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char/lrng: add SP800-90B compliant health tests
Implement health tests for LRNG's slow noise sources as mandated by SP-800-90B The file contains the following health tests: - stuck test: The stuck test calculates the first, second and third discrete derivative of the time stamp to be processed by the hash for the per-CPU entropy pool. Only if all three values are non-zero, the received time delta is considered to be non-stuck. - SP800-90B Repetition Count Test (RCT): The LRNG uses an enhanced version of the RCT specified in SP800-90B section 4.4.1. Instead of counting identical back-to-back values, the input to the RCT is the counting of the stuck values during the processing of received interrupt events. The RCT is applied with alpha=2^-30 compliant to the recommendation of FIPS 140-2 IG 9.8. During the counting operation, the LRNG always calculates the RCT cut-off value of C. If that value exceeds the allowed cut-off value, the LRNG will trigger the health test failure discussed below. An error is logged to the kernel log that such RCT failure occurred. This test is only applied and enforced in FIPS mode, i.e. when the kernel compiled with CONFIG_CONFIG_FIPS is started with fips=1. - SP800-90B Adaptive Proportion Test (APT): The LRNG implements the APT as defined in SP800-90B section 4.4.2. The applied significance level again is alpha=2^-30 compliant to the recommendation of FIPS 140-2 IG 9.8. The aforementioned health tests are applied to the first 1,024 time stamps obtained from interrupt events. In case one error is identified for either the RCT, or the APT, the collected entropy is invalidated and the SP800-90B startup health test is restarted. As long as the SP800-90B startup health test is not completed, all LRNG random number output interfaces that may block will block and not generate any data. This implies that only those potentially blocking interfaces are defined to provide random numbers that are seeded with the interrupt noise source being SP800-90B compliant. All other output interfaces will not be affected by the SP800-90B startup test and thus are not considered SP800-90B compliant. At runtime, the SP800-90B APT and RCT are applied to each time stamp generated for a received interrupt. When either the APT and RCT indicates a noise source failure, the LRNG is reset to a state it has immediately after boot: - all entropy counters are set to zero - the SP800-90B startup tests are re-performed which implies that getrandom(2) would block again until new entropy was collected To summarize, the following rules apply: • SP800-90B compliant output interfaces - /dev/random - getrandom(2) system call - get_random_bytes kernel-internal interface when being triggered by the callback registered with add_random_ready_callback • SP800-90B non-compliant output interfaces - /dev/urandom - get_random_bytes kernel-internal interface called directly - randomize_page kernel-internal interface - get_random_u32 and get_random_u64 kernel-internal interfaces - get_random_u32_wait, get_random_u64_wait, get_random_int_wait, and get_random_long_wait kernel-internal interfaces If either the RCT, or the APT health test fails irrespective whether during initialization or runtime, the following actions occur: 1. The entropy of the entire entropy pool is invalidated. 2. All DRNGs are reset which imply that they are treated as being not seeded and require a reseed during next invocation. 3. The SP800-90B startup health test are initiated with all implications of the startup tests. That implies that from that point on, new events must be observed and its entropy must be inserted into the entropy pool before random numbers are calculated from the entropy pool. Further details on the SP800-90B compliance and the availability of all test tools required to perform all tests mandated by SP800-90B are provided at [1]. The entire health testing code is compile-time configurable. The patch provides a CONFIG_BROKEN configuration of the APT / RCT cutoff values which have a high likelihood to trigger the health test failure. The BROKEN APT cutoff is set to the exact mean of the expected value if the time stamps are equally distributed (512 time stamps divided by 16 possible values due to using the 4 LSB of the time stamp). The BROKEN RCT cutoff value is set to 1 which is likely to be triggered during regular operation. CC: Torsten Duwe <duwe@lst.de> CC: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> CC: "Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@gmail.com> CC: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com> CC: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> CC: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> CC: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> CC: Vito Caputo <vcaputo@pengaru.com> CC: Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca> CC: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> CC: Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com> CC: William Jon McCann <mccann@jhu.edu> CC: zhangjs <zachary@baishancloud.com> CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> CC: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> CC: Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de> CC: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Alexander Lobakin <alobakin@pm.me> Tested-by: Alexander Lobakin <alobakin@pm.me> Reviewed-by: Roman Drahtmueller <draht@schaltsekun.de> Tested-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com> Tested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Tested-by: Jirka Hladky <jhladky@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jirka Hladky <jhladky@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
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