

**RESEARCH NOTE**

# Local conditions and the demand for independence: A dataset of secessionist grievances

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**Abstract**

There are more than 60 secessionist movements around the world, and they all advance arguments for why they deserve independence. These include a history of conflict with the state, illegal occupation and the democratic right to choose independence, among others. Yet no one has conducted a comparative analysis to see how these claims stack up and examined whether some movements actually deserve independence more than others. In this article, we construct a dataset of secessionist grievances. We develop a set of grievance indicators, we specify how they are operationalized and we detail how the grievances are categorized and aggregated. We then tally the results for each contemporary movement and discuss the broader patterns. Our findings show that the secessionist movements with the highest combined scores are, in order, the Saharawis, Palestinians, Tamils, Kachins and Cabindans. The nations with the lowest scores are the Scots and the Faroese.

**KEYWORDS**

autonomy, civil war, conflict management, grievances, independence movements, secession

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## 1 | INTRODUCTION

There are more than 60 contemporary secessionist movements around the world, and all of them advance arguments for why they should be allowed to break away from their parent state and form an independent country. The West Papuans contend that they have suffered human rights abuses at the hands of the Indonesian government. The leaders of Somaliland point to their sound government institutions, contrast them with the limited capabilities of Somalia and argue that they have earned their sovereignty. The Catalans maintain that they are a nation that has a right to choose their political fate. The Kanaks of New Caledonia posit that they should be independent given the principle of decolonization. All of these secessionist movements lodge grievances for why they should be granted independence. Yet no one has conducted a comparative analysis of the local conditions in which these grievances are expressed or explored whether some movements may actually deserve independence more than others.

We target this gap in the literature by constructing a dataset of secessionist grievances. A grievance is what secessionists typically reference in their claims when issuing a declaration of independence (Armitage, 2007). We define a grievance as an argument advanced by a secessionist movement for why they deserve or are entitled to independence. These grievances are self-reported and are quite often contested by other parties, particularly the state against which the claims are made. As we discuss below, our concept of a grievance covers a wide range of arguments that are commonly-used. Although they are built upon normative arguments, they may not find clear support in international law. Their use may be strategic, even cynical, but they may also be plausible, empirically grounded and persuasive. They are the normative appeals that secessionists regularly make, and they can have political consequences. Following recent research into this topic (Basta, 2020; Griffiths, 2020; Griffiths and Muro, 2020; Kelle and Sienknecht, 2020; Sanjaume-Calvet, 2020), our aim is to investigate systematically the settings in which these grievances are made. That is, we analyse the local conditions for each movement to see whether particular grievances are warranted and then compare the conditions across movements.

A central challenge in our project is the fact that secessionist grievances are normatively based and are therefore not easily quantified and/or normalized. For example, how does one measure the intensity of a remedial right to secession and compare it with the intensity of a primary right. We suspect that it is the difficulty of making such comparisons that has prevented scholars from attempting to create a dataset of grievances. Nevertheless, it would be quite useful for not only scholars across the social sciences but also for practitioners to have access to these kind of data. It would, to our knowledge, provide the first systematic and objectively data-driven ledger of the phenomena upon which grievances are purportedly based. It would permit an assessment of the relationship between reported grievances and actual experiences, and it would facilitate comparison. Overall, it would provide a more comprehensive understanding of the motives driving secessionist behaviour.

The article proceeds as follows. We begin with a dataset of all contemporary secessionist movements. Next, we examine the international legal terrain and normative theories of secession in order to construct a set of grievance indicators, and we specify how they are operationalized. We divide the secessionist grievances into five categories that capture the full range of commonly-given arguments. The first category focuses on restorative grievances in which movements argue that independence is necessary in order to restore the nation to a prior status. The second category stresses remedial rights related to persecution and human rights abuse by the larger state. The third category centers on primary rights related to the freedom to choose independence and to pursue a separate status. The fourth category highlights general conflict-related grievances vis-à-vis the larger state. The fifth category emphasizes functionality related grievances in which breakaway, *de facto* states have earned their sovereignty and deserve independence because they have a proven track record of governance. After sorting the grievances into these five categories, we tally the scores for each secessionist movement and show the results for each category ranging from 0 to 1, and as an aggregate score ranging from 0 to 5. We find that the top five scoring movements are, in order, the Saharawis, Palestinians, Tamils, Kachins and Cabindans. Notably, the nations to earn the lowest scores are the Scots and the Faroese.

It is important to say that our analysis should not be taken as advocacy for any particular group. Every secessionist effort is a complex issue, and there are usually good arguments on both sides. Our approach was objective,

transparent and designed to minimize bias. We recognize that additional grievance indicators and different aggregation rules can alter the results, but we attempted to maximize the robustness of the findings by utilizing all available and relevant indicators and dividing them across five commonly used categories. Further analyses can utilize different weights in the data as necessary.

## 2 | SECESSIONIST MOVEMENTS

The first step in constructing a dataset of secessionist grievances is to establish a list of secessionist movements. Following Griffiths (2016: 205), we define a secessionist movement as a “self-identified nation inside a sovereign state that seeks to separate and form a new [recognized] sovereign state.” To count, the movement must last at least 1 week, include at least 100 people, lay claim to a territory not smaller than 100 square kilometres, possess a flag, declare independence and claim territory that is contiguous with the larger state. This is a broad definition, but it does exclude self-determination movements who aim for a level of autonomy that falls short of full independence—e.g., the Gallegos, the Manx, and the Zanzibaris. Griffiths records a total of 60 movements in existence as of 2017, the last year for which data were collected.

We augmented this list of secessionist movements in two ways. First, we added secessionist movements who have exited Griffiths' dataset since 2000. In the dataset, a movement ends when the group formally renounces its independence claim, or an agreement is struck granting independence or some other concession short of independence, or 5 years pass without secessionist activity (Griffiths, 2016: 206). Although these criteria detect a measure of formal or informal cessation, they are not foolproof because in many cases the underlying desire for independence endures. For example, the Bougainville independence movement ended (according to the dataset) with the 2001 Peace Agreement, yet that region held an independence referendum in December, 2019. Given that our purpose is to identify the level of grievance rather than the current state of the movement, we concluded that it was best to push the end date back and include a wider set.<sup>1</sup> As such, 10 movements were added, including Lakotah, Assam, Tamil Eelam, Anjouan, Cabinda, Aceh, Tatarstan, Moheli, Bougainville and Guadalcanal.

Second, we added two prominent independence movements that were left out of Griffiths' dataset because they have not yet declared independence: New Caledonia and Iraqi Kurdistan. For some movements, the declaring of independence is a strategic act, and it therefore made sense to include these two prominent groups. In sum, we utilize a set of 72 movements (see Appendix A).

## 3 | SECESSIONIST GRIEVANCES

The core challenge in assembling a dataset of secessionist grievances is how to aggregate them. It is not that difficult to list the many grievances that secessionists reference. The problem is how to tally the answers. Indeed, international law does not provide comprehensive guidelines for doing so. According to Crawford (2006: 390), “secession is neither legal nor illegal in international law, but a legally neutral act the consequences of which are regulated internationally”. Most instances of secessionism exist in what Milanovic (2017) refers to as a zone of tolerance where “international law is neutral towards secession”. Outside of clear cases of decolonization or when the parent state has given its consent, the pathway to independence is ambiguous and also regulated by sovereign states with diverse political and normative concerns (Pavkovic and Radan, 2007; Fabry, 2010; Caspersen, 2012; Coggins, 2014; Sterio, 2013). As Griffiths (2017) put it, international recognition is an evolving and constitutive process consisting of legal principles and normative arguments with varying levels of acceptance. These arguments do provide guidelines for constructing a dataset of grievances. But how do we balance the varied arguments that are used? For example, does the fact that a nation was once an independent state matter as much as their current legal status in the country of which they are a part? Each grievance is normatively derived, and there is no obvious way to weight them.

Our solution was to differentiate categories of grievances from specific indicators of a grievance. Here, we identified five categories. The first category pertains to restorative grievances. These are arguments put forth for why independent statehood would be restoring a nation to some prior status. The underlying principle of decolonization is to rectify the wrongs of colonialism and restore a region and its people to their independence (Crawford, 2002; Crawford, 2006; Fabry, 2010; Grant, 1999; Jackson, 1990). Related arguments regarding inherent sovereignty are made in relation to indigenous groups in the United States and other settler countries. On 23 November 1993, President Bill Clinton stated that “the indigenous Hawaiian people never directly relinquished their claims to their inherent sovereignty as a people, or over their national lands, to the United States”. A similar argument has been made somewhat controversially by Catalan secessionists who argue that Catalonia was once a sovereign state prior to Castilian/Spanish domination and is therefore more eligible for regaining its independence. In sum, the first category focuses on restorative grievances.

The next two categories focus on the rights of the secessionist nation with respect to its home state. The second category focuses on remedial rights, also known as Just Cause Theory (Buchanan, 2003; Norman, 1998). These are arguments for why independence should be given as a remedy for human rights abuse at the hand of the state. They correspond with Berlin's (1969) concept of negative rights, like the freedom from persecution and unlawful imprisonment. Human rights issues are a commonly cited grievance for secessionist movements, as this article about South Sudan attests: “The more than 98 per cent of people of all tribes (rephrase) in Southern Sudan did not vote for independence for fun. The overwhelming vote for independence precisely meant people earnestly wanted freedom from human rights violations and services for a decent standard of living”.<sup>ii</sup>

The third category centres on rights regarding the freedom to choose independence and a separate status. A 1946 article on the Faroe Islands had this to say on the topic: “Persons everywhere who uphold free institutions will respect the right of the Faeroes people to determine their own destiny”.<sup>iii</sup> This category corresponds with what political theorists call primary rights (also known as Choice Theory), where the idea is that a self-identified nation should have the right to choose their political fate via a plebiscite, referendum or similar instrument (Beran, 1998; Pavkovic & Radan, 2007; Wellman, 2005). These are what Berlin (1969) would call positive rights, the freedom to do certain things. Such arguments are commonly used by numerous secessionist movements, certainly those who operate in advanced democracies like the Catalans. As we discuss below, indicators in this category will capture a movement's ability (or lack thereof) to access the right.

The fourth category is about grievances related to a history of violent conflict with the home state. Have the secessionist movement and the nation it purports to represent fought a civil war or ethnic conflict with the home state? If so, how frequently, and what was the intensity of the conflict? The logic of this category proceeds from the premise that violent conflict with the state, particularly when it recurs, is a source of ongoing grievance and instability. Although it is related to the second category that focuses on remedial rights, it is different in important ways. Whereas the second category captures a wide set of phenomena, this one focuses exclusively on violence. In addition, this category does not make a direct claim about the behaviour of the state. Indeed, the cause of the conflict could be mutual or even rebel-driven. The point here is not that the nation in question has been mistreated by the home state, but rather that the relationship is fraught and imperilled, and therefore a source of grievance.

The final category addresses issues of functionality. Consider this statement from Yousuf Sheikh Madar, Spokesperson for the Republic of Somaliland: “The Republic of Somaliland is a *de facto* entity. The Republic of Somalia, which came into existence in July 1960 by the merger of ex-Italian Somali territory (the south) and British Somaliland (the north) is non-existent today”.<sup>iv</sup> The sentiment expressed here is about earned sovereignty, and it is commonly used by *de facto* states who feel that they should be awarded the status of sovereignty given the standards of governance they have achieved (Berg, 2009; Caspersen, 2012; Florea, 2014; Pegg, 1998; Visoka, 2018). In contrast to restorative grievances, which plea for a return to a lost status, or rights-based grievances that focus on the current relationship with the parent state, functionality-based grievances focus on the breakaway nation itself, and what it has accomplished.

These categories represent different ways to conceptualize secessionist grievances. We think of them as images for how secessionists see and pitch their cause. As we discuss below, some groups cite grievances across multiple

categories, and some are focused on a particular category and image for why they are seeking independence. Our five-way categorization provides a comprehensive scheme for organizing the relevant and commonly used grievances.

### 3.1 | Grievance indicators

These grievances were operationalized in a manner that emphasized transparency and bias-minimization. Table 1 presents the aggregation scheme. Note that each category was quantified from 0 to 1. As such, the aggregate score across all five categories ranges from 0 to 5. The appendix at the end of the article lists the categorical and combined scores for each secessionist movement, and the complete dataset is available online.

In the restorative grievances category, two indicators were used. The first indicator is whether the secessionist movement has ever been, or is currently on, the UN List for Non-Self-Governing Territories, the so-called Decolonization List.<sup>y</sup> Examples of groups currently on the Decolonization List include the Saharawis, the Southern Cameroons and New Caledonia. Groups that were previously on the list include West Papua (Irian Jaya), Puerto Rico and Hawaii. The second indicator for restorative grievances is whether the nation in question was previously an independent state at some point after 1816, according to the International System(s) Dataset Project (ISD) (Griffiths and Butcher, 2013). Examples include Aceh, Baluchistan and Assam. Although some states may have been independent before 1816, there is currently no comprehensive dataset of all states prior to that year.

The indicators for restorative grievances were quantified as follows. The highest possible score for this category is 1. To allocate points, we determined that currently being on the Decolonization List was worth 0.66 (two-thirds of the possible points), formerly being on the list was worth 0.33 (one-third of the possible points), and that having prior statehood was worth 0.33 (one-third of the possible points). To obtain the maximum score of 1, a nation would have to currently be on the Decolonization List and formerly have been a state. Interestingly, no such nation exists. The highest scores of 0.66 were largely given to those groups who are currently on the list but were not prior states, such as the Southern Cameroons, New Caledonia and the Saharawis. One exception is Hawaii, which earned a 0.66 because it was once on the Decolonization List and was also a former state. Groups that ranked second were

**TABLE 1** Scheme for aggregating secessionist indicators

Grievance category	Variables	Value
Restorative	Decolonization	0–2
	Prior statehood	0–1
Remedial rights	Political discrimination	0–4
	Economic discrimination	0–4
	Religious discrimination	0–3
	Language discrimination	0–3
	Regional autonomy	0–1
Primary rights	Right of secession	0–2
	Referendum	0–2
	Parties	0–1
	Eternity clause	0–1
Conflict	Conflict	0–1
	Intensity	0–1
	Recent intensity	0–1
Functionality	Rebel capability	0–4
	Governance institutions	0–10

movements that were previously on the Decolonization List or are listed as having prior statehood. These groups include Tibet, Assam, Aceh, West Papua, Baluchistan, Puerto Rico and South Yemen. The third tier of rankings includes all the other secessionist movements in the dataset who received a score of 0 because they met none of the criteria. Overall, four secessionist movements were tied for the highest score: the Southern Cameroons, the Saharawis, New Caledonia and Hawaii.

The second category focuses on grievances related to remedial rights. Here, we combined indicators from two sources: the Minorities at Risk (MAR) Dataset and the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) Dataset.<sup>vi</sup> From the MAR Dataset, we used four indicators. For each of the four indicators, a score of 0 represents no discrimination, while a score of 3 or 4 represents the highest level of discrimination. The first indicator is *political discrimination*, ranging from no discrimination to an exclusive and actively repressive policy towards the group (0–4). The second indicator from MAR is *economic discrimination*, which measures the extent to which public policies restrict the ability of the group to gain economic opportunities (0–4). The third indicator measures *religious discrimination*, and to what extent religious activity is restricted (0–3). The fourth indicator from MAR measures *language discrimination* against the group (0–3). For the fifth and final indicator, we used the AUT2 variable from the EPR Dataset, which measures the degree to which an ethnic group has power at the regional level. Here, a group receives a score of 1 for not having power at the regional level, while a secessionist movement that has regional power receives a score of 0. Overall, we computed each movement's total score in this category by summing up these indicators (0–15) and dividing by 15. Our results show that the Arabistanis of southwest Iran had the highest score of .866 (13/15), followed by the Kachins, the Karen and the Iranian Kurds, all with scores of .80 (12/15).

The third category focuses on grievances related to primary rights. Does the secessionist movement have a legal pathway to independence and/or to a form of political separation? Note that a high score in this category implies limited or blocked access to primary rights. The first variable, *right of secession*, was constructed for this dataset. It looks at whether the country has issued a court ruling or has a constitutional clause that allows the group to secede (0–2). If there is a constitutional right to leave the country *via* secession, the group receives a score of 0. If there is a court ruling allowing the secessionist movement to leave the country, the variable is coded with a score of 1. If there is no right to leave whatsoever, the score awarded is 2. The second variable, *referendum*, was also generated for this project. It records whether a secessionist group has held a referendum, and whether this is legal in the eyes of the state (0–2). For the *referendum* variable, a score of 0 is awarded if the referendum is legal, a 1 if the referendum is not legal, and a 2 if no referendum has been held. The third and fourth variables (0–1), *party* and *eternity clause*, come from Weill's, 2017 publication on banned political parties and eternity clauses. *Party* tallies whether separatist parties are banned in the country (e.g., Cameroon). *Eternity clause* measures whether the country has an eternity clause, which ensures that the constitution cannot be changed by an amendment, and therefore prevents any change that renders secession legal (e.g., Italy). The overall logic for these indicators is that a lack of political representation or an inflexible constitution closes avenues by which to seek independence. Our findings show that nine secessionist movements achieved a complete score of 1 (6/6), meaning that they have the most legitimate grievances where primary rights are concerned. These include the Cabindans, the Kurds in Turkey and the Southern Cameroons.

The fourth category on conflict-related grievances measures the history and intensity of violence between the secessionist movement and the state. Here, we used three variables drawn from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), which records all conflict between groups and their government between 1946 and 2018 (Pettersson, Högbladh and Öberg, 2019). According to the UCDP website, an armed conflict "is a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year."<sup>vii</sup> The first indicator, *conflict*, tallies whether the group has ever been in conflict with the central government (0–1), where at least 25 were killed. The second variable, *intense*, tallies whether a conflict has been intense for at least 1 year (0–1), and at least 1,000 were killed.<sup>viii</sup> The third variable, *intense10* (worded as Recent Intensity in Table 1), tallies whether a conflict has been intense for at least 1 year during the last 10 years (0–1). As we show in Appendix A, three movements had full scores of 1 (3/3): South Yemen, Mindanao and Northern Ireland.

The final category centres on grievances related to functionality. We used two indicators that capture the group's capability and institutions, relative to the central government. Both indicators were taken from Florea's (2014) work on *de facto* states. The first indicator is rebel capability, which measures the group's strength relative to the central government from 0 to 4. Most of the secessionist movements in this dataset are not considered *de facto* states. For those that can be considered *de facto* states, a score of 1 for the rebel capability variable indicates the secessionist movement is weaker than the government, while a score of 2 indicates parity with the government. A score of 3 means the secessionist movement is stronger than the government, while a score of 4 means the secessionist movement is much stronger than the government. The second indicator is a count from 0 to 10 of how many independent governance institutions a *de facto* state has built.<sup>ix</sup> The functionality grievances category measures earned sovereignty, which suggests that *de facto* states and borderline *de facto* states will have a score greater than 0. Three movements had full scores of 1 (14/14), including the Bosnian Serbs, Northern Cyprus and Somaliland. However, the majority of secessionist movements in this dataset (51) do not fit the criteria and therefore score a 0 in this category.

## 4 | RESULTS

The rankings presented are useful for assessing types of grievances and which groups score higher on specific indicators and categories. There is substantial variation here because the settings in which these movements operate also varies. Some have a history of conflict when others do not. Some are functional *de facto* states, and some manoeuvre using the democratic institutions of the home state. Although we recognize that there is variation across the categories, and do not claim that one is more important than others, we can calculate a combined score that paints a fuller picture of secessionist grievances. To do so, we summed the scores from each category.

The 10 nations with the highest scores were, in order, the Saharawis, Palestinians, Tamils (of Sri Lanka), Kachin, Cabindans, Bosnian Serbs, Karen, Tibetans, Acehnese and Arabistanis. As listed in Appendix A, the general pattern is that groups who scored in 5/5 or 4/5 categories finished highest in the combined grievances rankings. For example, out of a maximum score of 5, the Saharawis scored the highest, with a 3.2857. The second highest scoring nation, the Palestinians, scored a 3.0190. Whereas the Saharawis scored in all five categories, the Palestinians scored in only four categories and received a 0 where restorative grievances are concerned. We do not have space, nor is it our intention, to go into a descriptive analysis of each of these movements. Suffice it to say that given the data used in our analysis, and the manner in which it was organized and aggregated, these secessionist movements appear to be the most deserving.

Of perhaps equal interest were what we might call the least deserving secessionist movements. The Scots and the Faroese scored the lowest overall points with 0.1667. Interestingly, the Quebecois and the Catalans were not far behind with scores of 0.5000 and 0.6667, respectively. All four of these secessionist movements operate in advanced democracies where conflict is largely absent and remedial rights arguments carry less weight. The source of points for these groups was mostly related to their incomplete access to primary rights, but their scores were very low even in that category. We do not mean to mitigate the causes that motivate these movements, but given the parameters of our analysis, we conclude that they are the least deserving.

## 5 | CONCLUSION

Many secessionist movements claim to deserve independence and point to various grievances to support their argument. In this article, we compiled a dataset of 72 secessionist movements, sorted their grievances into five categories and tallied the scores. According to our results, the top five scoring movements are, in order, the Saharawis, Palestinians, Tamils, Kachins and Cabindas. Notably, the nations to earn the lowest scores are the Scots and the Faroese. Unsurprisingly, groups that scored highly in numerous categories score higher when all grievances were combined.

We conclude with a caveat, an observation and two directions for further research. The caveat is that we are neutral with respect to these secessionist movements and stress that our analysis should not be taken as advocacy.

Our investigation was objective, transparent and even a little surprising given that we began the study without expectations for how different movements would fare. Observationally, it is interesting that some of the most prominent contemporary secessionist movements, like Scotland and Catalonia, had the lowest scores. Meanwhile, the movements with the highest scores occur in settings of semi-frozen conflict like Western Sahara and Palestine. Although the Scots may well deserve their independence, and may win it in the future, they come up short when stacked up against groups like the Saharawis and the Palestinians.

Although there are numerous directions for further research, we will limit our comments to two. First, one could revisit the five categories, the indicators used and the method by which they are weighted and aggregated. We think of our categories as images for how secessionist movements see their causes (and are seen). But the stress on these categories could be shifted as needed, depending on disciplinary interest and the aim of the researcher, and new indicators could be added. Second, it would be interesting to see how much our results actually predict the grievances used by these secessionist movements. That is, do the scores in each category correlate with the normative appeals and grievances made by the groups in their public pronouncements and political arguments? In other words, do they deploy the right arguments, and, if not, is that because the data are imperfect or because their self-image is inaccurate?

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## ENDNOTES

- <sup>i</sup> Although one could argue that the end date should be pushed back further, we felt that 2000 was a reasonable cut-off point that picked up the commonly discussed secessionist movements.
- <sup>ii</sup> "South Sudanese nationalism in post independence era," Jacob K. Lupai, 27 July 2012, *All Africa*
- <sup>iii</sup> "New Nation," *Washington Post*, September 21, 1946
- <sup>iv</sup> "Northern Somali state opposes UN troops," *Reuters News*, 21 February 1993
- <sup>v</sup> "Non-Self-Governing Territories" *The United Nations and Decolonization*.
- <sup>vi</sup> Minorities at Risk Project 2009; Ethnic Power Relations Core Dataset 2018.
- <sup>vii</sup> From website: [www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/). Viewed on June 21, 2019.
- <sup>viii</sup> This accords with the distinction the UCDP draws between minor conflicts resulting in 25–999 annual battle-related deaths, and war which results in at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a year.
- <sup>ix</sup> Florea, 2014:15. The possible government institutions are executive, legislative, judicial, taxation system, educational system, welfare system, foreign affairs, media system, police system and a banking system.
- <sup>x</sup> Names for movements are taken from Griffiths, 2016. Numbers in the titles indicate different iterations of the movement.

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## APPENDIX A.

Table A1. Secessionist grievances<sup>x</sup>

State	Movement	Restorative	Remedial rights	Primary rights	Conflict	Functionality	Combined
Morocco	Saharawis	0.6667	0.3333	0.8333	0.6667	0.7857	3.2857
Israel	Palestinians II	0.0000	0.7333	0.8333	0.6667	0.7857	3.0190
Sri Lanka	Tamils	0.0000	0.6667	0.8333	0.6667	0.6429	2.8095
Burma	Kachin III	0.0000	0.8000	0.8333	0.6667	0.4286	2.7286
Angola	Cabinda	0.0000	0.6667	1.0000	0.6667	0.2857	2.6190
Bosnia	Serbs	0.0000	0.2000	0.6667	0.6667	1.0000	2.5333
Burma	Karens	0.0000	0.8000	0.8333	0.6667	0.2143	2.5143
China	Tibet IV	0.3333	0.7333	0.6667	0.6667	0.0000	2.4000
Indonesia	Atjeh II	0.3333	0.1333	0.8333	0.6667	0.4286	2.3952
Iran	Arabistanis	0.0000	0.8667	0.8333	0.6667	0.0000	2.3667
Russia	Chechnya II	0.0000	0.6000	0.6667	0.6667	0.4286	2.3619
Georgia	Abkhazia	0.0000	0.0000	0.8333	0.6667	0.8571	2.3571
Cameroon	Southern Cameroons	0.6667	0.6667	1.0000	0.0000	0.0000	2.3333
Iran	Kurds II	0.0000	0.8000	0.8333	0.6667	0.0000	2.3000
Turkey	Kurds II	0.0000	0.6000	1.0000	0.6667	0.0000	2.2667
Azerbaijan	Nagorno Karabakh	0.0000	0.0000	0.6667	0.6667	0.9286	2.2619
Nigeria	Biafra	0.0000	0.0000	0.6667	0.6667	0.9286	2.2619
Burma	Shans	0.0000	0.7333	0.8333	0.6667	0.0000	2.2333
Yemen	South Yemen	0.3333	0.0667	0.8333	1.0000	0.0000	2.2333
Georgia	South Ossetia	0.0000	0.0000	0.6667	0.6667	0.8571	2.1905
Pakistan	Baluch	0.3333	0.3333	0.8333	0.6667	0.0000	2.1667
India	Kashmir II	0.0000	0.6667	0.8333	0.6667	0.0000	2.1667
India	Assam	0.3333	0.2667	0.8333	0.6667	0.0000	2.1000
Philippines	Mindanao	0.0000	0.2000	0.5000	1.0000	0.3571	2.0571
Senegal	Casamance	0.0000	0.4667	0.8333	0.3333	0.3571	1.9905
Iraq	Kurds IV	0.0000	0.1333	0.5000	0.6667	0.6429	1.9429
Comoros	Anjouan 2	0.0000	0.0000	0.8333	0.6667	0.3571	1.8571
Cyprus	North Cyprus	0.0000	0.0000	0.8333	0.0000	1.0000	1.8333
Pakistan	Pashtuns	0.0000	0.3333	0.8333	0.6667	0.0000	1.8333
India	Tripuras	0.0000	0.3333	0.8333	0.6667	0.0000	1.8333
India	Nagas	0.0000	0.2667	0.8333	0.6667	0.0000	1.7667
Philippines	Abu Sayyaf	0.0000	0.2000	0.8333	0.6667	0.0000	1.7000
Moldova	Transnistria	0.0000	0.0667	0.6667	0.0000	0.9286	1.6619
Mali	Azawad	0.0000	0.1333	0.8333	0.6667	0.0000	1.6333
India	Boro/Bodo	0.0000	0.1333	0.8333	0.6667	0.0000	1.6333

(Continues)

State	Movement	Restorative	Remedial rights	Primary rights	Conflict	Functionality	Combined
Burma	Arakanese II	0.0000	0.0667	0.8333	0.6667	0.0000	<b>1.5667</b>
Burma	Karenni	0.0000	0.0667	0.8333	0.6667	0.0000	<b>1.5667</b>
Thailand	Malays	0.0000	0.2000	0.6667	0.6667	0.0000	<b>1.5333</b>
India	Meitei	0.0000	0.0000	0.8333	0.6667	0.0000	<b>1.5000</b>
Somalia	Somaliland	0.0000	0.0000	0.5000	0.0000	1.0000	<b>1.5000</b>
Ukraine	Crimea	0.0000	0.1333	0.6667	0.6667	0.0000	<b>1.4667</b>
Ukraine	Donetsk	0.0000	0.1333	0.6667	0.6667	0.0000	<b>1.4667</b>
Ukraine	Luhansk	0.0000	0.1333	0.6667	0.6667	0.0000	<b>1.4667</b>
USA	Hawaii	0.6667	0.0667	0.6667	0.0000	0.0000	<b>1.4000</b>
China	Uighurs III (Xinjiang)	0.0000	0.7333	0.6667	0.0000	0.0000	<b>1.4000</b>
Spain	Basques III	0.0000	0.0000	0.6667	0.6667	0.0000	<b>1.3333</b>
France	New Caledonia	0.6667	0.0000	0.3333	0.3333	0.0000	<b>1.3333</b>
New Zealand	Maori	0.0000	0.2667	0.6667	0.3333	0.0000	<b>1.2667</b>
UK	Northern Ireland	0.0000	0.2667	0.0000	1.0000	0.0000	<b>1.2667</b>
Ethiopia	Somali II	0.0000	0.2667	0.3333	0.6667	0.0000	<b>1.2667</b>
Papua New Guinea	Bougainville	0.0000	0.1333	0.1667	0.6667	0.2857	<b>1.2524</b>
France	Basques	0.0000	0.2000	1.0000	0.0000	0.0000	<b>1.2000</b>
Australia	Euahlayi nation	0.0000	0.2000	0.6667	0.3333	0.0000	<b>1.2000</b>
Indonesia	Irian Jaya	0.3333	0.2000	0.6667	0.0000	0.0000	<b>1.2000</b>
France	Corsica	0.0000	0.1333	1.0000	0.0000	0.0000	<b>1.1333</b>
USA	Lokotah	0.0000	0.1333	0.6667	0.3333	0.0000	<b>1.1333</b>
Italy	Sardinia	0.0000	0.0667	1.0000	0.0000	0.0000	<b>1.0667</b>
France	Brittany	0.0000	0.0000	1.0000	0.0000	0.0000	<b>1.0000</b>
Comoros	Moheli	0.0000	0.0000	1.0000	0.0000	0.0000	<b>1.0000</b>
USA	Puerto Rico	0.3333	0.0000	0.3333	0.3333	0.0000	<b>1.0000</b>
France	Savoy	0.0000	0.0000	1.0000	0.0000	0.0000	<b>1.0000</b>
Namibia	Lozi	0.0000	0.1333	0.8333	0.0000	0.0000	<b>0.9667</b>
Australia	Murrawarri Republic	0.0000	0.2000	0.6667	0.0000	0.0000	<b>0.8667</b>
Russia	Dagestan	0.0000	0.0000	0.8333	0.0000	0.0000	<b>0.8333</b>
Italy	Padania	0.0000	0.0000	0.8333	0.0000	0.0000	<b>0.8333</b>
Russia	Tatars	0.0000	0.1333	0.6667	0.0000	0.0000	<b>0.8000</b>
Spain	Catalans III	0.0000	0.0000	0.6667	0.0000	0.0000	<b>0.6667</b>
Belgium	Flanders	0.0000	0.0000	0.6667	0.0000	0.0000	<b>0.6667</b>
Solomon Islands	Guadalcanal	0.0000	0.0000	0.6667	0.0000	0.0000	<b>0.6667</b>
Canada	Quebec	0.0000	0.0000	0.1667	0.3333	0.0000	<b>0.5000</b>
Denmark	Faeroe Islands	0.0000	0.0000	0.1667	0.0000	0.0000	<b>0.1667</b>
UK	Scotland	0.0000	0.0000	0.1667	0.0000	0.0000	<b>0.1667</b>