

CHAIN SECURITY AUDIT REPORT

For Qitmeer

25 November 2021



lunaray.co



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1. Overview

The Lunaray security team conducted a security audit on the Qitmeer public chain project in November 2021. This audit mainly included static code security and analysis of the static code content and the security of reference libraries, dependent libraries, and RPC. In this audit, there were no serious security issues in the code itself, and there were some specification issues in code specifications. Static code and memory allocation each had a security risk.

The Qitmeer public chain audit result: Passed

Audit Report MD5: 06A3BB6EE46D40C9ABD24B0C15262BCA



2. Background

2.1 Project Description

| Project name | Qitmeer |
|---------------------|---|
| Project address | https://qitmeer.io/ |
| Code warehouse | https://github.com/Qitmeer/qitmeer |
| Audit version | commit f1fa7ede24ea722d88f29bf612eda347f9ea1108 |
| Code language | Golang |
| Project Description | Qitmeer is the next generation public chain based on BlockDAG which is dedicated to serving the ecosystem of Islamic Finance, ethical finance, and socially responsible investment, thereby enhancing financial inclusion and creating social impact. |



2.2 Audit scope

The list of Qitmeer public chain audit projects is as follows:

| Туре | Name |
|---------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Environment setup | Main chain construction and debugging |
| Code audit | Golang static code audit |
| RPC | RPC interface test |
| P2P | P2P protocol test |
| Safety of tradement | Fake recharge attack |
| Private key | Private key security |
| P2P | Sybil Attack |
| P2P | Denial of service test |
| P2P | Large handshake package test |
| P2P | Slow attack |
| P2P | Eclipse attack |
| P2P | Multi-connection test |
| P2P | Fuzz test |



| RPC | Cross-domain resource sharing (CORS) testing |
|--------------------|--|
| RPC | Interface certification test |
| RPC | Secure transmission test |
| RPC | Super deep JSON attack |
| RPC | Oversized JSON Key attack |
| RPC | Oversized JSON Value attack |
| RPC | Fuzz test |
| Consensus security | Block verification |
| Consensus security | Transaction verification |
| Consensus security | Transaction replay attack |
| Merkle Tree | Replay attack |
| Merkle Tree | Transaction malleability attack |



2.3 Findings Summary

| Severity | Found | Resolved | Acknowledged |
|--------------------------|-------|----------|--------------|
| • High | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| Info | 0 | 0 | 0 |



3. Project Contract Details

3.1 Directory Structure

| common |
|-----------|
| ├──encode |
| |
| |
| |
| └─rlp |
| ├──hash |
| |
| L—dcr |
| ├─marshal |
| ├──math |
| ├─network |
| ├──prque |
| └─util |
| config |
| consensus |
| container |
| └──docker |
| └──alpine |
| —core |
| |



| | blockchain |
|----------|-----------------------|
| | blockdag |
| | └─anticone |
| | —dbnamespace |
| | json |
| | merkle |
| | message |
| | protocol |
| | serialization |
| | └─_types |
| | └─_pow |
| \vdash | —crypto |
| | bip32 |
| | -bip39 |
| | └─wordlists |
| | certgen |
| | cuckoo |
| | L siphash |
| | ecc |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | L testdata |
| | |



| └──seed |
|-------------------------|
| ├—database |
| benchmark |
| ffldb |
| L treap |
| |
| engine |
| └──txscript |
| ledger |
| ├—log |
| └─term |
| metrics |
| ├—node |
| └─notify |
| ├──p2p |
| │ |
| connmgr |
| peer |
| invcache |
| L—nounce |
| L peerserver |
| ├—params |



| ├—qx |
|--------------------|
| ├—rpc |
| script |
| services |
| —acct |
| │ |
| bloom |
| |
| ├──common |
| |
| index |
| ├─mempool |
| ├─miner |
| mining |
| │ |
| |
| tools |
| findcheckpoint |
| ├─ngen |
| │ |
| ├──nx-hd |
| |
| |
| L—bash_completion |



| | └—rlpdump |
|----------|-----------|
| <u> </u> | -trie |
| <u> </u> | -version |
| <u></u> | –wallet |



3.2 Ledger structure

```
// Transaction
type Transaction struct
   Version uint32
          []*TxInput
   TxIn
   TxOut []*TxOutput
   LockTime uint32
   Expire uint32
   Message
              []byte
   CachedHash *hash.Hash
}
// Contract transaction
type ContractTransaction struct
   From Account
   To Account
   Value uint64
   GasPrice uint64
   GasLimit uint64
   Nonce uint64
   Input []byte
   Signature []byte
}
//Block node
type blockNode struct
   parents
    []*blockNode children
   []*blockNode hash
   hash.Hash workSum
    *big.Int
   blockVersion uint32
   bits
           uint32
   timestamp
               int64
   txRoot hash.Hash
   stateRoot hash.Hash
   extraData
              [32]byte
   status blockStatus
   order uint64
   height uint
   layer uint
```



```
pow pow.IPow
    dirty bool
}

//Block header
type BlockHeader struct
{
    Version uint32
    ParentRoot hash.Hash
    TxRoot hash.Hash
    StateRoot hash.Hash
    Difficulty uint32
    Timestamp time.Time
    Pow pow.IPow
}
```



3.3 RPC interface list

getBlockCount getBlockHash getBlock getBlockHashByRange getBlockByOrder getBestBlockHash getBlockHeader **isOnMainChain** get Main Chain HeightgetBlockWeightcreateRawTransaction getRawTransaction decodeRawTransaction sendRawTransaction txSign getUtxo getNodeInfo getPeerInfo getMempool generate getBlockTemplate

submitBlock



3.4 P2P protocol list

| version |
|--------------|
| verack |
| getaddr |
| addr |
| reject |
| ping |
| pong |
| inv |
| block |
| getblocks |
| headers |
| miningstate |
| mempool |
| graphstate |
| sendheaders |
| feefilter |
| getcfilter |
| getcfheaders |
| getcftypes |
| cfilter |
| cfheaders |
| cftypes |



3.5 External reference library

```
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1
github.com/dchest/blake256 v1.0.0
github.com/deckarep/golang-set v1.7.1 github.com/go-stack/stack v1.8.0
github.com/golang-collections/collections v0.0.0-20130729185459-
604e922904d3
github.com/jessevdk/go-flags v1.4.0
github.com/jrick/logrotate v1.0.0
github.com/mattn/go-colorable v0.1.1 github.com/pkg/errors v0.8.1
github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics v0.0.0-20181016184325-3113b8401b8a
github.com/satori/go.uuid v1.2.0
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.3.0 github.com/syndtr/goleveldb v1.0.0
golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20190621222207-cc06ce4a13d4
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20190503192946-f4e77d36d62c
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20190412213103-97732733099d
golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20190511041617-99f201b6807e
gonum.org/v1/gonum v0.0.0-20190608115022-c5f01565d866
```



4. Audit Details

4.1 Risk Distribution

| Name | Risk level | Status |
|---------------------------------|------------|----------|
| Memory allocation | Low | Resolved |
| Interface certification test | No | Passed |
| Secure transmission test | No | Passed |
| Super deep JSON attack | No | Passed |
| Oversized JSON Key attack | No | Passed |
| Oversized JSON Value attack | No | Passed |
| RPC cross-domain (CORS) testing | No | Passed |
| Zero division risk | Low | Resolved |



4.2 Risk Audit Details

4.2.1 P2P

4.2.1.1 Memory allocation

· Risk description

During the audit, it was found that most of the memory allocation size is constant or uncontrollable, but there are some methods that use make for memory allocation without restricting the size. It is recommended to limit the size during memory allocation to avoid unpredictable risks.

```
func CheckEncode(input []byte, version []byte, cksum_size int, cksumfuncfunc([]byte) []byte) string {
    b:= make([]byte, 0, len(version)+len(input)+cksum_size)b = append(b,
    version[:]...)

b = append(b, input[:]...)

var cksum []byte = cksumfunc(b)b =
    append(b, cksum[:]...) return Encode(b)
```

Safety advice

It is recommended to limit the size during memory allocation to avoid unpredictable risks.

Repair status

Qitmeer official has confirmed to fix the risk.



4.2.2 RPC interface related

4.2.2.1 Interface certification test

Risk description

When starting the service, if the RPC default password is not used, a warning will be issued.

```
Find Qitmeer node executable :
qitmeer version 0.8.4+release-44ff547 (Go version gol.13.4)
rpcuser=qitmeer
WARNING using default RPC user
rpcpass=qitmeer123
WARNING using default RPC password
Do you wan to start the Qitmeer node [Y,N]?
```

Login authentication is required when calling the RPC interface.





4.2.2.2 Secure transmission test

Risk description

HTTPS protocol transmission is adopted in the default configuration to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks.





4.2.2.3 Super deep JSON attack

Risk description

Ultra-large deep JSON attack, constructing malformed data packets will not cause

```
{"jsonrpc":"2.0", "id":"1", "method": "getBlockCount", "params": '+'
{"noeage":'*0xfffffff+'""}'+'}'*0xfffffff+'}
```

the interface to feign death.





4.2.2.4 Oversized JSON Key attack

Risk description

Oversized JSON Key attack, constructing oversized JSON Key data packets will not cause the interface to feign death $_{\circ}$





4.2.2.5 Oversized JSON Value attack

Risk description

Oversized JSON Value attacks, constructing oversized JSON Value data packets will not cause the interface to feign death.





4.2.2.6 RPC cross-domain (CORS) testing

Risk description

When qitmeer calls the RPC service, login authentication is required by default, and HTTPS is used by default.

```
var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest(); xhr.open("POST",
   "http://127.0.0.1",true);

xhr.setRequestHeader("Content-Type", "application/json"); xhr.setRequestHeader('Authorization', 'Basic cWl0bWVlcjpxaXRtZWVyMTlz');xhr.onreadystatechange = function() {
    if (xhr.readyState == XMLHttpRequest.DONE && xhr.status == 200) {console.log("Modules: " + xhr.responseText);
}
```

qitmeer related RPC interface, with a certain method of processing illegal data, and verify the identity when calling.



4.2.3 Static audit

4.2.3.1 Zero division risk

Risk description

In Go, dividing by zero results in a panic. During the audit, it was found that most of the denominators are const and constant, but some methods have variables as the denominator. Whether there is a division by zero depends on the caller:

There is no use method that can cause the node to crash, but it is not safe to rely on the caller to ensure that it is not zero.

Safety advice

It is recommended that all non-constant dividends should be checked before division.

Repair status

Qitmeer official has confirmed to fix the risk.



5. Security Audit Tool

| Tool name | Tool Features |
|---------------------------|--|
| Lunaray Internal Security | Lunaray (Eagle Eye System) self-developed security audit |
| Toolkit | toolkit |
| Lunaray code automation | Support code security audit for C/C++, go, java, python, |
| security audit tool | solidity languages |



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