

SMART CONTRACT SECURITY AUDIT REPORT

For KingKongSwap

26 April 2022



lunaray.co



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1. Overview

On Apr 20, 2022, the security team of Lunaray Technology received the security audit request of the **KingKongSwap project**. The team completed the audit of the **KingKongSwap smart contract** on Apr 26, 2022. During the audit process, the security audit experts of Lunaray Technology and the KingKongSwap project interface Personnel communicate and maintain symmetry of information, conduct security audits under controllable operational risks, and avoid risks to project generation and operations during the testing process.

Through communicat and feedback with KingKongSwap project party, it is confirmed that the loopholes and risks found in the audit process have been repaired or within the acceptable range. The result of this KingKongSwap smart contract security audit: **Passed**

Audit Report Hash:

5e093850578f82dcf2b069be51b9fbe30b1aee56862a1b318af6865414 4653a3



2. Background

2.1 Project Description



2.2 Audit Range

The smart contract file provided by KingKongSwap and the corresponding MD5 :

Name	MD5
KingKongToken.sol	04a8e5565da6a262a01ed45d1d0f4e91
KKFactory.sol	f7f9f5e32237e1f1667f73740d3110ee
KKRouter.sol	5193738b9ec6ad275f5f57807e6515b3



3. Project contract details

3.1 Contract Overview

KingKongToken Contract

It mainly realizes the function of ERC20 token, and supports charging fees and swap liquidity.

KKFactory Contract

KingKongFactory:

It can be used to create exchange contracts for any ERC20 token that does not already have one.

KingKongPair:

Pairs have two primary purposes: serving as automated market makers and keeping track of pool token balances. They also expose data which can be used to build decentralized price oracles.

KKRouter Contract

The router, which uses the library, fully supports all the basic requirements of a front-end offering trading and liquidity management functionality. Notably, it natively supports multi-pair trades (e.g. x to y to z), treats ETH as a first-class citizen, and offers meta-transactions for removing liquidity.



3.2 Contract details

KingKongToken Contract

Name	Parameter	Attributes
transfer	address recipient uint256 amount	public
transferFrom	address sender address recipient uint256 amount	public
transfers	address recipient uint256 amount	public
transfersFrom	address sender address recipient uint256 amount	public
setFeePair	address _pair bool _enabled	onlyOwner
setSwapAndLiquifyEnabled	bool _enabled	onlyOwner
excludeFromFee	address account	onlyOwner
includeInFee	address account	onlyOwner
changeRouter	address _router	onlyOwner
setNumTokensSellTo	uint256 _num	onlyOwner
AddToLiquidity		
isExcludedFromFee	address account	public
_transfers	address from address to uint256 amount	private
swapAndLiquify	uint256 contractTokenBalance	public



KKFactory Contract

Name	Parameter	Attributes	
initialize	address _token0 address _token1	external	
getReserves	none	public	
_safeTransfer	address token address to uint value	private	
_safeTransfers	address token address to uint value	private	
_update	uint balance0 uint balance1 uint112 _reserve0 uint112 _reserve1	private	
_mintFee	uint112 _reserve0 uint112 _reserve1	private	
mint	address to	external	
burn	address to	external	
swap	uint amount0Out uint amount1Out address to bytes data	external	
skim	address to	external	
sync	none	external	
setWhiteList	address _token	external	
allPairsLength	none	external	
createPair	address tokenA address tokenB	external	
setFeeTo	address _feeTo	external	
setFeeToSetter	address _feeToSetter	external	
setWhiteList	address tokenA address tokenB address _token	onlyOwner	



KKRouter Contract

Parameter	Attributes
address tokenA address tokenB uint amountADesired uint amountBDesired uint amountAMin uint amountBMin	internal
address tokenA address tokenB uint amountADesired uint amountB Desired uint amountAMin uint amountBMin address to uint deadline	external
address token uint amountTokenDesired uint amountTokenMin uint amountETHMin address to uint deadline	external
address tokenA address tokenB uint liquidity uint amountAMin uint amountBMin address to uint deadline	public
address token uint liquidity uint amountTokenMin uint amountETHMin address to uint deadline	public
address tokenA address tokenB uint liquidity uint amountAMin uint amountBMin address to uint deadline bool approveMax uint8 v bytes32 r bytes32 s	external
address token uint liquidity uint amountTokenMin uint amountETHMin address to uint deadline bool approveMax uint8 v bytes32 r bytes32 s	external
address token uint liquidity uint amountTokenMin uint amountETHMin address to uint deadline	public
address token uint liquidity uint amountTokenMin uint amountETHMin address to uint deadline bool approveMax uint8 v bytes32 r bytes32 s	external
	1. 1.
uint amountA uint reserveA uint reserveB	public
	address tokenA address tokenB uint amountADesired uint amountBDesired uint amountAMin uint amountBMin address tokenA address tokenB uint amountADesired uint amountB Desired uint amountAMin uint amountBMin address to uint deadline address token uint amountTokenDesired uint amountTokenMin uint amountETHMin address to uint deadline address tokenA address tokenB uint liquidity uint amountAMin uint amountBMin address to uint deadline address token uint liquidity uint amountTokenMin uint amountETHMin address to uint deadline address tokenA address tokenB uint liquidity uint amountAMin uint amountBMin address to uint deadline address tokenA address tokenB uint liquidity uint amountAMin uint amountBMin address to uint deadline bool approveMax uint8 v bytes32 r bytes32 s address token uint liquidity uint amountTokenMin uint amountETHMin address to vint deadline bool approveMax uint8 v bytes32 r bytes32 s address token uint liquidity uint amountTokenMin uint amountETHMin address to vint deadline address token uint liquidity uint amountTokenMin uint amountETHMin address to vint deadline address token uint liquidity uint amountTokenMin uint amountETHMin address to vint deadline bool approveMax uint8 v bytes32 r bytes32 s

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	reserveOut	
getAmountIn	uint amountOut uint reserveln	public
	uint reserveOut	

4. Audit details

4.1 Findings Summary

Severity	Found	Resolved	Acknowledged
High	0	0	0
Medium	0	0	0
Low	1	0	1
Info	2	0	2



4.2 Risk distribution

Name	Risk level	Repair status
If conditions and modifiers are invalid	Low	Acknowledged
Redundant assignment	Info	Acknowledged
Users can transfer excess tokens	Info	Acknowledged
Variables are updated	No	normal
Floating Point and Numeric Precision	No	normal
Default visibility	No	normal
tx.origin authentication	No	normal
Faulty constructor	No	normal
Unverified return value	No	normal
Insecure random numbers	No	normal
Timestamp Dependent	No	normal
Transaction order dependency	No	normal
Delegatecall	No	normal
Call	No	normal
Denial of Service	No	normal
Logical Design Flaw	No	normal
Fake recharge vulnerability	No	normal
Short address attack Vulnerability	No	normal
Uninitialized storage pointer	No	normal
Frozen account bypass	No	normal
Uninitialized	No	normal
Reentry attack	No	normal

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Integer Overflow

No

normal

4.3 Risk audit details

4.3.1. If conditions and modifiers are invalid

Risk description

```
KingKongToken contract has invalid modifier: lockTheSwap, and redundant if conditions: !inSwapAndLiquify
```

```
if (overMinTokenBalance && !inSwapAndLiquify && !_feePair[from] && swap
AndLiquifyEnabled) {
    contractTokenBalance = numTokensSellToAddToLiquidity;
    swapAndLiquify(contractTokenBalance);
    }
    function swapAndLiquify(uint256 contractTokenBalance) public
lockTheSwap {...}
```

Safety advice

Remove redundant modifiers and if conditions.

Repair Status

Confirmed that it is to add liquidity and call transferfrom again when selling to prevent re-entry from reaching the threshold and call again to add liquidity.



4.3.2. Redundant assignment

Risk description

KingKongToken contract has redundant assignment:

contractTokenBalance = numTokensSellToAddToLiquidity; swapAndLiquify(contractTokenBalance);

Safety advice

It is recommended to pass function parameters directly.

Repair Status

Confirmed that it was used for other purposes before, but it didn't change after the function was deleted. It's not a big problem.



4.3.3. Users can transfer excess tokens

Risk description

KingKongPair contract, the skim method is to allow other users to trans fer excess funds, as shown in the following code:

```
function skim(address to) external lock {
    address _token0 = token0; // gas savings
    address _token1 = token1; // gas savings
    _safeTransfer(_token0, to, IERC20(_token0).balanceOf(address(this)).sub(reserve0));
    _safeTransfer(_token1, to, IERC20(_token1).balanceOf(address(this)).sub(reserve1));
}
```

Safety advice

Whether to add the fund transfer out as a fixed address, such as the official collection fund address.

Repair Status

KingKongSwap has officially confirmed.



4.3.4 Variables are updated

Risk description

When there is a contract logic to obtain rewards or transfer funds, the coder mistakenly updates the value of the variable that sends the funds, so that the user can use the value of the variable that is not updated to obtain funds, thus affecting the normal operation of the project.

Audit Results : Passed

4.3.5 Floating Point and Numeric Precision

Risk Description

In Solidity, the floating-point type is not supported, and the fixed-length floating-point type is not fully supported. The result of the division operation will be rounded off, and if there is a decimal number, the part after the decimal point will be discarded and only the integer part will be taken, for example, dividing 5 pass 2 directly will result in 2. If the result of the operation is less than 1 in the token operation, for example, 4.9 tokens will be approximately equal to 4, bringing a certain degree of The tokens are not only the tokens of the same size, but also the tokens of the same size. Due to the economic properties of tokens, the loss of precision is equivalent to the loss of assets, so this is a cumulative problem in tokens that are frequently traded.



4.3.6 Default Visibility

Risk description

In Solidity, the visibility of contract functions is public pass default. therefore, functions that do not specify any visibility can be called externally pass the user. This can lead to serious vulnerabilities when developers incorrectly ignore visibility specifiers for functions that should be private, or visibility specifiers that can only be called from within the contract itself. One of the first hacks on Parity's multisignature wallet was the failure to set the visibility of a function, which defaults to public, leading to the theft of a large amount of money.

Audit Results : Passed

4.3.7 tx.origin authentication

Risk Description

tx.origin is a global variable in Solidity that traverses the entire call stack and returns the address of the account that originally sent the call (or transaction). Using this variable for authentication in a smart contract can make the contract vulnerable to phishing-like attacks.



4.3.8 Faulty constructor

Risk description

Prior to version 0.4.22 in solidity smart contracts, all contracts and constructors had the same name. When writing a contract, if the constructor name and the contract name are not the same, the contract will add a default constructor and the constructor you set up will be treated as a normal function, resulting in your original contract settings not being executed as expected, which can lead to terrible consequences, especially if the constructor is performing a privileged operation.

Audit Results : Passed

4.3.9 Unverified return value

Risk description

Three methods exist in Solidity for sending tokens to an address: transfer(), send(), call.value(). The difference between them is that the transfer function throws an exception throw when sending fails, rolls back the transaction state, and costs 2300gas; the send function returns false when sending fails and costs 2300gas; the call.value method returns false when sending fails and costs all gas to call, which will lead to the risk of reentrant attacks. If the send or call.value method is used in the contract code to send tokens without checking the return value of the method, if an error occurs, the contract will continue to execute the code later, which will lead to the thought result.



4.3.10 Insecure random numbers

Risk Description

All transactions on the blockchain are deterministic state transition operations with no uncertainty, which ultimately means that there is no source of entropy or randomness within the blockchain ecosystem. Therefore, there is no random number function like rand() in Solidity. Many developers use future block variables such as block hashes, timestamps, block highs and lows or Gas caps to generate random numbers. These quantities are controlled pass the miners who mine them and are therefore not truly random, so using past or present block variables to generate random numbers could lead to a destructive vulnerability.

Audit Results : Passed

4.3.11 Timestamp Dependency

Risk description

In blockchains, data block timestamps (block.timestamp) are used in a variety of applications, such as functions for random numbers, locking funds for a period of time, and conditional statements for various time-related state changes. Miners have the ability to adjust the timestamp as needed, for example block.timestamp or the alias now can be manipulated pass the miner. This can lead to serious vulnerabilities if the wrong block timestamp is used in a smart contract. This may not be necessary if the contract is not particularly concerned with miner manipulation of block timestamps, but care should be taken when developing the contract.

Audit Results : Passed

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4.3.12 Transaction order dependency

Risk description

In a blockchain, the miner chooses which transactions from that pool will be included in the block, which is usually determined pass the gasPrice transaction, and the miner will choose the transaction with the highest transaction fee to pack into the block. Since the information about the transactions in the block is publicly available, an attacker can watch the transaction pool for transactions that may contain problematic solutions, modify or revoke the attacker's privileges or change the state of the contract to the attacker's detriment. The attacker can then take data from this transaction and create a higher-level transaction gasPrice and include its transactions in a block before the original, which will preempt the original transaction solution.

Audit Results : Passed

4.3.13 Delegatecall

Risk Description

In Solidity, the delegatecall function is the standard message call method, but the code in the target address runs in the context of the calling contract, i.e., keeping msg.sender and msg.value unchanged. This feature supports implementation libraries, where developers can create reusable code for future contracts. The code in the library itself can be secure and bug-free, but when run in another application's environment, new vulnerabilities may arise, so using the delegatecall function may lead to unexpected code execution.

Audit Results : Passed

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4.3.14 Call

Risk Description

The call function is similar to the delegatecall function in that it is an underlying function provided pass Solidity, a smart contract writing language, to interact with external contracts or libraries, but when the call function method is used to handle an external Standard Message Call to a contract, the code runs in the environment of the external contract/function The call function is used to interact with an external contract or library. The use of such functions requires a determination of the security of the call parameters, and caution is recommended. An attacker could easily borrow the identity of the current contract to perform other malicious operations, leading to serious vulnerabilities.

Audit Results : Passed

4.3.15 Denial of Service

Risk Description

Denial of service attacks have a broad category of causes and are designed to keep the user from making the contract work properly for a period of time or permanently in certain situations, including malicious behavior while acting as the recipient of a transaction, artificially increasing the gas required to compute a function causing gas exhaustion (such as controlling the size of variables in a for loop), misuse of access control to access the private component of the contract, in which the Owners with privileges are modified, progress state based on external calls, use of obfuscation and oversight, etc. can lead to denial of service attacks.

Audit Results : Passed

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4.3.16 Logic Design Flaw

Risk Description

In smart contracts, developers design special features for their contracts intended to stabilize the market value of tokens or the life of the project and increase the highlight of the project, however, the more complex the system, the more likely it is to have the possibility of errors. It is in these logic and functions that a minor mistake can lead to serious depasstions from the whole logic and expectations, leaving fatal hidden dangers, such as errors in logic judgment, functional implementation and design and so on.

Audit Results : Passed

4.3.17 Fake recharge vulnerability

Risk Description

The success or failure (true or false) status of a token transaction depends on whether an exception is thrown during the execution of the transaction (e.g., using mechanisms such as require/assert/revert/throw). When a user calls the transfer function of a token contract to transfer funds, if the transfer function runs normally without throwing an exception, the transaction will be successful or not, and the status of the transaction will be true. When balances[msg.sender] < _value goes to the else logic and returns false, no exception is thrown, but the transaction acknowledgement is successful, then we believe that a mild if/else judgment is an undisciplined way of coding in sensitive function scenarios like transfer, which will lead to Fake top-up vulnerability in centralized exchanges, centralized wallets, and token contracts.

Audit Results : Passed

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4.3.18 Short Address Attack Vulnerability

Risk Description

In Solidity smart contracts, when passing parameters to a smart contract, the parameters are encoded according to the ABI specification. the EVM runs the attacker to send encoded parameters that are shorter than the expected parameter length. For example, when transferring money on an exchange or wallet, you need to send the transfer address address and the transfer amount value. The attacker could send a 19-passte address instead of the standard 20-passte address, in which case the EVM would fill in the 0 at the end of the encoded parameter to make up the expected length, which would result in an overflow of the final transfer amount parameter value, thus changing the original transfer amount.

Audit Results : Passed

4.3.19 Uninitialized storage pointer

Risk description

EVM uses both storage and memory to store variables. Local variables within functions are stored in storage or memory pass default, depending on their type. uninitialized local storage variables could point to other unexpected storage variables in the contract, leading to intentional or unintentional vulnerabilities.



4.3.20 Frozen Account bypass

Risk Description

In the transfer operation code in the contract, detect the risk that the logical functionality to check the freeze status of the transfer account exists in the contract code and can be passpassed if the transfer account has been frozen.

Audit Results : Passed

4.3.21 Uninitialized

Risk description

The initialize function in the contract can be called pass another attacker before the owner, thus initializing the administrator address.

Audit Results : Passed

4.3.22 Reentry Attack

Risk Description

An attacker constructs a contract containing malicious code at an external address in the Fallback function When the contract sends tokens to this address, it will call the malicious code. The call.value() function in Solidity will consume all the gas he receives when it is used to send tokens, so a re-entry attack will occur when the call to the call.value() function to send tokens occurs before the actual reduction of the sender's account balance. The re-entry vulnerability led to the famous The DAO attack.

Audit Results : Passed

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4.3.23 Integer Overflow

Risk Description

Integer overflows are generally classified as overflows and underflows. The types of integer overflows that occur in smart contracts include three types: multiplicative overflows, additive overflows, and subtractive overflows. In Solidity language, variables support integer types in steps of 8, from uint8 to uint256, and int8 to int256, integers specify fixed size data types and are unsigned, for example, a uint8 type, can only be stored in the range 0 to 2^8-1, that is, [0,255] numbers, a uint256 type can only store numbers in the range 0 to 2^256-1. This means that an integer variable can only have a certain range of numbers represented, and cannot exceed this formulated range. Exceeding the range of values expressed pass the variable type will result in an integer overflow vulnerability.



5. Security Audit Tool

Tool name	Tool Features		
Oyente	Can be used to detect common bugs in smart contracts		
securify	Common types of smart contracts that can be verified		
MAIAN	Multiple smart contract vulnerabilities can be found and classified		
Lunaray Toolkit	self-developed toolkit		



Disclaimer:

Lunaray Technology only issues a report and assumes corresponding responsibilities for the facts that occurred or existed before the issuance of this report, Since the facts that occurred after the issuance of the report cannot determine the security status of the smart contract, it is not responsible for this.

Lunaray Technology conducts security audits on the security audit items in the project agreement, and is not responsible for the project background and other circumstances, The subsequent on-chain deployment and operation methods of the project party are beyond the scope of this audit.

This report only conducts a security audit based on the information provided by the information provider to Lunaray at the time the report is issued, If the information of this project is concealed or the situation reflected is inconsistent with the actual situation, Lunaray Technology shall not be liable for any losses and adverse effects caused thereby.

There are risks in the market, and investment needs to be cautious.

This report only conducts security audits and results announcements on smart contract codes, and does not make investment recommendations and basis.



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