Faster generic IND-CCA2 secure KEM using "encrypt-then-MAC"

Anonymous Submission

Abstract. The modular Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) transformation takes public-key encryption with weaker security and constructs a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) with indistinguishability under adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks. While the modular FO transform enjoys tight security bound and quantum resistance, it also suffers from computational inefficiency and vulnerabilities to side-channel attacks due to using de-randomization and re-encryption for providing ciphertext integrity. In this work, we propose an alternative KEM construction that achieves ciphertext integrity using a message authentication code (MAC) and instantiate a concrete instance using Kyber. Our experimental results showed that where the encryption routine incurs heavy computational cost, replacing re-encryption with MAC provides substantial performance improvements at comparable security level.

Keywords: Key encapsulation mechanism, post-quantum cryptography, lattice cryptography, Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation

1 Introduction

The Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation [FO99] is a generic construction that takes cryptographic primitives of lesser security and constructs a public-key encryption scheme with indistinguishability under adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks. Later works [HHK17] extended the original transformation to the construction of key encapsulation mechanism, which has been adopted by many post-quantum schemes such as Kyber [BDK+18], FrodoKEM [BCD+16], and SABER [DKSRV18].

The current state of the FO transformation enjoys proven tight security bound and quantum resistance [HHK17], but also leaves many open problems. One such problem is the substantial computational cost of using *de-randomization* and *re-encryption* [BP18] for providing ciphertext integrity. In many post-quantum schemes, including ML-KEM, the input encryption routine is substantially more expensive than the input decryption routine, so running the encryption as a subroutine dominates the runtime cost of the decapsulation routine. While not the focus of this project, *re-encryption* also introduces risks of side-channel vulnerabilities that may expose the plaintext or the secret key, as demonstrated in [RRCB19] and [UXT+22].

We are inspired by how ciphertext integrity is achieved in symmetric cryptography: given a semantically secure symmetric cipher and an existentially unforgeable message authentication code, combining them using in a pattern called "encrypt-then-MAC" provides proven authenticated encryption [BN00]. "encrypt-then-MAC" is now the most widely accepted method for doing symmetric encryption as AES-GCM [MV04] and ChaCha20-Poly1305 [NL18].

The main challenge in applying "encrypt-then-MAC" to public-key cryptography is the lack of a pre-shared symmetric key. We took inspiration from hybrid public-key encryption schemes (HPKE) such as .We proposed to derive the symmetric key by hashing the plaintext message. In section 3, we prove that under the random oracle model, if the input public-key encryption scheme is one-way secure against plaintext-checking attack

and the input message authentication code is one-time existentially unforgeable, then the transformed key encapsulation mechanism is IND-CCA2 secure.

In section 4, we instantiate concrete instances of our constructions by combining Kyber with GMAC and Poly1305. Our experimental results showed that replacing re-encryption with computing authenticator leads to significant performance improvements in the decapsulation routine while incurring only minimal runtime overhead in the encapsulation routine and a small increase in ciphertext size.

2 Preliminaries and previous results

2.1 Public-key encryption scheme

A public key encryption scheme $\mathtt{PKE}$ is a collection of three routines $(\mathtt{KeyGen}, \mathtt{Enc}, \mathtt{Dec})$ defined over some message space $\mathcal{M}$ and some ciphertext space $\mathcal{C}$. Where the encryption routine is probabilistic, the source of randomness is denoted by the coin space $\mathcal{R}$.

The encryption routine $\mathtt{Enc}(\mathtt{pk}, m)$ takes a public key, a plaintext message, and outputs a ciphertext $c \in \mathcal{C}$. Where the encryption routine is probabilistic, specifying a pseudorandom seed $r \in \mathcal{R}$ will make the encryption routine behave deterministically. The decryption routine $\mathtt{Dec}(\mathtt{sk}, c)$ takes a secret key, a ciphertext, and outputs the decryption $\hat{m}$ if the ciphertext is valid. Some PKE will explicitly reject invalid ciphertext, in which case the decryption routine will output the rejection symbol $\perp$

We discuss the security of a $\mathtt{PKE}$ using the sequence of games described in [Sho04]. Specifically, we first define the $\mathtt{OW\text{-}ATK}$ as they pertain to a public key encryption scheme. In later section we will define the $\mathtt{IND\text{-}CCA}$ game as it pertains to a key encapsulation mechanism.

Algorithm 1 The $\mathtt{OW\text{-}ATK}$ game

1: $(\mathtt{pk}, \mathtt{sk}) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathtt{KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$
2: $m^* \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{M}$
3: $c^* \xleftarrow{\$} \mathtt{Enc}(\mathtt{pk}, m^*)$
4: $\hat{m} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathtt{ATK}}}(1^\lambda, \mathtt{pk}, c^*)$
5: **return** $[\![m^* = \hat{m}]\!]$

Algorithm 2 $\mathtt{PCO}(m \in \mathcal{M}, c \in \mathcal{C})$

1: **return** $[\![\mathtt{Dec}(\mathtt{sk}, c) = m]\!]$

Figure 1: The $\mathtt{OW\text{-}ATK}$ game   **Figure 2:** Plaintext-checking oracle

In the $\mathtt{OW\text{-}ATK}$ game (see figure 1), an adversary's goal is to recover the decryption of a randomly generated ciphertext. A challenger randomly samples a keypair and a challenge plaintext m^*, encrypts the challenge plaintext $c^* \xleftarrow{\$} \mathtt{Enc}(\mathtt{pk}, m^*)$, then gives $\mathtt{pk}$ and c^* to the adversary A. The adversary A, with access to some oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\mathtt{ATK}}$, outputs a guess decryption $\hat{m}$. A wins the game if its guess $\hat{m}$ is equal to the challenge plaintext m^*. The *advantage* $\mathtt{Adv}_{\mathtt{OW\text{-}ATK}}$ of an adversary in this game is the probability that it wins the game:

$$\mathtt{Adv}_{\mathtt{OW\text{-}ATK}}(A) = P\left[A(\mathtt{pk}, c^*) = m^* | (\mathtt{pk}, \mathtt{sk}) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathtt{KeyGen}(); m^* \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{M}; c^* \xleftarrow{\$} \mathtt{Enc}(\mathtt{pk}, m^*)\right]$$

The capabilities of the oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\mathtt{ATK}}$ depends on the choice of security goal $\mathtt{ATK}$. Particularly relevant to our result is security against plaintext-checking attack (PCA), for which the adversary has access to a plaintext-checking oracle (PCO) (see figure 2). A PCO takes as input a plaintext-ciphertext pair (m, c) and returns $\mathtt{True}$ if m is the decryption of c or $\mathtt{False}$ otherwise.

2.2 Key encapsulation mechanism (KEM)

A key encapsulation mechanism is a collection of three routines $(\texttt{KeyGen}, \texttt{Encap}, \texttt{Decap})$ defined over some ciphertext space $\mathcal{C}$ and some key space $\mathcal{K}$. The key generation routine takes the security parameter 1^λ and outputs a keypair $(\texttt{pk}, \texttt{sk}) \xleftarrow{\$} \texttt{KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$. $\texttt{Encap}(\texttt{pk})$ is a probabilistic routine that takes a public key $\texttt{pk}$ and outputs a pair of values (c, K) where $c \in \mathcal{C}$ is the ciphertext (also called encapsulation) and $K \in \mathcal{K}$ is the shared secret (also called session key). $\texttt{Decap}(\texttt{sk}, c)$ is a deterministic routine that takes the secret key $\texttt{sk}$ and the encapsulation c and returns the shared secret K if the ciphertext is valid. Some KEM constructions use explicit rejection, where if c is invalid then $\texttt{Decap}$ will return a rejection symbol $\bot$; other KEM constructions use implicit rejection, where if c is invalid then $\texttt{Decap}$ will return a fake session key that depends on the ciphertext and some other secret values.

The IND-CCA security of a KEM is defined by an adversarial game in which an adversary's goal is to distinguish pseudorandom shared secret (generated by running the $\texttt{Encap}$ routine) and a truly random value.

Algorithm 3 $\texttt{IND-CCA}$ game for $\texttt{KEM}$

1: $(\texttt{pk}, \texttt{sk}) \xleftarrow{\$} \texttt{KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$
2: $(c^*, K_0) \xleftarrow{\$} \texttt{Encap}(\texttt{pk})$
3: $K_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}$
4: $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$
5: $\hat{b} \xleftarrow{\$} A^{\mathcal{O}_{\texttt{Decap}}}(1^\lambda, \texttt{pk}, c^*, K_b)$
6: **return** $[\![\hat{b} = b]\!]$

Algorithm 4 $\mathcal{O}_{\texttt{Decap}}(c)$

1: **return** $\texttt{Decap}(\texttt{sk}, c)$

Figure 3: The $\texttt{KEM-IND-CCA2}$ game

Figure 4: Decapsulation oracle

The decapsulation oracle $\mathcal{O}^{\texttt{Decap}}$ takes a ciphertext c and returns the output of the $\texttt{Decap}$ routine using the secret key. The advantage $\epsilon_{\texttt{IND-CCA}}$ of an IND-CCA adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\texttt{IND-CCA}}$ is defined by

$$\texttt{Adv}_{\texttt{IND-CCA}}(A) = \left| P[A^{\mathcal{O}_{\texttt{Decap}}}(a^\lambda, \texttt{pk}, c^*, K_b) = b] - \frac{1}{2} \right|$$

2.3 Message authentication code (MAC)

A message authentication code $\texttt{MAC}$ is a collection of routines $(\texttt{Sign}, \texttt{Verify})$ defined over some key space $\mathcal{K}$, some message space $\mathcal{M}$, and some tag space $\mathcal{T}$. The signing routine $\texttt{Sign}(k, m)$ takes the secret key $k \in \mathcal{K}$ and some message, and outputs a tag t. The verification routine $\texttt{Verify}(k, m, t)$ takes the triplet of secret key, message, and tag, and outputs 1 if the message-tag pair is valid under the secret key, or 0 otherwise. Many MAC constructions are deterministic. For these constructions it is simpler to denote the signing routine by $t \leftarrow \texttt{MAC}(k, m)$ and perform verification using a simple comparison.

The security of a MAC is defined in an adversarial game in which an adversary, with access to some signing oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\texttt{Sign}}(m)$, tries to forge a new valid message-tag pair that has never been queried before. The existential unforgeability under chosen message attack (EUF-CMA) game is shown below:

Algorithm 5 The EUF-CMA game

1: $k^* \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}$
2: $(\hat{m}, \hat{t}) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathtt{Sign}}}()$
3: **return** $[\![\mathtt{Verify}(k^*, \hat{m}, \hat{t}) \wedge (\hat{m}, \hat{t}) \notin \mathcal{O}_{\mathtt{Sign}}]\!]$

Figure 5: The `EUF-CMA` game

The advantage $\mathtt{Adv}_{\mathtt{EUF-CMA}}$ of the existential forgery adversary is the probability that it wins the EUF-CMA game.

We are specifically interested in one-time MAC, whose security goal is identical to EUF-CMA described above, except for the constraint that each secret key can be used to sign exactly one distinct message. This translates to an attack model in which the signing oracle will only answer one signing query. Restricting to one-time usage allows for more efficient MAC constructions. One popular way to build one-time MAC is with universal hash functions (UHF), where each instance is parameterized by a finite field $\mathbb{F}$ and a maximal message length $L \geq 0$. The secret key is a pair of field elements $(k_1, k_2) \in \mathbb{F} \times \mathbb{F}$, and each message is a tuple of up to L field elements $m = (m_1, m_2, \ldots, m_l) \in \mathbb{F}^{\leq L}$. To compute the tag:

$$\mathtt{MAC}((k_1, k_2), m) = H_{\mathrm{xpoly}}(k_1, m) + k_2$$

Where the H_{xpoly} is a universal hash function:

$$H_{\mathrm{xpoly}}(k_1, (m_1, m_2, \ldots, m_l)) = k_1^l \cdot m_1 + k_1^{l-1} \cdot m_2 + \ldots + k_1 \cdot m_l$$

Lemma 1. *For all adversaries (including unbounded ones) against the MAC described above, the probability of winning the one-time EUF-CMA game is at most:*

$$\boldsymbol{Adv}_{OT\text{-}EUF\text{-}CMA}(A) \leq \frac{L+1}{|\mathbb{F}|}$$

Proof. See [BS20] lemma 7.11 $\square$

2.4 Related works

The Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation [FO99][HHK17] is a family of generic transformations that takes as input a PKE with weaker security, such as OW-CPA, and outputs a PKE or KEM with IND-CCA2 security. The key ingredient in achieving ciphertext non-malleability is with *de-randomization* and *re-encryption*, which first transform a OW-CPA PKE into a *rigid* PKE, then transform the rigid PKE into a KEM. More specifically:

1. *de-randomization* means that a randomized encryption routine $c \xleftarrow{\$} \mathtt{Enc}(\mathtt{pk}, m)$ is made into a deterministic encryption routine by deriving randomization coin pseudorandomly: $c \leftarrow \mathtt{Enc}(\mathtt{pk}, m, r = H(m))$ for some hash function H

2. *re-encryption* means that the transformed decryption routine will run the transformed encryption routine to verify the integrity of the ciphertext. Because after *de-randomization*, each plaintext strictly corresponds exacty one ciphertext, tempering with a ciphertext means that even if the ciphertext decrypts back to the same plaintext, the re-encryption will detect that the ciphertext has been tempered with.

3. *rigidity* means that the decryption routine is a perfect inverse of the encryption routine: $c = \texttt{Enc}(\texttt{pk}, m) \Leftrightarrow m = \texttt{Dec}(\texttt{sk}, c)$. Converting a one-way secure rigid PKE (which is essentially a trapdoor function) into a IND-CCA2 KEM is well solved problem. We refer readers to [BS20] for details on such constructions.

let $\texttt{PKE} = (\texttt{KeyGen}_{\texttt{PKE}}, \texttt{Enc}, \texttt{Dec})$ be defined over message space $\mathcal{M}$ and ciphertext space $\mathcal{C}$. Let $G : \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ hash plaintexts into coincs, and let $H : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^*$ hash byte stream into session keys. Depending on whether the constructed KEM uses implicit or explicit rejection, and the security property of the PKE, [HHK17] described four variations. They are summarized in table 1 and figure 6.

Table 1: Variants of modular FO transforms

name	rejection	PKE security
$U^{\perp}$	explicit	OW-PCVA
$U^{\not\perp}$	implicit	OW-PCA
$U_m^{\perp}$	explicit	OW-VA + rigid
$U_m^{\not\perp}$	implicit	OW-CPA + rigid

Algorithm 6 KeyGen()

1: $(\texttt{pk}, \texttt{sk}') \xleftarrow{\$} \texttt{KeyGen}_{\texttt{PKE}}()$
2: $z \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{M}$
3: $\texttt{sk} \leftarrow (\texttt{sk}', z)$ $\triangleright U^{\not\perp}, U_m^{\not\perp}$
4: $\texttt{sk} \leftarrow \texttt{sk}'$ $\triangleright U^{\perp}, U_m^{\perp}$
5: **return** $(\texttt{pk}, \texttt{sk})$

Algorithm 7 Encap(pk)

1: $m \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{M}$
2: $r \leftarrow G(m)$
3: $c \leftarrow \texttt{Enc}(\texttt{pk}, m, r)$
4: $K \leftarrow H(m, c)$ $\triangleright U^{\perp}, U^{\not\perp}$
5: $K \leftarrow H(m)$ $\triangleright U_m^{\perp}, U_m^{\not\perp}$
6: **return** (c, K)

Algorithm 8 Decap(sk = (sk', z), c)

1: $\hat{m} \leftarrow \texttt{Dec}(\texttt{sk}', c)$
2: $\hat{r} \leftarrow G(\hat{m})$
3: $\hat{c} \leftarrow \texttt{Enc}(\texttt{pk}, \hat{m}, \hat{r})$
4: **if** $\hat{c} = c$ **then**
5:      $K \leftarrow H(\hat{m})$ $\triangleright U_m^{\perp}, U_m^{\not\perp}$
6:      $K \leftarrow H(\hat{m}, c)$ $\triangleright U^{\perp}, U^{\not\perp}$
7: **else**
8:      $K \leftarrow H(z, c)$ $\triangleright U^{\not\perp}, U_m^{\not\perp}$
9:      $K \leftarrow \perp$ $\triangleright U^{\perp}, U_m^{\perp}$
10: **end if**
11: **return** K

Figure 6: Summary of the modular Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation variations

The modular FO transformations enjoy tight security bounds and proven quantum resistance. Variations have been deployed to many post-quantum KEMs submitted to NIST's post-quantum cryptography competition. Kyber, one of the round 3 finalists, uses the $U^{\not\perp}$ transformation. When it was later standardized into FIPS-203, it changed to use the $U_m^{\not\perp}$ transformation for computational efficiencies.

3   The "encrypt-then-MAC" transformation

Let $\mathcal{B}^*$ denote the set of finite bit strings. Let $\texttt{PKE}(\texttt{KeyGen}, \texttt{Enc}, \texttt{Dec})$ be a public-key encryption scheme defined over message space $\mathcal{M}$ and ciphertext space $\mathcal{C}$. Let $\texttt{MAC} : \mathcal{K}_{\texttt{MAC}} \times \mathcal{B}^* \to \mathcal{T}$ be a deterministic message authentication code that takes a key $k \in \mathcal{K}_{\texttt{MAC}}$, some message $m \in \mathcal{B}^*$, and outputs a digest $t \in \mathcal{T}$. Let $G : \mathcal{M} \to \mathcal{K}_{\texttt{MAC}}$ be a hash function that maps from $\texttt{PKE}$'s plaintext space to $\texttt{MAC}$'s key space. Let $H : \mathcal{B}^* \to \mathcal{K}_{\texttt{KEM}}$ be a hash function that maps bit strings into the set of possible shared secrets. The "encrypt-then-MAC" transformation $\texttt{EtM}[\texttt{PKE}, \texttt{MAC}, G, H]$ constructs a key encapsulation mechanism $\texttt{KEM}_{\texttt{EtM}}(\texttt{KeyGen}_{\texttt{KEM}}, \texttt{Encap}, \texttt{Decap})$, whose routines are described in figure 7.

Algorithm 9 $\texttt{KeyGen}_{\texttt{EtM}}$

1: $(\texttt{pk}, \texttt{sk}') \xleftarrow{\$} \texttt{KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$
2: $z \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{M}$
3: $\texttt{sk} \leftarrow (\texttt{sk}', z)$
4: **return** $(\texttt{pk}, \texttt{sk})$

Algorithm 10 $\texttt{Encap}(\texttt{pk})$

1: $m \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{M}$
2: $k \leftarrow G(m)$
3: $c' \xleftarrow{\$} \texttt{Enc}(\texttt{pk}, m)$
4: $t \leftarrow \texttt{MAC}(k, c')$
5: $K \leftarrow H(m, c')$
6: $c \leftarrow (c', t)$
7: **return** (c, K)

Algorithm 11 $\texttt{Decap}(\texttt{sk}, c)$

1: $(c', t) \leftarrow c$
2: $(\texttt{sk}', z) \leftarrow \texttt{sk}$
3: $\hat{m} \leftarrow \texttt{Dec}(\texttt{sk}', c')$
4: $\hat{k} \leftarrow G(\hat{m})$
5: **if** $\texttt{MAC}(\hat{k}, c') \neq t$ **then**
6:      $K \leftarrow H(z, c')$
7: **else**
8:      $K \leftarrow H(\hat{m}, c')$
9: **end if**
10: **return** K

Figure 7: $\texttt{KEM}_{\texttt{EtM}}$ routines

The key generation routine of $\texttt{KEM}_{\texttt{EtM}}$ is largely identical to that of the $\texttt{PKE}$, only a secret value z is sampled as the implicit rejection symbol. In the encapsulation routine, a MAC key is derived from the randomly sampled plaintext $k \leftarrow G(m)$, then used to sign the unauthenticated ciphertext c'. Because the encryption routine might be randomized, the session key is derived from both the message and the ciphertext. Finally,

the unauthenticated ciphertext c' and the tag t combine into the authenticated ciphertext c that would be transmitted to the peer. In the decapsulation routine, the decryption $\hat{m}$ of the unauthenticated ciphertext is used to re-derive the MAC key $\hat{k}$, which is then used to re-compute the tag $\hat{t}$. The ciphertext is considered valid if and only if the recomputed tag is identical to the input tag.

For an adversary A to produce a valid tag t for some unauthenticated ciphertext c' under the symmetric key $k \leftarrow G(\texttt{Dec}(\texttt{sk}', c'))$ implies that A must either know the symmetric key k or produce a forgery. Under the random oracle model, A also cannot know k without knowing its preimage $\texttt{Dec}(\texttt{sk}', c')$, so A must either have produced c' honestly, or have broken the one-way security of PKE. This means that the decapsulation oracle will not give out information on decryptions that the adversary does not already know.

Algorithm 12 $\texttt{PCO}(m, c)$

1: $k \leftarrow G(m)$
2: $t \leftarrow \texttt{MAC}(k, c)$
3: **return** $[\![\mathcal{O}^{\texttt{Decap}}((c, t)) = H(m, c)]\!]$

Figure 8: Every decapsulation oracle can be converted into a plaintext-checking oracle

However, a decapsulation oracle can still give out some information: for a known plaintext m, all possible encryptions $c' \xleftarrow{\$} \texttt{Enc}(\texttt{pk}, m)$ can be correctly signed, while ciphertexts that don't decrypt back to m cannot be correctly signed. This means that a decapsulation oracle can be converted into a plaintext-checking oracle (algorithm 12), so every chosen-ciphertext attack against the KEM can be converted into a plaintext-checking attack against the underlying PKE.

On the other hand, if the underlying PKE is one-way secure against plaintext-checking attack that makes q plaintext-checking queries, then "encrypt-then-MAC" KEM is semantically secure under chosen ciphertext attacks making the same number of decapsulation queries:

Theorem 1. *For every* IND-CCA2 *adversary A against* KEM_{EtM} *that makes q decapsulation queries, there exists an* OW-PCA *adversary B who makes at least q plaintext-checking queries against the underlying* PKE*, and an one-time existential forgery adversary C against the underlying* MAC *such that*

$$Adv_{IND\text{-}CCA2}(A) \leq q \cdot Adv_{OT\text{-}MAC}(C) + 2 \cdot Adv_{OW\text{-}PCA}(B)$$

Theorem 1 naturally flows into an equivalence relationship between the security of the KEM and the security of the PKE:

Lemma 2. KEM_{EtM} *is IND-CCA2 secure if and only if the input* PKE *is OW-PCA secure*

3.1 Proof of theorem 1

Proof. We will prove theorem 1 using a sequence of games.

Algorithm 13 IND-CCA2 game for KEM

1: $(\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{KeyGen}_{\text{EtM}}()$
2: $m^* \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{M}$
3: $c' \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m^*)$
4: $k^* \leftarrow G(m^*)$
5: $t \leftarrow \text{MAC}(k, c')$
6: $c^* \leftarrow (c', t)$
7: $K_0 \leftarrow H(m^*, c')$
8: $K_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}_{\text{KEM}}$
9: $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$
10: $\hat{b} \leftarrow A^{\mathcal{O}^{\text{Decap}}}(\text{pk}, c^*, K_b)$
11: **return** $[\![\hat{b} = b]\!]$

Algorithm 14 $\mathcal{O}^{\text{Decap}}(c)$

1: $(c', t) \leftarrow c$
2: $\hat{m} = \text{Dec}(\text{sk}', c')$
3: $\hat{k} \leftarrow G(\hat{m})$
4: **if** $\text{MAC}(\hat{k}, c') = t$ **then**
5: $\quad K \leftarrow H(\hat{m}, c')$
6: **else**
7: $\quad K \leftarrow H(z, c')$
8: **end if**
9: **return** K

Algorithm 15 $\mathcal{O}^G(m)$

1: **if** $\exists (\tilde{m}, \tilde{k}) \in \mathcal{L}^G : \tilde{m} = m$ **then**
2: $\quad$ **return** $\tilde{k}$
3: **end if**
4: $k \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}_{\text{MAC}}$
5: $\mathcal{L}^G \leftarrow \mathcal{L}^G \cup \{(m, k)\}$
6: **return** k

Algorithm 16 $\mathcal{O}^H(m, c)$

1: **if** $\exists (\tilde{m}, \tilde{c}, \tilde{K}) \in \mathcal{L}^H : \tilde{m} = m \wedge \tilde{c} = c$ **then**
2: $\quad$ **return** $\tilde{K}$
3: **end if**
4: $K \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}_{\text{KEM}}$
5: $\mathcal{L}^H \leftarrow \mathcal{L}^H \cup \{(m, c, K)\}$
6: **return** K

Game 0 is the standard IND-CCA2 game for KEMs. The decapsulation oracle $\mathcal{O}^{\text{Decap}}$ executes the decapsulation routine using the challenge keypair and return the results faithfully. The queries made to the hash oracles $\mathcal{O}^G, \mathcal{O}^H$ are recorded to their respective tapes $\mathcal{L}^G, \mathcal{L}^H$.

Algorithm 17 $\mathcal{O}_1^{\text{Decap}}(c)$

1: $(c', t) \leftarrow c$
2: **if** $\exists (\tilde{m}, \tilde{k}) \in \mathcal{L}^G : \tilde{m} = \text{Dec}(\text{sk}', c') \wedge \text{MAC}(\tilde{k}, c') = t$ **then**
3: $\quad K \leftarrow H(\tilde{m}, c')$
4: **else**
5: $\quad K \leftarrow H(z, c')$
6: **end if**
7: **return** K

Figure 9: Simulated decapsulation oracle

Game 1 is identical to game 0 except that the true decapsulation oracle $\mathcal{O}^{\text{Decap}}$ is replaced with a simulated oracle $\mathcal{O}_1^{\text{Decap}}$. Instead of directly decrypting c' as in the decapsulation routine, the simulated oracle searches through the tape $\mathcal{L}^G$ to find a matching query $(\tilde{m}, \tilde{k})$ such that $\tilde{m}$ is the decryption of c'. The simulated oracle then uses $\tilde{k}$ to validate the tag t against c'.

If the simulated oracle accepts the queried ciphertext as valid, then there is a matching

query that also validates the tag, which means that the queried ciphertext is honestly generated. Therefore, the true oracle must also accept the queried ciphertext. On the other hand, if the true oracle rejects the queried ciphertext (and output the implicit rejection $H(z, c')$), then the tag is simply invalid under the MAC key $k = G(\text{Dec}(\text{sk}', c'))$. Therefore, there could not have been a matching query that also validates the tag, and the simulated oracle must also rejects the queried ciphertext.

This means that from the adversary A's perspective, game 1 and game 0 differ only when the true oracle accepts while the simulated oracle rejects, which means that t is a valid tag for c' under $k = G(\text{Dec}(\text{sk}', c'))$, but k has never been queried. Under the random oracle model, such k is a uniformly random sample of $\mathcal{K}_{\text{MAC}}$ that the adversary does not know, so for A to produce a valid tag is to produce a forgery against the MAC under an unknown and uniformly random key. Furthermore, the security game does not include a signing oracle, so this is a zero-time forgery. While zero-time forgery is not a standard security definition for a MAC, we can bound it by the advantage of a one-time forgery adversary C:

$$P\left[\mathcal{O}^{\text{Decap}}(c) \neq \mathcal{O}_1^{\text{Decap}}(c)\right] \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{OT-MAC}}(C)$$

Across all q decapsulation queries, the probability that at least one query is a forgery is thus at most $q \cdot P\left[\mathcal{O}^{\text{Decap}}(c) \neq \mathcal{O}_1^{\text{Decap}}(c)\right]$. By the difference lemma:

$$\text{Adv}_{G_0}(A) - \text{Adv}_{G_1}(A) \leq q \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{OT-MAC}}(C)$$

Game 2 is identical to game 1, except that on line 4 of algorithm 13, the challenger samples a uniformly random MAC key $k^* \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}_{\text{MAC}}$ instead of deriving it from m. From A's perspective the two games are indistinguishable, unless A queries G with the value of m^*. Denote the probability that A queries G with m^* by $P[\text{QUERY G}]$, then:

$$\text{Adv}_{G_1}(A) - \text{Adv}_{G_2}(A) \leq P[\text{QUERY G}]$$

Game 3 is identical to game 2, except that on line 7 of algorithm 13, the challenger samples a uniformly random shared secret $K_0 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}_{\text{KEM}}$ instead of deriving it from m^* and c'. From A's perspective the two games are indistinguishable, unless A queries H with $(m^*, \cdot)$. Denote the probability that A queries H with $(m^*, \cdot)$ by $P[\text{QUERY H}]$, then:

$$\text{Adv}_{G_2}(A) - \text{Adv}_{G_3}(A) \leq P[\text{QUERY H}]$$

Since in game 3, both K_0 and K_1 are uniformly random and independent of all other variables, no adversary can have any advantage: $\text{Adv}_{G_3}(A) = 0$.

Algorithm 18 $B(\text{pk}, c'^*)$

1: $z \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{M}$
2: $k \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}_{\text{MAC}}$
3: $t \leftarrow \text{MAC}(k, c'^*)$
4: $c^* \leftarrow (c'^*, t)$
5: $K \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}_{\text{KEM}}$
6: $\hat{b} \leftarrow A^{\mathcal{O}_B^{\text{Decap}}, \mathcal{O}_B^G, \mathcal{O}_B^H}(\text{pk}, c^*, K)$
7: **if** ABORT(m) **then**
8:     **return** m
9: **end if**

Algorithm 19 $\mathcal{O}_B^{\text{Decap}}(c)$

1: $(c', t) \leftarrow c$
2: **if** $\exists (\tilde{m}, \tilde{k}) \in \mathcal{L}^G : \text{PCO}(c', \tilde{m}) = 1 \wedge$ $\text{MAC}(\tilde{k}, c') = t$ **then**
3:     $K \leftarrow H(\tilde{m}, c')$
4: **else**
5:     $K \leftarrow H(z, c')$
6: **end if**
7: **return** K

Algorithm 20 $\mathcal{O}_B^G(m)$

1: **if** $\text{PCO}(m, c'^*) = 1$ **then**
2:     ABORT(m)
3: **end if**
4: **if** $\exists (\tilde{m}, \tilde{k}) \in \mathcal{L}^G : \tilde{m} = m$ **then**
5:     **return** $\tilde{k}$
6: **end if**
7: $k \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}_{\text{MAC}}$
8: $\mathcal{L}^G \leftarrow \mathcal{L}^G \cup \{(m, k)\}$
9: **return** k

Algorithm 21 $\mathcal{O}_B^H(m, c)$

if $\text{PCO}(m, c'^*) = 1$ then
    ABORT(m)
end if
if $\exists (\tilde{m}, \tilde{c}, \tilde{K}) \in \mathcal{L}^H : \tilde{m} = m \wedge \tilde{c} = c$ then
    return $\tilde{K}$
end if
$K \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}_{\text{KEM}}$
$\mathcal{L}^H \leftarrow \mathcal{L}^H \cup \{(m, c, K)\}$
return K

We will bound $P[\text{QUERY G}]$ and $P[\text{QUERY H}]$ by constructing a OW-PCA adversary B against the underlying PKE that uses A as a sub-routine. B's behaviors are described in algorithms 18, 19, 20, and 21.

B simulates game 3 for A: receiving the public key pk and challenge encryption c'^*, B samples random MAC key and session key to produce the challenge encapsulation, then feeds it to A. When simulating the decapsulation oracle, B uses the plaintext-checking oracle to look for matching queries in $\mathcal{L}^G$. When simulating the hash oracles, B uses the plaintext-checking oracle to detect when $m^* = \text{Dec}(\text{sk}', c'^\star)$ has been queried. When m^* is queried, B terminates A and returns m^* to win the OW-PCA game. In other words:

$$P[\text{QUERY G}] \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{OW-PCA}}(B)$$
$$P[\text{QUERY H}] \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{OW-PCA}}(B)$$

Combining all equations above produce the desired security bound. $\qquad\square$

4   Implementation

Originally known as Kyber [BDK+18][ABD+19], ML-KEM is an IND-CCA2 secure key encapsulation mechanism standardized in FIPS 203 by NIST. The IND-CCA2 security of ML-KEM is achieved in two steps. First, ML-KEM constructs an IND-CPA secure public key encryption scheme K-PKE(KeyGen, Enc, Dec) whose security is based on the conjectured intractability of the module learning with error (MLWE) problems against both classical and quantum adversaries. Then, the $U_m^{\not\perp}$ variant of the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation [HHK17] is used to construct the KEM MLKEM(KeyGen, Encap, Decap) by calling

250 `K-PKE.KeyGen`, `K-PKE.Enc`, `K-PKE.Dec` as sub-routines. Because `K-PKE.Enc` includes substan-
251 tially more arithmetics than `K-PKE.Dec`, by using *re-encryption* and *de-randomization*,
252 ML-KEM's decapsulation routine suffers from computational inefficiency.
253   We implemented the "encrypt-then-MAC" KEM construction using `K-PKE` as the input
254 PKE and compared its performance against ML-KEM under a variety of scenarios. The
255 experimental data showed that while the "encrypt-then-MAC" construction adds a small
256 amount of computational overhead to the encapsulation routine and a small increase in
257 ciphertext size when compared with ML-KEM, it boasts enormous runtime savings in the
258 decapsulation routine, which makes it particularly suitable for deployment in constrained
259 environment.
260   A detailed description of `K-PKE`'s routines can be found in FIPS 203 (TODO: citation).
261 The "encrypt-then-MAC" routines are listed in algorithms 22, 23, and 24.

Algorithm 22 `ML-KEM-ETM.KeyGen()`

1: $z \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{256}$
2: $(\text{pk}, \text{sk}') \xleftarrow{\$} \text{K-PKE.KeyGen}()$
3: $h \leftarrow H(\text{pk})$ ▷ H is `SHA3-256`
4: $\text{sk} \leftarrow (sk'\|\text{pk}\|h\|z)$
5: **return** (pk, sk)

Algorithm 23 `ML-KEM-ETM.Encap(pk)`

Require: Public key pk
1: $m \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{256}$
2: $(\overline{K}, r, k) \leftarrow \text{XOF}(m\|H(\text{pk}))$ ▷ XOF is `Shake256`, outputting 768 bits
3: $c' \leftarrow \text{K-PKE.Enc}(\text{pk}, m, r)$
4: $t \leftarrow \text{MAC}(k, c')$
5: $K \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\overline{K}\|t)$ ▷ KDF is `Shake256`, outputting 256 bits
6: $c \leftarrow (c', c)$
7: **return** (c, K)

Algorithm 24 `ML-KEM-ETM.Decap(sk, c)`

Require: Secret key $\text{sk} = (\text{sk}'\|\text{pk}\|h\|z)$
Require: Ciphertext $c = (c'\|t)$
1: $(\text{sk}', \text{pk}, h, z) \leftarrow \text{sk}$
2: $(c', t) \leftarrow c$
3: $\hat{m} \leftarrow \text{K-PKE.Dec}(\text{sk}', c')$
4: $(\overline{K}, \hat{r}, \hat{k}) \leftarrow \text{XOF}(\hat{m}\|h)$
5: $\hat{t} \leftarrow \text{MAC}(\hat{k}, c')$
6: **if** $\hat{t} = t$ **then**
7:      $K \leftarrow \text{KDF}(\overline{K}\|t)$
8: **else**
9:      $K \leftarrow \text{KDF}(z\|t)$
10: **end if**
11: **return** K

---

262   Our implementation extended from the reference implementation by the PQCrystals
263 team (https://github.com/pq-crystals/kyber). All C code is compiled with `GCC 11.4.1`

264   and `OpenSSL 3.0.8`. All binaries are executed on an AWS c7a.medium instance with an
265   AMD EPYC 9R14 CPU at 3.7 GHz and 1 GB of RAM.

4.1   Choosing a message authenticator

267   When instantiating `ML-KEM-ETM`, there are a variety of message authentication codes to
268   choose from. We selected four instances covering a wide range of designs:

269   1. Poly1305, a Carter-Wegman style MAC operating on a prime field

270   2. GMAC (AES-256-GCM), a Carter-Wegman style MAC operating on a binary field

271   3. CMAC (AES-256-CBC), a CBC-MAC

272   4. KMAC-256, a keyed hash function based on Keccak

273   We tested each MAC's throughput by measuring the CPU cycles needed to compute a
274   tag on the ciphertext returned by `K-PKE`. The length of the ciphertext varies depending on
275   the security level. The measurements are summarized in table 2.

Table 2: MAC performance

ML-KEM-512							
Ciphertext size (bytes):			768				
Poly1305		GMAC		CMAC		KMAC	
Median	909	Median	3899	Median	6291	Median	6373
Average	2823	Average	4859	Average	6373	Average	7791
ML-KEM-768							
Ciphertext size (bytes):			1088				
Poly1305		GMAC		CMAC		KMAC	
Median	961	Median	3899	Median	7305	Median	9697
Average	2704	Average	4827	Average	7588	Average	9928
ML-KEM-1024							
Ciphertext size (bytes):			1568				
Poly1305		GMAC		CMAC		KMAC	
Median	1065	Median	4055	Median	8735	Median	11647
Average	1809	Average	5026	Average	8772	Average	12186

4.2   KEM performance

277   Compared to the $U_m^{\not\perp}$ variant of Fujisaki-Okamoto transformed used in ML-KEM, the
278   "encrypt-then-MAC" transformation the following trade-off when given the same input
279   sub-routines:

280   1. Both encapsulation and decapsulation add a small amount of overhead for needing
281   to hash both the PKE plaintext and the PKE ciphertext when deriving the shared
282   secret, where as the $U_m^{\not\perp}$ transformation only needs to hash the PKE plaintext.

283   2. The encapsulation routine adds a small amount of run-time overhead for computing
284   the authenticator

285   3. The decapsulation routine enjoys substantial runtime speedup because *re-encryption*
286   is replaced with computing an authenticator

287   4. Ciphertext size increases by the size of an authenticator

Since `K-PKE.Enc` carries significantly more computational complexity than `K-PKE.Dec` or any MAC we chose, the performance advantage of the "encrypt-then-MAC" transformation over the $U_m^{\not\perp}$ transformation is dominated by the runtime saving gained from replacing *re-encryption* with MAC. A comparison between ML-KEM and variations of the ML-KEM-ETM can be found in table 3

4.3 Key exchange protocols

A common application of key encapsulation mechanism is key exchange protocols, where two parties establish a shared secret using a public channel. [BDK+18] described three key exchange protocols: unauthenticated key exchange (KE), unilaterally authenticated key exchange (UAKE), and mutually authenticated key exchange (AKE). We instantiated an implementation for each of the three key exchange protocols using different variations of the "encrypt-then-MAC" KEM and compared round trip time with implementations instantiated using ML-KEM.

For clarity, we denote the party who sends the first message to be the client and the other party to be the server. Round trip time (RTT) is defined to be the time interval between the moment before the client starts generating ephemeral keypairs and the moment after the client derives the final session key. All experiements are run on a pair of AWS c7a.medium instances both located in the `us-west-2` region. For each experiment, a total of 10,000 rounds of key exchange are performed, with the median and average round trip time (measured in microsecond) recorded.

4.3.1 Unauthenticated key exchange (KE)

In unauthenticated key exchange, a single pair of ephemeral keypair $(\text{pk}_e, \text{sk}_e) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{KeyGen}()$ is generated by the client. The client transmits the ephemeral public key pk_e to the server, who runs the encapsulation routine $(c_e, K_e) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Encap}(\text{pk}_e)$ and transmits the ciphertext c_e back to the client. The client finally decapsulates the ciphertext to recover the shared secret $K_e \leftarrow \text{Decap}(\text{sk}_e, c_e)$. The specific steps are described in algorithms 25, 26.

Note that in our implementation, a key derivation function (KDF) is applied to the ephemeral shared secret to derive the final session key. This step is added to maintain consistency with other authenticated key exchange protocols, where the final session key is derived from multiple shared secrets. The key derivation function is instantiated using Shake256, and the final session key is 256 bits in length.

Algorithm 25 KE_C

1: $(\text{pk}_e, \text{sk}_e) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{KeyGen}()$
2: $\text{send}(\text{pk}_e)$
3: $c_e \leftarrow \text{read}()$
4: $K_e \leftarrow \text{Decap}(\text{sk}_e, c_e)$
5: $K \leftarrow \text{KDF}(K)$
6: **return** K

Algorithm 26 KE_S

1: $\text{pk}_e \leftarrow \text{read}()$
2: $(c_e, K_e) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Encap}(\text{pk}_e)$
3: $\text{send}(c_e)$
4: $K \leftarrow \text{KDF}(K_e)$
5: **return** K

Figure 10: KE Client

Figure 11: KE Server

The RTT comparison is summarized in table 4

Table 3: CPU cycles of each KEM routine

ML-KEM-512			
public key size	800 bytes	KeyGen	
secret key size	1632 bytes	Median	75945
ciphertext size	768 bytes	Average	76171
Encap		Decap	
Median	91467	Median	121185
Average	92065	Average	121650
ML-KEM-ETM-512 + Poly1305		ML-KEM-ETM-512 + GMAC	
Encap		Decap		Encap		Decap	
Median	93157	Median	33773	Median	97369	Median	37725
Average	93626	Average	33908	Average	97766	Average	37831
ML-KEM-ETM-512 + CMAC		ML-KEM-ETM-512 + KMAC	
Encap		Decap		Encap		Decap	
Median	99839	Median	40117	Median	101009	Median	40741
Average	99959	Average	39943	Average	101313	Average	40916
ML-KEM-768			
public key size	1184 bytes	KeyGen	
secret key size	2400 bytes	Median	129895
ciphertext size	1088 bytes	Average	130650
Encap		Decap	
Median	146405	Median	186445
Average	147400	Average	187529
ML-KEM-ETM-768 + Poly1305		ML-KEM-ETM-768 + GMAC	
Encap		Decap		Encap		Decap	
Median	146405	Median	43315	Median	149525	Median	46513
Average	146860	Average	43463	Average	150128	Average	46706
ML-KEM-ETM-768 + CMAC		ML-KEM-ETM-768 + KMAC	
Encap		Decap		Encap		Decap	
Median	153139	Median	49841	Median	155219	Median	52415
Average	153735	Average	50074	Average	155848	Average	52611
ML-KEM-1024			
public key size	1568 bytes	KeyGen	
secret key size	3168 bytes	Median	194921
ciphertext size	1568 bytes	Average	195465
Encap		Decap	
Median	199185	Median	246245
Average	199903	Average	247320
ML-KEM-ETM-1024 + Poly1305		ML-KEM-ETM-1024 + GMAC	
Encap		Decap		Encap		Decap	
Median	205763	Median	51375	Median	208805	Median	54573
Average	206499	Average	51562	Average	209681	Average	54780
ML-KEM-ETM-1024 + CMAC		ML-KEM-ETM-1024 + KMAC	
Encap		Decap		Encap		Decap	
Median	213667	Median	59175	Median	216761	Median	62269
Average	214483	Average	59408	Average	217468	Average	62516

Table 4: Unauthenticated key exchange RTT comparison

KEM	median RTT (μs)	average RTT (μs)
ML-KEM-512	92	97
ML-KEM-512 + Poly1305	70	72
ML-KEM-512 + GMAC	73	76
ML-KEM-512 + CMAC	75	79
ML-KEM-512 + KMAC	76	78
ML-KEM-768	135	140
ML-KEM-768 + Poly1305	99	104
ML-KEM-768 + GMAC	101	105
ML-KEM-768 + CMAC	103	109
ML-KEM-768 + KMAC	103	107
ML-KEM-1024	193	199
ML-KEM-1024 + Poly1305	138	141
ML-KEM-1024 + GMAC	140	145
ML-KEM-1024 + CMAC	143	148
ML-KEM-1024 + KMAC	144	149

4.3.2   Unilaterally authenticated key exchange (UAKE)

In unilaterally authenticated key exchange, the authenticating party proves its identity to the other party by demonstrating possession of a secret key that corresponds to a published long-term public key. In this implementation, the client possesses the long-term public key $\mathtt{pk}_S$ of the server, and the server authenticates itself by demonstrating possession of the corresponding long-term secret key $\mathtt{sk}_S$. Details are described in algorithms 27 and 28.

In addition to the long-term key, the client will also generate an ephemeral keypair as it does in an unauthenticated key exchange, and the session key is derived by applying the KDF to the concatenation of both the ephemeral shared secret and the shared secret encapsulated under server's long-term key. This helps the key exchange to achieve weak forward secrecy (citation needed).

Using KEM for authentication is especially interesting within the context of post-quantum cryptography: post-quantum KEM schemes usually enjoy better performance characteristics than post-quantum signature schemes with faster runtime, smaller memory footprint, and smaller communication sizes. KEMTLS was proposed in 2020 as an alternative to existing TLS handshake protocols, and many experimental implementations have demonstrated the performance advantage. (citation needed).

Algorithm 27 $\mathtt{UAKE}_{\mathtt{C}}(\mathtt{pk}_S)$

Require: Server's long-term $\mathtt{pk}_S$
1: $(\mathtt{pk}_e, \mathtt{sk}_e) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathtt{KeyGen}()$
2: $(c_S, K_S) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathtt{Encap}(\mathtt{pk}_S)$
3: $\mathtt{send}(\mathtt{pk}_e, c_S)$
4: $c_e \leftarrow \mathtt{read}()$
5: $K_e \leftarrow \mathtt{Decap}(\mathtt{sk}_e, c_e)$
6: $K \leftarrow \mathtt{KDF}(K_e \| K_S)$
7: **return** K

Figure 12: UAKE Client

Algorithm 28 $\mathtt{UAKE}_{\mathtt{S}}(\mathtt{sk}_S)$

Require: Server's long-term $\mathtt{sk}_S$
1: $(\mathtt{pk}_e, c_S) \leftarrow \mathtt{read}()$
2: $K_S \leftarrow \mathtt{Decap}(\mathtt{sk}_S, c_S)$
3: $(c_e, K_e) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathtt{Encap}(\mathtt{pk}_e)$
4: $\mathtt{send}(c_e)$
5: $K \leftarrow \mathtt{KDF}(K_e \| K_S)$
6: **return** K

Figure 13: UAKE Server

Table 5: UAKE RTT comparison

KEM	median RTT (μs)	average RTT (μs)
ML-KEM-512	145	151
ML-KEM-512 + Poly1305	103	106
ML-KEM-512 + GMAC	106	110
ML-KEM-512 + CMAC	108	112
ML-KEM-512 + KMAC	109	113
ML-KEM-768	215	222
ML-KEM-768 + Poly1305	144	150
ML-KEM-768 + GMAC	149	156
ML-KEM-768 + CMAC	153	160
ML-KEM-768 + KMAC	154	159
ML-KEM-1024	310	318
ML-KEM-1024 + Poly1305	202	209
ML-KEM-1024 + GMAC	212	228
ML-KEM-1024 + CMAC	212	218
ML-KEM-1024 + KMAC	213	220

4.3.3 Mutually authenticated key exchange (AKE)

Mutually authenticated key exchange is largely identical to unilaterally authenticated key exchange, except for that client authentication is required. This means that client possesses server's long-term public key and its own long-term secret key, while the server possesses client's long-term public key and its own long-term secret key. The session key is derived by applying KDF onto the concatenation of shared secrets produced under the ephemeral keypair, server's long-term keypair, and client's long-term keypair, in this order.

Algorithm 29 $\text{AKE}_{\text{C}}(\text{pk}_S, \text{sk}_C)$

Require: Server's long-term pk_S
Require: Client's long-term sk_C
 1: $(\text{pk}_e, \text{sk}_e) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{KeyGen}()$
 2: $(c_S, K_S) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Encap}(\text{pk}_S)$
 3: $\text{send}(\text{pk}_e, c_S)$
 4: $(c_e, c_C) \leftarrow \text{read}()$
 5: $K_e \leftarrow \text{Decap}(\text{sk}_e, c_e)$
 6: $K_C \leftarrow \text{Decap}(\text{sk}_e, c_C)$
 7: $K \leftarrow \text{KDF}(K_e \| K_S \| K_C)$
 8: **return** K

Figure 14: AKE Client

Algorithm 30 $\text{AKE}_{\text{S}}(\text{sk}_S, \text{pk}_C)$

Require: Server's long-term sk_S
Require: Client's long-term pk_C
 1: $(\text{pk}_e, c_S) \leftarrow \text{read}()$
 2: $K_S \leftarrow \text{Decap}(\text{sk}_S, c_S)$
 3: $(c_e, K_e) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Encap}(\text{pk}_e)$
 4: $(c_C, K_C) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Encap}(\text{pk}_C)$
 5: $\text{send}(c_e, c_C)$
 6: $K \leftarrow \text{KDF}(K_e \| K_S \| K_C)$
 7: **return** K

Figure 15: AKE Server

Table 6: AKE RTT comparison

KEM	median RTT (μs)	average RTT (μs)
ML-KEM-512	200	213
ML-KEM-512 + Poly1305	133	138
ML-KEM-512 + GMAC	139	143
ML-KEM-512 + CMAC	143	148
ML-KEM-512 + KMAC	145	151
ML-KEM-768	294	301
ML-KEM-768 + Poly1305	190	196
ML-KEM-768 + GMAC	197	210
ML-KEM-768 + CMAC	202	208
ML-KEM-768 + KMAC	204	210
ML-KEM-1024	512	511
ML-KEM-1024 + Poly1305	266	273
ML-KEM-1024 + GMAC	273	282
ML-KEM-1024 + CMAC	280	287
ML-KEM-1024 + KMAC	282	288

5 Conclusions and future works

Comparison with Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation: We applied the "encrypt-then-MAC" transformation to Kyber and saw meaningful performance improvements over using de-randomization and re-encryption. Unfortunately the resulting KEM does not achieve the desired full IND-CCA2 security, because Kyber is known to be vulnerable to key-recovery plaintext-checking attack (KR-PCA) [RRCB19][UXT+22]. We speculate that while Kyber with "encrypt-then-MAC" could not achieve the full IND-CCA2 security, it can still be safe for use in ephemeral key exchange, where each secret key is used to decrypt at most one ciphertext (the KR-PCA requires a few hundred decryption queries to recover the secret key).

In section 3, we showed that if the input PKE is OW-PCA secure, then the resulting KEM is IND-CCA2 secure. One sufficient condition for OW-PCA security is one-way security plus rigidity. If the input PKE is rigid, then $m = \text{Dec}(\text{sk}, c)$ is equivalent to $c = \text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m)$, so a plaintext-checking oracle can be simulated without any secret information. However, the $U_m^{\not\perp}$ transformation in [HHK17] can already transform an OW-CPA secure and rigid PKE into an IND-CCA2 secure KEM with minimal overhead: the encapsulation and decapsulation routines each adds a hash of the plaintext to the encryption and decryption routine. In other words, where the input PKE is rigid, "encrypt-then-MAC" doesn't offer any performance advantage. It remains an open problem whether there exists a PKE that is OW-PCA secure but not rigid. If such a PKE exists, then "encrypt-then-MAC" would be a preferable strategy for constructing an IND-CCA2 KEM.

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