

CS558 Network Security

Lecture ²¹~~20~~: OPAQUE


hello

The Password Problem

- Dictionary Attacks
- Password Stealing

low Entropy / easy to guess

Passwords leaking



① Password Hashing

Username : password



Username : $H(\text{password})$

Username : password
 $H(\quad)$

↕ equality check

Dictionary Attack

Precomputation Attacks

② Salt the hash

user1 : Salt : $H(\text{Salt} \parallel \text{Password})$

Bob : Salt₂ : $H(\text{Salt}_2 \parallel P_2)$



"Slow" hash functions


Time-lock Puzzles and Memory Hardness

$H(H(H(H(\text{Salt} \parallel \text{pwd}))))$

SCRYPT




□ Username : Password





OPAQUE Goals

- Authenticated Server
- Authenticated Client
- Client only needs a username/password
- Forward Secrecy
- Pre-computation Resistant

Password Authenticated Key Exchange




OPAQUE At a High Level



Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions

$\text{PRF}(k, \text{query}) \rightarrow \text{looks random}$



query Client

$$H(g_{\text{user}}) \rightarrow g$$

$$b \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$$

$$b^{-1}$$

$$(g^{b^k} b^{-1})$$


$$= g^{b \cdot b^{-1} \cdot k} = g^k$$

$$\xrightarrow{g^b}$$


$$\xleftarrow{(g^b)^k}$$


Server k

OPAQUE Registration



OPAQUE Logging in





$$K = H(g^{r_a} \parallel g^{r_b} \parallel r_a \parallel r_b \parallel \text{nonce})$$

The OPAQUE Asymmetric PAKE Protocol

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Status

IRSG evaluation record

IESG evaluation record

[IESG writeups](#)


[Email expansions](#)

[History](#)

Versions:

00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10

draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque



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