Fix arbitrary code execution flaw in Active Response #14801
Merged
+83
−6
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Thanks to Roshan Guragain for reporting the flaw and helping us improve the product!
Flaw
References to a parent folder are possible in a custom AR API request:
{"command":"!../../../../../../bin/ls"}
Impact
A manager administrator with RBAC permissions
active-response:command
might execute a program outside the Active Response binary folder (/var/ossec/active-response/bin).extra_args
) as a command-line parameter list.Agents from 3.6.1 to 4.1.5
Running a custom Active Response with these parameters:
../../../../root/test.sh
true
[arg1, arg2, arg3]
This will cause the agent to run
/root/test.sh
with the following arguments:Agents from 4.2.0 to 4.3.7
Running a custom Active Response with these parameters:
!../../../../root/test.sh
[arg1, arg2, arg3]
This will cause the agent to run
/root/test.sh
with no extra arguments, but the agent will send the following string via stdin:Proposed fix
We're implementing protection at two levels:
command
contains any reference to a parent folder (../
).Tests
GetCommandbyName
rejects custom commands with path traversal.