

CS558 Network Security

Lecture 11: SSH

*Secure
world*

Unit 1 Very Brief Recap

ARP, DNS, BGP, DoS

Backbone internet protocols

} Some form of
DoS

Move to Confidentiality

Confidential Communication – Goals

→ No Unauthorized Recipients can read the message

Authenticity
→ tight binding to identities.

Integrity
→ message received = message sent

Replay Attack
timing


Forward Secrecy

The SSH (User) Experience


Keys → fulms

Password → fulms

fingerprints → on first access



Remember Diffie & Hellman?



Is Diffie Hellman Key Exchange Enough?

Monkey

g^a

g^b

~~KE~~ \rightarrow mutually authenticated
Key Exchange

g^{ad}

g^d

g^c

g^{cb}

pk, sk

$\sigma = \text{Sign}_{sk}(g^a)$

g^a

g^b

$\sigma = \text{Sign}_{sk'}(g^b)$

pk', sk'

Where are you from?

Authenticated Diffie Hellman

The following steps are used to exchange a key. In this, C is the client; S is the server; p is a large safe prime; g is a generator for a subgroup of $GF(p)$; q is the order of the subgroup; V_S is S's identification string; V_C is C's identification string; K_S is S's public host key; I_C is C's SSH_MSG_KEXINIT message and I_S is S's SSH_MSG_KEXINIT message that have been exchanged before this part begins.

1. C generates a random number x ($1 < x < q$) and computes $e = g^x \bmod p$. C sends e to S.

$$e = g^x \rightarrow$$

2. S generates a random number y ($0 < y < q$) and computes $f = g^y \bmod p$. S receives e. It computes $K = e^y \bmod p$, $H = \text{hash}(V_C || V_S || I_C || I_S || K_S || e || f || K)$ (these elements are encoded according to their types; see below), and signature s on H with its private host key. S sends $(K_S || f || s)$ to C. The signing operation may involve a second hashing operation.

$$f = g^y, \text{ pk}, \sigma$$

$$\text{Sign}(H) \rightarrow f$$

3. C verifies that K_S really is the host key for S (e.g., using certificates or a local database). C is also allowed to accept the key without verification; however, doing so will render the protocol insecure against active attacks (but may be desirable for practical reasons in the short term in many environments). C then computes $K = f^x \bmod p$, $H = \text{hash}(V_C || V_S || I_C || I_S || K_S || e || f || K)$, and verifies the signature s on H.

$$g^{xy}$$

To WIRESHARK!

(Mutually) Authenticated Diffie Hellman

The following steps are used to exchange a key. In this, C is the client; S is the server; p is a large safe prime; g is a generator for a subgroup of $GF(p)$; q is the order of the subgroup; V_S is S's identification string; V_C is C's identification string; K_S is S's public host key; I_C is C's SSH_MSG_KEXINIT message and I_S is S's SSH_MSG_KEXINIT message that have been exchanged before this part begins.

1. C generates a random number x ($1 < x < q$) and computes $e = g^x \bmod p$. C sends e to S.
2. S generates a random number y ($0 < y < q$) and computes $f = g^y \bmod p$. S receives e. It computes $K = e^y \bmod p$, $H = \text{hash}(V_C || V_S || I_C || I_S || K_S || e || f || K)$ (these elements are encoded according to their types; see below), and signature s on H with its private host key. S sends $(K_S || f || s)$ to C. The signing operation may involve a second hashing operation.
3. C verifies that K_S really is the host key for S (e.g., using certificates or a local database). C is also allowed to accept the key without verification; however, doing so will render the protocol insecure against active attacks (but may be desirable for practical reasons in the short term in many environments). C then computes $K = f^x \bmod p$, $H = \text{hash}(V_C || V_S || I_C || I_S || K_S || e || f || K)$, and verifies the signature s on H.

The following 'method name' values are defined.

"publickey"	REQUIRED
"password"	OPTIONAL
"hostbased"	OPTIONAL
"none"	NOT RECOMMENDED

Signature of S


Password

Mutual Auth Options

The value of 'signature' is a signature by the corresponding private key over the following data, in the following order:

string	session identifier
byte	SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
string	user name
string	service name
string	"publickey"
boolean	TRUE
string	public key algorithm name
string	public key to be used for authentication

byte	SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
string	user name
string	service name
string	"password"
boolean	FALSE
string	plaintext password in ISO-10646 UTF-8 encoding [RFC3629]



g^{xy}

m ,

K_{enc}

K_{mac}

$$C = Enc(K_{enc}, m)$$


$$t = MAC(K_{mac}, m)$$

Sequence #


C, t

So let's talk about Passwords (again)

salt, Hash
Gabe: ~~Password123!~~



"Password123!"



random
long value

$$H(\text{Password123!}) = \text{0x 123 9647 ...}$$

$$H(H(H(H(\text{Salt} \parallel \text{password}))))$$



SCP/SFTP

file transfer

① do an SSH handshake

