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Cm 13.0 #5
Cm 13.0 #5
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Change-Id: Ic7f9046521ff2eb71cc447b13fe089705f4fd42a
Android early_suspend/late_resume PM kernel driver framework has been deprecated by Google. This new powersuspend PM kernel driver is a replacement for it and existing early_suspend drivers can be easily adapted to use this new replacement driver Change-Id: I1cd1675abc20dd30da98f49ac35e268eb53056fd Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>
make powersuspend not depend on a userspace initiator anymore, but use a hook in autosleep instead. Change-Id: I59d946253f37f86455c1f35182e40a6567e59658 Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>
make kernel / userspace mode switchable Change-Id: I310028984f7c21a79935711fac6efd3abc69de0d Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>
- add an alternative hook for screen on / off detection in the display pannel driver - sleeps ~0.1s sooner, wakes up ~1s later then autosleep - clean up source formatting a bit (Paul Reioux) Change-Id: I3879636a06627e491ecf1f46acc4166d177da10f Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>
- fix hybrid-kernel mode cannot be set through sysfs kernel/power/powersuspend: new PM kernel driver for Android w/o early_suspend v1.4 (Yank555.lu) - add hybrid-kernel mode (autosleep and panel, first wins) - default to hybrid-kernel mode - harmonize debug message with my other stuff - include all 3 modes as default, so it's only commenting out to change kernel/power/powersuspend: new PM kernel driver for Android w/o early_suspend v1.3 (Yank555.lu) - fix stupid typo - add an alternative hook for screen on / off detection in the display panel driver (sleeps ~0.1s sooner, wakes up ~1s later then autosleep) kernel/power/powersuspend: new PM kernel driver for Android w/o early_suspend v1.2 (Yank555.lu) - make kernel / userspace mode switchable kernel/power/powersuspend: new PM kernel driver for Android w/o early_suspend v1.1 (Yank555.lu) - make powersuspend not depend on a userspace initiator anymore, but use a hook in autosleep instead. kernel/power/powersuspend: new PM kernel driver for Android w/o early_suspend (faux123) Android early_suspend/late_resume PM kernel driver framework has been deprecated by Google. This new powersuspend PM kernel driver is a replacement for it and existing early_suspend drivers can be easily adapted to use this new replacement driver Change-Id: I11d6c73eb971e1574142473f860797f2ee900357 Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>
Cluster-plug is a simple cluster-based hotplug implementation for homogeneous ARM big.LITTLE systems such as the MSM8939. It operated based on the principle that the big cluster is normally preferred, since it as as efficient as the little one, but can go faster for single core performance. This hotplug will only activate the little cluster for highly parallel loads, and then deactivate it once the parallel load ends. Change-Id: I188863d58285f363ac550528e664a9cad7ae1e5f
Needed for charge-only mode to work with ClusterPlug. Change-Id: Idf596bbb925472bb4ab1423592f1b730dec8efac Conflicts: arch/arm/boot/dts/qcom/msm8939.dtsi
When a conflicting Power HAL is meddling, it may offline CPU 0, causing havoc when I try to schedule work on CPU 0. Handle the case where onlining a CPU can fail. Change-Id: I3a7185116cd2b059d868a203f311043b572c3308
Change-Id: Iad220e533a2809616dfbbaf3a90b129728ac64bd
On ROMs not configured for use with ClusterPlug (eg. stock ROM), some components (such as the PowerHAL and perfd) may misbehave. While I've tried to make it tolerant of interference, it's best not to clash by default, and instead let the users enable it themselves. On ROMs that properly support it (such as my CyanogenMod port for lux), it will automatically be enabled by init scripts in the ROM. Change-Id: Ia7640e723ab31d7e92290361e643d132f7aa85ba
Fix compressed data corruption when multiple streams are opened at a time. Change-Id: Ida6df74e43e652923e517f051fb8af969dc9d874 Signed-off-by: Heather Lomond <heather.lomond@wolfsonmicro.com> Reviewed-on: http://gerrit.mot.com/743318 SME-Granted: SME Approvals Granted Submit-Approved: Jira Key <jirakey@motorola.com> Tested-by: Jira Key <jirakey@motorola.com> SLTApproved: Slta Waiver <sltawvr@motorola.com> Reviewed-by: Jason Hrycay <jason.hrycay@motorola.com>
Modified capture buffer and block so it does not get stuck in a specific stream. Change-Id: I3cc94ab5d7d74a2eb5f0beb0cf5f586171dbce9c Signed-off-by: Paul Handrigan <Paul.Handrigan@cirrus.com> Reviewed-on: http://gerrit.mot.com/745383 SLTApproved: Slta Waiver <sltawvr@motorola.com> SME-Granted: SME Approvals Granted Submit-Approved: Jira Key <jirakey@motorola.com> Tested-by: Jira Key <jirakey@motorola.com> Reviewed-by: Pratik Kamdar <pratikk@motorola.com> Reviewed-by: Jason Hrycay <jason.hrycay@motorola.com>
Break up buffer one and two actions for stream_start and stream_alloc. Change-Id: Ib9ab6a39c156b72c9c7c4d6f40adc88399041934 Signed-off-by: Paul Handrigan <Paul.Handrigan@cirrus.com> Reviewed-on: http://gerrit.mot.com/748788 SME-Granted: SME Approvals Granted Submit-Approved: Jira Key <jirakey@motorola.com> Tested-by: Jira Key <jirakey@motorola.com> SLTApproved: Slta Waiver <sltawvr@motorola.com> Reviewed-by: Vladimir Karpovich <vkarpovich@motorola.com>
commit b6878d9e03043695dbf3fa1caa6dfc09db225b16 upstream. In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file". 5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO); 5770 if (!file) 5771 return -ENOMEM; This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function. 5786 if (err == 0 && 5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file))) 5788 err = -EFAULT But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel space memory from user space. This is an information leak. 5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */ 5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file) 5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0'; Change-Id: I7cd2a3c7fad2e2cb9edb8b4eff2af8a3a8f40149 Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr> Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com> [lizf: Backported to 3.4: fix both branches] Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
If a user key gets negatively instantiated, an error code is cached in the payload area. A negatively instantiated key may be then be positively instantiated by updating it with valid data. However, the ->update key type method must be aware that the error code may be there. The following may be used to trigger the bug in the user key type: keyctl request2 user user "" @U keyctl add user user "a" @U which manifests itself as: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a IP: [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046 PGD 7cc30067 PUD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 3 PID: 2644 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.3.0+ #49 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 task: ffff88003ddea700 ti: ffff88003dd88000 task.ti: ffff88003dd88000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810a376f>] [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046 RSP: 0018:ffff88003dd8bdb0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: ffffffff81e3fe40 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffff82 RBP: ffff88003dd8bde0 R08: ffff88007d2d2da0 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88003e8073c0 R12: 00000000ffffff82 R13: ffff88003dd8be68 R14: ffff88007d027600 R15: ffff88003ddea700 FS: 0000000000b92880(0063) GS:ffff88007fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000007cc5f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Stack: ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff81160a8a 0000000000000000 00000000ffffff82 ffff88003dd8be68 ffff88007d027600 ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff810a39e5 ffff88003dd8be20 ffffffff812a31ab ffff88007d027600 ffff88007d027620 Call Trace: [<ffffffff810a39e5>] kfree_call_rcu+0x15/0x20 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3136 [<ffffffff812a31ab>] user_update+0x8b/0xb0 security/keys/user_defined.c:129 [< inline >] __key_update security/keys/key.c:730 [<ffffffff8129e5c1>] key_create_or_update+0x291/0x440 security/keys/key.c:908 [< inline >] SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:125 [<ffffffff8129fc21>] SyS_add_key+0x101/0x1e0 security/keys/keyctl.c:60 [<ffffffff8185f617>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185 Note the error code (-ENOKEY) in EDX. A similar bug can be tripped by: keyctl request2 trusted user "" @U keyctl add trusted user "a" @U This should also affect encrypted keys - but that has to be correctly parameterised or it will fail with EINVAL before getting to the bit that will crashes. Change-Id: I171d566f431c56208e1fe279f466d2d399a9ac7c Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet drops. If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values too small, but not for too big ones.) The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU. Note that similar check is already performed at ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA. Change-Id: I6b70d0c12a77c7932066982f8797d8024f130d7c Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
A userspace call to mmap(MAP_LOCKED) may result in the successful locking of memory while also producing a confusing audit log denial. can_do_mlock checks capable and rlimit. If either of these return positive can_do_mlock returns true. The capable check leads to an LSM hook used by apparmour and selinux which produce the audit denial. Reordering so rlimit is checked first eliminates the denial on success, only recording a denial when the lock is unsuccessful as a result of the denial. Change-Id: I8d300365c8f85b002d6c5375a22abfb1b7579d20 Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Paul Cassella <cassella@cray.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
commit 73af963f9f3036dffed55c3a2898598186db1045 upstream. __ptrace_may_access() checks get_dumpable/ptrace_has_cap/etc if task != current, this can can lead to surprising results. For example, a sub-thread can't readlink("/proc/self/exe") if the executable is not readable. setup_new_exec()->would_dump() notices that inode_permission(MAY_READ) fails and then it does set_dumpable(suid_dumpable). After that get_dumpable() fails. (It is not clear why proc_pid_readlink() checks get_dumpable(), perhaps we could add PTRACE_MODE_NODUMPABLE) Change __ptrace_may_access() to use same_thread_group() instead of "task == current". Any security check is pointless when the tasks share the same ->mm. Change-Id: Ib6ca927a1eb0637df8030aabcb3129d5be343512 Signed-off-by: Mark Grondona <mgrondona@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Ben Woodard <woodard@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ab676b7d6fbf4b294bf198fb27ade5b0e865c7ce upstream. As pointed by recent post[1] on exploiting DRAM physical imperfection, /proc/PID/pagemap exposes sensitive information which can be used to do attacks. This disallows anybody without CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read the pagemap. [1] http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html [ Eventually we might want to do anything more finegrained, but for now this is the simple model. - Linus ] Change-Id: Ib62bf4429dcdafd9fc1cd9b1a0c5665c64cc5d18 Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com> [mancha: Backported to 3.10] Signed-off-by: mancha security <mancha1@zoho.com>
The actual size of the tcp hashinfo table is tcp_hashinfo.ehash_mask + 1 so we need to adjust the loop accordingly to get the sockets hashed into the last bucket. Change-Id: I796b3c7b4a1a7fa35fba9e5192a4a403eb6e17de Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@google.com>
Specifications state that the MAP packet length in the MAP header do not account for the number of bytes of packet trailer from DL checksum offload. Current implementation does not take this into account when MAP aggregation is enabled. Fix this by accounting for the extra bytes of the DL checksum trailer if DL checksum offload is enabled when computing packet length during MAP deaggregation. Change-Id: I9c10bb9726413b1f14f94210dbe194c2c15349f5 Signed-off-by: Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan <subashab@codeaurora.org>
Checksum offload routine should skip checksum fixup computation on IPv4 UDP packets which have the checksum field set to 0 by the sender. This is allowed by RFC768. Packets are marked as checksum unnecessary and shipped up the stack as-is. Change-Id: I0432c3e1b25196134ecc8bbbe23c9cab46666d5c Signed-off-by: Harout Hedeshian <harouth@codeaurora.org>
Add UL checksum offload routines for MAPv3. Can bypass checksum software for IPv4/IPv6 TCP/UDP protocols. Set rmnet_data VNDs hw_flags to NETIF_F_IP_CSUM | NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM to define the checksum offload abilities. Add UL checksum meta-info header for IPv4/IPv6 TCP/UDP packets for which UL checksum is being offloaded. Change-Id: Ief139d357b528aead66acfe39a5227328b8fbf93 Signed-off-by: Sivan Reinstein <sivanr@codeaurora.org> [subashab@codeaurora.org: Fix trivial merge conflicts in net/rmnet_data/rmnet_data_trace.h] Signed-off-by: Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan <subashab@codeaurora.org>
Add the MAPv4 ingress and data format handlers. MAPv4 requires the checksum for uplink TCP and UDP packets to be 1's complemented before passing the packet onto the physical netdevice. This workaround is needed due to failures seen in hardware while processing translated packets. Change-Id: Ib79382fa7e8b2bd0c1adbe68b8de75f1602df10b Signed-off-by: Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan <subashab@codeaurora.org>
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by using a simple program: int socket_fd; struct sockaddr_in addr; addr.sin_port = 0; addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; addr.sin_family = 10; socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000); connect(socket_fd , &addr,16); AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly, thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and store a zero in the protocol fields. This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which is NULL for raw sockets. kernel: Call Trace: kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70 kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80 kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110 kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80 kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200 kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10 kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89 I found no particular commit which introduced this problem. Change-Id: I4354ae52b678cdd2de0d21ca934d956bb2929473 CVE: CVE-2015-8543 Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com> Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Change-Id: I9e77c85cdf04a8156c774b5c77ef74af0ae46941 Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
…ring The following sequence of commands: i=`keyctl add user a a @s` keyctl request2 keyring foo bar @t keyctl unlink $i @s tries to invoke an upcall to instantiate a keyring if one doesn't already exist by that name within the user's keyring set. However, if the upcall fails, the code sets keyring->type_data.reject_error to -ENOKEY or some other error code. When the key is garbage collected, the key destroy function is called unconditionally and keyring_destroy() uses list_empty() on keyring->type_data.link - which is in a union with reject_error. Subsequently, the kernel tries to unlink the keyring from the keyring names list - which oopses like this: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a IP: [<ffffffff8126e051>] keyring_destroy+0x3d/0x88 ... Workqueue: events key_garbage_collector ... RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8126e051>] keyring_destroy+0x3d/0x88 RSP: 0018:ffff88003e2f3d30 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: ffff88003bf1a900 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000003bfc6901 RDI: ffffffff81a73a40 RBP: ffff88003e2f3d38 R08: 0000000000000152 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff88003e2f3c18 R11: 000000000000865b R12: ffff88003bf1a900 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88003bf1a908 R15: ffff88003e2f4000 ... CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000003e3ec000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 ... Call Trace: [<ffffffff8126c756>] key_gc_unused_keys.constprop.1+0x5d/0x10f [<ffffffff8126ca71>] key_garbage_collector+0x1fa/0x351 [<ffffffff8105ec9b>] process_one_work+0x28e/0x547 [<ffffffff8105fd17>] worker_thread+0x26e/0x361 [<ffffffff8105faa9>] ? rescuer_thread+0x2a8/0x2a8 [<ffffffff810648ad>] kthread+0xf3/0xfb [<ffffffff810647ba>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1c2/0x1c2 [<ffffffff815f2ccf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 [<ffffffff810647ba>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1c2/0x1c2 Note the value in RAX. This is a 32-bit representation of -ENOKEY. The solution is to only call ->destroy() if the key was successfully instantiated. Change-Id: Ibd48474e09a18339f8e7b2b0e45da1a4c5989b27 Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Needed to support older camera blobs. Change-Id: I31e7bc447fcf10d043309a2fec6763a57f3842f2
Message notifications contains an additional uid field. This field represents the uid that was responsible for waking the radio. And hence it is present only in notifications stating that the radio is now active. Change-Id: I18fc73eada512e370d7ab24fc9f890845037b729 Signed-off-by: Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@google.com> Bug: 20264396
commit 71504062a7c34838c3fccd92c447f399d3cb5797 upstream. This patch fixes some wild pointers produced by xhci_mem_cleanup. These wild pointers will cause system crash if xhci_mem_cleanup() is called twice. Reported-and-tested-by: Pengcheng Li <lpc.li@hisilicon.com> Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> [wt: struct xhci_hcd has no ext_caps members in 3.10 ] Change-Id: Ib426afa66abe7c1967f0f408b3bd47be1fbf5c7d Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit 8f815cdde3e550e10c2736990d791f60c2ce43eb upstream. A non-privileged user can create a netlink socket with the same port_id as used by an existing open nl80211 netlink socket (e.g. as used by a hostapd process) with a different protocol number. Closing this socket will then lead to the notification going to nl80211's socket release notification handler, and possibly cause an action such as removing a virtual interface. Fix this issue by checking that the netlink protocol is NETLINK_GENERIC. Since generic netlink has no notifier chain of its own, we can't fix the problem more generically. Fixes: 026331c ("cfg80211/mac80211: allow registering for and sending action frames") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dmitry Ivanov <dima@ubnt.com> [rewrite commit message] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Change-Id: I7965aa92d344aab41fefb90b3f7c680c28faab70
commit 309cf37fe2a781279b7675d4bb7173198e532867 upstream. Because we miss to wipe the remainder of i->addr[] in packet_mc_add(), pdiag_put_mclist() leaks uninitialized heap bytes via the PACKET_DIAG_MCLIST netlink attribute. Fix this by explicitly memset(0)ing the remaining bytes in i->addr[]. Change-Id: Iaa95b2df5b43ed16604ad1a5548c2562ecd9efb7 Fixes: eea68e2 ("packet: Report socket mclist info via diag module") Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit b8670c09f37bdf2847cc44f36511a53afc6161fd upstream. The stack object �info� has a total size of 12 bytes. Its last byte is padding which is not initialized and leaked via �put_cmsg�. Change-Id: Ideda75389b4a75fb0bb671bd42e068cdc4ad9d4f Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit 5f8e44741f9f216e33736ea4ec65ca9ac03036e6 upstream. The stack object �map� has a total size of 32 bytes. Its last 4 bytes are padding generated by compiler. These padding bytes are not initialized and sent out via �nla_put�. Change-Id: I1079732bc9ad41752b6399257c88249a6098503d Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit 9b94a8fba501f38368aef6ac1b30e7335252a220 upstream. The size variable to change the ring buffer in ftrace is a long. The nr_pages used to update the ring buffer based on the size is int. On 64 bit machines this can cause an overflow problem. For example, the following will cause the ring buffer to crash: # cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing # echo 10 > buffer_size_kb # echo 8556384240 > buffer_size_kb Then you get the warning of: WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 318 at kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:1527 rb_update_pages+0x22f/0x260 Which is: RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, nr_removed); Note each ring buffer page holds 4080 bytes. This is because: 1) 10 causes the ring buffer to have 3 pages. (10kb requires 3 * 4080 pages to hold) 2) (2^31 / 2^10 + 1) * 4080 = 8556384240 The value written into buffer_size_kb is shifted by 10 and then passed to ring_buffer_resize(). 8556384240 * 2^10 = 8761737461760 3) The size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is then divided by BUF_PAGE_SIZE which is 4080. 8761737461760 / 4080 = 2147484672 4) nr_pages is subtracted from the current nr_pages (3) and we get: 2147484669. This value is saved in a signed integer nr_pages_to_update 5) 2147484669 is greater than 2^31 but smaller than 2^32, a signed int turns into the value of -2147482627 6) As the value is a negative number, in update_pages_handler() it is negated and passed to rb_remove_pages() and 2147482627 pages will be removed, which is much larger than 3 and it causes the warning because not all the pages asked to be removed were removed. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=118001 Change-Id: If606ce6d9d897b9743f008a01e582e304f52e9e4 Fixes: 7a8e76a ("tracing: unified trace buffer") Reported-by: Hao Qin <QEver.cn@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit 59643d1535eb220668692a5359de22545af579f6 upstream. If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero. Here's the details: # echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes. 18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520 and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size. size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE); Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here 18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599 where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64 2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17 But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792 and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360 This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080, which it is. Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed. nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE) but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and 2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823 Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes 3823 / 4080 = 0 an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the kernel. There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug. Change-Id: Ied3ad8a7e9178289ba9546411673b4b08ab57e87 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+ Fixes: 83f4031 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic") Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
If __key_link_begin() failed then "edit" would be uninitialized. I've added a check to fix that. Change-Id: I0e28bdba07f645437db2b08daf67ca27f16c6f5c Fixes: f70e2e0 ('KEYS: Do preallocation for __key_link()') Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
IPC Router binds any port as a control port and moves it from the client port list to control port list. Misbehaving clients can exploit this incorrect behavior. IPC Router to check if the port is a client port before binding it as a control port. CRs-Fixed: 974577 Change-Id: I9f189b76967d5f85750218a7cb6537d187a69663 Signed-off-by: Karthikeyan Ramasubramanian <kramasub@codeaurora.org>
The only users of collect_mounts are in audit_tree.c In audit_trim_trees and audit_add_tree_rule the path passed into collect_mounts is generated from kern_path passed an audit_tree pathname which is guaranteed to be an absolute path. In those cases collect_mounts is obviously intended to work on mounted paths and if a race results in paths that are unmounted when collect_mounts it is reasonable to fail early. The paths passed into audit_tag_tree don't have the absolute path check. But are used to play with fsnotify and otherwise interact with the audit_trees, so again operating only on mounted paths appears reasonable. Avoid having to worry about what happens when we try and audit unmounted filesystems by restricting collect_mounts to mounts that appear in the mount tree. Change-Id: I4a41beaaf80165b9bffb12983cb16799247c4d92 Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
When a controlling tty is being hung up and the hang up is waiting for a just-signalled tty reader or writer to exit, and a new tty reader/writer tries to acquire an ldisc reference concurrently with the ldisc reference release from the signalled reader/writer, the hangup can hang. The new reader/writer is sleeping in ldsem_down_read() and the hangup is sleeping in ldsem_down_write() [1]. The new reader/writer fails to wakeup the waiting hangup because the wrong lock count value is checked (the old lock count rather than the new lock count) to see if the lock is unowned. Change helper function to return the new lock count if the cmpxchg was successful; document this behavior. [1] edited dmesg log from reporter SysRq : Show Blocked State task PC stack pid father systemd D ffff88040c4f0000 0 1 0 0x00000000 ffff88040c49fbe0 0000000000000046 ffff88040c4a0000 ffff88040c49ffd8 00000000001d3980 00000000001d3980 ffff88040c4a0000 ffff88040593d840 ffff88040c49fb40 ffffffff810a4cc0 0000000000000006 0000000000000023 Call Trace: [<ffffffff810a4cc0>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x9f/0xe4 [<ffffffff810a4cc0>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x9f/0xe4 [<ffffffff810a4cc0>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x9f/0xe4 [<ffffffff810a4cc0>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x9f/0xe4 [<ffffffff817a6649>] schedule+0x24/0x5e [<ffffffff817a588b>] schedule_timeout+0x15b/0x1ec [<ffffffff810a4cc0>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x9f/0xe4 [<ffffffff817aa691>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x26 [<ffffffff817aa10c>] down_read_failed+0xe3/0x1b9 [<ffffffff817aa26d>] ldsem_down_read+0x8b/0xa5 [<ffffffff8142b5ca>] ? tty_ldisc_ref_wait+0x1b/0x44 [<ffffffff8142b5ca>] tty_ldisc_ref_wait+0x1b/0x44 [<ffffffff81423f5b>] tty_write+0x7d/0x28a [<ffffffff814241f5>] redirected_tty_write+0x8d/0x98 [<ffffffff81424168>] ? tty_write+0x28a/0x28a [<ffffffff8115d03f>] do_loop_readv_writev+0x56/0x79 [<ffffffff8115e604>] do_readv_writev+0x1b0/0x1ff [<ffffffff8116ea0b>] ? do_vfs_ioctl+0x32a/0x489 [<ffffffff81167d9d>] ? final_putname+0x1d/0x3a [<ffffffff8115e6c7>] vfs_writev+0x2e/0x49 [<ffffffff8115e7d3>] SyS_writev+0x47/0xaa [<ffffffff817ab822>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b bash D ffffffff81c104c0 0 5469 5302 0x00000082 ffff8800cf817ac0 0000000000000046 ffff8804086b22a0 ffff8800cf817fd8 00000000001d3980 00000000001d3980 ffff8804086b22a0 ffff8800cf817a48 000000000000b9a0 ffff8800cf817a78 ffffffff81004675 ffff8800cf817a44 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81004675>] ? dump_trace+0x165/0x29c [<ffffffff810a4cc0>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x9f/0xe4 [<ffffffff8100edda>] ? save_stack_trace+0x26/0x41 [<ffffffff817a6649>] schedule+0x24/0x5e [<ffffffff817a588b>] schedule_timeout+0x15b/0x1ec [<ffffffff810a4cc0>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x9f/0xe4 [<ffffffff817a9f03>] ? down_write_failed+0xa3/0x1c9 [<ffffffff817aa691>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x26 [<ffffffff817a9f0b>] down_write_failed+0xab/0x1c9 [<ffffffff817aa300>] ldsem_down_write+0x79/0xb1 [<ffffffff817aada3>] ? tty_ldisc_lock_pair_timeout+0xa5/0xd9 [<ffffffff817aada3>] tty_ldisc_lock_pair_timeout+0xa5/0xd9 [<ffffffff8142bf33>] tty_ldisc_hangup+0xc4/0x218 [<ffffffff81423ab3>] __tty_hangup+0x2e2/0x3ed [<ffffffff81424a76>] disassociate_ctty+0x63/0x226 [<ffffffff81078aa7>] do_exit+0x79f/0xa11 [<ffffffff81086bdb>] ? get_signal_to_deliver+0x206/0x62f [<ffffffff810b4bfb>] ? lock_release_holdtime.part.8+0xf/0x16e [<ffffffff81079b05>] do_group_exit+0x47/0xb5 [<ffffffff81086c16>] get_signal_to_deliver+0x241/0x62f [<ffffffff810020a7>] do_signal+0x43/0x59d [<ffffffff810f2af7>] ? __audit_syscall_exit+0x21a/0x2a8 [<ffffffff810b4bfb>] ? lock_release_holdtime.part.8+0xf/0x16e [<ffffffff81002655>] do_notify_resume+0x54/0x6c [<ffffffff817abaf8>] int_signal+0x12/0x17 Change-Id: I0db62bafd337488431848c4d70d3971664f540a0 Reported-by: Sami Farin <sami.farin@gmail.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.12.x Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
…recvfrom Change-Id: Ida19e5102b7faca17c685a261c20fbbf5c9614f9 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.19 Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
- disable compilation of unwanted modules Bug: 27976772 Bug: 27531992 Change-Id: I9df4efd899032fb9219a286fe469d7b2f476686f Signed-off-by: vivek mehta <mvivek@codeaurora.org>
I previously added an integer overflow check here but looking at it now, it's still buggy. The bug happens in snd_compr_allocate_buffer(). We multiply ".fragments" and ".fragment_size" and that doesn't overflow but then we save it in an unsigned int so it truncates the high bits away and we allocate a smaller than expected size. Fixes: b35cc82 ('ALSA: compress_core: integer overflow in snd_compr_allocate_buffer()') Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Bug: 28592007 Change-Id: I3ef098ada955449fdd109d37b2176da849dd26af Signed-off-by: Thierry Strudel <tstrudel@google.com> (cherry picked from commit 6215e5ede23285ddfee10d2e4ba0cc2d4c046205)
In case some sysfs nodes needs to be labeled with a different label than sysfs then user needs to be notified when a core is brought back online. Bug: 29359497 Change-Id: I0395c86e01cd49c348fda8f93087d26f88557c91 Signed-off-by: Thierry Strudel <tstrudel@google.com>
There's no reason to allocate the dec{32,64}table on the stack; it just wastes a bunch of instructions setting them up and, of course, also consumes quite a bit of stack. Using size_t for such small integers is a little excessive. $ scripts/bloat-o-meter /tmp/built-in.o lib/built-in.o add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 2/0 up/down: 1304/-1548 (-244) function old new delta lz4_decompress_unknownoutputsize 55 718 +663 lz4_decompress 55 632 +577 dec64table - 32 +32 dec32table - 32 +32 lz4_uncompress 747 - -747 lz4_uncompress_unknownoutputsize 801 - -801 The now inlined lz4_uncompress functions used to have a stack footprint of 176 bytes (according to -fstack-usage); their inlinees have increased their stack use from 32 bytes to 48 and 80 bytes, respectively. Change-Id: Id7d1c1d4e9c139ef420b3cce37f6eb4af5c92139 Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
If the part of the compression data are corrupted, or the compression data is totally fake, the memory access over the limit is possible. This is the log from my system usning lz4 decompression. [6502]data abort, halting [6503]r0 0x00000000 r1 0x00000000 r2 0xdcea0ffc r3 0xdcea0ffc [6509]r4 0xb9ab0bfd r5 0xdcea0ffc r6 0xdcea0ff8 r7 0xdce80000 [6515]r8 0x00000000 r9 0x00000000 r10 0x00000000 r11 0xb9a98000 [6522]r12 0xdcea1000 usp 0x00000000 ulr 0x00000000 pc 0x820149bc [6528]spsr 0x400001f3 and the memory addresses of some variables at the moment are ref:0xdcea0ffc, op:0xdcea0ffc, oend:0xdcea1000 As you can see, COPYLENGH is 8bytes, so @ref and @op can access the momory over @Oend. Change-Id: Ia6bf0f6fd17838f0775d78881625ae45574216c4 Signed-off-by: JeHyeon Yeon <tom.yeon@windriver.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This helps performance on moderately dense random reads on SSD. Transaction-Per-Second numbers provided by Taobao: QPS case ------------------------------------------------------- 7536 disable context readahead totally w/ patch: 7129 slower size rampup and start RA on the 3rd read 6717 slower size rampup w/o patch: 5581 unmodified context readahead Before, readahead will be started whenever reading page N+1 when it happen to read N recently. After patch, we'll only start readahead when *three* random reads happen to access pages N, N+1, N+2. The probability of this happening is extremely low for pure random reads, unless they are very dense, which actually deserves some readahead. Also start with a smaller readahead window. The impact to interleaved sequential reads should be small, because for a long run stream, the the small readahead window rampup phase is negletable. The context readahead actually benefits clustered random reads on HDD whose seek cost is pretty high. However as SSD is increasingly used for random read workloads it's better for the context readahead to concentrate on interleaved sequential reads. Another SSD rand read test from Miao # file size: 2GB # read IO amount: 625MB sysbench --test=fileio \ --max-requests=10000 \ --num-threads=1 \ --file-num=1 \ --file-block-size=64K \ --file-test-mode=rndrd \ --file-fsync-freq=0 \ --file-fsync-end=off run shows the performance of btrfs grows up from 69MB/s to 121MB/s, ext4 from 104MB/s to 121MB/s. Change-Id: I1a804898e3dc3835d325dce8fa54e9abacb31050 Signed-off-by: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Tested-by: Tao Ma <tm@tao.ma> Tested-by: Miao Xie <miaox@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry pick from commit 1a5bbfc3d6b700178b75743a2ba1fd2e58a8f36f) As reported by Randy Dunlap: ==================== when CONFIG_IPV6=m and CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_SOCKET=y: net/built-in.o: In function `socket_mt6_v1_v2': xt_socket.c:(.text+0x51b55): undefined reference to `udp6_lib_lookup' net/built-in.o: In function `socket_mt_init': xt_socket.c:(.init.text+0x1ef8): undefined reference to `nf_defrag_ipv6_enable' ==================== Like several other modules under net/netfilter/ we have to have a dependency "IPV6 disabled or set compatibly with this module" clause. Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Fix symbol export errors for when CONFIG_MODULES is set. Signed-off-by: Dmitriy Filchenko <dmitriyf@google.com> Change-Id: I9f5a1824a87388da1727f330f97e4982ad7069cd
(cherry pick from commit f09becc79f899f92557ce6d5562a8b80d6addb34) According to the reporter, they are not needed. Reported-by: Sergei Shtylyov <sergei.shtylyov@cogentembedded.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Change-Id: I5f28a81e1361c23cedd57338f30c81730dc8aa3b
(cherry picked from commit 6bc2b856bb7c49f238914d965c0b1057ec78226e) Set TIF_MEMDIE tsk_thread flag before send kill signal to the selected thread. This is to fit a usual code sequence and avoid potential race issue. Signed-off-by: Weijie Yang <weijie.yang@samsung.com> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: drivers/staging/android/lowmemorykiller.c Change-Id: Iae49eb9a2c11f616a85d04f8a4e422956f2ad6f1
(cherry pick from commit a3cfde2) We have two problems in UDP stack related to bogus checksums : 1) We return -EAGAIN to application even if receive queue is not empty. This breaks applications using edge trigger epoll() 2) Under UDP flood, we can loop forever without yielding to other processes, potentially hanging the host, especially on non SMP. This patch is an attempt to make things better. We might in the future add extra support for rt applications wanting to better control time spent doing a recv() in a hostile environment. For example we could validate checksums before queuing packets in socket receive queue. Bug: 29507402 Change-Id: I0f948e7136edf7d0bf9a23770ea7173d819a8c94 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Hi there; This is an automated reply, to let you know CyanogenMod doesn't merge pull You can submit your change requests through our public review system, That review system is an installation of Google's Gerrit code review. Thanks! |
commit b2504a5dbef3305ef41988ad270b0e8ec289331c upstream. Dmitry reported warnings occurring in __skb_gso_segment() [1] All SKB_GSO_DODGY producers can allow user space to feed packets that trigger the current check. We could prevent them from doing so, rejecting packets, but this might add regressions to existing programs. It turns out our SKB_GSO_DODGY handlers properly set up checksum information that is needed anyway when packets needs to be segmented. By checking again skb_needs_check() after skb_mac_gso_segment(), we should remove these pesky warnings, at a very minor cost. With help from Willem de Bruijn [1] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 6768 at net/core/dev.c:2439 skb_warn_bad_offload+0x2af/0x390 net/core/dev.c:2434 lo: caps=(0x000000a2803b7c69, 0x0000000000000000) len=138 data_len=0 gso_size=15883 gso_type=4 ip_summed=0 Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 1 PID: 6768 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.9.0 CyanogenMod#5 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 ffff8801c063ecd8 ffffffff82346bdf ffffffff00000001 1ffff100380c7d2e ffffed00380c7d26 0000000041b58ab3 ffffffff84b37e38 ffffffff823468f1 ffffffff84820740 ffffffff84f289c0 dffffc0000000000 ffff8801c063ee20 Call Trace: [<ffffffff82346bdf>] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [inline] [<ffffffff82346bdf>] dump_stack+0x2ee/0x3ef lib/dump_stack.c:51 [<ffffffff81827e34>] panic+0x1fb/0x412 kernel/panic.c:179 [<ffffffff8141f704>] __warn+0x1c4/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:542 [<ffffffff8141f7e5>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0xc5/0x100 kernel/panic.c:565 [<ffffffff8356cbaf>] skb_warn_bad_offload+0x2af/0x390 net/core/dev.c:2434 [<ffffffff83585cd2>] __skb_gso_segment+0x482/0x780 net/core/dev.c:2706 [<ffffffff83586f19>] skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:3985 [inline] [<ffffffff83586f19>] validate_xmit_skb+0x5c9/0xc20 net/core/dev.c:2969 [<ffffffff835892bb>] __dev_queue_xmit+0xe6b/0x1e70 net/core/dev.c:3383 [<ffffffff8358a2d7>] dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3424 [<ffffffff83ad161d>] packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2930 [inline] [<ffffffff83ad161d>] packet_sendmsg+0x32ed/0x4d30 net/packet/af_packet.c:2955 [<ffffffff834f0aaa>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] [<ffffffff834f0aaa>] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:631 [<ffffffff834f329a>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x8fa/0x9f0 net/socket.c:1954 [<ffffffff834f5e58>] __sys_sendmsg+0x138/0x300 net/socket.c:1988 [<ffffffff834f604d>] SYSC_sendmsg net/socket.c:1999 [inline] [<ffffffff834f604d>] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 net/socket.c:1995 [<ffffffff84371941>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit 504d58745c9ca28d33572e2d8a9990b43e06075d upstream. clockevents_increase_min_delta() calls printk() from under hrtimer_bases.lock. That causes lock inversion on scheduler locks because printk() can call into the scheduler. Lockdep puts it as: ====================================================== [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 3.15.0-rc8-06195-g939f04b #2 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------- trinity-main/74 is trying to acquire lock: (&port_lock_key){-.....}, at: [<811c60be>] serial8250_console_write+0x8c/0x10c but task is already holding lock: (hrtimer_bases.lock){-.-...}, at: [<8103caeb>] hrtimer_try_to_cancel+0x13/0x66 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> CyanogenMod#5 (hrtimer_bases.lock){-.-...}: [<8104a942>] lock_acquire+0x92/0x101 [<8142f11d>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2e/0x3e [<8103c918>] __hrtimer_start_range_ns+0x1c/0x197 [<8107ec20>] perf_swevent_start_hrtimer.part.41+0x7a/0x85 [<81080792>] task_clock_event_start+0x3a/0x3f [<810807a4>] task_clock_event_add+0xd/0x14 [<8108259a>] event_sched_in+0xb6/0x17a [<810826a2>] group_sched_in+0x44/0x122 [<81082885>] ctx_sched_in.isra.67+0x105/0x11f [<810828e6>] perf_event_sched_in.isra.70+0x47/0x4b [<81082bf6>] __perf_install_in_context+0x8b/0xa3 [<8107eb8e>] remote_function+0x12/0x2a [<8105f5af>] smp_call_function_single+0x2d/0x53 [<8107e17d>] task_function_call+0x30/0x36 [<8107fb82>] perf_install_in_context+0x87/0xbb [<810852c9>] SYSC_perf_event_open+0x5c6/0x701 [<810856f9>] SyS_perf_event_open+0x17/0x19 [<8142f8ee>] syscall_call+0x7/0xb -> CyanogenMod#4 (&ctx->lock){......}: [<8104a942>] lock_acquire+0x92/0x101 [<8142f04c>] _raw_spin_lock+0x21/0x30 [<81081df3>] __perf_event_task_sched_out+0x1dc/0x34f [<8142cacc>] __schedule+0x4c6/0x4cb [<8142cae0>] schedule+0xf/0x11 [<8142f9a6>] work_resched+0x5/0x30 -> #3 (&rq->lock){-.-.-.}: [<8104a942>] lock_acquire+0x92/0x101 [<8142f04c>] _raw_spin_lock+0x21/0x30 [<81040873>] __task_rq_lock+0x33/0x3a [<8104184c>] wake_up_new_task+0x25/0xc2 [<8102474b>] do_fork+0x15c/0x2a0 [<810248a9>] kernel_thread+0x1a/0x1f [<814232a2>] rest_init+0x1a/0x10e [<817af949>] start_kernel+0x303/0x308 [<817af2ab>] i386_start_kernel+0x79/0x7d -> #2 (&p->pi_lock){-.-...}: [<8104a942>] lock_acquire+0x92/0x101 [<8142f11d>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2e/0x3e [<810413dd>] try_to_wake_up+0x1d/0xd6 [<810414cd>] default_wake_function+0xb/0xd [<810461f3>] __wake_up_common+0x39/0x59 [<81046346>] __wake_up+0x29/0x3b [<811b8733>] tty_wakeup+0x49/0x51 [<811c3568>] uart_write_wakeup+0x17/0x19 [<811c5dc1>] serial8250_tx_chars+0xbc/0xfb [<811c5f28>] serial8250_handle_irq+0x54/0x6a [<811c5f57>] serial8250_default_handle_irq+0x19/0x1c [<811c56d8>] serial8250_interrupt+0x38/0x9e [<810510e7>] handle_irq_event_percpu+0x5f/0x1e2 [<81051296>] handle_irq_event+0x2c/0x43 [<81052cee>] handle_level_irq+0x57/0x80 [<81002a72>] handle_irq+0x46/0x5c [<810027df>] do_IRQ+0x32/0x89 [<8143036e>] common_interrupt+0x2e/0x33 [<8142f23c>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3f/0x49 [<811c25a4>] uart_start+0x2d/0x32 [<811c2c04>] uart_write+0xc7/0xd6 [<811bc6f6>] n_tty_write+0xb8/0x35e [<811b9beb>] tty_write+0x163/0x1e4 [<811b9cd9>] redirected_tty_write+0x6d/0x75 [<810b6ed6>] vfs_write+0x75/0xb0 [<810b7265>] SyS_write+0x44/0x77 [<8142f8ee>] syscall_call+0x7/0xb -> #1 (&tty->write_wait){-.....}: [<8104a942>] lock_acquire+0x92/0x101 [<8142f11d>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2e/0x3e [<81046332>] __wake_up+0x15/0x3b [<811b8733>] tty_wakeup+0x49/0x51 [<811c3568>] uart_write_wakeup+0x17/0x19 [<811c5dc1>] serial8250_tx_chars+0xbc/0xfb [<811c5f28>] serial8250_handle_irq+0x54/0x6a [<811c5f57>] serial8250_default_handle_irq+0x19/0x1c [<811c56d8>] serial8250_interrupt+0x38/0x9e [<810510e7>] handle_irq_event_percpu+0x5f/0x1e2 [<81051296>] handle_irq_event+0x2c/0x43 [<81052cee>] handle_level_irq+0x57/0x80 [<81002a72>] handle_irq+0x46/0x5c [<810027df>] do_IRQ+0x32/0x89 [<8143036e>] common_interrupt+0x2e/0x33 [<8142f23c>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3f/0x49 [<811c25a4>] uart_start+0x2d/0x32 [<811c2c04>] uart_write+0xc7/0xd6 [<811bc6f6>] n_tty_write+0xb8/0x35e [<811b9beb>] tty_write+0x163/0x1e4 [<811b9cd9>] redirected_tty_write+0x6d/0x75 [<810b6ed6>] vfs_write+0x75/0xb0 [<810b7265>] SyS_write+0x44/0x77 [<8142f8ee>] syscall_call+0x7/0xb -> #0 (&port_lock_key){-.....}: [<8104a62d>] __lock_acquire+0x9ea/0xc6d [<8104a942>] lock_acquire+0x92/0x101 [<8142f11d>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2e/0x3e [<811c60be>] serial8250_console_write+0x8c/0x10c [<8104e402>] call_console_drivers.constprop.31+0x87/0x118 [<8104f5d5>] console_unlock+0x1d7/0x398 [<8104fb70>] vprintk_emit+0x3da/0x3e4 [<81425f76>] printk+0x17/0x19 [<8105bfa0>] clockevents_program_min_delta+0x104/0x116 [<8105c548>] clockevents_program_event+0xe7/0xf3 [<8105cc1c>] tick_program_event+0x1e/0x23 [<8103c43c>] hrtimer_force_reprogram+0x88/0x8f [<8103c49e>] __remove_hrtimer+0x5b/0x79 [<8103cb21>] hrtimer_try_to_cancel+0x49/0x66 [<8103cb4b>] hrtimer_cancel+0xd/0x18 [<8107f102>] perf_swevent_cancel_hrtimer.part.60+0x2b/0x30 [<81080705>] task_clock_event_stop+0x20/0x64 [<81080756>] task_clock_event_del+0xd/0xf [<81081350>] event_sched_out+0xab/0x11e [<810813e0>] group_sched_out+0x1d/0x66 [<81081682>] ctx_sched_out+0xaf/0xbf [<81081e04>] __perf_event_task_sched_out+0x1ed/0x34f [<8142cacc>] __schedule+0x4c6/0x4cb [<8142cae0>] schedule+0xf/0x11 [<8142f9a6>] work_resched+0x5/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &port_lock_key --> &ctx->lock --> hrtimer_bases.lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(hrtimer_bases.lock); lock(&ctx->lock); lock(hrtimer_bases.lock); lock(&port_lock_key); *** DEADLOCK *** 4 locks held by trinity-main/74: #0: (&rq->lock){-.-.-.}, at: [<8142c6f3>] __schedule+0xed/0x4cb #1: (&ctx->lock){......}, at: [<81081df3>] __perf_event_task_sched_out+0x1dc/0x34f #2: (hrtimer_bases.lock){-.-...}, at: [<8103caeb>] hrtimer_try_to_cancel+0x13/0x66 #3: (console_lock){+.+...}, at: [<8104fb5d>] vprintk_emit+0x3c7/0x3e4 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 74 Comm: trinity-main Not tainted 3.15.0-rc8-06195-g939f04b #2 00000000 81c3a310 8b995c14 81426f69 8b995c44 81425a99 8161f671 8161f570 8161f538 8161f559 8161f538 8b995c78 8b142bb0 00000004 8b142fdc 8b142bb0 8b995ca8 8104a62d 8b142fac 000016f2 81c3a310 00000001 00000001 00000003 Call Trace: [<81426f69>] dump_stack+0x16/0x18 [<81425a99>] print_circular_bug+0x18f/0x19c [<8104a62d>] __lock_acquire+0x9ea/0xc6d [<8104a942>] lock_acquire+0x92/0x101 [<811c60be>] ? serial8250_console_write+0x8c/0x10c [<811c6032>] ? wait_for_xmitr+0x76/0x76 [<8142f11d>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2e/0x3e [<811c60be>] ? serial8250_console_write+0x8c/0x10c [<811c60be>] serial8250_console_write+0x8c/0x10c [<8104af87>] ? lock_release+0x191/0x223 [<811c6032>] ? wait_for_xmitr+0x76/0x76 [<8104e402>] call_console_drivers.constprop.31+0x87/0x118 [<8104f5d5>] console_unlock+0x1d7/0x398 [<8104fb70>] vprintk_emit+0x3da/0x3e4 [<81425f76>] printk+0x17/0x19 [<8105bfa0>] clockevents_program_min_delta+0x104/0x116 [<8105cc1c>] tick_program_event+0x1e/0x23 [<8103c43c>] hrtimer_force_reprogram+0x88/0x8f [<8103c49e>] __remove_hrtimer+0x5b/0x79 [<8103cb21>] hrtimer_try_to_cancel+0x49/0x66 [<8103cb4b>] hrtimer_cancel+0xd/0x18 [<8107f102>] perf_swevent_cancel_hrtimer.part.60+0x2b/0x30 [<81080705>] task_clock_event_stop+0x20/0x64 [<81080756>] task_clock_event_del+0xd/0xf [<81081350>] event_sched_out+0xab/0x11e [<810813e0>] group_sched_out+0x1d/0x66 [<81081682>] ctx_sched_out+0xaf/0xbf [<81081e04>] __perf_event_task_sched_out+0x1ed/0x34f [<8104416d>] ? __dequeue_entity+0x23/0x27 [<81044505>] ? pick_next_task_fair+0xb1/0x120 [<8142cacc>] __schedule+0x4c6/0x4cb [<81047574>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0xd7/0x108 [<810475b0>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xb/0xd [<81056346>] ? rcu_irq_exit+0x64/0x77 Fix the problem by using printk_deferred() which does not call into the scheduler. Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry-picked from commit b2504a5dbef3305ef41988ad270b0e8ec289331c) Dmitry reported warnings occurring in __skb_gso_segment() [1] All SKB_GSO_DODGY producers can allow user space to feed packets that trigger the current check. We could prevent them from doing so, rejecting packets, but this might add regressions to existing programs. It turns out our SKB_GSO_DODGY handlers properly set up checksum information that is needed anyway when packets needs to be segmented. By checking again skb_needs_check() after skb_mac_gso_segment(), we should remove these pesky warnings, at a very minor cost. With help from Willem de Bruijn [1] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 6768 at net/core/dev.c:2439 skb_warn_bad_offload+0x2af/0x390 net/core/dev.c:2434 lo: caps=(0x000000a2803b7c69, 0x0000000000000000) len=138 data_len=0 gso_size=15883 gso_type=4 ip_summed=0 Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 1 PID: 6768 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.9.0 CyanogenMod#5 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 ffff8801c063ecd8 ffffffff82346bdf ffffffff00000001 1ffff100380c7d2e ffffed00380c7d26 0000000041b58ab3 ffffffff84b37e38 ffffffff823468f1 ffffffff84820740 ffffffff84f289c0 dffffc0000000000 ffff8801c063ee20 Call Trace: [<ffffffff82346bdf>] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [inline] [<ffffffff82346bdf>] dump_stack+0x2ee/0x3ef lib/dump_stack.c:51 [<ffffffff81827e34>] panic+0x1fb/0x412 kernel/panic.c:179 [<ffffffff8141f704>] __warn+0x1c4/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:542 [<ffffffff8141f7e5>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0xc5/0x100 kernel/panic.c:565 [<ffffffff8356cbaf>] skb_warn_bad_offload+0x2af/0x390 net/core/dev.c:2434 [<ffffffff83585cd2>] __skb_gso_segment+0x482/0x780 net/core/dev.c:2706 [<ffffffff83586f19>] skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:3985 [inline] [<ffffffff83586f19>] validate_xmit_skb+0x5c9/0xc20 net/core/dev.c:2969 [<ffffffff835892bb>] __dev_queue_xmit+0xe6b/0x1e70 net/core/dev.c:3383 [<ffffffff8358a2d7>] dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3424 [<ffffffff83ad161d>] packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2930 [inline] [<ffffffff83ad161d>] packet_sendmsg+0x32ed/0x4d30 net/packet/af_packet.c:2955 [<ffffffff834f0aaa>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] [<ffffffff834f0aaa>] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:631 [<ffffffff834f329a>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x8fa/0x9f0 net/socket.c:1954 [<ffffffff834f5e58>] __sys_sendmsg+0x138/0x300 net/socket.c:1988 [<ffffffff834f604d>] SYSC_sendmsg net/socket.c:1999 [inline] [<ffffffff834f604d>] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 net/socket.c:1995 [<ffffffff84371941>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Bug: 63963029 Change-Id: I76d29d2facae8098f7323a83009d1e4add85987a
commit 420902c9d086848a7548c83e0a49021514bd71b7 upstream. If we hold the superblock lock while calling reiserfs_quota_on_mount(), we can deadlock our own worker - mount blocks kworker/3:2, sleeps forever more. crash> ps|grep UN 715 2 3 ffff880220734d30 UN 0.0 0 0 [kworker/3:2] 9369 9341 2 ffff88021ffb7560 UN 1.3 493404 123184 Xorg 9665 9664 3 ffff880225b92ab0 UN 0.0 47368 812 udisks-daemon 10635 10403 3 ffff880222f22c70 UN 0.0 14904 936 mount crash> bt ffff880220734d30 PID: 715 TASK: ffff880220734d30 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "kworker/3:2" #0 [ffff8802244c3c20] schedule at ffffffff8144584b #1 [ffff8802244c3cc8] __rt_mutex_slowlock at ffffffff814472b3 #2 [ffff8802244c3d28] rt_mutex_slowlock at ffffffff814473f5 #3 [ffff8802244c3dc8] reiserfs_write_lock at ffffffffa05f28fd [reiserfs] CyanogenMod#4 [ffff8802244c3de8] flush_async_commits at ffffffffa05ec91d [reiserfs] CyanogenMod#5 [ffff8802244c3e08] process_one_work at ffffffff81073726 CyanogenMod#6 [ffff8802244c3e68] worker_thread at ffffffff81073eba CyanogenMod#7 [ffff8802244c3ec8] kthread at ffffffff810782e0 #8 [ffff8802244c3f48] kernel_thread_helper at ffffffff81450064 crash> rd ffff8802244c3cc8 10 ffff8802244c3cc8: ffffffff814472b3 ffff880222f23250 .rD.....P2.".... ffff8802244c3cd8: 0000000000000000 0000000000000286 ................ ffff8802244c3ce8: ffff8802244c3d30 ffff880220734d80 0=L$.....Ms .... ffff8802244c3cf8: ffff880222e8f628 0000000000000000 (.."............ ffff8802244c3d08: 0000000000000000 0000000000000002 ................ crash> struct rt_mutex ffff880222e8f628 struct rt_mutex { wait_lock = { raw_lock = { slock = 65537 } }, wait_list = { node_list = { next = 0xffff8802244c3d48, prev = 0xffff8802244c3d48 } }, owner = 0xffff880222f22c71, save_state = 0 } crash> bt 0xffff880222f22c70 PID: 10635 TASK: ffff880222f22c70 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "mount" #0 [ffff8802216a9868] schedule at ffffffff8144584b #1 [ffff8802216a9910] schedule_timeout at ffffffff81446865 #2 [ffff8802216a99a0] wait_for_common at ffffffff81445f74 #3 [ffff8802216a9a30] flush_work at ffffffff810712d3 CyanogenMod#4 [ffff8802216a9ab0] schedule_on_each_cpu at ffffffff81074463 CyanogenMod#5 [ffff8802216a9ae0] invalidate_bdev at ffffffff81178aba CyanogenMod#6 [ffff8802216a9af0] vfs_load_quota_inode at ffffffff811a3632 CyanogenMod#7 [ffff8802216a9b50] dquot_quota_on_mount at ffffffff811a375c #8 [ffff8802216a9b80] finish_unfinished at ffffffffa05dd8b0 [reiserfs] #9 [ffff8802216a9cc0] reiserfs_fill_super at ffffffffa05de825 [reiserfs] RIP: 00007f7b9303997a RSP: 00007ffff443c7a8 RFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 00000000000000a5 RBX: ffffffff8144ef12 RCX: 00007f7b932e9ee0 RDX: 00007f7b93d9a400 RSI: 00007f7b93d9a3e0 RDI: 00007f7b93d9a3c0 RBP: 00007f7b93d9a2c0 R8: 00007f7b93d9a550 R9: 0000000000000001 R10: ffffffffc0ed040e R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 000000000000040e R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000c0ed040e R15: 00007ffff443ca20 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 CS: 0033 SS: 002b Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Acked-by: Mike Galbraith <mgalbraith@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit 3d46a44a0c01b15d385ccaae24b56f619613c256 upstream. PID: 614 TASK: ffff882a739da580 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "ocfs2dc" #0 [ffff882ecc3759b0] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103b35d #1 [ffff882ecc375a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b95b5 #2 [ffff882ecc375af0] oops_end at ffffffff815091d8 #3 [ffff882ecc375b20] die at ffffffff8101868b CyanogenMod#4 [ffff882ecc375b50] do_trap at ffffffff81508bb0 CyanogenMod#5 [ffff882ecc375ba0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff810165e5 CyanogenMod#6 [ffff882ecc375c40] invalid_op at ffffffff815116fb [exception RIP: ocfs2_ci_checkpointed+208] RIP: ffffffffa0a7e940 RSP: ffff882ecc375cf0 RFLAGS: 00010002 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 000000000000654b RCX: ffff8812dc83f1f8 RDX: 00000000000017d9 RSI: ffff8812dc83f1f8 RDI: ffffffffa0b2c318 RBP: ffff882ecc375d20 R8: ffff882ef6ecfa60 R9: ffff88301f272200 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffffffffffff R13: ffff8812dc83f4f0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8812dc83f1f8 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 CyanogenMod#7 [ffff882ecc375d28] ocfs2_check_meta_downconvert at ffffffffa0a7edbd [ocfs2] #8 [ffff882ecc375d38] ocfs2_unblock_lock at ffffffffa0a84af8 [ocfs2] #9 [ffff882ecc375dc8] ocfs2_process_blocked_lock at ffffffffa0a85285 [ocfs2] assert is tripped because the tran is not checkpointed and the lock level is PR. Some time ago, chmod command had been executed. As result, the following call chain left the inode cluster lock in PR state, latter on causing the assert. system_call_fastpath -> my_chmod -> sys_chmod -> sys_fchmodat -> notify_change -> ocfs2_setattr -> posix_acl_chmod -> ocfs2_iop_set_acl -> ocfs2_set_acl -> ocfs2_acl_set_mode Here is how. 1119 int ocfs2_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) 1120 { 1247 ocfs2_inode_unlock(inode, 1); <<< WRONG thing to do. .. 1258 if (!status && attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) { 1259 status = posix_acl_chmod(inode, inode->i_mode); 519 posix_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode) 520 { .. 539 ret = inode->i_op->set_acl(inode, acl, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS); 287 int ocfs2_iop_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, ... 288 { 289 return ocfs2_set_acl(NULL, inode, NULL, type, acl, NULL, NULL); 224 int ocfs2_set_acl(handle_t *handle, 225 struct inode *inode, ... 231 { .. 252 ret = ocfs2_acl_set_mode(inode, di_bh, 253 handle, mode); 168 static int ocfs2_acl_set_mode(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head ... 170 { 183 if (handle == NULL) { >>> BUG: inode lock not held in ex at this point <<< 184 handle = ocfs2_start_trans(OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb), 185 OCFS2_INODE_UPDATE_CREDITS); ocfs2_setattr.#1247 we unlock and at #1259 call posix_acl_chmod. When we reach ocfs2_acl_set_mode.#181 and do trans, the inode cluster lock is not held in EX mode (it should be). How this could have happended? We are the lock master, were holding lock EX and have released it in ocfs2_setattr.#1247. Note that there are no holders of this lock at this point. Another node needs the lock in PR, and we downconvert from EX to PR. So the inode lock is PR when do the trans in ocfs2_acl_set_mode.#184. The trans stays in core (not flushed to disc). Now another node want the lock in EX, downconvert thread gets kicked (the one that tripped assert abovt), finds an unflushed trans but the lock is not EX (it is PR). If the lock was at EX, it would have flushed the trans ocfs2_ci_checkpointed -> ocfs2_start_checkpoint before downconverting (to NULL) for the request. ocfs2_setattr must not drop inode lock ex in this code path. If it does, takes it again before the trans, say in ocfs2_set_acl, another cluster node can get in between, execute another setattr, overwriting the one in progress on this node, resulting in a mode acl size combo that is a mix of the two. Orabug: 20189959 Signed-off-by: Tariq Saeed <tariq.x.saeed@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit b2504a5dbef3305ef41988ad270b0e8ec289331c upstream. Dmitry reported warnings occurring in __skb_gso_segment() [1] All SKB_GSO_DODGY producers can allow user space to feed packets that trigger the current check. We could prevent them from doing so, rejecting packets, but this might add regressions to existing programs. It turns out our SKB_GSO_DODGY handlers properly set up checksum information that is needed anyway when packets needs to be segmented. By checking again skb_needs_check() after skb_mac_gso_segment(), we should remove these pesky warnings, at a very minor cost. With help from Willem de Bruijn [1] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 6768 at net/core/dev.c:2439 skb_warn_bad_offload+0x2af/0x390 net/core/dev.c:2434 lo: caps=(0x000000a2803b7c69, 0x0000000000000000) len=138 data_len=0 gso_size=15883 gso_type=4 ip_summed=0 Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 1 PID: 6768 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.9.0 CyanogenMod#5 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 ffff8801c063ecd8 ffffffff82346bdf ffffffff00000001 1ffff100380c7d2e ffffed00380c7d26 0000000041b58ab3 ffffffff84b37e38 ffffffff823468f1 ffffffff84820740 ffffffff84f289c0 dffffc0000000000 ffff8801c063ee20 Call Trace: [<ffffffff82346bdf>] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [inline] [<ffffffff82346bdf>] dump_stack+0x2ee/0x3ef lib/dump_stack.c:51 [<ffffffff81827e34>] panic+0x1fb/0x412 kernel/panic.c:179 [<ffffffff8141f704>] __warn+0x1c4/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:542 [<ffffffff8141f7e5>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0xc5/0x100 kernel/panic.c:565 [<ffffffff8356cbaf>] skb_warn_bad_offload+0x2af/0x390 net/core/dev.c:2434 [<ffffffff83585cd2>] __skb_gso_segment+0x482/0x780 net/core/dev.c:2706 [<ffffffff83586f19>] skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:3985 [inline] [<ffffffff83586f19>] validate_xmit_skb+0x5c9/0xc20 net/core/dev.c:2969 [<ffffffff835892bb>] __dev_queue_xmit+0xe6b/0x1e70 net/core/dev.c:3383 [<ffffffff8358a2d7>] dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3424 [<ffffffff83ad161d>] packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2930 [inline] [<ffffffff83ad161d>] packet_sendmsg+0x32ed/0x4d30 net/packet/af_packet.c:2955 [<ffffffff834f0aaa>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] [<ffffffff834f0aaa>] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:631 [<ffffffff834f329a>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x8fa/0x9f0 net/socket.c:1954 [<ffffffff834f5e58>] __sys_sendmsg+0x138/0x300 net/socket.c:1988 [<ffffffff834f604d>] SYSC_sendmsg net/socket.c:1999 [inline] [<ffffffff834f604d>] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 net/socket.c:1995 [<ffffffff84371941>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
kernel-fs-exfat