

# **Cryptanalysis**

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# Chapter 1

## Midterm

### Test

### Python Example

#### How to calculate a factorial

```
def factorial(n):  
    product=1           # Start with 1  
    for k in range(2,n+1): # For each  $k = 2, 3, \dots, n$ ,  
        product*=k       # Multiply by  $k$   
    return product
```

### Terminal Example

```
user@host:~$ echo "Hello, World!"  
Hello, World!
```

Listing 1.1: Simulating a terminal command

## 1.1 Time Memory Trade Off (TMTO) Attack

A TMTO attack is typically described in the context of finding the secret key  $k$  used in a cryptographic function  $f$ . The function  $f$  is assumed to be a block cipher or a cryptographic hash function.

### Setup

Consider a cryptographic function  $f : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{C}$ , where  $\mathcal{K}$  is the key space,  $\mathcal{M}$  is the message space and  $\mathcal{C}$  is the cipher space. The goal is to invert  $f$  given  $f(k)$ , i.e., to find  $k$  when  $f(k)$  is known.

### Precomputation Phase

In the precomputation phase, a series of computations are performed to create a trade-off between the computation time and memory usage:

1. Select a subset of keys  $\{k_1, k_2, \dots, k_t\} \subset \mathcal{K}$ .
2. Compute  $f(k_i)$  for each  $k_i$ .
3. Store the pairs  $(k_i, f(k_i))$  in a table called the **precomputed table**.

This table is used to accelerate the recovery of  $k$  by storing potential outputs and their corresponding inputs.

### Recovery Phase

Given a ciphertext  $c$ , the attacker attempts to find  $k$  such that  $f(k) = c$ :

1. For each potential key  $k'$ , compute  $f(k')$ .
2. Check if  $f(k')$  exists in the precomputed table.
3. If a match is found, i.e.,  $f(k') = f(k_i)$  for some  $i$ , retrieve  $k_i$ .

### Complexity Analysis

The effectiveness of a TMTO attack depends on the sizes of the key space  $\mathcal{K}$ , the cipher space  $\mathcal{C}$ , and the table:

- **Memory Requirement:** Proportional to the number of entries  $t$  in the table.
- **Time Complexity:** Proportional to  $\frac{|\mathcal{K}|}{t}$ , assuming uniform distribution and independent choices of  $k_i$ .

**Example: Hellman's TMTO**

Hellman's approach involves structuring the precomputed table in chains where each chain starts from a randomly chosen initial value  $k_0$  and is constructed as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}k_1 &= f(k_0), \\k_2 &= f(f(k_0)), \\&\vdots \\k_t &= f^{(t)}(k_0),\end{aligned}$$

where  $f^{(t)}$  denotes the  $t$ -th application of  $f$ . Only  $k_0$  and  $k_t$  are stored, reducing memory usage but requiring more time in the recovery phase to reconstruct chains.