

SMART CONTRACT SECURITY AUDIT REPORT

For Rollup.Finance

20 September 2023



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1. Overview

On Sep 6, 2023, the security team of Lunaray Technology received the security audit request of the **ROLLUP.FINANCE project**. The team completed the audit of the **ROLLUP.FINANCE smart contract** on Sep 20, 2023. During the audit process, the security audit experts of Lunaray Technology and the ROLLUP.FINANCE project interface Personnel communicate and maintain symmetry of information, conduct security audits under controllable operational risks, and avoid risks to project generation and operations during the testing process.

Through communication and feedback with ROLLUP.FINANCE project party, it is confirmed that the loopholes and risks found in the audit process have been repaired or within the acceptable range. The result of this ROLLUP.FINANCE smart contract security audit:

Passed

Audit Report Hash:

C8D58259CA9E53905A7CC444C66C88B7B98C1EAACF0C68F088B39EC94729BF76

2. Background

2.1 Project Description

Project name	Rollup.Finance
Contract type	Decentralized Perpetual Trading Platform
Code language	Solidity
Public chain	zkSync
Project website	https://rollup.finance
Introduction	Rollup.Finance is a decentralized derivatives exchange launched initially on zkSync, Layer 2 innovative solution for perpetual trading, creating a new model for on-chain perpetual trading and providing sustainable returns for users.
Contract file	FaucetToken.sol, SigVerify.sol, TimeVerify.sol, WETH9.sol, ReferralReader.sol, ReferralStorage.sol, FeeRewardDivider.sol, InsuranceFund.sol, ProfitRewardDivider.sol, RewardDivider.sol, RewardDistributor.sol, RewardRouter.sol, RewardTracker.sol, ChainUtils.sol, BasicRouter.sol, Config.sol, OrderBook.sol, PairsContract.sol, PositionManager.sol, Router.sol, StableToken.sol, StableVault.sol, Trading.sol, TradingExtension.sol

2.2 Audit Range

Smart contract file name and corresponding SHA256:

Name	SHA256
FaucetToken.sol	1D8A6E1028722D59B1CD48A2530E283082DDD11D33CC5A6 2D46997D16C1FE071
SigVerify.sol	45EC0614A4CC39D36D80BFD71905487E1898C42DC8517725 D057411E7EF3392F
TimeVerify.sol	EFCD43EE8DCA3BB055DECDB30F4E1CA9B061E74CF3B28D52 84061B1C72FE9198
WETH9.sol	839E5E751EA161494A12CCFB72F35FEB5CD030251248C1692 65036154896AD98
ReferralReader.sol	10B5D6BEE0B9F0C436770FFD9914B319F7656977F3C7C0AA 40F5E39C84581D6F
ReferralStorage.sol	A2279254A5C5A14E8EE2A65B2E59F174D795663F6C5CD20B 5A4B67A63609534F
FeeRewardDivider.sol	47AF6E2FD0ABA7901D3FDF12B87933D403A8A210B75E91FF 1664731919BE6DEA
InsuranceFund.sol	48961EF3EB927D2ACB107E13C0E2D46AAC218DD5FC8B76D EB6E08F450F7BE47F
ProfitRewardDivider.sol	C84F8408373800548DAB9B6E17EC71A58A2E6A846EDDF493 C2DCBAB8CDA60F04
RewardDivider.sol	C55A91CAAE4D6BED078333192677A60335FFB9646D4CE7A4 84F9DF60D8984691

RewardDistributor.sol	411F82D3DD7C21170A871064A7885CA11E571B4462D0F55A 0FD83434D6391378
RewardRouter.sol	FAD2AAFF329F111DE3A5C4D79FC40BE9C0D2C730CCB7D51 D48265B6904C8C573
RewardTracker.sol	BF45A093AEC2C9A5E2119C406888F6E8E0CDA59BE89B032D E501FC4329C17535
ChainUtils.sol	D37C26CD922B2913199FD34DAC117CB9A8160B2122BA161 E74EDC9C611FA4322
BasicRouter.sol	D9BF78928414B70E7B71835C53B504C8F680BB726F734A20 555569134FFCDC03
Config.sol	76289ABB317F247078351F65A74828A0DBFFC9BFA3A12A53 62D228B2707F8474
OrderBook.sol	29C8CF73980D7619A991184068E5F2B4BD9EA3962D21DEF9 450505EE9638E787
PairsContract.sol	3737DBE6EACDAF7D60D5FF3C5CB41750AA951BC975D6FCA A6A566C0FCF48C719
PositionManager.sol	8C1ED4E7660087B55AC0CC09407B97B5729A7285695FDD54 D082C1893AC87033
Router.sol	29C2767D15ECE920E95389B03358B00BD59D9C8815BED3CD 897CF46E8C4A564D
StableToken.sol	AF86A593D63770A484C630B5CE624FF89E689C6CA21B11EC 44F2EF3C43885550
StableVault.sol	15B224E123F24E9D6089A4D082D3D7DBF6C137CD5D20A9C B793183BAFA848938

Trading.sol

3B03F7A2F887E1A6B3ED85A81D0B5A268136D25C68523DE3
155B7ECF5123EE32

TradingExtension.sol

75A05D30E341513E2F47838C58F8798E2C53B188106E007EF
9AD88F587EBAB9D

3. Project contract details

3.1 Contract Overview

Config Contract

The contract implements the setup and access to global configuration information, as well as permission control over Vault and collateral tokens.

StableVault Contract

The contract implements an upgradable ERC20 Token called RUSD by inheriting the ERC20Upgradeable contract, with deposit and withdrawal functionality that allows users to deposit stablecoins and receive a share of RUSD tokens, or withdraw stablecoins based on a share of RUSD tokens. The contract also provides a rewards feature, whereby the reward distributor can distribute rewards to users and allow them to collect them. The contract administrator can set the reward distributor, liquidity provider and withdrawal delay. The structure Withdraw in the contract defines the information related to the withdrawal request, including the address of the token to be withdrawn, the number of liquidity tokens, the number of tokens, the RUSD price at the time of the withdrawal request, the RUSD price at the time of the withdrawal execution, and the timestamp of the withdrawal release. The contract implements the core functions of the stablecoin vault through initialization functions, setup functions, deposit and withdrawal functions, reward functions, and management functions, which are managed and configured by the contract's administrator.

StableToken Contract

This contract inherits the ERC20 contract from OpenZeppelin and implements a standard ERC20 Token with minting and destruction functions. The contract uses a whitelisting mechanism to manage mint privileges, and only addresses set to mint can call the mint and destroy functions. The owner of the contract can set the status of the minter.

TradingExtension Contract

The contract implements the auxiliary functions of the trading contract, including setting and managing the node address, the minimum position size, updating position information, verifying price signatures, calculating prices with spreads, obtaining the cumulative interest on assets and related parameters, verifying the validity of the transaction, and so on, a series of trading needs to be used in a series of parameters and the implementation of commonly used functions. The configuration parameters can only be modified by the administrator.

Trading Contract

The contract implements a basic trading system that realizes trading-related functions. It includes operations such as increasing positions, decreasing positions, liquidating positions and updating take profit and stop loss prices.

OrderBook Contract

This contract mainly realizes the order management related functions for managing the system to manage the orders to add and reduce positions, including the operations of creating, updating, canceling and executing orders. It realizes order execution and position management through interaction with other contracts.

PairsContract Contract

The contract implements a series of functions for managing asset information, positions, funding rates, etc. of a trading pair. The contract specifically implements functions such as adding and updating asset information, updating funding rates, editing long and short positions, setting user position limits, setting maximum asset positions and user position limits, and suspending asset trading. However, the main logic in this contract is qualified by privileged roles, and the contract point functions are called by other contracts in the overall project.

Router Contract

The contract implements a router contract that provides the user with the ability to increase positions, decrease positions and update take profit and stop loss prices. It also implements an interface in the form of a plug-in that provides additional front-end operations, which is restricted using a whitelist and the restrictions are managed by an administrator.

BasicRouter Contract

This contract is an abstract contract that implements the functions of transaction information verification and price signature verification required for routing operations, and provides the functions of obtaining the maximum price and minimum price. The main functions are also accomplished through indirect calls to TradingExtension and other contracts.

PositionManager Contract

The contract implements a function to manage the user's positions on the platform, including position liquidation, take-profit and stop-loss execution, and order execution. It also includes auxiliary functions such as generating unique identifiers for batch trades, obtaining maximum take-profit prices, and more.

ReferralStorage Contract

This contract is a system used to manage the relationship between the referrer and the trader as well as their rewards, and it contains information such as the referrer's share of the discount, the referrer's rank, and the referral code. This contract is mainly used to process the rebates and discounts of the referrals and to manage the ownership of the referral codes. The administrator can set the referrer level and set the privileged role of Handler, which sets the trader's referral code.

ReferralReader Contract

This contract is an implementation of a tool contract for fetching structured data on the chain for batch reading of referral code owner information from `ReferralStorage` contracts.

RewardRouter Contract

The contract provides users with the ability to pledge LP tokens for fees, release LP tokens from pledge, redeem RUSD tokens, withdraw pledged tokens, and collect fee rewards. The contract also manages a privileged role, UnstakeKeeper, and a minimum execution fee parameter charged by that role, both controlled by the contract administrator.

RewardTracker Contract

The contract is a contract for tracking and distributing rewards and mainly implements an ERC20 token-based collateralization and redemption mechanism, as well as the calculation and distribution of rewards. In addition to the main collateralization, redemption, transfer, authorization, reward collection and reward update functions, some setup functions are provided for some configuration.

RewardDistributor Contract

This contract is mainly used for distributing rewards. This contract mainly takes rewards from the vault and distributes them to RewardTracker contracts at regular intervals.

RewardDivider Contract

The contract is an abstract contract with an internal implementation of a list of special privileges and a list of reward recipients, through which the owner of the contract can manage the recipients and processors of rewards.

FeeRewardDivider Contract

This contract is a specific implementation of the RewardDivider contract, and its logic is mainly to distribute rewards according to the reward distribution ratio set by the administrator. According to its code comments, we know that the rewards are distributed proportionally to the following roles: ROP repurchase, ROP holders, RUSD pledged LPs, fee-tracking LPs, rewards dispensers, and teams. However, the actual distribution needs to be handled according to the admin settings.

InsuranceFund Contract

The contract is designed as an insurance fund, which can be initialized, the address of the insurance fund can be set, and compensation can be paid from the insurance fund. Called by a Trading contract.

ProfitRewardDivider Contract

This contract is a concrete implementation of the RewardDivider contract, which mainly implements the distribution of rewards to three recipients based on the Tp Token price range of a given prophecy machine: the Insurance Fund, the ROP Buyback, and the LP Vault.

ChainUtils Contract

The contract implements a simple library of tools that include functions such as getting on-chain block timestamps, block heights, and verifying signatures.

FaucetToken Contract

The contract implements a basic ERC20 token contract with added tap functionality that can be used to issue and manage tokens and allow users to pick up tokens through the tap.

SigVerify Contract

The contract implements a simple library of signature verification tools that provide multiple methods for verifying signatures and can be used to verify signatures on price data.

TimeVerify Contract

The contract implements a simple library of time verification tools that allow users to get the current block time and can record and update time information by setting the latest time and delaying setting the latest time.

WETH9 Contract

The contract is an implementation of an Ether wrapped Ether (Wrapped Ether, or WETH) contract that provides features such as deposits, withdrawals, authorizations, transfers, and support for authorization using signature verification.

3.2 Contract details

StableToken Contract

Name	Parameter	Attributes
burnFrom	address account uint256 amount	onlyMinter
mintFor	address account uint256 amount	onlyMinter
setMinter	address _address bool _status	onlyOwner

Config Contract

Name	Parameter	Attributes
initialize	address _weth	public
getAddr	AddressType _type	external
getUint	UIntType _type	external
setAddr	AddressType _type address _addr	onlyOwner
setUint	UIntType _type uint256 _value	onlyOwner
setVault	address _vault bool _allowed	onlyOwner
isAddr	AddressType _type address _addr	external
checkVaultAndMargin	address _vault address _token	external

StableVault Contract

Name	Parameter	Attributes
initialize	address_cfg address_stable	public
setRewardDivider	address_addr bool_isOk	onlyOwner
getLpPrice	none	external
setLpPrice	uint256_lpPrice	external
_setLpPrice	uint256_lpPrice	private
setLpPriceUpdater	address_addr bool_isOk	onlyOwner
setTokenWatcher	address_addr bool_isOk	onlyOwner
setStakeFeeBasisPoints	uint256_stakeFeeBasisPoints uint256_unstakeFeeBasisPoints	onlyOwner
setPrivateLiquidityMode	bool_isPrivateLiquidityMode	onlyOwner
setLiquidityRouter	address_addr bool_isOk	onlyOwner
setWithdrawDelay	uint256_withdrawDelay	onlyOwner
setMinUnderwaterLpPrice	uint256_minUnderwaterLpPrice	onlyOwner
tokenAmountToStableAmount	address_token uint256_tAmount	public
stableAmountToTokenAmount	address_token uint256_uAmount	public
_withdraw	address_token address_to uint256_amount	private
_defaultToken	none	private
transferOut	address_token address_to uint256_uAmount	external

_updateRewardBalance	address_addr int256 _amount	private
transferIn	address_from address_token uint256 _tAmount bool _toReward	public
stableRedeem	address_token address_to uint256 _uAmount	external
listToken	address_token	onlyOwner
delistToken	address_token	onlyOwner
pauseToken	address_token bool _isPaused	external
toShare	uint256 _amount	public
fromShare	uint256 _share	public
_checkAndSetPrice	PriceData _priceData bytes _signature	private
depositFor	PriceData _priceData bytes _signature address_from address_token uint256 _amount address _receiver	public
_getDelay	none	internal
_checkLiquidityRouter	none	internal
requestWithdraw	PriceData _priceData bytes _signature uint256 _lpAmount address _outputToken address _receiver	external
_popUserWithdraw	address_account uint256 _reqId	private
claimWithdraw	PriceData _priceData bytes _signature address _owner uint256 _reqId	external

payoutReward	address_to uint256_amount	external
paybackReward	address_from uint256_amount	external
claimReward	address_token uint256_amount	external
freeze	uint256_amount	external
unfreeze	uint256_amount	external
vaultValue	none	external

PositionManager Contract

Name	Parameter	Attributes
initialize	address_cfg	public
setOrderKeeper	address_account bool_isActive	onlyOwner
setPositionKeeper	address_account bool_isActive	onlyOwner
uuid	address_account uint256_index	public
_liquidatePosition	PriceData_priceData bytes_signature address_account uint256_assetId bool_isLong address_feeReceiver bytes32_uuid	private
liquidatePosition	PriceData_priceData bytes_signature address_account uint256_assetId bool_isLong	onlyPosition Keeper

	address _feeReceiver	
_getMaxTpPrice	ITrading.Position _pos	internal
_executePositionTpSl	PriceData _priceData bytes _signature address _account uint256 _assetId bool _isLong address _feeReceiver bytes32 _uuid	private
executePositionTpSl	PriceData _priceData bytes _signature address _account uint256 _assetId bool _isLong address _feeReceiver	onlyPosition Keeper
_executeIncreaseOrder	PriceData _priceData bytes _signature address _account uint256 _orderIndex address payable _feeReceiver bytes32 _uuid	private
executeIncreaseOrder	PriceData _priceData bytes _signature address _account uint256 _orderIndex address payable _feeReceiver	onlyOrderKe eper
_executeDecreaseOrder	PriceData _priceData bytes _signature address _account uint256 _orderIndex address payable _feeReceiver bytes32 _uuid	private
executeDecreaseOrder	PriceData _priceData bytes _signature address _account uint256 _orderIndex address payable _feeReceiver	onlyOrderKe eper

OrderBook Contract

Name	Parameter	Attributes
initialize	address _cfg uint256 _minExecutionFee	public
setMinExecutionFee	uint256 _minExecutionFee	onlyOwner
validatePositionOrder Price	bool _triggerAboveThreshold uint256 _triggerPrice uint256 _assetId uint256 _indexPrice bool _useMaxPrice bool _raise	public
getDecreaseOrder	address _account uint256 _orderIndex	public
getIncreaseOrder	address _account uint256 _orderIndex	public
getTradeInfo	uint256 _tradeInfoId	public
_pairs	none	internal
_updateOi	address _account uint256 _assetId address _vault bool _isLong uint256 _sizeDelta bool _isIncrease	private
createIncreaseOrder	TradeInfo _tradeInfo uint256 _triggerPrice bool _triggerAboveThreshold bytes32 _referralCode	external
_createIncreaseOrder	address _account uint256 _tradeInfoIndex uint256 _triggerPrice bool _triggerAboveThreshold uint256 _executionFee	private
updateIncreaseOrder	uint256 _orderIndex uint256 _sizeDelta uint256 _triggerPrice	external

	bool _triggerAboveThreshold	
cancelIncreaseOrder	uint256 _orderIndex	public
cancelIncreaseOrderByExecutor	address _account uint256 _orderIndex bytes32 _uuid	onlyExecutor
_cancelIncreaseOrder	address _account uint256 _orderIndex bytes32 _uuid	private
executeIncreaseOrder	uint256 _price address _account uint256 _orderIndex address payable _feeReceiver bytes32 _uuid	onlyExecutor
getPositionKey	address _account uint256 _indexAsset bool _isLong	public
createDecreaseOrder	TradeInfo _tradeInfo uint256 _triggerPrice bool _triggerAboveThreshold address _outputToken	external
_addDecreaseOrderToList	address _account uint256 _assetId bool _isLong uint256 _orderIndex	private
_delDecreaseOrderFromList	address _account uint256 _assetId bool _isLong uint256 _orderIndex	private
_createDecreaseOrder	address _account uint256 _tradeInfoIndex uint256 _triggerPrice bool _triggerAboveThreshold address _outputToken uint256 _executionFee	private
updateDecreaseOrder	uint256 _orderIndex uint256 _marginDelta uint256 _sizeDelta	external

	uint256 _triggerPrice bool _triggerAboveThreshold	
executeDecreaseOrder	uint256 _price address _address uint256 _orderIndex address payable _feeReceiver bytes32 _uuid	onlyExecutor
cancelDecreaseOrder	uint256 _orderIndex	public
cancelDecreaseOrderByExecutor	address _account uint256 _orderIndex bytes32 _uuid	onlyExecutor
_cancelDecreaseOrder	address _account uint256 _orderIndex bytes32 _uuid	internal
executeDecreasePosition	PosInfo _posInfo address _outputToken address _executor	onlyExecutor
cleanDecreaseOrderList	address _account uint256 _assetId bool _isLong bytes32 _uuid	external
setExecutor	address _executor bool _isExecutor	onlyOwner
_transferOutETH	uint256 _amountOut address payable _receiver	private

BasicRouter Contract

Name	Parameter	Attributes
_BasicRouter_init	address _cfg	internal
_validateAssetInfo	TradeInfo _tradeInfo	internal
_verifyPrice	uint256 _assetId PriceData _priceData bytes _signature	internal
_getMaxPrice	uint256 _assetId uint256 _indexPrice	internal
_getMinPrice	uint256 _assetId uint256 _indexPrice	internal
_tradeExt	none	internal
_trading	none	internal
_router	none	internal
_orderbook	none	internal
_referral	none	internal

Router Contract

Name	Parameter	Attributes
initialize	address _cfg	public
addPlugin	address _plugin	onlyOwner
removePlugin	address _plugin	onlyOwner
approvePlugin	address _plugin	external
denyPlugin	address _plugin	external
pluginIncreasePosition	PosInfo _posInfo	external
pluginDecreasePosition	PosInfo _posInfo address _outputToken address _executor	external
increasePosition	TradeInfo _tradeInfo PriceData _priceData bytes _signature	external

	bytes32 _referralCode	
decreasePosition	TradeInfo _tradeInfo PriceData _priceData bytes _signature address _outputToken	external
_checkSl	ITrading.Position _pos uint256 _slPrice uint256 _price	internal
_checkTp	ITrading.Position _pos uint256 _tpPrice uint256 _price	internal
updateTpSl	TpSlInfo _tpSlInfo PriceData _priceData bytes _signature	external
_validatePlugin	address _account	private

PairsContract Contract

Name	Parameter	Attributes
initialize	address _cfg uint256 _maxBaseFudingRate uint256 _fundingInterval uint256 _maxLoss uint256 _maxProfit	public
idToAsset	uint256 _assetId	public
idToOi	uint256 _assetId address _vault	public
getUserOrderOi	address _user uint256 _assetId	public
getOiInfo	uint256 _assetId address _vault	public
getUserOiInfo	uint256 _assetId address _user	public
getAccInterest	uint256 _assetId	public

	address_vault bool_isLong	
getSpread	uint256_assetId	public
setFundingInterval	uint256_fundingInterval	onlyOwner
getUserOi	uint256_assetId address_user	external
updateAssetLeverage	uint256_assetId uint256_minLeverage uint256_maxLeverage	onlyOwner
setAssetBaseFundingRate	uint256_assetId uint256_baseFundingRate	onlyOwner
updateSpread	uint256_assetId uint256_spread	onlyOwner
updateMaxTpSl	uint256_assetId uint256_maxProfit uint256_maxLoss	onlyOwner
pauseAsset	uint256_assetId bool_isPaused	onlyOwner
setMaxBaseFundingRate	uint256_maxBaseFundingRate	onlyOwner
setUserMaxMinOi	uint256_assetId address_user uint256_maxOi uint256_minOi	onlyOwner
updateOrderOi	address_account uint256_assetId address_vault bool_isLong uint256_sizeDelta bool_isIncrease	onlyOrderbook
modifyLongOi	address_trader uint256_assetId address_vault bool_isIncrease uint256_amount	onlyTradeExt
modifyShortOi	address_trader	onlyTradeExt

	uint256 _assetId address _vault bool _isIncrease uint256 _amount	
updateFundingFee	uint256 _assetId address _vault	external

Trading Contract

Name	Parameter	Attributes
initialize	address _cfg uint256 _openingFeeBasisPoints uint256 _closingFeeBasisPoints uint256 _hourlyFeeBasisPoints uint256 _liquidationFeeUsd	public
setInPrivateLiquidationMode	bool _inPrivateLiquidationMode	onlyOwner
setLiquidator	address _liquidator bool _isActive	onlyOwner
setFees	uint256 _openingFeeBasisPoints uint256 _closingFeeBasisPoints uint256 _hourlyFeeBasisPoints uint256 _liquidationFeeUsd uint256 _minProfitTime	onlyOwner
addRouter	address _router	external
removeRouter	address _router	external
_getPrice	PosInfo _posInfo bool _increased	internal
_getPosKey	PosInfo _posInfo	internal
getOpeningFeeBasisPoints	uint256 _indexAsset	public
getClosingFeeBasisPoints	uint256 _indexAsset	public
getHourlyFeeBasisPoints	uint256 _indexAsset	public

_collectIncreasePositionFee	Position _pos PosInfo _posInfo	private
_updateFundingFee	uint256 _assetId address _vault	private
increasePosition	PosInfo _posInfo	external
_emitIncreasePosition	bytes32 _key PosInfo _posInfo uint256 _price uint256 _fee uint256 _oriMargin	internal
decreasePosition	PosInfo _posInfo address _outputToken address _executor	external
_emitDecreasePosition	bytes32 _key PosInfo _posInfo uint256 _price uint256 _fee uint256 _oriMargin	internal
_updateOi	PosInfo _posInfo bool _isIncrease	private
_decreasePosition	PosInfo _posInfo address _outputToken address _executor bool _isLiquidate	internal
_emitLiquidatePosition	bytes32 _key PosInfo _posInfo uint256 _price Position _oriPosition DePosOut _outInfo	internal
liquidatePosition	PosInfo _posInfo address _feeReceiver	external
validateLiquidation	PosInfo _posInfo bool _raise	public
updateTpSl	TpSlInfo _tpSlInfo address _account	external
getMaxPrice	uint256 _indexAsset	public

	uint256_indexPrice	
getMinPrice	uint256_indexAsset uint256_indexPrice	public
getPosition	address_account uint256_indexAsset bool_isLong	public
getPositionKey	address_account uint256_indexAsset bool_isLong	public
getPositionLeverage	address_account uint256_indexAsset bool_isLong	public
getNextAveragePrice	Position_pos uint256_nextPrice uint256_sizeDelta	public
getPositionPnl	address_account uint256_indexAsset uint256_indexPrice bool_isLong	public
getFundingFee	Position_pos	public
getOpeningFee	uint256_assetId uint256_sizeDelta uint256_discount	public
getClosingFee	uint256_assetId uint256_sizeDelta uint256_discount	public
getHourlyFee	Position_pos	public
getPositionInfo	address_account uint256_indexAsset bool_isLong	external
_distributeDecreasePositionFee	PosInfo_posInfo uint256_fee	private
getPnl	Position_pos uint256_indexPrice	public
_getPnl	Position_pos uint256_indexPrice	private

	bool _includeHourly	
getDelta	Position _pos uint256 _indexPrice	public
_getAdjustedDelta	Position _pos PosInfo _posInfo	private
_reduceMargin	PosInfo _posInfo address _executor	private
_emitUpdatePnl	bytes32 _key int256 adjustDelta bytes32 _uuid	private
_validatePosition	uint256 _size uint256 _margin	private
_validateRouter	address _account	private
_transferOut	address _vault address _token uint256 _amount address _receiver	private
_tradeExt	none	internal
_referral	none	internal
_orderbook	none	internal
_feeDivider	none	internal
_profitDivider	none	internal
_insuranceFund	none	internal
_routerAddr	none	internal

TradingExtension Contract

Name	Parameter	Attributes
initialize	address_cfg uint256_validSignatureTime	public
minPos	address_vault	external
modifyShortOi	address_trader uint256_asset address_vault bool_isIncrease uint256_size	onlyTrade
modifyLongOi	address_trader uint256_asset address_vault bool_isIncrease uint256_size	onlyTrade
setFutureTimeDelta	uint256_time	onlyOwner
verifyPrice	uint256_assetId PriceData_priceData bytes_signature	public
verifyTest	uint256_assetId PriceData_priceData bytes_signature	external
getBlockTimestamp	none	external
getMaxPrice	uint256_assetId uint256_indexPrice	external
getMinPrice	uint256_assetId uint256_indexPrice	external
getAccInterest	uint256_assetId address_vault bool_isLong	external
getMaxLeverage	uint256_assetId	external
getMaxLoss	uint256_assetId	external
getMaxProfit	uint256_assetId	external
getFeeBasisPoints	uint256_assetId	external

isPaused	none	external
validateTrade	uint256 _asset	external
setValidSignatureTime	uint256 _time	onlyOwner
setNode	address _node bool _isNode	onlyOwner
setMinPositionSize	address _vault uint256 _min	onlyOwner
setPaused	bool _paused	onlyOwner
_pairs	none	internal

ChainUtils Contract

Name	Parameter	Attributes
getTime	none	internal
getBlock	none	internal
isValidSignature	address _address bytes32 _hash bytes _signature	internal

RewardRouter Contract

Name	Parameter	Attributes
initialize	address _cfg address _rusd address _feeLpTracker	external
setUnstakeKeeper	address _keeper bool _isKeeper	onlyOwner

setMinUnstakeFee	uint256 _minUnstakeFee	onlyOwner
_feeDivider	none	internal
mintAndStakeLp	PriceData _priceData bytes _signature address _token uint256 _amount uint256 _minLp	external
unstakeAndRedeemLp	PriceData _priceData bytes _signature address _outputToken uint256 _feeLpAmount	external
claimWithdraw	PriceData _priceData bytes _signature uint256 _reqId address _account	external
claim	none	external
claimReward	address _outputToken	external
_transferOutETH	uint256 _amountOut address payable _receiver	private

RewardTracker Contract

Name	Parameter	Attributes
initialize	string _name string _symbol	external
setDepositToken	address _depositToken bool _isDepositToken	onlyOwner
setDistributor	address _distributor	onlyOwner
setInPrivateTransferMode	bool _inPrivateTransferMode	onlyOwner

setInPrivateStakingMode	bool _inPrivateStakingMode	onlyOwner
setInPrivateClaimingMode	bool _inPrivateClaimingMode	onlyOwner
setHandler	address _handler bool _isActive	onlyOwner
balanceOf	address _account	external
stake	address _depositToken uint256 _amount	external
stakeForAccount	address _fundingAccount address _account address _depositToken uint256 _amount	external
unstake	address _depositToken uint256 _amount	external
unstakeForAccount	address _account address _depositToken uint256 _amount address _receiver	external
transfer	address _recipient uint256 _amount	external
allowance	address _owner address _spender	external
approve	address _spender uint256 _amount	external
transferFrom	address _sender address _recipient uint256 _amount	external
tokensPerInterval	none	external
updateRewards	none	external
claim	address _receiver	external
claimForAccount	address _account address _receiver	external
claimable	address _account	public
rewardToken	none	public
_claim	address _account	private

	address_receiver	
_mint	address_account uint256_amount	internal
_burn	address_account uint256_amount	internal
_transfer	address_sender address_recipient uint256_amount	private
_approve	address_owner address_spender uint256_amount	private
_validateHandler	none	private
_stake	address_fundingAccount address_account address_depositToken uint256_amount	private
_unstake	address_account address_depositToken uint256_amount address_receiver	private
_updateRewards	address_account	private

RewardDistributor Contract

Name	Parameter	Attributes
initialize	address_vault address_rewardTracker address_rewardDivider	external
rewardToken	none	public
setRewardInfo	address_rewardDivider uint256_rewardFetchInterval	onlyOwner
_setTokensPerInterval	uint256_amount	private

pendingRewards	none	public
fetchRewardManual	none	external
distribute	none	external

ReferralStorage Contract

Name	Parameter	Attributes
initialize	address_cfg uint256_defaultRebate uint256_defaultDiscountShare	external
setPrivateMode	bool_isPrivateMode	onlyOwner
setHandler	address_handler bool_isActive	onlyOwner
addTier	uint256_totalRebate uint256_discountShare uint256_subRate	onlyOwner
setTier	uint256_tierId uint256_totalRebate uint256_discountShare uint256_subRate	onlyOwner
setReferrerTier	address_referrer uint256_tierId	onlyOwner
setReferrerDiscountShareFromWl	bytes_signature address_whitelistSigner uint256_discountShare	external
setReferrerDiscountShare	uint256_discountShare	external
setTraderReferralCode	address_account bytes32_code	external
registerCode	bytes32_code	external
registerCodeFromWl	bytes_signature address_whitelistSigner	external

	bytes32 _code	
acceptReferral	bytes32 _code	external
setCodeOwner	bytes32 _code address _newAccount	external
getTraderReferralInfo	address _account	external
_setTraderReferralCode	address _account bytes32 _code	private
distribute	address _referrer address _trader address _vault uint256 _amount bytes32 _uuid	external

ReferralReader Contract

Name	Parameter	Attributes
getCodeOwners	IReferralStorage _referralStorage bytes32[] _codes	public

FeeRewardDivider Contract

Name	Parameter	Attributes
initialize	address _cfg	external
_referral	none	internal
distribute	address _account address _vault uint256 _amount bytes32 _uuid	onlyHandler

ProfitRewardDivider Contract

Name	Parameter	Attributes
initialize	address_cfg address_oracle	external
_getPercents	none	private
distribute	address_account address_vault uint256_amount bytes32_uuid	onlyHandler

RewardDivider Contract

Name	Parameter	Attributes
_RewardDivider_init	address_cfg	internal
setHandler	address_handler bool_enable	onlyOwner
addRecipient	address_account uint256_percent	onlyOwner
delRecipient	address_account	onlyOwner

InsuranceFund Contract

Name	Parameter	Attributes
initialize	address_cfg address_insuranceFund	external
setInsuranceFund	address_insuranceFund	onlyOwner
compensate	address_vault uint256_amount	external

TimeVerify Contract

Name	Parameter	Attributes
getTime	none	public
setTime	none	external
setTimeWithDelay	uint256 _delay	external

SigVerify Contract

Name	Parameter	Attributes
verify	PriceData _info bytes _signature	public
verify1	address _address bytes32 _hash bytes _signature	public
verify2	address _address bytes32 _hash bytes _signature	public
verify3	address _address bytes32 _hash bytes _signature	public
verify4	PriceData _info bytes _signature	public
verifyTest3	address _address bytes32 _hash bytes _signature	external
verifyTest4	PriceData _info bytes _signature	external

FaucetToken Contract

Name	Parameter	Attributes
mint	address account uint256 amount	public
enableFaucet	none	public
disableFaucet	none	public
setDropletAmount	uint256 dropletAmount	public
claimDroplet	none	public
name	none	public
symbol	none	public
decimals	none	public
totalSupply	none	public
balanceOf	address account	public
transfer	address recipient uint256 amount	public
allowance	address owner address spender	public
approve	address spender uint256 amount	public
transferFrom	address sender address recipient uint256 amount	public
increaseAllowance	address spender uint256 addedValue	public
decreaseAllowance	address spender uint256 subtractedValue	public
_transfer	address sender address recipient uint256 amount	internal
_mint	address account uint256 amount	internal
_burn	address account	internal

	uint256 amount	
_approve	address owner address spender uint256 amount	internal
_beforeTokenTransfer	address from address to uint256 amount	internal
_msgSender	none	internal

WETH Contract

Name	Parameter	Attributes
supportsInterface	bytes4 interfaceID	external
DOMAIN_SEPARATOR	none	public
_computeDomainSeparator	none	private
deposit	none	public
withdraw	uint value	external
totalSupply	none	external
approve	address spender uint value	external
transfer	address to uint value	external
transferFrom	address from address to uint value	external
permit	address owner address spender uint value uint deadline uint8 v bytes32 r bytes32 s	external
permit2	address owner	external

	address spender uint value uint deadline bytes signature	
_checkSignature	address signer bytes32 hash bytes signature	private
_recover	bytes32 hash bytes signature	private

4. Audit details

4.1 Findings Summary

Severity	Found	Resolved	Acknowledged
● High	0	0	0
● Medium	2	1	1
● Low	1	0	1
● Info	3	0	3

4.2 Risk distribution

Name	Risk level	Repair status
Signature Replay	Medium	Resolved
Price Control	Medium	Acknowledged
Administrator Permissions	Low	Acknowledged
Redundant codes	Info	Acknowledged
External Expansion Security	Info	Acknowledged
Logic Design Flaw	Info	Acknowledged
Variables are updated	No	normal
Floating Point and Numeric Precision	No	normal
Default visibility	No	normal
tx.origin authentication	No	normal
Faulty constructor	No	normal
Unverified return value	No	normal
Insecure random numbers	No	normal
Timestamp Dependent	No	normal
Transaction order dependency	No	normal
Delegatecall	No	normal
Denial of Service	No	normal
Fake recharge vulnerability	No	normal
Short address attack Vulnerability	No	normal
Uninitialized storage pointer	No	normal
Frozen account bypass	No	normal

Uninitialized	No	normal
Reentry attack	No	normal
Integer Overflow	No	normal

4.3 Risk audit details

4.3.1 Signature Replay

- Risk description

Signature replay risk is the risk that under certain circumstances, an attacker can use a valid signature that has been obtained to repeat the execution of a signed transaction or message to perform an unauthorized operation. Without proper protection mechanisms in a contract, an attacker can exploit this vulnerability to perform repeated operations, which may lead to undesirable consequences.

According to the implementation of the contract, the contract relies heavily on the time tolerance mechanism to protect against signature replay attacks, but there is no one-time use restriction on the signature data, and it is still possible for an attacker to replay the signature data before it expires within a short period of time; no obvious points of exploitation have been identified, but the risk is recommended to be fixed.

```
function verifyPrice(
    uint256 _assetId,
    PriceData calldata _priceData,
    bytes calldata _signature
)
    public override view returns (string memory)
{
    uint256 _time = ChainUtils.getTime();
    if (!ChainUtils.isValidSignature(
        _priceData.provider,
        keccak256(abi.encodePacked(_priceData.provider, _priceData.asset,
        _priceData.price, _priceData.timestamp)),
        _signature
    )) return "TradingExtension: bad sig";
    if (!isNode[_priceData.provider]) return "TradingExtension: !node";
    if (_assetId != _priceData.asset) return "TradingExtension: bad
asset";
    // _priceData.timestamp < _time - validSignatureTime
    if (_priceData.timestamp + validSignatureTime < _time) return
"TradingExtension: expired sig";
```

```
// _priceData.timestamp > _time + futureTimeDelta
if (futureTimeDelta > 0) {
    if (_priceData.timestamp > _time + futureTimeDelta) return
"TradingExtension: bad timestamp";
}
if (_priceData.price == 0) return "TradingExtension: bad price";
return "";
}
```

- **Safety advice**

It is recommended that the following mechanism be added to the signature verification mechanism here:

Use nonce: Introduce an incremental nonce value in each transaction or operation to ensure that each transaction or operation can only be executed once. Maintain a nonce counter in the contract and verify that the nonce is correct in each transaction or operation, and add 1 to the in-contract nonce upon successful verification to prevent malicious replay of privileged signatures.

- **Repair Status**

ROLLUP.FINANCE has Resolved.

4.3.2 Price Control

- **Risk description**

All locations in the program that involve prices use price data signed with administrator privileges and the source of the data is unknown, so there may be a risk of price manipulation.

```
function increasePosition(
    TradeInfo calldata _tradeInfo,
    PriceData calldata _priceData,
    bytes calldata _signature,
    bytes32 _referralCode
)
    external override
{
    address _account = _msgSender();
    _validateAssetInfo(_tradeInfo);
    // check price
    string memory _error = _verifyPrice(_tradeInfo.assetId, _priceData,
    _signature);
    if (bytes(_error).length > 0) {
        emit PriceVerify(_error);
        revert(_error);
    }
    // set referral code
    if (_referralCode != bytes32(0)) {
        if (_referral() != address(0)) {
            IReferralStorage(_referral()).setTraderReferralCode(_account,
    _referralCode);
        }
    }
    // margin to this
    IERC20(_tradeInfo.marginAsset).safeTransferFrom(
        _account,
        address(this),
        _tradeInfo.marginDelta
    );
    if (!_isApproved[_tradeInfo.marginAsset]) {
        IERC20(_tradeInfo.marginAsset).approve(_tradeInfo.vault,
    type(uint256).max);
        _isApproved[_tradeInfo.marginAsset] = true;
    }
    // then to vault
    uint256 _marginDelta = IStableVault(_tradeInfo.vault).transferIn(
```



```
        _account,
        _tradeInfo.marginAsset,
        _tradeInfo.marginDelta,
        false
    );
    _trading().increasePosition(
        PosInfo(
            _account,
            _tradeInfo.assetId,
            _priceData.price, // still use priceData price
            _marginDelta,
            _tradeInfo.sizeDelta,
            _tradeInfo.isLong,
            _tradeInfo.vault,
            bytes32(0)
        )
    );
}
function decreasePosition(
    TradeInfo calldata _tradeInfo,
    PriceData calldata _priceData,
    bytes calldata _signature,
    address _outputToken
)
    external override
{
    _validateAssetInfo(_tradeInfo);
    // check price
    string memory _error = _verifyPrice(_tradeInfo.assetId, _priceData,
    _signature);
    if (bytes(_error).length > 0) {
        emit PriceVerify(_error);
        revert(_error);
    }
    _trading().decreasePosition(
        PosInfo(
            _msgSender(),
            _tradeInfo.assetId,
            _priceData.price,
            _tradeInfo.marginDelta,
            _tradeInfo.sizeDelta,
            _tradeInfo.isLong,
```

```
        _tradeInfo.vault,  
        bytes32(0)  
    ),  
    _outputToken,  
    address(0) // non executor  
);  
}
```

- **Safety advice**

The source of prices is as transparent as possible and price data is available through trusted sources on the chain wherever possible.

- **Repair Status**

ROLLUP.FINANCE has Acknowledged.

4.3.3 Administrator Permissions

- **Risk description**

Contract administrator privileges are people who can change the status of a contract or perform certain sensitive operations. If administrator privileges are abused or hacked, the contract may be subject to several risks. First, a hacker may be able to obtain the administrator's private key, thus hijacking the administrator's account and thus having full control of the contract. The hacker can change the status of the contract or perform illegal operations at will, causing a serious loss of contract assets. Second, the administrator may intentionally or unintentionally disclose his or her private key, causing others to gain access. Hackers may obtain the administrator's private key through social engineering or trickery, and obtain a large amount of sensitive contract information, which can then be used to carry out attacks. Third, administrators may use their privileges to perform improper operations. For example, an administrator may change the status of a contract for financial gain, or change the execution rules of a contract to gain additional control, and so on. These actions may also lead to loss of contract assets or illegitimate domination.

The administrator address in the project has parameters that can arbitrarily restrict whether the main business can operate normally, such as: whether to enable the private clearing mode, etc., as well as the whitelist of the clearer, which may cause an impact on the main business when the administrator address is an EOA address and the administrator address is leaked by hackers' phishing or other means.

```
function setInPrivateLiquidationMode(bool _inPrivateLiquidationMode)
external onlyOwner {
    inPrivateLiquidationMode = _inPrivateLiquidationMode;
}
function setLiquidator(address _liquidator, bool _isActive) external
onlyOwner {
    isLiquidator[_liquidator] = _isActive;
}
function liquidatePosition(
    PosInfo calldata _posInfo,
    address _feeReceiver
) external override nonReentrant {
```

```
    if (inPrivateLiquidationMode) {
        if (!isLiquidator[_msgSender()]) revert("Trading: not
liquidator");
    }
    bytes32 key = _getPosKey(_posInfo);
    Position memory position = positions[key];
    if (position.size == 0) revert("Trading: position not found");
    if (position.size != _posInfo.sizeDelta) revert("Trading: liquidate
size not full");
    bool isLiquidatable = validateLiquidation(_posInfo, false);
    if (isLiquidatable == false) revert("Trading: position not
liquidatable");
    // decrease position now
    DePosOut memory _outInfo = _decreasePosition(_posInfo, address(0),
_feeReceiver, true);
    uint256 markPrice = _getPrice(_posInfo, false);
    _emitLiquidatePosition(key, _posInfo, markPrice, position, _outInfo);
    delete positions[key];
}
```

- **Safety advice**

Avoid using the EOA address as the administrator privilege owner when the contract goes live, and use multi-signature contracts or multi-signature wallets to manage the relevant special privilege operations.

- **Repair Status**

ROLLUP.FINANCE has Acknowledged.

4.3.4 Redundant codes

- **Risk description**

Code unrelated to the business may result in unnecessary processing fees.

The existence of a secondary wrapper function for global configuration acquisition that is not used in the contract may result in unnecessary contract deployment fees.

```
function _referral() internal view returns (address) {  
    return cfg.getAddr(AddressType.Referral);  
}
```

- **Safety advice**

If more code redundancy does exist, it is recommended that it be removed

- **Repair Status**

ROLLUP.FINANCE has Acknowledged.

4.3.5 External Expansion Security

- **Risk description**

There is an external expansion interface in the contract, which allows pluginIncreasePosition and pluginDecreasePosition functions to make external contract calls, so the plugins added in the future need to strictly carry out security checks to avoid mutual calls at the contract level, which may lead to exploitation points.

```
function addPlugin(address _plugin) external onlyOwner {  
    plugins[_plugin] = true;  
}  
function removePlugin(address _plugin) external onlyOwner {  
    plugins[_plugin] = false;  
}  
function approvePlugin(address _plugin) external {  
    approvedPlugins[msg.sender][_plugin] = true;  
}  
function denyPlugin(address _plugin) external {  
    approvedPlugins[msg.sender][_plugin] = false;  
}
```

```
}
/**
 * @dev plugin increase position
 * redirectly to trading with checking plugin approved
 */
function pluginIncreasePosition(
    PosInfo calldata _posInfo
) external override {
    _validatePlugin(_posInfo.account);
    _trading().increasePosition(_posInfo);
}
/**
 * @dev plugin decrease position
 * redirectly to trading with checking plugin approved
 */
function pluginDecreasePosition(
    PosInfo calldata _posInfo,
    address _outputToken,
    address _executor
) external override returns (uint256) {
    _validatePlugin(_posInfo.account);
    return _trading().decreasePosition(
        _posInfo,
        _outputToken,
        _executor
    );
}
```

- **Safety advice**

This issue requires additional security checks on the plugin along with the project as a whole to avoid suspicious or backdoor plugins being added to the whitelist, and administrator privileges here should also be managed using multi-signature wallets or multi-signature contracts, avoiding the use of EOA addresses for management.

- **Repair Status**

ROLLUP.FINANCE has Acknowledged.

4.3.6 Logic Design Flaw

- **Risk Description**

In smart contracts, developers design special features for their contracts intended to stabilize the market value of tokens or the life of the project and increase the highlight of the project, however, the more complex the system, the more likely it is to have the possibility of errors. It is in these logic and functions that a minor mistake can lead to serious depasstions from the whole logic and expectations, leaving fatal hidden dangers, such as errors in logic judgment, functional implementation and design and so on.

The data is not verified when creating the cashout request, so that once you have the correct price signature, you can forge a cashout request from any user. Moreover, there is a problem that in the requestWithdraw and claimWithdraw functions, since requestWithdraw can be created by any user for any other user, it is possible to execute a malicious withdrawal request created by another user, and thus the executor spends Lp funds but does not withdraw them to the address of the user who maliciously initiated the request. The executor spends Lp funds but does not withdraw them to the address of the user who maliciously initiated the request.

```
function requestWithdraw(
    PriceData calldata _priceData,
    bytes calldata _signature,
    uint256 _lpAmount,
    address _outputToken,
    address _receiver
) external override returns (uint256) {
    _checkLiquidityRouter();
    // verify price data, RUSD asset id is 0
    _checkAndSetPrice(_priceData, _signature);
    // check output token is allowed token
    if (!allowed[_outputToken]) revert("StableVault: token not listed");
    uint256 _reqId = allWithdraws.length;
    allWithdraws.push(
        Withdraw({
            outputToken: _outputToken,
            lpAmount: _lpAmount,
            amount: 0,
            priceAtReq: _priceData.price,
            releasedAt: ChainUtils.getTime() + _getDelay(),
```

```
        priceAtClaim: 0
    })
    );
    userWithdraws[_receiver].push(_reqId);
    emit WithdrawRequest(_receiver, _reqId, _outputToken, _lpAmount,
allWithdraws[_reqId].releasedAt);
    return _reqId;
}
function claimWithdraw(
    PriceData calldata _priceData,
    bytes calldata _signature,
    address _owner,
    uint256 _reqId
) external override returns (uint256, uint256) {
    _checkLiquidityRouter();
    // verify price data, RUSD asset id is 0
    _checkAndSetPrice(_priceData, _signature);
    Withdraw storage withdraw = allWithdraws[_reqId];
    if (withdraw.lpAmount == 0) revert("StableVault: no withdraw");
    if (withdraw.releasedAt > ChainUtils.getTime()) revert("StableVault:
withdraw not released");
    // check if this reqId's owner is account, and pop it from
userWithdraws
    _popUserWithdraw(_owner, _reqId);
    // burn lp token from sender, burn when claim withdraw
    _burn(_msgSender(), withdraw.lpAmount);
    uint256 _amount = fromShare(withdraw.lpAmount);
    uint256 _fee = _amount * stakeFeeBasisPoints[1] / PRECISION;
    uint256 _output = stableAmountToTokenAmount(withdraw.outputToken,
_amount - _fee);
    if (_output > 0) {
        _withdraw(withdraw.outputToken, _owner, _output);
        withdraw.amount = _output;
        withdraw.priceAtClaim = _priceData.price;
    }
    emit RemoveLiquidity(_owner, _reqId, withdraw.outputToken, _output,
withdraw.lpAmount, totalSupply(), lpPrice);
    return (_output, _fee);
}
```

- **Safety advice**

Since this function is called in the RewardRouter contract, it is impossible to check whether the calling address is the same as the withdrawing address, so it is recommended to adjust the permission of requestWithdraw function and add whitelisting calling restrictions to prevent malicious users from creating malicious LP withdrawing requests. This needs to be adjusted in conjunction with the needs of the project.

- **Repair Status**

ROLLUP.FINANCE has Acknowledged.

4.3.7 Variables are updated

- **Risk description**

When there is a contract logic to obtain rewards or transfer funds, the coder mistakenly updates the value of the variable that sends the funds, so that the user can use the value of the variable that is not updated to obtain funds, thus affecting the normal operation of the project.

- **Audit Results : Passed**

4.3.8 Floating Point and Numeric Precision

- **Risk Description**

In Solidity, the floating-point type is not supported, and the fixed-length floating-point type is not fully supported. The result of the division operation will be rounded off, and if there is a decimal number, the part after the decimal point will be discarded and only the integer part will be taken, for example, dividing 5 pass 2 directly will result in 2. If the result of the operation is less than 1 in the token operation, for example, 4.9 tokens will be approximately equal to 4, bringing a certain degree of The tokens are not only the tokens of the same size, but also the tokens of the same size. Due to the economic properties of tokens, the loss of precision is equivalent to the loss of assets, so this is a cumulative problem in tokens that are frequently traded.

- **Audit Results : Passed**

4.3.9 Default Visibility

- **Risk description**

In Solidity, the visibility of contract functions is public pass default. therefore, functions that do not specify any visibility can be called externally pass the user. This can lead to serious vulnerabilities when developers incorrectly ignore visibility specifiers for functions that should be private, or visibility specifiers that can only be called from within the contract itself. One of the first hacks on Parity's multi-signature wallet was the failure to set the visibility of a function, which defaults to public, leading to the theft of a large amount of money.

- **Audit Results : Passed**

4.3.10 tx.origin authentication

- **Risk Description**

tx.origin is a global variable in Solidity that traverses the entire call stack and returns the address of the account that originally sent the call (or transaction). Using this variable for authentication in a smart contract can make the contract vulnerable to phishing-like attacks.

- **Audit Results : Passed**

4.3.11 Faulty constructor

- **Risk description**

Prior to version 0.4.22 in solidity smart contracts, all contracts and constructors had the same name. When writing a contract, if the constructor name and the contract name are not the same, the contract will add a default constructor and the constructor you set up will be treated as a normal function, resulting in your original contract settings not being executed as expected, which can lead to terrible consequences, especially if the constructor is performing a privileged operation.

- **Audit Results : Passed**

4.3.12 Unverified return value

- **Risk description**

Three methods exist in Solidity for sending tokens to an address: `transfer()`, `send()`, `call.value()`. The difference between them is that the `transfer` function throws an exception throw when sending fails, rolls back the transaction state, and costs 2300gas; the `send` function returns false when sending fails and costs 2300gas; the `call.value` method returns false when sending fails and costs all gas to call, which will lead to the risk of reentrant attacks. If the `send` or `call.value` method is used in the contract code to send tokens without checking the return value of the method, if an error occurs, the contract will continue to execute the code later, which will lead to the thought result.

- **Audit Results : Passed**

4.3.13 Insecure random numbers

- **Risk Description**

All transactions on the blockchain are deterministic state transition operations with no uncertainty, which ultimately means that there is no source of entropy or randomness within the blockchain ecosystem. Therefore, there is no random number function like `rand()` in Solidity. Many developers use future block variables such as block hashes, timestamps, block highs and lows or Gas caps to generate random numbers. These quantities are controlled pass the miners who mine them and are therefore not truly random, so using past or present block variables to generate random numbers could lead to a destructive vulnerability.

- **Audit Results : Passed**

4.3.14 Timestamp Dependency

- **Risk description**

In blockchains, data block timestamps (block.timestamp) are used in a variety of applications, such as functions for random numbers, locking funds for a period of time, and conditional statements for various time-related state changes. Miners have the ability to adjust the timestamp as needed, for example block.timestamp or the alias now can be manipulated pass the miner. This can lead to serious vulnerabilities if the wrong block timestamp is used in a smart contract. This may not be necessary if the contract is not particularly concerned with miner manipulation of block timestamps, but care should be taken when developing the contract.

- **Audit Results : Passed**

4.3.15 Transaction order dependency

- **Risk description**

In a blockchain, the miner chooses which transactions from that pool will be included in the block, which is usually determined pass the gasPrice transaction, and the miner will choose the transaction with the highest transaction fee to pack into the block. Since the information about the transactions in the block is publicly available, an attacker can watch the transaction pool for transactions that may contain problematic solutions, modify or revoke the attacker's privileges or change the state of the contract to the attacker's detriment. The attacker can then take data from this transaction and create a higher-level transaction gasPrice and include its transactions in a block before the original, which will preempt the original transaction solution.

- **Audit Results : Passed**

4.3.16 Delegatecall

- **Risk Description**

In Solidity, the `delegatecall` function is the standard message call method, but the code in the target address runs in the context of the calling contract, i.e., keeping `msg.sender` and `msg.value` unchanged. This feature supports implementation libraries, where developers can create reusable code for future contracts. The code in the library itself can be secure and bug-free, but when run in another application's environment, new vulnerabilities may arise, so using the `delegatecall` function may lead to unexpected code execution.

- **Audit Results : Passed**

4.3.17 Denial of Service

- **Risk Description**

Denial of service attacks have a broad category of causes and are designed to keep the user from making the contract work properly for a period of time or permanently in certain situations, including malicious behavior while acting as the recipient of a transaction, artificially increasing the gas required to compute a function causing gas exhaustion (such as controlling the size of variables in a `for` loop), misuse of access control to access the private component of the contract, in which the Owners with privileges are modified, progress state based on external calls, use of obfuscation and oversight, etc. can lead to denial of service attacks.

- **Audit Results : Passed**

4.3.18 Fake recharge vulnerability

- **Risk Description**

The success or failure (true or false) status of a token transaction depends on whether an exception is thrown during the execution of the transaction (e.g., using mechanisms such as require/assert/revert/throw). When a user calls the transfer function of a token contract to transfer funds, if the transfer function runs normally without throwing an exception, the transaction will be successful or not, and the status of the transaction will be true. When `balances[msg.sender] < _value` goes to the else logic and returns false, no exception is thrown, but the transaction acknowledgement is successful, then we believe that a mild if/else judgment is an undisciplined way of coding in sensitive function scenarios like transfer, which will lead to Fake top-up vulnerability in centralized exchanges, centralized wallets, and token contracts.

- **Audit Results : Passed**

4.3.19 Short Address Attack Vulnerability

- **Risk Description**

In Solidity smart contracts, when passing parameters to a smart contract, the parameters are encoded according to the ABI specification. the EVM runs the attacker to send encoded parameters that are shorter than the expected parameter length. For example, when transferring money on an exchange or wallet, you need to send the transfer address address and the transfer amount value. The attacker could send a 19-passte address instead of the standard 20-passte address, in which case the EVM would fill in the 0 at the end of the encoded parameter to make up the expected length, which would result in an overflow of the final transfer amount parameter value, thus changing the original transfer amount.

- **Audit Results : Passed**

4.3.20 Uninitialized storage pointer

- **Risk description**

EVM uses both storage and memory to store variables. Local variables within functions are stored in storage or memory pass default, depending on their type. uninitialized local storage variables could point to other unexpected storage variables in the contract, leading to intentional or unintentional vulnerabilities.

- **Audit Results : Passed**

4.3.21 Frozen Account bypass

- **Risk Description**

In the transfer operation code in the contract, detect the risk that the logical functionality to check the freeze status of the transfer account exists in the contract code and can be passpassed if the transfer account has been frozen.

- **Audit Results : Passed**

4.3.22 Uninitialized

- **Risk description**

The initialize function in the contract can be called pass another attacker before the owner, thus initializing the administrator address.

- **Audit Results : Passed**

4.3.23 Reentry Attack

- **Risk Description**

An attacker constructs a contract containing malicious code at an external address in the Fallback function. When the contract sends tokens to this address, it will call the malicious code. The `call.value()` function in Solidity will consume all the gas he receives when it is used to send tokens, so a re-entry attack will occur when the call to the `call.value()` function to send tokens occurs before the actual reduction of the sender's account balance. The re-entry vulnerability led to the famous The DAO attack.

- **Audit Results : Passed**

4.3.24 Integer Overflow

- **Risk Description**

Integer overflows are generally classified as overflows and underflows. The types of integer overflows that occur in smart contracts include three types: multiplicative overflows, additive overflows, and subtractive overflows. In Solidity language, variables support integer types in steps of 8, from `uint8` to `uint256`, and `int8` to `int256`, integers specify fixed size data types and are unsigned, for example, a `uint8` type, can only be stored in the range 0 to 2^8-1 , that is, `[0,255]` numbers, a `uint256` type can only store numbers in the range 0 to $2^{256}-1$. This means that an integer variable can only have a certain range of numbers represented, and cannot exceed this formulated range. Exceeding the range of values expressed pass the variable type will result in an integer overflow vulnerability.

- **Audit Results : Passed**

1. Security Audit Tool

Tool name	Tool Features
Oyente	Can be used to detect common bugs in smart contracts
securify	Common types of smart contracts that can be verified
MAIAN	Multiple smart contract vulnerabilities can be found and classified
Lunaray Toolkit	self-developed toolkit

Disclaimer:

Lunaray Technology only issues a report and assumes corresponding responsibilities for the facts that occurred or existed before the issuance of this report, Since the facts that occurred after the issuance of the report cannot determine the security status of the smart contract, it is not responsible for this.

Lunaray Technology conducts security audits on the security audit items in the project agreement, and is not responsible for the project background and other circumstances, The subsequent on-chain deployment and operation methods of the project party are beyond the scope of this audit.

This report only conducts a security audit based on the information provided by the information provider to Lunaray at the time the report is issued, If the information of this project is concealed or the situation reflected is inconsistent with the actual situation, Lunaray Technology shall not be liable for any losses and adverse effects caused thereby.

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