CONTESTED SOLIDARITY

Trade Union Membership and Immigration Attitudes in Europe

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Updated: January 3, 2024

Abstract

Drawing from theories of the insider-outsider divide, I revisit the relationship between trade union membership and immigration attitudes. In addition to the influence of union leaders and labor market competition, I contend that preferences for job security and democracy constitute an important source of bias against immigrants among union members. I further theorize that female union members are less susceptible to this bias, as they select into trade unions based on pre-existing liberal values. I test this conceptual model with ten rounds of the European Social Survey data spanning from 2002 to 2020. Analyzing a sample of more than 90,000 workers in 15 advanced industrial societies, OLS regression analysis shows that male union members have more negative perceptions of immigrants' economic and cultural impacts compared to their non-union counterparts. In contrast, female union members hold more positive attitudes towards immigrants than their non-union counterparts. Importantly, these differences cannot be fully explained by labor market competition. I also document a concerning time trend in union members' immigration attitudes. Moreover, using establishment size as a source of plausible exogeneity, instrument variable results indicate that unions liberalize male members' immigration attitudes, whereas no such effect is observed among female members. Collectively, these findings suggest that men and women join unions with different motives. Finally, I demonstrate how anti-immigration politics can hamper trade unions' agenda for social equality using support for redistribution as an example.

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Introduction

For decades, immigration has been one of the defining issues on the agenda of trade unions. It raises fundamental questions for organized labor (Penninx and Roosblad 2000): Should immigrants be regarded as an opportunity or threat to the labor movement? Should trade unions oppose or support government restrictions on immigration? Should precious resources be directed towards immigrants when unions struggle to retain membership among native-born workers? In a critical review, Marino et al. (2015) conclude that as migration has become increasingly common in advanced industrial societies, most European trade unions have moved away from their restrictive stances of the past and embraced notions such as international solidarity and equality. Despite encountering unease and resistance, it appears that trade unions as an interest group have become increasingly committed to mobilizing and advocating for immigrants (Tapia and Turner 2013).

In contrast to the unambiguous position of many trade unions, the question of whether individual union members, compared to non-members, hold less or more positive attitudes towards immigrants remains unclear. Indeed, the existing literature on this subject is deeply divided. On the one hand, several studies suggest that union members have more favorable perceptions of immigrants than non-members (Artiles and Molina 2011; Donnelly 2016; Rosetti 2019). Central to these findings is a leadership effect, whereby union leaders communicate their pro-immigration messages to the rank and file, fostering solidarity among workers of diverse backgrounds. Nevertheless, recent work casts doubt on the extent to which unions can influence their members' political and social attitudes, arguing that members may not always receive union messages (Yan 2023). Moreover, even when information is conveyed, its acceptance may be hindered by mistrust and divergent interest considerations between union members and leaders (Budd 1995; Culpepper and Regan 2014).

On the other hand, theories of labor market competition implicitly indicate that union members should hold less favorable attitudes towards immigrants than non-members (Dancygier and Donnelly 2013; Iversen and Soskice 2001; Kambourov and Manovskii 2009; Pardos-Prado and Xena 2019; Parsons 1972), due to both increased labor supply caused by migration (hence lower wages) and specific human capital accumulated by union members (hence greater costs of labor market mobility). Moreover, numerous incidents suggest that immigrants frequently experience hostile treatment from their unionized colleagues, for reasons largely unrelated to any economic competition (Della Puppa 2020; Gorodzeisky and Richards 2020; Jefferys 2007; Jubany and Güell 2012). In these circumstances, theories of labor market competition fail to provide a full account of union members' immigration attitudes.

Given the imperative and unresolved state of the question, I present in this paper a new conceptual framework to unpack the relationship between trade union membership and immigration attitudes. I diverge from previous studies by incorporating *preferences* for job security and democracy, which are correlated with immigration attitudes, as an important determinant of union membership. I develop my argument based on the insider-outsider divide popularized by Rueda (2005, 2006). This theory suggests that labor can be disaggregated into two broad segments that have distinct and often conflicting economic preferences. Moreover, I extend the insider-outsider divide to the cultural domain by bringing in the literature on diversity, democracy, and civic engagement (Anderson and Paskeviciute 2006; Putnam 2007; Spinner-Halev 2008). My central argument is that the insider-outsider divide creates a preference-based selection process, such that workers who have negative perceptions of immigrants are more likely to be union members. I further consider potential gender differences in selection into union membership, arguing that females are less likely to join trade unions based on their insider preferences (Estevez-Abe 2006; Fraser 2013; Kirton 2005).

I test the model with ten rounds of the European Social Survey data spanning from 2002 to 2020. Analyzing a sample of more than 90,000 workers in 15 advanced industrial societies, OLS regression analysis indicates that male union members, on average, have more negative perceptions of immigrants' economic and cultural impacts compared to non-members. In contrast, female union members tend to hold more positive attitudes towards immigrants than non-members. Importantly, the union-nonunion gap cannot be fully explained by labor market competition. I also document a concerning time trend in union members' immigration attitudes. Moreover, using establishment size as a source of plausible exogeneity, instrument variable results suggest that unions liberalize male members' immigration attitudes, whereas no such effect is observed among female members. Collectively, the results are consistent with the notion that men and women join unions with different motives. Finally, I demonstrate how anti-immigration politics can hamper trade unions' agenda for social equality by reducing support for redistribution among union members.

The present paper contributes to the filed of industrial relations by proposing and testing a more nuanced theory to understand the relationship between union membership and immigration attitudes. The key insight is to differentiate the preferences of union members from the positions of union leaders. This perspective is informed by previous studies that have challenged both the "prevailing caricatures of organized labor as a monolithic and unidirectional restrictionist actor" (Fine and Tichenor 2009, p. 86) and the "assumption of trade unions as inclusive and equitable organizations of social justice" (Lee and Tapia 2021, p. 654). Adopting this view, the paper underscores the ongoing debate within the labor movement regarding attitudes towards immigrants.

1 The Insider-Outsider Divide and Immigration Attitudes

1.1 The Insider-Outsider Divide in the Economic Sphere

Existing work on trade union membership and immigration attitudes has either featured a leadership effect whereby union leaders communicate their pro-immigration messages to the rank and file (Artiles and Molina 2011; Donnelly 2016; Rosetti 2019), or a threat effect wherein labor market competition exists between union members and immigrants (Iversen and Soskice 2001; Kambourov and Manovskii 2009; Pardos-Prado and Xena 2019). Like previous studies, I recognize the non-random assignment of union membership as a result of individual preferences (Hadziabdic and Baccaro 2020; Kim and Margalit 2017). Yet unlike previous studies, I do not assume that union membership is often, if not always, correlated with unobserved, pre-existing liberal values (Donnelly 2016; Mosimann et al. 2019; Trentini 2022).

Instead, I contend that the non-random assignment of union membership can be an important source of bias against immigrants. I derive this argument from the seminal work of Rueda (2005), which proposes that labor can be disaggregated into two broad segments: an insider group that enjoys secure employment and an outsider group that is at high risk of unemployment or vulnerable employment. Importantly, I assume that this insider-outsider divide creates a preference-based selection process, such that workers who possess strong insider preferences (i.e., those who value job security) tend to self-select into industries and occupations safeguarded by trade unions. Within industries and occupations, workers with strong insider preferences may further join unions to alleviate the risk of unemployment (Jima Bedaso and Jirjahn 2023; Berger and Neugart 2012; Goerke and Pannenberg 2011).

This preference-based selection process does not constitute a source of bias against immigrants among union members unless strong insider preferences also lead to less pro-immigration attitudes. However, the literature implies the potential existence of such a relationship. First and foremost, labor market insiders are expected to support employment protection legislation, whereas outsiders typically favor public policies aimed at creating job opportunities and expanding unemployment insurance (Rueda 2006). These contrasting economic preferences may lead to negative perceptions among insiders, as outsiders' preferences not only mean higher tax burdens for insiders, but also a struggle over policy orientation in representative politics (Rueda 2005; Bürgisser and Kurer 2021; Lima Aranzaes et al. 2023). Consequently, workers with strong insider preferences may hold less favorable attitudes towards outsiders, including immigrants who typically benefit from wage subsidies and unemployment insurance (Butschek and Walter 2014; Gschwind 2021).

The source of preferences for job security may also contribute to a negative correlation between insider preferences and pro-immigration attitudes. As preferences can be derived from the institutions individuals live with, a strong preference for job security can stem from the prevailing institutions that prioritize the value of stable employment (Wildavsky 1987). For example, Germany's social market economy may cultivate workers' insider preferences through generous social insurance and employment protections (Schulze-Cleven and Weishaupt 2015). When workers internalize the value of external institutions, they may be willing to preserve such institutions (Harmon-Jones and Mills 2019). This could possibly lead to bias against immigrants, who are often portrayed as a risk of social dumping and a threat to the moral economy and social welfare (Fratzscher 2019; Vila-Henninger 2019).

An inverse association between insider preferences and pro-immigration attitudes can further arise from a combination of biased perceptions and rational calculations. In a large-scale cross-national survey, Alesina et al. (2023) find that all groups of respondents starkly overestimate the size of immigrant population. Moreover, respondents frequently "think that immigrants are less educated than they are, work less than is the case (are more 'unemployed'), and are poorer than they are . . . they believe that immigrants are, conditional on unemployment and education, favored by the welfare system and benefit more from government redistribution" (p. 18). These biased perceptions could produce anti-immigration attitudes particularly among workers with strong insider preferences, as they anticipate maintaining stable employment in the future and contributing to income taxes in the long run. With some rational calculations, workers with strong insider preferences may perceive themselves as the primary victim of a welfare system exploited by immigrants (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010).

Preferences for job security, therefore, are not only positively related to union membership, but also negatively related to pro-immigration attitudes. In other words, there exists a preference-based negative selection such that workers who have less favorable perceptions of immigrants—mainly concerned about their economic impact—are more likely to be union members. I thus do not expect union members to show more pro-immigration attitudes than non-members on average when it comes to economic issues, as long as the preference-based negative selection is not appropriately accounted for.

1.2 The Insider-Outsider Divide in the Cultural Sphere

The insider-outsider divide over economic preferences has received considerable attention. What is often neglected, however, is a parallel divide over non-economic preferences. For example, workers can be disaggregated not only based on the preferred level of employment protection, but also the extent to which they enjoy democracy at work, or more generally, in the society (Kokkonen and Linde 2023). This latter divide may also create a preference-based selection process, such that workers with a strong insider identity (i.e., those who value democracy) tend to self-select into industries and occupations with democratic practices, such as those provided by trade unions. Within industries and occupations, workers who value democracy may further join unions to influence organizational decision making in their places of employment (Hammer 1998).

Again, this preference-based selection process does not become a source of bias against immigrants among union members unless strong preferences for democracy are negatively related to pro-immigration attitudes. However, I suspect that this relationship may exist, importantly, for cultural rather than economic reasons. Democracy is often messy, costly, and conflict-ridden; individuals accumulate frustration when things do not unfold as desired (Theiss-Morse and Hibbing 2005). Accordingly, a negative correlation between preferences for democracy and pro-immigration attitudes may arise if immigrants are perceived to be a hindrance to democratic values and practices. Indeed, immigrants often feel themselves marginalized by trade unions for being perceived to be socially incompetent and culturally unfit to contribute to the labor movement (Dahlstedt and Hertzberg 2007; Della Puppa 2020; Montgomery 1987). After all, civil engagement requires a variety of preconditions, such as relevant knowledge about current affairs, familiarity with democratic procedures, shared idioms and norms, and a sense of social agency (Dahlgren 2000; Bauböck 2002).

Moreover, a negative relationship between preferences for democracy and pro-immigration attitudes is perhaps hardwired into many industrial societies. As Habermas (2001) argues, modern democratic states build up their political institutions on a prior cultural integration. This includes a sense of solidarity created by national identity, which allows individuals to be committed to and sacrifice for democracy (Spinner-Halev 2008). Previous studies have shown that national identity delineated by ethno-cultural lines is inversely related to pro-immigration attitudes (Lindstam et al. 2021; Wright et al. 2012). As such, if preferences for democracy is more or less rooted in such national identity, they should also be negatively correlated with pro-immigration attitudes. As a related example, migrant workers typically benefit less from representative democracy within unions, as their interests are often silenced and perceived to be less deserving (Marino et al. 2015).

The cultural insider-outsider divide thereby creates a problem similar to the economic one. That is, a preference-based negative selection process exists such that workers who have less favorable perceptions of immigrants—mainly concerned about their cultural impact—are more likely to be union members. To some extent, the problem reassembles the tension between ethnic diversity, nationalism, and social cohesion discussed in many studies (e.g., Anderson 2006; Ariely 2014; Bauböck 2002; Gellner 1983). Given this rationale, I do not anticipate union members showing more pro-immigration attitudes than non-members on average when it comes to cultural issues, provided that the preference-based negative selection remains unaddressed.

1.3 Gender Differences in Selection into Union Membership

Thus far, I have argued that preferences for job security and democracy can be a potential source of bias against immigrants among union members. This contrasts with the assumption in previous work that individuals with pre-existing liberal values, therefore a more positive outlook on immigrants, tend to join unions (Donnelly 2016; Mosimann et al. 2019; Trentini 2022). While the two perspectives are different, they do not necessarily conflict with each other. Both scenarios can be true, and the final outcome hinges on the relative strength of each selection process. In what follows, I will argue that for females, selection into union membership based on pre-existing liberal values is more salient than selection based on the insider identity (and vice versa for males).

A first reason is that women's preferences regarding economic policies, compared to men's, exhibit a greater proximity to those of immigrants. Take employment protection as an example. While strong employment protection motivates risk-averse workers to invest in specific human capital, it disproportionately benefits men more. As Estevez-Abe (2006) indicates, conditional on the same level of employment protection, women face a greater risk of job interruption due to pregnancy and child rearing. This reduces employers' willingness to hire and invest in women since the opportunity to reap the benefit of training in the long run is smaller. Importantly, strong employment protection makes it harder for employers to replace off-job workers, further amplifying the cost of women's job interruption. On the aggregate level, this may lead to occupational sex segregation with a large proportion of women in low-paying and low-investment jobs. Consequently, women are more likely to lean towards economic policies that provide job opportunities and unemployment insurance rather than employment protection—a position similar to that of immigrants.

A second reason for the proposed gender differences centers around the landscape of women's movement. As Fraser (2013) notes, the second-wave feminist movement is closely aligned with the rise of neoliberalism, which prioritizes individualism, self-interest, and negative liberty. While skeptical of the true merit of these values, Fraser acknowledges that neoliberalism has (uncritically) facilitated women's emancipation by forging a new alliance of social actors who all proclaim their modern and progressive credentials by advocating for diversity and multiculturalism (Brenner and Fraser 2017). After and above all, what neoliberal feminism indicates is the need to eliminate barriers that impede individual freedom for market and political participation, including those affecting immigrants. This idea has spilled over to the field of industrial relations, where females join trade unions as they view unions a means to champion and advance the rights of women and other minority groups (Blaschke 2015; Kirton 2005; Preminger and Bondy 2023; Williamson 2012).

Overall, the above analysis indicates that women are more likely to select into trade unions based on their pre-existing liberal values than insider preferences. Consequently, I expect female union members to show more pro-immigration attitudes in both economic and cultural domains compared to their non-member counterparts, provided that the positive selection is not fully accounted for. In the following section, I introduce the data employed to test the relationship between union membership and immigration attitudes informed by the preference-based selection.

2 European Social Survey Data and Measures

I analyze ten rounds of European Social Survey (ESS) data to study the relationship between trade union membership and immigration attitudes. The ESS is an ongoing cross-national survey of individuals aged 15 and over in private households. Data collection has been conducted biennially from 2002 (ESS-1) to 2020 (ESS-10), following strict random probability sampling methods and a minimum target response rate of 70% (Stoop et al. 2010). Over the past two decades of the ESS, forty European countries have participated in at least one round of the surveys. To improve cross-national comparisons, the ESS team implements several measures to minimize linguistic and semantic discrepancies in country questionnaires (ESS 2023). Given its high data quality and broad range of topics, the ESS has been extensively used to study diverse patterns of social relations, attitudes, and behaviors, including research on union members' immigration attitudes (Artiles and Molina 2011; Donnelly 2016; Rosetti 2019).

I follow three criteria to construct an analytical sample. First, I keep respondents whose main activity in the last 7 days was working, including those who are self-employed.[1] This step ensures that union members are not compared to non-members who were not working. My sample thus differs from Artiles and Molina (2011) and Donnelly (2016), which include individuals who were unemployed and out of the labor force at the time of the survey.[2] Second, I focus on the working age population and thereby exclude respondents who were above 65 years old. Third, I limit the sample to respondents in 15 advanced industrial societies that have consistently participated in the ESS.[3] I thus exclude countries that are typically origins of international migrants, as well as countries that only appear in a few rounds of the ESS. My final sample includes 91,768 workers as shown in Table 1. While the sample is more restrictive than those in previous studies, it suffers less from unfair comparison between respondents of different employment status, changes in country composition over time, and distinct economic conditions between immigrant-sending and receiving countries.

The ESS defines immigrants as "people who come to live in the country from abroad" (Card et al. 2005, p. 12). Follow Pardos-Prado and Xena (2019), I use two measures of

[1] In most EU countries, trade unions organize and represent self-employed workers (Fulton 2018).

[2] Controlling for employment status in OLS regression does not fully solve the problem. Instead, it transforms the problem of unfair comparisons to treatment heterogeneity, as OLS regression is essentially performing conditional variance weighting of covariate-specific differences in observed means (Angrist and Pischke 2009).

[3] These 15 countries are: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Switzerland (CH), Germany (DE), Denmark (DK), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), the United Kingdom (GB), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Portugal (PT), and Sweden (SE). All countries have participated in more than 8 rounds of the surveys in the sample, except for Austria (6 rounds) and Italy (5 rounds).

immigration attitudes as dependent variables: the perceived economic and cultural impacts of immigrants. Both are measured on an 11-point scale. The former is based on the question that ask respondents whether "immigrant is bad or good for the country's economy (0 = bad, 10 = good)," whereas the later is based on the question on whether "the country's cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants (0 = undermined, 10 = enriched)." The two measures are correlated at $r = 0.59$, indicating that the economic and cultural aspects of immigration attitudes do not perfectly overlap.[4]

The key independent variable, union membership, is dummy coded (0 = non-member, 1 = union member). Table 1 shows the means of immigration attitudes in the full sample and by union membership. On average, workers' immigration attitudes seem to be moderate, with cultural perception slightly more positive than the economic one. Figure 1 plots the average immigration attitudes in each country before 2008 and after 2014, roughly corresponding to the onsets of the global financial crisis and the European refugee crisis.[5] It shows that over the past 20 years, workers' attitudes towards immigrants have become more positive in most countries, although there are a few exceptions such as Austria and Italy. Further analysis indicates that the same trend hold for both union members and non-members, yet union members' pro-immigration attitudes grows at a slower rate than non-members.

Control variables include individual characteristics and macro indicators. For individual characteristics, I control for gender, age, years of education, income deciles, self-positioning on the left-right scale, citizenship, native status, household size, religiosity, supervisor status at work, employment type, marital status, and urban residence.[6] For macro indicators, I collect three country-level variables from the OECD database: immigrant inflow (as a percentage of country population), unemployment rate, and GDP per capital. These macro indicators are matched to the ESS using the actual survey years. Moreover, I harmonize industry and occupation variables in the ESS using the crosswalks provided by Humlum (2019).[7] For the ESS data, observations with missing values are dropped using listwise deletion. For the OECD data, missing values are interpolated (and extrapolated for a few cases).

[4] Pardos-Prado and Xena (2019) also include a measure for whether "immigrants make the country a worse or better place to live." This measure appears to be a mix of the economic and cultural aspects of immigration attitudes (both $r > 0.8$) and produce similar OLS/IV results.

[5] I use ESS round as a proxy for time. While using accurate interview dates is possible, it complicates the analysis as country composition changes considerably from time to time when interview dates are used. This is because country questionnaires are often administered at different points and last for different periods of time.

[6] Both OLS and IV results remain similar when limiting the sample to native-born workers.

[7] I use NACE 1 broad sections for industries and 4-digit ISCO 08 code for occupations.

3 Do Union Members Have Different Immigration Attitudes?

In this section, I use OLS regression to investigate if union members differ in immigration attitudes from non-members. I also assess how the results speak to the model of preference-based selection whenever possible. Before moving forward, it is important to note that my control variables include both income and unemployment rate, which are possible outcomes of immigration. This is because I am interested in a theory of preferences rather than labor market competition. However, controlling for these crude measures of economic conditions is unlikely to fully rule out labor market competition as an alternative explanation. While including industry and occupation dummies can better capture labor market shocks of immigrants, it simultaneously absorbs the preference-based selection into unions. I deal with these issues in detail at the end of the section.

3.1 Baseline OLS Results

Table 2 presents the OLS coefficients of union membership on the perceived economic and cultural impacts of immigrants. Each column represents a different specification, where baseline controls, round effects, country effects, and industry and occupation dummies are sequentially included in regression. Each row indicates whether the full sample, female sample, or male sample is used for the analysis. Table 2 yields three important findings. First, union members do not hold more positive perceptions of immigrants than non-members on average in the full sample. For the economic impact, this is true once baseline controls are taken into account (column 2). For the cultural impact, this is the case when union members are compared to non-members within the same country (column 4). This finding diverges from previous studies, where union members typically hold more pro-immigration attitudes than non-members (Artiles and Molina 2011; Donnelly 2016; Rosetti 2019). This discrepancy is mostly attributed to the differences in sample construction described earlier. That is, previous studies may suffer from unfair comparisons, changes in country composition over time, and distinct labor market conditions between immigrant-sending and receiving countries.

Second, Table 2 shows a notable gender difference in the relationship between union membership and immigration attitudes. In the female sample, union members have more positive perceptions of both economic and cultural impacts of immigrants than non-members across all specifications. By contrast, in the male sample, union members have more negative economic perceptions than non-members across all specifications, as well as more negative cultural perceptions when country effects are controlled. While some of the differences are not statistically significant, the OLS coefficients of union membership in the female sample are always significantly larger than those in the male sample, except for the economic one in the last column. These results seem to be consistent with the proposed gender differences in selection into union membership. Yet they may also be explained by theories of labor market competition if females are less influenced by the shock of immigrants.

Third, Table 2 indicates that the union-nonunion gap in immigration attitudes is much smaller within the same industry and occupation (column 6). This is likely because industry and occupation effects absorb both labor market shocks of immigrants and preference-based selection into unionized jobs. Table A1 in the appendix confirms this finding using a decomposition method proposed by Gelbach (2016), which assesses the contribution of each set of covariates—independent of the sequential order they are included—to the change in the estimated union membership coefficient (i.e., from column 1 to column 6). This exercise shows that including industry and occupation dummies shrinks the OLS coefficients of union membership towards zero in both female and male samples. Interestingly, for the economic impact, the change caused by the inclusion of industry and occupation dummies is of similar magnitude in the female and male samples (columns 2 and 3). However, for the cultural impact, the magnitude is much larger in the female sample than in the male sample (columns 5 and 6). This indicates that gender differences in selection into union membership are more likely to be driven by cultural rather than economic concerns.

3.2 Time Trend

The above analysis has ignored potential time dynamics in union members' immigration attitudes. To that end, I estimate an OLS model with three-way interactions between union membership, gender, and time dummies (proxied by ESS round). I include baseline controls, country effects, and industry and occupation effects. Figure 2 plots the marginal effects of union membership on immigration attitudes by gender and over time. The most notable finding is that compared to non-members, union members become less pro-immigration over time. Specifically, male union members hold more negative perceptions of immigrants' economic and cultural impacts after the refugee crisis than non-members. Before that, male union members did not differ significantly from their non-union counterparts. There is a similar decline for female union members in terms of the cultural impact. By 2020, female union members did not hold more positive perceptions of immigrants' cultural impact than non-members. These results remain robust when I use sub-group analysis specifying a linear time trend (see Table A2 in the appendix).

A less salient but interesting finding in Figure 2 is that union members did not show more anti-immigration attitudes during the financial crisis. If anything, union members demonstrated more positive perceptions of immigrants than non-members at the peak of the turbulence (i.e., circa 2010). Note that these results do not suggest that union members are immune to the negative influence of economic uncertainty and financial insecurity on pro-immigration attitudes (Ariely 2014; Cotofan et al. 2021; Vogt Isaksen 2019). Instead, the results indicate that such negative influence is weaker among union members. It is tempting to attribute this buffering effect to unions' effort to protect their members from unemployment. However, this labor market explanation is in conflict with the lower pro-immigration attitudes of union members relative to non-members after the refugee crisis. A more plausible account is that trade unions resort to their social and class identities in hard times, building solidarity and class conscientiousness across national and ethnic lines (Hyman 2001). Importantly, it is easier for unions to do so in the seemingly impersonal financial crisis than in the ethno-cultural conflict-ridden refugee crisis.

3.3 Preference-based Selection or Labor Market Competition?

I now turn to exam if the preference-based selection plays a role in the relationship between union membership and immigration attitudes. I start with the observation that the union-nonunion gap in immigration attitudes are smaller when controlling for industries and occupations. As noted earlier, it is unclear whether industry and occupation effects absorb labor market shocks of immigrants or self-selection into unionized jobs (or both). However, if labor market competition is the only story, taking into account of the covariance between insider preferences and union membership should not significantly change the OLS results without controlling for industry and occupation effects. By contrast, if workers select into unions based on their insider preferences, the OLS coefficients of union membership will become more positive after controlling for these preferences.

Performing such a test requires measures or proxies for insider preferences. Fortunately, in Rounds 2 and 5, respondents were directly asked about their preferences for job security (1

= not important at all, 5 = very important). While there is no information on preferences for democracy, in Rounds 1 and 7, respondents were asked to indicate how important speaking a country's official language is in deciding immigration qualification (0 = extremely unimportant, 10 = extremely important). This variable can be used as a proxy for ethno-cultural national identity, an important source of preferences for democracy as discussed earlier. In what follows, I use OLS regression to estimate the coefficients of union membership on immigration attitudes for each of the two waves of the data. I then include the two variables intended to capture insider preferences as covariates and assess changes in the estimated coefficients of union membership. I perform this analysis for the male and female samples separately to detect potential gender differences.

Table 3 presents the results from this exercise. Panel A shows the OLS coefficient of union membership on perceived economic impact of immigrants. In both male and female samples, the coefficient of union membership becomes more positive after including preferences for job security as a control variable (for males, $\Delta\hat{\beta}_{Union\ member} = 0.037$, $p < 0.01$; for females, $\Delta\hat{\beta}_{Union\ member} = 0.041$, $p < 0.01$). The results thus provide supportive evidence for the preference-based selection. However, in contrast to the theorized gender differences in selection into union membership, the magnitude of change is almost identical in the male and female sample. One possible explanation is that preferences for job security may be accompanied by preferences for other forms of protections, such as anti-discrimination in hiring. With these additional protective measures, female workers are less concerned about being treated unfairly by employers due to increased cost of job interruption. Accordingly, females may have similar preferences for job security as males.

Panel B of Table 3 shows the OLS coefficient of union membership on perceived cultural impact of immigrants. In the male sample, the coefficient of union membership becomes more positive after including the proxy for ethno-cultural national identity as a control variable ($\Delta\hat{\beta}_{Union\ member} = 0.017$, $p < 0.1$). By contrast, in the female sample, the coefficient of union membership remains unchanged after controlling for the proxy ($\Delta\hat{\beta}_{Union\ member} = 0.0001$, $p > 0.1$). The results thus provide evidence in favor of the preference-based negative selection into union membership. Moreover, the results again indicate that gender differences in selection into union membership are more likely to be driven by cultural reasons. Taken together, the analysis suggests that labor market competition is unlikely to be the sole explanation for union members' immigration attitudes.

I provide further evidence in the appendix showing the insufficiency of theories of labor market competition. Specifically, in Table A3, I assess how the OLS coefficient of union membership changes after controlling for exposure to labor market shocks of immigrants, which is proxied by communicational-manual skill content (Ortega and Polavieja 2012). I show that for males, controlling for skill content is of similar explanatory power as controlling for industries and occupations before the refugee crisis. However, after the crisis, skill content cannot fully account for the negative relationship between union membership and immigration attitudes. This finding is at odds with theories of labor market competition, which would predict skill content to be more salient in determining immigration attitudes after the refugee crisis due to the increased labor supply caused by immigrants.

4 Do Unions Influence Members' Immigration Attitudes?

The proceeding analysis has highlighted the issue of self-selection in understanding union members' immigration attitudes. In the presence of self-selection, OLS regression cannot effectively capture the causal effect of unions on their members' immigration attitudes. To isolate the influence of trade unions, I turn to an instrumental variable (IV) approach. This requires to find a source of variation (i.e., instrument) that affects immigration attitudes only through its effect on union membership. Finding a valid instrument, however, is challenging with observational data collected for general purposes like the ESS. Therefore, I proceed in the spirit of plausible exogeneity by carefully discussing the IV rationale and potential threats. Throughout the analysis, I apply several measures including sample restriction, placebo tests, and robustness checks to bolster the credibility of the IV approach.

4.1 IV Rationale and Potential Threats

I use establishment size—the number of people employed in the workplace—as an instrument to identify the effect of unions on immigration attitudes. Within the framework of constant treatment effects, the IV design requires three identifying assumptions: relevance condition, instrumental independence, and exclusion restriction (Angrist and Pischke 2009). Specifically, the relevance condition states that the instrument must be sufficiently correlated with the endogenous variable. This assumption is likely to hold, as I expect a strong and positive correlation between establishment size and union membership. This relationship arises from the cost of collective action. Several studies have indicated that workers who are union members or support trade unions may face discrimination and retaliation from employers (Baert and Omey 2015; Kreisberg and Wilmers 2022; Nüß 2023). In larger workplaces, workers can effectively reduce the cost of collective action by sharing the risk, increasing the likelihood of being union members (Ebbinghaus et al. 2011).[8]

Next, consider the instrumental independence assumption, which states that the instrument needs to be as good as randomly assigned conditional on other covariates. This assumption is likely to hold in the present case for two reasons. First, while workers can choose where they work, the predominant influence over establishment size lies with employers (Bills et al. 2017). Second, recent experiment evidence from the a nationally representative sample of Americans indicates that workers do not have strong preferences over establishment size, after controlling for income and other working conditions (Mazumder and Yan 2023). These findings alleviate the concern that workers self-select into workplaces of different sizes based on their pre-existing preferences, which could be directly correlated with immigration attitudes.

Finally, the exclusion restriction requires the instrument to influence the outcome variable only thorough its effect on the endogenous variable. In other words, to be a valid instrument, establishment size should not be correlated with immigration attitudes for reasons other than union membership. This assumption is questionable in the present case, as establishment size may be correlated with immigration attitudes in several other ways. Table 4 provides a summary of potential violations of the exclusion restriction, covering four scenarios implied by the relevant literature. First, intergroup contact theory suggests that interaction between different groups breaks down stereotypes and encourages understanding towards each other (Allport 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). As large establishments tend to have a more diverse workforce (Ferguson 2016), it can facilitate intergroup contact between workers of different races, ethnicities, and country origins, leading to more pro-immigration attitudes.

Second, labor market sorting theory indicates that organizations make hiring decisions based on their needs and characteristics (Jovanovic 1979). The existing research indicates that large establishments tend to hire high-ability workers (Brown and Medoff 1989; Lochner and Schulz 2024). Meanwhile, high-ability workers are less influenced by false anti-immigration information, implying a positive correlation between establishment size and pro-immigration

[8] More formally, Farber (2001) shows that the expected value of unionization increases when organizing and administrative costs are shared by a large group of workers.

attitudes (De keersmaecker and Roets 2017). Third, according to vulnerability theory, individuals who are economically and socially vulnerable tend to express negative attitudes towards immigrants (Ceobanu 2011). As large establishments provide better working conditions due to higher ability (Jovanovic 1982; Oi and Idson 1999), workers are therefore better insured against risk and more likely to express positive views on immigration.

Fourth, social enforcement theory proposes that organizations visible to the public respond more actively to societal pressure concerning diversity and inclusion (Edelman 1992). Consequently, large establishments are more likely to provide training and implement protocols to promote diversity and inclusion within their organizations, leading to more pro-immigration attitudes. Collectively, these scenarios imply that establishment size may influence workers' views on immigration beyond the union membership channel. The validity of establishment size as an IV is thereby threatened. In what follows, I provide a possible remedy and present (indirect) empirical evidence to further assess the IV validity.

4.2 Sample Restriction and Zero-First-Stage Test

To increase the credibility of the IV design, I restrict the sample to 64,025 respondents in tiny (< 25 workers) and small (25 – 99 workers) establishments. The underlying assumption is that compared to large establishments (≥ 100 workers), tiny and small establishments are more likely to be similar to each other, thereby reducing the likelihood of violating the exclusion restriction. This sample restriction has a testable implication, as I can directly compare if tiny and small establishments resemble each other. Table 5 shows the OLS coefficients of selected variables on establishment size. The results indicate that compared to large establishment, small establishments are more similar to tiny establishment across all six dependent variables. For instance, workers in small establishments do not differ significantly in gender and age from those in tiny establishments, while workers in large establishments are more likely to be male and older on average (columns 1 and 2).

Although small and tiny establishments are more similar, they still differ in several important characteristics. For instance, Table 5 shows that workers in small establishments are less likely to be native-born (column 3), complete additional years of education (column 4), receive higher income (column 5), and tend to locate in big cities (column 6). While these observed differences can be controlled in regression analysis, the results raise the concern that small and tiny establishment may be systematically different in other unobserved aspects. For example, more high-ability workers may be employed at small establishments than in tiny ones, thereby showing more pro-immigration attitudes. Hence, it is still uncertain whether the exclusion restriction will hold among workers in small and tiny establishments.

To further probe the validity of the IV in the restricted sample, I perform a zero-first-stage by regressing immigration attitudes on establishment size among self-employed workers. The rationale is that self-employed workers, given their high individual autonomy and unique task structure, are not likely to join unions merely because of the reduced cost of collective action. In other words, establishment size should not predict union membership among self-employed workers. Consequently, in this sample, a significant coefficient of establishment size on immigration attitudes is likely to indicate potential violations of the exclusion restriction (Bound and Jaeger 2000; Lal et al. 2023). By contrast, an insignificant coefficient can be interpreted as suggestive evidence for the IV validity.

Figure 3 presents the OLS coefficients of establishment size on immigration attitudes from the zero-first-stage test. The model includes baseline controls, round effects, country effects, and industry and occupation effects. The results indicate that among both female ($N = 3317$) and male samples ($N = 7449$), self-employed workers in small establishments do not differ significantly in immigration attitudes from those who work in tiny establishments (all $p > 0.1$). Further analysis demonstrates that establishment size is not a significant predictor for union membership among self-employed workers (for the female sample, $b = 0.061$, $p > 0.1$; for the male sample, $b = 0.018$, $p > 0.1$). The zero-first-stage test thus provides evidence in favor of the IV validity in the restricted sample. I thereby proceed to use establishment size as an instrument to study the causal effect of unions on members' immigration attitudes.[9]

4.3 IV Results

Figure 4 presents the IV estimates of union membership on immigration attitudes with establishment size as an instrument. Models are estimated for female and male samples separately using two-stage least-squares. Covariates include baseline controls, round effects, country effects, and industry and occupation effects. First-stage results indicate that establishment size is positively correlated with union membership in both samples (for females, $b = 0.039$, $p < 0.01$; for males, $b = 0.054$, $p < 0.01$). This is consistent with the theoretical relationship

[9] I also conduct a zero-first-stage test using a small sample of self-employed workers who are prevented from joining trade unions by national legislation (ETUC 2018). These workers are not in the analytical sample of the study. Again, I do not find strong indications of violations of the exclusion restriction (see Figure A1 in the appendix).

between establishment size and union membership discussed earlier. Moreover, the first-stage effective F statistic is considerably large in both samples, indicating that establishment size is not a weak IV (for females, effective $F = 41.3$; for males, effective $F = 89.8$).

An important finding from Figure 4 is that becoming a union member leads men to have more positive views on immigration, whereas no such effect is observed among women. Specifically, for the perceived economic impact of immigrants, the IV point estimate of union membership is negative and insignificant in the female sample ($b = -0.418$, $p > 0.1$), while positive and statistically significant in the male sample ($b = 1.312$, $p < 0.05$). Similarly, for the perceived cultural impact of immigrants, the IV point estimate of union membership is positive but insignificant in the female sample ($b = 0.316$, $p > 0.1$), while positive and statistically significant in the male sample ($b = 0.843$, $p < 0.1$). The IV results thus differ from the OLS results, where female union members show more pro-immigration attitudes than non-members, while male union members hold less positive attitudes than non-members on average.

The contrasting IV and OLS findings can be explained by gender differences in preference-based selection into union membership. For example, as females select into unions based on their pre-existing progressive values, there is little room for unions to further shape their immigration attitudes. By contrast, male union members tend to hold negative views on immigration before unionization. Yet trade unions can effectively alter male member's immigration attitudes by correcting explicit bias and advocating for solidarity with immigrants. Nonetheless, even with this causal effect, male members do not show more positive attitudes towards immigrants on average as the OLS regression analysis indicates, suggesting considerable inertia among male union members in developing a more positive mindset towards immigrants.

To further probe the preference-based selection, I divide the sample into two general types: labor and professionals. The former includes workers in industries such as manufacturing, construction, hotels and restaurants, and wholesale and retail trade ($N = 31293$). The latter consists of workers in public administration, education, finance and business, and other related industries ($N = 32551$). Not surprisingly, females are underrepresented among labor (30%) and overrepresented among professionals (63%). Given the traditionally masculine culture of labor, females who select into these industries may have preferences similar to males. Accordingly, the gender difference in the union effect should be smaller among labor than among professionals. Figure A2 in the appendix shows the IV estimates by two general types. The figure indicates that in the labor sample, the IV point estimates are positive for both genders. By contrast, in the professional sample, the IV point estimates are negative for females but positive for males. Overall, the results are consistent with the pattern implied by gender differences in preference-based selection into trade unions.

A remaining question concerns how trade unions influence their members' immigration attitudes. Theoretically, trade unions can adopt a general political orientation approach (i.e., focusing on broader ideologies and party affiliations) and/or an issue politics approach (i.e., discussion of specific political topics and problems). To understand these different mechanisms, I re-estimate the IV results without using self-positioning on the left-right scale as a control variable. The idea is that if unions influence members' attitudes mainly through altering their general political orientation, controlling for self-positioning on the left-right scale will significantly underestimate the causal effect of unions. However, Figure A3 in the appendix shows that the IV estimates remain largely unchanged in both male and female samples when self-positioning on the left-right scale is not controlled. According, the evidence seems to support the notion that trade unions influence members' immigration attitudes through an issue politics approach, rather than shifting members' general political orientation.

4.4 Placebo Test

While I have presented some evidence for the IV validity, one may still be concerned that the results are driven by violations of the exclusion restriction. To further bolster the credibility of the IV approach, I conduct a placebo test by examining how trade unions influence members' perception of crime related to immigrants (0 = crime problems made worse and 10 = crime problems made better). The rationale for this placebo test is twofold. On the one hand, radical right-wing populist politicians have strategically capitalized crime problems, co-opting union members into the anti-immigration propaganda. The result is a far-right labor movement aimed at undermining traditional trade unions. From the north to the south, this movement has emphasized an univocal link between immigration and an increased crime rate (Dörre 2018; Gregersen and Meret 2023; Kim 2022; Rego and Costa 2023). While unions have countered with the right-wing populism, they do explicitly tackle crime issues which are beyond the scope of workplace representations. Consequently, trade unions should have little or no influence on members' perceptions of crime related to immigrants.

On the other hand, potential violations of the exclusion restriction (e.g., Table 4) would suggest a specious causal effect of unions on perceived crime related to immigrants, when establishment size is used as an instrument. For instance, many field experiments have indicated that intergroup contact, which might be more prevalent at large establishments, can reduce bias towards immigrants and other racial minorities (Corno et al. 2022; Carrell et al. 2015; Finseraas et al. 2019). As another example, if labor marketing sorting is driving the previous results, workers with high cognitive ability hired at large establishments should be less influenced by false information that execrates immigrants' negative impact on crime (De keersmaecker and Roets 2017; Fitzgerald et al. 2012; Nunziata et al. 2016; Ousey and Kubrin 2018). In a nutshell, if the exclusion restriction is violated, one may expect a significant IV estimate of union membership on perceived crime related to immigrants.

To perform this placebo test, I use the first and seventh rounds of the ESS data collected circa 2002 and 2014, which provide information on the perceived impact of immigrants on crime. However, as the variable is only available in two rounds, there is a concern about whether statistical power is sufficient to detect potential violations of the exclusion restriction (for females, $N = 6287$; for males, $N = 7216$). To address this issue, I first replicate the previous IV results before conducting the placebo test. Figure 5 shows that even with only two rounds of the data, there is enough statistical power to detect the gendered influence of unions on their members' immigration attitudes. The IV point estimates are larger than those in the pooled ESS, which is consistent with the time trend observed earlier. More importantly, Figure 5 indicates that in both female and male samples, trade unions do not have a causal effect on their members' perceptions of crime problems related to immigrants (for females, $b = 0.507$, $p > 0.1$; for males, $b = -0.975$, $p > 0.1$). The placebo test thus provides additional evidence in favor of the IV validity.

5 Consequences for Organized Labor

If some union members tend to be less tolerant of immigrants, what are the implications for organized labor in an era with pervasive anti-immigration politics? Previous studies have linked anti-immigration politics to support for radical right populist parties among union members (Arndt and Rennwald 2016; Mosimann et al. 2019; Oesch 2008), to the integration of migrant workers into trade unions (Della Puppa 2020; Ibsen and Thelen 2017), and to the revitalization of the labor movement (Martínez Lucio and Connolly 2010; Ibsen and Tapia 2017). In what follows, I argue that anti-immigration politics may also influence trade unions' goal to fight against inequality by reducing support for redistribution among union members.

Studies have suggested that belonging to a union is positively related to preferences for redistribution via two mechanisms: an enlightenment effect whereby union members have better knowledge about their positions in the income distribution, and a solidarity effect whereby unions institutionalize distributive norms and breed trust between workers of diverse backgrounds (Mosimann and Pontusson 2017, 2022). Given this rationale, I suspect that anti-immigration politics, such as the xenophobic campaigns of radical right populist parties, will reduce union members' preferences for redistribution by undermining both enlightenment and solidarity effects. For the former, anti-immigration politics may induce union members to perceive immigrants to benefit disproportionately from redistributive policies (Alesina et al. 2023). For the latter, anti-immigration politics often depicts immigrants as less deserving by strengthening ingroup-outgroup bias, thereby justifying intergroup inequality (Jaśko and Kossowska 2013).

Moreover, I contemplate that the negative influence of anti-immigration politics on union members' preference for redistribution will be more pronounced for females. As Farris (2017) and Morgan (2017) indicate, radical right populist parties have strategically deploys "women's rights" to cultivate resentment against non-Western and Muslim immigrants. To co-opt female voters, radical right populist leaders have accused immigrants of violating commonly accepted liberal values such as gender equality. Since female union members tend to endorse progressive values, they may respond more strongly than male members when influenced by anti-immigration politics disguised by liberal arguments. Consequently, I expect that anti-immigration politics will reduce support for redistribution to a greater extent among female members than among male members.

I test this hypothesis using the ESS data, where respondents indicate their preferences for redistribution by answering to what extent they agree with the statement that "the government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels" (1 = disagree strongly, 5 = agree strongly). The influence of anti-immigration politics is proxied by anti-immigration attitudes, which is operationalized as the average of the economic and cultural impacts of immigrants (reverse coded). I use OLS regression to estimate a model with a three-way interaction between union membership, anti-immigration attitudes, and gender. For comparison, I also estimate models with no interaction term and a two-way interaction between union membership and anti-immigration attitudes. All models include baseline controls, round effects, country effects, and industry and occupation effects.

Table 6 presents the results from this analysis. Column 1 indicates that union members show more support for redistributive policies than non-members on average ($b = 0.093$, $p < 0.01$). Crucially, in column 2, the two-way interaction between union membership and anti-immigration attitudes is negative and statistically significant ($b = -0.023$, $p < 0.01$). This means that union members' preferences for redistribution, on average, decrease as anti-immigration attitudes increase. Column 3 further demonstrates a gender difference, as the three-way interaction between union membership, anti-immigration attitudes, and female gender is negative and statistically significant ($b = -0.015$, $p < 0.05$). To better characterize the three-way interaction, Figure 6 plots the marginal effects of union membership by anti-immigration attitudes and gender. It shows that anti-immigration attitudes reduce female union members' preferences for redistribution to a greater extent than male union members. Collectively, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that anti-immigration politics has a gendered negative influence on union members' support for redistribution.

6 Discussion and Conclusion

Organized labor has historically wrestled over the challenges posed by immigration (Fine and Tichenor 2009; Penninx and Roosblad 2000). White trade unions have endorsed more inclusive labor strategies in recent years (Donnelly 2016; Marino et al. 2015), it is unclear whether individual union members have followed their organizations and adopted a similar mindset towards immigrants. Drawing from theories of the insider-outsider divide, the present paper revisits the relationship between union membership and immigration attitudes. In addition to the influence of union leaders and labor market competition, I contend that preferences for job security and democracy constitute an overlooked source of bias against immigrants among union members. I further theorize that female union members are less susceptible to this bias, as they self-select into unions based on pre-existing liberal values.

I test this conceptual model with ten rounds of the European Social Survey data spanning from 2002 to 2020. Analyzing a sample of more than 90,000 workers in 15 advanced industrial societies, OLS regression analysis indicates that male union members have more negative perceptions of immigrants' economic and cultural impacts compared to their non-union counterparts. In contrast, female union members hold more positive attitudes towards immigrants than their non-union counterparts on average. Importantly, the union-nonunion gap in immigration attitudes cannot be fully explained by labor market competition. Instead, it is related to preferences for job security and democracy in a potentially gendered manner. I also document a concerning time trend in union members' immigration attitudes. After the refugee crisis, male union members become more negative in their views on immigration relative to non-members. In the meanwhile, female union members no longer show more pro-immigration attitudes than non-members on average.

After presenting the overall picture, I move to examine if trade unions have a causal influence on their members' immigration attitudes. Specifically, I resort to an IV approach and use establishment size as an instrument to identify the causal effect of unions. The results indicate that unions lead male members to have more pro-immigration attitudes, whereas no such effect is observed for female members. This gender difference is smaller in the labor sample than in the professional sample. Moreover, trade unions seem to influence immigration attitudes through an issue politics approach, rather than altering members' general political orientation. Collectively, the OLS and IV results are consistent with the proposed gender differences in selection into union membership.

Finally, I demonstrate an important consequence of anti-immigration politics for organized labor. I show that negative attitudes towards immigrants reduce union members' support for redistribution. This is likely because anti-immigration politics undermines both the enlightenment and solidarity effects of trade unions. Moreover, anti-immigration attitudes reduce female union members' preferences for redistribution to a greater extent than male union members, possibly due to the particular strategies adopted by radical right populist parties to attract female voters. Taken together, the analysis indicates that anti-immigration politics has a profound influence on trade unions' agenda of reducing social inequality.

The present study, however, does not come without limitations. For example, the analysis has ignored many Eastern European/immigrant-sending countries where different dynamics may exist between union membership and immigration attitudes (Card et al. 2005; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). Even within the 15 developed countries in the sample, there is significant amount of unexplained heterogeneity (see Figure A4 in the appendix). Future research can investigate these between-country differences by examining the influence of union traditions and structures (Ibsen and Thelen 2017; Visser 2012), institutional environment of trade unions (Baccaro et al. 2019; Kranendonk and De Beer 2016; Krings 2009; Marino 2012; Wrench 2004), and the characteristics of immigrants (Alarian and Neureiter 2021).

In terms of identification, while I have provided as much evidence as possible to bolster the validity of the IV approach, there may still exist unforeseen violations of the required identifying assumptions. Accordingly, future work can exploit other research designs to study the effect of trade unions on their members' immigration attitudes. Lastly, more work needs to be done to systematically examine the consequences of immigration politics for organized labor, such as new labor strategies and alternative forms of representation (Alberti et al. 2013; Fine et al. 2018; Ibsen and Thelen 2017; Rosenfeld 2019).

What practical implications might trade unions draw from the present study? Perhaps most importantly, union leaders may want to avoid the assumption that individual members would always take the pro-immigration positions of trade unions. Instead, more attention should be paid to the overlooked sources of bias against immigrants among union members, such as preferences for job security and industrial democracy. By continuing to emphasize the linked fate of the working class (Donnelly 2021), by recognizing the unique challenges faced by immigrants (Tapia and Alberti 2019), and by inoculating workers against the frustration with the messy, inefficient, and conflict-ridden process of democracy (Theiss-Morse and Hibbing 2005), trade unions will have a better chance to mobilize their members to create a more inclusive workplace. Meantime, union leaders might consider how immigration politics is related to the overall agenda of trade unions, rather than dismissing, evading, or relegating the challenges of immigration.

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Table 1. Means of Variables

	Full Sample	Union Members	Non-Members
Perceived economic impact of immigrants	5.53	5.57	5.50
Perceived cultural impact of immigrants	6.26	6.55	6.08
Union member	0.38		
Female	0.45	0.47	0.44
Age	42.87	44.45	41.88
Education (in years)	14.12	14.44	13.92
Income (deciles)	6.98	7.28	6.79
Left-right scale (0 = left, 10 = right)	5.02	4.94	5.06
Citizenship	0.95	0.97	0.93
Native (born in the country)	0.90	0.92	0.88
Household size	2.93	2.87	2.97
Religiosity (0 = not at all, 10 = very)	4.12	4.12	4.12
Supervisor at work	0.38	0.37	0.39
Employment Type			
Employee	0.88	0.95	0.84
Self-employed	0.12	0.05	0.16
Marital Status			
Never married	0.30	0.28	0.32
Married	0.58	0.60	0.58
Separated, divorced, widowed	0.11	0.13	0.11
Residence			
Big city	0.16	0.15	0.16
Suburban	0.15	0.17	0.14
Town or small city	0.31	0.31	0.30
Country village	0.30	0.26	0.32
Farm or countryside	0.09	0.11	0.07
Macro Indicators			
Immigrant inflow (% population)	0.72	0.71	0.72
Unemployment rate	7.11	6.75	7.34
GDP per capital (in $1,000)	45.30	45.40	45.24
Establishment Size			
Tiny (≤ 25 workers)	0.46	0.35	0.53
Small (25-99 workers)	0.24	0.28	0.21
Large (≥ 100 workers)	0.30	0.36	0.26
Preferences for job security (1-5)	4.25	4.25	4.25
Language as qualification (0-10)	6.26	5.75	6.63
Skill content (0 = communicational, 10 = manual)	4.06	4.07	4.06
Perceived crime (0 = negative = 10 = positive)	3.48	3.48	3.48
Preferences for redistribution (1-5)	3.66	3.69	3.65
Observations	91768	35347	56421

Notes: Data are from the ESS (individual-level variables), the OECD statistics (macro indicators), and Ortega and Polavieja (2012) (communicational-manual skill content). Individual-level variables are available in all ten rounds of the ESS, except for preferences for job security (Rounds 2 and 5), speaking a country's official language as immigration qualification (Rounds 1 and 7), and the perceived impact of immigrants on crime (Rounds 1 and 7). Sample includes the ESS respondents between 15-64 years old whose main activity was working in the last 7 days and who resided in 15 European countries: AT, BE, CH, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, GB, IE, IT, NL, NO, PT, SE. Results are weighted using the ESS design weights to adjust for unequal sampling probabilities across countries.

Table 2. OLS Coefficients of Union Membership on Immigration Attitudes

	Without Controls (1)	Baseline Controls (2)	Round Effects (3)	Country Effects (4)	Industry & Occupation (5)
Panel A. Economic Impact					
Full Sample	0.075**	−0.036	−0.028	−0.032	0.005
	(0.036)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.017)
Female Sample	0.254***	0.059*	0.081**	0.028	0.024
	(0.050)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.027)
Male Sample	−0.062*	−0.117***	−0.118***	−0.087***	−0.021
	(0.034)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.022)
$\hat{\beta}^{Female}_{Union\ member} - \hat{\beta}^{Male}_{Union\ member}$	0.315***	0.177***	0.199***	0.115***	0.045
	(0.049)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.043)
Panel B. Cultural Impact					
Full Sample	0.465***	0.343***	0.332***	−0.001	0.009
	(0.040)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.019)
Female Sample	0.718***	0.519***	0.511***	0.111***	0.067**
	(0.054)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.029)
Male Sample	0.237***	0.186***	0.174***	−0.099***	−0.046*
	(0.035)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.026)
$\hat{\beta}^{Female}_{Union\ member} - \hat{\beta}^{Male}_{Union\ member}$	0.480***	0.333***	0.337***	0.210***	0.113**
	(0.055)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.048)	(0.051)

Notes: The table presents the OLS coefficients of union membership on immigration attitudes, as well as the differences in OLS coefficients. Panels A and B show the results for the perceived economic and cultural impacts of immigrants, respectively. Each column represents a different specification, where baseline controls, round effects, country effects, and industry and occupation dummies are sequentially added. Each row indicates whether the full sample, female sample, or male sample is used for the analysis. The full sample consists of the ESS 1-10 respondents in 15 European countries, who were between 15-64 years old and worked in the last 7 days. Results are weighted using the ESS design weights. Standard errors are clustered at the occupation level and reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance levels at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. Furthermore, Table A2 in the appendix shows the results controlling for country-round effects. Table A3 in the appendix decomposes the contribution of each set of covariates (e.g., baseline controls) to the changes in the OLS coefficients of union membership, regardless of the order in which sets of covariates are included in regression.

Table 3. OLS Results Testing Preference-Based Selection

	Male Sample		Female Sample	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A. Economic Impact				
Union member	−0.075	−0.038	0.007	0.048
	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.059)	(0.058)
Preferences for job security		−0.264***		−0.253***
		(0.034)		(0.035)
$\Delta\hat{\beta}_{Union\ member}$	0.037***		0.041***	
	(0.007)		(0.009)	
Observations	9275	9275	7750	7750
R-squared	0.157	0.164	0.177	0.183
Panel B. Cultural Impact				
Union member	−0.108**	−0.091*	0.043	0.043
	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.078)	(0.071)
Language as qualification		−0.151***		−0.162***
		(0.008)		(0.009)
$\Delta\hat{\beta}_{Union\ member}$	0.017*		0.0001	
	(0.009)		(0.015)	
Observations	10644	10644	8694	8694
R-squared	0.180	0.211	0.238	0.275
Specification Details				
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Round	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry	No	No	No	No
Occupation	No	No	No	No

Notes: The table shows the OLS coefficients of union membership on immigration attitudes with and without controlling for the (antecedent of) insider identity for both male and female workers. Panel A shows the results for the perceived economic impact of immigrants, using a sample of eligible respondents in the ESS-2 and ESS-5. Panel B shows the results for the perceived cultural impact of immigrants, using a sample of eligible respondents in the ESS-1 and ESS-7. Preferences for job security is measured on a 5-point scale (1 = not important at all, 5 = very important). The importance of speaking a country's official language in deciding immigration qualification is measured on an 11-point scale (0 = extremely unimportant, 10 = extremely important). Results are weighted using the ESS design weights. Standard errors are clustered at the occupation level and reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance levels at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.

Table 4. Potential Violations of the IV Exclusion Restriction

Theory	Prediction	Scenario
Intergroup contact	Interaction between dominant and minority groups will break down stereotypes and encourage understanding towards each other (Allport 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006)	Large establishments have a more diverse workforce and therefore facilitate intergroup contact between workers of different races, ethnicities, and country origins (Ferguson 2016)
Labor market sorting	Individuals possess different skills, preferences, and characteristics. Hiring organizations offer various job characteristics and working conditions (Jovanovic 1979)	Large establishments select workers with higher ability (Brown and Medoff 1989; Lochner and Schulz 2024). Meanwhile, these workers are less influenced by false anti-immigration information and sentiments (De keersmaecker and Roets 2017)
Vulnerability theory	Individuals who are economically and socially vulnerable tend to express negative attitudes towards immigrants (Ceobanu 2011)	Large establishments provide better total compensation due to higher ability to pay and greater productivity (Oi and Idson 1999). This insures workers against risks
Social enforcement	Organizations visible to the public incline to respond to societal pressure concerning diversity and inclusion (Edelman 1992)	Large establishments face more social and regulatory pressure to provide training and implement protocols to promote diversity and inclusion

Notes: The table provides a brief summary of theories implying potential violations of the exclusion restriction, when establishment size is used as an instrument to identify the causal effect of unions on members' immigration attitudes. Overall, the examples indicate that workers in large establishments may hold more positive views on immigration compared to those in smaller ones, for reasons that are unrelated to trade unions.

Table 5. OLS Coefficients of Establishment Size on Selected Variables

	Female (1)	Age (2)	Native (3)	Education (4)	Income (5)	Big City (6)
Large (≥ 100 workers)	-0.020^{***}	0.248^{**}	-0.008^{***}	0.305^{***}	0.358^{***}	0.039^{***}
	(0.006)	(0.098)	(0.002)	(0.036)	(0.020)	(0.004)
Small (25-99 workers)	-0.008	0.010	-0.004^{**}	0.131^{***}	0.195^{***}	0.018^{***}
	(0.005)	(0.089)	(0.002)	(0.038)	(0.019)	(0.003)
$\hat{\beta}_{Large} - \hat{\beta}_{Small}$	-0.012^{***}	0.238^{**}	-0.004^{*}	0.173^{***}	0.163^{***}	0.021^{***}
	(0.004)	(0.102)	(0.002)	(0.032)	(0.019)	(0.004)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Round	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Occupation	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	91768	91768	91768	91768	91768	91768
R-squared	0.371	0.359	0.410	0.405	0.377	0.095

Notes: The table presents the OLS coefficients of establishment size on observed individual characteristics. The reference group is workers in tiny establishments (< 25 workers). The sample includes the ESS 1-10 respondents in 15 European countries, who were between 15-64 years old and worked in the last 7 days. Results are weighted using the ESS design weights. Standard errors are clustered at the occupation level and reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance levels at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.

Table 6. OLS Regression Results of Preferences for Redistribution

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Union member (a)	0.093***	0.185***	0.160***
	(0.009)	(0.016)	(0.023)
Anti-immigration attitudes (b)	−0.005***	0.003	−0.005
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Female (c)	0.103***	0.102***	0.031
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.022)
a × b		−0.023***	−0.016***
		(0.003)	(0.005)
a × c			0.061**
			(0.031)
b × c			0.018***
			(0.005)
a × b × c			−0.015**
			(0.007)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country	Yes	Yes	Yes
Round	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry	Yes	Yes	Yes
Occupation	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	91768	91768	91768
R-squared	0.194	0.195	0.195

Notes: The table presents the OLS results of immigration attitudes on the three-way interaction between union membership, anti-immigration attitudes, and gender. The sample includes the ESS 1-10 respondents in 15 European countries, who were between 15-64 years old and worked in the last 7 days. Results are weighted using the ESS design weights. Standard errors are clustered at the occupation level and reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance levels at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.

Figure 1. Trend in Immigration Attitudes by Country



Notes: The figure presents the country-specific trend in immigration attitudes in the ESS data. Panel A shows the results for the perceived economic impact of immigrants. Panel B shows the results for the perceived cultural impact of immigrants. The light blue/red color indicates the period before 2008 (ESS 1-3), and the dark blue/red color indicates the period after 2014 (ESS 7-10). Results are weighted using the ESS design weights. Over the past two decades, workers' perceptions of immigrants' economic and cultural impacts have become more positive in most countries, albeit there are a few exceptions such as Austria and Italy.

Figure 2. Marginal Effects of Union Membership on Immigration Attitudes by Gender and over Time with 95% CIs



Notes: The figure presents the marginal effects of union membership on immigration attitudes by time (proxied by a set of dummy variables for the ESS rounds) and gender from OLS regression. The bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals around the point estimates. The model includes baseline controls, round effects, country effects, industry and occupation effects, and, importantly, three-way interactions between union membership, time, and gender. Results are weighted using the ESS design weights. Standard errors are clustered at the occupation level. Panel A shows that before 2014, union members and non-members did not differ significantly in their perceived economic impact of immigrants. However, after 2014, male union members held less positive views on the economic impact of immigrants than non-members on average. Panel B shows that before 2014, female union member showed more positive perceptions of the cultural impact of immigrants than non-members, while male union members did not differ significantly from non-members. Yet after 2014, female union members became similar to non-members, while male union members held less positive views on the cultural impact of immigrants than non-members on average. Table A2 in the appendix confirms the time trend using sub-group analysis with a linear time trend.

Figure 3. Zero-First-Stage Test with 90% CIs (Self-Employed Workers)



Notes: The figure shows the OLS coefficients of establishment size on immigration attitudes among self-employed workers in small and tiny establishments (female N = 3317; male N = 7449). The bars indicate the 90% confidence intervals around the point estimates. The model includes baseline controls, round effects, country effects, and industry and occupation effects. Results are weighted using the ESS design weights. Standard errors are clustered at the occupation level. The analysis is a zero-first-stage test of establishment size as an instrument to identify the causal effect of unions on members attitudes. The idea is that self-employed workers, given their high autonomy and unique task structure, are not likely to join unions solely because of reduced cost of collective action. In other words, establishment size should not predict union membership among self-employed workers. Consequently, for these workers, a significant coefficient of establishment size on immigration attitudes is likely to be attributed to potential violations of the exclusion restriction (i.e., the influence of establishment size on immigration attitudes through non-union channels), whereas an insignificant coefficient can be interpreted as suggestive evidence for the IV validity. The results indicate that among both female and male samples, self-employed workers in small establishments do not differ significantly in immigration attitudes from those who in tiny establishments (all $p > 0.1$). Further analysis demonstrates that establishment size is not a significant predictor for union membership among self-employed workers (for the female sample, $b = 0.061$, $p > 0.1$; for the male sample, $b = 0.018$, $p > 0.1$).

Figure 4. IV Results with 90% CIs (Small and Tiny Establishments)



Notes: The figure shows the IV point estimates of union membership on immigration attitudes among workers in small and tiny establishments (female N = 30048; male N = 33977). The bars indicate the 90% confidence intervals. Results are estimated using the 2SLS with union membership instrumented by establishment size. The model includes baseline controls, round effects, country effects, and industry and occupation effects. Results are weighted using the ESS design weights. Standard errors are clustered at the occupation level. The first-stage effective F statistics for the instrument are 41.3 and 89.8 in the female and male samples, respectively. The results indicate that becoming a union member leads men to have more positive views on immigration, whereas no such effect is observed among women. Specifically, for the perceived economic impact of immigrants, the IV point estimate of union membership is negative and insignificant in the female sample ($b = -0.418$, $p > 0.1$), while positive and statistically significant in the male sample ($b = 1.312$, $p < 0.05$). Similarly, for the perceived cultural impact of immigrants, the IV point estimate of union membership is positive but insignificant in the female sample ($b = 0.316$, $p > 0.1$), while positive and statistically significant in the male sample ($b = 0.843$, $p < 0.1$).

Figure 5. IV Placebo Test with 90% CIs (Rounds 1 and 7)



Notes: The figure shows the IV point estimates of union membership on immigration attitudes among workers in small and tiny establishments in the ESS-1 and ESS-7 (female N = 6287; male N = 7216). The bars indicate the 90% confidence intervals. Results are estimated using the 2SLS with union membership instrumented by establishment size. The model includes baseline controls, round effects, country effects, and industry and occupation effects. Results are weighted using the ESS design weights. Standard errors are clustered at the occupation level. The first-stage effective F statistics for the instrument are 11.7 and 18.4 in the female and male samples, respectively. The figure indicates that even with only two rounds of the data, there is enough statistical power to detect the gendered influence of unions on their members' immigration attitudes. The IV point estimates for males using the ESS-1 and ESS-7 are larger than those in the pooled ESS, which is consistent with the time trend observed earlier. Since statistical power is not a major concern, I proceed to conduct a placebo test by estimating the IV results of union membership on the perceived impact of immigrants. The rationale is that if the instrument is valid, there should be no or little effect of union membership on perceived crime, given that radical right-wing populist politicians have strategically capitalized crime problems—a non-workplace issue—to co-opt union members into the anti-immigration movement. By contrast, the IV point estimates on perceived crime are likely to be positive and statistically significant in the presence of violations of the exclusion restriction as listed in Table 4. For instance, more frequent intergroup contact, at large establishments can reduce bias towards immigrants and racial minorities. As another example, workers with high cognitive ability hired at large establishments should be less influenced by false information that execrates immigrants' negative impact on crime, thereby showing more pro-immigration attitudes. The placebo test indicates that for both female and male samples, trade unions do not have a causal effect on their members' perceptions of crime problems related to immigrants (for females, $b = 0.507$, $p > 0.1$; for males, $b = -0.975$, $p > 0.1$). The results thus provide additional evidence in favor of the IV validity.

Figure 6. Marginal Effects of Union Membership on Preferences for Redistribution by Anti-Immigration Attitudes and Gender with 95% CIs



Notes: The figure shows the marginal effects of union membership on preferences for redistribution by anti-immigration attitudes and gender from OLS regression. The bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals around the point estimates. The model (column 3 of Table 7) includes three-way interactions between union membership, anti-immigration attitudes, and gender, controlling for baseline covariates, round effects, country effects, and industry and occupation effects. Results are weighted using the ESS design weights. Standard errors are clustered at the occupation level. The figure shows that anti-immigration attitudes reduce union members' preferences for redistribution, and importantly, to a greater extent for female members than for male members. The results thus support the idea that anti-immigration politics has a gendered negative influence on union members' support for redistribution.

Appendix

Table A1: Gelbach Decomposition of OLS Coefficients of Union Membership

Table A2: OLS Coefficients of Union Membership with a Linear Time Trend

Table A3: Preferences-based Selection or Labor Market Competition (Male Sample)?

Figure A1: Zero-First-Stage Test with 90% CIs (Policy Restrictions)

Figure A2: IV Results with 90% CIs (By Type of Workers)

Figure A3: IV Results with 90% CIs (Not Controlling for Left-Right Scale)

Figure A4: Marginal Effects of Union Membership on Immigration Attitudes by Country

Table A1. Gelbach Decomposition of OLS Coefficients of Union Membership

	Economic Impact			Cultural Impact		
	All	Females	Males	All	Females	Males
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Set of Variables						
Baseline controls	0.114***	0.181***	0.080***	0.082***	0.127***	0.049***
	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.016)
Round	−0.029***	−0.038***	−0.022***	0.001	−0.004	0.004
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Country	−0.017	0.042**	−0.053***	0.340***	0.436***	0.261***
	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.031)	(0.017)
Industry & occupation	0.002	0.045*	−0.045***	0.033	0.091***	−0.031
	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.030)	(0.019)
Total change ($\hat{\beta}^{Null} - \hat{\beta}^{Full}$)	0.070**	0.230***	−0.041	0.456***	0.650***	0.283***
	(0.032)	(0.043)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.037)	(0.030)
Observations	91768	41898	49870	91768	41898	49870

Notes: The table shows the contribution of each set of covariates to the changes in the OLS coefficients of union membership from column 1 to column 5 in Table 2, using a decomposition method developed by Gelbach (2016). This decomposition method accounts for the correlations among covariates and therefore is not influenced by the order of sequentially introducing different sets of covariates in regression. Results are weighted using the ESS design weights. Standard errors are clustered at the occupation level and reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance levels at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. The decomposition results indicate that including industry and occupation effects shrinks the OLS coefficients of union membership towards zero in both female and male samples. Interestingly, for the economic impact, the change caused by the inclusion of industry and occupation dummies is of similar magnitude in the female and male samples (columns 2 and 3). However, for the cultural impact, the magnitude of the change attributed to industries and occupations is much larger in the female sample than in the male sample (columns 5 and 6). This finding suggests that gender differences in selection into union membership are more likely to be driven by cultural reasons rather than economic reasons.

Table A2. OLS Coefficients of Union Membership with a Linear Time Trend

	Economic Impact			Cultural Impact		
	All	Females	Males	All	Females	Males
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Union member	0.087***	0.043	0.127***	0.096***	0.164***	0.045
	(0.032)	(0.048)	(0.042)	(0.035)	(0.049)	(0.050)
Round	0.044***	0.066***	0.028**	−0.004	0.006	−0.010
	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.010)
Union member × Round	−0.016***	−0.004	−0.029***	−0.016***	−0.018**	−0.017**
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Occupation	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	91768	41898	49870	91768	41898	49870
R-squared	0.183	0.191	0.186	0.214	0.238	0.205

Notes: The table shows the OLS coefficients of union membership on immigration attitudes in the full sample and by gender, specifying a linear time trend. Results are weighted using the ESS design weights. Standard errors are clustered at the occupation level and reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance levels at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.

Table A3. Preferences-based Selection or Labor Market Competition (Male Sample)?

	Coefficient of Union Membership			Change in Coefficient		
	Country Round	Skill Content	Industry Occupation	Skill Content	Industry Occupation	Difference (5) - (4)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A. Economic Impact						
Before 2014	-0.067^{**}	-0.008	-0.016	0.059^{***}	0.051^{***}	-0.008
	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.011)
After 2014	-0.141^{***}	-0.084^{**}	-0.053	0.056^{***}	0.089^{***}	0.032^{**}
	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.015)
Panel B. Cultural Impact						
Before 2014	-0.096^{***}	-0.037	-0.047	0.059^{***}	0.049^{***}	-0.010
	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.011)
After 2014	-0.129^{***}	-0.075^{*}	-0.064	0.054^{***}	0.065^{***}	0.011
	(0.047)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.014)

Notes: The table assesses the extent to which changes in the OLS coefficients of union membership after controlling for industries and occupations can be attributed to labor market competition. The exercise focuses on the male sample to avoid potential complications caused by gender differences in selection into union membership. Dependent variables in panels A and B are the perceived economic and cultural impacts of immigrants, respectively. Analyses are conducted for the periods before and after 2014 separately based on the observed time trend. Results are weighted using the ESS design weights. Standard errors are clustered at the occupation level and reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance levels at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. Column 1 shows the OLS coefficients of union membership controlling for baseline controls, country effects, and round effects. Column 2 additionally controls for exposure to labor market shocks of immigrants, which is proxied by communicational-manual skill content developed by Ortega and Polavieja (2012). The idea is that compared to jobs that require communicational skills, jobs that involve mainly manual skills are more influenced by immigrants. Column 3 controls for industry and occupation effects, but not skill content. Columns 4-6 compare changes in the OLS coefficients of union membership after controlling for skill content or industry and occupation effects. The results indicate that in the male sample, controlling for skill content and controlling for industries and occupations are of similar explanatory power before the refugee crisis: the OLS coefficients of union member both shrink towards zero and becomes statistically insignificantly (for the economic impact, $b = -0.008$, $p > 0.1$ after controlling for skill content, and $b = -0.016$, $p > 0.1$ after controlling for industries and occupations; for the cultural impact, $b = -0.037$, $p > 0.1$ after controlling for skill content, and $b = -0.047$, $p > 0.1$ after controlling for industries and occupations). However, after the refugee crisis, controlling for skill content cannot fully explain away the negative coefficients of union membership on pro-immigration attitudes (for the economic impact, $b = -0.084$, $p < 0.05$; for the cultural impact, $b = -0.075$, $p < 0.1$). By contrast, controlling for industries and occupations still renders the coefficients of union membership statistically insignificant (for the economic impact, $b = -0.053$, $p > 0.1$; for the cultural impact, $b = -0.064$, $p > 0.1$). Column 4 further suggests that the explanatory power of skill content is largely stable before and after the refugee crisis. By contrast, column 5 indicates that after the refugee crisis, industries and occupations explain more variation in union members' immigration attitudes. Collectively, the results are at odds with theories of labor market competition, which would predict skill content to be more salient in determining immigration attitudes after the refugee crisis due to the increased labor supply caused by immigrants.

Figure A1. Zero-First-Stage Test with 90% CIs (Policy Restrictions)



Notes: The figure shows the OLS coefficients of establishment size on immigration attitudes among self-employed workers in small and tiny establishments from six countries: Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Serbia, and Turkey (female N = 389; male N = 867). The bars indicate the 90% confidence intervals around the point estimates. The model includes baseline controls (no macro indicators), round effects, country effects, and industry and occupation effects. Results are weighted using the ESS design weights. Standard errors are clustered at the occupation level. The analysis is a zero-first-stage test, which utilizes policy restrictions to investigate the validity of establishment size as an instrument for union membership. Since national legislation in the six countries prevent most self-employed workers from being union members (ETUC 2018), establishment size should not predict union membership among these workers. Consequently, for this sample, a significant coefficient of establishment size on immigration attitudes is likely to be attributed to potential violations of the exclusion restriction (i.e., the influence of establishment size on immigration attitudes through non-union channels), whereas an insignificant coefficient can be interpreted as suggestive evidence for the IV validity. The results indicate that for both female and male samples, self-employed workers in small establishments do not differ significantly in immigration attitudes from those who in tiny establishments (all $p > 0.1$). Further analysis demonstrates that establishment size is not a significant predictor for union membership among self-employed workers in the six countries (for the female sample, $b = 0.087$, $p > 0.1$; for the male sample, $b = 0.063$, $p > 0.1$).

Figure A2. IV Results with 90% CIs (By Type of Workers)



Notes: The figure shows the IV point estimates of union membership on immigration attitudes by the type of workers (among small and tiny establishments): labor and professionals. The former includes workers in industries such as manufacturing, construction, hotels and restaurants, and wholesale and retail trade (N = 31293; NACE 1 broad section code 1-9). The latter consists of workers in public administration, education, financial and business sectors, and other related industries (N = 32551; NACE 1 broad section code 10-17). The model includes baseline controls, round effects, country effects, and industry and occupation effects. Results are weighted using the ESS design weights. Standard errors are clustered at the occupation level. The figure indicates that for labor, the IV point estimates are positive in both female and male samples. By contrast, for professionals, the IV point estimates are negative for females but positive for males. One possible explanation is that given the traditionally masculine culture of labor, females who select into these industries may have preferences more or less similar to males. Consequently, gender differences in selection into union membership and union influence are smaller among labor than among professionals.

Figure A3. IV Results with 90% CIs (Not Controlling for Left-Right Scale)



Notes: The figure shows the IV point estimates of union membership on immigration attitudes among workers in small and tiny establishments (female N = 30048; male N = 33977). The bars indicate the 90% confidence intervals. Results are estimated using the 2SLS with union membership instrumented by establishment size. The model includes baseline controls except for self-placement on the left-right scale, round effects, country effects, and industry and occupation effects. Results are weighted using the ESS design weights. Standard errors are clustered at the occupation level. The first-stage effective F statistics for the instrument are 42.2 and 93.0 in the female and male samples, respectively. The IV results remain almost identical without controlling for self-placement on the left-right scale. This finding indicates that unions are more likely change members' immigration attitudes through an issue politics approach instead of a general political orientation approach.

Figure A4. Marginal Effects of Union Membership on Immigration Attitudes by Country with 95% CIs



Notes: The figure shows the marginal effects of union membership on immigration attitudes in each country from OLS regression. The bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals around the point estimates. The model includes baseline controls, round effects, country effects, industry and occupation effects, and, importantly, three-way interactions between union membership, country, and gender. Standard errors are clustered at the occupation level. Results are weighted using the ESS design weights. The figure indicates that there is significant country heterogeneity in union members' immigration attitudes compared to non-members, even after limiting the analysis to 15 advanced industrial societies.