A recovery scheme, for private keys & un-resettable passwords, that is contextualizable to a person. (e.g. mapping to... private/security questions, biometric data, pictorial data, etc.)
rkm.digest(
{
private_key:(str), password:(str),
questions:(array(str)), answers:(array(str)),
false_positive_rate:(str,'33%'), batch_size:(+int,40000),
map_byte:(+int:(2~8)), salt_length:(+int:(16+)),
minimum_iteration_password:(+int,1),
minimum_iteration_mark:(+int,1),
minimum_iteration_answer:(+int,1)
},
{
callback:(func),
onprogress:(func)
}
);
//
// private_key accepted format: base58 (bitcoin) && base62 (xgov) & hex (ethereum)
// Minimum 1 Q&A required; maximum 16 pairs
// questions, answers, passwords all support Unicode, foreign characters
// default answer filter: toLowerCase then remove special chars and white spaces
//
// See example below for usage:
//
rkm.digest({
private_key:'SJSvdelNkuc9aKNQE1u8B1t3iLwHqicabPCzXbu8aBr',
password:'some_very_berry_difficult_password',
questions:[
"Custom Question 1",
"Custom Question 2",
"Custom Question 3",
"Custom Question 4",
"Custom Question 5"
],
answers:[
"Answer 1",
"Answer 2",
"Answer 3",
"Answer 4",
"Answer 5"
],
},{
callback:function(e,data){
if(e) return; //Error case;
var encrypted_questionnaire_base64 = data;
//wrapping scheme: JSON --> gzip --> nacl-secretbox --> base64
//To decrypt, base64_decode --> nacl-secretbox-open --> gzip.undo --> JSON.parse
},
onprogress:function(data){
//Progress event types
//data.type == 'thread_spawn'
//data.type == 'password_iteration'
//data.type == 'password_iteration_complete'
//data.type == 'mask_iteration'
//data.type == 'mask_iteration_complete'
//data.type == 'answer_iteration'
//data.type == 'answer_iteration_partial_complete'
//data.type == 'answer_iteration_all_complete'
//data.count is the iteration counter so far
//data.arg has the input parameters of each interation call
}
});The function resolves to an output which is an encrypted questionnaire. The encrypted questionnaire does not store the answers inside (only questions, iteration numbers, and salt), and thus is a much safer way to store an recovery option at-rest. The hacker must provide the right decryption password, then, has to provide all the answers correctly simultaneously; otherwise the recovery will output a gibberish 32-byte private key that resembles nothing like the original private key (not even a little partial resemblance which gives out information).
-
This is certainly better than 16~32 random recovery phrases that one has to write down which is vulnerable to location/physical attack)
-
This is also superior to user-chosen seed words which is notoriously easier to brute-force.
© 2018 Potion, all rights reserved.
Unauthorized copying of this file, via any medium is strictly prohibited.