Group Project Final Report

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1 Introduction

Our code: https://github.com/xiaoyu-iid/Simplog-Exploit

Our group was assigned CVE-2009-4092. The vulnerability exists in the user.php file of Simplog 0.9.3.2, an application used for blogging. Attackers can use cross-site request forgery (CSRF) to hijack the user authentication process by sending a malicious request to change the password. Upon following a malicious URI crafted by the attacker, given that the victim has an active session on the target website, the victim's password will be changed. Since the application cannot tell the difference between a same-site and cross-site request, it leaves itself vulnerable to this type of attack.

In order to patch the vulnerability, we will add a mechanism to the simplog code to distinguish same-site and cross-site requests and reject those requests which are cross-site and unauthenticated. Using a unique security token generated by the application at the beginning of each new session for each user, every request within the application can be sent with this token to verify that the request is a same-site request. By making the secret token randomly generated and of sufficient length, there is no way for attackers to correctly guess the secret token with noticeable probability.

2 Requirements

- PHP 5.6
- MySQL 5.7
- SEED VM: Ubuntu 16.04
- Apache 2.4.18

Notes on requirements:

The Simplog code is quite old, circa 2006. Consequently, it requires an antiquated version of PHP (5.6) in order to run most of the MySQL commands. The difference is mainly a result of PHP's switch from mysql_* commands to mysqli_* commands. The mysql PHP library was deprecated in PHP 5.5 and dropped in PHP 7.0. The mysqli library was introduced to patch a number of vulnerabilities in the old way of processing MySQL queries. The Simplog code does not take advantage of these patches and thus is also vulnerable to a number of SQL injections, documented in https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2005-3076.


The figure below shows one such mysql error associated with trying to run the Simplog code using PHP 7.x.

[Mon Nov 26 17:34:35.170514 2018] [:error] [pid 12776] [client 127.0.0.1:40736] PHP Fatal error: Call to undefined function mysql connect() in /var/www/simplog/install/install2.php on line 10, referer: http://localhost/simplog/install.php [11/26/18]seed@VM:.../apache2\$ ■

3 Installation

The code for Simplog 0.9.3.2 can be found on our github repository. The code can be cloned onto Ubuntu 16.4 VMs with the Web URL provided by github:

\$ git clone https://github.com/xiaoyu-iid/Simplog-Exploit.git



```
[11/26/18]seed@VM:~$ git clone https://github.com/xiaoyu-iid/Simplog-Exploit.git Cloning into 'Simplog-Exploit'... remote: Enumerating objects: 372, done. remote: Counting objects: 100% (372/372), done. remote: Compressing objects: 100% (328/328), done. remote: Total 372 (delta 37), reused 361 (delta 36), pack-reused 0 Receiving objects: 100% (372/372), 917.08 KiB | 0 bytes/s, done. Resolving deltas: 100% (37/37), done. Checking connectivity... done.
```

We will use the default installation of Apache, 2.4.18, to serve the Simplog files. Once we have cloned the vulnerable code, we need to first place the entire simplog/directory into /var/www/simplog. To use the patched version of the code, place the simplog_patched/ directory into /var/www/simplog instead.

```
[11/26/18]seed@VM:~/.../Simplog-Exploit$ ls
README.md Security & Privacy Progress Report.pdf simplog
[11/26/18]seed@VM:~/.../Simplog-Exploit$ sudo mv * /var/www/simplog
[sudo] password for seed:
[11/26/18]seed@VM:~/.../Simplog-Exploit$
```

Next, we add the following entry to /etc/apache2/sites-available/000-default.conf (you will need root access to modify this file):

```
<VirtualHost *:80>
ServerName localhost
DocumentRoot /var/www/
Alias /simplog "/var/www/simplog/"
<Directory "/var/www/simplog">
Options +Indexes
AllowOverride None
Order allow,deny
Allow from all
</Directory>
/VirtualHost>
```

This entry ensures that we have registered a virtual host on our machine for the Simplog server. Apache virtual hosts allow users to host multiple websites on the same machine.

We fix the compatibility issues with PHP7.x by first purging all php packages with the following lines:


```
$ sudo apt-get install aptitude
$ sudo aptitude purge `dpkg -l | grep php| awk '{print $2}' |tr "\n" " "`
```


Note: the first and last ticks should be backticks while the inner ticks are simply single quotes. We then add a Personal Package Archive (PPA) which


gives us compatibility with PHP5 commands so that the mysql_* functions will be found. We install php5.6 and the mysql client for it as well:

- \$ sudo add-apt-repository ppa:ondrej/php
- \$ sudo apt-get update
- \$ sudo apt-get install php5.6
- \$ sudo apt-get install mysql-server mysql-client php5.6-mysql

Follow the procedure shown in the screen shots below to completely uninstall PHP 7.0: $\,$







Finally, we need to restart our Apache server and mysql to allow all our changes to take effect:

- \$ sudo service apache2 restart
- \$ sudo service mysql restart

In the edit.php file, we comment out the line include_once("xmlrpc.inc"); because it was causing issues upon login (due to its use of the dl() function

among other things) and is irrelevant to the task at hand.

```
🔊 🖃 🕕 /bin/bash
ile Edit Options Buffers Tools Help
?php
session start();
include_once('lib.php');
include_once('class.BlogInfo.php');
//include once("xmlrpc.inc");
auth();
# get userid
$uid = getUID($ SESSION['login']);
#if no blog id passed, set to arbitrary blog in user's acl
if(!$_REQUEST['blogid']) {
        $$ql = "SELECT blog_id from blog_acl where user_id=$uid order by blog_i\
         $res = $db->Execute($sql);
         $blogid = $res->fields[blog id];
} else {
         $blogid = $ REQUEST['blogid'];
if(!isset($ REQUEST['trans']))
-UU-:----F1 edit.php
                              Top L1
                                       Git:master (Fundamental)
For information about GNU Emacs and the GNU system, type C-h C-a.
```

After installing PHP5.6 and restarting the Apache server, installation instructions of Simplog can be found at URL localhost/simplog/install.php, which is reachable by Firefox.



Checkpoint: Be absolutely certain that PHP 5.6 is installed an active AND

that there exists an empty database called blog in your mysql console before continuing with the installation.

We click on "Accept" button to accept Simplog terms and arrive at a page to specify the database we want to use with the Simplog application. In our setup, we specify out user to be blog with password blog, and the database we use will be a MySQL database called blog, which is hosted locally.

DB Host	localbost
DB User	
DB Password	
DB Name	blog
DB Type	MySQL
	Submit
	Powered by Simplog

After clicking the "Submit" button, we are notified to edit the following lines in config.php.

```
Please edit the following lines in your config.php file to match the following lines:

Shost = Tocalhost";
Schange = Thlog";
Spasswd = nlog";
```

The same webpage also notifies that we need to create a new MySQL database blog.

We add the skip-grant-tables option to the mysql configuration file to avoid

user privilege issues. We can open my ini with the following command:

\$ sudo subl /etc/mysql/my.cnf

Then we an add the following lines to the end of my.ini:

[mysqld] skip-grant-tables

```
config.php * my.cnf *

# The MySQL database server configuration file.

# You can copy this to one of:
# - "/etc/mysql/my.cnf" to set global options,
# " " One can use all long options that the program supports.
# # One can use all long options that the program supports.
# # Run program with --help to get a list of available options and with
# --print-defaults to see which it would actually understand and use.
# For explanations see
# # http://dev.mysql.com/doc/mysql/en/server-system-variables.html
# # IMPORTANT: Additional settings that can override those from this file!
# # The files must end with '.cnf', otherwise they'll be ignored.
# # !includedir /etc/mysql/conf.d/
| !includedir /etc/mysql/conf.d/
| [mysqld]
| skip-grant-tables
```

MySQL needs to be restarted with sudo service mysql restart. Then we can run MySQL using the following command:

\$ sudo mysql -u blog -p

When prompted for the password, enter blog.

```
[11/26/18]seed@VM:.../simplog$ sudo service mysql restart
[11/26/18]seed@VM:.../simplog$ sudo mysql -u blog -p
Enter password:
Welcome to the MySQL monitor. Commands end with ; or \g.
Your MySQL connection id is 4
Server version: 5.7.19-0ubuntu0.16.04.1 (Ubuntu)
Copyright (c) 2000, 2017, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
```


Now, create a new database called blog using create database blog.

```
+------
8 rows in set (0.06 sec)
mysql> create database blog;
Query OK, 1 row affected (0.04 sec)
```

Then we go back to the Simplog setup on Firefox. We click on the "New Install" button on the website, then we arrive at a page to specify the username and password for the admin user. In our installation, we specified the username to be admin with password admin, and with a few other entries:

Admin Login:	admin
Password:	*****
Re-Enter Password:	*****
Admin Name:	admin
Admin Email:	admin@email.com
Admin URL:	www.admin.com
Simplog will now install the database. Install!	
Po	wered by Simplog

We can now start using Simplog.




4 Exploit


If the user is signed in and follows a crafted link (e.g. via email, instant messaging, etc.) from some outside malicious source, their password will automatically be changed. In our example, the user is sent the following link:

 ${\tt localhost/simplog/user.php?pass1=newPass\&pass2=newPass\&blogid=1\&act=change}$

Upon following the link, this submits a password change request on behalf of the logged in user in order to set their new password to "newPass". We can see that the password has been updated:



By checking the MySQL database before and after this link has been clicked, we can further prove that the password has changed. Note the different hashed passwords, and that we can even successfully change the password of admin:



Let's examine the relevant code in user.php to see why this works:

Once user.php identifies the action to be "change" (\$REQUEST['act'] == "change"), it checks that pass1 and pass2 are nonempty and match each other for confirmation. If so, the new password is hashed and a SQL command is executed to update the password of the current blog user. Therefore, when these arguments are provided in the malicious URI, the user's password is changed without their consent.

5 Patch

In this section, we will demonstrate how the CSRF vulnerability could be prevented with validation tokens. To use our patched version of Simplog, place the simplog_patched/ directory from Github into /var/www/simplog instead.

We first create a file master_secret.txt which we fill with the result of a call to the following function:

```
$ head /dev/urandom | tr -dc A-Za-z0-9 | head -c 32
```

This generates a random string of length 32 using characters within the set of {A-Z, a-z, 0-9}. This master secret will be used in our MD5 hash to create the CSRF token. It should be updated on a regular basis by system administrators to ensure variability in the hashes:



The following functions are for token creation and validation. In the function generate_token(), tokens are created to be the MD5 hash value of master_secret.txt and timestamp concatenated. To provide even additional security, more values from the session could be concatenated here, but we found the master secret and timestamp to be sufficient.

Tokens are validated in the function validate_token(). The function recalculates the MD5 hash value of master_secret.txt and timestamp concatenated, and does an equality comparison between the recalculated token and the token passed by the request, returning the boolean result:

In the login.php file, we require our new token_gen_and_validate.php file. We then make a call to the time() function and place this in our timestamp variable ts. We call our generate_token() function, passing it the timestamp. We then save both the generated token and the timestamp in the _SESSION data structure:

```
diff simplog/login.php simplog_patched/login.php
21a22,23

> require('token_gen_and_validate.php');

> 23a26,29

> $ts = time();

> $token = generate_token($ts);

$mysql = "";

> 28a35,36

2 $_SESSION['token'] = $token;

> $_SESSION['timestamp'] = $ts;
```

In user.php, the file token_gen_and_validate.php is also required:

```
diff simplog/user.php simplog_patched/user.php
4,5d3

c require("lib.php");
6a5,6

prequire("lib.php");

require('token_gen_and_validate.php');

second contact of the simplog_patched/user.php

elseif($_REQUEST['act'] == "del") {
    ---
    elseif($_REQUEST['act'] == "del") {
    ---
    elseif($_REQUEST['act'] == "del") {
    ---
}
```


When a request to change the user password is created, user.php includes the saved token from \$_SESSION['token'] as a hidden input of the form.

```
83 ---
84 >
85 173a177
86 > <input type=hidden name=token value="<?=$_SESSION['token']?>">
87 180c184
88 < <?php
89 ---
```

Once user.php identifies the action to be "change" (\$REQUEST['act'] == "change"), we now call the validate_token() function to make sure that the CSRF token passed by the request matches the recalculation of the token. If the token matches, the password change proceeds as it did before. If the token does not match however, we add a "BAD TOKEN" line to the HTML:

Now we test out our changes.


We see that we are still able to change the password in the normal fashion from the change password form as intended:




We can observe that the password hash in our database is changed after a normal password change request sent by the user:



However, we can see that upon following the malicious link, the user is now presented with a "BAD TOKEN" message:



By checking the MySQL database before and after this link has been clicked, we show that the hashed password has not been changed:



Our CSRF token has therefore successfully blocked the attack.

6 Conclusion

Simplog is an old but simple application used to add blogging features to a personal website. However, it requires limited checks and validations for client requests to interact with the server database. As a result, a CSRF vulnerability can be exploited to change user passwords. One simple fix for this vulnerability is to use a CSRF token to validate each client request to change the current password. We expect there to be a number of other endpoints within Simplog that are vulnerable to CSRF attacks. The patches for those exploits should be a straightforward application of the CSRF token solution we have provided in this report.

Disclaimer: Simplog 0.9.3.2 is created by Jeremy Ashcraft (ashcraft@13monkeys.com). It is free software, released under GNU GPL Licence version 2.0.

7 References

- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-4092
- $\bullet \ https://stackoverflow.com/questions/36788873/package-php5-have-no-installation-candidate-ubuntu-16-04 \\$
- https://launchpad.net/ondrej/+archive/ubuntu/php
- https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_(CSRF)_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet
- http://www.cis.syr.edu/wedu/seed/Labs_16.04/Web/Web_CSRF_Elgg/