NAME

system - execute a shell command

SYNOPSIS

#include <stdlib.h>

int system(const char *command);

DESCRIPTION

The **system()** library function uses **fork(2)** to create a child process that executes the shell command specified in *command* using **execl(3)** as follows:

```
execl("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", command, (char *) NULL);
```

system() returns after the command has been completed.

During execution of the command, **SIGCHLD** will be blocked, and **SIGINT** and **SIGQUIT** will be ignored, in the process that calls **system**(). (These signals will be handled according to their defaults inside the child process that executes *command*.)

If *command* is NULL, then **system**() returns a status indicating whether a shell is available on the system.

RETURN VALUE

The return value of **system**() is one of the following:

- * If command is NULL, then a nonzero value if a shell is available, or 0 if no shell is available.
- * If a child process could not be created, or its status could not be retrieved, the return value is -1 and *errno* is set to indicate the error.
- * If a shell could not be executed in the child process, then the return value is as though the child shell terminated by calling **_exit**(2) with the status 127.
- * If all system calls succeed, then the return value is the termination status of the child shell used to execute *command*. (The termination status of a shell is the termination status of the last command it executes.)

In the last two cases, the return value is a "wait status" that can be examined using the macros described in **waitpid**(2). (i.e., **WIFEXITED**(), **WEXITSTATUS**(), and so on).

system() does not affect the wait status of any other children.

ERRORS

system() can fail with any of the same errors as **fork**(2).

ATTRIBUTES

For an explanation of the terms used in this section, see **attributes**(7).

Interface	Attribute	Value
system()	Thread safety	MT-Safe

CONFORMING TO

POSIX.1-2001, POSIX.1-2008, C89, C99.

NOTES

 $\operatorname{system}()$ provides simplicity and convenience: it handles all of the details of calling $\operatorname{fork}(2)$, $\operatorname{execl}(3)$, and $\operatorname{waitpid}(2)$, as well as the necessary manipulations of signals; in addition, the shell performs the usual substitutions and I/O redirections for *command*. The main cost of $\operatorname{system}()$ is inefficiency: additional system calls are required to create the process that runs the shell and to execute the shell.

If the **_XOPEN_SOURCE** feature test macro is defined (before including *any* header files), then the macros described in **waitpid**(2) (**WEXITSTATUS**(), etc.) are made available when including *<stdlib.h>*.

As mentioned, **system**() ignores **SIGINT** and **SIGQUIT**. This may make programs that call it from a loop uninterruptible, unless they take care themselves to check the exit status of the child. For example:

```
while (something) {
```

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According to POSIX.1, it is unspecified whether handlers registered using **pthread_atfork**(3) are called during the execution of **system**(). In the glibc implementation, such handlers are not called.

In versions of glibc before 2.1.3, the check for the availability of /bin/sh was not actually performed if command was NULL; instead it was always assumed to be available, and **system()** always returned 1 in this case. Since glibc 2.1.3, this check is performed because, even though POSIX.1-2001 requires a conforming implementation to provide a shell, that shell may not be available or executable if the calling program has previously called **chroot(**2) (which is not specified by POSIX.1-2001).

It is possible for the shell command to terminate with a status of 127, which yields a **system**() return value that is indistinguishable from the case where a shell could not be executed in the child process.

Caveats

Do not use **system**() from a privileged program (a set-user-ID or set-group-ID program, or a program with capabilities) because strange values for some environment variables might be used to subvert system integrity. For example, **PATH** could be manipulated so that an arbitrary program is executed with privilege. Use the **exec**(3) family of functions instead, but not **execlp**(3) or **execvp**(3) (which also use the **PATH** environment variable to search for an executable).

system() will not, in fact, work properly from programs with set-user-ID or set-group-ID privileges on systems on which */bin/sh* is bash version 2: as a security measure, bash 2 drops privileges on startup. (Debian uses a different shell, **dash**(1), which does not do this when invoked as **sh**.)

Any user input that is employed as part of *command* should be *carefully* sanitized, to ensure that unexpected shell commands or command options are not executed. Such risks are especially grave when using **system**() from a privileged program.

SEE ALSO

sh(1), execve(2), fork(2), sigaction(2), sigprocmask(2), wait(2), exec(3), signal(7)

COLOPHON

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