

How Gender Role Attitudes Shape Maternal Labor Supply

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We examine the influence of gender role attitudes, specifically views about the appropriate role of mothers, on post-childbirth employment decisions. German panel data reveals that mothers with traditional attitudes are 15% less likely to work during early motherhood than their egalitarian counterparts. Among working mothers, those with traditional attitudes work four hours less per week, and these differences persist for at least seven years. Fathers' attitudes also predict maternal labor supply, highlighting joint decision-making within couples. Examining the interaction of attitudes with changes in economic incentives, we find that the introduction of a cash-for-care payment for parents who abstain from using public childcare substantially reduced the labor supply of traditional mothers, whereas egalitarian mothers' labor supply remains unaffected. Moreover, a structural life-cycle model of female labor supply demonstrates that labor supply elasticities are substantially larger for traditional mothers while a counterfactual policy facilitating full-time childcare access has a more pronounced effect on egalitarian mothers. The findings stress that gender role attitudes can mediate the effects of policies, which implies that measured average policy effects cannot easily be transferred to other contexts, e.g., over time or to other countries, without accounting for differences in attitudes.

Keywords: Gender role attitudes, Labor supply, Life-cycle

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1 Introduction

A large share of remaining gender inequality in the labor market can be attributed to labor supply decisions of parents (Cortes and Pan, [forthcoming](#)). Globally, mothers participate substantially less in market work than women without children, fathers, or childless men. Extended spells of non-participation or part-time work of mothers translate into long-term gender differences in wages. Moreover, they reduce aggregate economic output due to unused potential in the workforce. Nevertheless, the driving forces of maternal labor supply choices are still largely unclear.

The fact that maternal labor supply strongly varies across countries (Kleven, Landais, and Mariante, [2023](#)) points to the role of behavioral motives like norms or attitudes. However, evidence on this channel mostly relies on group-level measures of norms, either comparing labor supply across countries (Kleven, Landais, Posch, Steinhauer, and Zweimüller, [2019](#)), or using immigrants' country of ancestry as individual-level measures of gender attitudes (following Fernández and Fogli, [2009](#)). Direct evidence on how observed attitudes at the individual level affect household choices is scarce. Furthermore, we do not know much about how individual differences in attitudes may mitigate and hamper the effectiveness of policies aiming to alter economic incentives. If parents with traditional gender attitudes respond differently to policies than egalitarian parents, measured average policy effects cannot easily be transferred to other contexts in which gender attitudes differ, like to other subgroups of the population, over time periods, or to other countries.

Against this background, this paper studies how individual-level gender role attitudes shape parental labor supply decisions, with a particular emphasis on how such attitudes mediate the effect of policy changes. Using German panel data containing self-reported gender role attitudes measured before the birth of the first child, we find that gender attitudes hold first-order importance. In an event study framework around the birth of the first child, attitudes of both parents play a crucial role for the labor supply choices of mothers at both the extensive and intensive margin. After the introduction of a transfer that required parents not to use public childcare, labor supply of mothers with traditional gender attitudes substantially decreased, but not the labor supply of egalitarian mothers. Based on these results, we estimate a life-cycle model of female labor supply which incorporates heterogeneity by gender role attitudes. Using the model, we show that labor supply elasticities are substantially larger for traditional mothers while a counterfactual policy facilitating access to full-time childcare has considerably stronger effects on egalitarian mothers.

We measure gender role attitudes based on self-reported data in the German Family Panel (pairfam). Pairfam is an annual survey of up to 12,000 respondents and their partners. The survey contains rich information on the household composition, labor market outcomes, and values and beliefs of both partners. Gender role attitudes are elicited in eight of the fourteen waves, which allows us to measure them before the birth of the first child. We obtain measures of gender role attitudes

based on the level of agreement with three statements, e.g. ‘Women should be more concerned about their family than about their career,’ ‘Men should participate in housework to the same extent as women,’ and ‘A child under 6 will suffer from having a working mother.’ For ease of interpretation, we aggregate the three measures to a gender role index and use a median split to identify ‘egalitarian’ and ‘traditional’ mothers in our main specification.¹

In the first step of our analysis, we document the relevance of gender role attitudes for maternal labor supply decisions. We make use of an event study framework around the birth of the first child (Kleven, Landais, and Søgaaard, 2019). By non-parametrically controlling for lifecycle and time trends, we compare mothers to women of the same age in the same calendar year who do not have a child yet, but do so one year later. This ensures that the comparison group is as similar as possible, in contrast to women who never have a child and hence likely differ in other aspects, for instance. To examine the difference in the motherhood penalty by gender attitudes, we interact event time dummies with gender role attitude groups, leading to a difference-in-difference setup.²

We find that labor supply is strikingly similar for egalitarian and traditional mothers before the birth of the first child, but substantially deviates thereafter: mothers with traditional gender role attitudes are 15% less likely to participate in the labor market when their first child is one year old compared to egalitarian mothers. When the child is older, differences at the extensive margin slightly attenuate, but persist for up to seven years after child birth. Differences also emerge at the intensive margin. Conditional on working, both groups of women work slightly below 40 hours per week before the birth of the first child. Afterwards, conditional working hours drop persistently by ten hours for egalitarian mothers, but by fourteen hours for traditional mothers.

Looking at fathers, we show that their gender attitudes also play an important role for maternal labor supply decisions. As we find evidence for assortative mating with a correlation of attitudes within couples of 0.41, we examine the contribution of paternal gender attitudes when controlling for mothers’ own attitudes. We find that attitudes of fathers predict working hours after child birth, where marginal effects are roughly half of marginal effects of mothers’ attitudes. This suggests joint decision-making of couples with a higher decision weight for mothers. In line with previous findings (e.g., Kleven, Landais, and Mariante, 2023), the labor supply of

1. We find very similar results when using other splits, e.g. in three groups. Moreover, when looking at the three measures of gender role attitudes separately, the results are quantitatively similar for two of the three items and qualitatively similar for all of them.

2. Measuring attitudes before the birth of the first child is potentially important as afterwards reported attitudes might be biased by realized labor supply choices. We document that gender role attitudes of subjects become more egalitarian over time, however conditional on age trends, there is a slight shift towards more traditional gender attitudes around child birth, in line with Kuziemko, Pan, Shen, and Washington (2018). For the analyses, we assume that despite these aggregate trends, the ranking of individuals in terms of their gender attitudes remains stable around the birth of the first child. Violations of this assumption would bias the estimated effects of attitudes downwards.

fathers themselves does not react to child birth and we do not find any heterogeneity by gender role attitudes.

A challenge in the study of gender role attitudes is that it is naturally difficult to study exogenous changes in attitudes and, hence, it is typically unclear whether all observed differences are caused by the attitudes themselves. One advantage of our approach compared to aggregate-level measures of norms is that we can examine the extent to which the labor supply differences observed between traditional and egalitarian mothers are driven by other observed characteristics. We collect several pieces of evidence that the differences in labor supply indeed reflect their attitudes. First, despite looking at a broad set of background variables, we can only explain 13% of the variation in gender role attitudes, suggesting that a substantial share of the differences is unrelated to potential confounding factors. Second, in terms of household composition, both the likelihood of having a partner and the number of children at the end of the observation period are very similar, with the only difference being that egalitarian mothers are one and a half years older at the time of first birth. Third, we employ a number of robustness checks to show that the results are not driven by differences in observed background characteristics. Most importantly, the results are very similar when restricting the sample at West Germany, where child care availability is generally less favorable than in East Germany, and when controlling for a set of variables that are correlated with attitudes, such as education, being religious, and the state of residence.

In the next step of our analysis, we investigate how gender role attitudes interact with changes in economic incentives. Traditional and egalitarian mothers not only differ in their levels of labor supply, they also respond differently to the introduction of a cash-for-care policy ('Betreuungsgeld'). The policy was introduced in 2013 and paid a subsidy for one- and two-year old children if the parents did not use (subsidized) public childcare. The amount was 100€ per month, equaling 9% of the median net income of women before birth. As maternal labor supply often is dependent on the use of public childcare, this policy raises the opportunity costs of working for mothers. Since the policy required that the parents do not use any public childcare, we expect it to have the strongest effect on mothers who would have taken up small levels of childcare in the absence of the policy, while mothers taking up full-time childcare are expected to be unaffected as long as the subsidy is not sufficiently large to induce them to reduce their childcare take-up to zero. Mothers not taking up any childcare even without the subsidy are unaffected by the increase in the opportunity costs of public childcare, but might adjust labor supply due to an income effect of the transfer.

We make use of a sharp eligibility threshold by birth date (August 1, 2012) during the introduction of the policy and compare mothers with children born in the two years before the cut-off date to those with children born in a two-year window after the threshold. We employ a triple-diff strategy comparing mothers with children below and above the age threshold by gender role attitudes around the birth

of the first child. We find when the child is one year old, the policy reduced labor supply of traditional mothers by eight hours per week or an additional 46% relative to their labor supply reduction in the absence of the policy. Conversely, the policy had no detectable effect on the labor supply of egalitarian mothers with the difference between egalitarian and traditional mothers being statistically significant. The labor supply changes of traditional mothers are solely driven by the extensive margin, which is in line with the payment requiring that the parents do not use any public childcare. The results are robust to a range of specific changes including restricting to a balanced panel, restricting to West German mothers, and the inclusion of additional control variables.

In a third step, we estimate a dynamic structural model of labor supply to quantify the underlying trade-off between gender attitudes and economic incentives and look at counter-factual policy changes. Taking the reduced form evidence into account, we do not model labor supply of fathers, but focus on a discrete set of maternal labor supply choices. Accumulation of human capital induces a trade-off between time spent out of the labor force, e.g., to provide childcare, and stunted wage growth in the future. The novel feature of the model is that we incorporate heterogeneity by gender role attitudes for a discrete set of types that differ in their disutility to work when having children.

We use the model to calculate Marshallian labor supply elasticities and find that elasticities are substantially higher for traditional mothers. Additionally, we look at a counterfactual policy change in which access to full-time childcare is no longer restricted in the sense that it is no longer more expensive than part-time childcare. We find that the policy change has a positive labor supply effect at the intensive margin for both attitude groups, but it is considerably stronger for egalitarian mothers who increase the likelihood to work full-time by 25 percentage points when the child is between one and two years old and are still more likely to work full-time when the child is older since they accumulated more human capital compared to the baseline scenario. These results show that although labor supply elasticities are in general larger for traditional mothers, policy reforms targeted at the needs of egalitarian mothers, can have a stronger effect on this group. More generally, they imply that elasticities and policy effects might change over time if the distribution of gender role attitudes is changing, e.g., becomes more egalitarian.

Our paper contributes to a growing body of literature highlighting the relevance of gender role attitudes and gender norms for the labor supply of mothers. Proxies of gender norms like the origin country or region of migrants (Fernández and Fogli, 2009; Boelmann, Raute, and Schönberg, 2021), labor supply of the grandmother (Fernández, Fogli, and Olivetti, 2004), the difference between same-sex and heterosexual couples (Andresen and Nix, 2022), or peer effects (Nicoletti, Salvanes, and Tominey, 2018; Olivetti, Patacchini, and Zenou, 2020) are related to maternal labor supply.

However, evidence using elicited gender role attitudes at the individual level is still rather limited, especially using an event study framework around child birth.³ Kuziemko et al. (2018) primarily look at changes in parental attitudes after a child is born, but also report results of a heterogeneity analysis of child penalty estimates by gender attitudes. In three data sets in the UK and the US, they do not find a significant difference although coefficients in all data sets go in the expected direction. Conversely, Rafols (2023) finds that long-run child penalties in the US are larger for mothers with traditional attitudes.⁴ Our study confirms the latter results by Rafols (2023) in a country with relatively traditional gender attitudes and high part-time rates. Additionally, we look specifically at the importance of paternal gender role attitudes and the interaction with policy-induced changes in economic incentives.

One of the rare papers exploring the interaction of economic policies and gender norms is Ichino, Olsson, Petrongolo, and Thoursie (2023). They examine a tax reform in Sweden and find that migrants originating from countries with relatively traditional norms are more likely to reallocate childcare to mothers following a reduction in the father's tax rate, and less likely to reallocate childcare to fathers following a reduction in the mother's tax rate. We use measures of gender role attitudes at the individual level instead of group-level differences and examine a change in a policy directly addressed to families.

Our paper also contributes to the literature on the effects of changes in childcare costs (e.g., Blau and Tekin, 2007; Lundin, Mörk, and Öckert, 2008; Black, Devereux, Løken, and Salvanes, 2014) and in particular cash-for-care policies. Cash-for-care policies are associated with negative labor supply effects of mothers in several Scandinavian countries (e.g., Hardoy and Schøne, 2010; Gruber, Kosonen, and Huttunen, 2023) and the German states of Thuringia (Gathmann and Sass, 2018) and Bavaria (Fendel and Jochimsen, 2022). Collischon, Kuehnle, and Oberfichtner (2022) look at the same policy that we investigate in our paper and find small negative employment effects and larger effects on childcare choices. While none of these studies consider gender norms or attitudes, some report heterogeneity analyses that our results may help to explain. They find that not having a university degree (Drange and Rege, 2013), having a migration background (Hardoy and Schøne, 2010; Fendel and Jochimsen, 2022), living in a rural area (Giuliani and Duvander, 2017), or in West Germany instead of East Germany (Collischon, Kuehnle, and Oberfichtner, 2022) is associated with stronger negative labor supply responses to a cash-for-care subsidy. In our data, all of these characteristics predict more traditional gender attitudes.

3. There exists a longer-running body of literature in sociology on the determinants (e.g., Cunningham, 2008; Zoch, 2021) and consequences of gender role attitudes. Individual measures of gender role attitudes are related to labor supply in the UK (Uunk and Lersch, 2019), the Netherlands (Stam, Verbakel, and de Graaf, 2014), and the US (Cunningham, 2008). The literature typically makes use of longitudinal panel models that relate changes in attitudes to changes in female labor supply. We see our event study approach around child birth as complementary to this evidence.

4. Boneva, Golin, Kaufmann, and Rauh (2022) elicit measures of perceived social norms, i.e., second-order beliefs, and show that they predict labor supply intentions of women.

Lastly, we contribute to the structural literature on the labor supply of women and couples over the life-cycle (e.g. Adda, Dustmann, and Stevens, 2017; Borella, De Nardi, and Yang, 2023; Jakobsen, Jørgensen, and Low, 2023). While these studies show the relevance of economic incentives induced by the tax-transfer system, to the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to incorporate heterogeneity stemming from gender role attitudes or norms into a life-cycle model of female labor supply.⁵ Wang (2022) also allows for heterogeneity in the disutility to work when children are in the household using unobserved types, which could be interpreted as representing role attitudes. The fact that we identify attitude types directly from observed measures of gender attitudes, facilitates the interpretation of types and the quantification of the relevance of gender role attitudes. In particular, it allows us to take the joint distribution of attitudes and other characteristics such as wages and fertility decisions into account. Our study shows that gender role attitudes are an important component of labor supply choices and enables us to gauge how estimated elasticities or policy effects might change when the distribution of gender role attitudes change over time.

2 Institutional background and data

In this section, we lay the foundation of the later analyses by describing the institutional background and the data that we use.

2.1 Institutional background

We start by describing aggregate maternal labor supply and the institutional background that families face in Germany.

The labor supply of women in Germany is characterized by high employment rates of just over 70%, at more than ten percentage points above the OECD average (OECD, 2017), although relatively many women work part-time. While in the OECD on average every fourth working women works part-time, this share is 37% in Germany. The reduction in the labor supply of women after child birth is among the strongest internationally (Kleven, Landais, and Mariante, 2023).

These patterns substantially differ between East and West Germany. During the separation of Germany from 1945 to 1990, policies and norms in the Eastern, socialist part of Germany encouraged mothers to return to work quickly after childbirth. Conversely, in West Germany a male-breadwinner norm prevailed in both norms and

5. Fogli and Veldkamp (2011) and Fernández (2013) investigate female labor force participation over time and explain it with a structural model of learning about the consequences of labor supply. Conversely, our model does not focus on changes in norms over time, but heterogeneity within the population.

policies. Although the policy system was fully aligned after the reunification, differences in labor market outcomes between East and West Germany persist (Jessen, 2022).

Several policies are in place to support families. Germany utilizes a comprehensive means-tested welfare system to provide assistance to low-income households. Furthermore, parents have a legal right to parental leave which allows them to return to the same or a similar job within three years. Paid parental leave is available for up to fourteen months where each parent can claim at most 12 months. The replacement rate is 67% of the parent's decline in net income, but at least 300 EUR and at most 1,800 EUR per month.⁶ Additionally, parents receive a monthly child benefit that amounted to 194 EUR for the first and second child, 200 EUR for the third child, and 225 EUR for every additional child in 2018.

In 2015, 33% of children below the age of three attended public childcare, compared to 94% of children between three and five years old.⁷ The supply and take-up of public childcare services for children under three years of age has been steadily progressing since 2005 but has slowed down in recent years: from 2015 to 2019, the share of children below the age of three in public childcare increased by only one percentage point to 34%.

The tax system adopts income splitting for married couples, which implies that each partner is taxed as if they earned half of the combined income. Due to the progressive nature of the tax rates, this arrangement provides substantial tax advantages to married couples that are increasing with the income gap and lead to high marginal tax rates for the lower-earning spouse.

2.2 Data set

To understand the labor supply choices of mothers, we need detailed information on the household context, labor market outcomes, and, importantly, the gender role attitudes of individuals.

We use the German Family Panel (pairfam), which provides us with all of this information. It surveys up to 12,000 randomly sampled subjects and their partners every year since 2009 (Bröderl, Drobníč, Hank, Neyer, Walper, et al., 2023). The subjects are drawn from three cohorts, born in 1971-73, 1981-83, and 1991-93 (**huininkPanelAnalysisIntimate2011b**). The questionnaire contains detailed information on the household composition, labor market outcomes, and values and beliefs of both partners. The latter is an important advantage over administrative data sets that provide larger sample sizes but do not contain this information. Another

6. See Olivetti and Petrongolo (2017) for a comparison to family policies in other high-income countries.

7. Data based on: https://www.statistischebibliothek.de/mir/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/DEHeft_derivate_00021684/Datenreport2016.pdf and <https://www.destatis.de/DE/Service/Statistik-Campus/Datenreport/Downloads/datenreport-2021.pdf>

important feature of the pairfam data set is that partners of the main subjects are tracked and surveyed regardless of whether they are (already) living in the same household, unlike in many other surveys. This allows us to use pre-birth information of both parents even if couples only move together shortly before having their first child.

In wave 11, a refreshment sample is drawn that replaces drop-outs and adds the cohort born in 2001-2003. From wave 2 onwards, the DemoDiff (Demographic Differences in Life Course Dynamics in Eastern and Western Germany) is part of the pairfam sample, which leads to respondents living in Eastern Germany being overrepresented in the two oldest cohorts in the final sample. We use the available data from 2009 to 2022.

For the event studies in the next section, we build an *event study sample*, for which we restrict the sample to mothers who have their first child in the observation period and are not younger than eighteen or older than 40 when giving birth. Furthermore, we exclude same-sex couples such that all subjects are either single or have a male partner.⁸ We look at up to five years prior and seven years past the birth and for each subject require at least two observations before and two observations after the birth of the first child. This results in a sample of 839 mothers. In robustness analyses, we replicate the results among others for a balanced panel of 551 mothers running from two years before to three years after birth.

For our structural estimation, we make use of an *estimation sample* which differs from the *event study sample* in several aspects. First, we restrict on women living together with a partner as the model does not account for household formation or dissolution. Second, we drop all women who are either self-employed, in education, retired, or doing military service to ensure the human capital accumulation processes do not differ by too much. Third, we do not restrict the sample based on years around birth of the first child, but based on an age range from the age of 24 to the age of 45. Fourth, we include women who do not get a child and do no longer require that we observe them before and after having a child.

2.3 Gender role attitudes

In eight of the fourteen waves in pairfam, subjects are asked about a set of attitudes and have to indicate their agreement with several statements on a five-point scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree.’ In this study, we focus on three items referring to the role of mothers, which we list in the notes of Figure 1. ‘Women family’ and ‘Equal housework’ are normatively framed, while ‘Child suffers’ is framed as a belief, but constitutes a clear normative imperative about the role of

8. Andresen and Nix (2022) show that labor supply patterns of same-sex parents strongly differ from those of heterosexual parents. This restriction affects less than 1% of the subjects.

a mother. Figure 1 shows the distribution of responses to these items over all waves and subjects.




Figure 1. Distribution of elicited gender role attitudes

Notes: Distribution of responses to three items measuring gender role attitudes in pairfam. The five-point scale ranges from 'strongly disagree' to 'strongly agree'. Responses are pooled over all waves. Sample: All three items observed. The wording of the items is listed below:

| Item label | Item wording |
|-----------------|--|
| Women family | 'Women should be more concerned about their family than about their career.' |
| Equal housework | 'Men should participate in housework to the same extent as women.' |
| Child suffers | 'A child under 6 will suffer from having a working mother.' |

For the 'Women family' and 'Child suffers' items, the modal response is the central value and the distribution is wide ranging, from more than one-fifth of subjects strongly disagreeing and about one-tenth of subjects strongly agreeing. The distribution of the 'Equal housework' item is more concentrated on the right of the scale. Note that in contrast to the other items, stronger agreement with the 'Equal housework' item indicates more egalitarian attitudes. Hence, we reverse the scale for this item in the following such that higher values are associated with more traditional attitudes for all items.

For the later analysis, we primarily focus on a gender role attitudes index, which we create as the standardized mean of the items. Inter-item correlations are between 0.17 and 0.38, indicating that the three items measure the same concept of role attitudes towards mothers but slightly different aspects of it. Hence, we also consider the three items separately in robustness analyses.

We next show that gender role attitudes vary over demographic variables in reasonable ways. Table 1 reports coefficients of OLS regressions of the index (in the first column) and the three individual items on a set of background variables. The

dependent variables are standardized such that effect sizes are comparable. The observed patterns are very similar over all four columns. Men hold more traditional attitudes than women. The same is true for subjects with lower education, any migration background, those who do not live in urban municipalities, and those who feel affiliated with a religion. Living in East Germany is strongly associated with egalitarian attitudes for the ‘Child suffers’ item, but – conditional on the other background variables – not with respect to the other items. Subjects born in earlier cohorts tend to hold more traditional attitudes when attitudes are elicited at the same age. However, we also document an age trend that is almost as strong as the birth year effect, whereby gender role attitudes of subjects born in a given birth year become more egalitarian over time. Conditional on age trends, we find a slight shift towards more traditional gender attitudes around child birth (see Appendix Figure A.2), in line with Kuziemko et al. (2018).

We draw three conclusions from these results. First, the items are very similarly distributed in the population, suggesting that they measure the same concept in line with our interpretation. Second, gender role attitudes are related to demographic variables in reasonable ways, thereby validating our elicited measures. Third, the explanatory value of background variables is limited as no more than 13% of the observed variance can be explained. A substantial part of the variation in gender attitudes between subject seems to be unrelated to confounding variables.

Table 1. Predicting (traditional) gender role attitudes

| | Gender role attitudes | Women family | Disagreement: Equal housework | Child suffers |
|---------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Male | 0.22*** (0.0089) | 0.054*** (0.012) | 0.3*** (0.012) | 0.31*** (0.012) |
| Age | −0.021*** (0.0007) | −0.024*** (0.0009) | −0.0066*** (0.001) | −0.032*** (0.0009) |
| Birth year | −0.024*** (0.0007) | −0.03*** (0.001) | −0.015*** (0.0009) | −0.027*** (0.001) |
| Living in East-Germany | −0.12*** (0.012) | −0.015 (0.015) | −0.021 (0.015) | −0.32*** (0.015) |
| Education: tertiary | −0.25*** (0.0094) | −0.31*** (0.012) | −0.16*** (0.012) | −0.28*** (0.012) |
| Any migration background | 0.25*** (0.012) | 0.33*** (0.015) | 0.13*** (0.015) | 0.28*** (0.015) |
| Municipality ≥ 100k inhabitants | −0.14*** (0.01) | −0.15*** (0.013) | −0.15*** (0.013) | −0.11*** (0.013) |
| Religious affiliation | 0.18*** (0.011) | 0.18*** (0.015) | 0.16*** (0.014) | 0.19*** (0.014) |
| Observations | 74836 | 74836 | 74836 | 74836 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.13 | 0.074 | 0.049 | 0.13 |

Notes: OLS regressions of gender role attitudes on a set of background variables. In columns (2) to (4), the dependent variables are the individual items (not restricted on being observed before the birth of the first child). In the first column, the dependent variable is the gender role attitude index, the standardized mean of the three items, coded such that higher values correspond to more traditional attitudes. See the notes of Figure 1 for the wording of the three items. All dependent variables are standardized and coded such that higher values are associated with more traditional gender attitudes. Sample: All three items observed. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and reported in parentheses.

* – $p < 0.1$, ** – $p < 0.05$, *** – $p < 0.01$

The panel structure of pairfam allows us to measure gender role attitudes before the birth of the first child. We use the last observation before birth as a measure of pre-birth attitudes. The index is fairly stable within individuals over time ($\rho = 0.63$). For the following analyses, we assume that the ranking of individuals remains stable over time despite the aggregate age trends described above. Violations of this assumption would bias the estimated effects of attitudes downwards in the later analyses. We classify mothers in two groups based on a median split of their pre-birth gender role attitudes and label the groups as ‘egalitarian’ and ‘traditional.’⁹ Table 2 shows summary statistics of these two groups in our event study sample.

Unsurprisingly, traditional women in our sample hold more traditional gender role attitudes based on all three items. In line with a within-household correlation of gender role attitudes of 0.41, the attitudes of the fathers – also measured before the birth of the first child – differ in the same direction, albeit being less pronounced. Egalitarian women tend to have egalitarian partners, although assortative mating is far from perfect and there are several couples with unaligned gender attitudes.

In the third part of Table 2, we focus on differences in background variables. This comparison shows us in which dimensions and how strongly the gender attitude groups differ in other dimension and therefore facilitates the interpretation of the later empirical results. In line with the findings of Table 1, egalitarian mothers are more likely to have a tertiary degree and live in East Germany or urban municipality. They are less likely to have a migration background and to have a religious affiliation. Egalitarian subjects are 1.5 years older on average when they have their first child, but have almost the same likelihood of having a partner and being married in the period before giving birth. This pattern is confirmed in Appendix Figure A.1, which looks at partnership variables five years prior to seven years after the birth of the first child. Both groups have the same likelihood to have a married partner during the thirteen years considered, and the likelihood of having any partner is only slightly and mostly insignificantly higher for egalitarian mothers. Moreover, the number of children over time develops in exactly the same way, as seven years after the birth of the first child both groups have slightly below two children on average.

9. In the *estimation sample* used for the structural model in Section 5, we do not observe gender role attitudes before having a child for many subjects because they do not have a child or did so before our observation period. In that sample, we therefore use the mean over all elicitations of an individual to classify subjects into gender attitude types.

Table 2. Summary statistics of gender role attitude groups

| | Gender role attitudes group | |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------|
| | egalitarian | traditional |
| Women family | 2.01 (0.04) | 3.27 (0.04) |
| Equal housework | 4.82 (0.02) | 3.97 (0.05) |
| Child suffers | 1.60 (0.03) | 2.95 (0.05) |
| Partner: Women family | 2.41 (0.05) | 2.92 (0.06) |
| Partner: Equal housework | 4.29 (0.05) | 4.02 (0.06) |
| Partner: Child suffers | 2.37 (0.06) | 2.85 (0.07) |
| Age at birth first child | 30.40 (0.21) | 28.90 (0.24) |
| Education: tertiary | 0.56 (0.02) | 0.37 (0.02) |
| Any migration background | 0.13 (0.02) | 0.19 (0.02) |
| Living in East-Germany | 0.36 (0.02) | 0.24 (0.02) |
| Municipality \geq 100k inhabitants | 0.34 (0.02) | 0.22 (0.02) |
| Any confession | 0.61 (0.02) | 0.75 (0.02) |
| Has a partner before birth | 0.87 (0.02) | 0.84 (0.02) |
| Has a married partner before birth | 0.46 (0.02) | 0.47 (0.02) |
| N subjects | 434 | 405 |

Notes: Mean and standard errors (in parentheses) of several variables for both gender role attitudes groups. In the first part, we display mean values of the three gender role attitudes items, measured before the birth of the first child on a five-point scale. The second part reports the respective attitudes of the partner. In the third part, we report means of background variables. The last row reports the number of subjects in each group. Partner attitudes and some background variables are only available for a subsample. The groups are determined via a median split on the gender role attitude index for all women in the full sample. Sample: observed at least twice before and twice after the birth of the first child.

3 Gender role attitudes and labor supply around child birth

In this section, we look at the labor supply of mothers in an event study setting. We show that gender role attitudes are highly relevant for labor supply choices at both the extensive and intensive margin after the birth of the first child, with mothers holding traditional attitudes reducing their labor supply more strongly and

persistently. The results build the foundation for the structural model we build and estimate below.

3.1 Empirical strategy

We are interested in ascertaining how the labor supply of traditional and egalitarian mothers reacts to having their first child, and in particular the difference between the two groups. For this purpose, we run event study regressions based on Kleven, Landais, and Søgaaard (2019), which are frequently used in the literature to examine the effect of children on a large range of outcomes. By non-parametrically controlling for life-cycle and time trends, the approach compares mothers to women of the same age in the same calendar year who do not have a child yet, but do so one year later. This ensures that the comparison group is as similar as possible, in contrast to using women who never have a child as a control group, for instance. Kleven, Landais, and Søgaaard (2019) discuss the assumptions under which the coefficients of the event dummies can be interpreted as the effect of the first child birth. Importantly, the estimated effects include the impact of additional children and do not account for any anticipatory effects of child birth on the outcome variable. Under a smoothness assumption that all determinants of outcome variables that are not controlled for are similar before and after child birth, the method identifies the effect of the first child conditional on those determinants.

We adjust the specification such that we interact event dummies with gender attitude groups. Event time 0 corresponds to the birth year of the first child. The left-out time dummy is -1 and the left-out attitude group is egalitarian mothers. For individual i , in year s , and event time t , we estimate the following equation:

$$\begin{aligned}
Y_{ist} = & \alpha + \beta \cdot \text{traditional} \\
& + \sum_{k \neq -1} \mathbb{I}[k = t] \cdot (\gamma_k + \delta_k \cdot \text{traditional}) \\
& + \phi_{age_{is}} + \psi_s + \nu_{ist}
\end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

At event time -1 , the outcome variable Y_{ist} depends on the intercept α and – in case the mother has traditional gender attitudes – the β coefficient. For other event times, we add a γ_k and a δ_k coefficient each. Furthermore, we control for age ($\phi_{age_{is}}$) and year (ψ_s) fixed effects.

Under the assumptions outlined above, the δ_k coefficients depict the difference between traditional and egalitarian mothers in the effect of the first child birth. They do not necessarily represent a causal effect of gender attitudes given that the groups also differ in other dimensions (as documented in Table 2). This is common in the literature on gender role attitudes as it is difficult to exogenously vary attitudes and quasi-experimental variations also potentially change attitudes and beliefs in other

dimension. While this might not be relevant for policy recommendations in many cases, we nevertheless collect several pieces of evidence suggesting that the differences between traditional and egalitarian mothers appear to reflect their attitudes. As shown in Section 2, despite looking at a broad set of background variables, we can only explain 13% of the variation in gender role attitudes, suggesting that a substantial share of the differences is unrelated to potential confounding factors. In terms of household composition, the likelihood of having a partner and the number of children at the end of the observation period are very similar, with the only difference being that egalitarian mothers are on average one and a half years older at the time of first birth. Additionally, we employ a number of robustness checks to show that the results are not driven by differences in observed background characteristics. Most importantly, the results are very similar when focusing on West Germany only and when controlling for a set of variables that are correlated with attitudes such as education, being religious and state of residence.

We focus on the time five years before the birth of the first child to seven years after birth. The main sample comprises mothers who we observe at least twice before and after the birth of the first child. In robustness analyses described at the end of this section, we replicate our findings for a balanced panel running from two years before to three years after birth.

3.2 Results

The left panels of Figure 2 display means of labor supply outcomes around the birth of the first child for both gender role attitude types without applying the event study framework. Labor supply is very similar in the five years before the birth of the first child, with a labor force participation of around 80% (Panel 2c) and conditional working hours of slightly below 40 hours (Panel 2e). After the birth of the first child, working hours strongly differ as mothers with egalitarian gender norms have a substantially higher likelihood of working than those with traditional attitudes, with the difference being strongest when the child is one year old. Conditional on working, egalitarian women work 30 hours per week on average and traditional women only 25.

The right panels of Figure 2 display the results of the event study regressions (the corresponding coefficients are reported in Appendix Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3.) More specifically, we plot the difference in event study dummies between traditional and egalitarian mothers (the δ_k coefficients in Equation 1). Mothers with traditional gender role attitudes are 15% less likely to participate in the labor market when their first child is one year old. When the child is older, differences at the extensive margin become slightly smaller. Differences in unconditional and conditional working hours remain very stable until the end of the observation period at around five or four working hours, respectively.




Figure 2. Female labor supply around the birth of the first child by gender role attitudes

Notes: The left panels depict means over time around child birth by gender role attitude group (observed before the birth of the first child). The right panels depict the difference between traditional and egalitarian mothers in event study regressions as specified in Equation 1 (i.e. the δ_k coefficients). The corresponding coefficients are reported in Appendix Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3. The dependent variable is unconditional working hours in Panel (a) and (b), a dummy variable whether the woman is working in Panel (c) and (d), and conditional working hours in Panel (e) and (f). Sample: observed at least twice before and twice after the birth of the first child. The vertical error bars display 95% confidence intervals.

Furthermore, Appendix Figure A.3 reveals that the differences between traditional and egalitarian mothers carries over to measures of income and – to a lesser extent – long-term wages.

3.3 Gender role attitudes of the fathers

Next, we examine the gender role attitudes of fathers and show that they are also strongly related to maternal labor supply. At the end of the section, we briefly document that the labor supply of fathers does not react to having a child, independent of gender role attitudes.

We are interested in whether the gender attitudes of the father predict maternal labor supply in addition to the fact that they are positively correlated with maternal gender attitudes. Therefore, we regress unconditional working hours on the gender attitudes of both parents. To facilitate interpretation, we deviate from the event study regressions above in two aspects. First, we pool observations over years and add event dummies for the period of child birth, the periods when the child is one or two years old, and the periods when the child is at least three years old. Second, we add the attitudes as continuous measure and standardize them to account for the fact that fathers' gender attitudes tend to be more traditional than those of the mothers. Note that higher values of the gender role attitude index correspond to more traditional attitudes. As before, we consider the time period from five years prior to seven year past birth of the first child.

Column (1) in Table 3 reveals that before having a child, as well as in the year the first child is born, attitudes of the mother are virtually unrelated to her working hours. Afterwards, an increase in traditional maternal gender attitudes by one standard deviation, is associated with a decrease of slightly above three hours when the child is between one and two years old, and slightly below three hours for older children. The respective coefficients for paternal attitudes in column (2), when we look at attitudes of the father, are only slightly lower. In column (3), we add attitudes of both parents as independent variables. In line with the positive correlation of attitudes within couples, coefficients are smaller than in the previous columns. However, they are still substantial and both significant. In column (4), we add interaction terms between the attitudes of both parents. The coefficients of the interaction terms are small and not significant while the individual coefficients do hardly change.¹⁰

These findings suggests that the attitudes of both parents influence maternal labor supply independently of each other and that the effects are additive. They indicate that the decision concerning how quickly mothers return to the labor market is a joint household decision, but with higher decision weights for the mothers.

In Appendix B.2, we look at the labor supply decision of fathers around the birth of their first child. We find very weak to no changes in labor supply over event time

10. In Appendix B.1 we provide additional evidence for the relevance of fathers' attitudes for maternal labor supply based on attitude groups instead of continuous measures. In particular, we run event study regressions in which event time dummies are interacted with attitude groups based on a median split of fathers' attitudes. Furthermore, we interact attitude groups of the parents (leading to four groups). We find that only if both parents have traditional gender attitudes, female labor supply after the birth of the first child is substantially and significantly lower compared to couples with egalitarian attitudes.

Table 3. Female (unconditional) working hours by fathers' gender role attitudes

| | Working hours (unconditional) | | | |
|---|-------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Event time = 0 | −32*** (0.69) | −32*** (0.69) | −32*** (0.69) | −32*** (0.72) |
| Event time ∈ [1, 2] | −18*** (0.8) | −18*** (0.79) | −18*** (0.79) | −18*** (0.84) |
| Event time ≥ 3 | −16*** (1) | −16*** (1) | −16*** (1) | −16*** (1.1) |
| Attitudes mother (traditional) | −0.45 (0.51) | | −0.23 (0.55) | −0.18 (0.56) |
| Attitudes mother (traditional) × Event time = 0 | −0.35 (0.61) | | −0.53 (0.66) | −0.63 (0.71) |
| Attitudes mother (traditional) × Event time ∈ [1, 2] | −3.1*** (0.63) | | −2.5*** (0.71) | −2.6*** (0.73) |
| Attitudes mother (traditional) × Event time ≥ 3 | −2.9*** (0.68) | | −2.1*** (0.77) | −2.1*** (0.77) |
| Attitudes father (traditional) | | −0.7 (0.51) | −0.61 (0.55) | −0.61 (0.55) |
| Attitudes father (traditional) × Event time = 0 | | 0.25 (0.64) | 0.47 (0.7) | 0.46 (0.7) |
| Attitudes father (traditional) × Event time ∈ [1, 2] | | −2.4*** (0.61) | −1.3** (0.67) | −1.3** (0.68) |
| Attitudes father (traditional) × Event time ≥ 3 | | −2.5*** (0.68) | −1.6** (0.75) | −1.6** (0.75) |
| Attitudes mother × Attitudes father | | | | −0.2 (0.47) |
| Attitudes mother × Attitudes father × Event time = 0 | | | | 0.33 (0.57) |
| Attitudes mother × Attitudes father × Event time ∈ [1, 2] | | | | 0.17 (0.56) |
| Attitudes mother × Attitudes father × Event time ≥ 3 | | | | 0.1 (0.66) |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Age FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 5865 | 5865 | 5865 | 5865 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.31 | 0.31 | 0.32 | 0.32 |

Notes: OLS regressions of unconditional working hours on gender role attitudes of both parents interacted with event time dummies and age and year fixed effects. We consider the time period from five years prior to seven year past birth of the first child. Event time dummies are added for the period of child birth, the periods when the child is one or two years old, and the periods when the child is at least three years old. Gender role attitudes are used as continuous variable, standardized, and coded such that higher values correspond to more traditional attitudes. Sample: observed at least twice before and twice after the birth of the first child, attitudes of both parents observed. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and reported in parentheses. * — $p < 0.1$, ** — $p < 0.05$, *** — $p < 0.01$

and no significant difference by either their own gender attitudes or those of their female partners. For almost all parents, the option that the father reduces his labor supply does not seem to be in their choice set. Hence, the relevant trade-off for most households seems to be whether the mother stays at home to care for the children or continues working earlier after child birth with more hours and the household employs external childcare. This tradeoff is what the structural model in Section 5 focuses on.

3.4 Robustness

A range of robustness checks confirm that the findings of this section are robust to the addition of further control variables, different classification approaches of attitude groups, and alternative sample restrictions.

Additional controls. First, we add control variables to the event study regressions: living together with a partner, education, migration background, having any religious affiliation, municipality size, and state fixed effects. The last column of Appendix Table A.4 reveals that the coefficients are almost unaffected.

Alternative classification. Second, we investigate alternative classifications of women by their gender role attitudes. Appendix Figure A.4 shows the results for the classification into three instead of two groups, which lead to very similar patterns: after child birth, the most traditional group of mothers reduces labor supply significantly stronger than the most egalitarian group of mothers, and the moderate group falls somewhere in between. In Appendix Table A.1, we classify subjects based on the individual gender role attitudes items instead of our index. Throughout, we find a larger labor supply drop for traditional than egalitarian women after birth. For the ‘Child suffers’ item, the coefficients are substantially lower and in many cases not significantly different from 0. Conversely, for the other two items, the results are very similar to the classification by the index. At the intensive margin (Appendix Table A.3), we find very strong and persistent differences for all items.

Alternative sample. Third, we look at alternative sample restrictions. Appendix Figure A.5 replicates Figure 2 for a balanced sample running from two years before to three years after birth. The results are very similar to the main specification. Appendix Table A.4 replicates the regression shown in Figure 2b for alternative samples. Both quantitatively and qualitatively, the coefficients are very similar when only looking at subjects living in West Germany and when dropping all observations from 2020 onwards (to abstract from any effects by the Covid-19 pandemic). Overall, we conclude that gender role attitudes are a pivotal factor for maternal labor supply decisions.

4 Gender role attitudes and a cash-for-care policy

In this section, we look at the introduction of a cash-for-care policy and show that gender role attitudes shape the labor supply response to the policy, with only traditional mothers reducing their labor supply. After describing the policy and explaining our empirical strategy, we present the results.

4.1 Cash-for-care policy

In 2013, Germany introduced a cash-for-care policy ('Betreuungsgeld'). For a child aged one or two years old, parents could claim a subsidy of initially 100 EUR/month if they did not use public childcare facilities. This amounts to approximately 9% of median net income of women before birth, 4% of median net income of eligible households, or 50% of average childcare costs (Collischon, Kuehnle, and Oberfichtner, 2022). As maternal labor supply is often dependent on the use of public childcare, the policy increased the opportunity costs of working for mothers. The subsidy was fully credited against welfare transfers such that the policy did not increase disposable income for very poor households. In contrast to similar policies in Norway, Sweden, and the German state of Thuringia, eligibility for the cash-for-care policy is withdrawn completely when any subsidized public childcare is taken up. We hence expect the effect of the policy to be more concentrated on the extensive margin compared to these other contexts in which the payment is gradually withdrawn. Furthermore, we expect the policy to have the strongest effect on mothers who would have taken up small levels of childcare in absence of the policy, while mothers taking up full-time childcare are expected to be unaffected as long as the subsidy is not sufficiently large to induce them to reduce their childcare take-up to zero. Mothers not taking up any childcare even without the subsidy are unaffected by the increase in the opportunity costs of public childcare, but might adjust labor supply due to an income effect of the transfer.

Essentially for our empirical strategy, the policy reform employed a clear eligibility cut-off based on the date of birth, whereby only children born after the cut-off date could receive the payment. The eligibility cut-off was planned to be January 1, 2012 in the first version of the parliamentary bill and was unexpectedly changed during the legislative process to August 1, 2012. Importantly, this did not allow parents to adjust their behavior in anticipation of the policy change. In July 2015, the Federal Constitutional Court abolished the cash-for-care policy, ruling that the policy exceeds the federal legislative authority. As the transfer continued for all parents who had their claim already approved, there is no clear cut-off in terms of birth date for the withdrawal of the policy, and we hence focus on the introduction of the policy.

In August 2013, Germany expanded the legal claim to a spot in public childcare from all children from three years old onwards to all children from the age of one onwards. In contrast to the cash-for-care policy, there was no clear cut-off based on age of birth. Children born after August 1, 2012 are fully affected by the legal claim, while children in the control group are also affected, albeit not directly at the point in time at which they become one year old. If anything, we would expect the introduction of the legal claim to increase the labor supply of mothers and hence bias the estimated labor supply response to the cash-for-care policy upwards.

In our data set, subjects are asked whether the household receives the cash-for-care payment. The share of eligible households that use the subsidy is almost twice as high for traditional mothers (38% vs 21%).¹¹

4.2 Empirical strategy

To evaluate the program's impact, we employ a treatment group comprising all children born in a two-year window after the cut-off date (August 1, 2012), while the control group comprises those born in a two-year window before the cut-off date, totaling approximately 450 births. The identification assumption underlying this approach is that the two groups are similar in all respects except for their eligibility for the cash-for-care payment. Under this assumption, observed differences in outcomes can be attributed to the program's effects.

In the spirit of a triple-difference design, we interact dummies of event time t , gender attitude A and eligibility for the cash-for-care payment $cash\text{-}for\text{-}care_{st}$ and estimate the following event study specification:

$$\begin{aligned}
Y_{ist}^A = & \sum_a \mathbb{I}[a = A] \cdot (\alpha^a + \zeta^a \cdot cash\text{-}for\text{-}care_{st}) \\
& + \sum_{k \neq -1} \sum_a \mathbb{I}[k = t] \cdot \mathbb{I}[a = A] \cdot (\gamma_k^a + \eta_k^a \cdot cash\text{-}for\text{-}care_{st}) \quad (2) \\
& + \phi_{age_{is}} + \nu_{ist}
\end{aligned}$$

Where $\mathbb{I}[a = A]$ are dummy variables whether the subject is of gender attitude type a . We add age fixed effects ($\phi_{age_{is}}$), but – conversely to the analyses in the last section – no year fixed effects, as all children in the sample were born around the same time and hence event time and year are highly collinear. Our coefficients of interest are the η_k^a which indicate the treatment effect of the cash-for-care policy for gender attitude type a at event times k .

Similar policies were already in place in some German states prior to the introduction of the federal policy. We exclude residents of Baden-Württemberg from the analysis as a cash-for-care policy was abolished in 2013 in this state. In Saxonia, Thuringia, and Bavaria, a similar policy was in place throughout the observation window. As the federal and state policies could be claimed simultaneously, we do not exclude observations from these states in our main specification.




Figure 3. Difference in female (unconditional) working hours by cash-for-care eligibility by gender role attitudes around the birth of the first child

Notes: The figure displays coefficients of event study regressions around the birth of the first child. Event dummies are interacted with both a dummy whether the child is eligible for cash-for-care and gender role attitudes type (see Equation 2). The eligible group comprises all children born in a two-year window after the cut-off date and the non-eligible group comprises all children born in a two-year window before the cut-off date. The left panel displays the difference in unconditional working hours by cash-for-care eligibility around the birth of the first child separately for egalitarian and traditional mothers, relative to event time -1. The corresponding coefficients are reported in Appendix Table A.5. The right panel plots the respective difference between egalitarian and traditional mothers. Sample: observed at least twice before and twice after the birth of the first child, not living in Baden-Württemberg. The vertical error bars display 95% confidence intervals.

4.3 Results

The impact of the cash-for-care policy on the labor supply of mothers substantially varies depending on their gender attitudes. Figure 3 displays the results of the event study regressions. For mothers with traditional gender roles, the policy demonstrates a notably negative treatment effect of eight hours when their child is one year old (Panel 3a). As non-eligible traditional mothers reduce their working hours at that event time by seventeen hours on average, the cash-for-care effect amounts to an additional 46%. Further analysis reveals that this effect is primarily driven by changes at the extensive margin, indicating that more mothers in this group choose to reduce labor force participation during this specific period. By contrast, there is no discernible impact on the labor supply of mothers with more egalitarian views towards gender roles. The positive yet insignificant coefficient for egalitarian mothers might be driven by the expansion in the legal claim to a spot in public childcare. The difference between the two groups is statistically significant, as shown in Panel 3b.

When examining the full sample without a split by gender attitude type, we find a relatively small negative and not statistically significant effect of the policy. This

11. Based on the ‘Kinderbetreuungsstudie,’ Collischon, Kuehnle, and Oberfichtner (2022) report take-up rates of 60% in West Germany and 28% in East Germany. This provides further suggestive evidence of unequal take-up by gender attitudes. It also indicates that there are differences in the level of measured take-up between the studies. This, however, does not affect the following analyses as these do not make use of take-up information.

aligns with the results by Collischon, Kuehnle, and Oberfichtner (2022), who also find only minor negative employment effects when analyzing administrative data.

4.4 Robustness

In this section, we investigate the robustness of our finding that the labor supply of traditional mothers decreased under a cash-for-care policy, but not the labor supply of egalitarian mothers. We do so by replicating our analyses with different samples and specifications.

First, Appendix Figure A.6 replicates Figure 3 using a balanced panel. The results are very similar to the main specification, indicating that they are not driven by the fact that we do not observe some mothers in all periods. Second, Appendix Table A.5 shows the results when we restrict the sample to mothers living in West Germany or drop those living in states with a cash-for-care policy at the state level (Saxonia, Thuringia, or Bavaria). In both cases, we detect even a slightly stronger negative labor supply effect for traditional mothers when their child is one year old. However, for the latter robustness check, we already detect a significant difference between the treatment and control group at event time -1, indicating that the identification assumption of parallel trends might not be fulfilled. Finally, we also add a set of controls to our main specification in the last column of Appendix Table A.5. The results remain qualitatively and quantitatively very similar. We conclude that our main results are robust to different sample restrictions and specifications.

5 A structural model of female labor supply

Based on the results of the last sections, we estimate a structural life-cycle model of female labor supply which incorporates a trade-off between disutility induced by gender role attitudes and economic incentives. Our key methodological contribution is that we model heterogeneity stemming from gender role attitudes using a discrete set of attitude types. The model allows us to estimate labor supply elasticities and the effects of counter-factual policy changes where we focus in particular on how those vary over gender attitude types. We describe the model and the estimation of the model in this section.

5.1 Overview and basic setup

A key feature why labor supply decisions of parents influence a substantial part of gendered inequalities in labor market outcomes is that periods in which a mother does not work translate not only to lower labor income in that period, but also affect future earnings through (the absence of) human capital accumulation. For

our research questions, it is hence essential to model the dynamic development of wages and the decision making process of couples over the life-cycle.

We set up a life-cycle model which closely builds upon state-of-the-art models, for instance, by Blundell, Dias, Meghir, and Shaw (2016), Adda, Dustmann, and Stevens (2017), and Jakobsen, Jørgensen, and Low (2023). While we slim down some parts of these models, we add heterogeneity by gender role attitude types as a novel feature. Specifically, we differentiate again two types, traditional and egalitarian mothers, that differ in their preferences about working when having children. Additionally, we allow for differences in initial wages, partner income, and fertility patterns.

We focus on women living together with a partner and follow them from age 24 to age 65 in discrete time steps of one year. Subjects are forward looking and maximize the sum of current utility and discounted expected future utility. By doing so, they take a set of state variables $S_t = (K_t, n_t, o_t)$ into account, where $K_t \geq 0$ is the human capital of the woman, $n_t \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$ is the number of children, and $o_t \in \{\emptyset, 0, 1, \dots, 16, 17\}$ is the age of the youngest child in the household. We denote age of the women with t , gender attitude type with T , and all variables referring to the (male) partner with m . In each period, women decide whether they work full-time, work part-time, or abstain from working entirely, which we denote as $l_t \in \{0, l_{PT}, l_{FT}\}$.¹² As we are particularly interested in the interplay of gender role attitudes and economic incentives for female labor supply, we incorporate a detailed representation of the German tax and transfer system.

We next introduce a framework to conceptualize gender role attitudes, before describing the structural model in more detail, where the notation loosely follows Jakobsen, Jørgensen, and Low (2023).

5.2 Per-period utility

Subjects value consumption C_t , as well as non-market time. The latter implies that, holding consumption constant, labor supply l_t enters the utility function negatively. The per-period utility function consists of the following three terms.

$$U(C_t, l_t, n_t, o_t) = \frac{(C_t / \nu(n_t))^{1-\rho}}{1-\rho} + f(l_t, \text{age}_t) + q^T(l_t, o_t) \mathbb{I}[n_t > 0] \quad (3)$$

The first term represents the constant relative risk aversion value of consumption where ρ governs the level of risk aversion and $\nu(n_t)$ equalizes household consumption using the OECD scale ($\nu(n_t) = 1.5 + 0.3n_t$), depending on the number of children n_t . The second term $f(l_t)$ constitutes disutility of work

12. We set $l_t = 0$ in the period a mother gives birth, in line with observed choices for almost all women. For the first two months after child birth the mother is not even legally allowed to work.

$$f(l_t) = \mu_{pT} \mathbb{I}[l_t = l_{pT}] + \mu_{FT} \mathbb{I}[l_t = l_{FT}] \quad (4)$$

where μ_{pT} and μ_{FT} represent the disutility of working part-time and full-time respectively.

The third term $q^T(l_t, o_t)$ captures changes in the preferences to work when children are in the household. The novel component of our model is that we allow for heterogeneity in the parameters of this function and relate them to observed measures of gender role attitudes.

$$\begin{aligned} q^T(l_t, o_t) = & \mu_{pT} \mathbb{I}[l_t = l_{pT}] \left(\alpha_{pT,child}^T + \alpha_{age}^T \max\{6 - o_t, 0\} \right) \\ & + \mu_{FT} \mathbb{I}[l_t = l_{FT}] \left(\alpha_{FT,child}^T + \alpha_{age}^T \max\{6 - o_t, 0\} \right) \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

Thereby, $\alpha_{pT,child}^T$ and $\alpha_{FT,child}^T$ capture the change in the disutility to working when a child of at least six years is in the household, relative to the disutility of working when no children are present (μ_{pT} or μ_{FT}). Furthermore, the disutility changes with the age of the youngest child (α_{age}^T) up to the age of six. All these parameters differ by gender attitude type T .

5.3 Wage process

Labor income Y_t is the product of the hourly wage w_t and labor supply l_t

$$Y_t = w_t l_t, \quad (6)$$

where the wage depends on accumulated human capital K_t

$$\log w_t = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 K_t. \quad (7)$$

Human capital evolves based on

$$K_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)K_t + \mathbb{I}[l_t = l_{FT}] + k_{pT} \mathbb{I}[l_t = l_{pT}] + k_e \epsilon_t. \quad (8)$$

It depreciates with the rate δ and increases by 1 when working full-time and by k_{pT} when working part-time. We also incorporate an additive shock ϵ_t to human capital, representing a permanent wage shock.¹³ We ensure $K_{t+1} \geq 0$.

To reduce the state space, we model the wage of the partner w_t^m as a quadratic function of the age of the woman, following van der Klaauw (1996) and several other studies. However, we allow for differences by type T . We do not model the

13. We fix both the probability of a negative shock ($\epsilon_t = -1$) and the probability of a positive shock ($\epsilon_t = 1$) to 0.25 while no shock ($\epsilon_t = 0$) happens with a probability of one-half. The scaling parameter k_e governs the size of the shocks and is estimated below.

labor supply decision of partners, but assume full-time work such that labor income of the partner is given by $Y_t^m = w_t^m l_{FT}$.

5.4 Budget constraint

The budget constraint is given by

$$C_t = Y_t + Y_t^m + T_t(Y_t, Y_t^m, n_t, o_t) - CC_t(n_t, o_t, l_t). \quad (9)$$

In each period, household consumption C_t is determined as the sum of labor income of both partners after applying taxes and transfers $T_t(Y_t, Y_t^m, n_t, o_t)$ and subtracting childcare costs $CC_t(n_t, o_t, l_t)$. We employ childcare costs as estimated by Geyer, Haan, and Wrohlich (2015) for Germany and assume that they are directly related to the labor supply of the mother as we do not account for informal childcare. We closely replicate the German tax and transfer system for the year 2018.¹⁴ See Appendix C for more details on the implementation of the tax and transfer system and childcare costs.

5.5 Calibrated parameters

The estimation proceeds in two steps. We first set some parameters of the model based on the previous literature or estimate them based on data outside of the model estimation. In the second step described below, we estimate the remaining parameters of the model using the Method of Simulated Moments.

We set the CRRA coefficient ρ to 1.5 following, for instance, Jakobsen, Jørgensen, and Low (2023) and fix the discount factor β at 0.95. The human capital return to part-time work k_{pT} is 0.5 following Adda, Dustmann, and Stevens (2017). We set the depreciation rate of human capital δ to 0.05. This corresponds to an upper bound of human capital of twenty as the yearly depreciation equals the experience gain of one year of full-time work at that point.

Finally, we calibrate labor income of the partner and fertility patterns based on pairfam data allowing for differences across attitude types. We describe the calibration in more detail in Appendix C.

5.6 Estimation

We estimate the remaining parameters using the Method of Simulated Moments (MSM) (Gourieroux, Monfort, and Renault, 1993). These parameters specify the human capital shock (k_e), the wage process (γ_0, γ_1), the disutility of working (μ_{pT}, μ_{FT}), and the change in the disutility of working with children ($\alpha_{pT}^T, \alpha_{FT}^T, \alpha_{age}^T$)

14. That is, after the abolishment of the cash-for-care policy that we study in Section 4.

where we estimate the latter set of parameters for both T . We denote the set of these eleven parameters with θ .

We estimate θ as

$$\hat{\theta} = \arg \min_{\ell \leq \theta \leq b} g(\theta)^\top W g(\theta), \quad (10)$$

where $g(\theta) = m^{data} - m^{sim}(\theta)$ is a J -dimensional vector of differences between the empirical moments, listed in Table 4, and the corresponding moments simulated from the model at the parameters θ . W is a $J \times J$ symmetric positive definite weighting matrix, set to the inverse of the covariance matrix of the empirical moments. We impose lower (ℓ) and upper (b) bounds on the parameters, e.g. we impose that the human capital shock factor (k_e) is positive. We report the list of all bounds in Table A.6.

To simulate the moments m^{sim} at a specific parameter value θ , we solve the model and simulate life-time trajectories for $N_{sim} = 10,000$ subjects, given initial conditions that we randomly draw from the data at age 24.¹⁵ We then minimize the criterion function using a non-linear least-square minimizer.

We only employ moments up to the age of 45 as we do not track our sample beyond that age. We do not deem this a strong limitation as we are mostly interested in the time when children are born and raised which typically happens during our observation period. Nevertheless, we simulate choices of women up to age 65 in order to capture the importance of human capital on life-time earnings.

Table 4. List of moments

| Moments | Number |
|--|--------|
| Share working by age | 22 |
| Share working full-time by age | 22 |
| Gross-income by age | 22 |
| Share working by age of the youngest child by gender attitude type | 14 |
| Share working full-time by age of the youngest child by gender attitude type | 14 |
| Share working by number of children by gender attitude type | 8 |
| Share working full-time by number of children by gender attitude type | 8 |
| Year-to-year labor supply transitions | 9 |
| | 119 |

Notes: The list of moments we use to estimate the model. Moments by age (of the mother) are calculated from age 24 to age 45 while moments by age of the youngest child are calculated from age one to age seven.

Table 4 displays the list of moments we use in our estimation. A set of 44 moments depict labor supply, the share working and the share working full-time, depending on age of the youngest child (closely related to the reduced form evidence in

15. We use LCM (2023) for the solution and simulation of the model and Gabler (2022) for the numerical optimization.

Section 3) and the number of children. We include moments by age of the youngest child, up to the age of seven as labor supply plateaus at around this age and later years would not provide much further information. These moments are informative on the disutility of working when having children, in particular $(\alpha_{PT}^T, \alpha_{FT}^T, \alpha_{age}^T)$. We expect the baseline disutility of working (μ_{PT}, μ_{FT}) to be primarily identified by the 44 moments on labor supply by age and the moments on labor supply of childless women. Furthermore, we add the age profile of income over the life-cycle to be informative on the wage process (γ_0, γ_1) and the transition probabilities between labor supply states to inform the size of human capital shocks k_ϵ . The latter moment group relates choices over periods. Eisenhauer, Heckman, and Mosso (2015) argue that these kind of dynamic moments are important for the identification of dynamic life-cycle models.

6 Results structural estimation

In this section, we use the structural model introduced in the last section to calculate labor supply elasticities, as well as a counter-factual policy change and explore the role of gender attitudes. Before doing so, we present the estimation results and show that the model fits the data well.

6.1 Estimation results and model fit

Appendix Table A.6 reports the list of estimated parameters. An increase in human capital by one unit, is associated with an increase in the log wage by 0.075 or an increase in the wage by roughly 8%. The return to human capital is only slightly below 0.085 as estimated by Jakobsen, Jørgensen, and Low (2023). We estimate a human capital shock factor (k_ϵ) of 0.49. The estimated μ_{PT} and μ_{FT} are negative implying that subjects *ceteris paribus* prefer to not work. Thereby, the disutility of full-time work is slightly more than twice as large as the disutility of part-time work. With respect to the disutility of working with children, we estimate a substantially higher disutility for traditional mothers. For full-time work as governed by the α_{FT}^T parameters the difference is even stronger than for part-time work. The estimated α_{PT}^T for egalitarian mothers is close to zero, which implies that their disutility of working part-time instead of not working at all does not change when having a child of at least 6 years old instead of not having a child at all.

Next, we compare the fit of our model to empirical data moments and find that, overall, we can replicate observed patterns well.

Figure 4 displays age profiles of the share of women that are working, the share working full-time, and the average labor income. We fit labor supply over the life-cycle fairly well with some deviations in the full-time rate at the beginning and the end of the considered period. With respect to labor income, we observe that

observed moments are somewhat noisily measured in pairfam. We fit the pattern well, but simulated labor income is on average a bit too high.




Figure 4. Simulated and observed moments by age

Notes: This figure depicts simulated and observed moments by age of the women. Panel 4a reports the share working, Panel 4b the share working full-time, and Panel 4c the average labor income. Observed moments are calculated in the estimation sample based on pairfam data.

We next turn to the moments capturing labor supply depending on age of the youngest child and the number of children. Looking at the top panels of Figure 5, we see that simulated labor supply varies less smoothly with age of the youngest child than in observed data. Nevertheless, the trends, the overall level, and in particular the difference between traditional and egalitarian mothers is well replicated. The bottom panels of Figure 5 show that the model also replicates the labor supply patterns by the number of children. While we fit the share of women working full-time very precisely, we slightly overestimate the share of working women with no or one child and underestimate the share of working women with three children.

Table 5 reports the simulated and observed transition probabilities. Simulated labor supply choices are somewhat more persistent than observed in the data. One reason for this could be that we do not incorporate involuntary unemployment or any frictions to finding a job in our model.

Overall, we conclude that the model fits the data well, especially given the complex decision problem of households that we are aiming to match.




Figure 5. Simulated and observed moments by age of the youngest child and number of children

Notes: This figure depicts simulated and observed moments by age of the youngest child (top panels) and number of children (bottom panel). The left panels report the share working and the right panels the share working full-time. Moments are also differentiated by gender attitude type. Observed moments are calculated in the estimation sample based on pairfam data.

Table 5. Simulated and observed labor supply transition probabilities

| | No Work | Part Time | Full Time |
|------------------|---------|-----------|-----------|
| <i>Simulated</i> | | | |
| No Work | 0.72 | 0.22 | 0.06 |
| Part Time | 0.06 | 0.90 | 0.04 |
| Full Time | 0.11 | 0.02 | 0.87 |
| <i>Observed</i> | | | |
| No Work | 0.64 | 0.28 | 0.08 |
| Part Time | 0.12 | 0.78 | 0.10 |
| Full Time | 0.13 | 0.09 | 0.78 |

Notes: Transition probabilities of labor supply choices in consecutive periods. Rows represent the employment status in period t , while columns represent the employment status in period $t + 1$.

6.2 Labor supply elasticities

In this section, we calculate elasticities of labor supply with respect to changes in wages. This follows at least two purposes. First, we compare the estimates to previous literature as another validation check of our model. Second, we analyze how

elasticities differ by gender attitude types as first evidence on whether the response to changes in incentives interact with gender attitudes.

We calculate Marshallian elasticities as response to a permanent increase in wages. Specifically, we increase the wage by 5% in all periods and calculate how this affects labor supply at different points in time over the life-cycle. We consider two measures of labor supply: unconditional working hours, that is counting not working as zero working hours, and labor force participation as measure of the extensive margin response.

Table 6 reports the results. We first note that elasticities are monotonically increasing from age 25 to 35 and they increase further up to age 40 for at least three of the four measures. This is in line with the results by Wang (2022) who report Marshallian elasticities with respect to unconditional working hours of 0.43 at age 25, of 0.96 at age 32, and of 1.13 at age 40. The fact that we find overall larger elasticities is expected given that we only consider women in a relationship. For the subset of partnered women, Wang (2022) reports elasticities of, on average, 1.54 which is even slightly higher than our results.

Table 6. Labor supply elasticities with respect to permanent changes in wages

| | Working hours (unconditional) | | Labor force participation | |
|--------|-------------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|
| | Egalitarian | Traditional | Egalitarian | Traditional |
| Age 25 | 0.62 | 0.78 | 0.11 | 0.33 |
| Age 30 | 1.33 | 1.66 | 0.77 | 1.01 |
| Age 35 | 1.58 | 1.71 | 0.74 | 1.13 |
| Age 40 | 1.70 | 1.59 | 0.95 | 1.34 |
| Mean | 1.31 | 1.44 | 0.64 | 0.95 |

Notes: We calculate elasticities as labor supply response to a permanent increase in wages of 5% over the full life-cycle. The first four rows display the elasticity at the respective age while the last row averages over these four points in time. We consider unconditional working hours in the two first columns and labor force participation in the two last columns.

Interestingly, labor supply elasticities are larger for traditional mothers compared to egalitarian mothers, with the only exception at age 40 for unconditional working hours, which is most likely driven by different fertility patterns. This shows that in terms of Marshallian elasticities, traditional mothers are more responsive to changes in economic incentives which fits very well to the fact that both Blundell et al. (2016) and Wang (2022) find smaller elasticities for higher educated mothers.

6.3 Reform to full-time childcare

Finally, we use our model to simulate a counterfactual policy change which removes barriers to full-time childcare. For this purpose, we set the additional cost of full-time childcare, over part-time childcare, to zero. Based on the estimated childcare

costs by Geyer, Haan, and Wrohlich (2015), which we use in our model, full-time childcare costs for children younger than three years then decrease substantially from 381 EUR to 219 EUR per month while full-time childcare costs for children between three and six years decrease only slightly from 128 EUR to 122 EUR.

Figure 6 depicts the changes in labor supply by age of the youngest child, separately for egalitarian and traditional mothers. Panel 6a reveals that the reform has almost no effect at the extensive margin, as expected given that part-time childcare costs are not affected by the policy change. Conversely, the rate of mothers working full-time increases considerably by more than 15 percentage points when the child is of age one or two for traditional mothers. For egalitarian mothers, the effect is even stronger as the full-time rate increases by 25 percentage points indicating that a larger share of egalitarian mothers is restricted in their labor supply choices by the lack of access to cheap full-time childcare. In relative terms, the difference between the attitude groups becomes even more pronounced in the years when the child is older. The full-time rate of traditional mothers returns almost completely to the baseline rate while egalitarian mothers are consistently more likely to work full-time driven by a stronger increase in human capital through the policy reform.




Figure 6. Reform effects of full-time childcare subsidy by age of the youngest child by gender attitudes

Notes: This figure depicts the difference in simulated labor supply between our baseline model and a reform in which we set the additional costs of full-time childcare (over part-time childcare) to zero. The left panels focuses on the share working and the right panels on the share working full-time.

These results show that although labor supply elasticities are in general larger for traditional mothers, policy reforms targeted at the needs of egalitarian mothers, can have a stronger effect on this group.

7 Conclusion

This paper documents that gender role attitudes hold first-order importance for parental labor supply decisions in at least two respects. After having their first child,

traditional mothers are substantially more likely to be out of the labor force and work fewer hours, although labor supply in the years prior to birth is remarkably similar to egalitarian parents. Furthermore, we show that gender role attitudes interact with economic incentives, both based on an ex-post evaluation of an actual policy change and ex-ante simulations of counterfactual policy changes using a structural model.

A main feature of our paper is that we use individual-level measures of gender role attitudes. This has the distinct advantage over more coarse norm-based measures (Fernández and Fogli, 2009) that it allows us to exploit between-individual heterogeneity. In particular, we examine the relation of individual-level measures of attitudes with potential confounding variables and can control for them in our analyses. Moreover, we disentangle the contribution of paternal and maternal gender attitudes and find that attitudes of the father are influential after controlling for attitudes of the mothers. This suggests that decisions surrounding employment and childcare are the result of joint decision-making within couples.

These findings have important implications for policymakers aiming to increase the participation of mothers in the workforce, a common goal in many developed countries. First, the high importance of attitudes constitute limitations to how effective policies can be in the short-run. Conditional on gender attitudes, changes in economic incentives can alter behavior only to some extent. It, hence, stresses the importance for research on the drivers of gender role attitudes. Second, our results suggest that the effect of policies can depend strongly on the gender role attitudes underscoring the necessity for a diverse array of policies if the behavior of the full population should be changed. Third, the mediating role of gender role attitudes emphasizes the importance to consider differences in the distribution of gender attitudes when extrapolating estimated average policy effects to different temporal or geographical contexts.

Our findings that gender role attitudes are highly influential for maternal labor supply might be able to also contribute to normative questions around policies aiming to increase female labor supply. On the one hand, if attitudes are interpreted as invariable preferences, efforts to equalize the variation in labor choices could potentially lead to a decrease in overall welfare. On the other hand, previous literature shows that gender role attitudes can be influenced by the social environment and public policies (Dhar, Jain, and Jayachandran, 2022; Farre, Felfe, Gonzalez, and Schneider, 2023).¹⁶ Our study abstains from taking a normative position on these questions and leaves welfare analyses for future research.

Our model captures the most important aspects of female labor supply decisions. However, we abstract from some decision margins that might also interact with gender attitudes and could be interesting to study in future research. While we allow

16. This might be especially relevant considering potential externalities associated with maternal reductions in labor supply, for instance, through reduced aggregate economic outcome or statistical discrimination of young women.

for differences in fertility patterns between gender attitude groups, a natural extension would be to include endogenous fertility decisions. This would allow subjects to adjust the number and the timing of births in response to policy changes. Moreover, we do not model paternal labor supply choices. The question why fathers typically reduce working hours after child birth much less than mothers is most likely also highly related to behavioral factors like norms, as well as economic incentives induced by the policy environment. This research question would be especially interesting to study in more progressive labor markets where a larger share of fathers adjust labor supply in response to child-birth. Furthermore, it would be interesting to look at the relation of gender attitudes and educational or occupational choices. Young women might choose different occupations depending on how strongly they plan to reduce labor supply after having children. To estimate the effect of this mechanism, it will be important to measure gender role attitudes at an early enough age as it is otherwise impossible to disentangle the potentially two-sided influence of gender role attitudes and education or occupational choices.

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Appendix for online publication

A Additional tables and figures

In this section, we present additional tables and figures.




Figure A.1. Household characteristics around the birth of the first child by gender role attitudes

Notes: The panels depict means of household characteristics over time around child birth by gender role attitude group (observed before the birth of the first child). The dependent variables are whether the subject lives together with a partner (Figure A.1a), whether the subject lives together with a married partner (Figure A.1b), and the number of children (Figure A.1c). Sample: observed at least twice before and twice after the birth of the first child. The vertical error bars display 95% confidence intervals.




Figure A.2. Gender role attitudes around the birth of the first child

Notes: Event study regressions including age and year fixed effects with current gender role attitudes as the dependent variable. Sample: observed at least twice before and twice after the birth of the first child. The vertical error bars display 95% confidence intervals.




Figure A.3. Female income around the birth of the first child by gender role attitudes

Notes: The left panels depict means over time around child birth by gender role attitude group (observed before the birth of the first child). The right panels depict the difference between groups in event study regressions as specified in Equation 1 (i.e. the δ_k coefficients). The dependent variable is log gross income in the top row and hourly wage in the bottom row. Sample: observed at least twice before and twice after the birth of the first child. The vertical error bars display 95% confidence intervals.

Table A.1. Event study regressions of unconditional working hours (individual items)

| | Gender role attitudes (index) | Women family | Equal housework | Child suffers |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Traditional | −0.64 (1.26) | 0.81 (1.27) | 0.98 (1.27) | −3.69*** (1.31) |
| Event time = −5 | 2.54* (1.42) | 2.96* (1.54) | 2.09 (1.37) | 2.44* (1.27) |
| Traditional × Event time = −5 | 1.57 (1.92) | 0.75 (1.96) | 3.05 (1.92) | 1.35 (1.98) |
| Event time = −4 | 3.08** (1.27) | 3.44** (1.40) | 3.88*** (1.22) | 2.79** (1.10) |
| Traditional × Event time = −4 | 2.01 (1.74) | 1.19 (1.78) | 0.71 (1.77) | 2.62 (1.85) |
| Event time = −3 | 3.84*** (1.12) | 3.47*** (1.27) | 4.38*** (1.04) | 3.49*** (0.97) |
| Traditional × Event time = −3 | 1.25 (1.53) | 1.72 (1.58) | 0.36 (1.56) | 1.99 (1.62) |
| Event time = −2 | 5.26*** (0.96) | 5.75*** (1.09) | 5.61*** (0.85) | 4.90*** (0.84) |
| Traditional × Event time = −2 | 0.19 (1.27) | −0.64 (1.33) | −0.48 (1.31) | 0.84 (1.30) |
| Event time = 0 | −27.56*** (1.00) | −26.21*** (1.15) | −26.48*** (0.94) | −29.02*** (0.91) |
| Traditional × Event time = 0 | 0.74 (1.43) | −1.80 (1.46) | −1.95 (1.45) | 4.81*** (1.46) |
| Event time = 1 | −13.37*** (1.12) | −13.07*** (1.24) | −14.95*** (1.00) | −15.14*** (1.02) |
| Traditional × Event time = 1 | −5.65*** (1.52) | −5.43*** (1.56) | −3.13** (1.58) | −2.16 (1.58) |
| Event time = 2 | −10.85*** (1.19) | −11.22*** (1.31) | −12.47*** (1.09) | −11.92*** (1.09) |
| Traditional × Event time = 2 | −4.40*** (1.59) | −3.33** (1.64) | −1.80 (1.63) | −2.45 (1.63) |
| Event time = 3 | −11.26*** (1.31) | −11.04*** (1.43) | −11.90*** (1.22) | −12.91*** (1.20) |
| Traditional × Event time = 3 | −4.80*** (1.73) | −4.72*** (1.76) | −4.85*** (1.75) | −1.42 (1.78) |
| Event time = 4 | −9.93*** (1.37) | −10.31*** (1.51) | −10.10*** (1.26) | −11.58*** (1.28) |
| Traditional × Event time = 4 | −4.94*** (1.75) | −3.88* (1.81) | −6.25*** (1.79) | −1.55 (1.81) |
| Event time = 5 | −7.92*** (1.50) | −7.07*** (1.65) | −7.97*** (1.38) | −9.22*** (1.41) |
| Traditional × Event time = 5 | −4.76** (1.87) | −5.86*** (1.92) | −6.37*** (1.90) | −2.10 (1.92) |
| Event time = 6 | −7.44*** (1.55) | −7.03*** (1.67) | −9.00*** (1.45) | −9.25*** (1.46) |
| Traditional × Event time = 6 | −5.72*** (1.89) | −6.07*** (1.91) | −4.18** (1.93) | −2.04 (1.96) |
| Event time = 7 | −6.20*** (1.63) | −6.96*** (1.78) | −8.83*** (1.61) | −7.69*** (1.56) |
| Traditional × Event time = 7 | −7.04*** (2.02) | −5.30*** (2.03) | −3.40* (2.05) | −4.05* (2.10) |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Age FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 7880 | 7880 | 7880 | 7880 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.30 | 0.30 | 0.30 | 0.30 |

Notes: The table depicts the coefficients of event study regressions as specified in Equation 1. The dependent variable is unconditional working hours. In the first column, subjects are classified based on the gender role attitudes index (observed before the birth of the first child). This column is visualized in Figure 2b. In the remaining columns, the classification variables are the individual items. Sample: observed at least twice before and twice after the birth of the first child, all three items observed. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and reported in parentheses. * — $p < 0.1$, ** — $p < 0.05$, *** — $p < 0.01$

Table A.2. Event study regressions of labor force participation (individual items)

| | Gender role attitudes (index) | Women family | Equal housework | Child suffers |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Traditional | 0.00 (0.03) | 0.03 (0.03) | 0.03 (0.03) | −0.07** (0.03) |
| Event time = -5 | 0.09*** (0.03) | 0.10*** (0.04) | 0.08*** (0.03) | 0.09*** (0.03) |
| Traditional × Event time = -5 | 0.02 (0.05) | 0.00 (0.05) | 0.05 (0.05) | 0.03 (0.05) |
| Event time = -4 | 0.11*** (0.03) | 0.11*** (0.03) | 0.13*** (0.03) | 0.10*** (0.03) |
| Traditional × Event time = -4 | 0.03 (0.04) | 0.04 (0.04) | 0.00 (0.04) | 0.05 (0.04) |
| Event time = -3 | 0.11*** (0.03) | 0.10*** (0.03) | 0.12*** (0.03) | 0.10*** (0.02) |
| Traditional × Event time = -3 | 0.02 (0.04) | 0.04 (0.04) | 0.00 (0.04) | 0.04 (0.04) |
| Event time = -2 | 0.14*** (0.02) | 0.14*** (0.03) | 0.13*** (0.02) | 0.13*** (0.02) |
| Traditional × Event time = -2 | 0.00 (0.03) | 0.00 (0.03) | 0.01 (0.03) | 0.02 (0.03) |
| Event time = 0 | −0.69*** (0.02) | −0.65*** (0.03) | −0.66*** (0.02) | −0.72*** (0.02) |
| Traditional × Event time = 0 | 0.02 (0.04) | −0.05 (0.04) | −0.05 (0.04) | 0.12*** (0.04) |
| Event time = 1 | −0.19*** (0.03) | −0.20*** (0.03) | −0.24*** (0.03) | −0.23*** (0.03) |
| Traditional × Event time = 1 | −0.15*** (0.04) | −0.12*** (0.04) | −0.06 (0.04) | −0.08* (0.04) |
| Event time = 2 | −0.12*** (0.03) | −0.14*** (0.03) | −0.16*** (0.03) | −0.14*** (0.03) |
| Traditional × Event time = 2 | −0.10** (0.04) | −0.05 (0.04) | −0.03 (0.04) | −0.06 (0.04) |
| Event time = 3 | −0.13*** (0.03) | −0.15*** (0.04) | −0.14*** (0.03) | −0.17*** (0.03) |
| Traditional × Event time = 3 | −0.09** (0.05) | −0.07 (0.05) | −0.10** (0.05) | −0.02 (0.05) |
| Event time = 4 | −0.10*** (0.04) | −0.13*** (0.04) | −0.09*** (0.03) | −0.13*** (0.03) |
| Traditional × Event time = 4 | −0.10** (0.05) | −0.04 (0.05) | −0.14*** (0.05) | −0.02 (0.05) |
| Event time = 5 | −0.04 (0.04) | −0.03 (0.04) | −0.04 (0.03) | −0.07** (0.03) |
| Traditional × Event time = 5 | −0.09* (0.05) | −0.11** (0.05) | −0.14*** (0.05) | −0.03 (0.05) |
| Event time = 6 | −0.03 (0.04) | −0.03 (0.04) | −0.06 (0.04) | −0.08** (0.04) |
| Traditional × Event time = 6 | −0.10* (0.05) | −0.09* (0.05) | −0.06 (0.05) | 0.02 (0.05) |
| Event time = 7 | 0.02 (0.04) | 0.01 (0.05) | −0.06 (0.04) | −0.01 (0.04) |
| Traditional × Event time = 7 | −0.12** (0.05) | −0.10* (0.05) | 0.01 (0.06) | −0.06 (0.06) |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Age FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 7880 | 7880 | 7880 | 7880 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 |

Notes: The table depicts the coefficients of event study regressions as specified in Equation 1. The dependent variable is labor force participation. In the first column, subjects are classified based on the gender role attitudes index (observed before the birth of the first child). This column is visualized in Figure 2b. In the remaining columns, the classification variables are the individual items. Sample: observed at least twice before and twice after the birth of the first child, all three items observed. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and reported in parentheses. * — $p < 0.1$, ** — $p < 0.05$, *** — $p < 0.01$

Table A.3. Event study regressions of conditional working hours (individual items)

| | Gender role attitudes (index) | Women family | Equal housework | Child suffers |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Traditional | -0.78 (0.71) | -0.35 (0.71) | -0.17 (0.71) | -1.21 (0.77) |
| Event time = -5 | -1.23 (0.85) | -1.18 (0.92) | -1.22 (0.87) | -1.00 (0.77) |
| Traditional × Event time = -5 | 1.02 (1.12) | 0.83 (1.15) | 1.35 (1.12) | 0.37 (1.15) |
| Event time = -4 | -1.44** (0.73) | -0.78 (0.83) | -1.11 (0.72) | -1.26* (0.67) |
| Traditional × Event time = -4 | 1.12 (1.00) | -0.17 (1.04) | 0.74 (1.01) | 0.73 (1.03) |
| Event time = -3 | -0.40 (0.63) | -0.27 (0.75) | -0.28 (0.63) | -0.55 (0.57) |
| Traditional × Event time = -3 | 0.51 (0.89) | 0.21 (0.93) | 0.47 (0.89) | 0.91 (0.95) |
| Event time = -2 | -0.11 (0.47) | 0.31 (0.57) | 0.49 (0.45) | -0.13 (0.40) |
| Traditional × Event time = -2 | 0.27 (0.66) | -0.50 (0.69) | -1.00 (0.66) | 0.32 (0.73) |
| Event time = 0 | -5.31** (2.30) | -6.71*** (2.36) | -6.36*** (2.16) | -5.57** (2.32) |
| Traditional × Event time = 0 | -5.84* (3.41) | -2.85 (3.47) | -4.34 (3.62) | -5.33 (3.40) |
| Event time = 1 | -10.00*** (0.80) | -9.44*** (0.87) | -10.73*** (0.82) | -10.68*** (0.76) |
| Traditional × Event time = 1 | -3.94*** (1.21) | -4.09*** (1.18) | -2.29* (1.23) | -2.69** (1.33) |
| Event time = 2 | -9.15*** (0.81) | -9.04*** (0.93) | -10.30*** (0.85) | -9.48*** (0.74) |
| Traditional × Event time = 2 | -3.21*** (1.19) | -2.82** (1.19) | -1.08 (1.19) | -3.13** (1.29) |
| Event time = 3 | -9.20*** (0.94) | -8.62*** (1.07) | -10.15*** (0.95) | -9.65*** (0.88) |
| Traditional × Event time = 3 | -4.14*** (1.29) | -4.44*** (1.31) | -2.89** (1.30) | -3.71*** (1.37) |
| Event time = 4 | -8.85*** (1.00) | -8.33*** (1.13) | -9.63*** (0.98) | -9.35*** (0.92) |
| Traditional × Event time = 4 | -3.80*** (1.33) | -4.02*** (1.33) | -3.18** (1.36) | -3.15** (1.44) |
| Event time = 5 | -8.34*** (1.14) | -7.94*** (1.28) | -8.87*** (1.09) | -8.63*** (1.07) |
| Traditional × Event time = 5 | -3.23** (1.39) | -3.53** (1.42) | -3.19** (1.41) | -2.95** (1.46) |
| Event time = 6 | -8.45*** (1.18) | -8.10*** (1.29) | -9.52*** (1.17) | -8.45*** (1.13) |
| Traditional × Event time = 6 | -4.37*** (1.43) | -4.42*** (1.43) | -3.10** (1.45) | -4.86*** (1.50) |
| Event time = 7 | -8.54*** (1.35) | -9.27*** (1.42) | -9.25*** (1.34) | -9.03*** (1.30) |
| Traditional × Event time = 7 | -5.05*** (1.53) | -3.04** (1.55) | -4.58*** (1.55) | -4.31*** (1.59) |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Age FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 5103 | 5103 | 5103 | 5103 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.24 | 0.24 | 0.23 | 0.24 |

Notes: The table depicts the coefficients of event study regressions as specified in Equation 1. The dependent variable is conditional working hours. In the first column, subjects are classified based on the gender role attitudes index (observed before the birth of the first child). This column is visualized in Figure 2b. In the remaining columns, the classification variables are the individual items. Sample: observed at least twice before and twice after the birth of the first child, all three items observed. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and reported in parentheses. * – $p < 0.1$, ** – $p < 0.05$, *** – $p < 0.01$




Figure A.4. Female labor supply around the birth of the first child by gender role attitudes (three groups)

Notes: The figure replicates Figure 2 for a split into three groups. Sample: observed in all periods from two periods before to three periods after the birth of the first child. The vertical error bars display 95% confidence intervals.




Figure A.5. Female labor supply around the birth of the first child by gender role attitudes (balanced panel)

Notes: The figure replicates Figure 2 for a balanced panel. Sample: observed in all periods from two periods before to three periods after the birth of the first child. The vertical error bars display 95% confidence intervals.

Table A.4. Event study regressions of working hours (robustness)

| | West Germany | Pre-2020 | Full sample including controls |
|---------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Traditional | -0.37 (1.51) | -0.70 (1.44) | -0.18 (1.28) |
| Event time = -5 | 2.83* (1.70) | 4.19** (1.75) | 2.44* (1.47) |
| Traditional × Event time = -5 | 1.28 (2.25) | -0.59 (2.29) | 1.62 (1.95) |
| Event time = -4 | 4.12*** (1.56) | 3.62** (1.53) | 2.92** (1.32) |
| Traditional × Event time = -4 | 0.68 (2.09) | 1.18 (2.04) | 1.95 (1.77) |
| Event time = -3 | 4.24*** (1.35) | 3.37** (1.36) | 3.67*** (1.16) |
| Traditional × Event time = -3 | 0.18 (1.80) | 1.08 (1.78) | 1.25 (1.56) |
| Event time = -2 | 5.60*** (1.19) | 5.19*** (1.13) | 5.29*** (0.99) |
| Traditional × Event time = -2 | -0.42 (1.50) | -0.27 (1.43) | 0.26 (1.31) |
| Event time = 0 | -28.00*** (1.20) | -27.44*** (1.20) | -27.58*** (1.03) |
| Traditional × Event time = 0 | -0.26 (1.67) | 0.76 (1.65) | 0.69 (1.46) |
| Event time = 1 | -15.89*** (1.32) | -12.69*** (1.33) | -13.49*** (1.14) |
| Traditional × Event time = 1 | -6.16*** (1.72) | -6.81*** (1.74) | -5.53*** (1.54) |
| Event time = 2 | -13.88*** (1.54) | -10.39*** (1.42) | -11.02*** (1.21) |
| Traditional × Event time = 2 | -4.99*** (1.90) | -5.41*** (1.80) | -4.15** (1.61) |
| Event time = 3 | -13.60*** (1.69) | -12.22*** (1.59) | -10.94*** (1.34) |
| Traditional × Event time = 3 | -5.76*** (2.09) | -4.30** (1.97) | -5.08*** (1.75) |
| Event time = 4 | -12.62*** (1.71) | -10.60*** (1.78) | -10.05*** (1.41) |
| Traditional × Event time = 4 | -5.10** (2.10) | -4.68** (2.07) | -4.85*** (1.77) |
| Event time = 5 | -10.14*** (1.88) | -9.09*** (2.01) | -8.02*** (1.54) |
| Traditional × Event time = 5 | -5.16* (2.23) | -4.64* (2.32) | -4.92*** (1.89) |
| Event time = 6 | -10.55*** (1.99) | -7.80*** (2.09) | -7.86*** (1.58) |
| Traditional × Event time = 6 | -5.97*** (2.25) | -7.05*** (2.33) | -5.58*** (1.90) |
| Event time = 7 | -9.74*** (2.13) | -8.83*** (2.44) | -6.38*** (1.67) |
| Traditional × Event time = 7 | -6.01** (2.41) | -5.22* (2.88) | -6.51*** (2.05) |
| Education: tertiary | | | 0.35 (0.67) |
| Any migration background | | | -1.88** (0.89) |
| Municipality ≥ 100k inhabitants | | | -0.23 (0.83) |
| Religious affiliation | | | -1.12 (0.77) |
| Has a partner | | | -1.31 (0.93) |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Age FE | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| State FE | No | No | Yes |
| Observations | 5402 | 5743 | 7585 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.36 | 0.31 | 0.31 |

Notes: The table depicts the coefficients of event study regressions as specified in Equation 1. The dependent variable is unconditional working hours. In the first three columns the samples are restricted on subjects living in West Germany and observations before 2020, respectively. In the last column, additional control variables are added. Sample: observed at least twice before and twice after the birth of the first child. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and reported in parentheses.

* — $p < 0.1$, ** — $p < 0.05$, *** — $p < 0.01$




Figure A.6. Difference in female (unconditional) working hours by cash-for-care eligibility by gender role attitudes around the birth of the first child

Notes: The figure replicates Figure 3 for a balanced panel. Sample: observed in all periods from two periods before to three periods after the birth of the first child. The vertical error bars display 95% confidence intervals.

Table A.5. Event study regressions of working hours by gender role attitudes and cash-for-care policy (robustness)

| | Main specification | West Germany | No cash-for-care states | Full sample including controls |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Egalitarian × cash-for-care × Event time = -3 | 0.14 (3.78) | 8.97* (4.84) | -3.82 (4.67) | -2.12 (3.85) |
| Egalitarian × cash-for-care × Event time = -2 | -1.79 (2.86) | 1.54 (3.27) | -2.05 (3.59) | -3.18 (2.81) |
| Egalitarian × cash-for-care × Event time = 0 | 1.60 (3.25) | 1.81 (4.06) | 0.47 (4.28) | -0.20 (3.34) |
| Egalitarian × cash-for-care × Event time = 1 | 4.41 (3.35) | 7.71* (4.14) | 4.79 (4.31) | 2.92 (3.46) |
| Egalitarian × cash-for-care × Event time = 2 | 3.28 (3.38) | 5.09 (4.75) | 3.53 (4.44) | 2.40 (3.43) |
| Egalitarian × cash-for-care × Event time = 3 | 5.08 (3.60) | 7.68 (5.44) | 3.30 (4.23) | 4.23 (3.68) |
| Egalitarian × cash-for-care × Event time = 4 | 2.62 (3.82) | 5.48 (5.26) | 2.69 (4.86) | 0.64 (3.83) |
| Egalitarian × cash-for-care × Event time = 5 | 2.03 (3.99) | 6.54 (5.52) | 1.90 (5.05) | -0.10 (4.02) |
| Traditional × cash-for-care × Event time = -3 | 1.74 (3.18) | -0.69 (3.22) | -2.82 (3.73) | 2.78 (3.11) |
| Traditional × cash-for-care × Event time = -2 | 2.73 (2.49) | 0.96 (2.29) | -1.03 (3.12) | 3.70 (2.49) |
| Traditional × cash-for-care × Event time = 0 | -4.90 (3.15) | -7.24** (3.42) | -8.24** (4.03) | -4.24 (3.20) |
| Traditional × cash-for-care × Event time = 1 | -7.84** (3.35) | -9.96*** (3.34) | -12.38*** (3.64) | -8.33*** (3.23) |
| Traditional × cash-for-care × Event time = 2 | -4.58 (3.70) | -8.79** (3.71) | -9.79** (4.12) | -4.56 (3.67) |
| Traditional × cash-for-care × Event time = 3 | -1.78 (3.71) | -5.76 (3.94) | -7.53* (4.41) | -1.63 (3.69) |
| Traditional × cash-for-care × Event time = 4 | -1.35 (3.56) | -4.99 (3.89) | -9.27** (4.23) | -1.50 (3.55) |
| Traditional × cash-for-care × Event time = 5 | 2.33 (3.71) | -0.20 (4.10) | -5.24 (4.58) | 1.62 (3.75) |
| Egalitarian × Event time = -3 | 1.76 (3.26) | -4.31 (3.99) | 1.56 (4.00) | 2.53 (3.28) |
| Egalitarian × Event time = -2 | 4.26** (2.05) | 1.52 (2.44) | 3.79 (2.49) | 4.45** (2.14) |
| Egalitarian × Event time = 0 | -27.39*** (2.41) | -28.56*** (2.98) | -26.11*** (3.32) | -26.74*** (2.52) |
| Egalitarian × Event time = 1 | -13.10*** (2.60) | -19.84*** (2.89) | -11.51*** (3.53) | -12.18*** (2.69) |
| Egalitarian × Event time = 2 | -11.62*** (2.46) | -18.01*** (3.19) | -12.10*** (3.25) | -11.49*** (2.50) |
| Egalitarian × Event time = 3 | -13.90*** (2.76) | -17.94*** (3.76) | -11.37*** (3.36) | -13.45*** (2.80) |
| Egalitarian × Event time = 4 | -10.84*** (3.08) | -16.67*** (3.97) | -10.39*** (4.00) | -9.84*** (3.10) |
| Egalitarian × Event time = 5 | -9.26*** (3.02) | -14.87*** (3.78) | -10.52*** (3.80) | -8.25*** (3.07) |
| Traditional × Event time = -3 | 2.48 (2.48) | 1.94 (2.64) | -0.55 (3.00) | 1.49 (2.47) |
| Traditional × Event time = -2 | 2.34 (1.52) | 1.47 (1.51) | 1.75 (2.17) | 1.84 (1.64) |
| Traditional × Event time = 0 | -24.88*** (2.31) | -27.53*** (2.73) | -21.47*** (2.89) | -25.47*** (2.40) |
| Traditional × Event time = 1 | -16.98*** (2.25) | -21.87*** (2.60) | -14.70*** (2.59) | -17.21*** (2.34) |
| Traditional × Event time = 2 | -14.74*** (2.42) | -19.41*** (2.81) | -13.87*** (2.78) | -15.13*** (2.51) |
| Traditional × Event time = 3 | -15.33*** (2.56) | -20.14*** (2.98) | -11.89*** (3.14) | -15.83*** (2.66) |
| Traditional × Event time = 4 | -14.68*** (2.34) | -18.94*** (2.80) | -10.23*** (2.96) | -14.87*** (2.43) |
| Traditional × Event time = 5 | -15.62*** (2.49) | -19.72*** (2.87) | -10.22*** (3.18) | -16.21*** (2.57) |
| Egalitarian × cash-for-care | -2.34 (2.62) | -4.38 (3.53) | -0.39 (3.28) | -0.83 (2.64) |
| Traditional × cash-for-care | 3.66 (2.71) | 5.38* (2.95) | 8.57** (3.51) | 3.06 (2.74) |
| Egalitarian | 25.62*** (1.98) | 29.28*** (2.54) | 31.61*** (2.53) | 26.99*** (2.35) |
| Traditional | 22.93*** (1.81) | 25.64*** (2.12) | 24.73*** (2.53) | 26.10*** (2.02) |
| Education: tertiary | | | | 0.57 (1.14) |
| Any migration background | | | | -3.12* (1.66) |
| Municipality ≥ 100k inhabitants | | | | -1.11 (1.29) |
| Religious affiliation | | | | -1.32 (1.25) |
| Has a partner | | | | -3.65** (1.54) |
| Age FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| State FE | No | No | No | Yes |
| Observations | 2727 | 1651 | 1703 | 2626 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.28 | 0.36 | 0.25 | 0.30 |

Notes: The table depicts the coefficients of event study regressions as specified in Equation 2. The treatment group consists of all children born in a two year window after the cut-off date and control group consists of all children born in a two year window before the cut-off date. The dependent variable is unconditional working hours. In the first column, our main specification as depicted in Figure 3 is shown. In columns 2 to 3 the samples are restricted on subjects living in West Germany and subjects not living in a state with a cash-for-care policy (Saxonia, Thuringia, or Bavaria), respectively. In the last column, additional control variables are added. Sample: observed at least twice before and twice after the birth of the first child, not living in Baden-Württemberg. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and reported in parentheses. * – $p < 0.1$, ** – $p < 0.05$, *** – $p < 0.01$

Table A.6. Estimated parameters

| Parameter | Attitude type | Estimate | Lower bound | Upper bound |
|--------------------|---------------|----------|-------------|-------------|
| k_ϵ | – | 0.48571 | 0 | – |
| γ_0 | – | 2.02605 | 0 | – |
| γ_1 | – | 0.07518 | 0 | – |
| μ_{PT} | – | -0.00380 | – | 0 |
| μ_{FT} | – | -0.00943 | – | 0 |
| α_{PT}^T | Egalitarian | 0.00021 | 0 | – |
| α_{PT}^T | Traditional | 0.02157 | 0 | – |
| α_{ET}^T | Egalitarian | 0.05098 | 0 | – |
| α_{ET}^T | Traditional | 0.10825 | 0 | – |
| α_{T}^{age} | Egalitarian | 0.01125 | 0 | – |
| α_{T}^{age} | Traditional | 0.00770 | 0 | – |

Notes: Estimated parameters. The last two columns depict the lower and upper bound we implemented for the estimation.

B Attitudes and labor supply of the fathers

In this section, we look in more detail at the role of paternal gender attitudes on maternal labor supply and on labor supply decisions of fathers around the birth of their first child.

B.1 Gender role attitudes of the fathers

In the top row of Figure B.1, we examine female labor supply depending on the gender role attitudes of their partner, again measured before the birth of the first child. The attitude groups of the fathers are based on a median split for all fathers such that for both mothers and fathers roughly 50% of the subjects are classified as traditional and egalitarian.¹⁷ For brevity, we focus on unconditional working hours, although the results are very similar when looking at the extensive or intensive margin. Before the birth, working hours hardly differ, but afterwards mothers with a traditional partner work more than five hours less than those with an egalitarian partner.

We next show that gender attitudes of mothers and fathers both contribute to maternal labor supply. We interact the attitude groups of mothers and fathers which leads to four groups where in 33% of couples, both parents hold egalitarian gender attitudes and in 29% both hold traditional attitudes. In 21% of the couples, the father holds traditional and the mother egalitarian attitudes, while in 17% of the couples, the father holds egalitarian and the mother traditional attitudes. The bottom row of Figure B.1 displays the labor supply differences between those groups around the birth of the first child with couples in which both parents hold egalitarian attitudes as the left-out group. If only one of the parents has traditional gender attitudes, maternal working hours are only slightly below those of all-egalitarian couples. Only if both parents have traditional gender attitudes, is female labor supply after the birth of the first child substantially and significantly lower.

17. When using the same splitting value as for mothers' attitudes, 58% of fathers would be classified as traditional, in line with the fact that men hold more traditional attitudes (as documented in Table 1).




Figure B.1. Female (unconditional) working hours by fathers' gender role attitudes

Notes: The left panels depict means over time around child birth by gender role attitude group (observed before the birth of the first child). The right panels depict the difference between groups in event study regressions as specified in Equation 1 (i.e. the δ_k coefficients). The dependent variable is unconditional working hours. In the top row, the sample is split by gender role attitudes of the partner, and in the bottom row, by both their own and the father's attitudes which results in four groups: in 33% of couples, both parents hold egalitarian gender attitudes and in 29% both hold traditional attitudes. In 21% of the couples, the father holds egalitarian and the mother traditional attitudes, while in 17% of the couples, the father holds egalitarian and the mother traditional attitudes. Sample: observed at least twice before and twice after the birth of the first child. The vertical error bars display 95% confidence intervals.

B.2 Labor supply of the fathers

In this section, we examine the relation of gender role attitudes and paternal labor supply decisions. We first split the sample based on gender attitudes of their (female) partner, and then examine differences based on their own gender attitudes.

Figure B.2 replicates Figure 2 for labor supply of the fathers. The groups are built based on gender role attitudes of their (female) partners. Figure B.3 employs splits by their own gender role attitudes. In both cases, we do not detect a difference in the paternal labor supply adjustment after child birth by gender role attitudes.




Figure B.2. Male labor supply around the birth of the first child by gender role attitudes of their partner

Notes: This figure replicates Figure 2 for labor supply of the fathers. The groups are built based on gender role attitudes of their (female) partners. Sample: observed at least twice before and twice after the birth of the first child.




Figure B.3. Male labor supply around the birth of the first child by own gender role attitudes

Notes: This figure replicates Figure 2 for labor supply of the fathers. The groups are built based on their own gender role attitudes. Sample: observed at least twice before and twice after the birth of the first child.

C Components of the structural model

This section describes several components of the structural model and the empirical implementation of it in more detail.

C.1 Tax and transfer system

We implement the German tax and transfer system as of 2018. We use the GETTSIM package¹⁸, which provides a detailed representation of taxes, social security contributions, several welfare transfers, as well as child related transfers. We do not model unemployment benefits.

Parental leave. Paid parental leave is available for up to fourteen months where each parent can claim at most 12 months. The replacement rate is 67% of the parent's decline in net income, but at least 300 EUR and at most 1,800 EUR per month. We assume that the mother takes up parental leave benefits during the twelve months after child birth and the father does not take up any parental leave benefits. For the calculation of the benefit, we further assume that the mother worked full-time in the year prior to childbirth.

Child benefits. Child benefits are paid for each child up to the age of 17 (we abstract from the fact that children can get child benefits until 25 if they are still in education). In 2018, they amounted to 194 EUR for the first and second child, and 200 EUR for the third child.

To save computation time, we pre-compute the tax and transfer system for a grid of gross incomes of both partners, number of children, age of the youngest child, and human capital. We then estimate the relation of these variables to disposable household income using a flexible OLS regression including interactions and quadratic terms. During the estimation of the model, we use these coefficients to predict disposable household income.

C.2 Childcare costs

We follow Geyer, Haan, and Wrohlich (2015) and set monthly childcare costs for a child younger than three years to 219 EUR for part-time care and 381 EUR for full-time care. For a child aged between three and six years, full-time childcare amounts to a cost of 122 EUR and full-time childcare to 128 EUR.

Since we do not track the age of older children, we assume that if the youngest child is younger than three years old and the households has more than one child, the second youngest child is between three and six years old.

18. See <https://gettsim.readthedocs.io/en/stable/>.

C.3 Partner income

Following van der Klaauw (1996) and several other studies, we model the wage of the partner w_t^m as a quadratic function of the age of the woman to reduce the state space.

$$\log w_t^m = \mu_0 + \mu_1 \text{age}_t + \mu_2 \text{age}_t^2 \quad (11)$$

We estimate the μ parameters separately for the group of egalitarian and traditional mothers. When the partner is older than 45 years, we hold the income of him fixed at the level of a 45 year old partner.

C.4 Fertility

We estimate fertility as a quadratic function of age of the mother if the mother has no child yet. If she already has a child, the probability to have another child is a quadratic function of both her age and the age of the youngest child. After having 3 children and after the age of 45, we assume that the probability to have another child is zero.