Somewhere over the rainbow? Opposition diversity and the outcomes of resistance episodes

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Abstract

How does opposition diversity in resistance episodes affect their outcome? Drawing on existing work on signalling and negative coalitions, we argue that opposition diversity improves the chances of short-term regime changes, but does not strongly affect future democratization. Using novel measures of the diversity of ideological positions, constituencies and organizations engaged in anti-regime dissent, we analyze the impact of diversity in resistance campaigns on the likelihood of regime changes and democratization in Africa from 1990-2015. We find that more diverse episodes of dissent are more likely to generate regime changes, but there is little evidence linking diversity to longer term democratization. Diversity may even create a dilemma, whereby it increases the prospects of short term regime changes, while making transitions to democracy more challenging.

Keywords: resistance movements,protest,regime change,Africa

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1 Introduction

Do ideologically or socially diverse resistance movements succeed more often? Diversity is a key mechanism thought to drive the relative effectiveness of civil resistance in relation to violent forms of resistance (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; DeNardo, 2014). Diverse movements are thought to be larger, more tactically innovative, harder to repress, and impose greater costs on the regime (Kuran, 1991; Rasler, 1996; Gawerc, 2020; Kurzman, 2009; Johnson, 2008; Olzak and Ryo, 2007). Signaling models of protest outcomes – arguably the dominant approach to understanding protest – see participant diversity as the key to understanding why movements succeed as more "moderates" join the protests (Lohmann, 1993; Kuran, 1991; Mcadam and Su, 2002). Moreover, the diversity of interests and dispersed power centers characterizing many nonviolent resistance campaigns are thought to underpin the correlation between nonviolent campaigns and transitions to democracy (Bayer et al., 2016; Celestino and Gleditsch, 2013; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). Celestino and Gleditsch (2013), for example, state that nonviolent uprisings have democratizing effects due to "dispersing power and increasing the incentives for compromise and concession," while Bayer et al. (2016) argue, that diversity in nonviolent movements generates "organizational cultures" that favor compromise, cooperation, and democracy (see also Kim and Kroeger (2019); Bethke and Pinckney (2019)).

While diversity and dispersion shoulder much of the theoretical burden in explaining links between nonviolence, regime change, and democratization, these links have not been directly tested in a cross-national setting. Studies in the social movements tradition have examined how organizational diversity affects protest outcomes, but overwhelmingly through single-case tests in wealthy democracies that do not allow for generalized conclusions about the effect of diversity across a large number of cases (Johnson, 2008; Olzak and Ryo, 2007; Staggenborg, 1986; Walker and Stepick, 2014; Dyke and Amos, 2017; Gawerc, 2020).[1]. In studies of civil resistance – which more commonly examine dissent in autocratic states – diversity is often assumed to play a positive role in generating regime changes and democratization, but this mechanism is rarely tested (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Chenoweth and Belgioioso, 2019). Moreover, studies in the social movements tradition (Dyke and Amos, 2017; Staggenborg, 1986; Walker and Stepick, 2014; Gawerc, 2020), the literature on bargaining and civil war (Cunningham, 2006, 2013) and the literature on the formation of legislative coalitions (Ecker and Meyer, 2020) suggest that under some circumstances diversity can lead to bargaining failures, division, and fragmentation that can raise the risk of movement collapse. Are more diverse movements in fact more likely to to obtain major concessions from governing regimes and generate democratization? Or do other mechanisms drive the link between resistance, regime change, and democratization?

Our study provides the first cross-national empirical tests of how opposition diversity impacts protest movement outcomes. We argue that diversity should be beneficial to shorter term outcomes such as regime change, but does not strongly affect the prospects of longer term democratization. This may even create a dilemma for civil resistance movements, where there are short term benefits to broadening protest coalitions that potentially endanger the prospects of longer term democratization. Using novel

[1]There are few single-case studies of the impact of opposition diversity on outcomes in autocracies, but some exceptions include (Chang and Kim, 2007; Chang, 2008; Rosenfeld, 2017)

measures of movement diversity measured at the country-month for all countries on the African continent from 1990-2015, we find that diversity has consistently positive associations with regime changes across numerous measures, although we find little evidence for the proposition that diversity positively impacts democratization. We also find some evidence that religious diversity increases the chances of regime changes, and is not an impediment to democratization, while ethnic diversity may produce short and long term challenges.

2 Theory

We begin by defining some key concepts: resistance movements, diversity, regime changes and democratization. We then outline how variations in diversity should affect the likelihood of regime concessions and democratization, given that a resistance movement with maximalist goals is present.

It is well established that most social movements are coalitions of organizations, even though periods of dissent may be characterised by mobilization and diffusion through more informal networks as well (Koopmans, 1993; Tarrow, 2011; Tilly, 1978; McAdam, 2010; Pearlman, 2020). We take this as a fairly uncontroversial starting point and one substantiated by a considerable amount of evidence (Diani and Bison, 2004; Rucht, 2007; Dyke and Amos, 2017). We examine periods of dissent with "maximalist goals." Maximalist goals are defined as demands for changes in the political structure which, if implemented, would significantly alter the executive branch's immediate access to state power, the rules with which executives are selected, or the the policy or geographic areas for which the executive has the right to make laws (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Butcher et al., 2021). Examples of maximalist goals include demands that a head of state resign from power via a non-institutional method, demands for democratization in autocratic settings, demands to enfranchise an excluded social group, and demands for regional or ethnic autonomy or independence. Maximalist goals exclude political changes that fall short of these fundamental aspects of executive power, such as demands for better human rights protections, or changes in public spending (Butcher et al., 2021). These are "big" goals such as democratization, regime change and territorial independence or autonomy that imply large costs for the regime, if conceded.

Understood as being driven by inter-organizational networks, episodes of maximalist dissent vary on multiple dimensions. This can include the types of participating organizations, their level of connectivity and past interaction, their goals, leadership and so on. Here we focus on the diversity that is encompassed within the resistance movement's network of organizations. In particular we focus on *ideological* diversity (Van Dyke and McCammon, 2010), *constituent* and *organizational* diversity. These are distinct but related concepts.

Ideological diversity refers to the extent of variation in the political goals of the organizations participating in a resistance movement during an episode of dissent. For example, an episode with a low level of diversity would be one dominated by organizations with very similar ideological positions. The workers-based "Burkinabe" revolution in Burkina Faso in late 2014 is an example of a movement with a fairly homogeneous set of organizations, understood in terms of ideological diversity. Of the 29 ideological positions encompassed by active organizations in the revolution, roughly 75% were classified as

socially "liberal" or related to workers rights, according to our data. The Egyptian revolution was much more ideologically diverse, and incorporated organizations with goals as varied as the implementation of Islamic law, the establishment of a secular state, ethnic autonomy, workers rights, women's rights, religious freedom and youth interests. While "liberals" were still the dominant ideological position in Egypt in January 2011, only 30% of organization's ideological positions fell into this category. The protests from 2012-2013 against the government of Mohammed Morsi were ideologically more narrow with participation by most of the main secular youth groups and political parties, but not by Islamist groups. The protests after the fall of Mohammed Morsi were heavily dominated by Islamist political parties and social movements under the umbrella of the "Anti-Coup Alliance."

Constituent diversity reflects variance in the social groups or "social base" of the organizations comprising a resistance movement. Organizations with similar goals can mobilize from different constituencies. Political parties can be pro-democracy, but mobilize from varied ethnic social bases, for example. Although the Burkinabe revolution was ideologically quite homogeneous, it was diverse in terms of its constituents, mobilizing fairly evenly from youth, professionals, workers, women's groups, and more general civil society organizations.

Organizational diversity captures differences in the types of organizations that participate. The organizational ecology of resistance is varied, including trade unions, political parties, armed rebel groups, women's organizations, human rights organizations and religious organizations, for example. When movements mobilise from many different types of organizations – created for different purposes – the movement is organizationally diverse. A movement dominated by political parties, on the other hand, is organizationally more homogeneous, even if it may be diverse on other dimensions.

Diversity is related to but remains conceptually distinct from dispersion, which refers to an even spread of power across multiple organizations mobilized within a resistance movement during a period of dissent. Periods of dissent must be diverse before they can be dispersed, as dispersion requires many potential loci of power, but diverse movements are not necessarily dispersed. The 2010-2011 Tunisian revolution was diverse, in the sense that workers as well as professional, religious, youth, and leftist organizations mobilised against the regime, but the movement was dominated by the main trade union – the UGTT – which dwarfed other organizations in terms of its membership with roughly 600,000 members. In practice for this paper, our measurement of diversity (discussed below) also captures an element of dispersion, but we note that they are closely related concepts.

In summary, by diversity we mean the extent of differences in the policy preferences of dissident organizations as well as the social groups and organizations from which participating organizations are mobilized during a period of dissent.

How might more or less ideological diversity among participating organizations affect the probability that opposition can attract major concessions or that regimes democratize? The following section discusses and synthesises existing theory on the links between diversity, regime change and democratization.

2.1 Diversity and regime transitions

How then does variation in opposition diversity affect likelihood of a regime acceding to such maximalist demands? Maximalist concessions in this paper primarily involve the initiation of a "regime transition." Regimes rarely concede voluntarily, and much existing work suggests that regime changes happen when the incumbent calculates that repression or co-optation measures are more costly than short-term concessions to the movement (Lohmann, 1993; DeNardo, 2014; Leventoğlu and Metternich, 2018). We maintain a distinction between the incumbent leader and the regime, the latter of which can consist of political elites and often the military (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005). Major short term concessions by a regime can include removing the current leader, while leaving the regime itself largely intact, as was the case in 2019 when the Sudanese military removed President Omar al-Bashir before a series negotiations, protests, and repression that occurred between the military and the opposition. This distinction between the leader and the regime is especially important in the case of primarily nonviolent contention, where the regime often remains in place after the leader has gone; this is in contrast to opposition victory in civil war which often involves the removal of the regime *and* the leader (Pinckney, 2020).

Previous work on both violent and nonviolent challenges to the state have identified several structural determinants of resistance movement success, such as state weakness (Skocpol and Theda, 1979; Goodwin, 2001), external support (Salehyan, 2007), demographic changes (Goldstone et al., 2010), pre-existing ethnic and religious cleavages (Svensson and Lindgren, 2011; Nepstad, 2011), economic inequality (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005) and economic modernization (Boix and Stokes, 2003). While existing patterns of economic and political activity shape which actors choose to challenge the state, such challenges also involve a significant degree of randomness and contingency. Revolutions are rife with examples of "unlikely" organizations choosing to challenge the state while the "usual suspects" remain loyal (Pinckney, 2020). There is considerable diversity within and across resistance movements, and we expect this also has a significant bearing on movement success.

Diversity is a concept commonly rooted in the characteristics of the resistance movement itself (Kadivar, 2018; Butcher et al., 2018; Dahlum et al., 2019). While some studies have emphasised the size and tactical choices of resistance campaigns as explanations for their success (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; DeNardo, 2014), few studies have examined how the organizational composition of resistance movements impact their outcomes. We now consider specific ways in which diversity can be an asset or an encumbrance to resistance movements.

2.1.1 The positive impact of diversity

Much of the existing literature suggests that diversity should increase the chances of regime concessions and movement victory. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) link the success of nonviolent campaigns to their ability to mobilize large and *diverse* anti-regime coalitions. More diverse movements signal to the regime that a broader base of the population (conceived of in ideological terms or in terms of support groups) is opposed to the regime (Lohmann, 1993; Koopmans, 1993; Tarrow, 1989; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, 65-66). The participation of "unexpected" groups in protest communicates that dissent is not routine or

normal, but rather is new and potentially threatening (Koopmans, 1993; Gawerc, 2020), involving higher costs for repression (Leventoğlu and Metternich, 2018; Klein and Regan, 2018).

Organizational diversity can enable tactical diversity and innovation, rendering the opposition more adaptable to repression and increasing the attractiveness of concessions for the regime (Schock, 2005; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Ganz, 2000; Haydu, 2012; Snow and Moss, 2014). More diverse movements may also simply be able to mobilize a greater number of people into acts of dissent, through "meso-mobilization" and "boundary-spanning" processes (Wang et al., 2018; Chung, 2011), dramatically increasing the potential size of the movement and subsequent costs to the regime for refusing to concede (Brooker and Meyer, 2019; Walker and Stepick, 2014). Others have argued that forming diverse coalitions can begin a self-reinforcing dynamic where social divides are bridged, undermining "divide-and-rule" strategies upon which many authoritarian states rely (Weinstein, 2006). Diversity that incorporates regime support groups also improves opposition leverage (Schock, 2005), in turn increasing the likelihood that security forces do not follow orders to repress the opposition (Thurber, 2018).

2.1.2 The downsides of diversity

Conversely, scholars have also identified ways in which diversity can create barriers to effective resistance. Ideological conflict is a key cause of coalition dissolution (Heaney and Rojas, 2008, 43) and as a greater number of ideological positions are represented, it becomes more difficult to maintain an alliance. One review of the impact of diversity on grassroots mobilization in the (relatively wealthy, democratic) United States concluded that diversity can "represent severe boundaries that thwart grassroots organization's capacities for developing collective identities, maintaining coalitions, and reaching shared understandings about other considerations such as tactical approaches, appropriate organizing structures, and cultural frames that may resonate with key audiences" (Walker and Stepick, 2014). Another meta-study of social movements concluded that ideological and cultural congruence was one of only two crucial factors explaining inter-organizational coalitions and their survival (Van Dyke and McCammon, 2010). Building a consensus on shared goals, tactics, and strategies is challenging in diverse coalitions because, among other things, organizations may need to appeal to different audiences that value contrasting approaches and end points (Gawerc, 2020).

Bridging these divisions takes time and can drain resources from the resistance movement. Furthermore, creative and innovative tactics that are likely to be especially effective in dissent may be harder to develop and adopt if movements fall back on a "lowest common denominator" strategy that all members agree upon more readily and efficiently (Gawerc, 2020). Including members of the regime's support group can provoke regime defections, but may also provoke backlash within the movement itself – especially in autocratic settings where former regime members may be implicated in human rights violations, or where the regime is characterized by favoritism to a particular ethnic or religious group (Svensson and Lindgren, 2011; Pischedda, 2020).

To this point, there is an emerging consensus that nonviolent mobilization across ethnic divides is fragile (Svensson and Lindgren, 2011; Pischedda, 2020; Abbs, 2020; Rørbæk, 2016; Thurber, 2018). Numerous studies also suggest that public goods provision is worse in diverse societies – especially in

ethnically diverse societies – and mobilization for protest faces similar problems of free riding (Miguel and Gugerty, 2005; Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina et al., 1999). Studies that see diversity as potentially detrimental to democratic consolidation largely point to ethnic and religious divisions (Horowitz, 2000). Diverse coalitions may therefore be more brittle in the face of regime repression or offers of partial concessions designed to divide the movement (Koopmans, 1993, 641), and less effective as coordinated fronts of resistance in autocratic or semi-autocratic settings.

Diversity within resistance campaigns can produce bargaining problems as well. Civil wars composed of multiple rebel organizations last longer because settlements that satisfy all parties are harder to find, and there is more uncertainty over the range of acceptable settlements (Cunningham, 2006; Walter, 2009). Even in stable democracies, ideologically diverse parliamentary groups take longer to form coalition governments (Ecker and Meyer, 2020). In situations of uprising and revolution, these bargaining costs may make repression a more attractive strategy than accommodation for the regime, at least in the short term. Finally, diverse coalitions with "radical" organizations whose policy preferences diverge very sharply from the regime's, such that old regime remnants won't retain privileges or other benefits of office after the transition, can make concessions more costly for the regime (Klein and Regan, 2018).

2.1.3 Synthesis

These mechanisms point in different directions regarding the effect(s) of resistance movement diversity on campaign success. If both logics are true, then we would expect the effect of organizational diversity on the outcomes of resistance movements to be zero, or small, due to these countervailing consequences of diversity. However, it is important to note that the vast majority of the studies finding a "downside" to diversity have focused on protest in developed democracies for reformist goals short of regime change and democratization (e.g Koopmans (1993); Heaney and Rojas (2008); Tarrow (1989); Walker and Stepick (2014); Diani and Bison (2004)). Are these effects likely to be similar when transferred to contexts with lower levels of democracy and development, which also happens to better characterize the institutional conditions under which most civil resistance movements for maximalist change occur? We argue that the positive impacts of diversity should outweigh the negative impacts in these circumstances.

Non-democracies, for example, are characterized by widespread *preference falsification* and the higher threat of severe repression (Svolik, 2012; Kuran, 1991). Tactical innovation and signalling should be *more* important in repressive and information-poor autocracies where preference falsification is widespread (Kuran, 1991). Diversity sends a stronger signal of regime weakness when there are few alternative sources of information on regime or opposition strength. This is in contrast to democracies that often tolerate and even encourage some levels of dissent and protest, which enable the regime and the broader public to gauge levels of support for the government.

Non-democracies are also often characterized by the more frequent use of repression to manage perceived threats (Davenport, 2007, 1996). This higher threat of violent repression has ambiguous effects on coalition formation and longevity (Dyke and Amos, 2017). Repression may increase the perceived costs of dissent and rapidly break up fragile coalitions, although repression has also been shown to facilitate coalition formation by creating a sense of shared threat (Chang, 2008; Kadivar, 2013; Sutton

et al., 2014). Repression can also help opposition actors create a common frame around which to mobilize their grievances and solidify the state as the primary source of those grievances (Cederman et al., 2010; Tarrow, 2011; Goodwin, 2001, 82). This indeterminacy reflects the broader 'paradox of repression' where violence sometimes depresses dissent and other times provokes it (Moore, 1998; Sutton et al., 2014).

Other conditions unique to non-democracies can also facilitate the formation of broad-short term coalitions, including, perhaps, succession crises (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005). Since we argue that the positive effects of diversity are enhanced by aspects of authoritarianism while the negative effects are indeterminate, our main hypothesis is that higher levels of diversity in pro-democracy movements should generally increase the likelihood of regime concessions.

H_1: Diversity has a positive impact on the likelihood of regime change during periods of maximalist resistance.

2.2 After the Revolution: Diversity and Democratization

Studies of the link between nonviolent movements and democratization also highlight diversity as mechanism through which civil resistance campaigns generate democracy (Celestino and Gleditsch, 2013). The basic argument is that diversity forces protest campaigns to cooperate and build procedures and institutions for compromise (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Bayer et al., 2016; Celestino and Gleditsch, 2013; Kim and Kroeger, 2019). Diverse coalitions need to cooperate across existing divisions to mobilize and succeed and often do this by creating institutions to coordinate resistance activities (such as fronts) or committees that bring various leaders together (such as the Jan Andolan Coordination Committees in Nepal). These institutions survive after the protest episode and provide a template for inclusive institutions, making it more likely that compromise and cooperation are built into post-campaign regimes. Cooperation also builds trust between leaders and participants, and instills norms of compromise – especially among the leadership – that push post-campaign institutions in a democratic direction.

However, other studies are skeptical that diverse protest coalitions can generate democratization after protest episodes. Perhaps the strongest statement of this position is Beissinger (2013)'s studies of "negative coalitions." Many protest episodes create short-term coalitions around a shared goal of removing a particular leader. These coalitions fragment after this shared goal is achieved and actors pursue parochial or sectoral interests, or demobilize entirely in the post-campaign period. Diverse coalitions should be especially susceptible to fragmentation processes. Democracy can be hard to instill in the wake of regime change because partners in the coalition must accept that the preferences of one may become law to another, which for some groups may simply be too high a price to pay. Diversity can activate intense political divisions that increase the incentives for the transition's losers to make a deal with the old regime, or support coups that provide them some nominal access to power. Arguably, the military in Egypt have deftly exploited such divisions between the Muslim Brotherhood (and Islamist political parties more generally) and the secular left. After the revolution of 2011, which involved an alliance between the Muslim Brotherhood and the secular left, the secular left actually came to an agreement with the military in 2013 to support a coup that would remove the Muslim Brotherhood from power. The military in Egypt remain in power today.

Other studies also suggest diversity can be an impediment to the consolidation of democratic states, although the evidence is fairly weak. (Weingast, 1997), for example, emphasises that diversity can make it easier for regimes to exploit divide and rule strategies and sustain autocratic or semi-autocratic rule. Daniel Horowitz has also suggested that ethnic diversity might make democratization difficult. Studies of inequality and democratic stability tend to find that vertical and horizontal inequality makes democracies less stable, which suggests that movements that cross such class and ethnic divides might have greater difficulty consolidating democratic states (Houle, 2009).

We argue that the negative coalitions logic is most likely to apply in the wake of resistance episodes. This is because the institutions and cooperative mechanisms that are created during periods of resistance are often purposed for the goal of bringing a regime down in the short term. Once a regime falls, these shared goals disappear as individual organizations must pursue different policy goals and compete politically, creating tendencies to fracture int he coalitions that may have achieved initial success. Coalitions that are more diverse should have a more difficult time overcoming these divisions during transition periods, making the longer term prospects of democratization less certain.

While we can't hypothesise a "no effect" for diversity and democratization, a positive and significant effect would constitute evidence against our negative coalitions logic here, and in favour of arguments highlighting the legacies of past cooperation on future democratization.

H_2: Diversity does not have a positive impact on democratization.

3 Research Design

3.1 Independent variables

Our main analyses are based on country-months in Africa over the 1990-2015 period, with country-years (primarily) used to examine democratization. Country-months were chosen over weeks or days because months provide a high level of temporal disaggregation and avoid problems that arise in events datasets whereby single events may span over weeks.[2] Whether an organization participated in an event or an event was a given size on a particular day or in a particular week is unclear when events span multiple weeks. We are more confident in the measures of these features over a full month.

We use the Anatomy of Resistance Campaigns (ARC) dataset to measure the diversity of actors in resistance events (Butcher et al., 2021) across these two units of analysis. The ARC data measure organizational participation in events of nonviolent and violent maximalist resistance and the features of those organizations. While the organization-level variables in ARC are measured at the country-year, each organization is linked to events in the Social Conflict Analysis Dataset (SCAD; Salehyan et al. (2012)), the Mass Mobilization Data (MM; Clark and Regan (2021)), the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED; Raleigh et al. (2010)) and the UCDP Geo-Referenced Event Dataset (GED; Sundberg and Melander (2013)). These links to conflict events enable us to measure organizational participation at the country-month. Multiple organizations participate in events and the ARC data include information on organization "types," the stated goals of participating organizations and the

[2] An extreme example is protests in Togo in SCAD in 1990 that last 365 days.

"social bases" (constituencies) from which these organizations were thought to mobilize. This allows us to create measurements of organizational, ideological, and constituent diversity at the country-month. To the best of our knowledge these represent the most fine-grained cross-national measurements of diversity in episodes of resistance.

Empirically, measures of diversity are undefined for periods with no organizations. In these cases we attribute observations with "0", which is consistent with the idea that these observations are not diverse (diversity increases with the fractionalization indices). However, we include a control for observations with no active organizations and another controls for observations with one active organization to account for the possibility that these episodes have special features related to regime changes and democratization. This is rich sample of cases that includes failed movements that fizzle out quickly such as protests by youth groups in Angola in December 2011 demanding regime change alongside larger, more sustained campaigns such as the Burkinabe revolution in 2014, and the major protest campaigns of the Arab Spring in North Africa. Our sample includes observations of maximalist protest and organizational participation across 49 countries. The results reported below are robust to restricting the sample to cases where there was more than one active organization.

3.1.1 Measuring Diversity

Diversity is measured as a function of the ideological positions of organizations (ideological diversity), their social bases (constituent diversity), and the types of organizations (organizational diversity). Ideological diversity is measured from the "organization goals" variable in ARC, which is an open text string of the stated goals of the organization. Organization goals captures what the organization *says* publicly that it stands for ideologically (Butcher et al., 2021). Goals in the ARC data are measured using formal statements on websites, in constitutions, and from secondary accounts of the organization – not from the statements of leaders to the media at a given protest or point in time – and as such are more likely to measure enduring ideological positions. We have removed "regime change" as a goal from organizations as nearly all organizations in ARC express "maximalist" demands at some point in the year(s) they are active.

Constituent diversity is measured using what ARC identifies as the "social base(s)" of the organization, which is an open-text string indicating the social groups that the organization was thought to mobilise from. Social bases capture the nature of the constituencies to which organizations are accountable (Staniland, 2014; Weinstein, 2006). The social base in ARC is not measured with reference to what the organization itself says about the groups it mobilises from, but rather how secondary academic accounts and journalistic reports render the organization's main supporters or membership pool. As such, diversity in social bases is measured somewhat independently of whom the organizations themselves say they mobilize from. For example, some political parties will say that they are opposed to ethnic politics but mobilize from one ethnic group. Clearly this measure is influenced by how commentators and external sources frame the organizations and the conflict more generally, but we think it is unlikely that conflicts are given a particular "frame" in the secondary literature based on whether or not the resistance campaign generated regime changes or democratization, so this should introduce only error

that is orthogonal to our dependent variable.

From these text strings we inductively coded nine ideological positions and ten constituencies. These are not mutually exclusive, so a single organization can have multiple ideologies and multiple constituencies. The main ideological positions are: Islamist, secular, leftist, general liberal, ethnic, separatist, Christian, workers rights, and gender. The ten constituencies are: youth, workers, rural, professional, political parties/activists, Islamist, gender activists, ethnic, general civil society and Christian. Together, 84% of organizations in ARC fall into at least one of these ideological positions and 78% into one of these constituencies. Details of the word-strings associated with each position can be found in the appendix. Figure 1 and Figure 2 in the Appendix show how these ideological positions correlate with each other at the organization-year level. While there clearly are associations (Islamist organizations tend not to express liberal positions, separatists tend to also have ethnic advocacy as a goal), none are particularly strong for ideological positions. The main association for social bases is that organizations with workers constituencies also have professional constituencies which is driven almost exclusively by national trade union umbrellas.

The organizational diversity variable was based on the *Alternative Organization Type* index in the ARC data, which categorises organizations into nine main types, listed in Table 1, below.

Table 1: Organization Types

Type	Org. Goals	Classification	Example
Revolutionary	Maximalist goals	Revolutionary	AFDL: Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo
Political Party	Win elections	Political Party	UFDG: Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea
Trade Union	Worker's rights/interests in a trade or industry	QCSO	CTNG: The National Confereration of Guinean Workers
Professional	Professionals's rights/interests	QCSO	ONAT: Tunisian Bar Association
Religious	Coordinate religious activities	QCSO	FNAI: Tunisian Front of Islamic Associations
Student or Youth	Youth/student interests	Student/Youth	GUTS: General Union of Tunisian Students
Women's	Women's rights/interests	Other CSO	AFTD: Tunisian Association of Democratic Women
Ethnic	Ethnic rights/interests	Other CSO	MAK: Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylie (Algeria)
Other CSOs	Broad, universal non-maximalist goals (i.e human rights)	Other CSO	CNOSCG: National Council of Civil Society Organizations

For each of these dimensions of diversity, we use the fractionalization index to capture the extent to which the movement was spread evenly across ideological positions, social bases, or organization types, as compared to being concentrated in just one of these positions/types (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Fractionalization is an index of both diversity and dispersion across multiple positions (Alesina et al., 1999) and captures the main arguments in the existing literature that emphasise aspects of both of these closely related concepts. For ideological and constituent diversity, these indices were calculated based on the total number of organization-ideological positions/social bases. Organizations can express more than one ideological position or mobilize from more than one social base, and it is these individual ideological positions/social bases that are the foundations for our calculations. Thus, the fractionalization indices measure the extent to which, of all the expressed ideological positions in that country-month, those positions were concentrated in one ideological group or spread over all potential positions. Organizational fractionalization was measured using the categories in Table 1.

The above measurements treat all organizations as contributing equally to the overall diversity of an episode. However, some organizations are larger than others, so the ideological importance of small organizations may be overstated. A period of resistance with one very large organization likely will be dominated by the ideology of that organization, even if there are many very small and ideologically different organizations. We re-calculated all of the above indices with a size-weighted estimate based on the "Organization size estimate" in the ARC data, but the results were very similar to those reported below.

Finally, we also include a raw count of the number of organizations engaged in maximalist dissent in the country-month. If organizations form at least in part around shared individual preferences, then the number of organizations is a plausible proxy for the diversity of these preferences across the movement. A movement with five political parties, for example, likely has more diverse political preferences than a movement with just one party. We normalized this measure by transforming it with the square root. The underlying ARC data collection procedure should be effective at capturing the "main" organizations in a movement, but the ability to capture smaller organizations (and therefore a greater number of organizations) might vary from country to country.[3] The square root transformation should reduce the impact of this potential measurement error.

Figure 1, 2, and 3 show how these measures capture different aspects of diversity. The top 30 country-months in terms of ideological diversity are quite different to the top 30 cases of constituent diversity. North African cases tend to score highest on ideological diversity, while Southern and West African cases are common among the top cases of constituent diversity. Organizational diversity is different again, capturing cases such as Nigeria during the 1990s.

[3]See Butcher et al. (2021) for more details and discussion of these procedures.

Figure 1: Top 30 cases of ideological diversity



Figure 2: Top 30 cases of constituent diversity



Figure 3: Top 30 cases of organizational diversity



3.2 Dependent Variable

Our dependent variable for the country-month tests – *regime change* – is an indicator of whether a regime ended in the country-month according to the Historical Regimes Dataset (HRD) (Djuve et al., 2019). The HRD define a regime by stability in the set of formal and informal rules for how executives are selected and how policy is selected (Djuve et al., 2019). The end of a regime occurs when those rules are changed. The HRD definition of regime change matches the concept of major concessions and regime changes well because it includes changes that occur because of leadership removal and "revolution" but also changes that occur through negotiated processes where the leader does not step down, as was the case following protests in Togo in 1991-1992. Both of these situations entail major short term disruptions to the "rules of the game" that characterize regimes. Importantly, the end of a regime change in the

HRD is agnostic in relation to the type of regime that follows, which may be a democracy or some other form of autocracy. There were 91 regime endings in Africa over the 1990-2015 period. Our reduced sample of protest episodes contains 26 regime transitions.

Our dependent variable for the analysis of democratization is change in the "Polyarchy" score from Coppedge et al. (2019), measured as *t+2 – t-1*. We include the lagged dependent variable to control for floor and ceiling effects. Democratization in the wake of dissent usually manifests 2-3 years after a period of contention and is fairly stable afterwards (Dahl, 2020; Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). The Polyarchy score is an index of democratic institutions that aggregates measures of the existence of electoral institutions, their degree of freedom and fairness, the extent of suffrage, and protections for freedom of association and expression.

3.3 Control Variables

3.4 Models of regime change

We control for several additional variables that could plausibly confound the relationships we are seeking to identify. These controls are introduced in three batteries. First, we run parsimonious models controlling only for the country's level of democracy in the previous year, using the Polyarchy score[4] (Coppedge et al., 2019; Goldstone et al., 2010) and a decay function of the time since the last transition with a half-life of one-year. Periods following regime transitions may be especially turbulent, and characterized by widespread mobilization and unstable regimes. The decay function controls for the possibility that the period just after a regime transition is the most unstable and as time passes after a transition this risk decreases.

Second, we add country fixed effects and year fixed effects to rule-out alternative explanations centred on factors that are constant to countries over time (e.g. colonial history) or continent wide shocks (such as the Arab Spring).

Third, we add controls capturing the size and intensity of dissent in a country-month. These models include the % of organizations that were armed rebel groups to control for the possibility that violence reduces the chances of regime changes. Any association between diversity and regime changes could also reflect larger protests that are more diverse and generate regime changes (Clark and Regan, 2021; DeNardo, 2014; Lohmann, 1993) or periods with more 'momentum' that are more diverse and also generate regime changes (Chenoweth and Belgioioso, 2019). Controls for the largest maximalist event size in the month, the number of events in the month, and the interaction of the two are included for this reason. However, these results should be treated with caution because they introduce post-treatment bias. Diverse coalitions probably generate bigger protests and more protests, meaning that we are parsing out some of the association between diversity and regime changes that runs through larger/more frequent protests. Nonetheless, the main mechanisms linking diversity to regime changes emphasise the signalling

[4]Findings are robust to including the strength of civil society in the year before using the core civil society index from V-DEM, also lagged by one year. In other models we control for GDP per capita, since wealthier regimes will have greater capacity to either repress or co-opt potential challenges (Fearon and Laitin, 2003), as well as GDP growth, since times of economic crisis may make regime breakdown more likely (Haggard and Kaufman, 1995). These latter two controls do not substantially change the results.

effects of diversity, which are plausibly independent of protest sizes. These controls also help distinguish mechanisms centred on diversity from a simpler "bigger equals better" story.

All models of regime changes are linear probability models (LPMs).

Table 2:

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
vdem_trans	14,985	0.006	0.075	0	0	0	1
ideo_frac	14,985	0.084	0.210	0	0	0	1
org_frac	14,985	0.014	0.087	0	0	0	1
sb_frac	14,985	0.064	0.197	0	0	0	1
n_orgs	14,985	0.718	2.489	0	0	0	54
density_score	14,985	0.207	0.384	0	0	0	1
centralization_score	14,985	0.021	0.132	0	0	0	1
npart_max	14,985	0.157	0.736	0	0	0	7
n_scad_events	14,985	0.101	0.600	0	0	0	33
v2x_polyarchy_lag1	14,920	0.351	0.182	0.069	0.205	0.485	0.815
v2xcs_ccsi_lag1	14,980	0.589	0.262	0.020	0.359	0.825	0.978
vdem_trans_decay	14,985	0.083	0.201	0	0	0.02	1
year	14,985	2,002.571	7.500	1,990	1,996	2,009	2,015

3.4.1 Models of democratization

We include a different set of control variables in the models of democratization. Like the country-month analysis the frst models include a parsimonious set of controls consisting of Polyarchy at $t-1$, which in this case is a lagged dependent variable, *GDP growth* because economic crises weaken regimes and create democratic transitions (Brancati, 2016; Haggard and Kaufman, 2016) and economic development using *GDP per capita*, as development is associated with increasing organizational density in civil society and may independently cause regimes to liberalize (Boix and Stokes, 2003; Haggard and Kaufman, 2016). These latter two variables come from the World Bank (2020). Regional democracy is included because surrounding democracies may support (i.e. cause) pro-democracy resistance movements and independently drive democratization (Gleditsch and Ward, 2006). A control for the age of the leader was included because elderly leaders are can generate elite splits, opportunities for protest and openings for democratization (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005). These models also include controls for country-years with no organizational activity or just one active organization.

Second, we add country and year fixed effects. The third battery of controls adds the maximum level of "momentum" generated in a country-month (i.e the interaction between the number of protests and the maximum size), along with the constituent terms. These models also include the % of organizations that were armed rebel groups to control for the democracy-inhibiting effects of organized violence.

4 Findings

Table **??** shows how the characteristics of protest episodes vary across months of regime change versus non-regime change months, for the moment restricting the sample to months with at least one active

Table 3:

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
vdem_trans	14,985	0.006	0.075	0	0	0	1
ideo_frac	14,985	0.084	0.210	0	0	0	1
org_frac	14,985	0.014	0.087	0	0	0	1
sb_frac	14,985	0.064	0.197	0	0	0	1
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centralization_score	14,985	0.021	0.132	0	0	0	1
npart_max	14,985	0.157	0.736	0	0	0	7
n_scad_events	14,985	0.101	0.600	0	0	0	33
v2x_polyarchy_lag1	14,920	0.351	0.182	0.069	0.205	0.485	0.815
v2xcs_ccsi_lag1	14,980	0.589	0.262	0.020	0.359	0.825	0.978
vdem_trans_decay	14,985	0.083	0.201	0	0	0.02	1
year	14,985	2,002.571	7.500	1,990	1,996	2,009	2,015

organization in maximalist dissent. Regime changes exhibit more organizations in dissent against the regime ($\tilde{3}$ vs 8.6) and are more diverse across all dimensions (ideological, constituent and organizational). Regime changes also involve larger protests and a lower proportion of active armed organizations. This lends initial support to the idea that diversity embedded in protest movements helps drive regime changes.

Table 4: Descriptives: Opposition diversity and regime changes

Regime Transition	Number of active organizations	Ideological fractionalization	Constituent fractionalization	Organizational fractionalization	Mean protest size	% Armed Orgs	n_obs
0	2.95	0.35	0.35	0.06	0.67	0.77	3502
1	8.62	0.51	0.51	0.23	2.25	0.52	48

Figure 4 shows the baseline regression results for diversity. All included measures of diversity have positive coefficients, indicating that the likelihood of regime changes is higher with higher levels of diversity. Only the measure of social base diversity does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance and only for the 'full' model that risks post-treatment bias, indicating that the true association between diversity and regime changes is unlikely to be zero, give our data and model. Our results here suggest that diversity does make regime changes more likely – on average – above and beyond what might be expected given protest sizes, the number of events, "momentum" and other country and continent-wide features controlled for in the analysis (Chenoweth and Belgioioso, 2019).



Figure 4: Marginal Effects of Diversity on Regime Changes

4.0.1 Extensions and robustness

We tested several additional extensions of the main models. First we replaced the fractionalization scores with simpler counts of the number of ideological positions included in the month (ranging from 1 to 9), the number of social bases represented in the month (ranging from 1 to 11) and the number of different organization types included (ranging from 1 to 9). We also tested whether religious diversity was detrimental to generating regime changes, defining cases of ideological religious diversity when the month included Islamist *and* secular organizations, Islamist *and* christian organizations, or christian *and* secular organizations. Finally, we tested the independent impacts of ethnic diversity with a count of the number of organizations expressing "ethnic goals" and the number of organizations drawing from an "ethnic base". Although not exclusively the case, different organizations with ethnic goals or constituencies tend to represent different ethnic groups. Figure 5 shows these results.



Figure 5: Robustness checks and extensions

We find generally similar results for the alternative measures of diversity – there is a consistent positive association between ideological, organizational, and constituent diversity and regime changes. We also observe that religious diversity has positive associations with regime changes, as does ethnic diversity, although this is not precisely estimated for organizations with ethnically-based goals. We also observe that the more a movement consists of armed organizations, the less likely that regime transitions are.

4.1 Democratization

Are periods of resistance with more diverse organizational participation more likely to generate changes towards democracy? To explore this question, we first descriptively analyse the aftermath of 39 country months that experienced regime change in the context of dissent. Our analysis here tackles the question of whether the coalition that (plausibly) engendered a regime change can also help us understand subsequent institutional changes. Table 5 shows how levels of diversity vary across regime changes that resulted in positive changes towards democracy (changes greater than 0.1 on the polyarchy scale) or negative changes and/or stability.

This is a small but focused sample of 10 cases of positive change towards democratization, with the largest changes occurring in Tunisia 2011, Mali in 1991, South Africa in 1994 and Benin in 1990, and 18 cases of stability or negative changes, including, for example, autocratization episodes following dissent in Zimbabwe in 2009, Libya in 1992 and Mali in 2012. There are strikingly small differences between

Table 5: Descriptives: democratization after regime transitions

δ democracy	Number of active organizations	Ideological fractionalization	Constituent fractionalization	Organizational fractionalization	Mean protest size	Perc Armed Orgs	n_obs
Stable / Negative	9.45	0.54	0.52	0.25	2.41	0.52	29
Positive	13.1	0.59	0.53	0.38	3.2	0.3	10

cases experiencing positive changes and those with no/negative changes. The number of active organizations is higher, but average levels of ideological and constituent fractionalization are similar. Positive changes in democracy scores tended to follow events that were more diverse in terms of organizational fractionalization and had fewer active armed organizations. These descriptive statistics provide mixed evidence for the idea that more diverse episodes of resistance are more likely to result in democratization.

We can't take these analyses much further without digging into the specific cases. But democratization may occur in the absence of short-term regime changes and may be the product of anti-regime mobilization over longer periods, such as years, rather than specific months. To explore this possibility, we show the results of a country-year analysis with the dependent variable remaining as the change in the polyarchy score at $t+2$, but with the main diversity variables measured over a country-year. These models therefore estimate whether future democratization can be explained by the diversity of episodes of dissent in previous years, controlling for factors discussed above.

Table 6: Descriptives, democratization and diversity, country-years

δ democracy	Number of active organizations	Ideological fractionalization	Constituent fractionalization	Organizational fractionalization	Perc Armed Orgs	n_obs
Stable / Negative	2.65	0.23	0.27	0.08	0.29	1095
Positive	3.24	0.23	0.29	0.11	0.21	152

Table 6 shows how country-years with positive changes towards democracy compare to no change or negative changes. The descriptives are similar to the small-sample of cases of regime change above. There are few significant differences across democratization and non-democratization episodes; they are similar in terms of ideological and constituent diversity and slightly higher numbers of active organizations and levels of organizational diversity.

Figure 6 shows the baseline regression results connecting our diversity measures to changes in the polyarchy score at $t+2$. None of the results are definitive. Generally, diversity has a positive association with future levels of democracy, but this association is not significant at conventional levels in most models. It's only when we use the count of the number of active organizations that the coefficients are positive, and even then only when we exclude controls for the number of protest events, their size and 'momentum'. Organizational fractionalization is positive and significant at the 0.10 level, but only in the model without country fixed effects and extra controls.



Figure 6: Marginal Effects of Diversity on Democratization (t+2)

4.1.1 Extensions and robustness

We also tested different leads for democracy, including one, three, five and ten years into the future. There were no precisely estimated associations for ideological, organizational, constituent fractionalization or the number of active organizations.



Figure 7: Robustness tests, Democratization (t+2)

Tests were also run on alternative measures of diversity, specifically a count of the number of ideological positions represented by active organizations in a country year, the number of distinct social bases,

and the number of organization types. Tests were run with measurements of religious and ethnic diversity used in the analysis of regime change, measured over the country-year for these analyses. These results are shown in Figure 7. We do find positive and significant associations between the alternative measures of diversity (number of ideological positions and number of social bases) and changes in democracy at $t + 2$. However, these results are dependent on the choice of lead for the dependent variable. There are no significant associations between these alternative measures of diversity and leads at 1, 3, 5, or 10 years. Estimates for the impact of ethnic diversity are imprecisely estimated and do not provide strong evidence for a positive or a negative association, while there is a positive and significant association between religious *ideological* diversity and democratization. Overall, our results provide a mixed picture for the impact of diversity on democratization. While most associations are positive, they are most often imprecisely estimated and do not provide a strong basis for concluding the opposition diversity in resistance episodes has a clear positive or negative link to future democratization.

5 Discussion and Conclusion

Scholars have postulated that campaign diversity is important to the success of anti-government resistance movements, in terms of promoting regime change and democratization. However, the evidence offered in support of these claims is largely anecdotal and may not stand up to systematic, cross-case comparison.

We use new data on the characteristics of organizations in dissent across African countries in the post-Cold War period that amount what we think is the most systematic, cross-national, quantitative analysis of the effects of diversity and unity in protest episodes on regime change and democratization. Our results suggest that diversity may create a dilemma for dissidents, especially when it comes to organizational diversity. Diversity can, in the short term, substantially increase the prospects of regime changes and generate openings for institutional change. We saw this especially in the case of organizational diversity, but most of our indicators showed positive and significant associations with regime change. However, that same diversity can undermine the prospects of medium-term democratization, again, especially when it comes to organizational diversity, which was the only variable with significant (negative) associations with democratization.

There are several limitations to the analyses. First, at this stage we have not accounted for the possibility that diversity increases right after regime changes – short term openings, even within country-months may generate explosions of protest activity. It remains likely that organizations "bandwagon" onto movements that look like they will win, and signals of regime fragility or impending concessions may be context-specific and difficult to capture in a quantitative framework. If this is the case, then concessions may cause diversity, not the other way around (see, e.g Butcher and Pinckney 2021). Our results, however, are independent of protest sizes and the number of events, and the "momentum" generated by the interaction of these two, which should to an extent control for protest cascades and bandwagoning dynamics. Reverse causality is less of a concern for the democratization analyses where we would have to accept that dissidents can anticipate institutional changes years into the future, which

seems unlikely. Nonetheless, we hope to address these issues in future versions of this paper.

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