New issue
Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.
By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.
Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account
Fix arbitrary code execution flaw in Active Response #14801
Merged
Merged
Conversation
This file contains bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
vikman90
added
type/bug
Something isn't working
type/bug/vulnerability
Exploitable vulnerability
labels
Sep 5, 2022
chemamartinez
approved these changes
Sep 5, 2022
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
LGTM!
2 tasks
davidjiglesias
approved these changes
Sep 6, 2022
This was referenced Sep 7, 2022
QA review
|
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Labels
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.
Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.
Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.
You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.
Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.
This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.
Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.
Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.
Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Thanks to Roshan Guragain for reporting the flaw and helping us improve the product!
Flaw
References to a parent folder are possible in a custom AR API request:
{"command":"!../../../../../../bin/ls"}
Impact
A manager administrator with RBAC permissions
active-response:command
might execute a program outside the Active Response binary folder (/var/ossec/active-response/bin).extra_args
) as a command-line parameter list.Agents from 3.6.1 to 4.1.5
Running a custom Active Response with these parameters:
../../../../root/test.sh
true
[arg1, arg2, arg3]
This will cause the agent to run
/root/test.sh
with the following arguments:Agents from 4.2.0 to 4.3.7
Running a custom Active Response with these parameters:
!../../../../root/test.sh
[arg1, arg2, arg3]
This will cause the agent to run
/root/test.sh
with no extra arguments, but the agent will send the following string via stdin:Proposed fix
We're implementing protection at two levels:
command
contains any reference to a parent folder (../
).Tests
GetCommandbyName
rejects custom commands with path traversal.