# **Assignment 4**

#### **Q1** (10 points)

Someone decides that to enable themselves to sign more messages with a SPHINCS-like signature scheme, they will generate different random keys at each level, pseudorandomly based on the message. That is, to sign a message m, in Step 4(a) in SPHINCS from the notes, they compute instead

$$(\mathbf{PK}_{\ell,j}, \mathbf{SK}_{\ell,j}) = \text{WOTS. KeyGen}(\mathsf{PRG}(s, \ell, j, m))$$

Explain why this is insecure.

#### Q2 (10 points)

Suppose you have a signature scheme (KeyGen, Sign, Verify) which can sign up to 3 messages with no loss of security, and it is just as fast and compact as WOTS. Describe how to make a SPHINCS-like signature scheme. Compare the efficiency of the new scheme to SPHINCS itself.

#### Q3 (10 points)

Show that if an adversary sees N messages signed with FORS (with k blocks of trees with n values in each tree), then they can efficiently forge a signature for a random message m with probability

$$\left(1 - \left(1 - \frac{1}{n}\right)^N\right)^k \tag{1}$$

### Q4 (10 points)

Consider a Merkle tree where each node is the hash of 3 child nodes, and suppose we use these Merkle trees in SPHINCS. Describe an authentication path in this new type of Merkle tree. What is the length of a signature in the new scheme?

## **Q6** (10 points)

Show that for a linear code  $\mathcal{C}\subseteq \mathbb{F}_2^n$  and a fixed constant d, the following are equivalent:

(1) for any 
$$c_1, c_2 \in C$$
,  $|c_1 - c_2|_{Ham} \ge d$ 

(2) for any 
$$c \in \mathcal{C}$$
 with  $c \neq 0$ ,  $|c|_{Ham} \geq d$ 

(Don't forget:  $\mathbb{F}_2^n$  is a vector space of n-bit strings, where addition and subtraction are done modulo 2, so both are equivalent to XOR)