

NAME

getpass – get a password

SYNOPSIS

```
#include <unistd.h>
```

```
char *getpass(const char *prompt);
```

Feature Test Macro Requirements for glibc (see **feature_test_macros(7)**):

getpass():

Since glibc 2.2.2:

```
_XOPEN_SOURCE && !(_POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 200112L)
    /* Glibc since 2.19: */ _DEFAULT_SOURCE
    /* Glibc versions <= 2.19: */ _BSD_SOURCE
```

Before glibc 2.2.2:

none

DESCRIPTION

This function is obsolete. Do not use it. If you want to read input without terminal echoing enabled, see the description of the *ECHO* flag in **termios(3)**.

The **getpass()** function opens */dev/tty* (the controlling terminal of the process), outputs the string *prompt*, turns off echoing, reads one line (the "password"), restores the terminal state and closes */dev/tty* again.

RETURN VALUE

The function **getpass()** returns a pointer to a static buffer containing (the first **PASS_MAX** bytes of) the password without the trailing newline, terminated by a null byte ('\0'). This buffer may be overwritten by a following call. On error, the terminal state is restored, *errno* is set appropriately, and NULL is returned.

ERRORS

The function may fail if

ENXIO

The process does not have a controlling terminal.

FILES

/dev/tty

ATTRIBUTES

For an explanation of the terms used in this section, see **attributes(7)**.

Interface	Attribute	Value
getpass()	Thread safety	MT-Unsafe term

CONFORMING TO

Present in SUSv2, but marked LEGACY. Removed in POSIX.1-2001.

NOTES

In the GNU C library implementation, if */dev/tty* cannot be opened, the prompt is written to *stderr* and the password is read from *stdin*. There is no limit on the length of the password. Line editing is not disabled.

According to SUSv2, the value of **PASS_MAX** must be defined in *<limits.h>* in case it is smaller than 8, and can in any case be obtained using *sysconf(_SC_PASS_MAX)*. However, POSIX.2 withdraws the constants **PASS_MAX** and **_SC_PASS_MAX**, and the function **getpass()**. The glibc version accepts **_SC_PASS_MAX** and returns **BUFSIZ** (e.g., 8192).

BUGS

The calling process should zero the password as soon as possible to avoid leaving the cleartext password visible in the process's address space.

SEE ALSO

crypt(3)

COLOPHON

This page is part of release 5.02 of the Linux *man-pages* project. A description of the project, information about reporting bugs, and the latest version of this page, can be found at <https://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/>.