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crypto: hisilicon/qm - Support queue update function #2
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When poll is used in userspace, kernel calls the update function to query the queue status and return result.If no new task,the thread sleeps and wait for interrupt wakeup. Signed-off-by: linwenkai <linwenkai6@hisilicon.com>
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The variable mm->total_vm could be accessed concurrently during mmaping and system accounting as noticed by KCSAN, BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __acct_update_integrals / mmap_region read-write to 0xffffa40267bd14c8 of 8 bytes by task 15609 on cpu 3: mmap_region+0x6dc/0x1400 do_mmap+0x794/0xca0 vm_mmap_pgoff+0xdf/0x150 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0xe1/0x380 do_syscall_64+0x37/0x50 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 read to 0xffffa40267bd14c8 of 8 bytes by interrupt on cpu 2: __acct_update_integrals+0x187/0x1d0 acct_account_cputime+0x3c/0x40 update_process_times+0x5c/0x150 tick_sched_timer+0x184/0x210 __run_hrtimer+0x119/0x3b0 hrtimer_interrupt+0x350/0xaa0 __sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x7b/0x220 asm_call_irq_on_stack+0x12/0x20 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x4d/0x80 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20 smp_call_function_single+0x192/0x2b0 perf_install_in_context+0x29b/0x4a0 __se_sys_perf_event_open+0x1a98/0x2550 __x64_sys_perf_event_open+0x63/0x70 do_syscall_64+0x37/0x50 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 2 PID: 15610 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.10.0+ #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 In vm_stat_account which called by mmap_region, increase total_vm, and __acct_update_integrals may read total_vm at the same time. This will cause a data race which lead to undefined behaviour. To avoid potential bad read/write, volatile property and barrier are both used to avoid undefined behaviour. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210913105550.1569419-1-liupeng256@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Peng Liu <liupeng256@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Patch series "Solve silent data loss caused by poisoned page cache (shmem/tmpfs)", v5. When discussing the patch that splits page cache THP in order to offline the poisoned page, Noaya mentioned there is a bigger problem [1] that prevents this from working since the page cache page will be truncated if uncorrectable errors happen. By looking this deeper it turns out this approach (truncating poisoned page) may incur silent data loss for all non-readonly filesystems if the page is dirty. It may be worse for in-memory filesystem, e.g. shmem/tmpfs since the data blocks are actually gone. To solve this problem we could keep the poisoned dirty page in page cache then notify the users on any later access, e.g. page fault, read/write, etc. The clean page could be truncated as is since they can be reread from disk later on. The consequence is the filesystems may find poisoned page and manipulate it as healthy page since all the filesystems actually don't check if the page is poisoned or not in all the relevant paths except page fault. In general, we need make the filesystems be aware of poisoned page before we could keep the poisoned page in page cache in order to solve the data loss problem. To make filesystems be aware of poisoned page we should consider: - The page should be not written back: clearing dirty flag could prevent from writeback. - The page should not be dropped (it shows as a clean page) by drop caches or other callers: the refcount pin from hwpoison could prevent from invalidating (called by cache drop, inode cache shrinking, etc), but it doesn't avoid invalidation in DIO path. - The page should be able to get truncated/hole punched/unlinked: it works as it is. - Notify users when the page is accessed, e.g. read/write, page fault and other paths (compression, encryption, etc). The scope of the last one is huge since almost all filesystems need do it once a page is returned from page cache lookup. There are a couple of options to do it: 1. Check hwpoison flag for every path, the most straightforward way. 2. Return NULL for poisoned page from page cache lookup, the most callsites check if NULL is returned, this should have least work I think. But the error handling in filesystems just return -ENOMEM, the error code will incur confusion to the users obviously. 3. To improve #2, we could return error pointer, e.g. ERR_PTR(-EIO), but this will involve significant amount of code change as well since all the paths need check if the pointer is ERR or not just like option #1. I did prototypes for both #1 and #3, but it seems #3 may require more changes than #1. For #3 ERR_PTR will be returned so all the callers need to check the return value otherwise invalid pointer may be dereferenced, but not all callers really care about the content of the page, for example, partial truncate which just sets the truncated range in one page to 0. So for such paths it needs additional modification if ERR_PTR is returned. And if the callers have their own way to handle the problematic pages we need to add a new FGP flag to tell FGP functions to return the pointer to the page. It may happen very rarely, but once it happens the consequence (data corruption) could be very bad and it is very hard to debug. It seems this problem had been slightly discussed before, but seems no action was taken at that time. [2] As the aforementioned investigation, it needs huge amount of work to solve the potential data loss for all filesystems. But it is much easier for in-memory filesystems and such filesystems actually suffer more than others since even the data blocks are gone due to truncating. So this patchset starts from shmem/tmpfs by taking option #1. TODO: * The unpoison has been broken since commit 0ed950d ("mm,hwpoison: make get_hwpoison_page() call get_any_page()"), and this patch series make refcount check for unpoisoning shmem page fail. * Expand to other filesystems. But I haven't heard feedback from filesystem developers yet. Patch breakdown: Patch #1: cleanup, depended by patch #2 Patch #2: fix THP with hwpoisoned subpage(s) PMD map bug Patch #3: coding style cleanup Patch #4: refactor and preparation. Patch #5: keep the poisoned page in page cache and handle such case for all the paths. Patch #6: the previous patches unblock page cache THP split, so this patch add page cache THP split support. This patch (of 4): A minor cleanup to the indent. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211020210755.23964-1-shy828301@gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211020210755.23964-4-shy828301@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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KCSAN reports a data-race on v5.10 which also exists on mainline: BUG: KCSAN: data-race in extfrag_for_order+0x33/0x2d0 race at unknown origin, with read to 0xffff9ee9bfffab48 of 8 bytes by task 34 on cpu 1: extfrag_for_order+0x33/0x2d0 kcompactd+0x5f0/0xce0 kthread+0x1f9/0x220 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 34 Comm: kcompactd0 Not tainted 5.10.0+ #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 Access to zone->free_area[order].nr_free in extfrag_for_order() and frag_show_print() is lockless. That's intentional and the stats are a rough estimate anyway. Annotate them with data_race(). [liushixin2@huawei.com: add comments] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210918084655.2696522-1-liushixin2@huawei.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210908015606.3999871-1-liushixin2@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Liu Shixin <liushixin2@huawei.com> Cc: "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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…ue initialztion We got UAF report on v5.10 as follows: [ 1446.674930] ================================================================== [ 1446.675970] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in blk_mq_get_driver_tag+0x9a4/0xa90 [ 1446.676902] Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880185afd10 by task kworker/1:2/12348 [ 1446.677851] [ 1446.678073] CPU: 1 PID: 12348 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 5.10.0-10177-gc9c81b1e346a #2 [ 1446.679168] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 1446.680692] Workqueue: kthrotld blk_throtl_dispatch_work_fn [ 1446.681448] Call Trace: [ 1446.681800] dump_stack+0x9b/0xce [ 1446.682916] print_address_description.constprop.6+0x3e/0x60 [ 1446.685999] kasan_report.cold.9+0x22/0x3a [ 1446.687186] blk_mq_get_driver_tag+0x9a4/0xa90 [ 1446.687785] blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x21a/0x1d40 [ 1446.692576] __blk_mq_do_dispatch_sched+0x394/0x830 [ 1446.695758] __blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x398/0x4f0 [ 1446.698279] blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0xdf/0x140 [ 1446.698967] __blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0xc0/0x270 [ 1446.699561] __blk_mq_delay_run_hw_queue+0x4cc/0x550 [ 1446.701407] blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x13b/0x2b0 [ 1446.702593] blk_mq_sched_insert_requests+0x1de/0x390 [ 1446.703309] blk_mq_flush_plug_list+0x4b4/0x760 [ 1446.705408] blk_flush_plug_list+0x2c5/0x480 [ 1446.708471] blk_finish_plug+0x55/0xa0 [ 1446.708980] blk_throtl_dispatch_work_fn+0x23b/0x2e0 [ 1446.711236] process_one_work+0x6d4/0xfe0 [ 1446.711778] worker_thread+0x91/0xc80 [ 1446.713400] kthread+0x32d/0x3f0 [ 1446.714362] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 1446.714846] [ 1446.715062] Allocated by task 1: [ 1446.715509] kasan_save_stack+0x19/0x40 [ 1446.716026] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.1+0xc1/0xd0 [ 1446.716673] blk_mq_init_tags+0x6d/0x330 [ 1446.717207] blk_mq_alloc_rq_map+0x50/0x1c0 [ 1446.717769] __blk_mq_alloc_map_and_request+0xe5/0x320 [ 1446.718459] blk_mq_alloc_tag_set+0x679/0xdc0 [ 1446.719050] scsi_add_host_with_dma.cold.3+0xa0/0x5db [ 1446.719736] virtscsi_probe+0x7bf/0xbd0 [ 1446.720265] virtio_dev_probe+0x402/0x6c0 [ 1446.720808] really_probe+0x276/0xde0 [ 1446.721320] driver_probe_device+0x267/0x3d0 [ 1446.721892] device_driver_attach+0xfe/0x140 [ 1446.722491] __driver_attach+0x13a/0x2c0 [ 1446.723037] bus_for_each_dev+0x146/0x1c0 [ 1446.723603] bus_add_driver+0x3fc/0x680 [ 1446.724145] driver_register+0x1c0/0x400 [ 1446.724693] init+0xa2/0xe8 [ 1446.725091] do_one_initcall+0x9e/0x310 [ 1446.725626] kernel_init_freeable+0xc56/0xcb9 [ 1446.726231] kernel_init+0x11/0x198 [ 1446.726714] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 1446.727212] [ 1446.727433] Freed by task 26992: [ 1446.727882] kasan_save_stack+0x19/0x40 [ 1446.728420] kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30 [ 1446.728943] kasan_set_free_info+0x1b/0x30 [ 1446.729517] __kasan_slab_free+0x111/0x160 [ 1446.730084] kfree+0xb8/0x520 [ 1446.730507] blk_mq_free_map_and_requests+0x10b/0x1b0 [ 1446.731206] blk_mq_realloc_hw_ctxs+0x8cb/0x15b0 [ 1446.731844] blk_mq_init_allocated_queue+0x374/0x1380 [ 1446.732540] blk_mq_init_queue_data+0x7f/0xd0 [ 1446.733155] scsi_mq_alloc_queue+0x45/0x170 [ 1446.733730] scsi_alloc_sdev+0x73c/0xb20 [ 1446.734281] scsi_probe_and_add_lun+0x9a6/0x2d90 [ 1446.734916] __scsi_scan_target+0x208/0xc50 [ 1446.735500] scsi_scan_channel.part.3+0x113/0x170 [ 1446.736149] scsi_scan_host_selected+0x25a/0x360 [ 1446.736783] store_scan+0x290/0x2d0 [ 1446.737275] dev_attr_store+0x55/0x80 [ 1446.737782] sysfs_kf_write+0x132/0x190 [ 1446.738313] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x319/0x4b0 [ 1446.738921] new_sync_write+0x40e/0x5c0 [ 1446.739429] vfs_write+0x519/0x720 [ 1446.739877] ksys_write+0xf8/0x1f0 [ 1446.740332] do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40 [ 1446.740802] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 1446.741462] [ 1446.741670] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880185afd00 [ 1446.741670] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256 [ 1446.743276] The buggy address is located 16 bytes inside of [ 1446.743276] 256-byte region [ffff8880185afd00, ffff8880185afe00) [ 1446.744765] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 1446.745416] page:ffffea0000616b00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x185ac [ 1446.746694] head:ffffea0000616b00 order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 [ 1446.747719] flags: 0x1fffff80010200(slab|head) [ 1446.748337] raw: 001fffff80010200 ffffea00006a3208 ffffea000061bf08 ffff88801004f240 [ 1446.749404] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 1446.750455] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 1446.751227] [ 1446.751445] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 1446.752102] ffff8880185afc00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 1446.753090] ffff8880185afc80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 1446.754079] >ffff8880185afd00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 1446.755065] ^ [ 1446.755589] ffff8880185afd80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 1446.756574] ffff8880185afe00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 1446.757566] ================================================================== Flag 'BLK_MQ_F_TAG_QUEUE_SHARED' will be set if the second device on the same host initializes it's queue successfully. However, if the second device failed to allocate memory in blk_mq_alloc_and_init_hctx() from blk_mq_realloc_hw_ctxs() from blk_mq_init_allocated_queue(), __blk_mq_free_map_and_rqs() will be called on error path, and if 'BLK_MQ_TAG_HCTX_SHARED' is not set, 'tag_set->tags' will be freed while it's still used by the first device. To fix this issue we move release newly allocated hardware context from blk_mq_realloc_hw_ctxs to __blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues. As there is needn't to release hardware context in blk_mq_init_allocated_queue. Fixes: 868f2f0 ("blk-mq: dynamic h/w context count") Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211108074019.1058843-1-yebin10@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Problem Description: When running running ~128 parallel instances of TZ=/etc/localtime ps -fe >/dev/null on a 128CPU machine, the %sys utilization reaches 97%, and perf shows the following code path as being responsible for heavy contention on the d_lockref spinlock: walk_component() lookup_fast() d_revalidate() pid_revalidate() // returns -ECHILD unlazy_child() lockref_get_not_dead(&nd->path.dentry->d_lockref) <-- contention The reason is that pid_revalidate() is triggering a drop from RCU to ref path walk mode. All concurrent path lookups thus try to grab a reference to the dentry for /proc/, before re-executing pid_revalidate() and then stepping into the /proc/$pid directory. Thus there is huge spinlock contention. This patch allows pid_revalidate() to execute in RCU mode, meaning that the path lookup can successfully enter the /proc/$pid directory while still in RCU mode. Later on, the path lookup may still drop into ref mode, but the contention will be much reduced at this point. By applying this patch, %sys utilization falls to around 85% under the same workload, and the number of ps processes executed per unit time increases by 3x-4x. Although this particular workload is a bit contrived, we have seen some large collections of eager monitoring scripts which produced similarly high %sys time due to contention in the /proc directory. As a result this patch, Al noted that several procfs methods which were only called in ref-walk mode could now be called from RCU mode. To ensure that this patch is safe, I audited all the inode get_link and permission() implementations, as well as dentry d_revalidate() implementations, in fs/proc. The purpose here is to ensure that they either are safe to call in RCU (i.e. don't sleep) or correctly bail out of RCU mode if they don't support it. My analysis shows that all at-risk procfs methods are safe to call under RCU, and thus this patch is safe. Procfs RCU-walk Analysis: This analysis is up-to-date with 5.15-rc3. When called under RCU mode, these functions have arguments as follows: * get_link() receives a NULL dentry pointer when called in RCU mode. * permission() receives MAY_NOT_BLOCK in the mode parameter when called from RCU. * d_revalidate() receives LOOKUP_RCU in flags. For the following functions, either they are trivially RCU safe, or they explicitly bail at the beginning of the function when they run: proc_ns_get_link (bails out) proc_get_link (RCU safe) proc_pid_get_link (bails out) map_files_d_revalidate (bails out) map_misc_d_revalidate (bails out) proc_net_d_revalidate (RCU safe) proc_sys_revalidate (bails out, also not under /proc/$pid) tid_fd_revalidate (bails out) proc_sys_permission (not under /proc/$pid) The remainder of the functions require a bit more detail: * proc_fd_permission: RCU safe. All of the body of this function is under rcu_read_lock(), except generic_permission() which declares itself RCU safe in its documentation string. * proc_self_get_link uses GFP_ATOMIC in the RCU case, so it is RCU aware and otherwise looks safe. The same is true of proc_thread_self_get_link. * proc_map_files_get_link: calls ns_capable, which calls capable(), and thus calls into the audit code (see note #1 below). The remainder is just a call to the trivially safe proc_pid_get_link(). * proc_pid_permission: calls ptrace_may_access(), which appears RCU safe, although it does call into the "security_ptrace_access_check()" hook, which looks safe under smack and selinux. Just the audit code is of concern. Also uses get_task_struct() and put_task_struct(), see note #2 below. * proc_tid_comm_permission: Appears safe, though calls put_task_struct (see note #2 below). Note #1: Most of the concern of RCU safety has centered around the audit code. However, since b17ec22 ("selinux: slow_avc_audit has become non-blocking"), it's safe to call this code under RCU. So all of the above are safe by my estimation. Note #2: get_task_struct() and put_task_struct(): The majority of get_task_struct() is under RCU read lock, and in any case it is a simple increment. But put_task_struct() is complex, given that it could at some point free the task struct, and this process has many steps which I couldn't manually verify. However, several other places call put_task_struct() under RCU, so it appears safe to use here too (see kernel/hung_task.c:165 or rcu/tree-stall.h:296) Patch description: pid_revalidate() drops from RCU into REF lookup mode. When many threads are resolving paths within /proc in parallel, this can result in heavy spinlock contention on d_lockref as each thread tries to grab a reference to the /proc dentry (and drop it shortly thereafter). Investigation indicates that it is not necessary to drop RCU in pid_revalidate(), as no RCU data is modified and the function never sleeps. So, remove the LOOKUP_RCU check. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211004175629.292270-2-stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Stephen Brennan <stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com> Cc: Konrad Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Add a convenience function, folio_inode() that will get the host inode from a folio's mapping. Changes: ver #3: - Fix mistake in function description[2]. ver #2: - Fix contradiction between doc and implementation by disallowing use with swap caches[1]. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Tested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Tested-by: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org> Tested-by: kafs-testing@auristor.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YST8OcVNy02Rivbm@casper.infradead.org/ [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YYKLkBwQdtn4ja+i@casper.infradead.org/ [2] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/162880453171.3369675.3704943108660112470.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # rfc Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/162981151155.1901565.7010079316994382707.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163005744370.2472992.18324470937328925723.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163584184628.4023316.9386282630968981869.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163649325519.309189.15072332908703129455.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v4 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163657850401.834781.1031963517399283294.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v5
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Convert the netfs helper library to use folios throughout, convert the 9p and afs filesystems to use folios in their file I/O paths and convert the ceph filesystem to use just enough folios to compile. With these changes, afs passes -g quick xfstests. Changes ======= ver #5: - Got rid of folio_end{io,_read,_write}() and inlined the stuff it does instead (Willy decided he didn't want this after all). ver #4: - Fixed a bug in afs_redirty_page() whereby it didn't set the next page index in the loop and returned too early. - Simplified a check in v9fs_vfs_write_folio_locked()[1]. - Undid a change to afs_symlink_readpage()[1]. - Used offset_in_folio() in afs_write_end()[1]. - Changed from using page_endio() to folio_end{io,_read,_write}()[1]. ver #2: - Add 9p foliation. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Tested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Tested-by: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org> Tested-by: kafs-testing@auristor.com cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> cc: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org> cc: v9fs-developer@lists.sourceforge.net cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-cachefs@redhat.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YYKa3bfQZxK5/wDN@casper.infradead.org/ [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2408234.1628687271@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # rfc Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/162877311459.3085614.10601478228012245108.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/162981153551.1901565.3124454657133703341.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163005745264.2472992.9852048135392188995.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163584187452.4023316.500389675405550116.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163649328026.309189.1124218109373941936.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v4 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163657852454.834781.9265101983152100556.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v5
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The exit function fixes a memory leak with the src field as detected by leak sanitizer. An example of which is: Indirect leak of 25133184 byte(s) in 207 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f199ecfe987 in __interceptor_calloc libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x55defe638224 in annotated_source__alloc_histograms util/annotate.c:803 #2 0x55defe6397e4 in symbol__hists util/annotate.c:952 #3 0x55defe639908 in symbol__inc_addr_samples util/annotate.c:968 #4 0x55defe63aa29 in hist_entry__inc_addr_samples util/annotate.c:1119 #5 0x55defe499a79 in hist_iter__report_callback tools/perf/builtin-report.c:182 #6 0x55defe7a859d in hist_entry_iter__add util/hist.c:1236 #7 0x55defe49aa63 in process_sample_event tools/perf/builtin-report.c:315 #8 0x55defe731bc8 in evlist__deliver_sample util/session.c:1473 #9 0x55defe731e38 in machines__deliver_event util/session.c:1510 #10 0x55defe732a23 in perf_session__deliver_event util/session.c:1590 #11 0x55defe72951e in ordered_events__deliver_event util/session.c:183 #12 0x55defe740082 in do_flush util/ordered-events.c:244 #13 0x55defe7407cb in __ordered_events__flush util/ordered-events.c:323 #14 0x55defe740a61 in ordered_events__flush util/ordered-events.c:341 #15 0x55defe73837f in __perf_session__process_events util/session.c:2390 #16 0x55defe7385ff in perf_session__process_events util/session.c:2420 ... Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Martin Liška <mliska@suse.cz> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211112035124.94327-3-irogers@google.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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…e_zone btrfs_can_activate_zone() can be called with the device_list_mutex already held, which will lead to a deadlock: insert_dev_extents() // Takes device_list_mutex `-> insert_dev_extent() `-> btrfs_insert_empty_item() `-> btrfs_insert_empty_items() `-> btrfs_search_slot() `-> btrfs_cow_block() `-> __btrfs_cow_block() `-> btrfs_alloc_tree_block() `-> btrfs_reserve_extent() `-> find_free_extent() `-> find_free_extent_update_loop() `-> can_allocate_chunk() `-> btrfs_can_activate_zone() // Takes device_list_mutex again Instead of using the RCU on fs_devices->device_list we can use fs_devices->alloc_list, protected by the chunk_mutex to traverse the list of active devices. We are in the chunk allocation thread. The newer chunk allocation happens from the devices in the fs_device->alloc_list protected by the chunk_mutex. btrfs_create_chunk() lockdep_assert_held(&info->chunk_mutex); gather_device_info list_for_each_entry(device, &fs_devices->alloc_list, dev_alloc_list) Also, a device that reappears after the mount won't join the alloc_list yet and, it will be in the dev_list, which we don't want to consider in the context of the chunk alloc. [15.166572] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected [15.167117] 5.17.0-rc6-dennis #79 Not tainted [15.167487] -------------------------------------------- [15.167733] kworker/u8:3/146 is trying to acquire lock: [15.167733] ffff888102962ee0 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs] [15.167733] [15.167733] but task is already holding lock: [15.167733] ffff888102962ee0 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x20a/0x560 [btrfs] [15.167733] [15.167733] other info that might help us debug this: [15.167733] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [15.167733] [15.171834] CPU0 [15.171834] ---- [15.171834] lock(&fs_devs->device_list_mutex); [15.171834] lock(&fs_devs->device_list_mutex); [15.171834] [15.171834] *** DEADLOCK *** [15.171834] [15.171834] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [15.171834] [15.171834] 5 locks held by kworker/u8:3/146: [15.171834] #0: ffff888100050938 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1c3/0x5a0 [15.171834] #1: ffffc9000067be80 ((work_completion)(&fs_info->async_data_reclaim_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1c3/0x5a0 [15.176244] #2: ffff88810521e620 (sb_internal){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: flush_space+0x335/0x600 [btrfs] [15.176244] #3: ffff888102962ee0 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x20a/0x560 [btrfs] [15.176244] #4: ffff8881152e4b78 (btrfs-dev-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_lock+0x27/0x130 [btrfs] [15.179641] [15.179641] stack backtrace: [15.179641] CPU: 1 PID: 146 Comm: kworker/u8:3 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc6-dennis #79 [15.179641] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1.fc35 04/01/2014 [15.179641] Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space [btrfs] [15.179641] Call Trace: [15.179641] <TASK> [15.179641] dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x59 [15.179641] __lock_acquire.cold+0x217/0x2b2 [15.179641] lock_acquire+0xbf/0x2b0 [15.183838] ? find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs] [15.183838] __mutex_lock+0x8e/0x970 [15.183838] ? find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs] [15.183838] ? find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs] [15.183838] ? lock_is_held_type+0xd7/0x130 [15.183838] ? find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs] [15.183838] find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs] [15.183838] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x24/0x40 [15.183838] ? btrfs_get_alloc_profile+0x106/0x230 [btrfs] [15.187601] btrfs_reserve_extent+0x131/0x260 [btrfs] [15.187601] btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0xb5/0x3b0 [btrfs] [15.187601] __btrfs_cow_block+0x138/0x600 [btrfs] [15.187601] btrfs_cow_block+0x10f/0x230 [btrfs] [15.187601] btrfs_search_slot+0x55f/0xbc0 [btrfs] [15.187601] ? lock_is_held_type+0xd7/0x130 [15.187601] btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x2d/0x60 [btrfs] [15.187601] btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x2b3/0x560 [btrfs] [15.187601] __btrfs_end_transaction+0x36/0x2a0 [btrfs] [15.192037] flush_space+0x374/0x600 [btrfs] [15.192037] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 [15.192037] ? btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x49/0x180 [btrfs] [15.192037] ? lock_release+0x131/0x2b0 [15.192037] btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x70/0x180 [btrfs] [15.192037] process_one_work+0x24c/0x5a0 [15.192037] worker_thread+0x4a/0x3d0 Fixes: a85f05e ("btrfs: zoned: avoid chunk allocation if active block group has enough space") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.16+ Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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There is possible circular locking dependency detected on event_mutex (see below logs). This is due to set fail safe mode is done at dp_panel_read_sink_caps() within event_mutex scope. To break this possible circular locking, this patch move setting fail safe mode out of event_mutex scope. [ 23.958078] ====================================================== [ 23.964430] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 23.970777] 5.17.0-rc2-lockdep-00088-g05241de1f69e #148 Not tainted [ 23.977219] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 23.983570] DrmThread/1574 is trying to acquire lock: [ 23.988763] ffffff808423aab0 (&dp->event_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: msm_dp_displ ay_enable+0x58/0x164 [ 23.997895] [ 23.997895] but task is already holding lock: [ 24.003895] ffffff808420b280 (&kms->commit_lock[i]/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_c rtcs+0x80/0x8c [ 24.012495] [ 24.012495] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 24.012495] [ 24.020886] [ 24.020886] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 24.028570] [ 24.028570] -> #5 (&kms->commit_lock[i]/1){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 24.035472] __mutex_lock+0xc8/0x384 [ 24.039695] mutex_lock_nested+0x54/0x74 [ 24.044272] lock_crtcs+0x80/0x8c [ 24.048222] msm_atomic_commit_tail+0x1e8/0x3d0 [ 24.053413] commit_tail+0x7c/0xfc [ 24.057452] drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x158/0x15c [ 24.062826] drm_atomic_commit+0x60/0x74 [ 24.067403] drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x6b0/0x908 [ 24.072508] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xe8/0x168 [ 24.077086] drm_ioctl+0x320/0x370 [ 24.081123] drm_compat_ioctl+0x40/0xdc [ 24.085602] __arm64_compat_sys_ioctl+0xe0/0x150 [ 24.090895] invoke_syscall+0x80/0x114 [ 24.095294] el0_svc_common.constprop.3+0xc4/0xf8 [ 24.100668] do_el0_svc_compat+0x2c/0x54 [ 24.105242] el0_svc_compat+0x4c/0xe4 [ 24.109548] el0t_32_sync_handler+0xc4/0xf4 [ 24.114381] el0t_32_sync+0x178 [ 24.118688] [ 24.118688] -> #4 (&kms->commit_lock[i]){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 24.125408] __mutex_lock+0xc8/0x384 [ 24.129628] mutex_lock_nested+0x54/0x74 [ 24.134204] lock_crtcs+0x80/0x8c [ 24.138155] msm_atomic_commit_tail+0x1e8/0x3d0 [ 24.143345] commit_tail+0x7c/0xfc [ 24.147382] drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x158/0x15c [ 24.152755] drm_atomic_commit+0x60/0x74 [ 24.157323] drm_atomic_helper_set_config+0x68/0x90 [ 24.162869] drm_mode_setcrtc+0x394/0x648 [ 24.167535] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xe8/0x168 [ 24.172102] drm_ioctl+0x320/0x370 [ 24.176135] drm_compat_ioctl+0x40/0xdc [ 24.180621] __arm64_compat_sys_ioctl+0xe0/0x150 [ 24.185904] invoke_syscall+0x80/0x114 [ 24.190302] el0_svc_common.constprop.3+0xc4/0xf8 [ 24.195673] do_el0_svc_compat+0x2c/0x54 [ 24.200241] el0_svc_compat+0x4c/0xe4 [ 24.204544] el0t_32_sync_handler+0xc4/0xf4 [ 24.209378] el0t_32_sync+0x174/0x178 [ 24.213680] -> #3 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 24.220308] __ww_mutex_lock.constprop.20+0xe8/0x878 [ 24.225951] ww_mutex_lock+0x60/0xd0 [ 24.230166] modeset_lock+0x190/0x19c [ 24.234467] drm_modeset_lock+0x34/0x54 [ 24.238953] drmm_mode_config_init+0x550/0x764 [ 24.244065] msm_drm_bind+0x170/0x59c [ 24.248374] try_to_bring_up_master+0x244/0x294 [ 24.253572] __component_add+0xf4/0x14c [ 24.258057] component_add+0x2c/0x38 [ 24.262273] dsi_dev_attach+0x2c/0x38 [ 24.266575] dsi_host_attach+0xc4/0x120 [ 24.271060] mipi_dsi_attach+0x34/0x48 [ 24.275456] devm_mipi_dsi_attach+0x28/0x68 [ 24.280298] ti_sn_bridge_probe+0x2b4/0x2dc [ 24.285137] auxiliary_bus_probe+0x78/0x90 [ 24.289893] really_probe+0x1e4/0x3d8 [ 24.294194] __driver_probe_device+0x14c/0x164 [ 24.299298] driver_probe_device+0x54/0xf8 [ 24.304043] __device_attach_driver+0xb4/0x118 [ 24.309145] bus_for_each_drv+0xb0/0xd4 [ 24.313628] __device_attach+0xcc/0x158 [ 24.318112] device_initial_probe+0x24/0x30 [ 24.322954] bus_probe_device+0x38/0x9c [ 24.327439] deferred_probe_work_func+0xd4/0xf0 [ 24.332628] process_one_work+0x2f0/0x498 [ 24.337289] process_scheduled_works+0x44/0x48 [ 24.342391] worker_thread+0x1e4/0x26c [ 24.346788] kthread+0xe4/0xf4 [ 24.350470] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 24.354683] [ 24.354683] [ 24.354683] -> #2 (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 24.361489] drm_modeset_acquire_init+0xe4/0x138 [ 24.366777] drm_helper_probe_detect_ctx+0x44/0x114 [ 24.372327] check_connector_changed+0xbc/0x198 [ 24.377517] drm_helper_hpd_irq_event+0xcc/0x11c [ 24.382804] dsi_hpd_worker+0x24/0x30 [ 24.387104] process_one_work+0x2f0/0x498 [ 24.391762] worker_thread+0x1d0/0x26c [ 24.396158] kthread+0xe4/0xf4 [ 24.399840] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 24.404053] [ 24.404053] -> #1 (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 24.411032] __mutex_lock+0xc8/0x384 [ 24.415247] mutex_lock_nested+0x54/0x74 [ 24.419819] dp_panel_read_sink_caps+0x23c/0x26c [ 24.425108] dp_display_process_hpd_high+0x34/0xd4 [ 24.430570] dp_display_usbpd_configure_cb+0x30/0x3c [ 24.436205] hpd_event_thread+0x2ac/0x550 [ 24.440864] kthread+0xe4/0xf4 [ 24.444544] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 24.448757] [ 24.448757] -> #0 (&dp->event_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 24.455116] __lock_acquire+0xe2c/0x10d8 [ 24.459690] lock_acquire+0x1ac/0x2d0 [ 24.463988] __mutex_lock+0xc8/0x384 [ 24.468201] mutex_lock_nested+0x54/0x74 [ 24.472773] msm_dp_display_enable+0x58/0x164 [ 24.477789] dp_bridge_enable+0x24/0x30 [ 24.482273] drm_atomic_bridge_chain_enable+0x78/0x9c [ 24.488006] drm_atomic_helper_commit_modeset_enables+0x1bc/0x244 [ 24.494801] msm_atomic_commit_tail+0x248/0x3d0 [ 24.499992] commit_tail+0x7c/0xfc [ 24.504031] drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x158/0x15c [ 24.509404] drm_atomic_commit+0x60/0x74 [ 24.513976] drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x6b0/0x908 [ 24.519079] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xe8/0x168 [ 24.523650] drm_ioctl+0x320/0x370 [ 24.527689] drm_compat_ioctl+0x40/0xdc [ 24.532175] __arm64_compat_sys_ioctl+0xe0/0x150 [ 24.537463] invoke_syscall+0x80/0x114 [ 24.541861] el0_svc_common.constprop.3+0xc4/0xf8 [ 24.547235] do_el0_svc_compat+0x2c/0x54 [ 24.551806] el0_svc_compat+0x4c/0xe4 [ 24.556106] el0t_32_sync_handler+0xc4/0xf4 [ 24.560948] el0t_32_sync+0x174/0x178 Changes in v2: -- add circular lockiing trace Fixes: d4aca42 ("drm/msm/dp: always add fail-safe mode into connector mode list") Signed-off-by: Kuogee Hsieh <quic_khsieh@quicinc.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org> Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/481396/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1649451894-554-1-git-send-email-quic_khsieh@quicinc.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org>
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The root cause is the race as follows: Thread #1 Thread #2(irq ctx) z_erofs_runqueue() struct z_erofs_decompressqueue io_A[]; submit bio A z_erofs_decompress_kickoff(,,1) z_erofs_decompressqueue_endio(bio A) z_erofs_decompress_kickoff(,,-1) spin_lock_irqsave() atomic_add_return() io_wait_event() -> pending_bios is already 0 [end of function] wake_up_locked(io_A[]) // crash Referenced backtrace in kernel 5.4: [ 10.129422] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address eb0454a4 [ 10.364157] CPU: 0 PID: 709 Comm: getprop Tainted: G WC O 5.4.147-ab09225 #1 [ 11.556325] [<c01b33b8>] (__wake_up_common) from [<c01b3300>] (__wake_up_locked+0x40/0x48) [ 11.565487] [<c01b3300>] (__wake_up_locked) from [<c044c8d0>] (z_erofs_vle_unzip_kickoff+0x6c/0xc0) [ 11.575438] [<c044c8d0>] (z_erofs_vle_unzip_kickoff) from [<c044c854>] (z_erofs_vle_read_endio+0x16c/0x17c) [ 11.586082] [<c044c854>] (z_erofs_vle_read_endio) from [<c06a80e8>] (clone_endio+0xb4/0x1d0) [ 11.595428] [<c06a80e8>] (clone_endio) from [<c04a1280>] (blk_update_request+0x150/0x4dc) [ 11.604516] [<c04a1280>] (blk_update_request) from [<c06dea28>] (mmc_blk_cqe_complete_rq+0x144/0x15c) [ 11.614640] [<c06dea28>] (mmc_blk_cqe_complete_rq) from [<c04a5d90>] (blk_done_softirq+0xb0/0xcc) [ 11.624419] [<c04a5d90>] (blk_done_softirq) from [<c010242c>] (__do_softirq+0x184/0x56c) [ 11.633419] [<c010242c>] (__do_softirq) from [<c01051e8>] (irq_exit+0xd4/0x138) [ 11.641640] [<c01051e8>] (irq_exit) from [<c010c314>] (__handle_domain_irq+0x94/0xd0) [ 11.650381] [<c010c314>] (__handle_domain_irq) from [<c04fde70>] (gic_handle_irq+0x50/0xd4) [ 11.659641] [<c04fde70>] (gic_handle_irq) from [<c0101b70>] (__irq_svc+0x70/0xb0) Signed-off-by: Hongyu Jin <hongyu.jin@unisoc.com> Reviewed-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220401115527.4935-1-hongyu.jin.cn@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com>
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into HEAD KVM/riscv fixes for 5.18, take #2 - Remove 's' & 'u' as valid ISA extension - Do not allow disabling the base extensions 'i'/'m'/'a'/'c'
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Apr 26, 2022
Make a KVM_REQ_APICV_UPDATE request when creating a vCPU with an in-kernel local APIC and APICv enabled at the module level. Consuming kvm_apicv_activated() and stuffing vcpu->arch.apicv_active directly can race with __kvm_set_or_clear_apicv_inhibit(), as vCPU creation happens before the vCPU is fully onlined, i.e. it won't get the request made to "all" vCPUs. If APICv is globally inhibited between setting apicv_active and onlining the vCPU, the vCPU will end up running with APICv enabled and trigger KVM's sanity check. Mark APICv as active during vCPU creation if APICv is enabled at the module level, both to be optimistic about it's final state, e.g. to avoid additional VMWRITEs on VMX, and because there are likely bugs lurking since KVM checks apicv_active in multiple vCPU creation paths. While keeping the current behavior of consuming kvm_apicv_activated() is arguably safer from a regression perspective, force apicv_active so that vCPU creation runs with deterministic state and so that if there are bugs, they are found sooner than later, i.e. not when some crazy race condition is hit. WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 484 at arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:9877 vcpu_enter_guest+0x2ae3/0x3ee0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:9877 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 484 Comm: syz-executor361 Not tainted 5.16.13 #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1~cloud0 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:vcpu_enter_guest+0x2ae3/0x3ee0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:9877 Call Trace: <TASK> vcpu_run arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:10039 [inline] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x337/0x15e0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:10234 kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x4d2/0xc80 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3727 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:874 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:860 [inline] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16d/0x1d0 fs/ioctl.c:860 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae The bug was hit by a syzkaller spamming VM creation with 2 vCPUs and a call to KVM_SET_GUEST_DEBUG. r0 = openat$kvm(0xffffffffffffff9c, &(0x7f0000000000), 0x0, 0x0) r1 = ioctl$KVM_CREATE_VM(r0, 0xae01, 0x0) ioctl$KVM_CAP_SPLIT_IRQCHIP(r1, 0x4068aea3, &(0x7f0000000000)) (async) r2 = ioctl$KVM_CREATE_VCPU(r1, 0xae41, 0x0) (async) r3 = ioctl$KVM_CREATE_VCPU(r1, 0xae41, 0x400000000000002) ioctl$KVM_SET_GUEST_DEBUG(r3, 0x4048ae9b, &(0x7f00000000c0)={0x5dda9c14aa95f5c5}) ioctl$KVM_RUN(r2, 0xae80, 0x0) Reported-by: Gaoning Pan <pgn@zju.edu.cn> Reported-by: Yongkang Jia <kangel@zju.edu.cn> Fixes: 8df14af ("kvm: x86: Add support for dynamic APICv activation") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20220420013732.3308816-4-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Current DP driver implementation has adding safe mode done at dp_hpd_plug_handle() which is expected to be executed under event thread context. However there is possible circular locking happen (see blow stack trace) after edp driver call dp_hpd_plug_handle() from dp_bridge_enable() which is executed under drm_thread context. After review all possibilities methods and as discussed on https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/483155/, supporting EDID compliance tests in the driver is quite hacky. As seen with other vendor drivers, supporting these will be much easier with IGT. Hence removing all the related fail safe code for it so that no possibility of circular lock will happen. Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org> ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.15.35-lockdep #6 Tainted: G W ------------------------------------------------------ frecon/429 is trying to acquire lock: ffffff808dc3c4e8 (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dp_panel_add_fail_safe_mode+0x4c/0xa0 but task is already holding lock: ffffff808dc441e0 (&kms->commit_lock[i]){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_crtcs+0xb4/0x124 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (&kms->commit_lock[i]){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock_common+0x174/0x1a64 mutex_lock_nested+0x98/0xac lock_crtcs+0xb4/0x124 msm_atomic_commit_tail+0x330/0x748 commit_tail+0x19c/0x278 drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x1dc/0x1f0 drm_atomic_commit+0xc0/0xd8 drm_atomic_helper_set_config+0xb4/0x134 drm_mode_setcrtc+0x688/0x1248 drm_ioctl_kernel+0x1e4/0x338 drm_ioctl+0x3a4/0x684 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x118/0x154 invoke_syscall+0x78/0x224 el0_svc_common+0x178/0x200 do_el0_svc+0x94/0x13c el0_svc+0x5c/0xec el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8 -> #2 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock_common+0x174/0x1a64 ww_mutex_lock+0xb8/0x278 modeset_lock+0x304/0x4ac drm_modeset_lock+0x4c/0x7c drmm_mode_config_init+0x4a8/0xc50 msm_drm_init+0x274/0xac0 msm_drm_bind+0x20/0x2c try_to_bring_up_master+0x3dc/0x470 __component_add+0x18c/0x3c0 component_add+0x1c/0x28 dp_display_probe+0x954/0xa98 platform_probe+0x124/0x15c really_probe+0x1b0/0x5f8 __driver_probe_device+0x174/0x20c driver_probe_device+0x70/0x134 __device_attach_driver+0x130/0x1d0 bus_for_each_drv+0xfc/0x14c __device_attach+0x1bc/0x2bc device_initial_probe+0x1c/0x28 bus_probe_device+0x94/0x178 deferred_probe_work_func+0x1a4/0x1f0 process_one_work+0x5d4/0x9dc worker_thread+0x898/0xccc kthread+0x2d4/0x3d4 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 -> #1 (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}: ww_acquire_init+0x1c4/0x2c8 drm_modeset_acquire_init+0x44/0xc8 drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes+0xb0/0x12dc drm_mode_getconnector+0x5dc/0xfe8 drm_ioctl_kernel+0x1e4/0x338 drm_ioctl+0x3a4/0x684 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x118/0x154 invoke_syscall+0x78/0x224 el0_svc_common+0x178/0x200 do_el0_svc+0x94/0x13c el0_svc+0x5c/0xec el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8 -> #0 (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x2650/0x672c lock_acquire+0x1b4/0x4ac __mutex_lock_common+0x174/0x1a64 mutex_lock_nested+0x98/0xac dp_panel_add_fail_safe_mode+0x4c/0xa0 dp_hpd_plug_handle+0x1f0/0x280 dp_bridge_enable+0x94/0x2b8 drm_atomic_bridge_chain_enable+0x11c/0x168 drm_atomic_helper_commit_modeset_enables+0x500/0x740 msm_atomic_commit_tail+0x3e4/0x748 commit_tail+0x19c/0x278 drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x1dc/0x1f0 drm_atomic_commit+0xc0/0xd8 drm_atomic_helper_set_config+0xb4/0x134 drm_mode_setcrtc+0x688/0x1248 drm_ioctl_kernel+0x1e4/0x338 drm_ioctl+0x3a4/0x684 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x118/0x154 invoke_syscall+0x78/0x224 el0_svc_common+0x178/0x200 do_el0_svc+0x94/0x13c el0_svc+0x5c/0xec el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8 Changes in v2: -- re text commit title -- remove all fail safe mode Changes in v3: -- remove dp_panel_add_fail_safe_mode() from dp_panel.h -- add Fixes Changes in v5: -- to=dianders@chromium.org Changes in v6: -- fix Fixes commit ID Fixes: 8b2c181 ("drm/msm/dp: add fail safe mode outside of event_mutex context") Reported-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kuogee Hsieh <quic_khsieh@quicinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1651007534-31842-1-git-send-email-quic_khsieh@quicinc.com Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org>
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While handling PCI errors (AER flow) driver tries to disable NAPI [napi_disable()] after NAPI is deleted [__netif_napi_del()] which causes unexpected system hang/crash. System message log shows the following: ======================================= [ 3222.537510] EEH: Detected PCI bus error on PHB#384-PE#800000 [ 3222.537511] EEH: This PCI device has failed 2 times in the last hour and will be permanently disabled after 5 failures. [ 3222.537512] EEH: Notify device drivers to shutdown [ 3222.537513] EEH: Beginning: 'error_detected(IO frozen)' [ 3222.537514] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): Invoking bnx2x->error_detected(IO frozen) [ 3222.537516] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_error_detected:14236(eth14)]IO error detected [ 3222.537650] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): bnx2x driver reports: 'need reset' [ 3222.537651] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.1): Invoking bnx2x->error_detected(IO frozen) [ 3222.537651] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_error_detected:14236(eth13)]IO error detected [ 3222.537729] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.1): bnx2x driver reports: 'need reset' [ 3222.537729] EEH: Finished:'error_detected(IO frozen)' with aggregate recovery state:'need reset' [ 3222.537890] EEH: Collect temporary log [ 3222.583481] EEH: of node=0384:80:00.0 [ 3222.583519] EEH: PCI device/vendor: 168e14e4 [ 3222.583557] EEH: PCI cmd/status register: 00100140 [ 3222.583557] EEH: PCI-E capabilities and status follow: [ 3222.583744] EEH: PCI-E 00: 00020010 012c8da2 00095d5e 00455c82 [ 3222.583892] EEH: PCI-E 10: 10820000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.583893] EEH: PCI-E 20: 00000000 [ 3222.583893] EEH: PCI-E AER capability register set follows: [ 3222.584079] EEH: PCI-E AER 00: 13c10001 00000000 00000000 00062030 [ 3222.584230] EEH: PCI-E AER 10: 00002000 000031c0 000001e0 00000000 [ 3222.584378] EEH: PCI-E AER 20: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584416] EEH: PCI-E AER 30: 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584416] EEH: of node=0384:80:00.1 [ 3222.584454] EEH: PCI device/vendor: 168e14e4 [ 3222.584491] EEH: PCI cmd/status register: 00100140 [ 3222.584492] EEH: PCI-E capabilities and status follow: [ 3222.584677] EEH: PCI-E 00: 00020010 012c8da2 00095d5e 00455c82 [ 3222.584825] EEH: PCI-E 10: 10820000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584826] EEH: PCI-E 20: 00000000 [ 3222.584826] EEH: PCI-E AER capability register set follows: [ 3222.585011] EEH: PCI-E AER 00: 13c10001 00000000 00000000 00062030 [ 3222.585160] EEH: PCI-E AER 10: 00002000 000031c0 000001e0 00000000 [ 3222.585309] EEH: PCI-E AER 20: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.585347] EEH: PCI-E AER 30: 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.586872] RTAS: event: 5, Type: Platform Error (224), Severity: 2 [ 3222.586873] EEH: Reset without hotplug activity [ 3224.762767] EEH: Beginning: 'slot_reset' [ 3224.762770] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): Invoking bnx2x->slot_reset() [ 3224.762771] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14271(eth14)]IO slot reset initializing... [ 3224.762887] bnx2x 0384:80:00.0: enabling device (0140 -> 0142) [ 3224.768157] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14287(eth14)]IO slot reset --> driver unload Uninterruptible tasks ===================== crash> ps | grep UN 213 2 11 c000000004c89e00 UN 0.0 0 0 [eehd] 215 2 0 c000000004c80000 UN 0.0 0 0 [kworker/0:2] 2196 1 28 c000000004504f00 UN 0.1 15936 11136 wickedd 4287 1 9 c00000020d076800 UN 0.0 4032 3008 agetty 4289 1 20 c00000020d056680 UN 0.0 7232 3840 agetty 32423 2 26 c00000020038c580 UN 0.0 0 0 [kworker/26:3] 32871 4241 27 c0000002609ddd00 UN 0.1 18624 11648 sshd 32920 10130 16 c00000027284a100 UN 0.1 48512 12608 sendmail 33092 32987 0 c000000205218b00 UN 0.1 48512 12608 sendmail 33154 4567 16 c000000260e51780 UN 0.1 48832 12864 pickup 33209 4241 36 c000000270cb6500 UN 0.1 18624 11712 sshd 33473 33283 0 c000000205211480 UN 0.1 48512 12672 sendmail 33531 4241 37 c00000023c902780 UN 0.1 18624 11648 sshd EEH handler hung while bnx2x sleeping and holding RTNL lock =========================================================== crash> bt 213 PID: 213 TASK: c000000004c89e00 CPU: 11 COMMAND: "eehd" #0 [c000000004d477e0] __schedule at c000000000c70808 #1 [c000000004d478b0] schedule at c000000000c70ee0 #2 [c000000004d478e0] schedule_timeout at c000000000c76dec #3 [c000000004d479c0] msleep at c0000000002120cc #4 [c000000004d479f0] napi_disable at c000000000a06448 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ #5 [c000000004d47a30] bnx2x_netif_stop at c0080000018dba94 [bnx2x] #6 [c000000004d47a60] bnx2x_io_slot_reset at c0080000018a551c [bnx2x] #7 [c000000004d47b20] eeh_report_reset at c00000000004c9bc #8 [c000000004d47b90] eeh_pe_report at c00000000004d1a8 #9 [c000000004d47c40] eeh_handle_normal_event at c00000000004da64 And the sleeping source code ============================ crash> dis -ls c000000000a06448 FILE: ../net/core/dev.c LINE: 6702 6697 { 6698 might_sleep(); 6699 set_bit(NAPI_STATE_DISABLE, &n->state); 6700 6701 while (test_and_set_bit(NAPI_STATE_SCHED, &n->state)) * 6702 msleep(1); 6703 while (test_and_set_bit(NAPI_STATE_NPSVC, &n->state)) 6704 msleep(1); 6705 6706 hrtimer_cancel(&n->timer); 6707 6708 clear_bit(NAPI_STATE_DISABLE, &n->state); 6709 } EEH calls into bnx2x twice based on the system log above, first through bnx2x_io_error_detected() and then bnx2x_io_slot_reset(), and executes the following call chains: bnx2x_io_error_detected() +-> bnx2x_eeh_nic_unload() +-> bnx2x_del_all_napi() +-> __netif_napi_del() bnx2x_io_slot_reset() +-> bnx2x_netif_stop() +-> bnx2x_napi_disable() +->napi_disable() Fix this by correcting the sequence of NAPI APIs usage, that is delete the NAPI after disabling it. Fixes: 7fa6f34 ("bnx2x: AER revised") Reported-by: David Christensen <drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Tested-by: David Christensen <drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Manish Chopra <manishc@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: Ariel Elior <aelior@marvell.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220426153913.6966-1-manishc@marvell.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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…/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm64 fixes for 5.18, take #2 - Take care of faults occuring between the PARange and IPA range by injecting an exception - Fix S2 faults taken from a host EL0 in protected mode - Work around Oops caused by a PMU access from a 32bit guest when PMU has been created. This is a temporary bodge until we fix it for good.
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As reported by Alan, the CFI (Call Frame Information) in the VDSO time routines is incorrect since commit ce7d805 ("powerpc/vdso: Prepare for switching VDSO to generic C implementation."). DWARF has a concept called the CFA (Canonical Frame Address), which on powerpc is calculated as an offset from the stack pointer (r1). That means when the stack pointer is changed there must be a corresponding CFI directive to update the calculation of the CFA. The current code is missing those directives for the changes to r1, which prevents gdb from being able to generate a backtrace from inside VDSO functions, eg: Breakpoint 1, 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () (gdb) bt #0 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () #1 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #2 0x00007fffffffd960 in ?? () #3 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 Backtrace stopped: frame did not save the PC Alan helpfully describes some rules for correctly maintaining the CFI information: 1) Every adjustment to the current frame address reg (ie. r1) must be described, and exactly at the instruction where r1 changes. Why? Because stack unwinding might want to access previous frames. 2) If a function changes LR or any non-volatile register, the save location for those regs must be given. The CFI can be at any instruction after the saves up to the point that the reg is changed. (Exception: LR save should be described before a bl. not after) 3) If asychronous unwind info is needed then restores of LR and non-volatile regs must also be described. The CFI can be at any instruction after the reg is restored up to the point where the save location is (potentially) trashed. Fix the inability to backtrace by adding CFI directives describing the changes to r1, ie. satisfying rule 1. Also change the information for LR to point to the copy saved on the stack, not the value in r0 that will be overwritten by the function call. Finally, add CFI directives describing the save/restore of r2. With the fix gdb can correctly back trace and navigate up and down the stack: Breakpoint 1, 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () (gdb) bt #0 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () #1 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #2 0x0000000100015b60 in gettime () #3 0x000000010000c8bc in print_long_format () #4 0x000000010000d180 in print_current_files () #5 0x00000001000054ac in main () (gdb) up #1 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 (gdb) #2 0x0000000100015b60 in gettime () (gdb) #3 0x000000010000c8bc in print_long_format () (gdb) #4 0x000000010000d180 in print_current_files () (gdb) #5 0x00000001000054ac in main () (gdb) Initial frame selected; you cannot go up. (gdb) down #4 0x000000010000d180 in print_current_files () (gdb) #3 0x000000010000c8bc in print_long_format () (gdb) #2 0x0000000100015b60 in gettime () (gdb) #1 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 (gdb) #0 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () (gdb) Fixes: ce7d805 ("powerpc/vdso: Prepare for switching VDSO to generic C implementation.") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.11+ Reported-by: Alan Modra <amodra@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Reviewed-by: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220502125010.1319370-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au
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…o HEAD KVM/riscv changes for 6.8 part Linaro#2 - Zbc extension support for Guest/VM - Scalar crypto extensions support for Guest/VM - Vector crypto extensions support for Guest/VM - Zfh[min] extensions support for Guest/VM - Zihintntl extension support for Guest/VM - Zvfh[min] extensions support for Guest/VM - Zfa extension support for Guest/VM
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…triggers I managed to hit following use after free warning recently: [ 2169.711665] ================================================================== [ 2169.714009] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __run_timers.part.0+0x179/0x4c0 [ 2169.716293] Write of size 8 at addr ffff88812b326a70 by task swapper/4/0 [ 2169.719022] CPU: 4 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/4 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc2jiri+ Linaro#2 [ 2169.720974] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 2169.722457] Call Trace: [ 2169.722756] <IRQ> [ 2169.723024] dump_stack_lvl+0x58/0xb0 [ 2169.723417] print_report+0xc5/0x630 [ 2169.723807] ? __virt_addr_valid+0x126/0x2b0 [ 2169.724268] kasan_report+0xbe/0xf0 [ 2169.724667] ? __run_timers.part.0+0x179/0x4c0 [ 2169.725116] ? __run_timers.part.0+0x179/0x4c0 [ 2169.725570] __run_timers.part.0+0x179/0x4c0 [ 2169.726003] ? call_timer_fn+0x320/0x320 [ 2169.726404] ? lock_downgrade+0x3a0/0x3a0 [ 2169.726820] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x14/0x20 [ 2169.727257] ? ktime_get+0x92/0x150 [ 2169.727630] ? lapic_next_deadline+0x35/0x60 [ 2169.728069] run_timer_softirq+0x40/0x80 [ 2169.728475] __do_softirq+0x1a1/0x509 [ 2169.728866] irq_exit_rcu+0x95/0xc0 [ 2169.729241] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6b/0x80 [ 2169.729718] </IRQ> [ 2169.729993] <TASK> [ 2169.730259] asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20 [ 2169.730755] RIP: 0010:default_idle+0x13/0x20 [ 2169.731190] Code: c0 08 00 00 00 4d 29 c8 4c 01 c7 4c 29 c2 e9 72 ff ff ff cc cc cc cc 8b 05 9a 7f 1f 02 85 c0 7e 07 0f 00 2d cf 69 43 00 fb f4 <fa> c3 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 65 48 8b 04 25 c0 93 04 00 [ 2169.732759] RSP: 0018:ffff888100dbfe10 EFLAGS: 00000242 [ 2169.733264] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff888100d9c200 RCX: ffffffff8241bd62 [ 2169.733925] RDX: ffffed109a848b15 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffff8127ac55 [ 2169.734566] RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed109a848b14 [ 2169.735200] R10: ffff8884d42458a3 R11: 000000000000ba7e R12: ffffffff83d7d3a0 [ 2169.735835] R13: 1ffff110201b7fc6 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888100d9c200 [ 2169.736478] ? ct_kernel_exit.constprop.0+0xa2/0xc0 [ 2169.736954] ? do_idle+0x285/0x290 [ 2169.737323] default_idle_call+0x63/0x90 [ 2169.737730] do_idle+0x285/0x290 [ 2169.738089] ? arch_cpu_idle_exit+0x30/0x30 [ 2169.738511] ? mark_held_locks+0x1a/0x80 [ 2169.738917] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x12e/0x200 [ 2169.739417] cpu_startup_entry+0x30/0x40 [ 2169.739825] start_secondary+0x19a/0x1c0 [ 2169.740229] ? set_cpu_sibling_map+0xbd0/0xbd0 [ 2169.740673] secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0x15d/0x16b [ 2169.741179] </TASK> [ 2169.741686] Allocated by task 1098: [ 2169.742058] kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40 [ 2169.742456] kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 [ 2169.742852] __kasan_kmalloc+0x83/0x90 [ 2169.743246] mlx5_dpll_probe+0xf5/0x3c0 [mlx5_dpll] [ 2169.743730] auxiliary_bus_probe+0x62/0xb0 [ 2169.744148] really_probe+0x127/0x590 [ 2169.744534] __driver_probe_device+0xd2/0x200 [ 2169.744973] device_driver_attach+0x6b/0xf0 [ 2169.745402] bind_store+0x90/0xe0 [ 2169.745761] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x1df/0x2a0 [ 2169.746210] vfs_write+0x41f/0x790 [ 2169.746579] ksys_write+0xc7/0x160 [ 2169.746947] do_syscall_64+0x6f/0x140 [ 2169.747333] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e [ 2169.748049] Freed by task 1220: [ 2169.748393] kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40 [ 2169.748789] kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 [ 2169.749188] kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x50 [ 2169.749621] poison_slab_object+0x106/0x180 [ 2169.750044] __kasan_slab_free+0x14/0x50 [ 2169.750451] kfree+0x118/0x330 [ 2169.750792] mlx5_dpll_remove+0xf5/0x110 [mlx5_dpll] [ 2169.751271] auxiliary_bus_remove+0x2e/0x40 [ 2169.751694] device_release_driver_internal+0x24b/0x2e0 [ 2169.752191] unbind_store+0xa6/0xb0 [ 2169.752563] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x1df/0x2a0 [ 2169.753004] vfs_write+0x41f/0x790 [ 2169.753381] ksys_write+0xc7/0x160 [ 2169.753750] do_syscall_64+0x6f/0x140 [ 2169.754132] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e [ 2169.754847] Last potentially related work creation: [ 2169.755315] kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40 [ 2169.755709] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0x9b/0xf0 [ 2169.756165] __queue_work+0x382/0x8f0 [ 2169.756552] call_timer_fn+0x126/0x320 [ 2169.756941] __run_timers.part.0+0x2ea/0x4c0 [ 2169.757376] run_timer_softirq+0x40/0x80 [ 2169.757782] __do_softirq+0x1a1/0x509 [ 2169.758387] Second to last potentially related work creation: [ 2169.758924] kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40 [ 2169.759322] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0x9b/0xf0 [ 2169.759773] __queue_work+0x382/0x8f0 [ 2169.760156] call_timer_fn+0x126/0x320 [ 2169.760550] __run_timers.part.0+0x2ea/0x4c0 [ 2169.760978] run_timer_softirq+0x40/0x80 [ 2169.761381] __do_softirq+0x1a1/0x509 [ 2169.761998] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88812b326a00 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256 [ 2169.763061] The buggy address is located 112 bytes inside of freed 256-byte region [ffff88812b326a00, ffff88812b326b00) [ 2169.764346] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 2169.764866] page:000000000f2b1e89 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x12b324 [ 2169.765731] head:000000000f2b1e89 order:2 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 [ 2169.766484] anon flags: 0x200000000000840(slab|head|node=0|zone=2) [ 2169.767048] page_type: 0xffffffff() [ 2169.767422] raw: 0200000000000840 ffff888100042b40 0000000000000000 dead000000000001 [ 2169.768183] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000200020 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 2169.768899] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 2169.769649] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 2169.770116] ffff88812b326900: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 2169.770805] ffff88812b326980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 2169.771485] >ffff88812b326a00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 2169.772173] ^ [ 2169.772787] ffff88812b326a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 2169.773477] ffff88812b326b00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 2169.774160] ================================================================== [ 2169.774845] ================================================================== I didn't manage to reproduce it. Though the issue seems to be obvious. There is a chance that the mlx5_dpll_remove() calls cancel_delayed_work() when the work runs and manages to re-arm itself. In that case, after delay timer triggers next attempt to queue it, it works with freed memory. Fix this by using cancel_delayed_work_sync() instead which makes sure that work is done when it returns. Fixes: 496fd0a ("mlx5: Implement SyncE support using DPLL infrastructure") Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240206164328.360313-1-jiri@resnulli.us Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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…kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.8, take Linaro#2 - Avoid dropping the page refcount twice when freeing an unlinked page-table subtree.
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Hou Tao says: ==================== Fix the read of vsyscall page through bpf From: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com> Hi, As reported by syzboot [1] and [2], when trying to read vsyscall page by using bpf_probe_read_kernel() or bpf_probe_read(), oops may happen. Thomas Gleixner had proposed a test patch [3], but it seems that no formal patch is posted after about one month [4], so I post it instead and add an Originally-by tag in patch #2. Patch #1 makes is_vsyscall_vaddr() being a common helper. Patch #2 fixes the problem by disallowing vsyscall page read for copy_from_kernel_nofault(). Patch #3 adds one test case to ensure the read of vsyscall page through bpf is rejected. Please see individual patches for more details. Comments are always welcome. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAG48ez06TZft=ATH1qh2c5mpS5BT8UakwNkzi6nvK5_djC-4Nw@mail.gmail.com/ [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CABOYnLynjBoFZOf3Z4BhaZkc5hx_kHfsjiW+UWLoB=w33LvScw@mail.gmail.com/ [3]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/87r0jwquhv.ffs@tglx/ [4]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/e24b125c-8ff4-9031-6c53-67ff2e01f316@huaweicloud.com/ Change Log: v3: * rephrase commit message for patch #1 & #2 (Sohil) * reword comments in copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed() (Sohil) * add Rvb tag for patch #1 and Acked-by tag for patch #3 (Sohil, Yonghong) v2: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240126115423.3943360-1-houtao@huaweicloud.com/ * move is_vsyscall_vaddr to asm/vsyscall.h instead (Sohil) * elaborate on the reason for disallowing of vsyscall page read in copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed() (Sohil) * update the commit message of patch #2 to more clearly explain how the oops occurs. (Sohil) * update the commit message of patch #3 to explain the expected return values of various bpf helpers (Yonghong) v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240119073019.1528573-1-houtao@huaweicloud.com/ ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240202103935.3154011-1-houtao@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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With parameters CONFIG_RISCV_PMU_LEGACY=y and CONFIG_RISCV_PMU_SBI=n linux kernel crashes when you try perf record: $ perf record ls [ 46.749286] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 [ 46.750199] Oops [#1] [ 46.750342] Modules linked in: [ 46.750608] CPU: 0 PID: 107 Comm: perf-exec Not tainted 6.6.0 #2 [ 46.750906] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) [ 46.751184] epc : 0x0 [ 46.751430] ra : arch_perf_update_userpage+0x54/0x13e [ 46.751680] epc : 0000000000000000 ra : ffffffff8072ee52 sp : ff2000000022b8f0 [ 46.751958] gp : ffffffff81505988 tp : ff6000000290d400 t0 : ff2000000022b9c0 [ 46.752229] t1 : 0000000000000001 t2 : 0000000000000003 s0 : ff2000000022b930 [ 46.752451] s1 : ff600000028fb000 a0 : 0000000000000000 a1 : ff600000028fb000 [ 46.752673] a2 : 0000000ae2751268 a3 : 00000000004fb708 a4 : 0000000000000004 [ 46.752895] a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : 000000000017ffe3 a7 : 00000000000000d2 [ 46.753117] s2 : ff600000028fb000 s3 : 0000000ae2751268 s4 : 0000000000000000 [ 46.753338] s5 : ffffffff8153e290 s6 : ff600000863b9000 s7 : ff60000002961078 [ 46.753562] s8 : ff60000002961048 s9 : ff60000002961058 s10: 0000000000000001 [ 46.753783] s11: 0000000000000018 t3 : ffffffffffffffff t4 : ffffffffffffffff [ 46.754005] t5 : ff6000000292270c t6 : ff2000000022bb30 [ 46.754179] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 000000000000000c [ 46.754653] Code: Unable to access instruction at 0xffffffffffffffec. [ 46.754939] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 46.755131] note: perf-exec[107] exited with irqs disabled [ 46.755546] note: perf-exec[107] exited with preempt_count 4 This happens because in the legacy case the ctr_get_width function was not defined, but it is used in arch_perf_update_userpage. Also remove extra check in riscv_pmu_ctr_get_width_mask Signed-off-by: Vadim Shakirov <vadim.shakirov@syntacore.com> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com> Reviewed-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com> Fixes: cc4c07c ("drivers: perf: Implement perf event mmap support in the SBI backend") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240227170002.188671-3-vadim.shakirov@syntacore.com Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
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…git/netfilter/nf Pablo Neira Ayuso says: ==================== Netfilter fixes for net Patch #1 restores NFPROTO_INET with nft_compat, from Ignat Korchagin. Patch #2 fixes an issue with bridge netfilter and broadcast/multicast packets. There is a day 0 bug in br_netfilter when used with connection tracking. Conntrack assumes that an nf_conn structure that is not yet added to hash table ("unconfirmed"), is only visible by the current cpu that is processing the sk_buff. For bridge this isn't true, sk_buff can get cloned in between, and clones can be processed in parallel on different cpu. This patch disables NAT and conntrack helpers for multicast packets. Patch #3 adds a selftest to cover for the br_netfilter bug. netfilter pull request 24-02-29 * tag 'nf-24-02-29' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf: selftests: netfilter: add bridge conntrack + multicast test case netfilter: bridge: confirm multicast packets before passing them up the stack netfilter: nf_tables: allow NFPROTO_INET in nft_(match/target)_validate() ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240229000135.8780-1-pablo@netfilter.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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When poll is used in userspace, kernel calls the
update function to query the queue status and return
result.If no new task,the thread sleeps and wait for
interrupt wakeup.
Signed-off-by: linwenkai linwenkai6@hisilicon.com