

Econ720 - TA Session 1

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UNC-Chapel Hill

2020. 8. 21

0. Macro is saying hi to you!

Office Hour:

Thursday, 1:00 - 2:00, Zoom

- Link:
`https://us02web.zoom.us/j/5736769300`
`pwd=VmRvM0t1dVB5RTF5c3FoZ0hFVGxJQT09`
- ID: 5736769300
- Passcode: 0EGbBi
- Appointment by email: `yanran@ad.unc.edu`

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Recitation:

Friday, 8:00 - 8:50, Zoom

- Link:
`https://us02web.zoom.us/j/5736769300`
`pwd=VmRvM0t1dVB5RTF5c3FoZ0hFVGxJQT09`
- ID: 5736769300
- Passcode: 0EGbBi
- I will record class meetings via zoom and send recordings by email.

0. Macro is saying hi to you!

Today's Task:

- How to define competitive equilibrium (On the Next: a detailed OLG example)
- Walras Law
- Arrow-Debreu and Sequential Trading

1. How to set up a competitive equilibrium?

- 1 Describe the economy (**Find how many sectors there are**)
- 2 Solve each sector's problem (e.g. Household, Firm)
endogenous/ choice variables
price variables

Example

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & u(c_1, c_2) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & p_1 c_1 + p_2 c_2 = p_1 e_1 + p_2 e_2 \end{aligned}$$

Choice variables?

Written in real terms: $c_1 + p c_2 = e_1 + p e_2$, where $p = \frac{p_2}{p_1}$

1. How to set up a competitive equilibrium?

- 2 Solve each sector's problem (e.g. Household, Firm)

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & \ln(c_1) + \beta \ln(c_2) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & c_1 + pc_2 = e_1 + pe_2 \end{aligned}$$

- Set up Lagrangean
- Get FOCs by taking derivative with respect **all choice variables in the Lagrangean.**

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$$\mathcal{L} = \ln(c_1) + \beta \ln(c_2) + \lambda(e_1 + pe_2 - c_1 - pc_2)$$

1. How to set up a competitive equilibrium?

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1. How to set up a competitive equilibrium?

③ State the market clearing condition

- How to find markets?
→ **Start with choice variables**
- How to write market clearing conditions?
→ **Aggregate supply = Aggregate demand**

④ Define the equilibrium

Allocations $\{ \dots \}$ and prices $\{ \dots \}$ that satisfy

Optimality conditions for each sector $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Household problem} \\ \text{Firm problem} \\ \dots \end{array} \right.$

Market clearing condition

Accounting identity

N objects, N+1 equations (Walras' Law)

2. Walras' Law

Define the equilibrium

Allocations $\{c_1, c_2\}$ and prices $\{p\}$ that satisfy

- Optimality conditions for household

① FOC: $\beta \frac{c_1}{c_2} = p$

② BC: $c_1 + pc_2 = e_1 + pe_2$

- Market clearing condition

③ $c_1 = e_1$

④ $c_2 = e_2$

3 objects, 4 equations (Walras' Law)

Linear combination exists in these 4 equations: equation 2 is a linear combination of equation 3 and 4

3. Arrow-Debreu vs. Sequential Trading

Two-period Example

Demographics: N identical household live for 2 periods, $t = 1, 2$

Commodities: c_1, c_2

Preference: $u(c_1, c_2)$

Endowments: e_1, e_2

3. Arrow-Debreu vs. Sequential Trading

Two-period $t = 1, 2$

- c_1 : consumption in period 1
- c_2 : consumption in period 2


Goods in different periods can be considered different goods

- c_1 : apple
- c_2 : pineapple

3. Arrow-Debreu vs. Sequential Trading

(1). Arrow-Debreu Trading

All trades take place at $t = 1$



3. Arrow-Debreu vs. Sequential Trading

(1). Arrow-Debreu Trading

All trades take place at $t = 1 \Rightarrow$ Only one BC!!

BC: $p_1 c_1 + p_2 c_2 = p_1 e_1 + p_2 e_2$

$$\max u(c_1, c_2)$$

s.t. $c_1 + p c_2 = e_1 + p e_2$ (BC here is written in real terms.)

$$\mathcal{L} = u(c_1, c_2) + \lambda(e_1 + p e_2 - c_1 - p c_2)$$

$$\therefore \frac{u_1}{u_2} = \frac{1}{p}$$

Competitive Equilibrium

Allocations $\{ \}$ and price $\{ \}$ that satisfy

Household problem solution:

Goods market clearing conditions:

3. Arrow-Debreu vs. Sequential Trading

(1). Arrow-Debreu Trading

All trades take place at $t = 1 \Rightarrow$ Only one BC!!

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Competitive Equilibrium

Allocations $\{ c_1, c_2 \}$ and price $\{ p \}$ that satisfy

Household problem solution: F.O.C., BC

Goods market clearing conditions: $c_1 = e_1, c_2 = e_2$

3. Arrow-Debreu vs. Sequential Trading

(2). Sequential Trading

Markets open at each date \Rightarrow For each period, there is a BC!!

Budget Constraint:

$$p_1 c_1 + () = p_1 e_1$$

$$p_2 c_2 = p_2 e_2 + ()$$

\Rightarrow We need assets to transfer resources between periods!

$$p_1 c_1 + Qb = p_1 e_1$$

$$p_2 c_2 = p_2 e_2 + p_2 b$$

Choose one price to normalize in one BC.

Normalize the price of good 1 in the first BC: $c_1 + qb = e_1$ where $q = \frac{Q}{p_1}$

Normalize the price of good 2 in the second BC: $c_2 = e_2 + b$

3. Arrow-Debreu vs. Sequential Trading

(2). Sequential Trading

$$\max u(c_1, c_2)$$

$$s.t. \ c_1 + qb = e_1$$

$$c_2 = e_2 + b$$

$$\mathcal{L} = u(c_1, c_2) + \lambda(e_1 + qe_2 - c_1 - qc_2)$$

$$\therefore \frac{u_1}{u_2} = \frac{1}{q}$$

Competitive Equilibrium

Allocations $\{ \}$ and price $\{ \}$ that satisfy

Household problem solution:

Market clearing conditions:

3. Arrow-Debreu vs. Sequential Trading

(2). Sequential Trading

$$\max u(c_1, c_2)$$

$$s.t. \ c_1 + qb = e_1$$

$$c_2 = e_2 + b$$

$$\mathcal{L} = u(c_1, c_2) + \lambda(e_1 + qe_2 - c_1 - qc_2)$$

$$\therefore \frac{u_1}{u_2} = \frac{1}{q}$$

Competitive Equilibrium

Allocations $\{ c_1, c_2, b \}$ and price $\{ q \}$ that satisfy

Household problem solution: F.O.C., BC

Market clearing conditions:

Goods market: $c_1 = e_1, \ c_2 = e_2$

Bonds market: $b = 0$

4. Why $b_t = 0$?

In equilibrium, the bond market clearing condition is $b_t = 0$

Recall the fundamental rule for market clearing condition:

Aggregate supply = Aggregate demand

→ Who supplies bonds? Household!

Who demands bonds? Household!

→ The model setup assumes **Representative Agent**, indicating that we can consider the model as if there was only **A SINGLE HOUSEHOLD** in this economy.

4. Why $b_t = 0$?

Could there be cases where $b_t \neq 0$ in equilibrium?

Yes!

e.g. Government issuing bonds

Heterogeneous agents (See PS1-Question 2)