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XSS in team name field #592
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Okay this is a reasonable issue. XSS from a privileged user to a privileged user is not a problem because there is no escalation. |
* Chals endpoint seperation (#572) * Separate the logic of ctftime and email confirmations and admin checking into decorators * Separate the chals endpoint into /chals and /chals/:id. Closes #552, #435. * Challenges are now loaded directly from the server before being displayed to the user. * Challenge modals now use `{{ description }}` instead of `{{ desc }}`. * 403 is now a more common status code and can indicate that a CTF has not begun or that you are not logged in. This is in addition to CSRF failures. * Update tests to new behavior * Fixing glitch if an entry chal or team id isn't defined * Markdown it (#574) * Replace Marked with Markdown-It * Update modal change (#576) * Switch update modals to use nunjucks instead of JS to load in data. * Fix previewing challenges after hitting the challenge update button. * Fix edit-files issue with an unnecessary request. * Fix solves button * Closes #592
@ColdHeat I know this issue is old, but this comment is not responding to this issue. I disagree with your assertion regarding XSS without escalation. Although self XSS is of significantly lower severity than remotely-exploitable reflected/stored XSS vulns, it is an easy fix and should be fixed. Otherwise, it is possible for the vuln could be chained with another vuln and used in a practical attack. XSS is an easy fix 99% of the time, so it's almost always worth the effort to go ahead and fix it even though a practical attack may not seem apparent. Edit: This comment would probably be more appropriate on this issue, sorry: #905 (comment) |
* Chals endpoint seperation (CTFd#572) * Separate the logic of ctftime and email confirmations and admin checking into decorators * Separate the chals endpoint into /chals and /chals/:id. Closes CTFd#552, CTFd#435. * Challenges are now loaded directly from the server before being displayed to the user. * Challenge modals now use `{{ description }}` instead of `{{ desc }}`. * 403 is now a more common status code and can indicate that a CTF has not begun or that you are not logged in. This is in addition to CSRF failures. * Update tests to new behavior * Fixing glitch if an entry chal or team id isn't defined * Markdown it (CTFd#574) * Replace Marked with Markdown-It * Update modal change (CTFd#576) * Switch update modals to use nunjucks instead of JS to load in data. * Fix previewing challenges after hitting the challenge update button. * Fix edit-files issue with an unnecessary request. * Fix solves button * Closes CTFd#592
I noticed that there are a few reports of XSS and you don't seem to believe that XSS from a privileged user is a problem. I have found an XSS where a user can target an admin user.
If someone makes a team name with a script, when an admin user tries to delete the team, the script will execute in the popup window. Case in point, iframe in the demo environment.
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