


Digital Watermarking and Steganography

by Ingemar Cox, Matthew Miller, Jeffrey Bloom, Jessica Fridrich, Ton Kalker

Chapter 9. Robust Watermarking

Lecturer: Jin HUANG

Valumetric Scaling



$c * 0.8$




$c * 1.0$




$c * 1.2$

QIM is not Robust



Error Illustration



Valumetric scaling on the E_LATTICE/D_LATTICE system.

Reason

$$\begin{aligned} z_{lc}(s) &= (s\mathbf{C}_w) \cdot \mathbf{W}_r \\ &= s(\mathbf{C}_w) \cdot \mathbf{W}_r \\ &= s \cdot z_{lc}. \end{aligned}$$

Possible solution?


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
$$\begin{aligned}z_{nc}(s) &= \frac{s\mathbf{c}_w}{\|s\mathbf{c}_w\|} \cdot \mathbf{w}_r \\&= \frac{\mathbf{c}_w}{\|\mathbf{c}_w\|} \cdot \mathbf{w}_r \\&= \cos(\theta(\mathbf{c}_w, \mathbf{w}_r)).\end{aligned}$$

Linear Correlation



E_FIXED_LC/D_LC.

Correlation Coefficients




E_BLK_FIXED_R/D_BLK_CC.

z_{nc} with Dirty Paper

Angle QIM (Ourique et al. ICASSP 2005.):

- Snap work to the closest “grid angle”.



2-Dimensional Case

- Choosing two bases $\mathbf{X}_1, \mathbf{X}_2$.
- Get coordinates x_1, x_2 .
- Evaluate the length and angle:

$$r = \sqrt{x_1^2 + x_2^2}, \quad \theta = \arctan(x_2/x_1).$$

- Angle QIM:

$$\theta^Q = Q_{m,\Delta}(\theta) = \left\lfloor \frac{\theta + m\Delta}{2\Delta} \right\rfloor 2\Delta + m\Delta.$$

- Restore:

$$x'_1 = r \cos(\theta^Q), \quad x'_2 = r \sin(\theta^Q).$$

L -Dimensional Case

- L bases: $\mathbf{X}_i, i = 1, \dots, L$.
- L coordinates: $\mathbf{x}_i, i = 1, \dots, L$.
- $L - 1$ angles: $\mathbf{x}_i, i = 1, \dots, L - 1$.

$$\theta_1 = \arctan(x_2/x_1)$$

$$\theta_i = \arctan \frac{x_{i+1}}{\sqrt{\sum_{k=1}^i x_k^2}}, i = 2, \dots, L - 1.$$

- Restore:

$$x'_1 = r \prod_{k=1}^{L-1} \cos \theta_k^Q$$

$$x'_i = r \sin \theta_{i-1}^Q \prod_{k=i}^{L-1} \cos \theta_k^Q, i = 2, \dots, L.$$

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Chapter 10. Watermark Security

Lecturer: Jin HUANG

Ambiguity Attacks with Blind Detection

I am the True Owner!

The owner hold c_o privately, and distribute

$$c_d = c_o + w_r.$$

If other people claim the ownership with c_d .

- c_d containing w_r .
- AND ONLY the owner has a copy c_o without w_r .

Example



Ownership

	c_o	c_d	c_f
w_r	-0.016	0.973	0.971

Example



Ownership

	c_o	c_d	c_f
w_r	-0.016	0.973	0.971
w_f	0.968	0.970	0.005

\mathbf{w}_f and \mathbf{c}_f

- \mathbf{w}_f : large z_{lc} for \mathbf{c}_o and $\mathbf{c}_d = \mathbf{c}_o + \mathbf{w}_r$

$$\mathbf{c}_o \cdot \mathbf{w}_f, \quad (\mathbf{c}_o + \mathbf{w}_r) \cdot \mathbf{w}_f.$$

- \mathbf{c}_f : small z_{lc} to \mathbf{w}_f

$$\mathbf{c}_f \cdot \mathbf{w}_f \approx 0.$$

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- \mathbf{w}_f : large z_{lc} for \mathbf{c}_o and $\mathbf{c}_d = \mathbf{c}_o + \mathbf{w}_r$

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- \mathbf{c}_f : small z_{lc} to \mathbf{w}_f

$$\mathbf{c}_f \cdot \mathbf{w}_f \approx 0.$$

- Idea:

- \mathbf{w}_f has high correlation with \mathbf{c}_d (or \mathbf{c}_o):
 $\mathbf{w}_f \cdot \mathbf{c}_d = 1.$

- $\mathbf{c}_f = \mathbf{c}_d - \mathbf{w}_f / \|\mathbf{w}_f\|^2.$

A Naive Solution

- Directly using $\mathbf{c}_d / \|\mathbf{c}_d\|^2$ as \mathbf{w}_f
 - $\mathbf{c}_f = \mathbf{c}_d - \mathbf{c}_d \approx 0$ has poor fidelity

A Naive Solution

- Directly using $\mathbf{c}_d / \|\mathbf{c}_d\|^2$ as \mathbf{w}_f
 - $\mathbf{c}_f = \mathbf{c}_d - \mathbf{c}_d \approx 0$ has poor fidelity
- So
 - \mathbf{w}_f has high z_{lc} to \mathbf{c}_o .
 - but, is noisy.

A Better Solution

Using the Fourier transformation F :

- Project to Fourier bases:

$$\mathbf{c}_d^1 = F \mathbf{c}_d.$$

- Scaling \mathbf{c}_d^1 by a random diagonal matrix D into a random vector:

$$\mathbf{c}_d^2 = D \mathbf{c}_d^1.$$

- Reconstruct it back:


$$\mathbf{w}_f = F^T \mathbf{c}_d^2 = F^T D F \mathbf{c}_d.$$

Check

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbf{w}_f \cdot \mathbf{c}_o &= (F^T D F)(\mathbf{c}_d) \cdot \mathbf{c}_o \\ &= \mathbf{c}_o^T (F^T D F) \mathbf{c}_d \\ &= (D^{1/2} F \mathbf{c}_o)^T (D^{1/2} F (\mathbf{c}_o + \mathbf{w}_r)) \\ &= \mathbf{c}'_o \cdot \mathbf{c}'_o + \mathbf{c}'_o \cdot \mathbf{w}'_r \\ &\approx \mathbf{c}'_o \cdot \mathbf{c}'_o.\end{aligned}$$

High correlation!

Illustration



More like noisy image, but not enough.

A Refinement


Add noise before applying Fourier transformation.

$$\mathbf{w}_f = (F^T D F)(\mathbf{c}_d + \mathbf{n}).$$

Check:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbf{w}_f \cdot \mathbf{c}_o &= (F^T D F)(\mathbf{c}_d + \mathbf{n}) \cdot \mathbf{c}_o \\ &= (D^{1/2} F \mathbf{c}_o)^T (D^{1/2} F (\mathbf{c}_d + \mathbf{n})) \\ &\approx \mathbf{c}'_o \cdot \mathbf{c}'_o + \mathbf{c}'_o \cdot \mathbf{n}' \\ &\approx \mathbf{c}'_o \cdot \mathbf{c}'_o\end{aligned}$$

Illustration



A noisy image, but high correlation to c_o .

$$c_f = c_d - 0.995w_f.$$

Ownership

	c_o	c_d	c_f
w_r	-0.016	0.973	0.971

$$c_f = c_d - 0.995w_f.$$

Ownership

	c_o	c_d	c_f
w_r	-0.016	0.973	0.971
w_f	0.968	0.970	0.005

Countering Ambiguity Attacks

Make the reference pattern dependent on c_o .

- No c_o , no reference pattern.

Using the md5 of the c_o as the seed of pseudo-noise generator.

- Adding a constraint: $w_r = \text{PN}(\text{md5}(c_o))$.
- Difficult to find a w_f
 - $w_f \cdot c_o$ is high,
 - AND $w_f = \text{PN}(\text{md5}(c_f))$.

Presentation: 8.1

Evaluating Perceptual Impact of Watermarks.

In addition:

- In color image: CIE
- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Color_difference