crypto: hisilicon/qm - Support queue update function #1

lin755 · 2021-04-25T09:24:06Z

Signed-off-by: linwenkai linwenkai6@hisilicon.com

gaozhangfei

pls add some description, why need this change, how test, etc.

When poll is used in userspace, kernel calls the update function to query the queue status and return result.If no new task,the thread sleeps and wait for interrupt wakeup. Signed-off-by: linwenkai <linwenkai6@hisilicon.com>

lin755 · 2021-04-26T01:31:13Z

pls add some description, why need this change, how test, etc.

I have add some description in commit now.

lin755 · 2021-04-26T01:51:46Z

pls add some description, why need this change, how test, etc.

I have add some description in commit now.

This reverts commit f4b34fa. Since commit f4b34fa ("drm/imx: Annotate dma-fence critical section in commit path") the following possible circular dependency is detected: [ 5.001811] ====================================================== [ 5.001817] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 5.001824] 5.14.9-01225-g45da36cc6fcc-dirty #1 Tainted: G W [ 5.001833] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 5.001838] kworker/u8:0/7 is trying to acquire lock: [ 5.001848] c1752080 (regulator_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: regulator_lock_dependent+0x40/0x294 [ 5.001903] [ 5.001903] but task is already holding lock: [ 5.001909] c176df78 (dma_fence_map){++++}-{0:0}, at: imx_drm_atomic_commit_tail+0x10/0x160 [ 5.001957] [ 5.001957] which lock already depends on the new lock. ... Revert it for now. Tested on a imx6q-sabresd. Fixes: f4b34fa ("drm/imx: Annotate dma-fence critical section in commit path") Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <festevam@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20211104001112.4035691-1-festevam@gmail.com

We used to include an alignment overhead into a search length, in that case we guarantee that a found area will definitely fit after applying a specific alignment that user specifies. From the other hand we do not guarantee that an area has the lowest address if an alignment is >= PAGE_SIZE. It means that, when a user specifies a special alignment together with a range that corresponds to an exact requested size then an allocation will fail. This is what happens to KASAN, it wants the free block that exactly matches a specified range during onlining memory banks: [root@vm-0 fedora]# echo online > /sys/devices/system/memory/memory82/state [root@vm-0 fedora]# echo online > /sys/devices/system/memory/memory83/state [root@vm-0 fedora]# echo online > /sys/devices/system/memory/memory85/state [root@vm-0 fedora]# echo online > /sys/devices/system/memory/memory84/state vmap allocation for size 16777216 failed: use vmalloc=<size> to increase size bash: vmalloc: allocation failure: 16777216 bytes, mode:0x6000c0(GFP_KERNEL), nodemask=(null),cpuset=/,mems_allowed=0 CPU: 4 PID: 1644 Comm: bash Kdump: loaded Not tainted 4.18.0-339.el8.x86_64+debug #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x8e/0xd0 warn_alloc.cold.90+0x8a/0x1b2 ? zone_watermark_ok_safe+0x300/0x300 ? slab_free_freelist_hook+0x85/0x1a0 ? __get_vm_area_node+0x240/0x2c0 ? kfree+0xdd/0x570 ? kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace+0x157/0x230 ? notifier_call_chain+0x90/0x160 __vmalloc_node_range+0x465/0x840 ? mark_held_locks+0xb7/0x120 Fix it by making sure that find_vmap_lowest_match() returns lowest start address with any given alignment value, i.e. for alignments bigger then PAGE_SIZE the algorithm rolls back toward parent nodes checking right sub-trees if the most left free block did not fit due to alignment overhead. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211004142829.22222-1-urezki@gmail.com Fixes: 68ad4a3 ("mm/vmalloc.c: keep track of free blocks for vmap allocation") Signed-off-by: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com> Reported-by: Ping Fang <pifang@redhat.com> Tested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Oleksiy Avramchenko <oleksiy.avramchenko@sonymobile.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

With KASAN_VMALLOC and NEED_PER_CPU_PAGE_FIRST_CHUNK the kernel crashes: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff7000028f2000 ... swapper pgtable: 64k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000042440000 [ffff7000028f2000] pgd=000000063e7c0003, p4d=000000063e7c0003, pud=000000063e7c0003, pmd=000000063e7b0003, pte=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.13.0-rc4-00003-gc6e6e28f3f30-dirty #62 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 200000c5 (nzCv daIF -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--) pc : kasan_check_range+0x90/0x1a0 lr : memcpy+0x88/0xf4 sp : ffff80001378fe20 ... Call trace: kasan_check_range+0x90/0x1a0 pcpu_page_first_chunk+0x3f0/0x568 setup_per_cpu_areas+0xb8/0x184 start_kernel+0x8c/0x328 The vm area used in vm_area_register_early() has no kasan shadow memory, Let's add a new kasan_populate_early_vm_area_shadow() function to populate the vm area shadow memory to fix the issue. [wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com: fix redefinition of 'kasan_populate_early_vm_area_shadow'] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211011123211.3936196-1-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210910053354.26721-4-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> [KASAN] Acked-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> [KASAN] Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

There was a report that starting an Ubuntu in docker while using cpuset to bind it to movable nodes (a node only has movable zone, like a node for hotplug or a Persistent Memory node in normal usage) will fail due to memory allocation failure, and then OOM is involved and many other innocent processes got killed. It can be reproduced with command: $ docker run -it --rm --cpuset-mems 4 ubuntu:latest bash -c "grep Mems_allowed /proc/self/status" (where node 4 is a movable node) runc:[2:INIT] invoked oom-killer: gfp_mask=0x500cc2(GFP_HIGHUSER|__GFP_ACCOUNT), order=0, oom_score_adj=0 CPU: 8 PID: 8291 Comm: runc:[2:INIT] Tainted: G W I E 5.8.2-0.g71b519a-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed (unreleased) Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R640/0PHYDR, BIOS 2.6.4 04/09/2020 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x6b/0x88 dump_header+0x4a/0x1e2 oom_kill_process.cold+0xb/0x10 out_of_memory.part.0+0xaf/0x230 out_of_memory+0x3d/0x80 __alloc_pages_slowpath.constprop.0+0x954/0xa20 __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x2d3/0x300 pipe_write+0x322/0x590 new_sync_write+0x196/0x1b0 vfs_write+0x1c3/0x1f0 ksys_write+0xa7/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xd0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Mem-Info: active_anon:392832 inactive_anon:182 isolated_anon:0 active_file:68130 inactive_file:151527 isolated_file:0 unevictable:2701 dirty:0 writeback:7 slab_reclaimable:51418 slab_unreclaimable:116300 mapped:45825 shmem:735 pagetables:2540 bounce:0 free:159849484 free_pcp:73 free_cma:0 Node 4 active_anon:1448kB inactive_anon:0kB active_file:0kB inactive_file:0kB unevictable:0kB isolated(anon):0kB isolated(file):0kB mapped:0kB dirty:0kB writeback:0kB shmem:0kB shmem_thp: 0kB shmem_pmdmapped: 0kB anon_thp: 0kB writeback_tmp:0kB all_unreclaimable? no Node 4 Movable free:130021408kB min:9140kB low:139160kB high:269180kB reserved_highatomic:0KB active_anon:1448kB inactive_anon:0kB active_file:0kB inactive_file:0kB unevictable:0kB writepending:0kB present:130023424kB managed:130023424kB mlocked:0kB kernel_stack:0kB pagetables:0kB bounce:0kB free_pcp:292kB local_pcp:84kB free_cma:0kB lowmem_reserve[]: 0 0 0 0 0 Node 4 Movable: 1*4kB (M) 0*8kB 0*16kB 1*32kB (M) 0*64kB 0*128kB 1*256kB (M) 1*512kB (M) 1*1024kB (M) 0*2048kB 31743*4096kB (M) = 130021156kB oom-kill:constraint=CONSTRAINT_CPUSET,nodemask=(null),cpuset=docker-9976a269caec812c134fa317f27487ee36e1129beba7278a463dd53e5fb9997b.scope,mems_allowed=4,global_oom,task_memcg=/system.slice/containerd.service,task=containerd,pid=4100,uid=0 Out of memory: Killed process 4100 (containerd) total-vm:4077036kB, anon-rss:51184kB, file-rss:26016kB, shmem-rss:0kB, UID:0 pgtables:676kB oom_score_adj:0 oom_reaper: reaped process 8248 (docker), now anon-rss:0kB, file-rss:0kB, shmem-rss:0kB oom_reaper: reaped process 2054 (node_exporter), now anon-rss:0kB, file-rss:0kB, shmem-rss:0kB oom_reaper: reaped process 1452 (systemd-journal), now anon-rss:0kB, file-rss:8564kB, shmem-rss:4kB oom_reaper: reaped process 2146 (munin-node), now anon-rss:0kB, file-rss:0kB, shmem-rss:0kB oom_reaper: reaped process 8291 (runc:[2:INIT]), now anon-rss:0kB, file-rss:0kB, shmem-rss:0kB The reason is that in this case, the target cpuset nodes only have movable zone, while the creation of an OS in docker sometimes needs to allocate memory in non-movable zones (dma/dma32/normal) like GFP_HIGHUSER, and the cpuset limit forbids the allocation, then out-of-memory killing is involved even when normal nodes and movable nodes both have many free memory. The OOM killer cannot help to resolve the situation as there is no usable memory for the request in the cpuset scope. The only reasonable measure to take is to fail the allocation right away and have the caller to deal with it. So add a check for cases like this in the slowpath of allocation, and bail out early returning NULL for the allocation. As page allocation is one of the hottest path in kernel, this check will hurt all users with sane cpuset configuration, add a static branch check and detect the abnormal config in cpuset memory binding setup so that the extra check cost in page allocation is not paid by everyone. [thanks to Micho Hocko and David Rientjes for suggesting not handling it inside OOM code, adding cpuset check, refining comments] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1632481657-68112-1-git-send-email-feng.tang@intel.com Signed-off-by: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com> Suggested-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Zefan Li <lizefan.x@bytedance.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

PagePoisoned() accesses page->flags which can be updated concurrently: | BUG: KCSAN: data-race in next_uptodate_page / unlock_page | | write (marked) to 0xffffea00050f37c0 of 8 bytes by task 1872 on cpu 1: | instrument_atomic_write include/linux/instrumented.h:87 [inline] | clear_bit_unlock_is_negative_byte include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-lock.h:74 [inline] | unlock_page+0x102/0x1b0 mm/filemap.c:1465 | filemap_map_pages+0x6c6/0x890 mm/filemap.c:3057 | ... | read to 0xffffea00050f37c0 of 8 bytes by task 1873 on cpu 0: | PagePoisoned include/linux/page-flags.h:204 [inline] | PageReadahead include/linux/page-flags.h:382 [inline] | next_uptodate_page+0x456/0x830 mm/filemap.c:2975 | ... | CPU: 0 PID: 1873 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 5.11.0-rc4-00001-gf9ce0be71d1f #1 To avoid the compiler tearing or otherwise optimizing the access, use READ_ONCE() to access flags. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20210826144157.GA26950@xsang-OptiPlex-9020/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210913113542.2658064-1-elver@google.com Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Patch series "Solve silent data loss caused by poisoned page cache (shmem/tmpfs)", v5. When discussing the patch that splits page cache THP in order to offline the poisoned page, Noaya mentioned there is a bigger problem [1] that prevents this from working since the page cache page will be truncated if uncorrectable errors happen. By looking this deeper it turns out this approach (truncating poisoned page) may incur silent data loss for all non-readonly filesystems if the page is dirty. It may be worse for in-memory filesystem, e.g. shmem/tmpfs since the data blocks are actually gone. To solve this problem we could keep the poisoned dirty page in page cache then notify the users on any later access, e.g. page fault, read/write, etc. The clean page could be truncated as is since they can be reread from disk later on. The consequence is the filesystems may find poisoned page and manipulate it as healthy page since all the filesystems actually don't check if the page is poisoned or not in all the relevant paths except page fault. In general, we need make the filesystems be aware of poisoned page before we could keep the poisoned page in page cache in order to solve the data loss problem. To make filesystems be aware of poisoned page we should consider: - The page should be not written back: clearing dirty flag could prevent from writeback. - The page should not be dropped (it shows as a clean page) by drop caches or other callers: the refcount pin from hwpoison could prevent from invalidating (called by cache drop, inode cache shrinking, etc), but it doesn't avoid invalidation in DIO path. - The page should be able to get truncated/hole punched/unlinked: it works as it is. - Notify users when the page is accessed, e.g. read/write, page fault and other paths (compression, encryption, etc). The scope of the last one is huge since almost all filesystems need do it once a page is returned from page cache lookup. There are a couple of options to do it: 1. Check hwpoison flag for every path, the most straightforward way. 2. Return NULL for poisoned page from page cache lookup, the most callsites check if NULL is returned, this should have least work I think. But the error handling in filesystems just return -ENOMEM, the error code will incur confusion to the users obviously. 3. To improve #2, we could return error pointer, e.g. ERR_PTR(-EIO), but this will involve significant amount of code change as well since all the paths need check if the pointer is ERR or not just like option #1. I did prototypes for both #1 and #3, but it seems #3 may require more changes than #1. For #3 ERR_PTR will be returned so all the callers need to check the return value otherwise invalid pointer may be dereferenced, but not all callers really care about the content of the page, for example, partial truncate which just sets the truncated range in one page to 0. So for such paths it needs additional modification if ERR_PTR is returned. And if the callers have their own way to handle the problematic pages we need to add a new FGP flag to tell FGP functions to return the pointer to the page. It may happen very rarely, but once it happens the consequence (data corruption) could be very bad and it is very hard to debug. It seems this problem had been slightly discussed before, but seems no action was taken at that time. [2] As the aforementioned investigation, it needs huge amount of work to solve the potential data loss for all filesystems. But it is much easier for in-memory filesystems and such filesystems actually suffer more than others since even the data blocks are gone due to truncating. So this patchset starts from shmem/tmpfs by taking option #1. TODO: * The unpoison has been broken since commit 0ed950d ("mm,hwpoison: make get_hwpoison_page() call get_any_page()"), and this patch series make refcount check for unpoisoning shmem page fail. * Expand to other filesystems. But I haven't heard feedback from filesystem developers yet. Patch breakdown: Patch #1: cleanup, depended by patch #2 Patch #2: fix THP with hwpoisoned subpage(s) PMD map bug Patch #3: coding style cleanup Patch #4: refactor and preparation. Patch #5: keep the poisoned page in page cache and handle such case for all the paths. Patch #6: the previous patches unblock page cache THP split, so this patch add page cache THP split support. This patch (of 4): A minor cleanup to the indent. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211020210755.23964-1-shy828301@gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211020210755.23964-4-shy828301@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Patch series "fix two bugs for file THP". This patch (of 2): Transparent huge page has supported read-only non-shmem files. The file- backed THP is collapsed by khugepaged and truncated when written (for shared libraries). However, there is a race when multiple writers truncate the same page cache concurrently. In that case, subpage(s) of file THP can be revealed by find_get_entry in truncate_inode_pages_range, which will trigger PageTail BUG_ON in truncate_inode_page, as follows: page:000000009e420ff2 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x7ff pfn:0x50c3ff head:0000000075ff816d order:9 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0x37fffe0000010815(locked|uptodate|lru|arch_1|head) raw: 37fffe0000000000 fffffe0013108001 dead000000000122 dead000000000400 raw: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 head: 37fffe0000010815 fffffe001066bd48 ffff000404183c20 0000000000000000 head: 0000000000000600 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff ffff000c0345a000 page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PageTail(page)) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at mm/truncate.c:213! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: xfs(E) libcrc32c(E) rfkill(E) ... CPU: 14 PID: 11394 Comm: check_madvise_d Kdump: ... Hardware name: ECS, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--) Call trace: truncate_inode_page+0x64/0x70 truncate_inode_pages_range+0x550/0x7e4 truncate_pagecache+0x58/0x80 do_dentry_open+0x1e4/0x3c0 vfs_open+0x38/0x44 do_open+0x1f0/0x310 path_openat+0x114/0x1dc do_filp_open+0x84/0x134 do_sys_openat2+0xbc/0x164 __arm64_sys_openat+0x74/0xc0 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x88/0x220 do_el0_svc+0x30/0xa0 el0_svc+0x20/0x30 el0_sync_handler+0x1a4/0x1b0 el0_sync+0x180/0x1c0 Code: aa0103e0 900061e1 910ec021 9400d300 (d4210000) This patch mainly to lock filemap when one enter truncate_pagecache(), avoiding truncating the same page cache concurrently. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211025092134.18562-1-rongwei.wang@linux.alibaba.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211025092134.18562-2-rongwei.wang@linux.alibaba.com Fixes: eb6ecbe ("mm, thp: relax the VM_DENYWRITE constraint on file-backed THPs") Signed-off-by: Xu Yu <xuyu@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Rongwei Wang <rongwei.wang@linux.alibaba.com> Suggested-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Tested-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org> Cc: Collin Fijalkovich <cfijalkovich@google.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com> Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

If we do a direct IO read or write when the buffer given by the user is memory mapped to the file range we are going to do IO, we end up ending in a deadlock. This is triggered by the new test case generic/647 from fstests. For a direct IO read we get a trace like this: [967.872718] INFO: task mmap-rw-fault:12176 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [967.874161] Not tainted 5.14.0-rc7-btrfs-next-95 #1 [967.874909] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [967.875983] task:mmap-rw-fault state:D stack: 0 pid:12176 ppid: 11884 flags:0x00000000 [967.875992] Call Trace: [967.875999] __schedule+0x3ca/0xe10 [967.876015] schedule+0x43/0xe0 [967.876020] wait_extent_bit.constprop.0+0x1eb/0x260 [btrfs] [967.876109] ? do_wait_intr_irq+0xb0/0xb0 [967.876118] lock_extent_bits+0x37/0x90 [btrfs] [967.876150] btrfs_lock_and_flush_ordered_range+0xa9/0x120 [btrfs] [967.876184] ? extent_readahead+0xa7/0x530 [btrfs] [967.876214] extent_readahead+0x32d/0x530 [btrfs] [967.876253] ? lru_cache_add+0x104/0x220 [967.876255] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x40 [967.876258] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xd/0x110 [967.876263] ? lock_release+0x155/0x4a0 [967.876271] read_pages+0x86/0x270 [967.876274] ? lru_cache_add+0x125/0x220 [967.876281] page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x1a3/0x220 [967.876291] filemap_fault+0x626/0xa20 [967.876303] __do_fault+0x36/0xf0 [967.876308] __handle_mm_fault+0x83f/0x15f0 [967.876322] handle_mm_fault+0x9e/0x260 [967.876327] __get_user_pages+0x204/0x620 [967.876332] ? get_user_pages_unlocked+0x69/0x340 [967.876340] get_user_pages_unlocked+0xd3/0x340 [967.876349] internal_get_user_pages_fast+0xbca/0xdc0 [967.876366] iov_iter_get_pages+0x8d/0x3a0 [967.876374] bio_iov_iter_get_pages+0x82/0x4a0 [967.876379] ? lock_release+0x155/0x4a0 [967.876387] iomap_dio_bio_actor+0x232/0x410 [967.876396] iomap_apply+0x12a/0x4a0 [967.876398] ? iomap_dio_rw+0x30/0x30 [967.876414] __iomap_dio_rw+0x29f/0x5e0 [967.876415] ? iomap_dio_rw+0x30/0x30 [967.876420] ? lock_acquired+0xf3/0x420 [967.876429] iomap_dio_rw+0xa/0x30 [967.876431] btrfs_file_read_iter+0x10b/0x140 [btrfs] [967.876460] new_sync_read+0x118/0x1a0 [967.876472] vfs_read+0x128/0x1b0 [967.876477] __x64_sys_pread64+0x90/0xc0 [967.876483] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 [967.876487] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [967.876490] RIP: 0033:0x7fb6f2c038d6 [967.876493] RSP: 002b:00007fffddf586b8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000011 [967.876496] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000001000 RCX: 00007fb6f2c038d6 [967.876498] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 00007fb6f2c17000 RDI: 0000000000000003 [967.876499] RBP: 0000000000001000 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000000 [967.876501] R10: 0000000000001000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003 [967.876502] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fb6f2c17000 R15: 0000000000000000 This happens because at btrfs_dio_iomap_begin() we lock the extent range and return with it locked - we only unlock in the endio callback, at end_bio_extent_readpage() -> endio_readpage_release_extent(). Then after iomap called the btrfs_dio_iomap_begin() callback, it triggers the page faults that resulting in reading the pages, through the readahead callback btrfs_readahead(), and through there we end to attempt to lock again the same extent range (or a subrange of what we locked before), resulting in the deadlock. For a direct IO write, the scenario is a bit different, and it results in trace like this: [1132.442520] run fstests generic/647 at 2021-08-31 18:53:35 [1330.349355] INFO: task mmap-rw-fault:184017 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [1330.350540] Not tainted 5.14.0-rc7-btrfs-next-95 #1 [1330.351158] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [1330.351900] task:mmap-rw-fault state:D stack: 0 pid:184017 ppid:183725 flags:0x00000000 [1330.351906] Call Trace: [1330.351913] __schedule+0x3ca/0xe10 [1330.351930] schedule+0x43/0xe0 [1330.351935] btrfs_start_ordered_extent+0x108/0x1c0 [btrfs] [1330.352020] ? do_wait_intr_irq+0xb0/0xb0 [1330.352028] btrfs_lock_and_flush_ordered_range+0x8c/0x120 [btrfs] [1330.352064] ? extent_readahead+0xa7/0x530 [btrfs] [1330.352094] extent_readahead+0x32d/0x530 [btrfs] [1330.352133] ? lru_cache_add+0x104/0x220 [1330.352135] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x40 [1330.352138] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xd/0x110 [1330.352143] ? lock_release+0x155/0x4a0 [1330.352151] read_pages+0x86/0x270 [1330.352155] ? lru_cache_add+0x125/0x220 [1330.352162] page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x1a3/0x220 [1330.352172] filemap_fault+0x626/0xa20 [1330.352176] ? filemap_map_pages+0x18b/0x660 [1330.352184] __do_fault+0x36/0xf0 [1330.352189] __handle_mm_fault+0x1253/0x15f0 [1330.352203] handle_mm_fault+0x9e/0x260 [1330.352208] __get_user_pages+0x204/0x620 [1330.352212] ? get_user_pages_unlocked+0x69/0x340 [1330.352220] get_user_pages_unlocked+0xd3/0x340 [1330.352229] internal_get_user_pages_fast+0xbca/0xdc0 [1330.352246] iov_iter_get_pages+0x8d/0x3a0 [1330.352254] bio_iov_iter_get_pages+0x82/0x4a0 [1330.352259] ? lock_release+0x155/0x4a0 [1330.352266] iomap_dio_bio_actor+0x232/0x410 [1330.352275] iomap_apply+0x12a/0x4a0 [1330.352278] ? iomap_dio_rw+0x30/0x30 [1330.352292] __iomap_dio_rw+0x29f/0x5e0 [1330.352294] ? iomap_dio_rw+0x30/0x30 [1330.352306] btrfs_file_write_iter+0x238/0x480 [btrfs] [1330.352339] new_sync_write+0x11f/0x1b0 [1330.352344] ? NF_HOOK_LIST.constprop.0.cold+0x31/0x3e [1330.352354] vfs_write+0x292/0x3c0 [1330.352359] __x64_sys_pwrite64+0x90/0xc0 [1330.352365] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 [1330.352369] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [1330.352372] RIP: 0033:0x7f4b0a580986 [1330.352379] RSP: 002b:00007ffd34d75418 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000012 [1330.352382] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000001000 RCX: 00007f4b0a580986 [1330.352383] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 00007f4b0a3a4000 RDI: 0000000000000003 [1330.352385] RBP: 00007f4b0a3a4000 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000000 [1330.352386] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003 [1330.352387] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Unlike for reads, at btrfs_dio_iomap_begin() we return with the extent range unlocked, but later when the page faults are triggered and we try to read the extents, we end up btrfs_lock_and_flush_ordered_range() where we find the ordered extent for our write, created by the iomap callback btrfs_dio_iomap_begin(), and we wait for it to complete, which makes us deadlock since we can't complete the ordered extent without reading the pages (the iomap code only submits the bio after the pages are faulted in). Fix this by setting the nofault attribute of the given iov_iter and retry the direct IO read/write if we get an -EFAULT error returned from iomap. For reads, also disable page faults completely, this is because when we read from a hole or a prealloc extent, we can still trigger page faults due to the call to iov_iter_zero() done by iomap - at the moment, it is oblivious to the value of the ->nofault attribute of an iov_iter. We also need to keep track of the number of bytes written or read, and pass it to iomap_dio_rw(), as well as use the new flag IOMAP_DIO_PARTIAL. This depends on the iov_iter and iomap changes introduced in commit c03098d ("Merge tag 'gfs2-v5.15-rc5-mmap-fault' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gfs2/linux-gfs2"). Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

After removing /dev/kmem, sanitizing /proc/kcore and handling /dev/mem, this series tackles the last sane way how a VM could accidentially access logically unplugged memory managed by a virtio-mem device: /proc/vmcore When dumping memory via "makedumpfile", PG_offline pages, used by virtio-mem to flag logically unplugged memory, are already properly excluded; however, especially when accessing/copying /proc/vmcore "the usual way", we can still end up reading logically unplugged memory part of a virtio-mem device. Patch #1-#3 are cleanups. Patch #4 extends the existing oldmem_pfn_is_ram mechanism. Patch #5-#7 are virtio-mem refactorings for patch #8, which implements the virtio-mem logic to query the state of device blocks. Patch #8: "Although virtio-mem currently supports reading unplugged memory in the hypervisor, this will change in the future, indicated to the device via a new feature flag. We similarly sanitized /proc/kcore access recently. [...] Distributions that support virtio-mem+kdump have to make sure that the virtio_mem module will be part of the kdump kernel or the kdump initrd; dracut was recently [2] extended to include virtio-mem in the generated initrd. As long as no special kdump kernels are used, this will automatically make sure that virtio-mem will be around in the kdump initrd and sanitize /proc/vmcore access -- with dracut" This is the last remaining bit to support VIRTIO_MEM_F_UNPLUGGED_INACCESSIBLE [3] in the Linux implementation of virtio-mem. Note: this is best-effort. We'll never be able to control what runs inside the second kernel, really, but we also don't have to care: we only care about sane setups where we don't want our VM getting zapped once we touch the wrong memory location while dumping. While we usually expect sane setups to use "makedumfile", nothing really speaks against just copying /proc/vmcore, especially in environments where HWpoisioning isn't typically expected. Also, we really don't want to put all our trust completely on the memmap, so sanitizing also makes sense when just using "makedumpfile". [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210526093041.8800-1-david@redhat.com [2] dracutdevs/dracut#1157 [3] https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/virtio-comment/202109/msg00021.html This patch (of 9): The callback is only used for the vmcore nowadays. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211005121430.30136-1-david@redhat.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211005121430.30136-2-david@redhat.com Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrvsky@oracle.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Problem Description: When running running ~128 parallel instances of TZ=/etc/localtime ps -fe >/dev/null on a 128CPU machine, the %sys utilization reaches 97%, and perf shows the following code path as being responsible for heavy contention on the d_lockref spinlock: walk_component() lookup_fast() d_revalidate() pid_revalidate() // returns -ECHILD unlazy_child() lockref_get_not_dead(&nd->path.dentry->d_lockref) <-- contention The reason is that pid_revalidate() is triggering a drop from RCU to ref path walk mode. All concurrent path lookups thus try to grab a reference to the dentry for /proc/, before re-executing pid_revalidate() and then stepping into the /proc/$pid directory. Thus there is huge spinlock contention. This patch allows pid_revalidate() to execute in RCU mode, meaning that the path lookup can successfully enter the /proc/$pid directory while still in RCU mode. Later on, the path lookup may still drop into ref mode, but the contention will be much reduced at this point. By applying this patch, %sys utilization falls to around 85% under the same workload, and the number of ps processes executed per unit time increases by 3x-4x. Although this particular workload is a bit contrived, we have seen some large collections of eager monitoring scripts which produced similarly high %sys time due to contention in the /proc directory. As a result this patch, Al noted that several procfs methods which were only called in ref-walk mode could now be called from RCU mode. To ensure that this patch is safe, I audited all the inode get_link and permission() implementations, as well as dentry d_revalidate() implementations, in fs/proc. The purpose here is to ensure that they either are safe to call in RCU (i.e. don't sleep) or correctly bail out of RCU mode if they don't support it. My analysis shows that all at-risk procfs methods are safe to call under RCU, and thus this patch is safe. Procfs RCU-walk Analysis: This analysis is up-to-date with 5.15-rc3. When called under RCU mode, these functions have arguments as follows: * get_link() receives a NULL dentry pointer when called in RCU mode. * permission() receives MAY_NOT_BLOCK in the mode parameter when called from RCU. * d_revalidate() receives LOOKUP_RCU in flags. For the following functions, either they are trivially RCU safe, or they explicitly bail at the beginning of the function when they run: proc_ns_get_link (bails out) proc_get_link (RCU safe) proc_pid_get_link (bails out) map_files_d_revalidate (bails out) map_misc_d_revalidate (bails out) proc_net_d_revalidate (RCU safe) proc_sys_revalidate (bails out, also not under /proc/$pid) tid_fd_revalidate (bails out) proc_sys_permission (not under /proc/$pid) The remainder of the functions require a bit more detail: * proc_fd_permission: RCU safe. All of the body of this function is under rcu_read_lock(), except generic_permission() which declares itself RCU safe in its documentation string. * proc_self_get_link uses GFP_ATOMIC in the RCU case, so it is RCU aware and otherwise looks safe. The same is true of proc_thread_self_get_link. * proc_map_files_get_link: calls ns_capable, which calls capable(), and thus calls into the audit code (see note #1 below). The remainder is just a call to the trivially safe proc_pid_get_link(). * proc_pid_permission: calls ptrace_may_access(), which appears RCU safe, although it does call into the "security_ptrace_access_check()" hook, which looks safe under smack and selinux. Just the audit code is of concern. Also uses get_task_struct() and put_task_struct(), see note #2 below. * proc_tid_comm_permission: Appears safe, though calls put_task_struct (see note #2 below). Note #1: Most of the concern of RCU safety has centered around the audit code. However, since b17ec22 ("selinux: slow_avc_audit has become non-blocking"), it's safe to call this code under RCU. So all of the above are safe by my estimation. Note #2: get_task_struct() and put_task_struct(): The majority of get_task_struct() is under RCU read lock, and in any case it is a simple increment. But put_task_struct() is complex, given that it could at some point free the task struct, and this process has many steps which I couldn't manually verify. However, several other places call put_task_struct() under RCU, so it appears safe to use here too (see kernel/hung_task.c:165 or rcu/tree-stall.h:296) Patch description: pid_revalidate() drops from RCU into REF lookup mode. When many threads are resolving paths within /proc in parallel, this can result in heavy spinlock contention on d_lockref as each thread tries to grab a reference to the /proc dentry (and drop it shortly thereafter). Investigation indicates that it is not necessary to drop RCU in pid_revalidate(), as no RCU data is modified and the function never sleeps. So, remove the LOOKUP_RCU check. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211004175629.292270-2-stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Stephen Brennan <stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com> Cc: Konrad Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

…_fini() When the amt module is being removed, it calls flush_delayed_work() to exit source_gc_wq. But it wouldn't be exited properly because the amt_source_gc_work(), which is the callback function of source_gc_wq internally calls mod_delayed_work() again. So, amt_source_gc_work() would be called after the amt module is removed. Therefore kernel panic would occur. In order to avoid it, cancel_delayed_work() should be used instead of flush_delayed_work(). Test commands: modprobe amt modprobe -rv amt Splat looks like: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff80f50db #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 1237ee067 P4D 1237ee067 PUD 1237b2067 PMD 100c11067 PTE 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN PTI CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 5.15.0+ #27 5a0ebebc29fe5c40c68bea90197606c3a832b09f RIP: 0010:run_timer_softirq+0x221/0xfc0 Code: 00 00 4c 89 e1 4c 8b 30 48 c1 e9 03 80 3c 29 00 0f 85 ed 0b 00 00 4d 89 34 24 4d 85 f6 74 19 49 8d 7e 08 48 89 f9 48 c1 e9 03 <80> 3c 29 00 0f 85 fa 0b 00 00 4d 89 66 08 83 04 24 01 49 89 d4 48 RSP: 0018:ffff888119009e50 EFLAGS: 00010806 RAX: ffff8881191f8a80 RBX: 00000000007ffe2a RCX: 1ffffffff80f50db RDX: ffff888119009ed0 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffffc07a86d8 RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffff8881191f8280 R09: ffffed102323f061 R10: ffff8881191f8307 R11: ffffed102323f060 R12: ffff888119009ec8 R13: 00000000000000c0 R14: ffffffffc07a86d0 R15: ffff8881191f82e8 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888119000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: fffffbfff80f50db CR3: 00000001062dc002 CR4: 00000000003706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <IRQ> ? add_timer+0x650/0x650 ? kvm_clock_read+0x14/0x30 ? ktime_get+0xb9/0x180 ? rcu_read_lock_held_common+0xe/0xa0 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x56/0xc0 ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xa0/0xa0 ? hrtimer_interrupt+0x271/0x790 __do_softirq+0x1d0/0x88f irq_exit_rcu+0xe7/0x120 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8a/0xb0 </IRQ> <TASK> [ ... ] Fixes: bc54e49 ("amt: add multicast(IGMP) report message handler") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211108145340.17208-1-ap420073@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

When fully configure VLANs for a VF, then unload the VF while triggering a reset to PF, will cause a kernel crash because the irq is already uninit. [ 293.177579] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 293.183502] kernel BUG at drivers/pci/msi.c:352! [ 293.189547] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP ...... [ 293.390124] Workqueue: hclgevf hclgevf_service_task [hclgevf] [ 293.402627] pstate: 80c00009 (Nzcv daif +PAN +UAO) [ 293.414324] pc : free_msi_irqs+0x19c/0x1b8 [ 293.425429] lr : free_msi_irqs+0x18c/0x1b8 [ 293.436545] sp : ffff00002716fbb0 [ 293.446950] x29: ffff00002716fbb0 x28: 0000000000000000 [ 293.459519] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: ffff45b91ea16b00 [ 293.472183] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffffa587b08f4700 [ 293.484717] x23: ffffc591ac30e000 x22: ffffa587b08f8428 [ 293.497190] x21: ffffc591ac30e300 x20: 0000000000000000 [ 293.509594] x19: ffffa58a062a8300 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 293.521949] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffff45b91dcc3f48 [ 293.534013] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 293.545883] x13: 0000000000000040 x12: 0000000000000228 [ 293.557508] x11: 0000000000000020 x10: 0000000000000040 [ 293.568889] x9 : ffff45b91ea1e190 x8 : ffffc591802d0000 [ 293.580123] x7 : ffffc591802d0148 x6 : 0000000000000120 [ 293.591190] x5 : ffffc591802d0000 x4 : 0000000000000000 [ 293.602015] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000000 [ 293.612624] x1 : 00000000000004a4 x0 : ffffa58a1e0c6b80 [ 293.623028] Call trace: [ 293.630340] free_msi_irqs+0x19c/0x1b8 [ 293.638849] pci_disable_msix+0x118/0x140 [ 293.647452] pci_free_irq_vectors+0x20/0x38 [ 293.656081] hclgevf_uninit_msi+0x44/0x58 [hclgevf] [ 293.665309] hclgevf_reset_rebuild+0x1ac/0x2e0 [hclgevf] [ 293.674866] hclgevf_reset+0x358/0x400 [hclgevf] [ 293.683545] hclgevf_reset_service_task+0xd0/0x1b0 [hclgevf] [ 293.693325] hclgevf_service_task+0x4c/0x2e8 [hclgevf] [ 293.702307] process_one_work+0x1b0/0x448 [ 293.710034] worker_thread+0x54/0x468 [ 293.717331] kthread+0x134/0x138 [ 293.724114] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 [ 293.731324] Code: f940b000 b4ffff00 a903e7b8 f90017b6 (d4210000) This patch fixes the problem by waiting for the VF reset done while unloading the VF. Fixes: e2cb1de ("net: hns3: Add HNS3 VF HCL(Hardware Compatibility Layer) Support") Signed-off-by: Yufeng Mo <moyufeng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Guangbin Huang <huangguangbin2@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Fix a corner case between PCI device driver remove callback and runtime PM idle callback. Following sequence of events can happen: - at azx_create, context is allocated with devm_kzalloc() and stored as pci_set_drvdata() - user-space requests to unbind audio driver - dd.c:__device_release_driver() calls PCI remove - pci-driver.c:pci_device_remove() calls the audio driver azx_remove() callback and this is completed - pci-driver.c:pm_runtime_put_sync() leads to a call to rpm_idle() which again calls azx_runtime_idle() - the azx context object, as returned by dev_get_drvdata(), is no longer valid -> access fault in azx_runtime_idle when executing struct snd_card *card = dev_get_drvdata(dev); chip = card->private_data; if (chip->disabled || hda->init_failed) This was discovered by i915_module_load test with 5.15.0 based linux-next tree. Example log caught by i915_module_load test with linux-next https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/linux-next/ <4> [264.038232] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b73f0: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI <4> [264.038248] CPU: 0 PID: 5374 Comm: i915_module_loa Not tainted 5.15.0-next-20211109-gc8109c2ba35e-next-20211109 #1 [...] <4> [264.038267] RIP: 0010:azx_runtime_idle+0x12/0x60 [snd_hda_intel] [...] <4> [264.038355] Call Trace: <4> [264.038359] <TASK> <4> [264.038362] __rpm_callback+0x3d/0x110 <4> [264.038371] rpm_idle+0x27f/0x380 <4> [264.038376] __pm_runtime_idle+0x3b/0x100 <4> [264.038382] pci_device_remove+0x6d/0xa0 <4> [264.038388] device_release_driver_internal+0xef/0x1e0 <4> [264.038395] unbind_store+0xeb/0x120 <4> [264.038400] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x11a/0x1c0 Fix the issue by setting drvdata to NULL at end of azx_remove(). Signed-off-by: Kai Vehmanen <kai.vehmanen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211110210307.1172004-1-kai.vehmanen@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

Commit 719c571 ("net: make napi_disable() symmetric with enable") accidentally introduced a bug sometimes leading to a kernel BUG when bringing an iface up/down under heavy traffic load. Prior to this commit, napi_disable() was polling n->state until none of (NAPIF_STATE_SCHED | NAPIF_STATE_NPSVC) is set and then always flip them. Now there's a possibility to get away with the NAPIF_STATE_SCHE unset as 'continue' drops us to the cmpxchg() call with an uninitialized variable, rather than straight to another round of the state check. Error path looks like: napi_disable(): unsigned long val, new; /* new is uninitialized */ do { val = READ_ONCE(n->state); /* NAPIF_STATE_NPSVC and/or NAPIF_STATE_SCHED is set */ if (val & (NAPIF_STATE_SCHED | NAPIF_STATE_NPSVC)) { /* true */ usleep_range(20, 200); continue; /* go straight to the condition check */ } new = val | <...> } while (cmpxchg(&n->state, val, new) != val); /* state == val, cmpxchg() writes garbage */ napi_enable(): do { val = READ_ONCE(n->state); BUG_ON(!test_bit(NAPI_STATE_SCHED, &val)); /* 50/50 boom */ <...> while the typical BUG splat is like: [ 172.652461] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 172.652462] kernel BUG at net/core/dev.c:6937! [ 172.656914] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [ 172.661966] CPU: 36 PID: 2829 Comm: xdp_redirect_cp Tainted: G I 5.15.0 #42 [ 172.670222] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0014.082620210524 08/26/2021 [ 172.680646] RIP: 0010:napi_enable+0x5a/0xd0 [ 172.684832] Code: 07 49 81 cc 00 01 00 00 4c 89 e2 48 89 d8 80 e6 fb f0 48 0f b1 55 10 48 39 c3 74 10 48 8b 5d 10 f6 c7 04 75 3d f6 c3 01 75 b4 <0f> 0b 5b 5d 41 5c c3 65 ff 05 b8 e5 61 53 48 c7 c6 c0 f3 34 ad 48 [ 172.703578] RSP: 0018:ffffa3c9497477a8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 172.708803] RAX: ffffa3c96615a014 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff8a4b575301a0 < snip > [ 172.782403] Call Trace: [ 172.784857] <TASK> [ 172.786963] ice_up_complete+0x6f/0x210 [ice] [ 172.791349] ice_xdp+0x136/0x320 [ice] [ 172.795108] ? ice_change_mtu+0x180/0x180 [ice] [ 172.799648] dev_xdp_install+0x61/0xe0 [ 172.803401] dev_xdp_attach+0x1e0/0x550 [ 172.807240] dev_change_xdp_fd+0x1e6/0x220 [ 172.811338] do_setlink+0xee8/0x1010 [ 172.814917] rtnl_setlink+0xe5/0x170 [ 172.818499] ? bpf_lsm_binder_set_context_mgr+0x10/0x10 [ 172.823732] ? security_capable+0x36/0x50 < snip > Fix this by replacing 'do { } while (cmpxchg())' with an "infinite" for-loop with an explicit break. From v1 [0]: - just use a for-loop to simplify both the fix and the existing code (Eric). [0] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20211110191126.1214-1-alexandr.lobakin@intel.com Fixes: 719c571 ("net: make napi_disable() symmetric with enable") Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> # for-loop Signed-off-by: Alexander Lobakin <alexandr.lobakin@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jesse Brandeburg <jesse.brandeburg@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211110195605.1304-1-alexandr.lobakin@intel.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

…/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into kvm-master KVM/arm64 fixes for 5.16, take #1 - Fix the host S2 finalization by solely iterating over the memblocks instead of the whole IPA space - Tighten the return value of kvm_vcpu_preferred_target() now that 32bit support is long gone - Make sure the extraction of ESR_ELx.EC is limited to the architected bits - Comment fixups

kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com> writes[1]: > > Greeting, > > FYI, we noticed the following commit (built with gcc-9): > > commit: 1a4d21a ("signal/vm86_32: Replace open coded BUG_ON with an actual BUG_ON") > https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master > > in testcase: trinity > version: trinity-static-i386-x86_64-1c734c75-1_2020-01-06 > with following parameters: > > > [ 70.645554][ T3747] kernel BUG at arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c:109! > [ 70.646185][ T3747] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP > [ 70.646682][ T3747] CPU: 0 PID: 3747 Comm: trinity-c6 Not tainted 5.15.0-rc1-00009-g1a4d21a23c4c #1 > [ 70.647598][ T3747] EIP: save_v86_state (arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c:109 (discriminator 3)) > [ 70.648113][ T3747] Code: 89 c3 64 8b 35 60 b8 25 c2 83 ec 08 89 55 f0 8b 96 10 19 00 00 89 55 ec e8 c6 2d 0c 00 fb 8b 55 ec 85 d2 74 05 83 3a 00 75 02 <0f> 0b 8b 86 10 19 00 00 8b 4b 38 8b 78 48 31 cf 89 f8 8b 7a 4c 81 > [ 70.650136][ T3747] EAX: 00000001 EBX: f5f49fac ECX: 0000000b EDX: f610b600 > [ 70.650852][ T3747] ESI: f5f79cc0 EDI: f5f79cc0 EBP: f5f49f04 ESP: f5f49ef0 > [ 70.651593][ T3747] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0000 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00010246 > [ 70.652413][ T3747] CR0: 80050033 CR2: 00004000 CR3: 35fc7000 CR4: 000406d0 > [ 70.653169][ T3747] DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000 > [ 70.653897][ T3747] DR6: fffe0ff0 DR7: 00000400 > [ 70.654382][ T3747] Call Trace: > [ 70.654719][ T3747] arch_do_signal_or_restart (arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:792 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:867) > [ 70.655288][ T3747] exit_to_user_mode_prepare (kernel/entry/common.c:174 kernel/entry/common.c:209) > [ 70.655854][ T3747] irqentry_exit_to_user_mode (kernel/entry/common.c:126 kernel/entry/common.c:317) > [ 70.656450][ T3747] irqentry_exit (kernel/entry/common.c:406) > [ 70.656897][ T3747] exc_page_fault (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1535) > [ 70.657369][ T3747] ? sysvec_kvm_asyncpf_interrupt (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1488) > [ 70.657989][ T3747] handle_exception (arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S:1085) vm86_32.c:109 is: "BUG_ON(!vm86 || !vm86->user_vm86)" When trying to understand the failure Brian Gerst pointed out[2] that the code does not need protection against vm86->user_vm86 being NULL. The copy_from_user code will already handles that case if the address is going to fault. Looking futher I realized that if we care about not allowing struct vm86plus_struct at address 0 it should be do_sys_vm86 (the system call) that does the filtering. Not way down deep when the emulation has completed in save_v86_state. So let's just remove the silly case of attempting to filter a userspace address with a BUG_ON. Existing userspace can't break and it won't make the kernel any more attackable as the userspace access helpers will handle it, if it isn't a good userspace pointer. I have run the reproducer the fuzzer gave me before I made this change and it reproduced, and after I made this change and I have not seen the reported failure. So it does looks like this fixes the reported issue. [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211112074030.GB19820@xsang-OptiPlex-9020 [2] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAMzpN2jkK5sAv-Kg_kVnCEyVySiqeTdUORcC=AdG1gV6r8nUew@mail.gmail.com Suggested-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com> Tested-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>

The exit function fixes a memory leak with the src field as detected by leak sanitizer. An example of which is: Indirect leak of 25133184 byte(s) in 207 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f199ecfe987 in __interceptor_calloc libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x55defe638224 in annotated_source__alloc_histograms util/annotate.c:803 #2 0x55defe6397e4 in symbol__hists util/annotate.c:952 #3 0x55defe639908 in symbol__inc_addr_samples util/annotate.c:968 #4 0x55defe63aa29 in hist_entry__inc_addr_samples util/annotate.c:1119 #5 0x55defe499a79 in hist_iter__report_callback tools/perf/builtin-report.c:182 #6 0x55defe7a859d in hist_entry_iter__add util/hist.c:1236 #7 0x55defe49aa63 in process_sample_event tools/perf/builtin-report.c:315 #8 0x55defe731bc8 in evlist__deliver_sample util/session.c:1473 #9 0x55defe731e38 in machines__deliver_event util/session.c:1510 #10 0x55defe732a23 in perf_session__deliver_event util/session.c:1590 #11 0x55defe72951e in ordered_events__deliver_event util/session.c:183 #12 0x55defe740082 in do_flush util/ordered-events.c:244 #13 0x55defe7407cb in __ordered_events__flush util/ordered-events.c:323 #14 0x55defe740a61 in ordered_events__flush util/ordered-events.c:341 #15 0x55defe73837f in __perf_session__process_events util/session.c:2390 #16 0x55defe7385ff in perf_session__process_events util/session.c:2420 ... Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Martin Liška <mliska@suse.cz> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211112035124.94327-3-irogers@google.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

…e_zone btrfs_can_activate_zone() can be called with the device_list_mutex already held, which will lead to a deadlock: insert_dev_extents() // Takes device_list_mutex `-> insert_dev_extent() `-> btrfs_insert_empty_item() `-> btrfs_insert_empty_items() `-> btrfs_search_slot() `-> btrfs_cow_block() `-> __btrfs_cow_block() `-> btrfs_alloc_tree_block() `-> btrfs_reserve_extent() `-> find_free_extent() `-> find_free_extent_update_loop() `-> can_allocate_chunk() `-> btrfs_can_activate_zone() // Takes device_list_mutex again Instead of using the RCU on fs_devices->device_list we can use fs_devices->alloc_list, protected by the chunk_mutex to traverse the list of active devices. We are in the chunk allocation thread. The newer chunk allocation happens from the devices in the fs_device->alloc_list protected by the chunk_mutex. btrfs_create_chunk() lockdep_assert_held(&info->chunk_mutex); gather_device_info list_for_each_entry(device, &fs_devices->alloc_list, dev_alloc_list) Also, a device that reappears after the mount won't join the alloc_list yet and, it will be in the dev_list, which we don't want to consider in the context of the chunk alloc. [15.166572] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected [15.167117] 5.17.0-rc6-dennis #79 Not tainted [15.167487] -------------------------------------------- [15.167733] kworker/u8:3/146 is trying to acquire lock: [15.167733] ffff888102962ee0 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs] [15.167733] [15.167733] but task is already holding lock: [15.167733] ffff888102962ee0 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x20a/0x560 [btrfs] [15.167733] [15.167733] other info that might help us debug this: [15.167733] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [15.167733] [15.171834] CPU0 [15.171834] ---- [15.171834] lock(&fs_devs->device_list_mutex); [15.171834] lock(&fs_devs->device_list_mutex); [15.171834] [15.171834] *** DEADLOCK *** [15.171834] [15.171834] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [15.171834] [15.171834] 5 locks held by kworker/u8:3/146: [15.171834] #0: ffff888100050938 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1c3/0x5a0 [15.171834] #1: ffffc9000067be80 ((work_completion)(&fs_info->async_data_reclaim_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1c3/0x5a0 [15.176244] #2: ffff88810521e620 (sb_internal){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: flush_space+0x335/0x600 [btrfs] [15.176244] #3: ffff888102962ee0 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x20a/0x560 [btrfs] [15.176244] #4: ffff8881152e4b78 (btrfs-dev-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_lock+0x27/0x130 [btrfs] [15.179641] [15.179641] stack backtrace: [15.179641] CPU: 1 PID: 146 Comm: kworker/u8:3 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc6-dennis #79 [15.179641] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1.fc35 04/01/2014 [15.179641] Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space [btrfs] [15.179641] Call Trace: [15.179641] <TASK> [15.179641] dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x59 [15.179641] __lock_acquire.cold+0x217/0x2b2 [15.179641] lock_acquire+0xbf/0x2b0 [15.183838] ? find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs] [15.183838] __mutex_lock+0x8e/0x970 [15.183838] ? find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs] [15.183838] ? find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs] [15.183838] ? lock_is_held_type+0xd7/0x130 [15.183838] ? find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs] [15.183838] find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs] [15.183838] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x24/0x40 [15.183838] ? btrfs_get_alloc_profile+0x106/0x230 [btrfs] [15.187601] btrfs_reserve_extent+0x131/0x260 [btrfs] [15.187601] btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0xb5/0x3b0 [btrfs] [15.187601] __btrfs_cow_block+0x138/0x600 [btrfs] [15.187601] btrfs_cow_block+0x10f/0x230 [btrfs] [15.187601] btrfs_search_slot+0x55f/0xbc0 [btrfs] [15.187601] ? lock_is_held_type+0xd7/0x130 [15.187601] btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x2d/0x60 [btrfs] [15.187601] btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x2b3/0x560 [btrfs] [15.187601] __btrfs_end_transaction+0x36/0x2a0 [btrfs] [15.192037] flush_space+0x374/0x600 [btrfs] [15.192037] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 [15.192037] ? btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x49/0x180 [btrfs] [15.192037] ? lock_release+0x131/0x2b0 [15.192037] btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x70/0x180 [btrfs] [15.192037] process_one_work+0x24c/0x5a0 [15.192037] worker_thread+0x4a/0x3d0 Fixes: a85f05e ("btrfs: zoned: avoid chunk allocation if active block group has enough space") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.16+ Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

FRR folks have hit a kernel warning[1] while deleting routes[2] which is caused by trying to delete a route pointing to a nexthop id without specifying nhid but matching on an interface. That is, a route is found but we hit a warning while matching it. The warning is from fib_info_nh() in include/net/nexthop.h because we run it on a fib_info with nexthop object. The call chain is: inet_rtm_delroute -> fib_table_delete -> fib_nh_match (called with a nexthop fib_info and also with fc_oif set thus calling fib_info_nh on the fib_info and triggering the warning). The fix is to not do any matching in that branch if the fi has a nexthop object because those are managed separately. I.e. we should match when deleting without nh spec and should fail when deleting a nexthop route with old-style nh spec because nexthop objects are managed separately, e.g.: $ ip r show 1.2.3.4/32 1.2.3.4 nhid 12 via 192.168.11.2 dev dummy0 $ ip r del 1.2.3.4/32 $ ip r del 1.2.3.4/32 nhid 12 <both should work> $ ip r del 1.2.3.4/32 dev dummy0 <should fail with ESRCH> [1] [ 523.462226] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 523.462230] WARNING: CPU: 14 PID: 22893 at include/net/nexthop.h:468 fib_nh_match+0x210/0x460 [ 523.462236] Modules linked in: dummy rpcsec_gss_krb5 xt_socket nf_socket_ipv4 nf_socket_ipv6 ip6table_raw iptable_raw bpf_preload xt_statistic ip_set ip_vs_sh ip_vs_wrr ip_vs_rr ip_vs xt_mark nf_tables xt_nat veth nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xt_addrtype br_netfilter overlay dm_crypt nfsv3 nfs fscache netfs vhost_net vhost vhost_iotlb tap tun xt_CHECKSUM xt_MASQUERADE xt_conntrack 8021q garp mrp ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 ip6table_mangle ip6table_nat iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter bridge stp llc rfcomm snd_seq_dummy snd_hrtimer rpcrdma rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core ip6table_filter xt_comment ip6_tables vboxnetadp(OE) vboxnetflt(OE) vboxdrv(OE) qrtr bnep binfmt_misc xfs vfat fat squashfs loop nvidia_drm(POE) nvidia_modeset(POE) nvidia_uvm(POE) nvidia(POE) intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic ledtrig_audio snd_hda_codec_hdmi btusb btrtl iwlmvm uvcvideo btbcm snd_hda_intel edac_mce_amd [ 523.462274] videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops btintel snd_intel_dspcfg videobuf2_v4l2 snd_intel_sdw_acpi bluetooth snd_usb_audio snd_hda_codec mac80211 snd_usbmidi_lib joydev snd_hda_core videobuf2_common kvm_amd snd_rawmidi snd_hwdep snd_seq videodev ccp snd_seq_device libarc4 ecdh_generic mc snd_pcm kvm iwlwifi snd_timer drm_kms_helper snd cfg80211 cec soundcore irqbypass rapl wmi_bmof i2c_piix4 rfkill k10temp pcspkr acpi_cpufreq nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc drm zram ip_tables crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel nvme sp5100_tco r8169 nvme_core wmi ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler fuse [ 523.462300] CPU: 14 PID: 22893 Comm: ip Tainted: P OE 5.16.18-200.fc35.x86_64 #1 [ 523.462302] Hardware name: Micro-Star International Co., Ltd. MS-7C37/MPG X570 GAMING EDGE WIFI (MS-7C37), BIOS 1.C0 10/29/2020 [ 523.462303] RIP: 0010:fib_nh_match+0x210/0x460 [ 523.462304] Code: 7c 24 20 48 8b b5 90 00 00 00 e8 bb ee f4 ff 48 8b 7c 24 20 41 89 c4 e8 ee eb f4 ff 45 85 e4 0f 85 2e fe ff ff e9 4c ff ff ff <0f> 0b e9 17 ff ff ff 3c 0a 0f 85 61 fe ff ff 48 8b b5 98 00 00 00 [ 523.462306] RSP: 0018:ffffaa53d4d87928 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 523.462307] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffaa53d4d87a90 RCX: ffffaa53d4d87bb0 [ 523.462308] RDX: ffff9e3d2ee6be80 RSI: ffffaa53d4d87a90 RDI: ffffffff920ed380 [ 523.462309] RBP: ffff9e3d2ee6be80 R08: 0000000000000064 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 523.462310] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000031 [ 523.462310] R13: 0000000000000020 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff9e3d331054e0 [ 523.462311] FS: 00007f245517c1c0(0000) GS:ffff9e492ed80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 523.462313] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 523.462313] CR2: 000055e5dfdd8268 CR3: 00000003ef488000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 [ 523.462315] Call Trace: [ 523.462316] <TASK> [ 523.462320] fib_table_delete+0x1a9/0x310 [ 523.462323] inet_rtm_delroute+0x93/0x110 [ 523.462325] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x133/0x370 [ 523.462327] ? _copy_to_iter+0xb5/0x6f0 [ 523.462330] ? rtnl_calcit.isra.0+0x110/0x110 [ 523.462331] netlink_rcv_skb+0x50/0xf0 [ 523.462334] netlink_unicast+0x211/0x330 [ 523.462336] netlink_sendmsg+0x23f/0x480 [ 523.462338] sock_sendmsg+0x5e/0x60 [ 523.462340] ____sys_sendmsg+0x22c/0x270 [ 523.462341] ? import_iovec+0x17/0x20 [ 523.462343] ? sendmsg_copy_msghdr+0x59/0x90 [ 523.462344] ? __mod_lruvec_page_state+0x85/0x110 [ 523.462348] ___sys_sendmsg+0x81/0xc0 [ 523.462350] ? netlink_seq_start+0x70/0x70 [ 523.462352] ? __dentry_kill+0x13a/0x180 [ 523.462354] ? __fput+0xff/0x250 [ 523.462356] __sys_sendmsg+0x49/0x80 [ 523.462358] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 523.462361] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 523.462364] RIP: 0033:0x7f24552aa337 [ 523.462365] Code: 0e 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b9 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10 [ 523.462366] RSP: 002b:00007fff7f05a838 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e [ 523.462368] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000006245bf91 RCX: 00007f24552aa337 [ 523.462368] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007fff7f05a8a0 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 523.462369] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 523.462370] R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 [ 523.462370] R13: 00007fff7f05ce08 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000055e5dfdd1040 [ 523.462373] </TASK> [ 523.462374] ---[ end trace ba537bc16f6bf4ed ]--- [2] FRRouting/frr#6412 Fixes: 4c7e808 ("ipv4: Plumb support for nexthop object in a fib_info") Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

the driver uses libata's "tag" values from in various arrays. Since the mentioned patch bumped the ATA_TAG_INTERNAL to 32, the value of the SATA_DWC_QCMD_MAX needs to account for that. Otherwise ATA_TAG_INTERNAL usage cause similar crashes like this as reported by Tice Rex on the OpenWrt Forum and reproduced (with symbols) here: | BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0x00000000 | Faulting instruction address: 0xc03ed4b8 | Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] | BE PAGE_SIZE=4K PowerPC 44x Platform | CPU: 0 PID: 362 Comm: scsi_eh_1 Not tainted 5.4.163 #0 | NIP: c03ed4b8 LR: c03d27e8 CTR: c03ed36c | REGS: cfa59950 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (5.4.163) | MSR: 00021000 <CE,ME> CR: 42000222 XER: 00000000 | DEAR: 00000000 ESR: 00000000 | GPR00: c03d27e8 cfa59a08 cfa55fe0 00000000 0fa46bc0 [...] | [..] | NIP [c03ed4b8] sata_dwc_qc_issue+0x14c/0x254 | LR [c03d27e8] ata_qc_issue+0x1c8/0x2dc | Call Trace: | [cfa59a08] [c003f4e0] __cancel_work_timer+0x124/0x194 (unreliable) | [cfa59a78] [c03d27e8] ata_qc_issue+0x1c8/0x2dc | [cfa59a98] [c03d2b3c] ata_exec_internal_sg+0x240/0x524 | [cfa59b08] [c03d2e98] ata_exec_internal+0x78/0xe0 | [cfa59b58] [c03d30fc] ata_read_log_page.part.38+0x1dc/0x204 | [cfa59bc8] [c03d324c] ata_identify_page_supported+0x68/0x130 | [...] This is because sata_dwc_dma_xfer_complete() NULLs the dma_pending's next neighbour "chan" (a *dma_chan struct) in this '32' case right here (line ~735): > hsdevp->dma_pending[tag] = SATA_DWC_DMA_PENDING_NONE; Then the next time, a dma gets issued; dma_dwc_xfer_setup() passes the NULL'd hsdevp->chan to the dmaengine_slave_config() which then causes the crash. With this patch, SATA_DWC_QCMD_MAX is now set to ATA_MAX_QUEUE + 1. This avoids the OOB. But please note, there was a worthwhile discussion on what ATA_TAG_INTERNAL and ATA_MAX_QUEUE is. And why there should not be a "fake" 33 command-long queue size. Ideally, the dw driver should account for the ATA_TAG_INTERNAL. In Damien Le Moal's words: "... having looked at the driver, it is a bigger change than just faking a 33rd "tag" that is in fact not a command tag at all." Fixes: 28361c4 ("libata: add extra internal command") Cc: stable@kernel.org # 4.18+ BugLink: openwrt/openwrt#9505 Signed-off-by: Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@opensource.wdc.com>

…date_bw [Why] Below general protection fault observed when WebGL Aquarium is run for longer duration. If drm debug logs are enabled and set to 0x1f then the issue is observed within 10 minutes of run. [ 100.717056] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x2d33302d32323032: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 100.727921] CPU: 3 PID: 1906 Comm: DrmThread Tainted: G W 5.15.30 #12 d726c6a2d6ebe5cf9223931cbca6892f916fe18b [ 100.754419] RIP: 0010:CalculateSwathWidth+0x1f7/0x44f [ 100.767109] Code: 00 00 00 f2 42 0f 11 04 f0 48 8b 85 88 00 00 00 f2 42 0f 10 04 f0 48 8b 85 98 00 00 00 f2 42 0f 11 04 f0 48 8b 45 10 0f 57 c0 <f3> 42 0f 2a 04 b0 0f 57 c9 f3 43 0f 2a 0c b4 e8 8c e2 f3 ff 48 8b [ 100.781269] RSP: 0018:ffffa9230079eeb0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 100.812528] RAX: 2d33302d32323032 RBX: 0000000000000500 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 100.819656] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff99deb712c49c RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 100.826781] RBP: ffffa9230079ef50 R08: ffff99deb712460c R09: ffff99deb712462c [ 100.833907] R10: ffff99deb7124940 R11: ffff99deb7124d70 R12: ffff99deb712ae44 [ 100.841033] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffa9230079f0a0 [ 100.848159] FS: 00007af121212640(0000) GS:ffff99deba780000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 100.856240] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 100.861980] CR2: 0000209000fe1000 CR3: 000000011b18c000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 [ 100.869106] Call Trace: [ 100.871555] <TASK> [ 100.873655] ? asm_sysvec_reschedule_ipi+0x12/0x20 [ 100.878449] CalculateSwathAndDETConfiguration+0x1a3/0x6dd [ 100.883937] dml31_ModeSupportAndSystemConfigurationFull+0x2ce4/0x76da [ 100.890467] ? kallsyms_lookup_buildid+0xc8/0x163 [ 100.895173] ? kallsyms_lookup_buildid+0xc8/0x163 [ 100.899874] ? __sprint_symbol+0x80/0x135 [ 100.903883] ? dm_update_plane_state+0x3f9/0x4d2 [ 100.908500] ? symbol_string+0xb7/0xde [ 100.912250] ? number+0x145/0x29b [ 100.915566] ? vsnprintf+0x341/0x5ff [ 100.919141] ? desc_read_finalized_seq+0x39/0x87 [ 100.923755] ? update_load_avg+0x1b9/0x607 [ 100.927849] ? compute_mst_dsc_configs_for_state+0x7d/0xd5b [ 100.933416] ? fetch_pipe_params+0xa4d/0xd0c [ 100.937686] ? dc_fpu_end+0x3d/0xa8 [ 100.941175] dml_get_voltage_level+0x16b/0x180 [ 100.945619] dcn30_internal_validate_bw+0x10e/0x89b [ 100.950495] ? dcn31_validate_bandwidth+0x68/0x1fc [ 100.955285] ? resource_build_scaling_params+0x98b/0xb8c [ 100.960595] ? dcn31_validate_bandwidth+0x68/0x1fc [ 100.965384] dcn31_validate_bandwidth+0x9a/0x1fc [ 100.970001] dc_validate_global_state+0x238/0x295 [ 100.974703] amdgpu_dm_atomic_check+0x9c1/0xbce [ 100.979235] ? _printk+0x59/0x73 [ 100.982467] drm_atomic_check_only+0x403/0x78b [ 100.986912] drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x49b/0x546 [ 100.991358] ? drm_ioctl+0x1c1/0x3b3 [ 100.994936] ? drm_atomic_set_property+0x92a/0x92a [ 100.999725] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xdc/0x149 [ 101.003648] drm_ioctl+0x27f/0x3b3 [ 101.007051] ? drm_atomic_set_property+0x92a/0x92a [ 101.011842] amdgpu_drm_ioctl+0x49/0x7d [ 101.015679] __se_sys_ioctl+0x7c/0xb8 [ 101.015685] do_syscall_64+0x5f/0xb8 [ 101.015690] ? __irq_exit_rcu+0x34/0x96 [How] It calles populate_dml_pipes which uses doubles to initialize. Adding FPU protection avoids context switch and probable loss of vba context as there is potential contention while drm debug logs are enabled. Signed-off-by: CHANDAN VURDIGERE NATARAJ <chandan.vurdigerenataraj@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Rodrigo Siqueira <Rodrigo.Siqueira@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

OF framebuffers do not have an underlying device in the Linux device hierarchy. Do a regular unregister call instead of hot unplugging such a non-existing device. Fixes a NULL dereference. An example error message on ppc64le is shown below. BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000060 Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000080dfa4 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries [...] CPU: 2 PID: 139 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 5.17.0-ae085d7f9365 #1 NIP: c00000000080dfa4 LR: c00000000080df9c CTR: c000000000797430 REGS: c000000004132fe0 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (5.17.0-ae085d7f9365) MSR: 8000000002009033 <SF,VEC,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 28228282 XER: 20000000 CFAR: c00000000000c80c DAR: 0000000000000060 DSISR: 40000000 IRQMASK: 0 GPR00: c00000000080df9c c000000004133280 c00000000169d200 0000000000000029 GPR04: 00000000ffffefff c000000004132f90 c000000004132f88 0000000000000000 GPR08: c0000000015658f8 c0000000015cd200 c0000000014f57d0 0000000048228283 GPR12: 0000000000000000 c00000003fffe300 0000000020000000 0000000000000000 GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000113fc4a40 0000000000000005 0000000113fcfb80 GPR20: 000001000f7283b0 0000000000000000 c000000000e4a588 c000000000e4a5b0 GPR24: 0000000000000001 00000000000a0000 c008000000db0168 c0000000021f6ec0 GPR28: c0000000016d65a8 c000000004b36460 0000000000000000 c0000000016d64b0 NIP [c00000000080dfa4] do_remove_conflicting_framebuffers+0x184/0x1d0 [c000000004133280] [c00000000080df9c] do_remove_conflicting_framebuffers+0x17c/0x1d0 (unreliable) [c000000004133350] [c00000000080e4d0] remove_conflicting_framebuffers+0x60/0x150 [c0000000041333a0] [c00000000080e6f4] remove_conflicting_pci_framebuffers+0x134/0x1b0 [c000000004133450] [c008000000e70438] drm_aperture_remove_conflicting_pci_framebuffers+0x90/0x100 [drm] [c000000004133490] [c008000000da0ce4] bochs_pci_probe+0x6c/0xa64 [bochs] [...] [c000000004133db0] [c00000000002aaa0] system_call_exception+0x170/0x2d0 [c000000004133e10] [c00000000000c3cc] system_call_common+0xec/0x250 The bug [1] was introduced by commit 27599aa ("fbdev: Hot-unplug firmware fb devices on forced removal"). Most firmware framebuffers have an underlying platform device, which can be hot-unplugged before loading the native graphics driver. OF framebuffers do not (yet) have that device. Fix the code by unregistering the framebuffer as before without a hot unplug. Tested with 5.17 on qemu ppc64le emulation. Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de> Fixes: 27599aa ("fbdev: Hot-unplug firmware fb devices on forced removal") Reported-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Reviewed-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com> Tested-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudip.mukherjee@codethink.co.uk> Cc: Zack Rusin <zackr@vmware.com> Cc: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com> Cc: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.11+ Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Cc: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> Cc: Zheyu Ma <zheyuma97@gmail.com> Cc: Xiyu Yang <xiyuyang19@fudan.edu.cn> Cc: Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Cc: linux-fbdev@vger.kernel.org Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/YkHXO6LGHAN0p1pq@debian/ # [1] Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220404194402.29974-1-tzimmermann@suse.de

With newer versions of GCC, there is a panic in da850_evm_config_emac() when booting multi_v5_defconfig in QEMU under the palmetto-bmc machine: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000020 pgd = (ptrval) [00000020] *pgd=00000000 Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT ARM Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.15.0 #1 Hardware name: Generic DT based system PC is at da850_evm_config_emac+0x1c/0x120 LR is at do_one_initcall+0x50/0x1e0 The emac_pdata pointer in soc_info is NULL because davinci_soc_info only gets populated on davinci machines but da850_evm_config_emac() is called on all machines via device_initcall(). Move the rmii_en assignment below the machine check so that it is only dereferenced when running on a supported SoC. Fixes: bae1058 ("davinci: DA850/OMAP-L138 EVM: implement autodetect of RMII PHY") Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Reviewed-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <brgl@bgdev.pl> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YcS4xVWs6bQlQSPC@archlinux-ax161/ Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

The CI testing bots triggered the following splat: [ 718.203054] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in free_irq_cpu_rmap+0x53/0x80 [ 718.206349] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881bd127e00 by task sh/20834 [ 718.212852] CPU: 28 PID: 20834 Comm: sh Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S W IOE 5.17.0-rc8_nextqueue-devqueue-02643-g23f3121aca93 #1 [ 718.219695] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0012.070720200218 07/07/2020 [ 718.223418] Call Trace: [ 718.227139] [ 718.230783] dump_stack_lvl+0x33/0x42 [ 718.234431] print_address_description.constprop.9+0x21/0x170 [ 718.238177] ? free_irq_cpu_rmap+0x53/0x80 [ 718.241885] ? free_irq_cpu_rmap+0x53/0x80 [ 718.245539] kasan_report.cold.18+0x7f/0x11b [ 718.249197] ? free_irq_cpu_rmap+0x53/0x80 [ 718.252852] free_irq_cpu_rmap+0x53/0x80 [ 718.256471] ice_free_cpu_rx_rmap.part.11+0x37/0x50 [ice] [ 718.260174] ice_remove_arfs+0x5f/0x70 [ice] [ 718.263810] ice_rebuild_arfs+0x3b/0x70 [ice] [ 718.267419] ice_rebuild+0x39c/0xb60 [ice] [ 718.270974] ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20 [ 718.274472] ? ice_init_phy_user_cfg+0x360/0x360 [ice] [ 718.278033] ? delay_tsc+0x4a/0xb0 [ 718.281513] ? preempt_count_sub+0x14/0xc0 [ 718.284984] ? delay_tsc+0x8f/0xb0 [ 718.288463] ice_do_reset+0x92/0xf0 [ice] [ 718.292014] ice_pci_err_resume+0x91/0xf0 [ice] [ 718.295561] pci_reset_function+0x53/0x80 <...> [ 718.393035] Allocated by task 690: [ 718.433497] Freed by task 20834: [ 718.495688] Last potentially related work creation: [ 718.568966] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881bd127e00 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-96 of size 96 [ 718.574085] The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of 96-byte region [ffff8881bd127e00, ffff8881bd127e60) [ 718.579265] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 718.598905] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 718.601809] ffff8881bd127d00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc [ 718.604796] ffff8881bd127d80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 718.607794] >ffff8881bd127e00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc [ 718.610811] ^ [ 718.613819] ffff8881bd127e80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc [ 718.617107] ffff8881bd127f00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc This is due to that free_irq_cpu_rmap() is always being called *after* (devm_)free_irq() and thus it tries to work with IRQ descs already freed. For example, on device reset the driver frees the rmap right before allocating a new one (the splat above). Make rmap creation and freeing function symmetrical with {request,free}_irq() calls i.e. do that on ifup/ifdown instead of device probe/remove/resume. These operations can be performed independently from the actual device aRFS configuration. Also, make sure ice_vsi_free_irq() clears IRQ affinity notifiers only when aRFS is disabled -- otherwise, CPU rmap sets and clears its own and they must not be touched manually. Fixes: 28bf267 ("ice: Implement aRFS") Co-developed-by: Ivan Vecera <ivecera@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ivan Vecera <ivecera@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Lobakin <alexandr.lobakin@intel.com> Tested-by: Ivan Vecera <ivecera@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>

The below commit introduced a WARN when phy state is not in the states: PHY_HALTED, PHY_READY and PHY_UP. commit 744d23c ("net: phy: Warn about incorrect mdio_bus_phy_resume() state") When cpsw resumes, there have port in PHY_NOLINK state, so the below warning comes out. Set mac_managed_pm be true to tell mdio that the phy resume/suspend is managed by the mac, to fix the following warning: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 965 at drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c:326 mdio_bus_phy_resume+0x140/0x144 CPU: 0 PID: 965 Comm: sh Tainted: G O 6.1.46-g247b2535b2 Linaro#1 Hardware name: Generic AM33XX (Flattened Device Tree) unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x18/0x1c show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x24/0x2c dump_stack_lvl from __warn+0x84/0x15c __warn from warn_slowpath_fmt+0x1a8/0x1c8 warn_slowpath_fmt from mdio_bus_phy_resume+0x140/0x144 mdio_bus_phy_resume from dpm_run_callback+0x3c/0x140 dpm_run_callback from device_resume+0xb8/0x2b8 device_resume from dpm_resume+0x144/0x314 dpm_resume from dpm_resume_end+0x14/0x20 dpm_resume_end from suspend_devices_and_enter+0xd0/0x924 suspend_devices_and_enter from pm_suspend+0x2e0/0x33c pm_suspend from state_store+0x74/0xd0 state_store from kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x104/0x1ec kernfs_fop_write_iter from vfs_write+0x1b8/0x358 vfs_write from ksys_write+0x78/0xf8 ksys_write from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54 Exception stack(0xe094dfa8 to 0xe094dff0) dfa0: 00000004 005c3fb8 00000001 005c3fb8 00000004 00000001 dfc0: 00000004 005c3fb8 b6f6bba0 00000004 00000004 0059edb8 00000000 00000000 dfe0: 00000004 bed918f0 b6f09bd3 b6e89a66 Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.0+ Fixes: 744d23c ("net: phy: Warn about incorrect mdio_bus_phy_resume() state") Fixes: fba863b ("net: phy: make PHY PM ops a no-op if MAC driver manages PHY PM") Signed-off-by: Sinthu Raja <sinthu.raja@ti.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>

Recently, I've been hitting following deadlock warning during dpll pin dump: [52804.637962] ====================================================== [52804.638536] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [52804.639111] 6.8.0-rc2jiri+ Linaro#1 Not tainted [52804.639529] ------------------------------------------------------ [52804.640104] python3/2984 is trying to acquire lock: [52804.640581] ffff88810e642678 (nlk_cb_mutex-GENERIC){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: netlink_dump+0xb3/0x780 [52804.641417] but task is already holding lock: [52804.642010] ffffffff83bde4c8 (dpll_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dpll_lock_dumpit+0x13/0x20 [52804.642747] which lock already depends on the new lock. [52804.643551] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [52804.644259] -> Linaro#1 (dpll_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [52804.644836] lock_acquire+0x174/0x3e0 [52804.645271] __mutex_lock+0x119/0x1150 [52804.645723] dpll_lock_dumpit+0x13/0x20 [52804.646169] genl_start+0x266/0x320 [52804.646578] __netlink_dump_start+0x321/0x450 [52804.647056] genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0x155/0x1e0 [52804.647575] genl_rcv_msg+0x1ed/0x3b0 [52804.648001] netlink_rcv_skb+0xdc/0x210 [52804.648440] genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 [52804.648831] netlink_unicast+0x2f1/0x490 [52804.649290] netlink_sendmsg+0x36d/0x660 [52804.649742] __sock_sendmsg+0x73/0xc0 [52804.650165] __sys_sendto+0x184/0x210 [52804.650597] __x64_sys_sendto+0x72/0x80 [52804.651045] do_syscall_64+0x6f/0x140 [52804.651474] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e [52804.652001] -> #0 (nlk_cb_mutex-GENERIC){+.+.}-{3:3}: [52804.652650] check_prev_add+0x1ae/0x1280 [52804.653107] __lock_acquire+0x1ed3/0x29a0 [52804.653559] lock_acquire+0x174/0x3e0 [52804.653984] __mutex_lock+0x119/0x1150 [52804.654423] netlink_dump+0xb3/0x780 [52804.654845] __netlink_dump_start+0x389/0x450 [52804.655321] genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0x155/0x1e0 [52804.655842] genl_rcv_msg+0x1ed/0x3b0 [52804.656272] netlink_rcv_skb+0xdc/0x210 [52804.656721] genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 [52804.657119] netlink_unicast+0x2f1/0x490 [52804.657570] netlink_sendmsg+0x36d/0x660 [52804.658022] __sock_sendmsg+0x73/0xc0 [52804.658450] __sys_sendto+0x184/0x210 [52804.658877] __x64_sys_sendto+0x72/0x80 [52804.659322] do_syscall_64+0x6f/0x140 [52804.659752] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e [52804.660281] other info that might help us debug this: [52804.661077] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [52804.661671] CPU0 CPU1 [52804.662129] ---- ---- [52804.662577] lock(dpll_lock); [52804.662924] lock(nlk_cb_mutex-GENERIC); [52804.663538] lock(dpll_lock); [52804.664073] lock(nlk_cb_mutex-GENERIC); [52804.664490] The issue as follows: __netlink_dump_start() calls control->start(cb) with nlk->cb_mutex held. In control->start(cb) the dpll_lock is taken. Then nlk->cb_mutex is released and taken again in netlink_dump(), while dpll_lock still being held. That leads to ABBA deadlock when another CPU races with the same operation. Fix this by moving dpll_lock taking into dumpit() callback which ensures correct lock taking order. Fixes: 9d71b54 ("dpll: netlink: Add DPLL framework base functions") Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Arkadiusz Kubalewski <arkadiusz.kubalewski@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240207115902.371649-1-jiri@resnulli.us Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

While running the CI for an unrelated change I hit the following panic with generic/648 on btrfs_holes_spacecache. assertion failed: block_start != EXTENT_MAP_HOLE, in fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:1385 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:1385! invalid opcode: 0000 [Linaro#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 2695096 Comm: fsstress Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 6.8.0-rc2+ Linaro#1 RIP: 0010:__extent_writepage_io.constprop.0+0x4c1/0x5c0 Call Trace: <TASK> extent_write_cache_pages+0x2ac/0x8f0 extent_writepages+0x87/0x110 do_writepages+0xd5/0x1f0 filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x63/0x90 __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x5c/0x80 btrfs_fdatawrite_range+0x1f/0x50 btrfs_write_out_cache+0x507/0x560 btrfs_write_dirty_block_groups+0x32a/0x420 commit_cowonly_roots+0x21b/0x290 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x813/0x1360 btrfs_sync_file+0x51a/0x640 __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x52/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x9c/0x190 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 This happens because we fail to write out the free space cache in one instance, come back around and attempt to write it again. However on the second pass through we go to call btrfs_get_extent() on the inode to get the extent mapping. Because this is a new block group, and with the free space inode we always search the commit root to avoid deadlocking with the tree, we find nothing and return a EXTENT_MAP_HOLE for the requested range. This happens because the first time we try to write the space cache out we hit an error, and on an error we drop the extent mapping. This is normal for normal files, but the free space cache inode is special. We always expect the extent map to be correct. Thus the second time through we end up with a bogus extent map. Since we're deprecating this feature, the most straightforward way to fix this is to simply skip dropping the extent map range for this failed range. I shortened the test by using error injection to stress the area to make it easier to reproduce. With this patch in place we no longer panic with my error injection test. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

shutdown_pirq and startup_pirq are not taking the irq_mapping_update_lock because they can't due to lock inversion. Both are called with the irq_desc->lock being taking. The lock order, however, is first irq_mapping_update_lock and then irq_desc->lock. This opens multiple races: - shutdown_pirq can be interrupted by a function that allocates an event channel: CPU0 CPU1 shutdown_pirq { xen_evtchn_close(e) __startup_pirq { EVTCHNOP_bind_pirq -> returns just freed evtchn e set_evtchn_to_irq(e, irq) } xen_irq_info_cleanup() { set_evtchn_to_irq(e, -1) } } Assume here event channel e refers here to the same event channel number. After this race the evtchn_to_irq mapping for e is invalid (-1). - __startup_pirq races with __unbind_from_irq in a similar way. Because __startup_pirq doesn't take irq_mapping_update_lock it can grab the evtchn that __unbind_from_irq is currently freeing and cleaning up. In this case even though the event channel is allocated, its mapping can be unset in evtchn_to_irq. The fix is to first cleanup the mappings and then close the event channel. In this way, when an event channel gets allocated it's potential previous evtchn_to_irq mappings are guaranteed to be unset already. This is also the reverse order of the allocation where first the event channel is allocated and then the mappings are setup. On a 5.10 kernel prior to commit 3fcdaf3 ("xen/events: modify internal [un]bind interfaces"), we hit a BUG like the following during probing of NVMe devices. The issue is that during nvme_setup_io_queues, pci_free_irq is called for every device which results in a call to shutdown_pirq. With many nvme devices it's therefore likely to hit this race during boot because there will be multiple calls to shutdown_pirq and startup_pirq are running potentially in parallel. ------------[ cut here ]------------ blkfront: xvda: barrier or flush: disabled; persistent grants: enabled; indirect descriptors: enabled; bounce buffer: enabled kernel BUG at drivers/xen/events/events_base.c:499! invalid opcode: 0000 [Linaro#1] SMP PTI CPU: 44 PID: 375 Comm: kworker/u257:23 Not tainted 5.10.201-191.748.amzn2.x86_64 Linaro#1 Hardware name: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 4.11.amazon 08/24/2006 Workqueue: nvme-reset-wq nvme_reset_work RIP: 0010:bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0 Code: 5d 41 5e c3 cc cc cc cc 44 89 f7 e8 2b 55 ad ff 49 89 c5 48 85 c0 0f 84 64 ff ff ff 4c 8b 68 30 41 83 fe ff 0f 85 60 ff ff ff <0f> 0b 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 RSP: 0000:ffffc9000d533b08 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000006 RDX: 0000000000000028 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: 00000000ffffffff RBP: ffff888107419680 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff82d72b00 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000000001ed R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000ffffffff R15: 0000000000000002 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88bc8b500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000002610001 CR4: 00000000001706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c1/0x2d9 ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c1/0x2d9 ? set_affinity_irq+0xdc/0x1c0 ? __die_body.cold+0x8/0xd ? die+0x2b/0x50 ? do_trap+0x90/0x110 ? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0 ? do_error_trap+0x65/0x80 ? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0 ? exc_invalid_op+0x4e/0x70 ? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x12/0x20 ? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0 ? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xc5/0xf0 set_affinity_irq+0xdc/0x1c0 irq_do_set_affinity+0x1d7/0x1f0 irq_setup_affinity+0xd6/0x1a0 irq_startup+0x8a/0xf0 __setup_irq+0x639/0x6d0 ? nvme_suspend+0x150/0x150 request_threaded_irq+0x10c/0x180 ? nvme_suspend+0x150/0x150 pci_request_irq+0xa8/0xf0 ? __blk_mq_free_request+0x74/0xa0 queue_request_irq+0x6f/0x80 nvme_create_queue+0x1af/0x200 nvme_create_io_queues+0xbd/0xf0 nvme_setup_io_queues+0x246/0x320 ? nvme_irq_check+0x30/0x30 nvme_reset_work+0x1c8/0x400 process_one_work+0x1b0/0x350 worker_thread+0x49/0x310 ? process_one_work+0x350/0x350 kthread+0x11b/0x140 ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 Modules linked in: ---[ end trace a11715de1eee1873 ]--- Fixes: d46a78b ("xen: implement pirq type event channels") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Co-debugged-by: Andrew Panyakin <apanyaki@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Maximilian Heyne <mheyne@amazon.de> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240124163130.31324-1-mheyne@amazon.de Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>

…39_FILTER) Lock jsk->sk to prevent UAF when setsockopt(..., SO_J1939_FILTER, ...) modifies jsk->filters while receiving packets. Following trace was seen on affected system: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888012144014 by task j1939/350 CPU: 0 PID: 350 Comm: j1939 Tainted: G W OE 6.5.0-rc5 Linaro#1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: print_report+0xd3/0x620 ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x7d/0x200 ? j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] kasan_report+0xc2/0x100 ? j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] __asan_load4+0x84/0xb0 j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] j1939_sk_recv+0x20b/0x320 [can_j1939] ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20 ? __pfx_j1939_sk_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939] ? j1939_simple_recv+0x69/0x280 [can_j1939] ? j1939_ac_recv+0x5e/0x310 [can_j1939] j1939_can_recv+0x43f/0x580 [can_j1939] ? __pfx_j1939_can_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939] ? raw_rcv+0x42/0x3c0 [can_raw] ? __pfx_j1939_can_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939] can_rcv_filter+0x11f/0x350 [can] can_receive+0x12f/0x190 [can] ? __pfx_can_rcv+0x10/0x10 [can] can_rcv+0xdd/0x130 [can] ? __pfx_can_rcv+0x10/0x10 [can] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x13d/0x150 ? __pfx___netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x10/0x10 ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20 ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x8c/0xe0 __netif_receive_skb+0x23/0xb0 process_backlog+0x107/0x260 __napi_poll+0x69/0x310 net_rx_action+0x2a1/0x580 ? __pfx_net_rx_action+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 ? handle_irq_event+0x7d/0xa0 __do_softirq+0xf3/0x3f8 do_softirq+0x53/0x80 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0x6e/0x70 netif_rx+0x16b/0x180 can_send+0x32b/0x520 [can] ? __pfx_can_send+0x10/0x10 [can] ? __check_object_size+0x299/0x410 raw_sendmsg+0x572/0x6d0 [can_raw] ? __pfx_raw_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [can_raw] ? apparmor_socket_sendmsg+0x2f/0x40 ? __pfx_raw_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [can_raw] sock_sendmsg+0xef/0x100 sock_write_iter+0x162/0x220 ? __pfx_sock_write_iter+0x10/0x10 ? __rtnl_unlock+0x47/0x80 ? security_file_permission+0x54/0x320 vfs_write+0x6ba/0x750 ? __pfx_vfs_write+0x10/0x10 ? __fget_light+0x1ca/0x1f0 ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x5b/0x280 ksys_write+0x143/0x170 ? __pfx_ksys_write+0x10/0x10 ? __kasan_check_read+0x15/0x20 ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x62/0x70 __x64_sys_write+0x47/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 ? do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x90 ? irqentry_exit+0x3f/0x50 ? exc_page_fault+0x79/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Allocated by task 348: kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x1f/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0xb5/0xc0 __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x67/0x160 j1939_sk_setsockopt+0x284/0x450 [can_j1939] __sys_setsockopt+0x15c/0x2f0 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x6b/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Freed by task 349: kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40 kasan_save_free_info+0x2f/0x50 __kasan_slab_free+0x12e/0x1c0 __kmem_cache_free+0x1b9/0x380 kfree+0x7a/0x120 j1939_sk_setsockopt+0x3b2/0x450 [can_j1939] __sys_setsockopt+0x15c/0x2f0 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x6b/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Fixes: 9d71dd0 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol") Reported-by: Sili Luo <rootlab@huawei.com> Suggested-by: Sili Luo <rootlab@huawei.com> Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231020133814.383996-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>

…in attach The function spapr_tce_platform_iommu_attach_dev() is missing to call iommu_group_put() when the domain is already set. This refcount leak shows up with BUG_ON() during DLPAR remove operation as: KernelBug: Kernel bug in state 'None': kernel BUG at arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/iommu.c:100! Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [Linaro#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=8192 NUMA pSeries <snip> Hardware name: IBM,9080-HEX POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NH1060_016) hv:phyp pSeries NIP: c0000000000ff4d4 LR: c0000000000ff4cc CTR: 0000000000000000 REGS: c0000013aed5f840 TRAP: 0700 Tainted: G I (6.8.0-rc3-autotest-g99bd3cb0d12e) MSR: 8000000000029033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 44002402 XER: 20040000 CFAR: c000000000a0d170 IRQMASK: 0 ... NIP iommu_reconfig_notifier+0x94/0x200 LR iommu_reconfig_notifier+0x8c/0x200 Call Trace: iommu_reconfig_notifier+0x8c/0x200 (unreliable) notifier_call_chain+0xb8/0x19c blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x64/0x98 of_reconfig_notify+0x44/0xdc of_detach_node+0x78/0xb0 ofdt_write.part.0+0x86c/0xbb8 proc_reg_write+0xf4/0x150 vfs_write+0xf8/0x488 ksys_write+0x84/0x140 system_call_exception+0x138/0x330 system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec The patch adds the missing iommu_group_put() call. Fixes: a8ca9fc ("powerpc/iommu: Do not do platform domain attach atctions after probe") Reported-by: Venkat Rao Bagalkote <venkat88@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/274e0d2b-b5cc-475e-94e6-8427e88e271d@linux.vnet.ibm.com/ Signed-off-by: Shivaprasad G Bhat <sbhat@linux.ibm.com> Tested-by: Venkat Rao Bagalkote <venkat88@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/170784021983.6249.10039296655906636112.stgit@linux.ibm.com

… into HEAD KVM/riscv fixes for 6.8, take Linaro#1 - Fix steal-time related sparse warnings

The function xe_vm_prepare_vma was blindly accepting zero as the number of fences and forwarded that to drm_exec_prepare_obj. However, that leads to an out-of-bounds shift in the dma_resv_reserve_fences() and while one could argue that the dma_resv code should be robust against that, avoid attempting to reserve zero fences. Relevant stack trace: [773.183188] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [773.183199] UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in ../include/linux/log2.h:57:13 [773.183241] shift exponent 64 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int' [773.183254] CPU: 2 PID: 1816 Comm: xe_evict Tainted: G U 6.8.0-rc3-xe Linaro#1 [773.183256] Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME Z690-P D4, BIOS 2014 10/14/2022 [773.183257] Call Trace: [773.183258] <TASK> [773.183260] dump_stack_lvl+0xaf/0xd0 [773.183266] dump_stack+0x10/0x20 [773.183283] ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x40 [773.183286] __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x10f/0x170 [773.183293] dma_resv_reserve_fences.cold+0x2b/0x48 [773.183295] ? ww_mutex_lock+0x3c/0x110 [773.183301] drm_exec_prepare_obj+0x45/0x60 [drm_exec] [773.183313] xe_vm_prepare_vma+0x33/0x70 [xe] [773.183375] xe_vma_destroy_unlocked+0x55/0xa0 [xe] [773.183427] xe_vm_close_and_put+0x526/0x940 [xe] Fixes: 2714d50 ("drm/xe: Convert pagefaulting code to use drm_exec") Cc: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com> Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com> Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld@intel.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240208132115.3132-1-thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com (cherry picked from commit eb538b5) Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>

…kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.8, take Linaro#1 - Don't source the VFIO Kconfig twice - Fix protected-mode locking order between kvm and vcpus

Unfortunately the commit `fd8958efe877` introduced another error causing the `descs` array to overflow. This reults in further crashes easily reproducible by `sendmsg` system call. [ 1080.836473] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x400300015528b00a: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [ 1080.869326] RIP: 0010:hfi1_ipoib_build_ib_tx_headers.constprop.0+0xe1/0x2b0 [hfi1] -- [ 1080.974535] Call Trace: [ 1080.976990] <TASK> [ 1081.021929] hfi1_ipoib_send_dma_common+0x7a/0x2e0 [hfi1] [ 1081.027364] hfi1_ipoib_send_dma_list+0x62/0x270 [hfi1] [ 1081.032633] hfi1_ipoib_send+0x112/0x300 [hfi1] [ 1081.042001] ipoib_start_xmit+0x2a9/0x2d0 [ib_ipoib] [ 1081.046978] dev_hard_start_xmit+0xc4/0x210 -- [ 1081.148347] __sys_sendmsg+0x59/0xa0 crash> ipoib_txreq 0xffff9cfeba229f00 struct ipoib_txreq { txreq = { list = { next = 0xffff9cfeba229f00, prev = 0xffff9cfeba229f00 }, descp = 0xffff9cfeba229f40, coalesce_buf = 0x0, wait = 0xffff9cfea4e69a48, complete = 0xffffffffc0fe0760 <hfi1_ipoib_sdma_complete>, packet_len = 0x46d, tlen = 0x0, num_desc = 0x0, desc_limit = 0x6, next_descq_idx = 0x45c, coalesce_idx = 0x0, flags = 0x0, descs = {{ qw = {0x8024000120dffb00, 0x4} # SDMA_DESC0_FIRST_DESC_FLAG (bit 63) }, { qw = { 0x3800014231b108, 0x4} }, { qw = { 0x310000e4ee0fcf0, 0x8} }, { qw = { 0x3000012e9f8000, 0x8} }, { qw = { 0x59000dfb9d0000, 0x8} }, { qw = { 0x78000e02e40000, 0x8} }} }, sdma_hdr = 0x400300015528b000, <<< invalid pointer in the tx request structure sdma_status = 0x0, SDMA_DESC0_LAST_DESC_FLAG (bit 62) complete = 0x0, priv = 0x0, txq = 0xffff9cfea4e69880, skb = 0xffff9d099809f400 } If an SDMA send consists of exactly 6 descriptors and requires dword padding (in the 7th descriptor), the sdma_txreq descriptor array is not properly expanded and the packet will overflow into the container structure. This results in a panic when the send completion runs. The exact panic varies depending on what elements of the container structure get corrupted. The fix is to use the correct expression in _pad_sdma_tx_descs() to test the need to expand the descriptor array. With this patch the crashes are no longer reproducible and the machine is stable. Fixes: fd8958e ("IB/hfi1: Fix sdma.h tx->num_descs off-by-one errors") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Mats Kronberg <kronberg@nsc.liu.se> Tested-by: Mats Kronberg <kronberg@nsc.liu.se> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vacek <neelx@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240201081009.1109442-1-neelx@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>

Avoid the following warning by making sure to free the allocated resources in case that qedr_init_user_queue() fail. -----------[ cut here ]----------- WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 143192 at drivers/infiniband/core/rdma_core.c:874 uverbs_destroy_ufile_hw+0xcf/0xf0 [ib_uverbs] Modules linked in: tls target_core_user uio target_core_pscsi target_core_file target_core_iblock ib_srpt ib_srp scsi_transport_srp nfsd nfs_acl rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace fscache netfs 8021q garp mrp stp llc ext4 mbcache jbd2 opa_vnic ib_umad ib_ipoib sunrpc rdma_ucm ib_isert iscsi_target_mod target_core_mod ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm hfi1 intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common mgag200 qedr sb_edac drm_shmem_helper rdmavt x86_pkg_temp_thermal drm_kms_helper intel_powerclamp ib_uverbs coretemp i2c_algo_bit kvm_intel dell_wmi_descriptor ipmi_ssif sparse_keymap kvm ib_core rfkill syscopyarea sysfillrect video sysimgblt irqbypass ipmi_si ipmi_devintf fb_sys_fops rapl iTCO_wdt mxm_wmi iTCO_vendor_support intel_cstate pcspkr dcdbas intel_uncore ipmi_msghandler lpc_ich acpi_power_meter mei_me mei fuse drm xfs libcrc32c qede sd_mod ahci libahci t10_pi sg crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel qed libata tg3 ghash_clmulni_intel megaraid_sas crc8 wmi [last unloaded: ib_srpt] CPU: 0 PID: 143192 Comm: fi_rdm_tagged_p Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.14.0-408.el9.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R430/03XKDV, BIOS 2.14.0 01/25/2022 RIP: 0010:uverbs_destroy_ufile_hw+0xcf/0xf0 [ib_uverbs] Code: 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e e9 0f 26 1b dd 48 89 df e8 67 6a ff ff 49 8b 86 10 01 00 00 48 85 c0 74 9c 4c 89 e7 e8 83 c0 cb dd eb 92 <0f> 0b eb be 0f 0b be 04 00 00 00 48 89 df e8 8e f5 ff ff e9 6d ff RSP: 0018:ffffb7c6cadfbc60 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: ffff8f0889ee3f60 RBX: ffff8f088c1a5200 RCX: 00000000802a0016 RDX: 00000000802a0017 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8f0880042600 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff8f11fffd5000 R11: 0000000000039000 R12: ffff8f0d5b36cd80 R13: ffff8f088c1a5250 R14: ffff8f1206d91000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8f11d7c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000147069200e20 CR3: 00000001c7210002 CR4: 00000000001706f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df ? ib_uverbs_close+0x1f/0xb0 [ib_uverbs] ? uverbs_destroy_ufile_hw+0xcf/0xf0 [ib_uverbs] ? __warn+0x81/0x110 ? uverbs_destroy_ufile_hw+0xcf/0xf0 [ib_uverbs] ? report_bug+0x10a/0x140 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70 ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 ? uverbs_destroy_ufile_hw+0xcf/0xf0 [ib_uverbs] ib_uverbs_close+0x1f/0xb0 [ib_uverbs] __fput+0x94/0x250 task_work_run+0x5c/0x90 do_exit+0x270/0x4a0 do_group_exit+0x2d/0x90 get_signal+0x87c/0x8c0 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x25/0x100 ? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xc2/0x110 [ib_uverbs] exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x9c/0x130 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xb6/0x100 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x40 do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90 ? syscall_exit_work+0x103/0x130 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x22/0x40 ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90 ? syscall_exit_work+0x103/0x130 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x22/0x40 ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90 ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90 ? common_interrupt+0x43/0xa0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc RIP: 0033:0x1470abe3ec6b Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x1470abe3ec41. RSP: 002b:00007fff13ce9108 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: fffffffffffffffc RBX: 00007fff13ce9218 RCX: 00001470abe3ec6b RDX: 00007fff13ce9200 RSI: 00000000c0181b01 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007fff13ce91e0 R08: 0000558d9655da10 R09: 0000558d9655dd00 R10: 00007fff13ce95c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff13ce9358 R13: 0000000000000013 R14: 0000558d9655db50 R15: 00007fff13ce9470 </TASK> --[ end trace 888a9b92e04c5c97 ]-- Fixes: df15856 ("RDMA/qedr: restructure functions that create/destroy QPs") Signed-off-by: Kamal Heib <kheib@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240208223628.2040841-1-kheib@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>

Correct blk-mq registration issue with module parameter disable_managed_interrupts enabled. When we turn off the default PCI_IRQ_AFFINITY flag, the driver needs to register with blk-mq using blk_mq_map_queues(). The driver is currently calling blk_mq_pci_map_queues() which results in a stack trace and possibly undefined behavior. Stack Trace: [ 7.860089] scsi host2: smartpqi [ 7.871934] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 238 at block/blk-mq-pci.c:52 blk_mq_pci_map_queues+0xca/0xd0 [ 7.889231] Modules linked in: sd_mod t10_pi sg uas smartpqi(+) crc32c_intel scsi_transport_sas usb_storage dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler fuse [ 7.924755] CPU: 0 PID: 238 Comm: kworker/0:3 Not tainted 4.18.0-372.88.1.el8_6_smartpqi_test.x86_64 #1 [ 7.944336] Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL380 Gen10/ProLiant DL380 Gen10, BIOS U30 03/08/2022 [ 7.963026] Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn [ 7.978275] RIP: 0010:blk_mq_pci_map_queues+0xca/0xd0 [ 7.978278] Code: 48 89 de 89 c7 e8 f6 0f 4f 00 3b 05 c4 b7 8e 01 72 e1 5b 31 c0 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f e9 7d df 73 00 31 c0 e9 76 df 73 00 <0f> 0b eb bc 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 57 49 89 ff 41 56 41 55 41 54 [ 7.978280] RSP: 0018:ffffa95fc3707d50 EFLAGS: 00010216 [ 7.978283] RAX: 00000000ffffffff RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000010 [ 7.978284] RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9190c32d4310 [ 7.978286] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffa95fc3707d38 R09: ffff91929b81ac00 [ 7.978287] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffa95fc3707ac0 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 7.978288] R13: ffff9190c32d4000 R14: 00000000ffffffff R15: ffff9190c4c950a8 [ 7.978290] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9193efc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 7.978292] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 8.172814] CR2: 000055d11166c000 CR3: 00000002dae10002 CR4: 00000000007706f0 [ 8.172816] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 8.172817] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 8.172818] PKRU: 55555554 [ 8.172819] Call Trace: [ 8.172823] blk_mq_alloc_tag_set+0x12e/0x310 [ 8.264339] scsi_add_host_with_dma.cold.9+0x30/0x245 [ 8.279302] pqi_ctrl_init+0xacf/0xc8e [smartpqi] [ 8.294085] ? pqi_pci_probe+0x480/0x4c8 [smartpqi] [ 8.309015] pqi_pci_probe+0x480/0x4c8 [smartpqi] [ 8.323286] local_pci_probe+0x42/0x80 [ 8.337855] work_for_cpu_fn+0x16/0x20 [ 8.351193] process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360 [ 8.364462] ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0 [ 8.379252] worker_thread+0x1ce/0x390 [ 8.392623] ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0 [ 8.406295] kthread+0x10a/0x120 [ 8.418428] ? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50 [ 8.431532] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40 [ 8.444137] ---[ end trace 1bf0173d39354506 ]--- Fixes: cf15c3e ("scsi: smartpqi: Add module param to disable managed ints") Tested-by: Yogesh Chandra Pandey <YogeshChandra.Pandey@microchip.com> Reviewed-by: Scott Benesh <scott.benesh@microchip.com> Reviewed-by: Scott Teel <scott.teel@microchip.com> Reviewed-by: Mahesh Rajashekhara <mahesh.rajashekhara@microchip.com> Reviewed-by: Mike McGowen <mike.mcgowen@microchip.com> Reviewed-by: Kevin Barnett <kevin.barnett@microchip.com> Signed-off-by: Don Brace <don.brace@microchip.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240213162200.1875970-2-don.brace@microchip.com Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ewan D. Milne <emilne@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>

When trying to use copy_from_kernel_nofault() to read vsyscall page through a bpf program, the following oops was reported: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffff600000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 3231067 P4D 3231067 PUD 3233067 PMD 3235067 PTE 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 1 PID: 20390 Comm: test_progs ...... 6.7.0+ #58 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) ...... RIP: 0010:copy_from_kernel_nofault+0x6f/0x110 ...... Call Trace: <TASK> ? copy_from_kernel_nofault+0x6f/0x110 bpf_probe_read_kernel+0x1d/0x50 bpf_prog_2061065e56845f08_do_probe_read+0x51/0x8d trace_call_bpf+0xc5/0x1c0 perf_call_bpf_enter.isra.0+0x69/0xb0 perf_syscall_enter+0x13e/0x200 syscall_trace_enter+0x188/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0xb5/0xe0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 </TASK> ...... ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- The oops is triggered when: 1) A bpf program uses bpf_probe_read_kernel() to read from the vsyscall page and invokes copy_from_kernel_nofault() which in turn calls __get_user_asm(). 2) Because the vsyscall page address is not readable from kernel space, a page fault exception is triggered accordingly. 3) handle_page_fault() considers the vsyscall page address as a user space address instead of a kernel space address. This results in the fix-up setup by bpf not being applied and a page_fault_oops() is invoked due to SMAP. Considering handle_page_fault() has already considered the vsyscall page address as a userspace address, fix the problem by disallowing vsyscall page read for copy_from_kernel_nofault(). Originally-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reported-by: syzbot+72aa0161922eba61b50e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAG48ez06TZft=ATH1qh2c5mpS5BT8UakwNkzi6nvK5_djC-4Nw@mail.gmail.com Reported-by: xingwei lee <xrivendell7@gmail.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CABOYnLynjBoFZOf3Z4BhaZkc5hx_kHfsjiW+UWLoB=w33LvScw@mail.gmail.com Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240202103935.3154011-3-houtao@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

Hou Tao says: ==================== Fix the read of vsyscall page through bpf From: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com> Hi, As reported by syzboot [1] and [2], when trying to read vsyscall page by using bpf_probe_read_kernel() or bpf_probe_read(), oops may happen. Thomas Gleixner had proposed a test patch [3], but it seems that no formal patch is posted after about one month [4], so I post it instead and add an Originally-by tag in patch #2. Patch #1 makes is_vsyscall_vaddr() being a common helper. Patch #2 fixes the problem by disallowing vsyscall page read for copy_from_kernel_nofault(). Patch #3 adds one test case to ensure the read of vsyscall page through bpf is rejected. Please see individual patches for more details. Comments are always welcome. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAG48ez06TZft=ATH1qh2c5mpS5BT8UakwNkzi6nvK5_djC-4Nw@mail.gmail.com/ [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CABOYnLynjBoFZOf3Z4BhaZkc5hx_kHfsjiW+UWLoB=w33LvScw@mail.gmail.com/ [3]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/87r0jwquhv.ffs@tglx/ [4]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/e24b125c-8ff4-9031-6c53-67ff2e01f316@huaweicloud.com/ Change Log: v3: * rephrase commit message for patch #1 & #2 (Sohil) * reword comments in copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed() (Sohil) * add Rvb tag for patch #1 and Acked-by tag for patch #3 (Sohil, Yonghong) v2: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240126115423.3943360-1-houtao@huaweicloud.com/ * move is_vsyscall_vaddr to asm/vsyscall.h instead (Sohil) * elaborate on the reason for disallowing of vsyscall page read in copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed() (Sohil) * update the commit message of patch #2 to more clearly explain how the oops occurs. (Sohil) * update the commit message of patch #3 to explain the expected return values of various bpf helpers (Yonghong) v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240119073019.1528573-1-houtao@huaweicloud.com/ ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240202103935.3154011-1-houtao@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

…ntroller When a PCI device is dynamically added, the kernel oopses with a NULL pointer dereference: BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000030 Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000006bbe5c Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries Modules linked in: rpadlpar_io rpaphp rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace fscache netfs xsk_diag bonding nft_compat nf_tables nfnetlink rfkill binfmt_misc dm_multipath rpcrdma sunrpc rdma_ucm ib_srpt ib_isert iscsi_target_mod target_core_mod ib_umad ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_ipoib rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm mlx5_ib ib_uverbs ib_core pseries_rng drm drm_panel_orientation_quirks xfs libcrc32c mlx5_core mlxfw sd_mod t10_pi sg tls ibmvscsi ibmveth scsi_transport_srp vmx_crypto pseries_wdt psample dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse CPU: 17 PID: 2685 Comm: drmgr Not tainted 6.7.0-203405+ #66 Hardware name: IBM,9080-HEX POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NH1060_008) hv:phyp pSeries NIP: c0000000006bbe5c LR: c000000000a13e68 CTR: c0000000000579f8 REGS: c00000009924f240 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (6.7.0-203405+) MSR: 8000000000009033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 24002220 XER: 20040006 CFAR: c000000000a13e64 DAR: 0000000000000030 DSISR: 40000000 IRQMASK: 0 ... NIP sysfs_add_link_to_group+0x34/0x94 LR iommu_device_link+0x5c/0x118 Call Trace: iommu_init_device+0x26c/0x318 (unreliable) iommu_device_link+0x5c/0x118 iommu_init_device+0xa8/0x318 iommu_probe_device+0xc0/0x134 iommu_bus_notifier+0x44/0x104 notifier_call_chain+0xb8/0x19c blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x64/0x98 bus_notify+0x50/0x7c device_add+0x640/0x918 pci_device_add+0x23c/0x298 of_create_pci_dev+0x400/0x884 of_scan_pci_dev+0x124/0x1b0 __of_scan_bus+0x78/0x18c pcibios_scan_phb+0x2a4/0x3b0 init_phb_dynamic+0xb8/0x110 dlpar_add_slot+0x170/0x3b8 [rpadlpar_io] add_slot_store.part.0+0xb4/0x130 [rpadlpar_io] kobj_attr_store+0x2c/0x48 sysfs_kf_write+0x64/0x78 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x1b0/0x290 vfs_write+0x350/0x4a0 ksys_write+0x84/0x140 system_call_exception+0x124/0x330 system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec Commit a940904 ("powerpc/iommu: Add iommu_ops to report capabilities and allow blocking domains") broke DLPAR add of PCI devices. The above added iommu_device structure to pci_controller. During system boot, PCI devices are discovered and this newly added iommu_device structure is initialized by a call to iommu_device_register(). During DLPAR add of a PCI device, a new pci_controller structure is allocated but there are no calls made to iommu_device_register() interface. Fix is to register the iommu device during DLPAR add as well. Fixes: a940904 ("powerpc/iommu: Add iommu_ops to report capabilities and allow blocking domains") Signed-off-by: Gaurav Batra <gbatra@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Brian King <brking@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20240215221833.4817-1-gbatra@linux.ibm.com

syzbot reported a lockdep violation [1] involving af_unix support of SO_PEEK_OFF. Since SO_PEEK_OFF is inherently not thread safe (it uses a per-socket sk_peek_off field), there is really no point to enforce a pointless thread safety in the kernel. After this patch : - setsockopt(SO_PEEK_OFF) no longer acquires the socket lock. - skb_consume_udp() no longer has to acquire the socket lock. - af_unix no longer needs a special version of sk_set_peek_off(), because it does not lock u->iolock anymore. As a followup, we could replace prot->set_peek_off to be a boolean and avoid an indirect call, since we always use sk_set_peek_off(). [1] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.8.0-rc4-syzkaller-00267-g0f1dd5e91e2b #0 Not tainted syz-executor.2/30025 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8880765e7d80 (&u->iolock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: unix_set_peek_off+0x26/0xa0 net/unix/af_unix.c:789 but task is already holding lock: ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1691 [inline] ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sockopt_lock_sock net/core/sock.c:1060 [inline] ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sk_setsockopt+0xe52/0x3360 net/core/sock.c:1193 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}: lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 lock_sock_nested+0x48/0x100 net/core/sock.c:3524 lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1691 [inline] __unix_dgram_recvmsg+0x1275/0x12c0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2415 sock_recvmsg_nosec+0x18e/0x1d0 net/socket.c:1046 ____sys_recvmsg+0x3c0/0x470 net/socket.c:2801 ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2845 [inline] do_recvmmsg+0x474/0xae0 net/socket.c:2939 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3018 [inline] __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3041 [inline] __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3034 [inline] __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x199/0x250 net/socket.c:3034 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77 -> #0 (&u->iolock){+.+.}-{3:3}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline] validate_chain+0x18ca/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 __lock_acquire+0x1345/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:608 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x136/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752 unix_set_peek_off+0x26/0xa0 net/unix/af_unix.c:789 sk_setsockopt+0x207e/0x3360 do_sock_setsockopt+0x2fb/0x720 net/socket.c:2307 __sys_setsockopt+0x1ad/0x250 net/socket.c:2334 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(sk_lock-AF_UNIX); lock(&u->iolock); lock(sk_lock-AF_UNIX); lock(&u->iolock); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by syz-executor.2/30025: #0: ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1691 [inline] #0: ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sockopt_lock_sock net/core/sock.c:1060 [inline] #0: ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sk_setsockopt+0xe52/0x3360 net/core/sock.c:1193 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 30025 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc4-syzkaller-00267-g0f1dd5e91e2b #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/25/2024 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x1e7/0x2e0 lib/dump_stack.c:106 check_noncircular+0x36a/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2187 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline] validate_chain+0x18ca/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 __lock_acquire+0x1345/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:608 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x136/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752 unix_set_peek_off+0x26/0xa0 net/unix/af_unix.c:789 sk_setsockopt+0x207e/0x3360 do_sock_setsockopt+0x2fb/0x720 net/socket.c:2307 __sys_setsockopt+0x1ad/0x250 net/socket.c:2334 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77 RIP: 0033:0x7f78a1c7dda9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f78a0fde0c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f78a1dac050 RCX: 00007f78a1c7dda9 RDX: 000000000000002a RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 00007f78a1cca47a R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000020000180 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000000006e R14: 00007f78a1dac050 R15: 00007ffe5cd81ae8 Fixes: 859051d ("bpf: Implement cgroup sockaddr hooks for unix sockets") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com> Cc: Daan De Meyer <daan.j.demeyer@gmail.com> Cc: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org> Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The gtp_net_ops pernet operations structure for the subsystem must be registered before registering the generic netlink family. Syzkaller hit 'general protection fault in gtp_genl_dump_pdp' bug: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000002: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017] CPU: 1 PID: 5826 Comm: gtp Not tainted 6.8.0-rc3-std-def-alt1 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.0-alt1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:gtp_genl_dump_pdp+0x1be/0x800 [gtp] Code: c6 89 c6 e8 64 e9 86 df 58 45 85 f6 0f 85 4e 04 00 00 e8 c5 ee 86 df 48 8b 54 24 18 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 de 05 00 00 48 8b 44 24 18 4c 8b 30 4c 39 f0 74 RSP: 0018:ffff888014107220 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff88800fcda588 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f1be4eb05c0(0000) GS:ffff88806ce80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f1be4e766cf CR3: 000000000c33e000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_regs+0x90/0xa0 ? die_addr+0x50/0xd0 ? exc_general_protection+0x148/0x220 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30 ? gtp_genl_dump_pdp+0x1be/0x800 [gtp] ? __alloc_skb+0x1dd/0x350 ? __pfx___alloc_skb+0x10/0x10 genl_dumpit+0x11d/0x230 netlink_dump+0x5b9/0xce0 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x253/0x430 ? __pfx_netlink_dump+0x10/0x10 ? kasan_save_track+0x10/0x40 ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x9b/0xa0 ? genl_start+0x675/0x970 __netlink_dump_start+0x6fc/0x9f0 genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0x1bb/0x2d0 ? __pfx_genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0x10/0x10 ? genl_op_from_small+0x2a/0x440 ? cap_capable+0x1d0/0x240 ? __pfx_genl_start+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_genl_dumpit+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_genl_done+0x10/0x10 ? security_capable+0x9d/0xe0 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kovalev <kovalev@altlinux.org> Fixes: 459aa66 ("gtp: add initial driver for datapath of GPRS Tunneling Protocol (GTP-U)") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240214162733.34214-1-kovalev@altlinux.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Use i2c adapter when there isn't aux_mode in dc_link to fix a null-pointer derefence that happens when running igt@kms_force_connector_basic in a system with DCN2.1 and HDMI connector detected as below: [ +0.178146] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000004c0 [ +0.000010] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ +0.000005] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ +0.000004] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ +0.000006] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ +0.000006] CPU: 15 PID: 2368 Comm: kms_force_conne Not tainted 6.5.0-asdn+ #152 [ +0.000005] Hardware name: HP HP ENVY x360 Convertible 13-ay1xxx/8929, BIOS F.01 07/14/2021 [ +0.000004] RIP: 0010:i2c_transfer+0xd/0x100 [ +0.000011] Code: ea fc ff ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 55 53 <48> 8b 47 10 48 89 fb 48 83 38 00 0f 84 b3 00 00 00 83 3d 2f 80 16 [ +0.000004] RSP: 0018:ffff9c4f89c0fad0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ +0.000005] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 0000000000000080 [ +0.000003] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffff9c4f89c0fb20 RDI: 00000000000004b0 [ +0.000003] RBP: ffff9c4f89c0fb80 R08: 0000000000000080 R09: ffff8d8e0b15b980 [ +0.000003] R10: 00000000000380e0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000080 [ +0.000002] R13: 0000000000000002 R14: ffff9c4f89c0fb0e R15: ffff9c4f89c0fb0f [ +0.000004] FS: 00007f9ad2176c40(0000) GS:ffff8d90fe9c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ +0.000003] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ +0.000004] CR2: 00000000000004c0 CR3: 0000000121bc4000 CR4: 0000000000750ee0 [ +0.000003] PKRU: 55555554 [ +0.000003] Call Trace: [ +0.000006] <TASK> [ +0.000006] ? __die+0x23/0x70 [ +0.000011] ? page_fault_oops+0x17d/0x4c0 [ +0.000008] ? preempt_count_add+0x6e/0xa0 [ +0.000008] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ +0.000011] ? exc_page_fault+0x7f/0x180 [ +0.000009] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 [ +0.000013] ? i2c_transfer+0xd/0x100 [ +0.000010] drm_do_probe_ddc_edid+0xc2/0x140 [drm] [ +0.000067] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ +0.000006] ? _drm_do_get_edid+0x97/0x3c0 [drm] [ +0.000043] ? __pfx_drm_do_probe_ddc_edid+0x10/0x10 [drm] [ +0.000042] edid_block_read+0x3b/0xd0 [drm] [ +0.000043] _drm_do_get_edid+0xb6/0x3c0 [drm] [ +0.000041] ? __pfx_drm_do_probe_ddc_edid+0x10/0x10 [drm] [ +0.000043] drm_edid_read_custom+0x37/0xd0 [drm] [ +0.000044] amdgpu_dm_connector_mode_valid+0x129/0x1d0 [amdgpu] [ +0.000153] drm_connector_mode_valid+0x3b/0x60 [drm_kms_helper] [ +0.000000] __drm_helper_update_and_validate+0xfe/0x3c0 [drm_kms_helper] [ +0.000000] ? amdgpu_dm_connector_get_modes+0xb6/0x520 [amdgpu] [ +0.000000] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ +0.000000] drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes+0x2ab/0x540 [drm_kms_helper] [ +0.000000] status_store+0xb2/0x1f0 [drm] [ +0.000000] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x136/0x1d0 [ +0.000000] vfs_write+0x24d/0x440 [ +0.000000] ksys_write+0x6f/0xf0 [ +0.000000] do_syscall_64+0x60/0xc0 [ +0.000000] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ +0.000000] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x2b/0x40 [ +0.000000] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ +0.000000] ? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0xc0 [ +0.000000] ? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0xc0 [ +0.000000] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 [ +0.000000] RIP: 0033:0x7f9ad46b4b00 [ +0.000000] Code: 40 00 48 8b 15 19 b3 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 80 3d e1 3a 0e 00 00 74 17 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 58 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 83 ec 28 48 89 [ +0.000000] RSP: 002b:00007ffcbd3bd6d8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ +0.000000] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f9ad46b4b00 [ +0.000000] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 00007f9ad48a7417 RDI: 0000000000000009 [ +0.000000] RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000064 R09: 0000000000000000 [ +0.000000] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007f9ad48a7417 [ +0.000000] R13: 0000000000000009 R14: 00007ffcbd3bd760 R15: 0000000000000001 [ +0.000000] </TASK> [ +0.000000] Modules linked in: ctr ccm rfcomm snd_seq_dummy snd_hrtimer snd_seq snd_seq_device cmac algif_hash algif_skcipher af_alg bnep btusb btrtl btbcm btintel btmtk bluetooth uvcvideo videobuf2_vmalloc sha3_generic videobuf2_memops uvc jitterentropy_rng videobuf2_v4l2 videodev drbg videobuf2_common ansi_cprng mc ecdh_generic ecc qrtr binfmt_misc hid_sensor_accel_3d hid_sensor_magn_3d hid_sensor_gyro_3d hid_sensor_trigger industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf industrialio snd_ctl_led joydev hid_sensor_iio_common rtw89_8852ae rtw89_8852a rtw89_pci snd_hda_codec_realtek rtw89_core snd_hda_codec_generic intel_rapl_msr ledtrig_audio intel_rapl_common snd_hda_codec_hdmi mac80211 snd_hda_intel snd_intel_dspcfg kvm_amd snd_hda_codec snd_soc_dmic snd_acp3x_rn snd_acp3x_pdm_dma libarc4 snd_hwdep snd_soc_core kvm snd_hda_core cfg80211 snd_pci_acp6x snd_pcm nls_ascii snd_timer hp_wmi snd_pci_acp5x nls_cp437 snd_rn_pci_acp3x ucsi_acpi sparse_keymap ccp snd platform_profile snd_acp_config typec_ucsi irqbypass vfat sp5100_tco [ +0.000000] snd_soc_acpi fat rapl pcspkr wmi_bmof roles rfkill rng_core snd_pci_acp3x soundcore k10temp watchdog typec battery ac amd_pmc acpi_tad button hid_sensor_hub hid_multitouch evdev serio_raw msr parport_pc ppdev lp parport fuse loop efi_pstore configfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 ext4 crc16 mbcache jbd2 btrfs blake2b_generic dm_crypt dm_mod efivarfs raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx libcrc32c crc32c_generic xor raid6_pq raid1 raid0 multipath linear md_mod amdgpu amdxcp i2c_algo_bit drm_ttm_helper ttm crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel drm_exec gpu_sched drm_suballoc_helper nvme ghash_clmulni_intel drm_buddy drm_display_helper sha512_ssse3 nvme_core ahci xhci_pci sha512_generic hid_generic xhci_hcd libahci rtsx_pci_sdmmc t10_pi i2c_hid_acpi drm_kms_helper i2c_hid mmc_core libata aesni_intel crc64_rocksoft_generic crypto_simd amd_sfh crc64_rocksoft scsi_mod usbcore cryptd crc_t10dif cec drm crct10dif_generic hid rtsx_pci crct10dif_pclmul scsi_common rc_core crc64 i2c_piix4 [ +0.000000] usb_common crct10dif_common video wmi [ +0.000000] CR2: 00000000000004c0 [ +0.000000] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fixes: 0e859fa ("drm/amd/display: Remove unwanted drm edid references") Signed-off-by: Melissa Wen <mwen@igalia.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>

Turning on CONFIG_DMA_API_DEBUG_SG results in the following warning: DMA-API: mmci-pl18x 48220000.mmc: cacheline tracking EEXIST, overlapping mappings aren't supported WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 51 at kernel/dma/debug.c:568 add_dma_entry+0x234/0x2f4 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 51 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 6.1.28 #1 Hardware name: STMicroelectronics STM32MP257F-EV1 Evaluation Board (DT) Workqueue: events_freezable mmc_rescan Call trace: add_dma_entry+0x234/0x2f4 debug_dma_map_sg+0x198/0x350 __dma_map_sg_attrs+0xa0/0x110 dma_map_sg_attrs+0x10/0x2c sdmmc_idma_prep_data+0x80/0xc0 mmci_prep_data+0x38/0x84 mmci_start_data+0x108/0x2dc mmci_request+0xe4/0x190 __mmc_start_request+0x68/0x140 mmc_start_request+0x94/0xc0 mmc_wait_for_req+0x70/0x100 mmc_send_tuning+0x108/0x1ac sdmmc_execute_tuning+0x14c/0x210 mmc_execute_tuning+0x48/0xec mmc_sd_init_uhs_card.part.0+0x208/0x464 mmc_sd_init_card+0x318/0x89c mmc_attach_sd+0xe4/0x180 mmc_rescan+0x244/0x320 DMA API debug brings to light leaking dma-mappings as dma_map_sg and dma_unmap_sg are not correctly balanced. If an error occurs in mmci_cmd_irq function, only mmci_dma_error function is called and as this API is not managed on stm32 variant, dma_unmap_sg is never called in this error path. Signed-off-by: Christophe Kerello <christophe.kerello@foss.st.com> Fixes: 46b723d ("mmc: mmci: add stm32 sdmmc variant") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240207143951.938144-1-christophe.kerello@foss.st.com Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>

If CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled, copying completion record from event log cache to user triggers a kernel bug. [ 1987.159822] usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLUB object 'dsa0' (offset 74, size 31)! [ 1987.170845] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 1987.176086] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102! [ 1987.180946] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 1987.186866] CPU: 17 PID: 528 Comm: kworker/17:1 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc2+ #5 [ 1987.194537] Hardware name: Intel Corporation AvenueCity/AvenueCity, BIOS BHSDCRB1.86B.2492.D03.2307181620 07/18/2023 [ 1987.206405] Workqueue: wq0.0 idxd_evl_fault_work [idxd] [ 1987.212338] RIP: 0010:usercopy_abort+0x72/0x90 [ 1987.217381] Code: 58 65 9c 50 48 c7 c2 17 85 61 9c 57 48 c7 c7 98 fd 6b 9c 48 0f 44 d6 48 c7 c6 b3 08 62 9c 4c 89 d1 49 0f 44 f3 e8 1e 2e d5 ff <0f> 0b 49 c7 c1 9e 42 61 9c 4c 89 cf 4d 89 c8 eb a9 66 66 2e 0f 1f [ 1987.238505] RSP: 0018:ff62f5cf20607d60 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 1987.244423] RAX: 000000000000005f RBX: 000000000000001f RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 1987.252480] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff9c61429e RDI: 00000000ffffffff [ 1987.260538] RBP: ff62f5cf20607d78 R08: ff2a6a89ef3fffe8 R09: 00000000fffeffff [ 1987.268595] R10: ff2a6a89eed00000 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ff2a66934849c89a [ 1987.276652] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ff2a66934849c8b9 R15: ff2a66934849c899 [ 1987.284710] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff2a66b22fe40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1987.293850] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 1987.300355] CR2: 00007fe291a37000 CR3: 000000010fbd4005 CR4: 0000000000f71ef0 [ 1987.308413] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 1987.316470] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 1987.324527] PKRU: 55555554 [ 1987.327622] Call Trace: [ 1987.330424] <TASK> [ 1987.332826] ? show_regs+0x6e/0x80 [ 1987.336703] ? die+0x3c/0xa0 [ 1987.339988] ? do_trap+0xd4/0xf0 [ 1987.343662] ? do_error_trap+0x75/0xa0 [ 1987.347922] ? usercopy_abort+0x72/0x90 [ 1987.352277] ? exc_invalid_op+0x57/0x80 [ 1987.356634] ? usercopy_abort+0x72/0x90 [ 1987.360988] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1f/0x30 [ 1987.365734] ? usercopy_abort+0x72/0x90 [ 1987.370088] __check_heap_object+0xb7/0xd0 [ 1987.374739] __check_object_size+0x175/0x2d0 [ 1987.379588] idxd_copy_cr+0xa9/0x130 [idxd] [ 1987.384341] idxd_evl_fault_work+0x127/0x390 [idxd] [ 1987.389878] process_one_work+0x13e/0x300 [ 1987.394435] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 1987.399284] worker_thread+0x2f7/0x420 [ 1987.403544] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2b/0x50 [ 1987.409171] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 1987.414019] kthread+0x107/0x140 [ 1987.417693] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 1987.421954] ret_from_fork+0x3d/0x60 [ 1987.426019] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 1987.430281] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 [ 1987.434744] </TASK> The issue arises because event log cache is created using kmem_cache_create() which is not suitable for user copy. Fix the issue by creating event log cache with kmem_cache_create_usercopy(), ensuring safe user copy. Fixes: c2f156b ("dmaengine: idxd: create kmem cache for event log fault items") Reported-by: Tony Zhu <tony.zhu@intel.com> Tested-by: Tony Zhu <tony.zhu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Lijun Pan <lijun.pan@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240209191412.1050270-1-fenghua.yu@intel.com Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>

…SR-IOV When kdump kernel tries to copy dump data over SR-IOV, LPAR panics due to NULL pointer exception: Kernel attempted to read user page (0) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0) BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000000 Faulting instruction address: 0xc000000020847ad4 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries Modules linked in: mlx5_core(+) vmx_crypto pseries_wdt papr_scm libnvdimm mlxfw tls psample sunrpc fuse overlay squashfs loop CPU: 12 PID: 315 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 6.4.0-Test102+ #12 Hardware name: IBM,9080-HEX POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NH1060_008) hv:phyp pSeries NIP: c000000020847ad4 LR: c00000002083b2dc CTR: 00000000006cd18c REGS: c000000029162ca0 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (6.4.0-Test102+) MSR: 800000000280b033 <SF,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 48288244 XER: 00000008 CFAR: c00000002083b2d8 DAR: 0000000000000000 DSISR: 40000000 IRQMASK: 1 ... NIP _find_next_zero_bit+0x24/0x110 LR bitmap_find_next_zero_area_off+0x5c/0xe0 Call Trace: dev_printk_emit+0x38/0x48 (unreliable) iommu_area_alloc+0xc4/0x180 iommu_range_alloc+0x1e8/0x580 iommu_alloc+0x60/0x130 iommu_alloc_coherent+0x158/0x2b0 dma_iommu_alloc_coherent+0x3c/0x50 dma_alloc_attrs+0x170/0x1f0 mlx5_cmd_init+0xc0/0x760 [mlx5_core] mlx5_function_setup+0xf0/0x510 [mlx5_core] mlx5_init_one+0x84/0x210 [mlx5_core] probe_one+0x118/0x2c0 [mlx5_core] local_pci_probe+0x68/0x110 pci_call_probe+0x68/0x200 pci_device_probe+0xbc/0x1a0 really_probe+0x104/0x540 __driver_probe_device+0xb4/0x230 driver_probe_device+0x54/0x130 __driver_attach+0x158/0x2b0 bus_for_each_dev+0xa8/0x130 driver_attach+0x34/0x50 bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x300 driver_register+0xa4/0x1b0 __pci_register_driver+0x68/0x80 mlx5_init+0xb8/0x100 [mlx5_core] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x300 do_init_module+0x7c/0x2b0 At the time of LPAR dump, before kexec hands over control to kdump kernel, DDWs (Dynamic DMA Windows) are scanned and added to the FDT. For the SR-IOV case, default DMA window "ibm,dma-window" is removed from the FDT and DDW added, for the device. Now, kexec hands over control to the kdump kernel. When the kdump kernel initializes, PCI busses are scanned and IOMMU group/tables created, in pci_dma_bus_setup_pSeriesLP(). For the SR-IOV case, there is no "ibm,dma-window". The original commit: b1fc44e, fixes the path where memory is pre-mapped (direct mapped) to the DDW. When TCEs are direct mapped, there is no need to initialize IOMMU tables. iommu_table_setparms_lpar() only considers "ibm,dma-window" property when initiallizing IOMMU table. In the scenario where TCEs are dynamically allocated for SR-IOV, newly created IOMMU table is not initialized. Later, when the device driver tries to enter TCEs for the SR-IOV device, NULL pointer execption is thrown from iommu_area_alloc(). The fix is to initialize the IOMMU table with DDW property stored in the FDT. There are 2 points to remember: 1. For the dedicated adapter, kdump kernel would encounter both default and DDW in FDT. In this case, DDW property is used to initialize the IOMMU table. 2. A DDW could be direct or dynamic mapped. kdump kernel would initialize IOMMU table and mark the existing DDW as "dynamic". This works fine since, at the time of table initialization, iommu_table_clear() makes some space in the DDW, for some predefined number of TCEs which are needed for kdump to succeed. Fixes: b1fc44e ("pseries/iommu/ddw: Fix kdump to work in absence of ibm,dma-window") Signed-off-by: Gaurav Batra <gbatra@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Brian King <brking@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20240125203017.61014-1-gbatra@linux.ibm.com

With numa balancing on, when a numa system is running where a numa node doesn't have its local memory so it has no managed zones, the following oops has been observed. It's because wakeup_kswapd() is called with a wrong zone index, -1. Fixed it by checking the index before calling wakeup_kswapd(). > BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000000033f3 > #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode > #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page > PGD 0 P4D 0 > Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI > CPU: 2 PID: 895 Comm: masim Not tainted 6.6.0-dirty #255 > Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS > rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 > RIP: 0010:wakeup_kswapd (./linux/mm/vmscan.c:7812) > Code: (omitted) > RSP: 0000:ffffc90004257d58 EFLAGS: 00010286 > RAX: ffffffffffffffff RBX: ffff88883fff0480 RCX: 0000000000000003 > RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88883fff0480 > RBP: ffffffffffffffff R08: ff0003ffffffffff R09: ffffffffffffffff > R10: ffff888106c95540 R11: 0000000055555554 R12: 0000000000000003 > R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88883fff0940 > FS: 00007fc4b8124740(0000) GS:ffff888827c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 > CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 > CR2: 00000000000033f3 CR3: 000000026cc08004 CR4: 0000000000770ee0 > DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 > DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 > PKRU: 55555554 > Call Trace: > <TASK> > ? __die > ? page_fault_oops > ? __pte_offset_map_lock > ? exc_page_fault > ? asm_exc_page_fault > ? wakeup_kswapd > migrate_misplaced_page > __handle_mm_fault > handle_mm_fault > do_user_addr_fault > exc_page_fault > asm_exc_page_fault > RIP: 0033:0x55b897ba0808 > Code: (omitted) > RSP: 002b:00007ffeefa821a0 EFLAGS: 00010287 > RAX: 000055b89983acd0 RBX: 00007ffeefa823f8 RCX: 000055b89983acd0 > RDX: 00007fc2f8122010 RSI: 0000000000020000 RDI: 000055b89983acd0 > RBP: 00007ffeefa821a0 R08: 0000000000000037 R09: 0000000000000075 > R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000 > R13: 00007ffeefa82410 R14: 000055b897ba5dd8 R15: 00007fc4b8340000 > </TASK> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240216111502.79759-1-byungchul@sk.com Signed-off-by: Byungchul Park <byungchul@sk.com> Reported-by: Hyeongtak Ji <hyeongtak.ji@sk.com> Fixes: c574bbe ("NUMA balancing: optimize page placement for memory tiering system") Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

Commit a5a9230 (fbdev: fbcon: Properly revert changes when vc_resize() failed) started restoring old font data upon failure (of vc_resize()). But it performs so only for user fonts. It means that the "system"/internal fonts are not restored at all. So in result, the very first call to fbcon_do_set_font() performs no restore at all upon failing vc_resize(). This can be reproduced by Syzkaller to crash the system on the next invocation of font_get(). It's rather hard to hit the allocation failure in vc_resize() on the first font_set(), but not impossible. Esp. if fault injection is used to aid the execution/failure. It was demonstrated by Sirius: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffffffffffff8 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD cb7b067 P4D cb7b067 PUD cb7d067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 1 PID: 8007 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.7.0-g9d1694dc91ce #20 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:fbcon_get_font+0x229/0x800 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c:2286 Call Trace: <TASK> con_font_get drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:4558 [inline] con_font_op+0x1fc/0xf20 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:4673 vt_k_ioctl drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:474 [inline] vt_ioctl+0x632/0x2ec0 drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:752 tty_ioctl+0x6f8/0x1570 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2803 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] ... So restore the font data in any case, not only for user fonts. Note the later 'if' is now protected by 'old_userfont' and not 'old_data' as the latter is always set now. (And it is supposed to be non-NULL. Otherwise we would see the bug above again.) Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby (SUSE) <jirislaby@kernel.org> Fixes: a5a9230 ("fbdev: fbcon: Properly revert changes when vc_resize() failed") Reported-and-tested-by: Ubisectech Sirius <bugreport@ubisectech.com> Cc: Ubisectech Sirius <bugreport@ubisectech.com> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: linux-fbdev@vger.kernel.org Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240208114411.14604-1-jirislaby@kernel.org

Syzkaller reported the following bug: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000038: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000001c0-0x00000000000001c7] Call Trace: lock_acquire lock_acquire+0x1ce/0x4f0 down_read+0x93/0x4a0 iommufd_test_syz_conv_iova+0x56/0x1f0 iommufd_test_access_rw.isra.0+0x2ec/0x390 iommufd_test+0x1058/0x1e30 iommufd_fops_ioctl+0x381/0x510 vfs_ioctl __do_sys_ioctl __se_sys_ioctl __x64_sys_ioctl+0x170/0x1e0 do_syscall_x64 do_syscall_64+0x71/0x140 This is because the new iommufd_access_change_ioas() sets access->ioas to NULL during its process, so the lock might be gone in a concurrent racing context. Fix this by doing the same access->ioas sanity as iommufd_access_rw() and iommufd_access_pin_pages() functions do. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 9227da7 ("iommufd: Add iommufd_access_change_ioas(_id) helpers") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3f1932acaf1dd494d404c04364d73ce8f57f3e5e.1708636627.git.nicolinc@nvidia.com Reported-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Nicolin Chen <nicolinc@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>

Syzbot and Eric reported a lockdep splat in the subflow diag: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.8.0-rc4-syzkaller-00212-g40b9385dd8e6 #0 Not tainted syz-executor.2/24141 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888045870130 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: tcp_diag_put_ulp net/ipv4/tcp_diag.c:100 [inline] ffff888045870130 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: tcp_diag_get_aux+0x738/0x830 net/ipv4/tcp_diag.c:137 but task is already holding lock: ffffc9000135e488 (&h->lhash2[i].lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] ffffc9000135e488 (&h->lhash2[i].lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: inet_diag_dump_icsk+0x39f/0x1f80 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1038 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&h->lhash2[i].lock){+.+.}-{2:2}: lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] __inet_hash+0x335/0xbe0 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:743 inet_csk_listen_start+0x23a/0x320 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1261 __inet_listen_sk+0x2a2/0x770 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:217 inet_listen+0xa3/0x110 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:239 rds_tcp_listen_init+0x3fd/0x5a0 net/rds/tcp_listen.c:316 rds_tcp_init_net+0x141/0x320 net/rds/tcp.c:577 ops_init+0x352/0x610 net/core/net_namespace.c:136 __register_pernet_operations net/core/net_namespace.c:1214 [inline] register_pernet_operations+0x2cb/0x660 net/core/net_namespace.c:1283 register_pernet_device+0x33/0x80 net/core/net_namespace.c:1370 rds_tcp_init+0x62/0xd0 net/rds/tcp.c:735 do_one_initcall+0x238/0x830 init/main.c:1236 do_initcall_level+0x157/0x210 init/main.c:1298 do_initcalls+0x3f/0x80 init/main.c:1314 kernel_init_freeable+0x42f/0x5d0 init/main.c:1551 kernel_init+0x1d/0x2a0 init/main.c:1441 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:242 -> #0 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.}-{0:0}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline] validate_chain+0x18ca/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 __lock_acquire+0x1345/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 lock_sock_fast include/net/sock.h:1723 [inline] subflow_get_info+0x166/0xd20 net/mptcp/diag.c:28 tcp_diag_put_ulp net/ipv4/tcp_diag.c:100 [inline] tcp_diag_get_aux+0x738/0x830 net/ipv4/tcp_diag.c:137 inet_sk_diag_fill+0x10ed/0x1e00 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:345 inet_diag_dump_icsk+0x55b/0x1f80 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1061 __inet_diag_dump+0x211/0x3a0 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1263 inet_diag_dump_compat+0x1c1/0x2d0 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1371 netlink_dump+0x59b/0xc80 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2264 __netlink_dump_start+0x5df/0x790 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2370 netlink_dump_start include/linux/netlink.h:338 [inline] inet_diag_rcv_msg_compat+0x209/0x4c0 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1405 sock_diag_rcv_msg+0xe7/0x410 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2543 sock_diag_rcv+0x2a/0x40 net/core/sock_diag.c:280 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1341 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x7ea/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1367 netlink_sendmsg+0xa3b/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2584 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [inline] __sys_sendmsg+0x2b0/0x3a0 net/socket.c:2667 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77 As noted by Eric we can break the lock dependency chain avoid dumping any extended info for the mptcp subflow listener: nothing actually useful is presented there. Fixes: b8adb69 ("mptcp: fix lockless access in subflow ULP diag") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CANn89iJ=Oecw6OZDwmSYc9HJKQ_G32uN11L+oUcMu+TOD5Xiaw@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240223-upstream-net-20240223-misc-fixes-v1-9-162e87e48497@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

With parameters CONFIG_RISCV_PMU_LEGACY=y and CONFIG_RISCV_PMU_SBI=n linux kernel crashes when you try perf record: $ perf record ls [ 46.749286] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 [ 46.750199] Oops [#1] [ 46.750342] Modules linked in: [ 46.750608] CPU: 0 PID: 107 Comm: perf-exec Not tainted 6.6.0 #2 [ 46.750906] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) [ 46.751184] epc : 0x0 [ 46.751430] ra : arch_perf_update_userpage+0x54/0x13e [ 46.751680] epc : 0000000000000000 ra : ffffffff8072ee52 sp : ff2000000022b8f0 [ 46.751958] gp : ffffffff81505988 tp : ff6000000290d400 t0 : ff2000000022b9c0 [ 46.752229] t1 : 0000000000000001 t2 : 0000000000000003 s0 : ff2000000022b930 [ 46.752451] s1 : ff600000028fb000 a0 : 0000000000000000 a1 : ff600000028fb000 [ 46.752673] a2 : 0000000ae2751268 a3 : 00000000004fb708 a4 : 0000000000000004 [ 46.752895] a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : 000000000017ffe3 a7 : 00000000000000d2 [ 46.753117] s2 : ff600000028fb000 s3 : 0000000ae2751268 s4 : 0000000000000000 [ 46.753338] s5 : ffffffff8153e290 s6 : ff600000863b9000 s7 : ff60000002961078 [ 46.753562] s8 : ff60000002961048 s9 : ff60000002961058 s10: 0000000000000001 [ 46.753783] s11: 0000000000000018 t3 : ffffffffffffffff t4 : ffffffffffffffff [ 46.754005] t5 : ff6000000292270c t6 : ff2000000022bb30 [ 46.754179] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 000000000000000c [ 46.754653] Code: Unable to access instruction at 0xffffffffffffffec. [ 46.754939] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 46.755131] note: perf-exec[107] exited with irqs disabled [ 46.755546] note: perf-exec[107] exited with preempt_count 4 This happens because in the legacy case the ctr_get_width function was not defined, but it is used in arch_perf_update_userpage. Also remove extra check in riscv_pmu_ctr_get_width_mask Signed-off-by: Vadim Shakirov <vadim.shakirov@syntacore.com> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com> Reviewed-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com> Fixes: cc4c07c ("drivers: perf: Implement perf event mmap support in the SBI backend") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240227170002.188671-3-vadim.shakirov@syntacore.com Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>

…git/netfilter/nf Pablo Neira Ayuso says: ==================== Netfilter fixes for net Patch #1 restores NFPROTO_INET with nft_compat, from Ignat Korchagin. Patch #2 fixes an issue with bridge netfilter and broadcast/multicast packets. There is a day 0 bug in br_netfilter when used with connection tracking. Conntrack assumes that an nf_conn structure that is not yet added to hash table ("unconfirmed"), is only visible by the current cpu that is processing the sk_buff. For bridge this isn't true, sk_buff can get cloned in between, and clones can be processed in parallel on different cpu. This patch disables NAT and conntrack helpers for multicast packets. Patch #3 adds a selftest to cover for the br_netfilter bug. netfilter pull request 24-02-29 * tag 'nf-24-02-29' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf: selftests: netfilter: add bridge conntrack + multicast test case netfilter: bridge: confirm multicast packets before passing them up the stack netfilter: nf_tables: allow NFPROTO_INET in nft_(match/target)_validate() ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240229000135.8780-1-pablo@netfilter.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>

The gtp_link_ops operations structure for the subsystem must be registered after registering the gtp_net_ops pernet operations structure. Syzkaller hit 'general protection fault in gtp_genl_dump_pdp' bug: [ 1010.702740] gtp: GTP module unloaded [ 1010.715877] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 1010.715888] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f] [ 1010.715895] CPU: 1 PID: 128616 Comm: a.out Not tainted 6.8.0-rc6-std-def-alt1 #1 [ 1010.715899] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.0-alt1 04/01/2014 [ 1010.715908] RIP: 0010:gtp_newlink+0x4d7/0x9c0 [gtp] [ 1010.715915] Code: 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 41 04 00 00 48 8b bb d8 05 00 00 e8 ed f6 ff ff 48 89 c2 48 89 c5 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 4f 04 00 00 4c 89 e2 4c 8b 6d 00 48 b8 00 00 00 [ 1010.715920] RSP: 0018:ffff888020fbf180 EFLAGS: 00010203 [ 1010.715929] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88800399c000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 1010.715933] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff84805280 RDI: 0000000000000282 [ 1010.715938] RBP: 000000000000000d R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 1010.715942] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88800399cc80 [ 1010.715947] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000400 [ 1010.715953] FS: 00007fd1509ab5c0(0000) GS:ffff88805b300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1010.715958] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 1010.715962] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000001c07a000 CR4: 0000000000750ee0 [ 1010.715968] PKRU: 55555554 [ 1010.715972] Call Trace: [ 1010.715985] ? __die_body.cold+0x1a/0x1f [ 1010.715995] ? die_addr+0x43/0x70 [ 1010.716002] ? exc_general_protection+0x199/0x2f0 [ 1010.716016] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x1e/0x30 [ 1010.716026] ? gtp_newlink+0x4d7/0x9c0 [gtp] [ 1010.716034] ? gtp_net_exit+0x150/0x150 [gtp] [ 1010.716042] __rtnl_newlink+0x1063/0x1700 [ 1010.716051] ? rtnl_setlink+0x3c0/0x3c0 [ 1010.716063] ? is_bpf_text_address+0xc0/0x1f0 [ 1010.716070] ? kernel_text_address.part.0+0xbb/0xd0 [ 1010.716076] ? __kernel_text_address+0x56/0xa0 [ 1010.716084] ? unwind_get_return_address+0x5a/0xa0 [ 1010.716091] ? create_prof_cpu_mask+0x30/0x30 [ 1010.716098] ? arch_stack_walk+0x9e/0xf0 [ 1010.716106] ? stack_trace_save+0x91/0xd0 [ 1010.716113] ? stack_trace_consume_entry+0x170/0x170 [ 1010.716121] ? __lock_acquire+0x15c5/0x5380 [ 1010.716139] ? mark_held_locks+0x9e/0xe0 [ 1010.716148] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x35f/0x3c0 [ 1010.716155] ? __rtnl_newlink+0x1700/0x1700 [ 1010.716160] rtnl_newlink+0x69/0xa0 [ 1010.716166] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x43b/0xc50 [ 1010.716172] ? rtnl_fdb_dump+0x9f0/0x9f0 [ 1010.716179] ? lock_acquire+0x1fe/0x560 [ 1010.716188] ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x12f/0xd50 [ 1010.716196] netlink_rcv_skb+0x14d/0x440 [ 1010.716202] ? rtnl_fdb_dump+0x9f0/0x9f0 [ 1010.716208] ? netlink_ack+0xab0/0xab0 [ 1010.716213] ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x202/0xd50 [ 1010.716220] ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x218/0xd50 [ 1010.716226] ? __virt_addr_valid+0x30b/0x590 [ 1010.716233] netlink_unicast+0x54b/0x800 [ 1010.716240] ? netlink_attachskb+0x870/0x870 [ 1010.716248] ? __check_object_size+0x2de/0x3b0 [ 1010.716254] netlink_sendmsg+0x938/0xe40 [ 1010.716261] ? netlink_unicast+0x800/0x800 [ 1010.716269] ? __import_iovec+0x292/0x510 [ 1010.716276] ? netlink_unicast+0x800/0x800 [ 1010.716284] __sock_sendmsg+0x159/0x190 [ 1010.716290] ____sys_sendmsg+0x712/0x880 [ 1010.716297] ? sock_write_iter+0x3d0/0x3d0 [ 1010.716304] ? __ia32_sys_recvmmsg+0x270/0x270 [ 1010.716309] ? lock_acquire+0x1fe/0x560 [ 1010.716315] ? drain_array_locked+0x90/0x90 [ 1010.716324] ___sys_sendmsg+0xf8/0x170 [ 1010.716331] ? sendmsg_copy_msghdr+0x170/0x170 [ 1010.716337] ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x2c7/0x860 [ 1010.716343] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x430/0x430 [ 1010.716350] ? debug_mutex_init+0x33/0x70 [ 1010.716360] ? percpu_counter_add_batch+0x8b/0x140 [ 1010.716367] ? lock_acquire+0x1fe/0x560 [ 1010.716373] ? find_held_lock+0x2c/0x110 [ 1010.716384] ? __fd_install+0x1b6/0x6f0 [ 1010.716389] ? lock_downgrade+0x810/0x810 [ 1010.716396] ? __fget_light+0x222/0x290 [ 1010.716403] __sys_sendmsg+0xea/0x1b0 [ 1010.716409] ? __sys_sendmsg_sock+0x40/0x40 [ 1010.716419] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x2b3/0x430 [ 1010.716425] ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x1d/0x60 [ 1010.716432] do_syscall_64+0x30/0x40 [ 1010.716438] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x62/0xc7 [ 1010.716444] RIP: 0033:0x7fd1508cbd49 [ 1010.716452] Code: 00 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d ef 70 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 1010.716456] RSP: 002b:00007fff18872348 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e [ 1010.716463] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055f72bf0eac0 RCX: 00007fd1508cbd49 [ 1010.716468] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000280 RDI: 0000000000000006 [ 1010.716473] RBP: 00007fff18872360 R08: 00007fff18872360 R09: 00007fff18872360 [ 1010.716478] R10: 00007fff18872360 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 000055f72bf0e1b0 [ 1010.716482] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 1010.716491] Modules linked in: gtp(+) udp_tunnel ib_core uinput af_packet rfkill qrtr joydev hid_generic usbhid hid kvm_intel iTCO_wdt intel_pmc_bxt iTCO_vendor_support kvm snd_hda_codec_generic ledtrig_audio irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel snd_hda_intel nls_utf8 snd_intel_dspcfg nls_cp866 psmouse aesni_intel vfat crypto_simd fat cryptd glue_helper snd_hda_codec pcspkr snd_hda_core i2c_i801 snd_hwdep i2c_smbus xhci_pci snd_pcm lpc_ich xhci_pci_renesas xhci_hcd qemu_fw_cfg tiny_power_button button sch_fq_codel vboxvideo drm_vram_helper drm_ttm_helper ttm vboxsf vboxguest snd_seq_midi snd_seq_midi_event snd_seq snd_rawmidi snd_seq_device snd_timer snd soundcore msr fuse efi_pstore dm_mod ip_tables x_tables autofs4 virtio_gpu virtio_dma_buf drm_kms_helper cec rc_core drm virtio_rng virtio_scsi rng_core virtio_balloon virtio_blk virtio_net virtio_console net_failover failover ahci libahci libata evdev scsi_mod input_leds serio_raw virtio_pci intel_agp [ 1010.716674] virtio_ring intel_gtt virtio [last unloaded: gtp] [ 1010.716693] ---[ end trace 04990a4ce61e174b ]--- Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexander Ofitserov <oficerovas@altlinux.org> Fixes: 459aa66 ("gtp: add initial driver for datapath of GPRS Tunneling Protocol (GTP-U)") Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240228114703.465107-1-oficerovas@altlinux.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>

(1 << idx) of int is not desired when setting bits in unsigned long overflowed_ctrs, use BIT() instead. This panic happens when running 'perf record -e branches' on sophgo sg2042. [ 273.311852] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000098 [ 273.320851] Oops [#1] [ 273.323179] Modules linked in: [ 273.326303] CPU: 0 PID: 1475 Comm: perf Not tainted 6.6.0-rc3+ #9 [ 273.332521] Hardware name: Sophgo Mango (DT) [ 273.336878] epc : riscv_pmu_ctr_get_width_mask+0x8/0x62 [ 273.342291] ra : pmu_sbi_ovf_handler+0x2e0/0x34e [ 273.347091] epc : ffffffff80aecd98 ra : ffffffff80aee056 sp : fffffff6e36928b0 [ 273.354454] gp : ffffffff821f82d0 tp : ffffffd90c353200 t0 : 0000002ade4f9978 [ 273.361815] t1 : 0000000000504d55 t2 : ffffffff8016cd8c s0 : fffffff6e3692a70 [ 273.369180] s1 : 0000000000000020 a0 : 0000000000000000 a1 : 00001a8e81800000 [ 273.376540] a2 : 0000003c00070198 a3 : 0000003c00db75a4 a4 : 0000000000000015 [ 273.383901] a5 : ffffffd7ff8804b0 a6 : 0000000000000015 a7 : 000000000000002a [ 273.391327] s2 : 000000000000ffff s3 : 0000000000000000 s4 : ffffffd7ff8803b0 [ 273.398773] s5 : 0000000000504d55 s6 : ffffffd905069800 s7 : ffffffff821fe210 [ 273.406139] s8 : 000000007fffffff s9 : ffffffd7ff8803b0 s10: ffffffd903f29098 [ 273.413660] s11: 0000000080000000 t3 : 0000000000000003 t4 : ffffffff8017a0ca [ 273.421022] t5 : ffffffff8023cfc2 t6 : ffffffd9040780e8 [ 273.426437] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: 0000000000000098 cause: 000000000000000d [ 273.434512] [<ffffffff80aecd98>] riscv_pmu_ctr_get_width_mask+0x8/0x62 [ 273.441169] [<ffffffff80076bd8>] handle_percpu_devid_irq+0x98/0x1ee [ 273.447562] [<ffffffff80071158>] generic_handle_domain_irq+0x28/0x36 [ 273.454151] [<ffffffff8047a99a>] riscv_intc_irq+0x36/0x4e [ 273.459659] [<ffffffff80c944de>] handle_riscv_irq+0x4a/0x74 [ 273.465442] [<ffffffff80c94c48>] do_irq+0x62/0x92 [ 273.470360] Code: 0420 60a2 6402 5529 0141 8082 0013 0000 0013 0000 (6d5c) b783 [ 273.477921] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 273.482630] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com> Reviewed-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com> Signed-off-by: Fei Wu <fei2.wu@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240228115425.2613856-1-fei2.wu@intel.com Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>

For fiemap we recently stopped locking the target extent range for the whole duration of the fiemap call, in order to avoid a deadlock in a scenario where the fiemap buffer happens to be a memory mapped range of the same file. This use case is very unlikely to be useful in practice but it may be triggered by fuzz testing (syzbot, etc). However by not locking the target extent range for the whole duration of the fiemap call we can race with an ordered extent. This happens like this: 1) The fiemap task finishes processing a file extent item that covers the file range [512K, 1M[, and that file extent item is the last item in the leaf currently being processed; 2) And ordered extent for the file range [768K, 2M[, in COW mode, completes (btrfs_finish_one_ordered()) and the file extent item covering the range [512K, 1M[ is trimmed to cover the range [512K, 768K[ and then a new file extent item for the range [768K, 2M[ is inserted in the inode's subvolume tree; 3) The fiemap task calls fiemap_next_leaf_item(), which then calls btrfs_next_leaf() to find the next leaf / item. This finds that the the next key following the one we previously processed (its type is BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY and its offset is 512K), is the key corresponding to the new file extent item inserted by the ordered extent, which has a type of BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY and an offset of 768K; 4) Later the fiemap code ends up at emit_fiemap_extent() and triggers the warning: if (cache->offset + cache->len > offset) { WARN_ON(1); return -EINVAL; } Since we get 1M > 768K, because the previously emitted entry for the old extent covering the file range [512K, 1M[ ends at an offset that is greater than the new extent's start offset (768K). This makes fiemap fail with -EINVAL besides triggering the warning that produces a stack trace like the following: [1621.677651] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [1621.677656] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 204366 at fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:2492 emit_fiemap_extent+0x84/0x90 [btrfs] [1621.677899] Modules linked in: btrfs blake2b_generic (...) [1621.677951] CPU: 1 PID: 204366 Comm: pool Not tainted 6.8.0-rc5-btrfs-next-151+ #1 [1621.677954] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-0-gea1b7a073390-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [1621.677956] RIP: 0010:emit_fiemap_extent+0x84/0x90 [btrfs] [1621.678033] Code: 2b 4c 89 63 (...) [1621.678035] RSP: 0018:ffffab16089ffd20 EFLAGS: 00010206 [1621.678037] RAX: 00000000004fa000 RBX: ffffab16089ffe08 RCX: 0000000000009000 [1621.678039] RDX: 00000000004f9000 RSI: 00000000004f1000 RDI: ffffab16089ffe90 [1621.678040] RBP: 00000000004f9000 R08: 0000000000001000 R09: 0000000000000000 [1621.678041] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000001000 R12: 0000000041d78000 [1621.678043] R13: 0000000000001000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff9434f0b17850 [1621.678044] FS: 00007fa6e20006c0(0000) GS:ffff943bdfa40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [1621.678046] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [1621.678048] CR2: 00007fa6b0801000 CR3: 000000012d404002 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 [1621.678053] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [1621.678055] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [1621.678056] Call Trace: [1621.678074] <TASK> [1621.678076] ? __warn+0x80/0x130 [1621.678082] ? emit_fiemap_extent+0x84/0x90 [btrfs] [1621.678159] ? report_bug+0x1f4/0x200 [1621.678164] ? handle_bug+0x42/0x70 [1621.678167] ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70 [1621.678170] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 [1621.678178] ? emit_fiemap_extent+0x84/0x90 [btrfs] [1621.678253] extent_fiemap+0x766/0xa30 [btrfs] [1621.678339] btrfs_fiemap+0x45/0x80 [btrfs] [1621.678420] do_vfs_ioctl+0x1e4/0x870 [1621.678431] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x6a/0xc0 [1621.678434] do_syscall_64+0x52/0x120 [1621.678445] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 There's also another case where before calling btrfs_next_leaf() we are processing a hole or a prealloc extent and we had several delalloc ranges within that hole or prealloc extent. In that case if the ordered extents complete before we find the next key, we may end up finding an extent item with an offset smaller than (or equals to) the offset in cache->offset. So fix this by changing emit_fiemap_extent() to address these three scenarios like this: 1) For the first case, steps listed above, adjust the length of the previously cached extent so that it does not overlap with the current extent, emit the previous one and cache the current file extent item; 2) For the second case where he had a hole or prealloc extent with multiple delalloc ranges inside the hole or prealloc extent's range, and the current file extent item has an offset that matches the offset in the fiemap cache, just discard what we have in the fiemap cache and assign the current file extent item to the cache, since it's more up to date; 3) For the third case where he had a hole or prealloc extent with multiple delalloc ranges inside the hole or prealloc extent's range and the offset of the file extent item we just found is smaller than what we have in the cache, just skip the current file extent item if its range end at or behind the cached extent's end, because we may have emitted (to the fiemap user space buffer) delalloc ranges that overlap with the current file extent item's range. If the file extent item's range goes beyond the end offset of the cached extent, just emit the cached extent and cache a subrange of the file extent item, that goes from the end offset of the cached extent to the end offset of the file extent item. Dealing with those cases in those ways makes everything consistent by reflecting the current state of file extent items in the btree and without emitting extents that have overlapping ranges (which would be confusing and violating expectations). This issue could be triggered often with test case generic/561, and was also hit and reported by Wang Yugui. Reported-by: Wang Yugui <wangyugui@e16-tech.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/20240223104619.701F.409509F4@e16-tech.com/ Fixes: b0ad381 ("btrfs: fix deadlock with fiemap and extent locking") Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

gaozhangfei reviewed Apr 25, 2021

View reviewed changes

crypto: hisilicon/qm - Support queue update function

40ed4a5

When poll is used in userspace, kernel calls the update function to query the queue status and return result.If no new task,the thread sleeps and wait for interrupt wakeup. Signed-off-by: linwenkai <linwenkai6@hisilicon.com>

lin755 force-pushed the uacce-devel-5.12 branch from 4f28bc4 to 40ed4a5 Compare April 26, 2021 01:28

lin755 closed this Apr 26, 2021

gaozhangfei pushed a commit to gaozhangfei/linux-kernel-uadk that referenced this pull request Feb 21, 2024

Merge tag 'kvm-riscv-fixes-6.8-1' of https://github.com/kvm-riscv/linux…

e67391c

… into HEAD KVM/riscv fixes for 6.8, take Linaro#1 - Fix steal-time related sparse warnings

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crypto: hisilicon/qm - Support queue update function #1

crypto: hisilicon/qm - Support queue update function #1

lin755 commented Apr 25, 2021

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lin755 commented Apr 26, 2021

lin755 commented Apr 26, 2021

crypto: hisilicon/qm - Support queue update function #1

crypto: hisilicon/qm - Support queue update function #1

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lin755 commented Apr 26, 2021

lin755 commented Apr 26, 2021