Always fall back to reverse DNS if trusted #844
Merged
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Whenever reverse DNS is trusted, this enables the "historical" configuration where the IP address of the connected socket is considered for reverse resolution (and the remote server's DN is compared against the resulting hostname).
IMHO, this is significantly more dangerous than "traditional' reliance on reverse DNS for non-Xrootd cases. Any attacker that is performing a MITM is able to force the client to accept any valid host certificate.
So, if the attacker controlling DNS could force
foo.example.com
to resolve to attacker-controlled IP address1.2.3.4
with reverse resolution ofbadguy.io
, the client would accept the connection as long asbadguy.io
has a certificate from a valid authority.Fix #841