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Request forgery/cross-protocol attacks #175

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martinthomson opened this issue Dec 9, 2020 · 2 comments · Fixed by #369
Closed

Request forgery/cross-protocol attacks #175

martinthomson opened this issue Dec 9, 2020 · 2 comments · Fixed by #369
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@martinthomson
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The current security considerations text implies that there are good defenses against cross-protocol attacks. QUIC isn't completely free from this style of attack. Some careful rewording might be needed.

@jan-ivar
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@martinthomson Would you like to provide some prose suggestions?

@martinthomson
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A citation for Section 21.5 of QUIC might be a good way to avoid having to say anything too carefully.

(I can't promise to get to this soon, but keep me assigned.)

@wilaw wilaw added this to the Minimum viable ship milestone Jun 2, 2021
martinthomson added a commit to martinthomson/webtransport that referenced this issue Oct 13, 2021
In looking into this text and the related specifications I decided that
it would be better to address the risk of request forgery in the
protocol specifications.  Right now, they say nothing about this
problem, but they really should.  I'm going to open an issue.

On the assumption that the protocol documents address this problem
adequately, then this document doesn't need to concern itself with the
problem.  It is enough to remove any false claims and defer to the
protocol spec.

This contains a tweak to the adjacent text for the Origin field (w3c#368),
but it doesn't fix that issue.

Closes w3c#175.
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3 participants