append |supplementalPubKey| to |spks|.

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -7396,17 +7396,17 @@ then the below verification steps are performed in the context of [step 19](#reg
of [[#sctn-registering-a-new-credential]] using these variables established therein: |credential|, |clientExtensionResults|, |authData|, and |hash|.
[=[RP]=] policy may specify whether a response without a `supplementalPubKeys` extension output is acceptable.

1. Verify that the {{AuthenticationExtensionsClientOutputs/supplementalPubKeys}} member of |clientExtensionResults| exists, and contains the {{AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPublicKeysOutputs/signatures}} field. Let |signatures| be the value of that field.
1. Verify that the {{AuthenticationExtensionsClientOutputs/supplementalPubKeys}} member of |clientExtensionResults| exists, and contains the {{AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPubKeysOutputs/signatures}} field. Let |signatures| be the value of that field.

1. Let |attObjsForSupplementalPublicKey| be the value of the `supplementalPubKeys` member of the [=authenticator extension output=] from |authData|.

1. If the [=list/size=] of |attObjsForSupplementalPublicKey| is not equal to the [=list/size=] of |signatures| then abort the registration process with an error.

1. [=list/Iterate=] over the indices of |attObjsForSupplementalPublicKey| (which, after the check in the previous step, must also be the indices of |signatures|). Then, for each (|attObjForSupplementalPublicKey|, |signature|) from the two lists:
1. [=list/Iterate=] over the indices of |attObjsForSupplementalPublicKey| (which, after the check in the previous step, must also be the indices of |signatures|). Then, for each (|attObjForSupplementalPubKey|, |signature|) from the two lists:

1. Extract the contained fields from |attObjForSupplementalPublicKey|: |aaguid|, |spk|, |nonce|, |fmt| and |attStmt|. Also let |scope| reflect the scope, specified by the member of the `scope` group that is present.
1. Extract the contained fields from |attObjForSupplementalPubKey|: |aaguid|, |spk|, |nonce|, |fmt| and |attStmt|. Also let |scope| reflect the scope, specified by the member of the `scope` group that is present.

Note: The latter |attObjForSupplementalPublicKey| fields are referenced exclusively in the below steps and are not to be confused with other fields with the same names in other portions of the top-level [=attestation object=].
Note: The latter |attObjForSupplementalPubKey| fields are referenced exclusively in the below steps and are not to be confused with other fields with the same names in other portions of the top-level [=attestation object=].

1. Verify that |signature| is a valid signature over the [=assertion signature=] [input](#fig-signature) (i.e. `authData` and `hash`) by the [=supplemental public key=] |spk|. (The signature algorithm is the same as for the [=user credential=].)

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -7447,17 +7447,17 @@ of [[#sctn-verifying-assertion]] using these variables established therein: |cre

1. Let |recognizedSpks| be a new [=set/empty=] [=set=].

1. Verify that the {{AuthenticationExtensionsClientOutputs/supplementalPubKeys}} member of |clientExtensionResults| exists, and contains the {{AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPublicKeysOutputs/signatures}} field. Let |signatures| be the value of that field.
1. Verify that the {{AuthenticationExtensionsClientOutputs/supplementalPubKeys}} member of |clientExtensionResults| exists, and contains the {{AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPubKeysOutputs/signatures}} field. Let |signatures| be the value of that field.

1. Let |attObjsForSupplementalPublicKeys| be the value of the `supplementalPubKeys` member of the [=authenticator extension output=] from |authData|.
1. Let |attObjsForSupplementalPubKeys| be the value of the `supplementalPubKeys` member of the [=authenticator extension output=] from |authData|.

1. If the [=list/size=] of |attObjsForSupplementalPublicKeys| is not equal to the [=list/size=] of |signatures| then abort the authentication process with an error.
1. If the [=list/size=] of |attObjsForSupplementalPubKeys| is not equal to the [=list/size=] of |signatures| then abort the authentication process with an error.

1. [=list/Iterate=] over the indices of |attObjsForSupplementalPublicKeys| (which, after the check in the previous step, must also be the indices of |signatures|). Then, for each (|attObjForSupplementalPublicKey|, |signature|) from the two lists:
1. [=list/Iterate=] over the indices of |attObjsForSupplementalPubKeys| (which, after the check in the previous step, must also be the indices of |signatures|). Then, for each (|attObjForSupplementalPubKey|, |signature|) from the two lists:

1. Extract the contained fields from |attObjForSupplementalPublicKey|: |aaguid|, |spk|, |nonce|, |fmt|, |attStmt|. Also let |scope| reflect the scope, specified by the member of the `scope` group that is present.
1. Extract the contained fields from |attObjForSupplementalPubKey|: |aaguid|, |spk|, |nonce|, |fmt|, |attStmt|. Also let |scope| reflect the scope, specified by the member of the `scope` group that is present.

Note: The latter |attObjForSupplementalPublicKey| fields are referenced exclusively in the below steps and are not to be confused with other fields with the same names in other portions of [=authenticator data=].
Note: The latter |attObjForSupplementalPubKey| fields are referenced exclusively in the below steps and are not to be confused with other fields with the same names in other portions of [=authenticator data=].

1. Verify that |signature| is a valid signature over the [=assertion signature=] [input](#fig-signature) (i.e. `authData` and `hash`) by the [=supplemental public key=] |spk|. (The signature algorithm is the same as for the [=user credential=].)

Expand All @@ -7479,7 +7479,7 @@ of [[#sctn-verifying-assertion]] using these variables established therein: |cre

If |fmt|'s value is "none" then there is no attestation signature to verify and this is a known [=supplemental public key=] with a valid signature. Append |spkRecord| to |recognizedSpks| and continue to the next iteration, if any.

Otherwise, let |spkRecord| be |matchedSpkRecords|[0]. If the |attStmt| in |attObjForSupplementalPublicKey|:
Otherwise, let |spkRecord| be |matchedSpkRecords|[0]. If the |attStmt| in |attObjForSupplementalPubKey|:
<dl class="switch">
: equals |spkRecord|.[$supplementalPubKeys record/attStmt$] by binary equality:
:: This is a known [=supplemental public key=] with a valid signature and valid attestation. Append |spkRecord| to |recognizedSpks| and continue to the next iteration, if any.
Expand Down

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