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dropbear: Fix CVE-2018-15599
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Wait to fail invalid usernames to fix
CVE-2018-15599

Rework 0006-dropbear-configuration-file.patch
to fix fuzz warnings

(From OE-Core rev: f017715)

Signed-off-by: Mingli Yu <Mingli.Yu@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
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Mingli Yu authored and rpurdie committed Sep 10, 2018
1 parent 8e8d296 commit 688611a
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Showing 3 changed files with 254 additions and 6 deletions.
1 change: 1 addition & 0 deletions meta/recipes-core/dropbear/dropbear.inc
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ RPROVIDES_${PN} = "ssh sshd"
DEPENDS += "${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'pam', 'libpam', '', d)}"

SRC_URI = "http://matt.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/releases/dropbear-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
file://CVE-2018-15599.patch \
file://0001-urandom-xauth-changes-to-options.h.patch \
file://0007-fix-localoptions-search-path.patch \
file://init \
Expand Down
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,4 +1,7 @@
Subject: [PATCH 6/6] dropbear configuration file
From e3a5db1b6d3f6382a15b2266458c26c645a10f18 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mingli Yu <Mingli.Yu@windriver.com>
Date: Thu, 6 Sep 2018 15:54:00 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] dropbear configuration file

dropbear: Change the path ("/etc/pam.d/sshd" as default) to find a pam configuration file \
to "/etc/pam.d/dropbear for dropbear when enabling pam supporting"
Expand All @@ -7,16 +10,24 @@ Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [configuration]

Signed-off-by: Maxin B. John <maxin.john@enea.com>
Signed-off-by: Xiaofeng Yan <xiaofeng.yan@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Mingli Yu <Mingli.Yu@windriver.com>
---
diff -Naur dropbear-2013.60-orig/svr-authpam.c dropbear-2013.60/svr-authpam.c
--- dropbear-2013.60-orig/svr-authpam.c 2013-10-16 16:34:53.000000000 +0200
+++ dropbear-2013.60/svr-authpam.c 2013-10-21 17:04:04.969416055 +0200
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@
userData.passwd = password;
svr-authpam.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/svr-authpam.c b/svr-authpam.c
index d201bc9..165ec5c 100644
--- a/svr-authpam.c
+++ b/svr-authpam.c
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ void svr_auth_pam(int valid_user) {
}

/* Init pam */
- if ((rc = pam_start("sshd", NULL, &pamConv, &pamHandlep)) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ if ((rc = pam_start("dropbear", NULL, &pamConv, &pamHandlep)) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING, "pam_start() failed, rc=%d, %s",
rc, pam_strerror(pamHandlep, rc));
goto cleanup;
--
2.7.4

236 changes: 236 additions & 0 deletions meta/recipes-core/dropbear/dropbear/CVE-2018-15599.patch
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
From 256e2abb8150f9fea33cd026597dbe70f0379296 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au>
Date: Thu, 23 Aug 2018 23:43:12 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] Wait to fail invalid usernames

Wait to fail invalid usernames

Upstream-Status: Backport [https://secure.ucc.asn.au/hg/dropbear/rev/5d2d1021ca00]
CVE: CVE-2018-15599
Signed-off-by: Mingli Yu <Mingli.Yu@windriver.com>
---
auth.h | 6 +++---
svr-auth.c | 19 +++++--------------
svr-authpam.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++----
svr-authpasswd.c | 27 ++++++++++++++-------------
svr-authpubkey.c | 11 ++++++++++-
5 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)

diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
index da498f5..98f5468 100644
--- a/auth.h
+++ b/auth.h
@@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ void recv_msg_userauth_request(void);
void send_msg_userauth_failure(int partial, int incrfail);
void send_msg_userauth_success(void);
void send_msg_userauth_banner(const buffer *msg);
-void svr_auth_password(void);
-void svr_auth_pubkey(void);
-void svr_auth_pam(void);
+void svr_auth_password(int valid_user);
+void svr_auth_pubkey(int valid_user);
+void svr_auth_pam(int valid_user);

#if DROPBEAR_SVR_PUBKEY_OPTIONS_BUILT
int svr_pubkey_allows_agentfwd(void);
diff --git a/svr-auth.c b/svr-auth.c
index 64d97aa..1f364ca 100644
--- a/svr-auth.c
+++ b/svr-auth.c
@@ -149,10 +149,8 @@ void recv_msg_userauth_request() {
if (methodlen == AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD_LEN &&
strncmp(methodname, AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD,
AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD_LEN) == 0) {
- if (valid_user) {
- svr_auth_password();
- goto out;
- }
+ svr_auth_password(valid_user);
+ goto out;
}
}
#endif
@@ -164,10 +162,8 @@ void recv_msg_userauth_request() {
if (methodlen == AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD_LEN &&
strncmp(methodname, AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD,
AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD_LEN) == 0) {
- if (valid_user) {
- svr_auth_pam();
- goto out;
- }
+ svr_auth_pam(valid_user);
+ goto out;
}
}
#endif
@@ -177,12 +173,7 @@ void recv_msg_userauth_request() {
if (methodlen == AUTH_METHOD_PUBKEY_LEN &&
strncmp(methodname, AUTH_METHOD_PUBKEY,
AUTH_METHOD_PUBKEY_LEN) == 0) {
- if (valid_user) {
- svr_auth_pubkey();
- } else {
- /* pubkey has no failure delay */
- send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 0);
- }
+ svr_auth_pubkey(valid_user);
goto out;
}
#endif
diff --git a/svr-authpam.c b/svr-authpam.c
index 05e4f3e..d201bc9 100644
--- a/svr-authpam.c
+++ b/svr-authpam.c
@@ -178,13 +178,14 @@ pamConvFunc(int num_msg,
* Keyboard interactive would be a lot nicer, but since PAM is synchronous, it
* gets very messy trying to send the interactive challenges, and read the
* interactive responses, over the network. */
-void svr_auth_pam() {
+void svr_auth_pam(int valid_user) {

struct UserDataS userData = {NULL, NULL};
struct pam_conv pamConv = {
pamConvFunc,
&userData /* submitted to pamvConvFunc as appdata_ptr */
};
+ const char* printable_user = NULL;

pam_handle_t* pamHandlep = NULL;

@@ -204,12 +205,23 @@ void svr_auth_pam() {

password = buf_getstring(ses.payload, &passwordlen);

+ /* We run the PAM conversation regardless of whether the username is valid
+ in case the conversation function has an inherent delay.
+ Use ses.authstate.username rather than ses.authstate.pw_name.
+ After PAM succeeds we then check the valid_user flag too */
+
/* used to pass data to the PAM conversation function - don't bother with
* strdup() etc since these are touched only by our own conversation
* function (above) which takes care of it */
- userData.user = ses.authstate.pw_name;
+ userData.user = ses.authstate.username;
userData.passwd = password;

+ if (ses.authstate.pw_name) {
+ printable_user = ses.authstate.pw_name;
+ } else {
+ printable_user = "<invalid username>";
+ }
+
/* Init pam */
if ((rc = pam_start("sshd", NULL, &pamConv, &pamHandlep)) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING, "pam_start() failed, rc=%d, %s",
@@ -242,7 +254,7 @@ void svr_auth_pam() {
rc, pam_strerror(pamHandlep, rc));
dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING,
"Bad PAM password attempt for '%s' from %s",
- ses.authstate.pw_name,
+ printable_user,
svr_ses.addrstring);
send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 1);
goto cleanup;
@@ -253,12 +265,18 @@ void svr_auth_pam() {
rc, pam_strerror(pamHandlep, rc));
dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING,
"Bad PAM password attempt for '%s' from %s",
- ses.authstate.pw_name,
+ printable_user,
svr_ses.addrstring);
send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 1);
goto cleanup;
}

+ if (!valid_user) {
+ /* PAM auth succeeded but the username isn't allowed in for another reason
+ (checkusername() failed) */
+ send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 1);
+ }
+
/* successful authentication */
dropbear_log(LOG_NOTICE, "PAM password auth succeeded for '%s' from %s",
ses.authstate.pw_name,
diff --git a/svr-authpasswd.c b/svr-authpasswd.c
index bdee2aa..69c7d8a 100644
--- a/svr-authpasswd.c
+++ b/svr-authpasswd.c
@@ -48,22 +48,14 @@ static int constant_time_strcmp(const char* a, const char* b) {

/* Process a password auth request, sending success or failure messages as
* appropriate */
-void svr_auth_password() {
+void svr_auth_password(int valid_user) {

char * passwdcrypt = NULL; /* the crypt from /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow */
char * testcrypt = NULL; /* crypt generated from the user's password sent */
- char * password;
+ char * password = NULL;
unsigned int passwordlen;
-
unsigned int changepw;

- passwdcrypt = ses.authstate.pw_passwd;
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_HACKCRYPT
- /* debugging crypt for non-root testing with shadows */
- passwdcrypt = DEBUG_HACKCRYPT;
-#endif
-
/* check if client wants to change password */
changepw = buf_getbool(ses.payload);
if (changepw) {
@@ -73,12 +65,21 @@ void svr_auth_password() {
}

password = buf_getstring(ses.payload, &passwordlen);
-
- /* the first bytes of passwdcrypt are the salt */
- testcrypt = crypt(password, passwdcrypt);
+ if (valid_user) {
+ /* the first bytes of passwdcrypt are the salt */
+ passwdcrypt = ses.authstate.pw_passwd;
+ testcrypt = crypt(password, passwdcrypt);
+ }
m_burn(password, passwordlen);
m_free(password);

+ /* After we have got the payload contents we can exit if the username
+ is invalid. Invalid users have already been logged. */
+ if (!valid_user) {
+ send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 1);
+ return;
+ }
+
if (testcrypt == NULL) {
/* crypt() with an invalid salt like "!!" */
dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING, "User account '%s' is locked",
diff --git a/svr-authpubkey.c b/svr-authpubkey.c
index aa6087c..ff481c8 100644
--- a/svr-authpubkey.c
+++ b/svr-authpubkey.c
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static int checkfileperm(char * filename);

/* process a pubkey auth request, sending success or failure message as
* appropriate */
-void svr_auth_pubkey() {
+void svr_auth_pubkey(int valid_user) {

unsigned char testkey; /* whether we're just checking if a key is usable */
char* algo = NULL; /* pubkey algo */
@@ -102,6 +102,15 @@ void svr_auth_pubkey() {
keybloblen = buf_getint(ses.payload);
keyblob = buf_getptr(ses.payload, keybloblen);

+ if (!valid_user) {
+ /* Return failure once we have read the contents of the packet
+ required to validate a public key.
+ Avoids blind user enumeration though it isn't possible to prevent
+ testing for user existence if the public key is known */
+ send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 0);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
/* check if the key is valid */
if (checkpubkey(algo, algolen, keyblob, keybloblen) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) {
send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 0);

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