Visualizing Climate-Refugees: Race, Vulnerability, and Resilience in Global Liberal Politics

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The literature on climate-induced migration agrees that it is almost impossible to identify individual people as displaced by global warming. At the same time, it is very hard not to see climate-refugees—thanks to the news, reports, films, and charity adverts that picture climate-refugees as the "human face of global warming." This article engages with this often unnoticed and taken-for-granted field of visibility and investigates its implications for the securitization of climate-induced migration. Based on a Foucauldian notion of security, the paper conducts a visual discourse analysis of 135 images collected from publications, newspapers, and Web sites on climate-induced migration. Throughout this analysis, the climate migrant/refugee appears as a racialized figure, a passive and helpless victim of global warming. In turn, global warming is pictured as an overwhelming, omnipresent, and erratic threat, endangering large parts of the global population. This field of visibility showcases a shift from liberal biopolitics in the name of human security toward securing through fostering resilience. This shift depoliticizes the issue of global warming, makes those affected by it responsible for their own survival, reinstates them as the dangerous Other and so bars them from crossing the global "life-chance divide."

How do you recognize a climate migrant/refugee when you see one? Put simply, most of the serious research on climate-induced migration tells you that you do not! Earlier studies of environmental migration assumed a rather deterministic relationship between climatic change and mobility and sought to predict the refugee flows which would be triggered by global warming (Gemenne 2011). Yet today scholars agree "that migration has many causes, and that climatic variability is just one of several factors that explain migration" (Gemenne and Baldwin 2013:265). The authoritative Foresight Report further concludes that "the range and complexity of the interactions between these drivers means that it will rarely be possible to distinguish individuals for whom environmental factors are the sole driver" (Foresight 2011:9). Migrants' backgrounds are too complex to classify into one single category (Jakobeit and Methmann 2012). Moreover, those subsumed under this category often reject the very notion of being a climate-refugee (Mortreux and Barnett 2009; Farbotko and Lazrus 2011). The climate-refugee, it seems, is a "speculative, virtual phenomenon," and only comes into being through "future conditional knowledge practices," such as "scenario forecasting

and stochastic modeling" (Gemenne and Baldwin 2013:267). In fact, it is almost impossible to see climate-refugees.[1] Yet, for the casual observer, it is impossible not to see climate migrants or refugees. Most people already have an image in mind when it comes to the issue of climate-induced migration—thanks to the news, reports, films, or charity adverts which picture climate-refugees as the "human face of climate change" (Care International 2011). Barely noticed images illustrate the message that the complex and abstract phenomenon of climate change endangers "real people." Being a mere illustration, the images picturing the often invisible impacts of global warming remain unseen in the background. Nonetheless, they subconsciously convey a sense of what (potential) climate migrants/refugees and their situation looks like.

This article investigates the implications of this "human face" for the securitization of climate-induced migration. The climate migrant/refugee features prominently in debates about climate security in the UN Security Council (UN Security Council 2007; Security Council 2011), while NGOs warn of "future floods of refugees" (NRC 2008). The possibility of climate-induced migration makes climate change a "threat multiplier" (UN Secretary General 2009). Scholars have engaged with this securitization of climate change and climate-induced migration from various perspectives (Trombetta 2008; Brzoska 2009; Hartmann 2010; Methmann and Rothe 2012; Oels 2012; McDonald 2013). However, this literature only covers the language and practices of securitization. The visibility of security is neglected. My analysis seeks to fill this gap, asking: How are climate-refugees depicted? How is climate change made visible? And what does this imply for the securitization of climate-induced migration? As the visibility of climate-induced migration is mostly about people, these questions are approached from a Foucauldian perspective, where security is not primarily concerned with sovereignty and nation states but with managing and optimizing the population (Evans 2010). The next section briefly outlines this approach and develops a methodology that allows us to study "fields of visibility" and how they interact with a Foucauldian notion of security (Dean 2010). In particular, I draw on Gillian Rose's (2007) method of visual discourse analysis and investigate a sample of 135 images collected from major NGO, IGO, and scientific reports as well as a representative number of German, British, and US newspapers, and global Web sites (see Table 1). As visual discourse analysis is concerned with the intertextuality of images, I successively widen my sample to other visual landmarks which characterize the discourse on climate-induced migration, such as photo exhibitions or documentaries.

The main part of the article maps the configurations of power that emerge in the visual discourse of climate-induced migration. I first delineate the field of visibility by carving out significant invisibilities—among them the virtual absence of traditional notions of national security. Second, I show how the field of visibility is almost exclusively populated by (potential) climate migrants/refugees. They are depicted as racialized and passive victims of global warming. Third, I argue that climate change is dominantly visualized as a potentially apocalyptic threat. I suggest that both patterns together constitute a configuration of power in which liberal biopolitics identifies a large part of the global population as vulnerable climate migrants/refugees, and resilience provides the scheme for securing them. Visually securitizing climate-induced migration in this way not only provides a subtle image of "white supremacy," but also depoliticizes the issue of climate change and makes those affected by it responsible for their own survival.

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[1]Throughout the article I refer to climate-induced migration to talk about the phenomenon at hand. When I talk about individual people, I refer to the double notion of the climate-refugee/migrant to do justice to the distinction between rapid displacement and gradual change driving migration. Keep in mind, though, that both refer to discursively produced problematizations/subjectivities and not actual phenomena, which I do not intend to reify.

Table 1. Sampling

Newspapers	Reports
The New York Times	Blue Alert (Greenpeace 2008)
The Independent	In Search of Shelter (Care International et al. 2009)
The Daily Mail	The Human Tide (Christian Aid 2009)
The Guardian	No Place Like Home (Care International et al. 2009)
The Daily Telegraph	Migration and Global Environmental Change (Foresight 2011)
BBC	
Der Spiegel	Assessing the Evidence (IOM 2010)
Der Stern	Future Floods of Refugees (NRC 2008)
Die Zeit	Climate Change, Vulnerability and Human Mobility (Afifi, Govil, Sakdapolrak, and Warner 2012)
Deutsche Welle	Climate Change as a Security Risk (WBGU 2007)
Web sites	
IOM Web site (http://www.iom.int)	
Policy Innovations Blog (http://www.policyinnovations.org)	
Worldwatch Institute Blog (http://blogs.worldwatch.org)	
UK Climate Change & Migration Coalition (http://climatemigration.org.uk)	

Climate-Induced Migration as a Field of Visibility

By and large, the literature on climate security agrees that global warming is increasingly understood as a security issue—not, however, security in the sense of national security (Brzoska 2009; Detraz and Betsill 2009; Methmann and Rothe 2012; Oels 2012; McDonald 2013). Given this, I employ a notion of security that emerges from Foucault's lectures on biopolitics, governmentality, and security (Foucault 2007, 2008). For Foucault, security includes all "the practices and institutions that ensure the optimal and proper functioning of the economic, vital, and social processes ... and would thus also include health, welfare, and education systems" (Dean 2010:29). Thus, security is not only concerned with obvious threats to territory and rule, but also with the optimization of the population. In his lectures, Foucault fleshed out different governmentalities of security, which render the population as the referent object of security, governable in different ways. As the term governmentality implies, discourses are crucial here (Gordon 1991). They problematize issues in a certain way and so legitimize and rationalize particular forms of exercising power. In this sense, I am interested in how discourses of climate-induced migration affect the way it is securitized and what political implications they produce.

I am concerned here with a particular form of discourse: visuality. Large parts of critical security studies have so far failed to engage with visuality in detail (Williams 2003). However, there is a growing awareness of the effect of visibilities on securitization (Campbell 1999; Bleiker and Kay 2007; Vuori 2010; Hansen 2011). In this paper, I follow this trail and engage with the implications of particular ways of seeing and showing a security problem. My starting point is the notion of the "field of visibility," which is prominent in studies of governmentality (Dean 2010:41). If we understand security as discourses and practices that render the population governable in a certain form,

> [w]e might ask what the field of visibility is that characterizes a regime of government, by what kind of light it illuminates and defines certain objects and with what shadows and darkness it obscures and hides others. ... These all make it possible to 'picture' who and what is to be governed, how relations of authority and obedience are constituted in space, how different locales and agents are to

> be connected with one another, what problems are to be solved and what objec-
> tives are to be sought. (*Ibid.*)

In order to map this field of visibility, this paper conducts a visual discourse analysis informed by Gillian Rose's influential work, *Visual Methodologies* (Rose 2007: chapters 8–9). Rose approaches images as a discourse in the Foucauldian sense of the term, since "visuality will make certain things visible in particular ways, and other things unseeable, for example, and subjects will be produced and act within that field of vision" (*ibid.*:191). Compared to other visual methodologies, the strength of discourse analysis lies in its ability to flesh out the "intertextuality" of images, which

> refers to the way that the meanings of any one discursive image or text depend
> not only on that one text or image, but also on the meanings carried by other
> images and texts. (*Ibid.*)

This hooks up well with Dean's fields of visibility. Visual discourse analysis is looking for "recurring themes or visual patterns" (*ibid.*:208) within the analyzed material and so draws our attention to the manifold connections in a certain field of visibility. It is furthermore aware that visuality is never neutral, but rather socially produced and constructed and with political effects. Like Dean, visual discourse analysis is also interested in the sites and mechanisms that produce particular visibilities, the institutionalized ways of seeing and showing. Like the metaphor of the "field," which implies a clear demarcation, visual discourse analysis is aware that particular things remain invisible and so also directs our attention to what we cannot see (*ibid.*:219). Finally, visual discourse analysis combines images and texts. Thus, intertextuality also refers to the connections or even tensions between linguistic and visual discourses.

My sampling strategy thus follows Rose's advice. She advocates an evolutionary process that starts with relevant and particularly productive images and successively widens the focus (*ibid.*:199). Accordingly, I began by putting together a sample of 135 images, including all pictures from the most notable reports on climate-induced migration, relevant Web sites, and newspaper articles.[2] I started with the most prominent reports on climate-induced migration and successively broadened my sample. As a first step, I then inductively coded the sample in the style of content analysis (*ibid.*:210) in order to identify key themes and recurring images (see table 2). Based on this, I concentrated on particularly important publications in order to flesh out the meaning of these key tropes in detail (Greenpeace 2008; Care International, CIESIN, UNHCR, UNU-EHS, and The World Bank 2009; Foresight 2011). Moreover, to highlight the intertextuality of the discourse, I have expanded the scope to other forms of visibility that emerged throughout my research, for example photo exhibitions, videos, and documentaries. Finally, I contextualized these findings with the existing literature on climate security in order to flesh out the implications in terms of securitization.

Invisibilities: Delineating the Field

Let us start from the margins. What is not shown in the discourse about climate-induced migration? I'll discuss three visual tropes that are virtually absent from the sample of analyzed images: the causes of global warming, endangered nat-

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[2]Newspaper databases such as LexisNexis usually only contain the textual content of the stored articles. For that reason, I have used the online archives of the selected newspapers and searched for the terms "climate migration" and "climate-refugee." I only included those articles in the sample that contained visual information beyond text.

TABLE 2. Codes

Code	Frequency	Explanation
Activities		
Governance	7	The people displayed on the image manage the impacts of climate change or climate-induced migration officially (for example distributing food packages)
Mobility	28	The people displayed on the image are on the move, obviously beyond their daily routines (as indicated, for example, by bags and chests they are carrying)
Passive/Helpless	30	The people are not engaged in any visible activity or they are waiting for help, and obviously cannot cope with the situation they are in
Reproduction	17	The people displayed are engaged in activities concerning their reproduction, for example fetching water, tending goats, etc.
Preparation	2	People are actively preparing for future harm that might arise from climate change
Context		
Camp	11	People are living in tents/sheds that belong to a refugee camp
Nature	34	People are displayed in a natural environment
Rural	27	People are displayed in a rural environment, that is, in an environment that shows signs of human habitation or settlement
Urban	18	People are displayed in an urban environment
Water	13	People are displayed in a water environment, often on boats or sheds located at a nearby shoreline, for example
People		
Children	27	The picture mostly displays children
Women	35	The image mostly displays women
Elderly	3	The image mostly shows elderly people
Mass	11	The image shows an anonymous mass of people (usually more than 10)
Non-White	78	The people on the image are People of Color
White	5	The people on the image are white
Climate Change		
Drought	10	
Flood	30	
Rain	5	
Storm	4	

ure, and national security. Already these limits of visibility have important implications for securitization.

The first obvious omission in the field of visibility is the sources of global warming. They appear on only six pictures that were taken from the Environmental Justice Foundation report (2008) on climate-induced migration. Instead, global warming is depicted as a simple matter of fact. Of course, the analyzed publications are mostly concerned with the impacts of, and adaptation to, climate change. However, as the In Search of Shelter report puts it, their first and foremost policy recommendation is to "avoid dangerous climate change" and "reduce greenhouse gas emissions to safe levels" (Care International et al. 2009:v). Against this backdrop, it is striking that the sources of these greenhouse gas emissions are virtually invisible.

Second, traditional ways of communicating environmental change are also strikingly absent. In general, imaging environmental change is often difficult because it comprises complex and mostly gradual processes (Doyle 2007). Where spectacular environmental disasters such as those in Chernobyl, Bhopal, or Seveso are clearly visible, most environmental problems have to be symbolized. Scientific discourses often express environmental change in formal scenarios or figures of probability. The general public, by contrast, relies on images (Hulme

2004). For example, the famous photograph 22,727, shot by the NASA mission Apollo 17 in 1972, soon became a symbol for the fragility of "Spaceship Earth." The Brundtland Report of 1987, one of the hallmarks of global environmental governance, mirrors this prominent image in its opening passage which revolves around the image of "a small and fragile ball" in space (Brundtland 1987:1) and so feeds into a popular "whole-earth" discourse (Cosgrove 2001:262–263). By contrast, Planet Earth appears only once in the sample. The theme of the vulnerability of nature is therefore largely absent. Only a minor fraction of the sample pictures what one could call, paraphrasing Hulme (2009), a "lost paradise" discourse. This fraction contains beautiful images of nature, representing its pristine and fragile character. Only a few images show low-lying small islands, the tropical rainforest or savannah landscapes, implying that these are threatened by climate change.

Finally, given the strong association of climate-induced migration with discourses of security, it is striking that the sample makes almost no explicit visual reference to traditional notions of security. Only one image out of 135 displays something similar to military security. The title page of the German Advisory Council report displays a soldier on an armored vehicle who is apparently deployed to deal with the impacts of global warming (WBGU 2007). The Greenpeace Blue Alert report's title page, moreover, shows a large group of angry men, thus alluding to threats to stability and security (Greenpeace 2008). A remarkable fraction of the pictures also show people on the move. In terms of security, this could imply that a mass of climate-refugees will soon come knocking at the doors of our homelands. However, not one single image shows borders, which one might well expect in a migration discourse. Obvious threats triggering traditional security policies are thus not very salient in the field of visibility.

The Human Security Face of Global Warming

So what do we see instead? The rest of the sample, to put it bluntly, shows people. Yet, these people are endowed with significant characteristics. As I will show in this section, the figure of the climate migrant/refugee produced here is marked by a number of racializing tropes and is thus inserted into a liberal–biopolitical governmentality of security. The concept of racialization highlights the complex nature of racist discourses. Whereas talking about race risks reifying the category itself, racialization points to the manifold practices through which race comes into being. Practices of racialization categorize social groups on the basis of bodily attributes (Miles 1989:75) and connect them to particular stereotypes and supposedly natural or typical characteristics (Kobayashi and Peake 2000:393). Race and racialization are more than racial hatred. Whereas hatred is tied to the extraordinary, racialization points to the fact that racism is manifest "in the microexpressions of daily life" (Goldberg 1997:21).[3] Racialization is thus a set of practices which create social groups on the basis of bodily attributes and ascribes meaning to them.

The Racialized Climate Migrant/Refugee

Racialization is the most easily discernible pattern in the visual discourse about climate-induced migration. It associates being a climate migrant/refugee with not being White and attaches a number of racializing tropes to it by drawing on deeply ingrained stereotypes about poor Southern populations. On the one

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[3]When talking about racialized figures, I thus do not intend to accuse someone of "being a racist," but rather to highlight how racism is reproduced through very mundane practices.

hand, stating the obvious, the climate migrant/refugee is obviously not White. Only five of the 135 pictures do not show People of Color. Even the pictured victims of the 2004 Hurricane Katrina that hit New Orleans are Black. This might correspond to the ambition of the analyzed reports to portray climate change as a matter of global justice. Nonetheless, it associates being a climate migrant/refugee with not being White, thereby mobilizing the whole range of stereotypes about Southern populations. On the other hand, as Andrew Baldwin points out, the characteristics of this group are also "arrived at by implication" (Baldwin 2013:4). The field of visibility presents the climate migrants/refugees in their supposed natural environments. There are 34 images showing people in entirely natural environments, another 27 locate them in a rural environment, even though the majority of people on the planet live in cities and many impacts of global warming will hit the urban poor. However, it seems that the visual discourse of climate-refugees downplays urban environments as only 18 images refer to urban contexts. In other words, the discourse sticks to the image of the South as a place of primordial lifestyles and modes of production. This corresponds with the usual charity adverts. They portray Southern populations as inferior, primordial, and deficient (Kiesel and Bendix 2010:486; Manzo 2010). The "colonial gaze" of such adverts is marked by an "absence of culture" and a "focus on nature, naturalness, and nativeness" (Kiesel and Bendix 2010:486; own translation). Moreover, by putting the South at the center of attention, such a pictorial strategy runs the risk of turning people into "victims" of climate change without any capacity for action. It is "recycling Western visions of a temperate world that exercises dominion over tropical realms" (Manzo 2010:1003).

What is more, most of the people displayed in the images are passive or waiting. If at all, they are occupied with reproductive activities: fetching water, cooking, tending goats, or harvesting crops. Only a few pictures show people actively trying to prepare for a changing climate. Two pictures show construction works: a group of women constructing an embankment; people erecting the wall of a makeshift shed. In addition, 28 images show people that are somehow on the move, obviously beyond their home context as they carry luggage or travel in groups. These are the only occupations beyond waiting or reproduction that people in the images actually pursue. Finally, the majority of people are women or children. Of 85 pictures, the 55 showing people are populated exclusively by these two groups. As Kate Manzo argues, the iconography of childhood "reinforces an impression of both institutional efficacy and the power to act in *loco parentis* by tapping into cultural associations of childhood with dependence, innocence, and the need for protection and care" (Manzo 2008:652; emphasis in original). The same obviously holds true for women. Racism and sexism share a common genealogy, which is why racialized images are often also feminized ones (McWhorter 2004). However, again, femininity and childhood are no essential category; they are social constructions that often also apply to the men represented in the images. For example, a report in a British newspaper on climate-refugees was illustrated with a man under a makeshift tent, sitting, and staring in a childlike pose (Harvey 2011). This is in line with many colonial stereotypes that equate not being White with infancy and immaturity (Kiesel and Bendix 2010:485).

Human Security and Liberal Biopolitics

In other words, we look at climate-induced migration with a racialized gaze. As Figure 1 aptly demonstrates, (potential) climate migrants and refugees are identified by deeply ingrained (post-)colonial stereotypes: they are mostly women and children, in rural or natural environments, waiting for climate change to come. What are the implications of this for the securitization of climate-induced

FIG 1. Racialized Victims
(Source: Care International et al. 2009)

migration? What concrete configurations of power appear in these images? How do they render climate-induced migration governable in the name of security? I would like to suggest that the racialization feeds into a liberal–biopolitical way of securing. It creates a highly hierarchical relationship between North and South and turns the latter into an object for top-down intervention and management.

Biopolitics is closely tied to the notion of racism. Biopolitics describes how, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, "life has become the 'object-target' for specific techniques and technologies of power" (Anderson 2011:28). The liberal–biopolitical governmentality of security is concerned with the life and well-being of the population, "organizing circulation, eliminating its dangerous elements, making a division between good and bad circulation, and maximizing the good circulation by diminishing the bad" (Foucault 2007:18). Foucault pointed out that racism is crucial to liberal biopolitics. It defines "the break between what must live and what must die ... It is a way of separating out the groups that exist within a population. It is, in short, a way of establishing a bio-logical-type caesura within a population that appears to be a biological domain" (Foucault 2003:254–255). Biopolitics manifests in "internal racism" as a "pattern of imagination according to which the population must be defended against vari-ous forms of degeneration," mostly in Western societies (Rasmussen 2011:38). Yet, external racism also has a biopolitical component, for example, by legitimiz-ing interventions in non-Western contexts such as population control (Tambe 2011). Finally, racialization is crucial to post 9/11 security practices which seek to single out dangerous individuals (Maguire 2012). In this sense, racialization is a crucial part of liberal biopolitics.

Liberal biopolitics is deeply ingrained in environmental and development pol-icy through the notion of human security. Popularized by a UNDP report in 1994, human security seeks to replace the survival of the nation state with a focus on the well-being of people; in other words, it represents a liberal–biopolit-ical governmentality of security (Duffield and Waddell 2006; Chandler 2012b). Throughout the 1990s, human security became the dominant framework in debates about the environment-security nexus; the flag around which critics of a

state-centered conception of environmental security rallied (Barnett 2001; Dalby 2002; Brauch 2009). Recently, Detraz and Betsill (2009), for example, have shown that human security dominates debates about climate security in the UN Security Council at the cost of national security. The racialization of the climate migrant/refugee in the pictures analyzed here indicates that liberal biopolitics also dominates the field of climate-induced migration.

This is also expressed in the omnipresent notion of vulnerability, which has gained considerable weight in discourses about environmental change (Methmann and Oels 2013). The concept of vulnerability points to the fact that the impact of natural disasters, for example, has not only a physical, but also a social dimension, as people are always part of a coupled human-ecological system (Adger 2006). As the authoritative Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change emphasizes, though, vulnerability

> constitutes an internal characteristic of the affected element. In the field of disaster risk, this includes the characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influences their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from the adverse effects of physical events.   (IPCC 2012:32, emphasis added)

Vulnerability, thus, is first and foremost an individual problem. This fits well with the sample. Most people in the sample are displayed within their natural or rural environment and identified by particular individual characteristics. This clearly conveys a sense of vulnerability. However, vulnerability not only focuses on people. It also seeks to provide a systemic perspective by revealing patterns of vulnerability. For example, scholars are trying to identify and map those parts of the global population which are particularly vulnerable to climate change (for example, O'Brien, Leichenko, Kelkar, Venema, Aandahl, Tompkins, Javed, Bhadwal, Barg, Nygaard, and West 2004). These maps then identify "hotspots" of vulnerability, which allow for targeted biopolitical intervention. This fits well with a recurrent pattern of visibility in the sample of analyzed documents: maps which seek to display the vulnerability of particular populations. The In Search of Shelter report represents a case in point, as a large part of the report is made up of such maps. For example, it shows areas prone to drought, floods, or sea level rise and relates this to information on agricultural technologies, population density or pasture patterns. A sense of vulnerability is then created through overlaying these various pieces of information and so identifying hotspots of vulnerability. The truth claims of these images are based on scientific measurements and calculations as well as future projections, for example the IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report. These maps represent perfect examples for liberal biopolitics, as they underpin biopolitical intervention. For example, mapping vulnerability in India has legitimized biopolitical interventions in the form of forced sterilization of the rural poor, explicitly justified by the need to adapt to a changing climate (Reid 2014).[4] Others discuss the large-scale "planned" relocation of populations identified as vulnerable, managed by the World Bank and UNDP (Biermann and Boas 2010).

Linking information on lifestyles and projected changes in physical environments through scientific measures, populations are rendered vulnerable. Together with the racialized image of climate-induced migration which prevails in the sample, these vulnerable populations are cast as helpless and passive victims of climate change, unable to withstand the forces of nature and thus dependent on external assistance. Those affected by climate change are presented as unfit to resist or adapt, as passive victims who are obviously in need of Western

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[4]Reid discusses the example of the Indian regions of Bihar and Madhya Pradesh and connects the projects to representations of vulnerability also reproduced in my sample (namely in Greenpeace 2008:8).

care and intervention. This becomes apparent when one considers the primordial lifestyles and helplessness of the populations facing the forces of nature. The vulnerability of these people is highlighted, whereas agency, anticipation of, or even preparation for, climate change is hardly visible—and if so, their means are hardly sufficient. This enables targeted intervention and allows for top-down policies through global and Western institutions.

(Beyond) White Supremacy

This insight leads directly to the political implications of this visual discourse of climate-induced migration. As Duffield and Waddel put it, human security is "producing the 'humans' requiring securing" (Duffield and Waddell 2006:2). In this sense, the visual discourse casts climate-induced migration as an object of governance—as people in need of assistance. The crucial point, however, is that this creation is a dialectical process. Racialization creates an image of selfhood *vis-à-vis* the racialized other and so does the racialized figure of the climate migrant. It produces the Northern "environmental citizen" as the agent of change in the fight against global warming (Baldwin 2012). It creates a rather clear-cut savior–victim relationship between North and South: the racialized climate migrant/refugee and the White environmental citizen (*ibid.*). And this, in turn, feeds into and legitimizes "white supremacy," a political, economic and social system which—without being driven by obvious racial hatred—concentrates power and control in the hands of White people and supports White dominance and non-White subordination (Hooks 1989).

This hierarchy between environmental citizens and climate-refugees/migrants is also reflected in the production of this visual discourse. Most, if not all,[5] of the material included in the sample has been published by Northern institutions. Take, for example, the In Search of Shelter report—published by the US-based NGO Care International, based on research funded by the European Commission, written by researchers employed at New York's Columbia University and the United Nations University in Bonn and sponsored by the World Bank. And this bias is not a selection bias. It reflects the fact that the discourse on climate-induced migration is almost exclusively a Northern discourse. In other words, the visual discourse about climate-induced migration represents White people looking at Black climate-refugees as the racialized Other. It is this pattern which corresponds to the human security agenda of liberal biopolitics and so legitimizes top-down intervention by Northern governments, NGOs, and scientists on behalf of those most severely affected by climate change.

In light of this interpretation, there are, however, two important patterns that contradict the diagnosis of a liberal–biopolitical approach. First, it is striking that almost no intervention at all appears in the images. Only a few images show Northern/White people engaging in preventive and reactive measures, for example, handing out food aid to the victims. Whereas vulnerability is the dominant theme within the visual discourse, it does not seem to generate any form of intervention or top-down policy. By contrast, it is remarkable that hardly any policy at all appears in the picture. What is more, the discourse is not even interested in calculating and predicting vulnerability in detail so as to prevent its gravest impacts. On the one hand, many of the maps used to display the impact of climate change do not go into detail. They display large fractions of the Earth's surface as ground zero of global warming. On the other hand, being a victim is almost entirely defined in terms of racialized and colonial stereotypes. And these obviously apply to a huge number of people on the planet. In other

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[5]Greenpeace India's Blue Alert report is ambiguous in this regard, as it represents a Southern branch of a global, culturally Northern NGO.

words, the field of visibility of climate-induced migration undermines the decisive feature of security as liberal biopolitics: calculating and predicting vulnerability, locating it in a particular fraction of the global population, and curing the pathogenic parts of the global organism. In this sense, understanding the field of visibility of climate-induced migration as constitutive of liberal biopolitics represents a helpful starting point, but is not sufficient to fully grasp its implications for the securitization of climate migrants and refugees.

Climate-Refugees as "Agents of Change"

In this final section, I would like to suggest that the contradictions in understanding climate-induced migration as a liberal biopolitics signpost a shift in this very framework toward the concept of resilience.

The Apocalyptic Potentiality of Climate Change

This shift is already contained in the way climate change itself is depicted within the sample. The dominant way global warming, a highly gradual and complex process, becomes visualized in the sample is through extreme weather events in local contexts. The theme of flooding is most prominent in the sample, but droughts, storms, and rain are also notable. Pictures of extreme weather events use the past, and present them as harbingers or "canaries in the coalmine" (Manzo 2010). This creates a paradox, however. Thus, although extreme weather events are usually understood as some of the least directly attributable impacts of global warming, they become its symbolic expression in the visual discourse on climate-induced migration. Consequently, the emphasis on extreme weather events exaggerates the consequences of climate change by implying that all extreme weather events are related to climate change—creating a sense of a nature out of control (Swyngedouw 2010).

It is nevertheless striking that the majority of images do not directly refer to climate change. Instead, these images insinuate global warming by showing people in extremely humid, arid, or marine environments. Normally, one would not relate these images to climate change, and yet the fact that they appear in a context dedicated to climate change means that normal humid, marine, or arid environments become metaphors for global warming. In turn, climate change becomes a normal feature of this world. The field of visibility thus plays with the potentiality of climate change—the fact that the impact of climate change cannot be known in advance, that it strikes erratically and unpredictably and may hit anyone at any time. This image of a radically contingent climate change corresponds to a recent shift in climate science which acknowledges that global warming beyond a certain threshold—usually understood to be +2°C compared to pre-industrial levels—will be nonlinear and marked by certain tipping points which, once reached, will trigger catastrophic consequences (Lenton, Held, Kriegler, Hall, Lucht, and Rahmstorf 2008).

Against this backdrop, the broad-brush nature of most of the maps contained in the sample—which, I argued, would contradict liberal biopolitics—suddenly makes sense. What unites these maps is that, due to their low level of detail, they trigger the sense of a massive problem affecting large proportions of the earth's surface. The In Search of Shelter report (Care International et al. 2009), for instance, pictures Bangladesh and the entire Nile delta in the alarming color of red, thus implying that nobody within this area is safe from climate change. The possibility of apocalyptic events becomes a contingent feature of life in most parts of the planet, signposted by the absence or abundance of water. Together with the heavy reliance on floods, droughts, and large-scale maps, this feeds into the apocalyptic undertone that can be fre-

quently detected in discourses of climate security. Many cultural representations depict climate change as a dawning apocalypse—take, for example, Roland Emmerich's (2004) movie, *The Day after Tomorrow*; the independent drama-documentary, *The Age of Stupid* (Armstrong 2009); or the bestselling novel trilogy, *The Hunger Games*, by Suzanne Collins (2008), which is staged in a post-climate-change world.

Yet, the political discourse is also driven by apocalyptic tropes (Swyngedouw 2010; Methmann and Rothe 2012). The potentiality of climate change that is present in most of the analyzed pictures is a particular feature of such apocalyptic undertones: climate change can potentially strike anytime and anywhere, hitting almost anyone. Thus, the environment of a large proportion of the global population effectively constitutes the "banality of the apocalypse" and becomes a normal feature of their lives (De Goede and Randalls 2009).

Another remarkable example of this apocalyptic undertone is the photo exhibition, 100 Places to Remember Before They Disappear, which was sponsored by Care International, coeditor of In Search of Shelter. It shows 100 locations whose existence is supposedly threatened by climate change. It was shown as an exhibition in Copenhagen during COP 15 in 2009, published as a book, and even has its own YouTube channel (100 Places to Remember 2013). In its mission statement, it declares that "simply by drawing attention to the beauty of these places, 100 Places to Remember Before They Disappear creates an argument to preserve them" (*ibid.*). Although it seemingly contradicts my claim that nature lies at the margins of the field of visibility of climate-induced migration—most of the 100 places are natural monuments—the pristine nature that is projected to "disappear" directly supports the idea of the dawning apocalypse. It is important to keep in mind that not one of these places is literally going to "disappear." What the exhibition conveys, though, is a sense of the apocalyptic potentiality of climate change.

Potentiality and Racialization

This apocalyptic potentiality of climate change is crucial for understanding the implications of the racialized climate migrant/refugee for the securitization of climate-induced migration. As Andrew Baldwin has argued in detail, the theme of potentiality is of crucial importance for fully grasping the racialization of climate-induced migration. For Baldwin (2013), the racialization of the climate migrant/refugee is a feature of mainly three discursive tropes, which can also be found in the sample analyzed here. First, its "naturalness," whereby the climate migrant/refugee is thought to be driven rather deterministically to migration or conflict. This is, for example, conveyed by the idea of vulnerability, which leaves people no other choice than to migrate. Second, "its loss of political status," whereby the climate migrant/refugee is cast as a helpless victim, an object of governmental management. Finally, its "ambiguity," which sees the climate migrant/refugee enmeshed in a complex web of social–ecological conditions, further complicated by the potentiality of climate change. The crucial point, however, is that, in combination, these tropes turn the climate migrant/refugee into a potential threat. Whereas traditional colonial discourses create the

> [o]ther in the idiom of the pre-modern, in climate change and migration discourse, the Other is defined not in relation to the colonial past but in relation to the future … [T]he figure is not pre-modern, but extra-modern, not post-modern but yet-to-come … although the grammar of climate change and migration discourse bears the trace of colonial modernity, the discourse on climate change and migration is written almost exclusively in the future-conditional tense. (Baldwin 2012:634)

The racialization of the climate migrant/refugee is thus entirely bound to its potential for disrupting order on the planet as opposed to being an actual threat, rooted in its colonial Otherness. The dimensions of the potential are clearly visible in the analyzed visual discourse, in the form of the banality of the apocalypse, as described above. Climate change can unleash tremendously destructive forces which are latent virtually everywhere (of course, only in the Global South). This is clearly Brian Massumi's (1993:154) emergent potentiality of the world as "the churning seabed of crisis in the perpetual making," to which Baldwin refers. Only in conjunction with the way climate change is depicted in the field of visibility can we grasp the full implications for securitization. Thus, the racialization of the climate-refugee merges colonial markers of the past, and the future potential for disrupting global order, into a peculiar discourse of security. Whereas colonial tropes help to identify the dangerous poor, potentiality is the rationality that informs practices of security.

Securing Through Resilience

This key theme of omnipresent potentiality ties in with a reconfiguration of biopolitical security practices, traced by scholars in recent years. It is still based on biopolitics but disposes of the idea that risks and vulnerability can be calculated, predicted, and prevented. Instead, threats such as transnational terrorism are understood as radically contingent. This "paradigm of prudence" (Diprose, Stephenson, Mills, Race, and Hawkins 2008) combines two complementary responses: entirely eliminating risk through a "principle of precaution" (Aradau and van Munster 2007), and investing in the "resilience" of potential victims (Duffield 2011; Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams 2011; Walker and Cooper 2011). The latter is particularly relevant here. Thus, the rationale is, if we cannot prevent vulnerability due to the overwhelming and erratic nature of the threat, and if vulnerability potentially materializes in catastrophic consequences, we have to prepare people and societal infrastructure to be able to cope with such dramatic events. Resilience emerges as the positive correlate of vulnerability. In this sense, security does not seek to tame contingencies but governs "through contingency" (Dillon 2007), creating adaptive and resilient life that is able to sustain and transform itself in the face of even dramatic environmental change. What is more, "[l]ife that is exposed to environmental uncertainty can properly develop the desirable attributes of foresight, enterprise, and self-reliance" (Duffield 2011:758). Dramatic change remains a threat, but may also provide an opportunity.

Resilience is of growing importance in the field of development and climate change (Folke 2006). Chandler (2012a:128) has argued that the dominant paradigm of "development as freedom," which puts self-reliance and resilience at the center of development policies meets perfectly with the agenda for adaptation to global warming:

> Rather than the problems of Africa being seen as a lack of development resulting in dependency on climate uncertainties, the problem of development has increasingly been reinterpreted in terms of the problem of individual life-style choices and the survival strategies of the poor [so that the] African poor are problematized as being responsible for their own problems.

And this perfectly mirrors and explains the fact that no actual Northern intervention takes place despite, as a liberal–biopolitical governmentality of security would suggest, the omnipresence of vulnerability within the field of visibility of climate-induced migration. By contrast, as Evans and Reid (2013:2) explain, "[t]o be able to become resilient, one must first accept that one is fundamentally

vulnerable." This gives the omnipresence of racialized passive victims a completely new twist, as it paves the way for a resilience take on climate-induced migration. Vulnerability becomes the prerequisite for resilience. It underpins the speculative nature of assumptions about the potentiality of climate change with "claims to empirical truth" which are directly derived from the vulnerability of potential climate migrants/refugees (*ibid.*). This is the subtext of the field of visibility: Climate-refugees are deemed to be unfit to deal with a changing climate. But as climate change is virtually everywhere, and as all people defined by certain racializing colonial stereotypes are affected, planned intervention and preparation—as in liberal biopolitics—becomes impossible. By contrast, we have to put people at the center—in the sense of increasing and strengthening their ability to deal with a changing climate.

The UK Government Office's Foresight Report on Migration and Global Environmental Change represents a case in point for this shift in perspective. The report, published by the UK Government's Science Office, and involving a large number of researchers working on the issue, "assembles and analyzes the latest evidence and research" on climate-induced migration (The World Bank 2013). The report discusses the evidence on climate-induced migration and concludes that "'no migration' is not an option in the context of future environmental change" (Foresight 2011:16). Instead, migration is re-conceptualized as an appropriate means of adaptation. Migration is praised as a "'transformational' adaptation to environmental change 'which' in many cases will be an extremely effective way to build long-term resilience" (*ibid.*:7). From this perspective, circular and temporary migration are important strategies for income diversification in times of drought or flood. Such an interpretation is also supported by the fact that a considerable number of images in the sample show people on the move— in a non-threatening way. Accordingly, mobility in the sample has a rather positive connotation.

The In Search of Shelter report is also mostly concerned with the theme of resilience. Its policy recommendations, for example, include, among others, to "invest in resilience," as climate change will drive migration "unless vulnerable populations, especially the poorest, are assisted in building climate-resilient livelihoods" (Care International et al. 2009:v). The focus on resilience, however, does not mean a move away from liberal biopolitics, as the center of attention is always directed at those who are already identified as vulnerable. Thus, the report still advocates a "[f]ocus on human security" (*ibid.*). Resilience, as it appears in the images, reconfigures liberal biopolitics into a new governmentality of security; a governmentality in which vulnerability helps to identify the still racialized victims of climate change, and resilience provides the main techniques for securing. This idea is showcased in a video clip, also by Care International, which accompanies the In Search of Shelter report (Care International 2009). The short 3-minute clip is basically an animation of the sample we have discussed so far: racialized women and children, located in natural environments. None of them are passive, though—they are planting crops, tending their cattle and harvesting. This is not very different to the field of visibility we have analyzed so far, where people are also occupied with such activities. Yet, as a crucial difference, the whole clip is overlaid by a female voice, redefining these activities:

> I watch the climate change around me. But I am also changing. We are changing. … We are not victims of climate change. We are agents of change. We are learning, preparing, and planning. The best we can as the world changes around us.

This is a clear sign of the resilience paradigm. The text that overlays the clip turns the actual situation people are living in, into a sign of, and source for, resilience.[6] And this does not contradict the claim made above that the climate migrant/refugee appears as helpless and passive victim. Crucially, resilience here does not refer to a radically altered lifestyle, a different social and economic system similar to those societies which provide an entirely different level of resilience, namely those in the Global North. Instead, advocating only measures such as better irrigation methods, resilience sticks to the idea of the racialized Other in its natural or rural environment. The only concrete measures suggested by Care are "water-wise irrigation systems, low/no-till agricultural practices, income diversification, and disaster risk management" (Care International et al. 2009:v). This reveals the effects of securitizing climate-induced migration in the form of a resilience framework. As Evans and Reid (2013:3) put it, "the resilient subject is a subject which must permanently struggle to accommodate itself to the world, and not a subject which can conceive of changing the world, its structure and conditions of possibility." This is the dialectic of the field of visibility of climate-induced migration—the climate migrant/refugee is cast as an agent of change, but the boundaries of change are narrowly conceived and broadly correspond to the cage of the racialized Other.

Resilience, in a nutshell, does not aim for structural change, but simply redefines the climate migrant/refugee from a passive victim into an active agent of its fate. The climate migrant/refugee is thus what applies to the resilient subject in general: it is not a "political subject which can conceive of changing the world, but a politically debased subject" (Reid 2012:74). This is a theme that runs through the whole sample of analyzed documents. Neither do we see any Northern intervention and care. There are not even any signs of structural change which would result in qualitatively different living conditions and so reduce the dangers posed by climate change. Instead, the field of visibility advocates only minor lifestyle changes that adapt the already vulnerable and marginal living conditions of the global poor to the dangers of climate changes. When the In Search of Shelter report suggests income diversification as a means of adaptation, the accompanying video provides an idea of how this could look; as one of the very few activities that go beyond mere subsistence, it shows a woman wrapping up pieces of soap, supposedly for the world market. This seems to be the best structural change the vulnerable can hope for. Finally, this example also highlights that resilience perfectly dovetails into neoliberal forms of governmentality (*ibid.*). As the term implies, resilient life does not need to be saved and is to some extent self-reliant. Northern interventions are therefore much more limited in scope; they are about helping the affected populations to help themselves. This is the key theme of advanced liberal techniques of government (Chandler 2012a) and is one which further depoliticizes climate-induced migration and "naturalizes neoliberal systems of governance" (Reid 2012:74).

The Killing Fields of Visibility

Foucault famously remarked that with the emergence of biopolitics "the ancient right to take life or let live was replaced by a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death" (Foucault 1978:138). Throughout this paper, I have argued that "life" is indeed the core concern of the field of visibility of climate-induced migration. National security concerns—as, for example, pictures of military inter-

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[6]That is not to say, however, that this would entirely undermine the racialization of the climate migrant/refugee. The text continues with the statement that "sometimes, it is not enough," which leads to White people in the North who have the real power for change. For example, they have a government which could "support policies to build a better world."

ventions, peacekeeping missions, or border controls—are largely absent from the sample of analyzed pictures. In this sense, the invisible images picturing the impacts of global warming convey a liberal–biopolitical understanding of security. Potential climate-refugees appear as racialized, passive, and helpless victims, located in a natural environment, thus reinvigorating colonial stereotypes of primordial lifestyles. These images speak the language of a global liberal biopolitics, promoting top-down management, and intervention, since those vulnerable to climate change, the people most at risk in a warming world, will not be able to sustain their livelihoods on their own. Climate-refugees, however, are not only defined in the visual language of (post-)colonialism as the racialized Other in need of patronage, but also in terms of their potential to bring about a catastrophic future. This becomes apparent when looking at the way climate change itself is visualized. It appears as a normalized apocalypse. And if climate change may strike everywhere with tremendous impact, targeted biopolitical management becomes obsolete, if not impossible. This also explains the fact that no actual biopolitical management appears in the field of visibility. For the amalgamation of racialized victims and normalized apocalypse turns them into an ungovernable mass of people widely dispersed across the globe.

   I thus suggest that the field of visibility of climate-induced migration signposts a transformation of liberal biopolitics that incorporates resilience as a means of securing. People are rendered as active "agents of change" that are supposed to creatively adapt to climate change. Whereas this shifts the focus away from climate migrants/refugees as victims, their agency is still confined within the basic structures of a fundamentally divided world. Resilience remains closely tied to the idea of a vulnerable, racialized subject located in a natural or rural environment. The resilient subject is supposed to adapt itself to the dangers of a warming world, but it is not allowed to transgress the "global life-chance divide" (Duffield 2010).

   Does all this mean that security in the national sense of the term, closely associated with the notion of threats and enacted through violent interventions, is absent from the field of visibility of climate-induced migration? Are claims which fear that responses to climate-induced migration will be military in nature (as in Hartmann 2010) thus exaggerated? I would doubt such a conclusion. Duffield has argued that

> when forms of radical autonomy and emergence are deemed to be a risk to the system as a whole—indeed, to global-life itself—then the liberal way of war itself threatens to go global, unrestrained and unlimited in discharging its new security responsibilities.   (Duffield 2010:68)

Despite all resilience, the climate migrant/refugee still remains the racialized Other—a vulnerable Other with enormous potential for disorder and disruption on the planet. The visual discourse examined here does show few signs of measures that actually increase the resilience of affected populations. And climate-induced migration may turn into a danger, if resilience fails. This interpretation becomes especially apparent in one illustration in the Greenpeace Blue Alert report. Located on the first pages of the document, it directly catches the reader's eye (see figure 2). It conveys most of the visual patterns discussed here, displaying a child in a natural marine environment. Yet, it appears to me far removed from arousing compassion. Instead, the child has a demanding and self-conscious look. The bottom-up perspective of the photograph, and its gloominess, create a frightening atmosphere which implies a dawning threat. The image of the child plays with the idea of potentiality. In this sense, the picture spurs a subtle fear, one which may indeed erupt into violent interventions if the potentiality of the racialized climate-refugees actualizes as a threat. The field

Fig 2. Subtle Fear

(Source: Greenpeace 2008:4–5)

of visibility of climate-induced migration is thus precisely located at the meeting point of Foucault's "right to take life," "power to foster it," or "disallow it to the point of death." If this hypothesis held true, the dominant pictorial strategy aiming to raise awareness would, despite its best intentions, create a very distinct field of visibility—a killing field of visibility.

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