YOU CAN'T SPELL TRUST WITHOUT RUST

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ABSTRACT

Rust is a new programming language developed by Mozilla in response to the fact that C and C++ are unsafe, inefficient, and unergonomic – particularly when applied to concurrency. Version 1.0 of Rust was released in May 2015, and appears to be performing excellently. Rust code is memory-safe by default, faster than C++, easier to maintain, and excels at concurrency.

Yet little analysis exists of the semantics and expressiveness of Rust's type system. This thesis focuses on one of the core aspects of Rust's type system: *ownership*. Ownership is a system for expressing where and when data lives, and where and when data can be mutated. In order to understand ownership and the problems it solves, we provide a novel analysis of both in terms of *trust*.

We observe that many classical memory safety errors are the result of some code trusting data to be in a particular state that doesn't necessarily hold. For instance, indexing out of bounds occurs when one incorrectly trusts an index to agree with an array's length. The problem of trust is largely addressed using three different strategies: naivety, paranoia, and suspicion. Each of these strategies represents a compromise among the competing concerns of control, safety, and ergonomics. Briefly, naive interfaces optimize for control by assuming that state is correct; paranoid interfaces optimize for safety by statically preventing invalid states; and suspicious interfaces optimize for ergonomics by validating states at runtime.

We demonstrate how ownership can be used to build efficient and ergonomic paranoid interfaces on top of unsafe naive interfaces. For example, iterators in Rust provide an interface for indexing into an array without bounds checks while being statically immune to invalidation. Two of these interfaces, *drain* and *entry*, were developed by us for Rust's standard library.

Finally we demonstrate some of the limits of ownership. In particular, we explore how the lack of proper linear typing makes it difficult to guarantee that desirable operations are performed, such as freeing unused memory or repairing invariants. However we provide some tricks for *ensuring* that operations are performed (at the cost of ergonomics), or simply mitigating the impact of not performing them.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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INTRODUCTION

Modern systems are built upon shaky foundations. Core pieces of computing infrastructure like kernels, system utilities, web browsers, and game engines are almost invariably written in C and C++. Although these languages provide their users the control necessary to satisfy their correctness and performance requirements, this control comes at the cost of an overwhelming burden for the user: *Undefined Behaviour*. Users of these languages must be ever-vigilant of Undefined Behaviour, and even well-maintained projects fail to do so [14]. The price for invoking Undefined Behaviour is dire: compilers are allowed to do *absolutely anything at all*.

Modern compilers can and will analyze programs on the assumption that Undefined Behaviour is impossible, leading to counter-intuitive results like time travel, wherein correct code is removed because subsequent code is Undefined. This aggressive misoptimization can turn relatively innocuous bugs like integer overflow in a print statement into a wildly incorrect behaviour. Severe vulnerabilities subsequently occur because Undefined Behaviour often leads to the program blindly stomping through memory and bypassing checks, providing attackers great flexibility.

As a result, our core infrastructure is constantly broken and exploited. Worse, C and C++ are holding back systems from being as efficient as they could be. These languages were fundamentally designed for single-threaded programming and reasoning, having only had concurrency grafted onto their semantics in the last 5 years. As such, legacy code bases struggle to take advantage of hardware parallelism. Even in a single-threaded context, the danger of Undefined Behaviour encourages programs to be written inefficiently to defend against common errors. For instance it's much safer to copy a buffer than have several disjoint locations share pointers to it, because unmanaged pointers in C and C++ are wildly unsafe.

In order to address these problems, Mozilla developed the Rust programming language. Rust has ambitious goals. It intends to be more efficient than C++ and safer than Java without sacrificing ergonomics. Although Rust 1.0 was released less than a year ago [1], early results are incredibly promising. To see this, we need look no further than the Servo project, a rewrite of Firefox's core engine in Rust [5].

Preliminary results [6] have found that Servo can perform layout two times faster than Firefox on a single thread, and four times faster with four threads. Servo has also attracted over 300 contributors [4], in spite of the fact that it's written in a language that was barely

just stabilized, demonstrating the maintainability of Rust applications. There's little data on safety and correctness in Servo, but we will see throughout this thesis that Rust provides powerful tools for ensuring safety and correctness.

It should be noted that Rust doesn't desire to invent novel systems or analyses, because research is hard, slow, and risky. Indeed, to a well-versed programming language theorist Rust can be easily summarized as a list of well-studied ideas. However, Rust's type system as a whole is greater than the sum of the parts. As such, we believe it merits research.

Truly understanding Rust's type system in a rigorous way is a massive under-taking that will fill several PhD theses [3]. As such, we will make no effort to do this. Instead, we will focus in on what we consider the most interesting aspect of Rust: *ownership*. Ownership is an emergent system built on three major pieces: *affine types*, *region analysis*, and *privacy*. Together we get a system for programmers to manage where and when data lives, and where and when it can be mutated in a reasonably ergonomic and intuitive manner.

In particular, we observe that many of the kinds of problems Rust seeks to solve boil down to issues of *trust* between different pieces of code and the data they share. Because Rust's ownership system allows developers to model access to data in novel ways, it's possible to cleanly model the trust these interfaces require to be safe and efficient.

Ownership particularly shines when one wants to develop concurrent programs, an infamously difficult problem. Using Rust's tools for generic programming, it's possible to build totally safe concurrent algorithms and data structures which work with arbitrary data without relying on any particular paradigm like message-passing or persistence. Rust's crowning jewel in this regard is the ability to safely have child threads mutate data on a parent thread's stack without any unnecessary synchronization, as the following program demonstrates. (If you don't understand Rust syntax, a brief introduction is provided in a later section. For now, trust us that this is a super cool example)

```
[dependencies]
crossbeam = 0.1.6


-----


extern crate crossbeam;

fn main() {
    let mut array = [1, 2, 3];

    // Create a scope to know when to join all threads
    crossbeam::scope(|scope| {
```

```rust
    // Get pointers to each element in the array
    for x in &mut array {
        // Spawn a thread to increment this element of the array
        scope.spawn(move || {
            *x += 1;
        });
    }

    // Block on all the child threads joining here
});

println!("{:?}", array);
}
```

The most amazing part of this program is that it's based entirely on a third- party library (crossbeam [2]). Rust does not require threads to be modeled as part of the language or standard library in order for these powerful safe abstractions to be constructed. Any attempt to share non-threadsafe data with the scoped threads, give the same pointer to two threads, keep a pointer for too long, or access the array while the threads are running won't just fail to work, it will *fail to compile*. The fact that misuse is a static error is incredibly important for concurrent programs, because runtime errors can be incredibly difficult to reproduce or debug.

Before we get into all the finer details of how this example works, we'll need to build up some foundations. In chapter 2, we establish the basic principles of safety and correctness that we're interested in. Since these are ultimately vague concepts in a practical setting, we do this by surveying several classic errors that all languages must deal with. In chapter 3 we identify how each kind of error can be understood in terms of *trust* and the major strategies for handling trust issues. In chapter 4 we give a brief introduction to Rust's syntax, semantics, and ownership. In chapter 5 we analyze several interfaces designed by ourselves and the greater Rust community in terms of trust. In chapter 6 we we examine the limitations of ownership. Finally, in chapter 7 we briefly survey how ownership in Rust compares to similar systems in other languages.

SAFETY AND CORRECTNESS

Programming is hard. [citation needed]

We would like our programs to be correct, but we seem to be very bad at doing this. In fact, any assertion that a non-trivial program is totally correct will be met with deep suspicion. This isn't unreasonable: any non-trivial property one might be interested in is usually undecidable in even trivial programming languages. Still, some bugs are more pervasive and pernicious than others. It's one thing to get a poorly rounded display value, but another thing altogether to join a botnet because of an insecure integer parser.

For this reason, it is common to distinguish one major category of bug from all others: *memory safety*. A system is memory-safe if access to memory is properly restricted. This is an unfortunately vague definition, but that's because it's a broad problem. At the heart of memory safety are two major concerns: preventing secrets from being stolen, and systems from being hijacked. It is of course possible to design a memory-safe system that liberally leaks secrets and happily takes arbitrary commands from the public internet, but an absence of memory safety makes even innocuous systems trivial to hijack in this way.

Most importantly, programs must have *some* restriction on what can be read and written by what. If a function can freely read and write all the memory in a process, then compromising that function can make it do almost certainly anything and everything. In particular, overwriting return pointers in a program's call stack can often enable an attacker to execute arbitrary computations, even in a system with proper code-data separation and address space layout randomization.

Even "only" being able to read arbitrary memory can be an exploit, particularly as reading memory often implies writing the value somewhere else. This is the basis for the infamous Heart Bleed attack, where clients could ask servers to send them random chunks of its memory, leaking the server's private key.

Upholding memory safety is a difficult task that must often be approached in a holistic manner, because two interfaces that are memory-safe on their own can easily be unsafe when combined. For instance, dereferencing a pointer that is known to be valid is safe, and offsetting a pointer is technically safe (it's just adding integers), but being allowed to dereference *and* offset is unsafe.

In addition to the matter of memory safety, there is also the broader problem of overall correctness. It is of course impossible for a system to enforce that all programs are correct, because it requires the pro-

grammer to correctly interpret and encode their program's requirements. Computers can't possibly understand if requirements reflect reality, so they must trust the programmer in this regard. That said, it is possible for a system to understand *common* errors. Where it's impractical to prevent these errors in general, a language can orient itself to make these errors less likely. For instance, few programs expect integers to overflow, so a system that does more to prevent integer overflow or mitigate its consequences may be regarded as safer.

Rust is fundamentally committed to being memory-safe. If memory safety can be violated, this is a critical issue in Rust's design and must be fixed. That said, Rust also tries to be safer in general. All else equal, if an interface can prevent misuse, it should. The question is if all else is *really* equal, or if preventing an error comes at significant ergonomic or performance costs.

While the techniques demonstrated in this thesis are can be applied generally, we will be focusing on few particular common problems that can lead to memory safety violations: use-after-free, iterator invalidation, and indexing out of bounds. In addition, we will consider the problem of memory leaks, which aren't a memory-safety problem, but still problematic.

We will see how all of these problems occur in the two most prolific programming languages of all: C and C++. It's worth noting that the practices encouraged by "modern" C++ can significantly mitigate or eliminate these errors, but unfortunately these are only conventions, and must be rigorously followed and understood to work correctly. A C++ programmer who is unaware of these practices gains little safety from using the latest C++ release, particularly since the unsafe practices are often the most convenient and well-supported.

Bjarne Stroustrup and Herb Sutter recently announced an experimental system built on top of C++ that claims to statically enforce that programs are memory- safe, but not enough is currently known to comment on the viability or soundness of this system. From what we've seen, it actually hews quite close to Rust, but like Cyclone, it appears to be significantly burdened by C++'s legacy semantics.

2.1   USE-AFTER-FREE

A use-after-free is one of the two canonical memory safety violations. It occurs when some memory is marked as unused (freed), but the program continues to use that memory. Here's two simple versions of this problem, as seen in C:

```c
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>

// use-after-free with heap allocation
int main() {
```

```c
    // Get some memory from the allocator
    char* string = (char*) calloc(3, 1);
    string[0] = 'h';
    string[1] = 'i';

    // Give the memory back to the system allocator
    free(string);

    // Use the memory anyway
    printf("%s\n", string);
}

#include <stdio.h>

// use-after-free with stack allocation
int main() {
    char* ptr = 0;

    if (!ptr) {
        char data = 17;
        // take a pointer to 'data'
        ptr = &data;
    }
    // data is now out of scope, and undefined

    // read it anyway
    printf("%u\n", *ptr);
}
```

In principle, a use-after-free can be harmless if the code in question gets lucky. The system may never look at this memory again, allowing it to continue to behave in an allocated manner. However the system has been given permission to do whatever it pleases with this memory, which can lead to several problems.

First, the memory can be returned to the operating system. If memory returned to the OS is used, this will cause a page fault, causing the program to crash. This is annoying, but is arguably memory-safe in the sense that the memory is never successfully used after it is freed. The problematic case is when the allocator *reuses* the memory. Any subsequent allocation may receive the freed memory, leading the memory to be used for two different purposes. This violates memory safety, allowing code to read or write memory that it wasn't supposed to.

Use-after-frees are solved by almost all languages by requiring pervasive garbage collection. C and C++ are the two major exceptions, which by default don't use any garbage collection mechanisms. In these two languages use-after-free is a rich source of exploits to this

day. As we will see, this is no coincidence. The solution taken by most languages is unacceptable to those who traditionally use C or C++.

Use-after-frees are the canonical example of the more general problem of using something after it has been logically destroyed. For instance, a similar problem applies to using file handles after they're closed. However the use-after-free is particularly problematic because most system allocators pool and reuse pages of memory acquired from the OS. This prevents the OS from understanding that memory is supposed to be unused.

File handles, on the other hand, are generally not pooled like this. T hat said, it's possible for new handles to match the value of old handles (like pointers, they're ultimately just integers). This can lead to a similar scenario as a use-after-free, where two distinct handles are independently trying to use the same file.

The more general category reveals a fundamental weakness of garbage collection: it only solves a use-after-free, and no other kind of use-after. Most languages therefore require runtime checks to guard against this problem in the general case. Regardless of if one gets particularly lucky or guards against this error at runtime, any program that tries to use-after is certainly *wrong*, and we would like our programs to be correct.

2.2   INDEX OUT OF BOUNDS

An index out of bounds is the second canonical memory safety violation. It occurs when the index used to access an array is too large or small. A simple C version:

```c
#include <stdio.h>

int main() {
    // An array of 5 elements
    char data[5] = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5};

    // Print out the 17th element
    printf("%u\n", data[17]);
}
```

The consequence of an index out of bounds is quite straight-forward: it reads or writes memory that happens to be near the array as if it were an element of that array. For arrays sitting on the stack, this is an easy vector for overwriting a function's return pointer.

Like general use-afters, this problem is usually resolved through runtime checks. Every operation that takes an index compares it to the length of the array. However C and C++ provide no guards by default, and in some cases array length isn't even known, making it *impossible* to check.

2.3   ITERATOR INVALIDATION

Iterator invalidation is particularly interesting because it's similar to a use-after-free or indexing out of bounds, but can require more pervasive checking to guard against. This problem occurs when a data structure is mutated while it is being iterated. A simple example in C++:

```cpp
#include <vector>
#include <stdio.h>
using namespace std;

int main() {
    // a growable array of four 5's
    vector<char> data (4, 5);

    // loop over the array to print the elements out
    for (auto it = data.begin(); it != data.end(); ++it) {
        printf("%u\n", *it);

        // but push a single element onto the stack while doing it
        if (it == data.begin()) {
            data.push_back(0);
        }
    }
}
```

When an iterator is invalidated it will start acting on outdated information, potentially stomping through memory that is no longer part of the collection. For instance, when we executed this program it produced 22(!) values. Evidently the array's backing storage had been reallocated in a different location on the heap, conveniently only a few bytes over. The 'it' variable simply walked forward through the heap until it found the new end of the array. In other words, we managed to index out of bounds *and* use-after-free at the same time.

Even if an iterator isn't invalidated in this process, mutating a collection while iterating it is an easy way to produce a nonsensical program. For instance, unconditionally inserting into a collection while iterating into it may lead to an infinite memory-consuming loop. That said, it can be be desirable to mutate a collection while iterating it. For instance, one may wish to process all the elements in an array, removing those that don't meet some condition.

In order to guard against this, any operations which can invalidate an iterator need to somehow know about any outstanding iterators or otherwise signal to them that a change has been made. One way to do this is to have the collection contain a timestamp of when it was last modified which iterators repeatedly verify hasn't changed. This is exactly how OpenJDK's ArrayList is implemented [**?**].

Once again, neither C nor C++ provide any guards against this sort of thing by default.

Iterator invalidation can be generalized to the invalidation of any "view" into another type. Iterators are particularly nasty because they're often low-level and performance sensitive, but any view can be made inconsistent by mutating what it intends to represent.

2.4   MEMORY LEAKS

Memory leaks are unlike any of the other errors above. The other errors are a matter of doing a thing that shouldn't have been done. Leaks, on the other hand, are failing to do something that *should* have been done. In contrast to a use-after-free, a memory leak occurs when memory is *never* returned to the allocator. We can demonstrate a memory leak by just removing the call to 'free' from our use-after-free example:

```c
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>

// memory leak with heap allocation
int main() {
    // Get some memory from the allocator
    char* string = (char*) calloc(3, 1);
    string[0] = 'h';
    string[1] = 'i';

    printf("%s\n", string);

    // Don't bother to release the memory
}
```

Leaks aren't a memory-safety issue. Leaks just waste resources which can seriously impact performance, or even cause a crash. Crashing is obviously not good, so leaks should be avoided if possible. That said, leaks can be benign or even desirable under the right circumstances. For instance, our example of a leak is actually totally fine. Operating systems reclaim a process' memory on exit anyway, so fiddling with the allocator is just slowing down the program's execution for no good reason.

Most languages handle memory leaks with garbage collection. C++ primarily handles memory leaks with destructors. C doesn't provide anything for avoiding memory leaks. Regardless, no strategy is perfect because properly eliminating leaks may require semantic understanding of how an application works. For instance, none of the strategies mentioned can deal with forgetting to remove unused values from a collection. Even ignoring these "undetectable" cases, these

strategies can also fail to properly collect truly unreachable memory due to implementation details.

Memory leaks generalize to the leaking of basically any other resource such as threads, file descriptors, or connections. Arguably, leaks are just a special case of forgetting to do any final step at all. Garbage collection does nothing for these errors, while destructors work just as well for them all.

Leaks are a sufficiently special case that we'll be skipping over them for the bulk of this thesis. For now we'll only focus on the errors that can lead to programs behaving incorrectly, instead of just poorly.

TRUST

We believe that the three memory-safety errors we described in the previous section, and many more like them, all boil down to a single issue: data trust. All programs require or expect data to have certain properties. This trust is so pervasive that it's easy to forget that we're even making assumptions about how data will behave. This trust has many aspects:

First, there is the *property* of the data that is trusted. The simplest form of trust is trusting that certain values don't occur: booleans are either 'true' or 'false', but never 'FileNotFound'. This kind of property is generally quite manageable because it's easy to verify on demand.

The more complex form of property is trusting that separate pieces of data agree. This is the kind of property that we see in our memory-safety errors. Indices need to agree with the length of the array, the allocator needs to agree that dereferenced pointers are allocated, and iterators need to agree with the collection they iterate. This is the kind of trust we will be focusing on for the bulk of this work.

Second, there is the *who* to trust with data. For most applications, it's pretty reasonable to design an interface that assumes that the language, hardware, and operating system are well-behaved. Of course, bugs in any of these systems may necessitate workarounds, but we don't consider this aspect to be particularly interesting. At some limit, these systems just work the way they work, and any oddities can be regarded as a nasty corner-case to be documented.

The aspect of who to trust that we consider really interesting is within the boundary of userland. Within a single program, functions need to decide whether to trust other functions. It's fairly reasonable to trust a single concrete function to be well-behaved. For instance, if one wishes to invoke a print function that claims to only read its inputs, it's reasonable to rely on that fact. We consider it reasonable to extend our trust here because it's being done in a *closed* manner. That is, it's in principle possible to test or otherwise verify that the print function doesn't mutate its input, especially if the source is available.

The problematic case is when we need to extend our trust in an *open* manner. Public functions can be called by arbitrary code, and as such need to worry about trusting their caller. Do we trust the caller to pass us correct inputs? Do we trust the caller to invoke us at the right time? Similarly, generic or higher-order functions need to worry about trusting the arbitrary functions that they're given. If we were *given* a printing function instead of getting to call some concrete one,

we then have to worry if that print function will uphold its promise not to mutate the input.

Third, there is the *consequences* of the trust; what happens if trust is violated? Consequences for an application can range from marginal to catastrophic; it could perform slightly worse, produce nonsensical output, crash, delete the production database, or compromise the system it's running on. The consequences of an assumption can easily shape whether that assumption is made at all. Certainly, leaving the system vulnerable is not something to be taken lightly.

Fourth and finally, there is the *justification* of the trust. At one extreme, one may simply blindly trust the data. Indexing is unchecked; pointers are assumed to be allocated; and booleans are assumed to be true or false.

At the other extreme, one can statically guarantee that data is correct. Static type checking can help ensure that a boolean doesn't contain FileNotFound, control flow analysis can determine if a pointer is used after it's freed, and normalized databases ensure that there is a single source of truth for each fact.

Somewhere in between these two extremes, one can *validate* or *correct* data at runtime. Indexes may be checked against an array's length; inputs may be escaped; and iterators can check that their collection hasn't been modified.

We respectively call these three approaches *naivety*, *paranoia*, and *suspicion*. As we will see, they each have their own strengths and weaknesses that makes them appropriate for different tasks. As such, basically every piece of software relies on a combination of these strategies to strike a balance between the competing demands of control, safety, and ergonomics. That said, some systems clearly favour some strategies more than others.

3.1 NAIVETY

A naive interface isn't a fundamentally bad interface. It's just one that trusts that the world is great and everyone is well-behaved. Providing a naive interface is a bit like giving everyone you meet a loaded gun and trusting that they use it wisely. If everyone *is* well-behaved, then everything goes great. Otherwise, someone might lose a leg.

First and foremost, a naive interface is simply the easiest to *implement*. The implementor doesn't need to concern themselves with corner cases because they are simply assumed to not occur. This in turn gives significant control to the user of the interface, because they don't need to worry about the interface checking or mangling inputs. It's up to the user to figure out how correct usage is ensured. Since the user has the most context, they are the best poised to identify when assumptions can or can't be made.

Naive interfaces may also expose lower-level details more freely, on the assumption that they will be used correctly. This empowers users to effeciently and reliably perform operations that may never have been envisioned by the original implementor, or were simply deemed too much work to develop and maintain. Control is absolutely the greatest strength of naive interfaces. They empower excellent programmers to produce excellent code where it matters.

For similar reasons, naive interfaces are also, in principle, ergonomic to work with. In particular one is allowed to try to use the interface in whatever manner they please. This enables programs to be transformed in a more continuous manner. Intermediate designs may be incorrect in various ways, but if one is only interested in exploring a certain aspect of the program that doesn't depend on the incorrect parts, they are free to do so.

The uncontested champion of this approach is C. In particular, its notion of *Undefined Behaviour* is exactly naivety. C programs are expected to uphold several non-trivial properties, and the C standard simply declares that if those properties *don't* hold, the program is *undefined*. This naivety can be found in relatively small and local details like unchecked indexing, as well as massive and pervasive ones like manual memory management.

Undefined Behaviour demonstrates the extreme drawback of naive interfaces. Breaking C's trust has dire consequences, as the compiler is free to misoptimize the program in arbitrary ways, leading to memory corruption bugs and high severity vulnerabilities. Modern compilers try to give a helping hand with debug assertions and static analysis, but blind trust is evidently too deeply ingrained into C. Programs written in languages like C continue to be exploited, and no end to this is in sight.

If the consequences of misuse are high or the contracts that must be upheld are too onerous, the ergonomic benefits of naive interfaces can be undermined. Having to be always vigilant against incorrect usage can be mentally exhausting. The problems that result from misusing a naive interface can also be cryptic and difficult to debug, due to the fact that they don't tend to fail fast, but instead silently corrupt the system.

That said, the control that C's trusting design provides is highly coveted. Operating systems, web browsers, game engines, and other widely used pieces of software continue to be primarily developed in C(++) because of the perceived benefits of this control. Performance is perhaps the most well-understood benefit of control, but it can also be necessary for correctness in the case of hardware interfaces. Languages without this control are simply irrelevant for many projects.

3.2   PARANOIA

Paranoid designs represent a distrust so deep that one believes things must be taken away so as to eliminate a problem *a priori*. Where the naive would give everyone a loaded gun, the paranoid are so concerned with people getting shot that they would try to make it impossible by eliminating bullets, guns, or even people.

There are two major families of paranoid practices: omissions and static analysis.

Omissions represent pieces of functionality that could have been provided or used, but were deemed too error-prone. The much-maligned 'goto' is perhaps the most obvious instance of a paranoid omission, but it's not the most interesting. The most interesting omission is the ability to manually free memory, which is the omission that all garbage collected languages effectively make. Some less popular examples include always-nullable pointers (Haskell, Swift, Rust), concurrency (JavaScript), and side-effects (pure functional programming).

Static analysis consists of verifying a program has certain properties at compile-time. Static typing is the most well-accepted of these practices, requiring every piece of data in the program to have a statically known type. Various static lints for dubious behaviours also fall into this category, including code style checks. This analysis also includes more exotic systems like dependent-typing, which expresses requirements on runtime values (such as 'x < y') at the type level.

The primary benefit of paranoid practices is maximum safety. Ideally, a paranoid solution doesn't just handle a problem, it *eliminates* that problem. For instance, taking away memory freeing completely eliminates the use-after-free, because there is *no* "after free" (garbage collection being "only" an optimization). Similarly, a lack of concurrency eliminates data races, because it's impossible to race. Lints may completely eliminate specific mistakes, or simply reduce their probability by catching the common or obvious instances. Dependent typing can eliminate indexing out of bounds, by statically proving that all indices are in bounds [15].

The cost of this safety is usually control or ergonomics. Paranoid practices point to the pervasive problems that unchecked control leads to, and declare that this is why we can't have nice things. Certain operations must be forbidden, or require burdensome annotation. It's worth noting that a loss of control does not necessarily imply a loss in performance. In fact, quite the opposite can be true: an optimizing compiler can use the fact that certain things are impossible to produce more efficient programs [8].

That said, paranoid practices *do* generally take away a programmer's ability to directly construct an optimized implementation. One must instead carefully craft their program so that it happens to be optimized in the desired manner. This leaves the programmer depen-

dent on the compiler to understand how to produce the desired id-iom, and may require significant annotations to convince it that this is desirable. In some cases, this means that the desired output is simply impossible.

The ergonomic impact of paranoid practices is a tricky subject. For the most part, paranoid practices err on the side of producing false negatives – better to eliminate some good programs than allow bad programs to exist! This can lead to frustration if one wishes to pro-duce a program they believe to be a false negative.

Omissions are generally much more well-accepted in this regard, particularly when an alternative is provided that handles common cases. The absence of manual free is quite popular because freeing memory is purely annoying book-keeping. Freeing memory has no inherent semantic value, it's just necessary to avoid exhausting sys-tem resources. The fact that garbage collection just magically frees memory for you is pretty popular, as evidenced by its dominance of the programming language landscape (C and C++ being the most no-table exceptions). However some omissions can be too large to bear. Few systems are designed in a pure-functional manner.

Static analysis is much more maligned, as the developers of cover-ity found [7]. It's easy to forgive an omission, particularly if one isn't even aware that an omission occurred (how many programmers are even aware of goto these days?). Static analysis, on the other hand, is active and in the programmer's face. It continuously nags the pro-grammer to do a better job, or even prevents the program from run-ning. Static typing, one of the less controversial strategies, is rejected by many popular languages (JavaScript, Python, Ruby). Meanwhile, dependent types struggle to find any mainstream usage at all. These practices can also harm the ability to continuously transform a pro-gram, forcing the programmer to prove that *everything* is correct in order to test *anything*.

Regardless, embracing paranoia *can* be liberating. Once a paranoid practice is in place, one never needs to worry about the problems it addresses again. Once you start collecting your own rainwater, why worry what's being put in the water supply?

3.3 SUSPICION

Finally we have the position of compromise: the suspicious practices. A suspicious design often looks and acts a lot like a trusting design, but with one caveat: it actually checks at runtime. The suspicious stance is that some baseline level of safety is important, but categori-cally eliminating an error with a paranoid practice is impractical. The suspicious might give everyone guns, but make them explode when-ever a HumanPointerException is detected.

Suspicious practices can skew to be implicit or explicit, in an attempt to fine-tune the tradeoffs.

In languages where pointers are nullable by default, it's common for all dereferences to silently and implicitly check for null. This may cause the program to completely crash or trigger unwinding (an "exception" in many languages). This allows the programmer to write the program in a trusting way without worrying about the associated danger.

Other interfaces may require the author to explicitly acknowledge invalid cases. For instance, an API may only provide access to its data through callbacks which it invokes when the data is specifically correct or incorrect. This approach is often more general, as it can be wrapped to provide the implicit form. Compared to implicit checks, explicit checks give more control to the user and can improve the clarity of code by making failure conditions more clear. But this comes at a significant ergonomic cost; imagine if every pointer dereference in Java required an error callback!

Regardless of the approach, suspicious practices are a decent compromise. For many problems the suspicious solution is much easier to implement, work with, and understand than the paranoid solution. Array indexing is perhaps the best example of this. It's incredibly simple to have array indexing unconditionally check the input against the length of the array. Meanwhile, the obvious paranoid solution to this problem requires an integer theorem solver and may require significant programmer annotations for complex access patterns. That said, paranoid solutions can also be simpler. Why check every dereference for null, when one can simply not let pointers be null in the first place?

One significant drawback of suspicious practices, particularly of the implicit variety, is that they do little for program *correctness*. They just make sure that the program doesn't do arbitrary unpredictable things with bad data, usually by reliably crashing the program. This can be great for detecting, reproducing, and fixing bugs, but a crash is still a crash to the end user. This can be especially problematic for critical systems, where a crash is essentially a critical vulnerability.

Suspicious solutions also often have the worst-in-class performance properties of the three solutions. Trusting solutions let the programmer do whatever they please while still aggressively optimizing. Paranoid solutions give the compiler and programmer rich information to optimize the program with. But suspicious solution gets to assume little, and must bloat up the program with runtime checks which further inhibit other optimizations. That said, a good optimizing compiler can completely eliminate this gap in some cases. Bounds checks in particular are easily eliminated in common cases [9].

RUST

Rust tries to be a practical language. It understands that each perspective has advantages and drawbacks, and tries to pick the best tool for each job. From each perspective, Rust takes one key insight. From the naive perspective, we embrace that control is incredibly important. Rust wants to be used in all the places where C and C++ are used today, and being able to manually manage memory is a critical aspect of that. From the paranoid perspective, we embrace that completely eliminating errors is great. Humans are fallible and get tired, but a good compiler never rests and always has our back. From the suspicious perspective, we embrace that compromises must be made for ergonomics.

Part of Rust's solution is then simply taking our favourite solutions for each specific problem: static types, runtime bounds checks, no nulls, wrapping arithmetic, and so on. However Rust has one very large holistic solution to many problems, and it's what separates it from most other languages: ownership. The ownership model has two major aspects: controlling where and when data lives; and controlling where and when mutation can occur. These aspects are governed by three major features: affine types, regions, and privacy.

4.1 AFFINE TYPES

At a base level, Rust manages data ownership with an *affine type system* [13]. The literature often describes affine types as being usable *at most once*, but from Rust's perspective affine typing primarily means values are *uniquely owned*. To C++ developers, affine typing can be understood as a stricter version of *move semantics*.

If a variable stores a collection, passing it to a function by-value or assigning it to another variable transfers ownership of the value to the new location. The new location gains access to the value, and the old location loses access. Whoever owns the value knows that it's the only location in existence that can possibly talk about the contents of the collection. This allows the owner of the collection to soundly *trust* the collection. Any properties it observes and wishes to rely on will not be changed by some other piece of code without its permission. Perhaps more importantly, the owner of the collection knows that it can do whatever it pleases with the collection without interfering with anyone else.

A simple example:

```rust
fn main() {
    // A growable array
    let data = Vec::new();

    // transfer ownership of 'data' to 'data2'
    let data2 = data;
    // 'data' is now statically inaccessible, and logically uninitialized

    // transfer ownership of 'data2' to 'consume'
    consume(data2)
    // 'data2' is now statically inaccessible, and logically uninitialized
}

fn consume(mut data3: Vec<u32>) {
    // Mutating the collection is known to be safe, because 'data3' knows
    // it's the only one who can access it.
    data3.push(1);
}
```

The greatest of these rights is destruction: when a variable goes out of scope, it destroys its value forever. This can mean simply forgetting the value, or it can mean executing the type's destructor. In the case of a collection, this would presumably recursively destroy all contained values, and free all of its allocations.

Affine types are primarily useful for eliminating the *use-after* family of bugs. If only one location ever has access to a value, and a value is only invalidated when that one location disappears, then it's trivially true that one cannot use an invalidated value. For this reason, the most obvious applications of affine typing are with various forms of transient resources: threads, connections, files, allocations, and so on.

However it turns out that a surprising number of problems can be reduced to a use-after problem. For instance, many APIs require some sequence of steps to be executed in a certain order. This can be encoded quite easily using affine types. Functions can produce a "proof of work" by returning a type that only they have permission to produce. Similarly, functions can *require* a proof of work by consuming a special type:

```rust
fn first() -> First;
fn second(First) -> Second;
fn third(Second) -> Third;
fn alternative(First) -> Alternative;
```

We can therefore use affine types to model valid control flow and statically ensure correct usage. *Session types* are the logical extreme of this technique, where programs effectively "write themselves" due to their type constraints. Munksgaard and Jespersen [10] have an ex-

cellent analysis of session typing in Rust, so we won't dwell on this topic.

It should be noted that affine typing isn't mandatory in Rust. For many types, like booleans and integers, unique ownership doesn't make sense or isn't important. Such types can opt into *copy* semantics. Copy types behave like any other value with one simple caveat: when they're moved, the old copy of the value is still valid.

Copy semantics can have surprising consequences though. For instance, it may be reasonable for a random number generator to be copyable, as their internal state is generally just some integers. It then becomes possible to *accidentally* copy the generator, causing the same number to be yielded repeatedly. For this reason, some types which *could* be copied safely don't opt into copy semantics. In this case, affine typing is used as a lint against what is likely, but not necessarily, a mistake.

4.2 BORROWS AND REGIONS

Affine types are all fine and good for some problems, but if that's all Rust had, it would be a huge pain in the neck. In particular, it's very common to want to *borrow* a value. In the case of a unique borrow, affine types can encode this fine: you simply pass the borrowed value in, and then return it back.

This is, at best, just annoying to do. Borrows must be "threaded" throughout such an API explicitly in both the types and code:

```rust
struct Data { secret: u32 }

fn main() {
    let mut data = Data { secret: 0 }
    data = mutate(data);
    data = mutate(data);
    data = mutate(data);
}

fn mutate(mut data: Data) -> Data {
    data.secret += 1;
    return data;
}
```

Affine types *really* hit a wall when data wants to be *shared*. If several pieces of code wish to concurrently read some data, we have a serious issue. One solution is to simply *copy* the data to all the consumers. Each has their own unique copy to work with, and everyone's happy.

However, even if we're ignoring the performance aspect of this strategy (which is non-trivial), it may simply not make sense. If the underlying resource to share is truly affine, then there may be *no* way

to copy the data in a semantic-preserving way. For instance, one cannot just blindly copy a file handle, as each holder of the handle could then close it while the others are trying to use it.

At the end of the day, having only values everywhere is just dang *impractical*. Rust is a practical language, so it takes a tried and true solution: pointers! Unfortunately, pointers make everything more complicated and difficult. Affine types "solved" use-after errors for us, but pointers bring them back and make them *far* worse. The fact that data has been moved or destroyed says nothing of the state of pointers to it. As C has demonstrated since its inception, pointers are all too happy to let us view data that might be destroyed or otherwise invalid.

Garbage collection solves this problem for allocations, but does nothing to prevent trying to use an otherwise invalidated value, such as a closed file. Rust's solution to this problem is Cyclone's most significant contribution to the language: regions [11].

Like affine types, regions are something well established in both theory and implementation, but with little mainstream usage. Although Rust primarily cribs them from Cyclone, they were first described by Tofte and Talpin [12] and used in an implementation of ML. That said, Cyclone's version of regions is most immediately recognizable to a Rust programmer.

The idea of a region system is that pointers are associated with the region of the program that they're valid for, and the compiler ensures that pointers don't escape their region. This is done entirely at compile time, and has no runtime component.

For Rust, these regions correspond to lexical scopes, which are roughly speaking pairs of matching braces. The restriction to lexical scopes is not fundamental, and was simply easier to implement for the 1.0 release. It is however sufficient for most purposes. Rust calls these regions *lifetimes*.

At a base level, all a region system does is statically track what pointers are outstanding during any given piece of code. By combining this information with other static analysis it's possible to completely eliminate several classes of error that are traditionally relegated to garbage collection. Region analysis allows us to statically identify when a value is moved or destroyed while being pointed to, and produce an error to that effect:

```rust
fn main() {
    // Gets a dangling pointer
    let data = compute_it(&0);
    println!("{}", data);
}

fn compute_it(input: &u32) -> &u32 {
    let data = input + 1;
```

```
    // Returning a pointer to a local variable
    return &data;
}

<anon>:11:13: 11:17 error: 'data' does not live long enough
<anon>:11     return &data;
                     ~~~~
<anon>:8:36: 12:2 note: reference must be valid for the anonymous lifetime #1 defined on th
<anon>: 8 fn compute_it(input: &u32) -> &u32 {
<anon>: 9     let data = input + 1;
<anon>:10     // Returning a pointer to a local variable
<anon>:11     return &data;
<anon>:12 }
<anon>:9:26: 12:2 note: ...but borrowed value is only valid for the block suffix following
<anon>: 9     let data = input + 1;
<anon>:10     // Returning a pointer to a local variable
<anon>:11     return &data;
<anon>:12 }
```

On its own, this is pretty great: no dangling pointers without the need for garbage collection! When combined with an affine type system we get something even more powerful than garbage collection. For instance, if you close a file in a garbage collected language, there is nothing to prevent old pointers to the file from continuing to work with it. One must guard for this at runtime. In Rust, this is simply not a concern: it's statically impossible. Closing the file destroys it, and that means all pointers must be gone. Affinity is therefore a paranoid solution to using things in the wrong order.

Unfortunately, this doesn't solve problems like iterator invalidation. When an iterator is invalidated, the collection it was pointing to wasn't *destroyed*, it was just changed.

The most extreme solution is to simply forbid internal pointers. Only allow pointers to borrow variables on the stack, and everything else has to be copied out. Then we never have to worry about pointers being invalidated. Unfortunately, this would be a very limiting system. It would make composition of affine types useless, because you could never access the components without destroying the aggregate. It also doesn't really solve the problem the way we wanted. Most iterators we'd be interested in providing would become inexpressible under this model. For instance, one couldn't yield interior pointers from an iterator. Depending on the details, any kind of tree iterator may be completely impractical.

Another extreme solution would be to forbid mutation of data. Mutations can be emulated by creating a new object with the necessary changes, so this is in principle possible. However this suffers from similar issues as borrow threading: it's really annoying. It would also be incredibly difficult to obtain the same control as C(++) under this model.

Yet another way is to treat all pointers into the array as pointers *to* the array, and simply forbidding mutation *through* pointers. All mutating operations could require by-value (and therefore unique) access, which could be done with borrow-threading. This is unfortunate because we were trying to avoid borrow-threading by introducing pointers in the first place. But hey, at least we could share data immutably, which is a definite win.

Rust basically takes this last approach, but in order to avoid the annoying pain of threading borrows, it includes two different *kinds* of pointer: *mutable references* and *shared references* denoted `&mut` and `&` respectively. Shared references are exactly as we described: they can be freely aliased, but only allow you to read the data they point to. Mutable references on the other hand must be unique, but enable mutation of the data they point to. This means that taking a mutable reference to some data is like moving it, but then having the compiler automatically insert all the boiler-plate to move it back into place when the mutable reference is gone (the compiler does not actually move the data around when you take a mutable reference).

Let's look at some simple examples:

```rust
let mut data = 0;

{
    // Allowed to take multiple shared references
    let data_ref1 = &data;
    let data_ref2 = &data;

    // Allowed to read through them, and still read the value directly
    println!("{} {} {}", data_ref1, data_ref2, data);

    // Note allowed to mutate through them (compiler error)
    // *data_ref1 += 1;
}

{
    // Allowed to take one mutable reference
    let data_mut = &mut data;

    // Allowed to read or write through it
    println!("{}", data_mut);
    *data_mut += 1;

    // Allowed to move the mutable reference to someone else
    data_the_second = data_mut;

    // Not allowed to get an aliasing shared reference (compiler error)
    // let data_ref = &data;
```

```
    // Not allowed to get an aliasing mutable reference (compiler error)
    // let data_mut2 = &mut data;

    // Not allowed to directly access data anymore (compiler error)
    // println!("{}", data);
}


// All borrows out of scope, allowed to access data again
data += 1;
println!("{}", data);
```

4.3 MUTABLE XOR SHARED

This is Rust's most critical perspective on ownership: mutation is mutually exclusive with sharing. In order to get the most out of this perspective, Rust doesn't allow mutability to be declared at the type level. That is, a struct's field cannot be declared to be constant. Instead, the mutability of a value is *inherited* from how it's accessed: as long as you have something by-value or by-mutable-reference, you can mutate it.

This stands in contrast to the perspective that mutation is something to be avoided completely. It's well-known that mutation can cause problems, as we've seen. This has lead some to conclude that mutation should be avoided as much as possible. Never mutating anything does indeed satisfy Rust's requirement that sharing and mutating be exclusive, but in a vacuous way (mutating never occurs). Rust takes a more permissive stance: mutate all you want as long as you're not sharing. It is our belief that this eliminates most of the problems that mutation causes in practice.

In particular, this statically eliminates iterator invalidation. For instance, consider the following program:

```
fn main() {
    let mut data = vec![1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6];
    for x in &data {
        data.push(2 * x);
    }
}
```

What exactly the programmer's intent was here was unclear, and what exactly will happen if this were allowed to compile is even more unclear. Thankfully, in Rust we don't *need* to wonder what the programmer meant or what will happen when this is run, because it doesn't compile:

```
<anon>:4:9: 4:13 error: cannot borrow 'data' as mutable because it is also borrowed as immu
<anon>:4          data.push(2 * x);
```

```
                          ^~~~
<anon>:3:15: 3:19 note: previous borrow of 'data' occurs here; the immutable b
<anon>:3     for x in &data {
                          ^~~~
<anon>:5:6: 5:6 note: previous borrow ends here
<anon>:3     for x in &data {
<anon>:4         data.push(2 * x);
<anon>:5     }
                  ^
```

This strategy also nicely generalizes to a concurrent context. A data race is defined to occur when two threads access a piece of data in an unsynchronized way, and one is writing. This is exactly aliasing and mutation, which is forbidden by Rust's scheme. As such, everything in Rust is thread-safe by default.

Of course, perfectly good concurrent algorithms and data structures are rife with aliasing and mutability. Mutexes exist *precisely* to enable aliasing and mutation in a controlled manner. As a result, although inherited mutability is the default way to do things in Rust, it is not the only way. A few key types provide *interior mutability*, which enables their data to be mutated through shared references as long as some runtime mechanism ensures that mutable references aren't aliased. The most obvious example of this is exactly the standard library's Mutex type, which allows an `&Mutex<T>` to become an `&mut T` by acquiring its lock. This is in turn made sound by affinity and the borrow checker ensuring the

4.4 UNSAFE RUST

Most languages are considered memory-safe. However with few exceptions, this isn't actually true. In fact, basically *every* language has unsafe bits that make the language totally unsound. The most fundamental of these is quite simple: talking to C. C is the lingua-franca of the programming world. All major operating systems and many major libraries primarily expose a C interface. Any language that wants to integrate with these systems must therefore learn how to talk to C. Because C is *definitely* unsafe and can do just about anything to your program, these languages then become transitively unsafe.

Rust is no different, but it embraces this reality a little more than most other languages. Rust is actually *two* languages: Safe Rust, and Unsafe Rust. Safe Rust is the Rust we have been focusing on for the most part. It is intended to be completely safe with one exception: it can talk to Unsafe Rust. Unsafe Rust, on the other hand, is definitely not a safe language. In addition to being able to talk to C (like any safe language), it enables the programmer to work with several constructs that would be easily unsound for Safe Rust. Most notably, Unsafe Rust includes raw C-like pointers which are nullable and untracked.

At first glance, Unsafe Rust appears to completely undermine Rust's claims about safety, but we argue that it in fact *improves* its safety story. In most safe languages, if one needs to do something very low level (for performance, control, or any other reason) the general solution to this is "use C". This has several downsides.

First, there's a cognitive overhead. Such an application now has its logic spread across two completely different languages with different semantics, runtimes, and behaviors. If the safe language is what the development team primarily works in, it's unlikely that a significant percentage of the team is qualified to actively maintain the C components. Second, it incurs non-trivial runtime overhead. Data must often be reformatted at the language boundary, and this boundary is usually an opaque box for either language's optimizer. Finally, falling back to C is simply a *huge* jump in unsafety, from "totally safe" to "pervasively unsafe".

Unsafe Rust largely avoids these issues with one simple fact: it's just a superset of Safe Rust. Lifetimes, Affine Types, and everything else that helps you write good Rust programs are still working exactly as before. You're just allowed to do a few extra things that are unsafe. As a result, there's no unnecessary runtime or semantic overhead for using Unsafe Rust.

Of course one *does* need to understand how to manually uphold Safe Rust's various guarantees when using Unsafe Rust's extra parts, and this isn't trivial. However this is still a better situation than using C, because the unsafety is generally much more modular. For instance, if you use Unsafe Rust to index into an array in an unchecked manner, you don't suddenly need to worry about the array being null, dangling, or containing uninitialized memory. All you need to worry about is if the index is actually in bounds. You know everything else is still normal.

In addition, Unsafe Rust doesn't require any kind of complicated foreign function interface. It can be written inline with Safe Rust on demand. Rust's only requirement is that you write the word "unsafe" *somewhere* to indicate that you understand that what you're doing is unsafe. Since unsafety is explicitly denoted in this manner, it also enables it to be detected and linted against if desired.

Rust's standard library (which is written entirely in Rust) makes copious use of Unsafe Rust internally. Most fundamentally, Unsafe Rust is necessary to provide various operating system APIs because those are written in C, and only Unsafe Rust can talk to C. However Unsafe Rust is also used in various places to implement core abstractions like mutexes and growable arrays.

It's important to note that the fact that these APIs use unsafe code is entirely an implementation detail to those using the standard library. All the unsafety is wrapped up in *safe abstractions*. These abstractions serve two masters: the consumer of the API, and the producer of the

API. The benefit to consumers of an API is fairly straight-forward: they can rest easy knowing that if something terrible happens, it wasn't their fault. For producers of the API, these safe abstractions mark a clear boundary for the unsafety they need to worry about.

Unsafe code can be quite difficult because it often relies on stateful invariants. For instance, the capacity of a growable array is a piece of state that unsafe code must trust. However within the array's privacy boundary, this state can be arbitrarily manipulated by anyone. The abstraction boundary is often exactly where privacy kicks in, preventing consumers of the API from doing arbitrarily bad things to the state unsafe code relies on.

This rest of this thesis focuses primarily on these safe abstractions. A good safe abstraction must have many properties:

* Safety: Using the abstraction inappropriately cannot violate Rust's safety guarantees. * Efficiency: Ideally, an abstraction is *zero cost*, meaning it is as efficient at the task it is designed to solve as an unabstracted solution (with a decent optimizing compiler). * Usability: A good abstraction should be more convenient and easy to understand than the code it's wrapping.

It would be *excellent* if the implementation was also completely safe, but we do not consider this a critical requirement.

It should be noted that Rust's reliance on safe abstractions is, in some sense, unfortunate. For one, it makes reasoning about the performance characteristics of a program much more difficult, as it relies on a sufficiently smart compiler to tear away these abstractions. This in turn means Rust's unoptimized performance in a rather atrocious state. It's not uncommon for a newcomer to the language to express shock that a Rust program is several times slower than an equivalent Python program, only to learn that enabling optimizations makes the Rust program several times *faster* than the Python program. However it is our opinion that this is simply fundamental to providing a programming environment that is safe, efficient, and usable.

DESIGNING APIS FOR TRUST

It has been our experience that almost everything you want to express at a high level can be safely, efficiently, and usably expressed in an ownership-oriented system. However this does *not* mean that you can express it however you please! In order to achieve all of these goals, the API itself must be designed in terms of data trust. If the API isn't designed with trust and ownership in mind, safety, efficiency, or usability will likely be compromised.

5.1 INDEXING

Let's return to the problem of indexing out of bounds. Arrays are overwhelmingly the most common and important data structure in all of programming. Basically every program will do some array processing – even *hello world* is just copying an array of bytes to stdio. Array processing is so pervasive that Rust provides no less than *four* different ways to index into an array, each corresponding to one of the trust strategies: naive, paranoid, implicitly suspicious, and explicitly suspicious.

First and foremost, Rust provides the two most popular interfaces: completely unchecked indexing (via Unsafe Rust), and implicitly checked indexing (which unwinds the program if it fails). Nothing particularly surprising or novel there.

Slightly more interesting is how Rust provides an explicitly checked option. Explicit checking is most commonly done through the Option and Result types in Rust. If an operation can fail, it will return one of these types. These types are simple tagged unions, which means they can contain different types at runtime. 'Option<T>' can be 'Some(T)' or 'None', while 'Result<T, E>' can be 'Ok(T)' or 'Err(E)'. By owning the data they wrap, these types can control how it's accessed. Both of them provide a multitude of ways to access their contents in an explicitly checked way.

So if we want to explicitly handle indexing failing, we can do any of the following:

```
// Exhaustively match on the possible choices
match array.get(index) {
    Some(elem) => println!("Elem: {}", elem),
    None       => println!("Nothing"),
}


// Only handle one pattern
```

```rust
if let Some(elem) = array.get(index) {
    println!("Elem: {}", elem);
}

// Execute a callback if the value is Some
array.get(index).map(|elem| {
    println!("Elem: {}", elem);
});

// ... And more
```

It's worth noting checked indexing is surprisingly performant here. First off, these bounds checks are by definition trivially predictable in a correct program. So the overhead at the hardware level is quite small. That said, having to do the checks at all is the worst-case. A good optimizing compiler (like LLVM) can optimize away bounds checks in many "obviously correct" cases. For instance, the following code doesn't actually perform any bounds checks when optimized, because LLVM can see that the way the indices are generated trivially satisfies the bounds checking.

```rust
let mut x = 0;
for i in 0 .. arr.len() {
    // implicit checked indexing
    x += arr[i];
}
```

Indeed, if you can convince LLVM to not completely inline and constant-fold this code away, it will even successfully vectorize the loop!

However compiler optimizations are brittle things that can break under even seemingly trivial transformations. For instance, changing this code to simply iterate over the array *backwards* completely broke LLVM's analysis and produced naive code that adds the integers one at a time with bounds checking. This is perhaps the most serious cost of bounds checks: inhibiting other optimizations.

If we really care about avoiding this cost, we can't just rely on the optimizer to magically figure out what we're doing, we need to actually not do bounds checking. We can use the unsafe unchecked indexing, but we'd rather not resort to unsafe code unless totally necessary. What we really want here is the final solution: the paranoid one.

This code is hard to optimize safely because we've pushed too much of the problem at hand to the user of the array. They need to figure out how to generate the access pattern, and we in turn can't trust it. If the *array* handles generating the access pattern *and* acquiring the elements, then all the bounds checks can be eliminated at the

source level in a way that's safe to the end-user. This is handled by a tried and true approach: iterators.

```
let mut sum = 0;
for x in arr.iter() {
    sum += *x;
}
```

This produces the same optimized code as the original indexing-based solution, but more importantly, it's more robust to transformations. Iterating backwards now also produces vectorized unchecked code, because the optimizer has less to prove about the program's behaviour. As an added bonus, client code ends up simplified as well, as all the error-prone iteration boiler plate has been eliminated.

Of course, this doesn't come for free: iterators are effectively special-casing certain access patterns at the burden of the interface's implementor. In the case of iterators, this burden is well justified. Linear iteration is incredibly common, and therefore well worth the specialization. But if the user wants to binary search an array without bounds checks, iterators do them no good.

This is why Rust also provides the raw unchecked indexing API. If users have a special case and really need to optimize it to death, they can drop down to the raw API and regain full control. In the case of arrays, the raw API is trivial to provide and obvious, so there's little worry of the maintenance burden or unnecessarily exposing implementation details. Unfortunately, this isn't true for all interfaces (what's the raw API for searching an ordered map?).

5.2 EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL INTERFACES

It is relatively common to use maps as *accumulators*. The most trivial example of this is using a map to count the number of occurrences of each key. Accumulators are interesting because special logic must usually be performed when a key is seen for the first time. In the case of a key counter, the first time we see a key we want to insert the value 1, but each subsequent time we see the same key, we want to instead increment the count.

Naively, one may write this as follows:

```
if map.contains(&key) {
    map[key] += 1;
} else {
    map.insert(key, 1);
}
```

Those concerned with performance may see an obvious problem with this implementation: we're unnecessarily looking up each key

twice. Instead we would like to search in the map only once, and execute different logic depending on if the key was found or not *without* performing the search again.

Before Rust 1.0 was released, there existed a family of functions for doing exactly that. For the simple case of a counter, we only need to provide a default value, which works well enough:

```
*map.find_or_insert(key, 0) += 1;
```

However for some kinds of accumulators, the default value might be expensive to create. As such, we'd like to avoid constructing it unless we know it's required. And so, `find_or_insert_with` was provided, which took a *function* that computed the default value:

```
*map.find_or_insert(key, expensive_default_func) += 1;
```

However this interface had the problem that it could be difficult to tell which case was found. This is where the interface became unwieldy. In order to support this, a function that took *two* functions was created, one for each case. However this design was problematic because each function may want to capture the same affine data by-value. We know this is sound because only one of the two functions will be called, but the compiler doesn't understand that. So an extra argument was added which would be passed to the function that *was* called.

```
map.update_with_or_insert_with(key, capture, compute_default_func, update_exis
```

While the first APIs seemed quite reasonable, this final API was nightmarish. Worse, it didn't even accommodate all the use cases people came up with. Some wanted to possible *remove* the key from the map under some conditions, which would necessitate a whole new family of update functions. The problem is that this design is what the Rust community calls an *internal* interface. Internal interfaces require the client to execute *inside* the interface's own code by passing functions that should be called at the appropriate time. In some cases, internal interfaces can be convenient or even more efficient, but they generally suffer from how little control they give the client.

We solved this inflexibility by instead providing an *external* interface. Where internal interfaces execute the entire algorithm at once, invoking the client to handle important cases, an external interface requires the client to drive the execution of the algorithm manually. At each step, the algorithm returns some value that summarizes the current state, and exposes relevant operations.

For the accumulator problem, we created the *entry* API. The basic idea of the entry API is simple: execute the insertion algorithm up until we determine whether the key already existed. Once this is known, take a *snapshot* of the algorithm state, and store it in a tagged union

with two states: Vacant or Occupied. The consumer of the interface must then match on union to determine which state the algorithm is in. The Vacant state exposes only one operation: 'insert', as this is the only valid operation to perform on an empty entry. The Occupied state, on the other hand, exposes the ability to overwrite, remove, or take a pointer to the old value.

In its most general form, usage looks as follows:

```
// Search for this key, and capture whether it's in the map or not
match map.entry(key) {
    Vacant(e) => {
        // The key is not in the map, compute the new value
        let value = expensive_default(capture);
        e.insert(value);
    }
    Occupied(e) => {
        // The key is in the map, update the value
        expensive_update(e.get_mut(), capture);

        // Conditionally remove the key from the map altogether
        if *e.get() == 0 {
            e.remove();
        }
    }
}
```

Control flow is now driven by the client of the API, and not the API itself. No additional interfaces need to be added to accommodate all the different actions that are desired, and no additional lookups are performed.

Of course, this is a significant ergonomic regression for simple cases like counting, for which convenience methods were added to the Entry result:

```
*map.entry(key).or_insert(0) += 1;
```

One may question if we have then gained much if we're still adding some of the old interfaces this design was intended to replace, but there is an important difference. Before, we were required to add new interfaces to accommodate increasingly complex use cases. Now, we are adding new interfaces to accommodate increasingly *common* use cases. We believe this to be the more correct way for an interface to grow; adding conveniences for idioms, rather than adding nightmares for special cases.

One important question about this interface is whether it's *sound*. After all, we're taking a snapshot of the internal state of a collection, and then yielding control to the client explicitly to mutate the collection. Indeed, in many languages this interface would be dangerous

without additional guards, for exactly the same reason that iterators are dangerous. And for exactly the same reason that iterators can safely be used without any runtime checking, entry can be used without any runtime checking: ownership!

An Entry mutably borrows the map it points into, which means that while it exists, we know that it has exclusive access to the map. It can trust that the algorithmic state it recorded will never become inconsistent. Further, any operation that the entry exposes that would invalidate itself (such as inserting into a vacant entry or removing from an occupied entry) consumes itself by-value, preventing further use.

5.3 HACKING GENERATIVITY ONTO RUST

Given the array iteration example, one might wonder if it's sufficient for the array to simply provide the indices. This would be a more composable API with a reduced implementation burden. Perhaps this API could be used something like this:

```
let mut sum = 0;
for i in arr.indices() {
    sum += arr[i];
}
```

Unfortunately, this doesn't immediately get us anywhere. This is no different than the original example which produced its own iteration sequence. As soon as the array loses control of the yielded indices, they are *tainted* and all trust is lost. After all, they're just integers, which can come from anywhere. One may consider wrapping the integers in a new type that doesn't expose the values to anyone but the array, preventing them from being tampered with, but this is still insufficient unless the *origin* of these values can be verified. Given two arrays, it mustn't be possible to index one using the indices of the other:

```
let mut sum = 0;
for i in arr1.indices() {
    // index arr2 using arr1's trusted indices
    sum += arr2[i];
}
```

This is a problem most static type systems generally struggle to model, because they don't provide tools to talk about the origin or destination of a particular instance of a type. In addition, even if we could prevent this, we would have to deal with the problem of temporal validity. The indices into an array are only valid as long as the array's length doesn't change:

```
let i = arr.indices().next().unwrap();
arr.pop();
// index arr with an outdated index
let x = arr[i];
```

By pure accident, Rust provides enough tools to solve this problem. It turns out that lifetimes in conjunction with some other features are sufficient to introduce *generativity* into the type system. Generativity is a limited system that can solve some of the problems usually reserved for dependent typing. We won't lie: this is an ugly hack, and we don't expect it to see much use. Still, it demonstrates the power of the ownership system.

In order to encode sound unchecked indexing, we need a way for types to talk about particular instances of other types. In this case, we specifically need a way to talk about the relationship between a particular array, and the indices it has produced. Rust's lifetime system, it turns out, gives us exactly that. Every instance of a value that contains a lifetime (e.g. a pointer) is referring to some particular region of code. Further, code can require that two lifetimes satisfy a particular relationship (typically, that one outlives the other).

The basic idea is then as follows: associate an array and its indices with a particular region of code. Unchecked indexing then simply requires that the input array and index are associated with the same region. However care must be taken, as Rust was not designed to support this. In particular, the borrow checker is a constraint solver that will attempt do everything in its power to make code type-check. As such, if it sees a constraint that two lifetimes must be equal, it may expand their scopes in order to satisfy this constraint. Since we're trying to explicitly use equality constraints to prevent certain programs from compiling, this puts us at odds with the compiler.

In order to accomplish our goal, we need to construct a black box that the borrow checker can't penetrate. This involves two steps: disabling lifetime variance, and creating an inaccessible scope. Disabling variance is relatively straight forward. Several generic types disable variance in order to keep Rust sound. Getting into the details of this is fairly involved, so we will just say we can wrap a pointer in the standard library's Cell type as follows:

```
struct Index<'id> {
    data: usize,
    _id: Cell<&'id u8>,
}
```

Of course we don't *actually* want to store a pointer at runtime, because we're only interested in creating a lifetime for the compiler to work with. Needing to signal that we contain a lifetime or type that we don't directly store is a sufficiently common requirement in

Unsafe Rust that the language provides a primitive for exactly this:
PhantomData. PhantomData tells the type system "pretend I contain
this", while not actually taking up any space at runtime.

```rust
// Synonym to avoid writing this out a lot
type Id<'id> = PhantomData<Cell<&'id u8>>;

struct Index<'id> {
    data: usize,
    _id: Id<'id>,
}
```

Now Rust believes it's unsound to freely resize the ''id' lifetime.
However, as written, there's nothing that specifies where this ''id'
should come from. If we're not careful, Rust could *still* unify these
lifetimes if it notices there's no actual constraints on them. Consider
the following kind of program we're trying to prevent:

```rust
let arr1: Array<'a> = ...;
let arr2: Array<'b> = ...;
let index: Index<'a> = arr1.get_index();

// This should fail to compile; trying to index Array<'b> with Index<'a>
let x = arr2[index];
```

If we don't constrain the lifetimes ''a' and ''b', then the constraint
solver will see only the following system:
   * ''a' and ''b' are invariant lifetimes * indexing requires ''a = 'b'
   Which has the obvious solution of ''a = 'b = anything'. We need
to apply some constraint to ''a' and ''b' to prevent Rust from unify-
ing them. Within a single function the compiler has perfect informa-
tion and can't be tricked. However Rust explicitly does not perform
inter-procedural analysis, so we can apply constraints with functions.
In particular, Rust has to assume that the *input* to a function is a
fresh lifetime, and can only unify them if that function provides con-
straints:

```rust
fn foo<'a, 'b>(x: &'a u8, y: &'b u8) {
    // cannot assume x has any relationship to y, since they
    // have their own lifetimes
}

fn bar<'a>(x: &'a u8, y: &'a u8) {
    // x has the same lifetime as y, since they share 'a
}
```

Therefore, for every fresh lifetime we wish to construct, we require
a new function call. We can do this in as ergonomically as possible
(considering this is a hack) by using closures:

```rust
fn main() {
    let arr1 = &[1, 2, 3, 4, 5];
    let arr2 = &[10, 20, 30];

    // Yuck! So much nesting!
    make_id(arr1, move |arr1| {
    make_id(arr2, move |arr2| {
        // Within this closure, Rust is forced to assume that the lifetimes
        // associated with arr1 and arr2 originate in their respective make_id
        // calls. As such, it is unable to unify them.

        // Iterate over arr1
        for i in arr1.indices() {
            // Will compile, no bounds checks
            println!("{}", arr1.get(i));

            // Won't compile
            println!("{}", arr2.get(i));
        }
    });
    });
}

/// An Invariant Lifetime
type Id<'id> = PhantomData<Cell<&'id u8>>;

/// A wrapper around an array that has a unique lifetime
struct Array<'arr, 'id> {
    array: &'arr [i32],
    _id: Id<'id>,
}

/// A trusted in-bounds index to an Array with the same lifetime
struct Index<'id> {
    idx: usize,
    _id: Id<'id>,
}

/// A trusted iterator of in-bounds indices into an Array
/// with the same lifetime
struct Indices<'id> {
    min: usize,
    max: usize,
    _id: Id<'id>,
}
```

```rust
/// Given a normal array, wrap it to have a unique lifetime
/// and pass it to the given function
pub fn make_id<'arr, F>(array: &'arr [i32], func: F)
    where F: for<'id> FnOnce(Array<'arr, 'id>),
{
    let arr = Array { array: array, _id: PhantomData };
    func(arr);
}


impl<'arr, 'id> Array<'arr, 'id> {
    /// Access the following index without bounds checking
    pub fn get(&self, idx: Index<'id>) -> &'arr i32 {
        unsafe { self.get_unchecked(idx.idx) }
    }

    /// Get an iterator over the indices of the array
    pub fn indices(&self) -> Indices<'id> {
        Indices { min: 0, max: self.array.len(), _id: PhantomData }
    }
}

impl<'id> Iterator for Indices<'id> {
    type Item = Index<'id>;
    pub fn next(&mut self) -> Option<Self::Item> {
        if self.min == self.max {
            None
        } else {
            self.min += 1;
            Some(Index { idx: self.min - 1, _id: PhantomData })
        }
    }
}
```

That's a *lot* of work to safely avoid bounds checks, and although there's only a single line marked as 'unsafe', its soundness relies on a pretty deep understanding of Rust. Any errors in the interface design could easily make the whole thing unsound. So we *really* don't recommend doing this. Also, whenever this interface catches an error, it produces nonsensical lifetime errors because Rust has no idea what we're doing. That said, it does demonstrate our ability to model particularly complex constraints.

LIMITATIONS OF OWNERSHIP

TODO: this section needs to cleaned up and refactored (bitrot) TODO: talk about thread::scoped? TODO:

We've seen that ownership allows us to cleanly model several problems, preventing incorrect usage without runtime overhead. In particular, ownership is very good at preventing the use-after and view-invalidation classes of errors. This is because ownership's primary role is to prevent data from being accessed at inappropriate times. However ownership is unable to properly model the opposite problem: *requiring* data be accessed, as is the case for leaks.

Leaks aren't well-modeled by ownership because Rust is based on *affine* semantics, which allow us to forget about values at any time. In order to encode that a value must be properly consumed, we need to be able to express that a value must be used *exactly* once. Types with this property are said to be *linear*.

A poor-man's linear-typing can be acquired with *destructors*. A value's destructor is some code to execute when it goes out of scope. This effectively mandates that values with destructors be used exactly once: the owner who decides to drop the value on the ground is forced to invoke the value's destructor.

The most obvious limitation to this approach is that since destructors are implicitly invoked, they cannot take any additional context. For instance, it may be desirable to have a type that is allocated using a custom allocator, but does not store a pointer to that allocator. The type therefore has insufficient information to clean itself up, requiring the allocator be passed to it. A more robust linearity system would allow us to encode this by requiring the destructor be explicitly invoked with the allocator as an argument. Destructors also can't return anything to indicate success or failure.

That said, destructors do a great job for many types. Collections and files have a single "natural" final operation that requires no additional context. Collections free their allocations and Files close their file descriptors. Destructors also have the distinct advantage over more general linearity in that they compose well with generic code. If some generic code wants to drop a value on the ground, it can always do this knowing any linear requirements will be satisfied by the destructor. Destructors provide a uniform interface with no context required precisely *because* they aren't general.

Unfortunately, ensuring that destructors execute is a nasty problem. At the limit, hardware can fail and programs can abort. We just need to live with that fact. For most resources this is actually fine; either

the resources are rendered irrelevant by the program ending, or the operating system will automatically clean them all up itself.

Even accepting those circumstances, strict linearity is a bit of a pain. In particular, it is desirable to be able to create reference-counted cycles of types with destructors. Even if all references to such a cycle are lost, it will keep itself alive, leaking the destructors themselves. Further, it is sometimes desirable to manually prevent a destructor from running, particularly when decomposing a value into its constituent parts. For instance, one may wish to downgrade a pointer that would normally free its allocation to a raw pointer, perhaps to pass to a C API.

There are various solutions to this problem, but most languages that include destructors (C++, Rust, D, C#, Java, ...) generally accept that sometimes they won't run. They're convenient and generally reliable, but if one *really* needs something to happen, they can't always be relied on. For Rust in particular, one can't pass a value with a destructor to an arbitrary third-party and rely on the destructor to be called, even if the borrows it held have expired.

As a concrete example, we can consider Rust's 'drain' interface. 'Drain' is a utility for efficiently performing bulk removal from the middle of a growable array. Arrays require their elements to be stored contiguously, so removing from the middle of one generally requires the elements after it to be shifted back to fill the hole. Doing this repeatedly is incredibly expensive, so it's desirable to be able to defer the shift until we are done removing elements. Doing this means the array is in an unsound state while the removals are happening. We don't want this state to be observable by the client.

One solution to this problem is to require the caller to pass in a destination buffer for all the elements that will be removed. Then 'drain' can just run to completion without ever yielding control to the client. Unfortunately, this is quite inflexible.

To get more control we once again created an external interface, implementing 'drain' as an iterator. Elements are removed one at a time, allowing the user to decide what is done with them without any need for allocating a buffer. At first blush, the safety of this interface seems trivially solved by ownership. Drain is mutating the array, so it contains a mutable reference to the array. That means the array is inaccessible through any interface but the iterator while it exists. The shifting can then be done in the iterator's destructor, which is exactly when the borrow it holds expires. Perfect!

```rust
// A growable array with 5 numbers
let mut arr = vec![0, 1, 2, 3, 4];

// Drain out elements 1 to 3 (exclusive).
// The result of 'drain' is an iterator
// that we pass to the for loop to drive.
```

```rust
for x in arr.drain(1..3) {
    // arr is statically inaccessible here
    println!("{}", x);
}
// backshifting is performed here
// arr is now accessible again

// 1 and 2 are now gone
assert_eq!(arr, vec![0, 3, 4]);
```

Unfortunately, the soundness of this design relies on the user of our interface allowing the destructor to run. No reasonable code would ever *not* run the destructor, but since one can violate memory safety by accessing these empty indices, we cannot tolerate the possibility.

Thankfully, all is not lost. The solution to our problem is in fact quite simple. Rather than relying on the destructor to put the array in a sound state, we will *start* the drain by putting the array into an incorrect but otherwise sound state, and rely on the destructor to put the array into the correct state. If the user of our interface prevents the destructor from running, they'll get a poisoned array which will probably cause their program to behave incorrectly, but be unable to violate memory safety.

In the case of 'drain', the poison is setting the length of the array to be zero. The destructor in turn just sets the length to the correct value (which it would have done anyway). So the overhead for this scheme is zeroing out a single integer, which is completely negligible considering the operation we're performing. The consequence of this poison is that all the elements in the array will be lost if the destructor is leaked. There's a certain fairness to this: you leak me, I leak you!

Not all interfaces have such a convenient poison though. If this is the case, one may instead ensure some code executes by inverting the control. Instead of our code having to execute in the user's function, we can require the user's code to execute in ours. In the case of drain, we can require the user to pass a function that will be passed a *pointer* to the iterator, preventing them from gaining true ownership of the iterator. We can then guarantee that the iterator's destructor always runs by dropping it in our own function. In fact, because we always control the value, we don't even need to use a destructor to ensure the cleanup code runs.

```rust
let mut arr = vec![0, 1, 2, 3, 4];

// Drain out elements 1 to 3 (exclusive).
// 'drain' has no result, but instead passes a
// pointer to a Drain iterator that it owns.
arr.drain(1..3, |iter| {
    // arr is statically inaccessible here
```

```rust
    for x in iter {
        println!("{}", x);
    }
}); // backshifting is performed once here
// arr is now accessible again

// 1 and 2 are now gone
assert_eq!(arr, vec![0, 3, 4]);
```

This design is a bit less ergonomic and flexible, but it can easily cover the common cases.

RELATED WORK

TODO: this whole section

As has been noted, Rust's constituent parts aren't unique. Other languages have consequently been built on the same or similar foundations. Of particular interest is C++, Cyclone, Alms, and Vault.

7.1 C++

* Move semantics suck, need to mark the old value as "moved", access still permitted (uniqueptr) * Unmanaged pointers are wildly unsafe; safe abstractions can't expose them * C++ core guidelines (basically a different language, unproven, adhoc)

7.2 CYCLONE

Although Rust was not originally based on Cyclone, the version of Rust that was stabilized can be seen as the direct descendant of the final version of Cyclone. Most notably, the region analysis employed by Rust and Cyclone for borrowed pointers is (as far as we can tell) identical. Where the two deviate is in affine typing. Since Cyclone intended to be a drop-in replacement for C, it was based largely around copy semantics, and not move semantics. However near the end of its development Cyclone introduced affine unique and reference-counted pointers in order to enable more flexible memory management. These types were built into the language, and no mechanism was provided to mark other types as affine. As such, affine typing couldn't be used as a mechanism to manage access to data, because all other data was still freely copyable. Instead, affine typing was used exclusively for allocation management.

7.3 ALMS

Alms has affine types, but exposes a more advanced mechanism than regions. It's sufficient to implement regions as a library notion.

7.4 VAULT

Vault uses linear typing instead of affine typing.

8

CONCLUSION

TODO: Say what I said

8.1   APPENDIX: RUST SYNTAX PRIMER

??

Since this thesis is focused on Rust in particular, it will include a lot of Rust source code. Although our code is slightly unidiomatic in order to avoid overloading the reader with the finer details of Rust's syntax and semantics, this section exists for readers who are completely unfamiliar with Rust.

First and foremost, Rust has the same basic control constructs and operators as every other C-style language. *if*, *else*, *while*, and *return* behave exactly as expected. Assignment is performed with =, comparison with ==, and so on. The only notable exception is that Rust does not provide the traditional C-style for-loop. Instead, Rust only provides the simpler for-each construct:

```rust
for x in iter {
    // do stuff with x
}
```

Variables in Rust are declared with a *let statement*. Variables are immutable by default, and can be made mutable with the *mut* keyword. The type of a variable is usually inferred, but can be explicitly specified with a colon.

```rust
let x = true;        // x is an immutable boolean
let mut y = false;   // y is a mutable boolean
let z: i32 = 0;      // z is an immutable 32-bit integer
```

Functions in Rust are written as follows:

```rust
// A function called 'add' that takes two 32-bit integers
// and returns their sum (also a 32-bit integer).
fn add(x: i32, y: i32) -> i32 {
    return x + y;
}
```

There are two major composite data types in Rust, *structs* and *enums*. Structs are exactly like structs in C – a series of named and typed fields that are all stored inline. Fields can be accessed through the *dot operator*, as in most C-like languages.

```rust
// A struct called Foo
struct Foo {
    x: u32,          // x is a u32
    y: bool,         // y is a boolean
}


// Get the x field of the given Foo
```

```
fn get_x(data: Foo) -> u32 {
    return data.x;
}
```

Enums, on the other hand, are a bit different from C. Like C enums, Rust enums are a simple way to represent a type whose value can be one of a small set of *variants*. However Rust enums are *tagged unions*, which means each variant can have arbitrary data associated with it.

```
// An enum called Bar with three variants A, B, and C
// A contains a u32
// B contains a boolean
// C has no data associated with it
enum Bar {
    A(u32),
    B(bool),
    C,
}
```

In order to access the data in an enum's variant, one must pattern match against the enum to determine what state it is in. Matching and binding the data to a variable is performed as a single step to ensure that one does not access the data as if it were a different variant.

```
// An exhaustive match of all possible variants that the value
// 'data' could have.
match data {
    A(count) => {
        return count;
    },
    B(is_one) => if is_one {
        return 1;
    } else {
        return 0;
    },
    C => {
        return -1;
    },
}
```

```
// A fallible match of only a single variant. The code inside
// an 'if-let' is executed only if 'data' matches the pattern.
if let A(count) = data {
    return count;
}
```

Functions can be associated with a particular type by using an *impl* block. This is just a convenience for grouping functionality, and does

not imbue the code with any particular semantic. However it is necessary to implement *traits* which are Rust's version of an interface.

```rust
struct Foo {
    x: i32,
    y: i32,
}

// Associate the following code with a Foo
impl Foo {
    // A static function, in this case a constructor.
    // 'new' has no special meaning in Rust, it's just a convention.
    // Invoked as 'Foo::new()'
    fn new() -> Foo {
        return Foo { x: 0, y: 1 };
    }

    // A member function that takes a Foo by-reference
    // invoked as 'some_foo.get_x()'
    fn get_x(&self) -> i32 {
        return self.x;
    }

    // A member function that takes a Foo by-value
    // invoked as 'some_foo.consume()'
    fn consume(self) {
        let id = self.get_x();
        delete_the_database(id);
    }
}

// An interface for things that can be converted to integers.
trait ToInt {
    fn to_int(&self) -> i32;
}

// Implementing that interface for Foo
impl ToInt for Foo {
    // Trait implementations are invoked just like
    // any other member function
    fn to_int(&self) -> i32 {
        return self.x;
    }
}
```

impl, fn, struct, enum, and trait can all be generic over arbitrary types. Generics in Rust are implemented in a similar manner to C++

templates, but are type-checked before any usage like Java generics. In order to facilitate this, generic arguments can be specified to implement particular traits.

```rust
// 'Compare' is generic over some type T, allowing
// implementors to be compared against multiple things.
trait Compare<T> {
    fn is_larger_than(&self, other: &T) -> bool;
}

// The 'Generic' struct can be made for any type.
struct Generic<T> {
    data: T,
}

struct Concrete {
    data: i32,
}

// Implementing the Compare trait concretely
impl Compare<Concrete> for Concrete {
    fn is_larger_than(&self, other: &Concrete) -> bool {
        return self.data > other.data;
    }
}

// Because Compare is generic, we can implement it multiple
// times, as long as the generic arguments are different.
impl Compare<i32> for Concrete {
    fn is_larger_than(&self, other: &i32) -> bool {
        return self.data > other;
    }
}

// Implementing the Compare trait generically. We declare that
// this implementation applies only if T itself implements Compare.
impl<T: Compare<T>> Compare<Generic<T>> for Generic<T> {
    fn is_larger_than(&self, other: &Generic<T>) {
        return self.data.is_greater_than(&other.data);
    }
}

// A function generic over any two types which can be compared.
fn compare<R, L: Compare<R>>(left: &L, right: &R) -> bool {
    return left.is_larger_than(right);
}
```

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