Summary

Skriv sammendrag av oppgaven din her. Sammendraget skal ikke være lenger enn én side.

Abstract

1st section describing the findings.

Acknowledgements

Forord, dedikasjon, takk til.

Denne masteroppgåva er av profesjonsrelevans fordi… (lektorstudiet)

PRIO + explain your role + thanks to Kerstin for providing the geo-ref data to me directly.

Karin – Helping me through this process from start to finish.

Ønsker du å spre forord, dedikasjon e.l. over flere sider kan du gjøre det, men pass på å legge inn blanke sider slik at alt havner på oddetallssider. Slik havner det på høyre side dersom du skal ha trykte eksemplarer av oppgaven.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Kenya's minister of interior states the following: "Due to Kenya's national security interest, the government has decided the hosting of refugees has to come to an end" (Agutu 2016). The effects of hosting refugees are pressuring African states to act, but how does the presence of refugees affect citizens' trust in their political institutions? To answer this question, this paper investigates the effect of refugees on institutional trust in Kenya and Tanzania. By researching Kenya and Tanzania this topic will be in two of the major refugee hosting countries in Africa (Mogire 2009:16). The two cases inherit some structural similarities when it comes to colonial history, independence, but when it comes to refugee-policy Kenya and Tanzania is characterised as quite different[1],although Tanzania has more recently followed in Kenya's footsteps by pulling out from the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (Romtveit 2019). Even so, Kenya and Tanzania inherit two different refugee-hosting backgrounds which are fruitful for research. In answering the research question: How do refugee camps affect citizen's institutional trust in Kenya and Tanzania? What are the actual effects of hosting refugees, and can this, in turn, harm the host-country or community's trust in institutions?

Refugee camps are according to the UNHCR temporary facilities which are built to provide immediate protection and assistance to people who have been forced to flee their homes for different reasons[2]. In situations where there is need for long term solutions, where services include educational and livelihood opportunities. These services are also offered to host communities (UNHCR 2021g), and but research has to a large extent focused on the effects of immigration in the Western Hemisphere. This research looks at how host-communities are affected by having refugee-camps in their regions in the Global South.

Research on the effects that refugees have on public attitudes are highly relevant since international migration is at its all-time high. The researchers Alrababa'h, Dillon, Williamson, Hainmueller, Hangartner & Weinstein (2021) argue that although this is an international trend, most research focuses on developed countries, which have relatively fewer migrants and more capacity to absorb them (2021:33). This thesis focuses on the East-African context where states do not have the same resources or capacity as Western countries to tackle unwanted effects of immigration. This is the main objective for conducting this research, and it is needed to

[1] "In 1991 there were a revolution in Kenyan refugee policy, which up until that point had allowed for the integration of arriving refugees into the Kenyan population. 1991 marked the beginning of the "encampment" strategy in Kenya and the hand-over of the refugee screening process from the Kenyan government to the UNHCR" (Verdirame 1999).

[2] Some of these reasons being: war, persecution or violence (UNHCR 2021g).

investigate how refugees can affect institutional trust, which is a central legitimacy indicator. By researching refugees and its effects on institutional trust on the individual, regional and country level, the two case countries show: (*Add core finding from the research*).

In this thesis I conduct a multilevel analysis based on data from the Geo-Refugee dataset (Fisk 2021)[3] and Afrobarometer round 6 and 7 (2015) to measure refugee presence in a region and its effect on institutional trust in Kenya and Tanzania. Due to a difficulty in matching regions in the case of Kenya (regional reform in 2010), two different rounds of the Afrobarometer data is used in this research.

1.1 Structure of the Thesis

Add:

- Specify what you expect to find of effects for institutional trust?
- Since this is a thesis with limited previous research the theory chapter is structured according to its main dependent variable institutional trust (chapter 3), further it covers the literature on migration research and attitudinal impacts of hosting refugees, and finally it present the hypotheses for this thesis.
- Your findings
- Where they in accordance?

[3] The Geo-Refugee dataset provide geocoded data on location, population size and accommodation types in refugee camps. I requested access to more recently updated data from Kerstin Fisk personally, and gained access to the second version of the dataset in December 2020, including data from 2000 until 2017.

Chapter 2: Background for Researching Kenya and Tanzania

This thesis focuses on the cases of Kenya and Tanzania, two of the major refugee hosting countries in Africa (Mogire 2009:16), researching how refugee affect the institutional trust. The countries are of interest based on their difference in refugee-policy and in institutional trust (Uddhammar 2011:1169), but they inherit structural similarities which makes them beneficial to comparison. The chapter which follows addresses these countries' similarities, differences, history, and refugee-policies.

2.1 Comparing Kenya and Tanzania

Kenya and Tanzania are often subject of comparison in different areas of research (Barkan 1994; Miguel 2004), but in order to do an accurate comparison it is important to point out areas where the two countries differ, and where they are similar to one another. After this clarification one can see what these two countries are the cases of, and what they can contribute with in further research. Barkan (1994) argues for a comparison between Kenya and Tanzania since they have similar influential variables which can be prominent for their political climate. Both countries are former British colonies, have similar geography (1994:7), and host refugees from neighbouring countries[4]. Since this book was published, Kenya and Tanzania have evolved and changed. Kenya and Tanzania are still similar in some respects, which allows for a MSSD[5]-analysis, keeping major structural elements constant while researching effects of institutional trust. Gerring (2008) marks that using the most similar method (MSSD) in a hypothesis generating study the researcher looks for cases that differ on the outcome variable (institutional trust), but are similar on various factors that have contributed to that outcome (2008:668). This research design fits well since both countries are experiencing a high influx of refugees.

In addition to Barkan (1994), Miguel (2004) also observes that many social scientists see Kenya and Tanzania as fundamentally similar, and based on this similarity they conduct their comparative analysis (2004:335). It is seemingly so, that Kenya and Tanzania are often being compared in the field of social science, but it is important to ask oneself whether they differ in relation to the main research area of this thesis, which is the effects of migration on institutional trust.

[4] Some examples being: Kenya's experience of large immigration flows from Somalia, and Tanzania's experience with high level of immigrants from the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda (Betts 2013:34-37).

[5] MSSD or "Most Similar Systems Design" is used as a research method in comparative political science. The reason for choosing systems that are similar is the ambition to keep constant as many extraneous variables as possible (Anckar 2008:389).

2.1.1 General Similarities and Differences between the Case Countries

Before a more comprehensive review of Kenya and Tanzania can take place, the following table (Table 1) will shortly give an overview of some central aspects of the Kenyan and Tanzanian context, looking at a range of topics: colonialism, independence, population size, refugee-population, and different development indexes.

Table 1: Case Overview of Kenya and Tanzania

		Case	
Element	**Characteristic**	***Kenya***	***Tanzania***
History	Colonial past	Previous British colony	Previous British colony
	Independence	1963	Tanzania – Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1964.
	Regional reform	2010 (47 counties)	2012 (31 regions)
Regime type	Regime type	Presidential Republic	Presidential Republic
	Freedom score[6]	48 (Partly free).	40 (Partly free)
Development	Poverty	37 percent of Kenyans lived in extreme poverty in 2015.	49 percent of Tanzanians lived in extreme poverty in 2017
	HDI[7] (2019)	0,601	0,529
Refugee-situation	Total number of refugees and asylum seekers (2018)	471,724	330,755
	IDP[8]	1,400 (2019)	1,300 (2019)
	Majority of refugee and asylum seeker's country of origin	Somalia (54%), South Sudan (24.6%), DRC (9%).	Burundi (73.9%), DRC (26%).
	Largest refugee camps	Dadaab (hosting 44% of Kenya's refugees)[9].	Nyarugusu, Nduta and Mtendeli.
Demography and language	Refugee policy	Hosts refugees in camps, but are starting to close Dadaab (2018)	Re-opening old camps, building new, and withdrawing from CRRF.
	Population size	52,573,973	58,005,463
	Official languages	Kiswahili and English.	Swahili and English

Sources: (Thomson 2010; The World Bank 2019; UNHCR 2021; UNCHR 2019b; UNCHR 2019c; UNHCR 2019d; UNHCR 2019e; IDMC 2019 UN 2015; UN 2017; The Republic 2010; UNDP 2020; Transparency International 2017; Freedom House 2020; KNBS 2019; NBS 2011).

As seen in Table 1, there are several areas where these two countries are similar, regarding to their history, demography, freedom score and population size. Kenya has a stronger development score, and Tanzania seem to be less corrupt than Kenya on the Corruption Perception Index. As outlined in the latter section (2.1.1) the refugee-hosting policy is different for the selected countries. For the remainder of this chapter I will go further into the two cases,

[6] Freedom House rates people's access to political rights and civil liberties in 210 countries and territories through its annual Freedom in the World report. This score range from 0 (not free) and 100 (free) (Freedom House 2020).

[7] **Health Development Index (HDI) is** based on three indicators: life expectancy, education and income (GDP per capita). Ranging from 0 (lowest value) and 1 (highest value) (UNDP 2020).

[8] **Internally Displaced People (IDP)** statistics from Global Internal Displacement Database (IDMC 2019).

[9] Kenya started to dismantle the Dadaab refugee camp in 2018, and by the end of the year, over 75,297 refugees were returned to Somalia. The population of Dadaab has diminished by 50 percent as of 2018 (Bhagat 2020:439)

focusing on central themes, such as system of government, degree of institutionalism and refugee policy.

2.2 System of Governments

Kenya's government consists of four organs: Parliament, Executive, Judiciary and the Devolved Government. Most people are familiar with the three firstly mentioned institutions here, but the fourth might need further elaboration. In order to understand factors influential for Kenya's institutional trust, we need to understand what these institutions represent, and which functions they inherit.

In 2010, Kenya approved a new constitution which aimed at decentralizing power through providing 47 county governments, which constitute the Devolved Government, with its own elected governors (county executive) and county assemblies. Three years later, the new constitution was criticized as not being sufficient due to disputes. These emerged both between and within the new levels of the political system (Cheeseman, Lynch & Willis 2016:2).

The three remaining state organs which comprise the Kenyan state are the Judiciary, the Legislature and the Executive (Republic of Kenya 2021). The Judiciary and its related institutions[10] have the following functions; "Administration of justice, formulation and implementation of judicial policies, and compilation and dissemination of case law and other legal information for the effective administration of justice" (Republic of Kenya 2021). The President, the Deputy President and the Cabinet constitute the executive branch of Kenya's government. Lastly, as stated in Kenya's constitution, the Legislative branch is the Parliament of Kenya, which includes the National Assembly, and the Senate – representing the county interests (Constitute Project 2010).

Tanzania's system of government is built up similar to Kenya's. It is made up by three branches of government; the Executive, the Legislature, and Judiciary (Constitute Project 2005). The Tanzanian parliament consists of the President of the United Republic and the National Assembly. The National Assembly has 295 members and makes up for Tanzania's parliament, with five members of Zanzibar House of Representatives among other specified seats. Zanzibar's House of Representatives can make laws for Zanzibar without the approval of the union government if it does not involve union-designated matters. One can see that there are

[10] These institutions include: Judicial Service Commission (JSC), Kenya Law; previously National Council for Law Reporting (NCLR), Tribunals and the Judiciary Training Institute (JTI) (Republic of Kenya 2021).

differences between the countries due to the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1964 (Parliament of Tanzania 2015).

The Executive branch includes the President and the appointed cabinet, and the judiciary consists of a five-level judiciary combining the jurisdictions of tribal, Islamic, and British common law. Zanzibar has a court system which is parallel to the legal system of the union. It is important to mark that all state authority is being exercised and controlled by the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar. Although both Kenya and Tanzania are presidential republics, their government institutions are unique in each context (United Republic of Tanzania 2015).

2.3 Political Landscapes

Before one can move on to the topic of refugee-policy an outline of Kenya and Tanzania's political background is provided[11]. Kenya experienced increased pressure for democratisation and human rights after the cold war, and in 1992 the republic that was formed after independence in 1963 turned into a multi-party system (NIMD 2003). Although there were organised elections taking place, the political party Kenya African National Union (KANU) sat in office from Kenya's independence, in 1963, until 2002. Four decades had passed, and Kenya experienced for the very first time that a president retired from office, and Kibaki took over as president (Nasong'o & Murunga 2007:9). In the election of 2007, the sitting president Kibaki were announced as the winner, winning with a small margin which led to large riots, which became rooted in ethnic divisions in the country (Norad 2018). Branch and Cheeseman (2009) researched this election, and identified what could have stabilized the situation in the multi-party election in 2007. These stabilizing factors included an effective rule of law, an agreed national identity, and basic state capacity (2009:26).

By comparison, Tanzania also gained its independence around the same time as Kenya, in 1964 (see table 1). But since independence Tanzania focused more on state-building than Kenya did. Miguel (2004) points to certain dimensions ranging from language policy, educational curriculum, and local institutional reform, where Tanzania pursued nation-building policies (2004: 327). Ever since independence the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party has dominated parliament in Tanzania. Despite the fact that Tanzania has had multiparty-elections since 1995, the CCM has won the vast majority of seats in the National Assembly (O'Gorman 2012:313).

[11] In the year of 2014, which is the year the selected Afrobarometer survey was conducted the President in office in Kenya was Uhuru Kenyatta and Jakaya Kikwete sat in office in Tanzania.

The opposition in the country are divided and lack power to overthrow the sitting government in an election (UN 2020). O'Gorman (2012) lists two reasons for why the CCM is highly supported in Tanzania: the citizens see them as a maintenance for peace and their performance before the multiparty rule (from 1964-1995) (2012:314). In comparison to Kenya we see that there is an absence of suited oppositional alternatives to the CCM in Tanzanian politics.

2.4 Refugee Policy in Kenya and Tanzania

The West only receives a small portion of the world's total amount of migrants, and there is an overrepresentation of Western-focused studies considering the amounts of migrants they receive. In accordance with Alrababa'h et al. (2021), I argue for a greater focus in regions that are largely affected by recent waves of migration, which accumulates in areas where refugees and asylum seekers flee conflicts. These areas exist mainly in Africa, the Middle East and Asia (2021:35), Sub-Saharan Africa hosts more than 26 percent of the world's refugee population (UNHCR 2021a). This thesis specifically concentrates on East-Africa, which has gained increased interest by the academic community after an increase in migration to the region in the 1990's (Jansen & de Bruijne 2020:669). Originally, the thesis was supposed to include Uganda as well, to get a greater view on migration's effects on institutional trust, but due to limitations in data availability, this thesis only focuses on Kenya and Tanzania. Which are hosting a large proportion of the refugees in Eastern-Africa (Bhargat 2020; Alix-Garcia & Saah 2010).

Mogire's (2009) research compares Kenya and Tanzania's refugee policy. In combination, these countries represent two of the major refugee hosting countries in Africa (2009:16). Both countries are pointed to by Mogire (2009) as destinations of major refugee flows from neighbouring countries. The argument connects to Kenya and Tanzania's relative political stability[12] and their location next to Africa's major conflict and refugee producing zones, and their limited ability to control their boarders and hospitality which attracted refugees from neighbouring countries (2009:16). Their relative political stability, geo-strategic location in the Horn of Africana and Great Lakes region – Africa's major conflict and refugee producing zones, inability to control their borders and perhaps hospitality made them the destination of major refugee flows from neighbouring countries (2009:16).

[12] There are good reasons for Mogire describing the political stability as relative. Certain areas in North-Eastern Kenya with a high number of Somali refugees (Garissa, Wajir, and Mandera), have been historically influenced by for instance conflict, terrorism, and riots (Africa Research Bulletin 2015; Lochery 2012).

According to Betts (2013), a comparison between Kenya and Tanzania is fruitful to explore the effects of refugees. The main reason lies in their different approaches to hosting refugees, although both countries have in later years gained a more restrictive approach. These countries can consequently offer significant insight on the effects of hosting immigrants. In addition, the two countries have for the last decades changed their policies relating to hosting refugees (2013:44-45), an example is Kenya which started to close refugee camps in Dadaab in 2018 (Bhagat 2020:439).

Alix-Garcia & Saah (2010) marks that Tanzania also have gone through changes in its refugee-policy. Tanzania experienced two large waves of immigration, one in 1993 (from Burundi), and a second in 1994 (from Rwanda). After this, Tanzania changed its refugee-policy drastically and went from hosting refugees in Tanzanian villages, to hosting refugees in large refugee camps, based on the number of refugees arriving at this time (2010:148-151). Refugees were separated from the local population to a larger extent (Landau 2000:286). Historically, Tanzania is often referred to as the world's most generous refugee-hosting countries, but changes have occurred since the 1990's (Chaulia 2003:147). Refugees are not allowed to leave the camps since the Tanzanian government focuses on returning refugees to their home country rather than integrating them locally (NRC 2019). According to UNHCR (2021h), the governments of Tanzania and Burundi, with assistance from the UNHCR, agreed to voluntarily send back Burundi refugees living in Tanzania. The governments and UNHCR agreed to uphold the principle of voluntariness and more than 70,000 refugees have returned since September 2017.

According to the UNHCR (2021f), Kenya hosted 488,415 refugees and asylum seekers by the end of 2017 (2021f:2), and it has a long history as a refugee-hosting nation (Betts 2013). Kenya is an interesting case for migration research. Refugees experience violence within its own borders, and the refugees in Nairobi has been characterised as a hot-spot for urban refugees (Bhagat 2020:439-440). Statistics from UNHCR shows that in 2018 there were 450,000 refugees staying in Kenyan refugee camps and urban settlements, with 100,000 pending registrations in these areas, making Kenya hold amongst the highest refugee populations in the world (UNHCR 2018).

Kenya changed its refugee-policy in 2016, when the Kenyan Government announced that they would close the Dadaab camp (NRC 2019). This was triggered, among other things, by terrorist attacks in 2013 and 2015 (Bhagat 2020:349). In the aftermath of these events the Kenyan state started to dismantle the Dadaab refugee camp, hosting a large majority of Somali-refugees. This

refugee camp had hosted Somalis since 1991, and by the year of 2018, over 75,297 were returned to Somalia. The population of Dadaab diminished by 50 percent as of 2018 (Bhagat 2020:439). This is only one example of the effects that countries experience relating to increased immigration.

Changes in migration policy is also present in Tanzania's case, in 2018 the country withdrew from the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework[13]. This initiative aimed at finding solutions for refugees and improving the situation in refugee-hosting countries. The withdrawal has contributed to massive underfunding of aid to refugees in the country (Romtveit 2019). As stated in table 1, Tanzania has over 300,000 refugees and asylum seekers. Rudolf (2019) claims that the reason for withdrawing were a contradiction between Tanzania's domestic policies, and the goals for the CRRF (2019:208). The Government of Tanzania were "[…] concerned with indebting their own citizens on behalf of the refugees, which unfortunately has set back the CRRF approach" (Anker 2018) the NRC country director for Tanzania, Neil Turner, stated.

2.5 Summary and Expected Contributions

After this review of the cases there is a need to address what the cases can contribute with in relation to research of institutional trust in refugee hosting communities. By only researching the cases of Kenya and Tanzania, my thesis is able to go in-depth on how refugees can affect hosting communities and highlight these issues in two developing East African countries. As previously stated, Kenya has hosted refugees for a long period, and has a large refugee-population, with a change into a stricter refugee-policy after 2016, by returning Somali refugees and deciding to shut down refugee camps.

Relating to this same issue, we see another tendency in Tanzania's case. The country has been known for its open approach to refugees in the past, with a focus on resettling refugees. In recent years, Tanzania also have changed their tactics (Mogire 2009:17), and have been struggling with underfunding due to the withdrawal from the CRRF initiative (Romtveit 2019). Although both countries have shifted in their policy, some divergences necessary to mention. Kenya's government has decided to shut down camps and return refugees, and Tanzania still enforced voluntary returns of refugees. Based on this argument one cannot expect to find the same effects on institutional trust in these countries, both because they have different ways of

[13] The UNHCR (2021c) defines the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) as a framework for improving the situation for refugee-hosting countries, including enabling refugees to integrate into the local economy.

handling incoming refugees, but also when it comes to trust in their ruling institutions (described in section 4.2).

Based on the characteristics of the two case countries I expect them to show different levels on institutional trust in my analysis. The arguments which substantiate this expected tendency is found in the chapter four, but shortly can be encapsulated in Tanzania's citizens' strong trust towards its ruling institution (Uddhammar 2011:1168). The analysis of this thesis is expected to reflect this, in consequence Tanzania's institutional trust is expected to be higher than in Kenya's. Kenya is expected to show lower levels of trust due to its citizens' tendency to be more sceptical towards the ruling institutions (Uddhammar 2011:1168). This is in despite of both countries seeing their refugee-situation as increasingly problematic in recent years. This study does not research variation of institutional trust over time, so one cannot tell how institutional trust change in this regard (more on this research limitations in chapter six), but this research does cover, in an area of limited research, how refugees affect institutional trust in developing African states.

Chapter 3: Theoretical Outline of Political- and Institutional Trust

The theory section is structured into three chapters. In the first chapter an introduction is given to what political trust is, the relevant research literature on this topic and importantly why political trust matters why it matters. From this introduction the argument for why this thesis is looking institutional trust is presented and discussed. The chapter's main purpose is to provide an overview of the trust literature, so the thesis can further focus more specifically on migration's[14] effect on political trust. Both this chapter and the upcoming one will focus on limiting, explaining, and defining different aspects of political trust and its relevance for this research. The first chapter provides an outline, and chapter two is handles previous research on institutional trust and migration specifically. The third, and last, theory-oriented chapter present previous research which is directly connected to hypotheses for institutional trust which this research is going to test. The reason for separating these three chapters is to clearly mark which theory is linked to the research field of trust (chapter one), which research connects to migration's effect on institutional trust, and finally what previous research (work) lies the groundwork for what this thesis is interested to test.

3.1 Defining Political Trust

One of the most important terms to define for this thesis is political trust. For this reason, I see it necessary to evaluate different definitions and of political trust, to identify the one definition, or definitions, which are best suited to answer my thesis question.

One central question needs to be addressed before we move on to the specific definitions: Is political trust something that relates to the trust to political institutions or trust to specific people in government or selected positions? Newton in Dalton and Klingemann (2007) offers their insight here. Newton notes that most survey questions in political opinion research about trust in people and confidence in institutions. This means that trust can only be related to people, and confidence is often restricted to institutions (2007:344). The latter distinction illustrates a theoretical issue. Most surveys tend to use this distinction, but not all measure trust in this manner. For example the Afrobarometer round 6 and does not use this distinction, and ask for people's trust in institutions (Isbell 2017) [15].

The work of Hutchison and Johnson (2011) provides a definition of political trust which connects it to the literature. They define political trust as one of the primary indicators of state

[14] Throughout this thesis migration effects are referred to as the effect of refugees in a region or area.
[15] The Afrobarometer survey is used to investigate the political trust in Kenya and Tanzania in this thesis.

legitimacy, because it measures the society's overall confidence in political institutions that comprise the state (2011:739). In this definition, political trust can be separated into two sections: First, as one of the primary indicators for state legitimacy, and secondly, as a measure for the society's overall confidence in political institutions. This is the main definition of political trust this thesis is based on.

3.1.1 Common explanations of political trust

One of the more frequently used definitions, in the field of trust, is made by Easton. Easton (1975) sees trust as the probability that the political system will produce wanted outcomes even if it is left unattended. If this is the case the political system is so stable and predictable that it will be able to fulfil the population's wishes without being checked by its people (1975:447). In this type of scenario, the people will trust their political system to act in their best interest. This is very close to how an advanced representative democracy works. Not all states inherit this kind of political stability, and the countries researched by this thesis can be a good example of such states. Therefore Easton's definition can mainly give an overarching idea of political trust, but is not as precise as the definition from Hutchison and Johnson (2011).

Other influential scholars, such as Weber (1972) mark that "legitimacy arise out of the confidence of the ruled" (1975:267), and Lipset (1959) indicates that "legitimacy involves the capacity of the political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing institutions are the most appropriate and proper ones for the society" (1959:86).

3.2 Institutional Trust

The focus for this thesis is trust towards institutions. Institutional theories mark that the trust a citizen has toward an institution is politically endogenous, which means that institutional trust is a consequence of institutional performance (Mishler & Rose 2001:31). The reason for looking at this specifically is based on Hutchison and Johnson's (2011) argument. As previously stated, citizen's political trust can be related to political actors such as the president, and/or to the political institutions which comprise the state (2011:739). It is in this area this research's interest lies.

Institutional political trust, or institutional trust[16], connects to the crucial components of the state system. The reason behind this focus on institutions specifically can be supported by Godefroidt, Langer, and Meuleman (2017). The scholars mark the following in their article on

[16] For the remaining of this paper I will use institutional trust instead of institutional political trust.

political trust in developing countries: "institutional trust is considered to be a cornerstone of democracy, enhancing the legitimacy, efficiency, and sustainability of governments by linking citizens to the institutions created to represent them" (2017:906). By focusing on trust to the institutions that are essential for the state, one can measure the trust of citizens have to their system of government.

Mattes & Moreno (2018) define institutional trust through its purpose: "it is thought to convey a vertical sense of confidence in the formal, legal organisations of government and state, as distinct from the incumbents […] within those organisations' (2018:357)[17]. This sort of trust is a form of consent between the public and the incumbents of these government and state organisations, to make decisions without having to constantly seek consultation to obtain their mandates (2018:357).

Levi & Stoker (1997) points to trust as a concept seldom is unconditional. This indicates that it is connected to specific individuals or institutions over specific domains (1997:476). When it comes to institutional trust in new emerging democracies, which is the context for this thesis, Letki (2018) notes that people living under these conditions need trustworthy, reliable, and transparent institutions that citizens can trust as guarantors of the safety and predictability of social interactions. The measured institutional trust in countries that have recently transitioned into democracy, or are still struggling to become one is difficult to research. Letki (2018) concretises this by affirming that there are various factors that are difficult to disentangle when it comes to trust in institutions, not only because these factors co-vary but also because they influence each other (2018:337).

Although it is challenging to research, there are many reasons for studying newer states that are or is transitioning into democracies. As Cook, Hardin, and Levi (2005) describes: a reliable and trustworthy state "enhances the sense of security, promotes cooperation, and evokes a willingness to take risks even among strangers or relative strangers" (Cook et al. 2005:160). The willingness to take risks, cooperate, and gain security is difficult to gain without trust in state institutions (Marien & Hooghe 2011; Mishler & Rose 1997; Fukuyama 2001). For the remainder of this chapter I want to highlight why a trust in state institutions matters. In addition, I want to shortly actualise why political trust is important to research in refugee-hosting nations, such as Kenya and Tanzania.

[17] Incumbents referring to the actual people working in these political institutions.

3.3 Why does Institutional Trust Matter?

The trust literature provides many more of these definitions that were presented in the previous two sections, but to accurately research institutional trust, it is necessary to mark its consequences. Gouws & Schultz-Herzenberg (2016) comments more generally that political trust will start to wane when citizens stop respecting the norms and principles of the democratic process. In this context political trust is a result of a democratic process taking place. As political trust is disappearing, it can be destabilising for a country, even if the country is transitioning into becoming a democracy, and it can even revert this process, and throw the country back into authoritarianism (Norris 1999 in Gouws & Schultz-Herzenberg 2016:7). This insight shows the serious consequences of political trust decreasing or starting to wane.

The reasons for why institutional trust matters will actualised by the purpose for researching this exact phenomenon. The support for institutions and political actors is important for democracy to survive, Warren (2018) points out. The trust citizens have for political institutions are extremely important for democracy to work, in addition to many other important features, such as: personal security and freedom, welfare supports and protections, banking and pensions, extensive economic divisions of labour that generate wealthy societies (2018:88). In order for democracies to last, Diamond (1999) states that it is crucial that the citizens trust the political institutions. Further Diamond argues that this is attained by granting political freedom, transparency, a strong rule of law, constitutionalism and an absence of arbitrariness in the political process (1999:168). Godefroidt et al. (2017) point specifically to institutional being a cornerstone of democracy (2017:906). Several political scientists, Fukuyama (2015); Huntington (1968); Marien and Hooghe (2011); Listhaug & Rindal (2008), support this relationship. This is why I am researching this in this thesis.

Chapter 4: Institutional Trust and Refugees

This chapter focuses on previous research which can provide insight on how institutional trust is being affected by refugees in Kenya and Tanzania. It will firstly outline central differences between the terms; refugee, migrant and IDP's, secondly shortly present previous research in relations to political trust, thirdly bring forward research on political trust in East-Africa, and lastly present previous research which lay the groundwork the upcoming chapter with the different hypothesis that are being tested in this thesis.

4.1 Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced People

Before an outline of research on the connection between presence of refugees and political trust can be connected, there is a need to define and separate the following terms: refugees, internally displaced people and migrants. In this thesis if something is referred to as a refugee it is defined in accordance with the definition from the UNHCR, which is seen below. This study will research how the refugee camps affect the institutional trust in Kenya and Tanzania. Based on the research question it is essential to mark the different terminology which is used in migration research. At the core for this thesis lies the term refugee, and this is the main factor measured in the Geo-Refugee data[18], and I want to repeat the definition here: "individuals granted complementary forms of protection and those enjoying temporary protection" (UNHCR 2013).

When I refer to the term migrant, I want to emphasise that I do not connect this to people that are categorised as refugees. The term migrant has different meaning across different contexts, but according to the IOM (2021): "the common lay understanding of a person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons" (IOM 2021). Not all migrants are refugees, and the consequences of misunderstanding this divide can be problematic. Therefore, I am separating these two terms clearly in the beginning of this chapter. According to the UNHCR (2021b) the tendency to see refugees and migrants as the same thing, or to refer to refugees as a subcategory of migrants, can have serious consequences for the lives and safety of people which are fleeing prosecution or conflict. In doing so one does not acknowledge the human rights and human dignity of all people that are moving from one country to another. Therefore, it is of the upmost importance to mark that refugees separates from migrants since

[18] More information on the Geo-Refugee dataset in section 6.2.1.

they are a protected group in international law and are not able to return back to their country of origin[19] (UNHCR 2021b).

The third definition regards the term IDP. The UNHCR (2021e) defines internally displaced people (IDP's) as people who are not closing any country boarders, but are moving internally within their own country boarders. IDP's are under protection of its own government, even if the government is the reason for their displacement (UNHCR 2021e). With these different distinctions outlined I can start the theory outline of political trust and refugee presence.

4.2 Political Trust Research on the Rise

The research field of political trust has been in a period of strong growth, argues Listhaug and Jakobsen (2018), and political trust constitutes an important field within public opinion studies. This growth is caused by new sources of data surfacing which can test many of the explanations of political trust that the research field has discussed (2018:573). Due to this increased access to data we now also can gain access to quality data from the non-western section of the world. Researching the relationship between refugee presence and political trust is one of these topics that now can more easily be investigated through new sources of data emerging. Researching political trust and migration has in previous research focused on the western part of the world, but there are exceptions to this. This section will highlight previous research on political trust, which focuses on the effects on hosting refugees in the Global South. The goal for this is to give an outline of how previous researchers have gained knowledge on the effects of refugees in developing countries.

4.2.1 Political Trust in the East-African Context

Firstly, it is important to mark that political trust behaves differently in various parts of the world. In the Western context, in for example European nations and in the United States, democracies are characterised as more stable and less challenged. Most of the research on migration effects is conducted in this specific context, and different researchers sees this as problematic. In their view, research on political trust is needed all around the world (Betts 2013). There are of course exceptions to this trend, where scholars focus specifically at non-Western contexts.

[19] The important distinction between refugees and migrants was acknowledged by the UN in the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (UNHCR 2021b). This resolution was then adopted by the UN general assembly on the 19th September 2016 (UN 2016).

An example of a researcher is Uddhammar (2011) which demonstrates how different political trust can be in three East-African countries: Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. By using Afrobarometer data he finds that the two countries of Kenya and Uganda are more sceptical toward their ruling institutions, while Tanzanians are characterised as very trusting (2011:1168). Further, Uddhammar 2011 focuses on why these three countries differ in their expressed support for the local opposition, on the one hand, and in the ruling political institutions on the other (2011:1169).

One of the key findings of this research is that constitutional values feeds support in different ways in the three countries: it gives support to the opposition in Kenya and Uganda, but it does not do so in Tanzania (Uddhammar 2011:1184). A second discovery is that the evaluation of government significantly affects how citizens trust its government and the opposition. This goes for issues such as: handling of the economy, corruption, crime, health and infrastructure, and control of disorder. Thirdly, free elections, and a high level of democracy will give support to the government. If elections are unfair and there is a low level of democracy in the country the support will go to the political opposition. Interestingly, in Kenya, if you have a strong adherence to democratic constitutional values, it is the one most important factor for voting for the political opposition. In Tanzania these values tend to *increase* support for the government and ruling institutions (Uddhammar 2011:1186).

4.2.2 Trust in Government and the Opposition

One can see through the findings of Uddhammar (2011) that it is important to separate support for the currently sitting government on one hand and support for the opposition when we are researching trust in Eastern African countries. This distinction is also argued for by Norris (1999) which also separates between these two elements, where political trust is not related to the system as a whole, but rather to the smaller dimensions of the political system. In this line of thought you can trust the system, although you are not trusting the currently sitting government. Warren (2018) support this argument also by marking that trust to an institution in a democracy is not the same as trusting the political officials who represent the institution. This thesis will focus on institutional trust towards the sitting government, and not the opposition, and this divide is essential in researching institutional trust.

4.3 Refugee Presence and its Effect on Host Communities

The effects of refugees on their host environments in East Africa has been the subject of much academic attention since the late 1990's (Jansen & de Bruijne 2020:669). This was due to an

increase in refugee arrivals in this area during this period. Since then, it is safe to suggest that refugee arrivals have not ceased to exist. On the basis of this development, an understanding of the impacts of hosting refugees on poor host populations is imperative, according to Alix-Garcia and Saah (2010). They further comment on the status in this field of research, and marks that there is little mention of the effects of refugee-crises on host communities (2010:149). This is despite increased attention on this topic since 1990's (Jansen & de Bruijne 2020; Baez 2002 & Fisk 2014). The main function for this upcoming section is to present the exceptions of this trend, showing previous research on effects of hosting refugees. The previous research continues to be presented in the upcoming chapter, but here they are directly linked to the hypotheses for this thesis.

Jacobsen (2002) researched whether refugees can benefit the African state. Jacobsen portrays refugees as resources for their host countries in many areas (2002:577). Although every host country in Africa has its own set of studies describing the burdens of hosting refugees, Jacobsen marks that the presence of refugees can have positive effects as well. Some of them being international refugee assistance, human capital, and economic activities. These factors can have positive effects for the host community's standard of living (2002:580). On the other hand, Jacobsen (2002) also identifies different challenges that are present in refugee-hosting nations in Africa. Three of them being:

1) Increased demands for government bureaucracy in areas where the state might be absent or weakly represented.
2) Higher demands for the state's security apparatus to control borders and manage security threats.
3) Increased needs for the state apparatus to control and manage contested refugee resources, either for their own state building purposes, or to ensure that its citizens benefit from these allocated resources (Jacobsen 2002:588).

Throughout the article Jacobsen (2002) weigh the negative and positive consequences of hosting immigrants for African states, and further concludes with the resources that are embodied in refugees. These represent all kinds of potential, both for legitimate state-building and for the purposes of leader's own personal enrichment (2002: 593). But these positive effects do not occur by themselves. Through utilising what Jacobsen calls, 'refugee resources' states can act and utilise refugee's individual skills and resources through their policy. The ability the government must shape policies can have large beneficial effects for state-building, but this is only if the government are able to hinder security problems among other issues.

4.4 Developing Countries' Refugee Presence and Institutional Trust

The main aim for this final section is to creates an introduction to relevant research which can substantiate the selected hypothesis in the upcoming chapter. This research on the effects of migration on public attitudes is highly relevant here since international migration is at its all-time high, Alrababa'h et al. (2021) argues. Although this is an international trend, it is obvious that most of this literature focus on developed countries, which have relatively fewer migrants and a higher capacity to absorb them (2021:33). This claim is also supported by Böhmelt, Bove, & Gleditsch (2019), stressing the importance of the state managing security consequences of hosting refugee populations in developing countries (2019:73). This is the gap which this research aims to fill.

According to Mattes & Moreno (2018), people in Sub-Saharan Africa express some of the highest average levels of institutional trust in the world (2018:367). However, looking more closely at the cases of Kenya and Tanzania, these countries diverge in their levels of political trust (Uddhammar 2011:1181). Many factors influence this level of trust, and it is difficult to find a one-sided yes answer to the question if refugees are damaging for institutional trust in Kenya and Tanzania. Based on previous research one can anticipate what influence refugee-presence can have for institutional trust, and this requires a closer look at central aspects of how these two states are managing their refugee inflow.

As mentioned in section 2.4, Kenya and Tanzania experience high level immigration from neighbouring countries (Betts 2013:37). They also experience, in accordance with general trends for refugee-hosting countries on the African continent, inflows of refugees due to conflict ridden neighbouring countries (Jacobsen 2002:586). Kenya and Tanzania are as a result left with a large responsibility to handle the effects of neighbouring conflicts in for example Somalia (Anderson & McKnight 2015:1), and the DRC[20] (UNHCR 2021h). Managing the effects of refugees are demanding for these states, and in more recent years both Tanzania and Kenya have started to implement a stricter refugee policy to handle the issues deriving from refugees arriving (Bhagat 2020; Betts 2013). The pressure these states experience can threaten state legitimacy, if they are not able to handle the effects of immigration in a good way and its citizens suffers from unwanted effects, such as terrorism (mainly in Kenya's case). Godefroidt et al. (2017) argue that having low institutional trust may result in a democratic breakdown and even a return to authoritarianism (2017:906). It is therefore essential to research if the presence

[20] DRC refers to the Democratic Republic of Congo.

of refugees have a negative impact on citizen's perceptions of safety, employment and their trust in central political institutions which are expected to manage the refugee-situation.

I argue for the following mechanism in relation to government handling the refugee situation; as developing countries are faced with increased refugee presence (UNHCR 2019), there is a need for government engagement to handle the effects of hosting refugees in these regions. In areas where large amounts of refugees are arriving, the host-community will evaluate their government's performance through how they prioritize help or assistance in these regions. This is why institutional trust can reflect the effects of refugees in host-communities.

Chapter 5: Expected Effects of Refugees on Institutional Trust

The two previous chapters have provided a theoretical backdrop to political trust, outlined some key determinants of political trust research, and reviewed some of the arguments as to why political trust matters. The main objective of this chapter is to specifically look at the mechanisms which are being tested for in this thesis. The chapter's main purpose is to form an argument of central mechanisms of how institutional trust is affected by hosting refugees, which is based on previous research. I formulate four hypotheses which are tested in this thesis. For each hypothesis there lies an argumentation to why these mechanisms are expected to be present in my analysis, and why it is crucial to test to answer the research question: How do refugee camps affect citizen's institutional trust in Kenya and Tanzania?

Earlier in this thesis (section 2.5) I marked which effects I anticipated to see in relation to Kenya and Tanzania's institutional trust levels. This concerned the difference in their expressed institutional trust. In addition, both countries host a substantial number of refugees, but I expect the effects of hosting refugees to be negative since they are developing nations, which do not inherit the same capacity to handle possible unwanted effects of hosting migrants as more developed countries (Alrababa'h et al. 2021:33) This is seen in H_1.

Institutional theory sees government performance as built on national institutions' performance, and how these institutions cope with challenges (Hutchison & Johnson 2011; Mishler & Rose 1997; Whitaker 2002). In this thesis the performance of government is reflected in institutional trust. This implies that if institutions act poorly, this tends to create a cycle of decreasing trust in these institutions (Godefroidt et al. 2017:909). Decreasing institutional trust in developing countries can cause serious outcomes such as a democratic breakdown, or a return to authoritarianism (Godefroidt et al. 2017:906). Applying this logic to the refugee-hosting context, these institutions are evaluated based on their ability to handle central challenges in these refugee – hosting societies. Handling the effects of hosting refugees includes managing ethnic differences, labour market competition and food resources (Jacobsen 2002; Whitaker 2002).

I base my first hypothesis (H_1), on these arguments, which his leads to the first hypothesis:

H_1 *People in regions with refugee camps express lower institutional trust than people in regions with no refugee camps present.*

5.1 The Hosting Community: Unemployment and Insecurity

Whitaker (2002) notes that there are several reasons why host experiences differ[21]. Host experiences are in this context related to the benefits and burdens these communities are facing due to hosting refugees in their local communities. Some of the reasons were the basis of gender, age, and class[22]. In Whitaker's research, these experiences were also contingent on settlement patterns, pre-existing socio-economic conditions, and the nature of host – refugee relations. Logically, the hosts who already had access to resources, education, or power, were better positioned to benefit from the refugee presence. In comparison, those who already was disadvantaged in the local context became even further marginalised (2002:339). This research is highly relevant to this thesis's main research question and shows how pre-existing characterisations are influential for the experiences refugee-hosts experience. I will continue to present the key determinants for how refugees may affect institutional trust.

One of the central aims for this research to see if institutional trust can be influenced by having refugee camps present in a region. Some of these regions are, as mentioned by Whitaker (2002), more vulnerable to begin with (2002:339). This can be seen in unemployment rates in the host communities. Some scholars see heightened competition for jobs as an issue deriving from higher influx of refugees (Borjas 1987; Ruiz & Vargas-Silva 2016). Other research of host communities is focusing on the positive effects on host communities. Bilgili, Loschmann, Fransen, & Siegel (2019) find "that children residing closer to the camps have better schooling outcomes and that locals residing closer to the camps have mostly positive views regarding the effects of refugees on local education" in Rwanda's case (2019:391). There seem to be a divide between considering refugees as a burden or a benefit in the migration literature, and this might also be a consequence of how different African countries and regions react to refugee-presence.

Fisk (2019) researches the effects of refugee camps in her article on camp-settlement and communal conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. The research indicates that refugee camps have a significant marginal effect on conflict only if they are located in areas with politically marginalized host groups (2019:57). This thesis does not research conflict, but the essence of Fisk's argument can be made also for political trust as well. It underlines the significance of researching the effects of refugees more closely in given contexts. This research is doing so, by taking two countries into consideration, and analysing the regional contexts for these refugee-

[21] This research was based in Tanzania's case, but these factors can also be present in the Kenya due to limited resources to handle large amounts of refugees arriving.
[22] Which is controlled for in the explanatory variables in section 6.6.

hosting areas, one can spot which context the refugees are present in. Are they highly influenced by unemployment, terrorism, or are these areas reliant on hosting the refugees? This is directly related to the research question for this thesis, and by measuring institutional trust one can identify how refugee-presence affect an important factor for democracy to work (Warren 2018:88).

H_2 connects the employment situation the host-community finds itself in. There is a lot of research which focuses on more severe outcomes of hosting refugees (Wig & Tollefsen 2016, Gineste & Savun 2019, Ghosn et al. 2019). But as Braithwaite et al. (2019) marks, there is need for more knowledge when it comes to the relationship between refugee populations and political instability in host countries and tracking public attitudes towards hosting refugee populations (2019:5). Although large amounts of research look at the negative effects of hosting refugees, some scholars focus on what refugees can contribute with to its hosting society. This positive effect relates to certain variables: the human capital refugees bring with them, the host country response to these refugees, and actions taken by the international community (Braithwaite et al. 2019:8). The latter point draws an interesting picture of the effects of hosting refugees in developing countries.

In the North-Western region in Tanzania Ruiz & Vargas-Silva (2016) found a negative effect on the labour market after a large inflow of refugees. A core result of this research was that immigration affected the work situation of natives in this area. After the large inflow of refugees in the region, Tanzanians were more likely to work in household shambas,[23] or caring for household stocks and were less likely to work outside the household as employees. The main reasons for this shift lie within the agricultural sector is particularly likely to be seriously impacted by the increase in the supply of low-skilled labour which resulted from the refugee shock (2016:667). As this research shows, the impact of refugee inflow affects the labour situation for the Tanzanians causal workers[24] since workers were particularly likely to compete with refugees for jobs. Ruiz & Vargas-Silva (2016) suggest that particular attention should be brought to the well-being of native workers who are likely to compete with refugees in the labour market, such as agricultural and/or casual waged workers (2016:6). Based on this finding, I want to test the following hypothesis for Kenya and Tanzania, and test if the competition argument is present in this context.

[23] The Oxford English Dictionary (2021) define shambas as a cultivated plot of ground; a farm or plantation.
[24] A causal worker is a person with temporary employment, opposed to a permanent and regular one.

H_2 *The negative impact of refugees on institutional trust will be stronger among unemployed people.*

In line with the host community's experience of increased refugee-presence, I want to test for the level of safety the citizens inherit in areas with a higher refugee-population, and whether this can affect citizen's institutional trust. As Jacobsen (2002) comments:

> Refugee flows present a challenge to one of the key principles of state sovereignty: the control of borders and of non-citizens in the country. African host countries experience a range of security related problems associated with refugees and others crossing the border from conflict ridden neighbouring countries (Jacobsen 2002:586).

In some cases, governments have in response to coping with unwanted effects of refugees decided to shut down refugee camps and implement a stricter refugee-policy based on refugee's threat of security. As one can see in Kenya's response to shut down certain camps of the Dadaab Refugee Camp (Bhagat 2020:439). I want to test whether the presence of refugees can make people's institutional trust decrease due to a feeling of being less safe in these areas. The state's ability to secure the individual's security is crucial in these refugee-hosting communities, Böhmelt et al. (2019) argues, and this is something that is essential for the citizens' perception of the refugees they are hosting in their communities (2019:73).

Further research from Ruegger in Braithwaite et al. (2019) demonstrates that in cases where refugees have ethnic ties to host regions, which upsets the demographic balance within the state, conflict is mostly likely to erupt. Somali refugees in Kenya, and Hutu refugees in the Democratic Republic of Congo, are examples of this, prompted fighting in receiving states (2019:8). What one can take from this research, is the fact that safety is a factor which can be challenged in areas of increased refugee presence to this research it is important to focus on safety in areas with an increased presence of refugees. It is important to mark that this thesis do not have data on the ethnicity of the refugee-population, but only on the locations of the refugees.

Mogire (2009) researches Kenya and Tanzania's refugee policies relating to whether they portray refugees as a threat. By arguing, especially in Kenya's case, that refugees are a danger for the citizens' safety. Mogire marks that both countries have been able to adapt anti-refugee policies due to citizens fearing for their safety (2009:25). Based on this assumption from Mogire I want to test whether Kenya, particularly, have a stronger negative effect on institutional trust where the citizens are feeling less safe. In addition, Mogire found that refugees were linked to

rising crime in both countries (2009:18). What this research can provide of insight is that safety is an important indicator to research when one looks at how refugee presence can affect institutional trust. Especially in the two case countries. On the basis of the arguments from various scholars in the migration research field I want to test the following hypothesis:

H_{3a} *The negative effect of refugees on institutional trust is stronger among people who feels less safe in their neighbourhoods.*

H_{3b} *Kenya will show a stronger negative effect of refugees on institutional trust among people who feel less safe in their neighbourhoods Tanzania.*

5.2 Urban or Rural Host-Communities

The last hypothesis to be tested in this study is regarding urban and rural effects on the host community's institutional trust in areas with a higher refugee population. Firstly it might be helpful to clarify what an urban and rural area implies. There are no universal definition of urban or rural areas according to Wineman, Alia, & Anderson (2020). They illustrate this by applying seven different definitions of urban to the Tanzanian context. In conclusion they mark that urban definitions produce different levels of urbanization (2020:254). This is why I am devoting some time to the issue of the urban/rural distinction. (Add definition of urban and rural).

Previous research from Alix-Garcia & Saah (2010) looks at the impact of refugees and internally displaced people on the communities that receive them. Their research concentrates on Western-Tanzania, and the results show that there are positive wealth effects of refugee camps on nearby rural households, but on households in urban areas they identify that refugee camps have a negative wealth effect (2010:148). Based on the previous result I want to test if institutional trust will decrease in urban areas due to close proximity to a refugee-camp, and institutional trust will increase in close proximity to a refugee-camp in rural areas. Hypothesis four handles the effect of refugees on institutional trust, tested for whether the refugee-camp is placed in a rural or urban area. Controlling for placement of refugee camps have been done by different scholars (Bhagat 2020; Landau 2002; Alix-Garcia, Bartlett, & Saah 2011). On the basis of this previous work on camp placement I expect the effects of refugees to be different in urban and rural areas.

H_{4a} *Having a refugee camp present in a region will decrease institutional trust in urban areas.*

H_{4b} *Having a refugee camp present in a region will increase institutional trust in rural areas.*

Chapter 6: Data and Methodology

The following chapter describes the selected data sources and methodology for this thesis. Firstly it provides information on the research design, the datasets, operationalisation of the dependent variable institutional trust, and lastly it presents the independent variables at the regional and individual level.

6.1 Research Design: Multilevel Analysis

Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen (2017) marks that one central criticism of the quantitative method is that it does not take the context of the individuals into account when studying them (2017:195). A reply to this criticism is the use of multilevel modelling, which considers the factors which influence across different contexts or levels. By applying a multilevel analysis one can identify the share of variance at the individual level on the dependent variable (in this case institutional trust), and the share of variance at the regional level (Steenbergen & Jones 2002:220).

The respondents of the Afrobarometer survey live in different contexts, which can influence their political values and attitudes. Examples of these effects can be if there has been violent conflict in a region, a shared national history, or other influential experiences (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen 2017:198). This is the main reason for conducting a multilevel analysis, researching factors at the regional level and the individual level. By using this kind of modelling one can show how the effects of refugees can be different across contexts which have a different refugee-situation.

Since this thesis researches institutional trust in two countries in different regions, it is vital to answer how institutional trust is affected by these refugee-camps in these different host-communities. I expect the presence of refugees to influence citizen's institutional trust differently in Kenya and Tanzania. There number of camps in the different regions vary greatly, for example, some regions have highly consentrated amounts of refugee camps, such as in Kigoma in Tanzania, and Dadaab in Kenya. While other regions might have no camps present at all. This thesis applies a multilevel analysis which marks if refugee camps at the regional level can have a negative affect on institutional trust. The multilevel analysis will include two levels, and will be carried out separately the two countries to create the simplest model possible to investigate the research question.

Multilevel models are usually estimated using maximum likelihood, this study is no exception. Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen (2017) mark that maximum likelihood estimation finds the

coefficients that make the data most likely, this means that it estimate the hypothetical population value that is more likely than any other to generate the sample that is actually observed (2017:199). Further, the prerequisites for this multilevel analysis is described.

6.1.1 Prerequisites for Multilevel Analysis

One central prerequisite for multilevel analysis is that the data are hierarchically structured, which means that observations are nested within units.[25] Multilevel analysis is used to accommodate for the complexities of estimating regression models with two or more levels (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen 2017:196). The more levels one includes in a multilevel analysis, the more complex it becomes. Only two levels are included in this analysis: the main independent variable (X) *refugee_camp* is based on level-2 data at the regional level[26], and the dependent variable (Y) called *institutional trust*, which is situated at level 1. One could argue that an alternative variable measuring refugee presence, could have been measured at the individual level, but for practical reasons this variable is simplified and is situated at the regional level. It might be theoretically interesting to include a third level here, which then would look at the country levels, but this thesis does implicitly compare the separate results from the two-levelled analysis, but it was excluded from the multilevel model. In this thesis the regional level is the highest level included since it is important to keep the research centred around the individuals, and the different regions' context. The analysis will follow what is called a "bottom up" structure, which means that first a simple regression model is presented, and from here, there will be added more variables for the model to become more complex and improved.

In multilevel analysis one needs to take the number of observations for each level into account. The two levels which are included here, the individual, with (# of obs for Kenya / Tanz) and the regional, with 47 regions in Kenya and 29 regions in Tanzania.[27] According to Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen (2017) it is problematic to include more than one independent variable per ten observations. This can lead to unreliable confidence intervals (2017:206). Since this study only have the lowest number of regions (for Tanzania) with 29 regional units, I do not see it fit to include more than *three* level-2 variables for this multilevel analysis at the most.

Since this thesis applies multilevel analysis there is a need to test for heteroscedasticity, which according to Mehmetoglu & Jacobsen (2017) can create a bias in the estimates of standard

[25] An example being pupils are categorized are categorised by classes.
[26] Retrieved from the ID_2 level from Geo-Refugee dataset (Fisk 2021).
[27] The region of Songwe is not present in either Afrobarometer round 6 or in the Geo-Refugee dataset, and therefore data from this region is excluded since it was created first in 2016. In addition the region of Rukwa is added to the region of Katavi, measuring one region, due to Tanzania's regional reform (see section 6.5).

errors in the model. To check whether the multilevel model has a problematic association with heteroscedasticity one can conduct a Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test (2017:149-150). The test showed that the models for Kenya and Tanzania did not have an issue with heteroscedasticity. I also plotted the variance of the residuals, to supplement for the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test (Mehmetoglu & Jacobsen 2017:150). Lastly it is important to check if the variables included in the random intercept models are normally distributed. This is checked for with a sktest and a plot over the the residuals normal distribution. All variables lie within the critical value for skewness[28] and kurtosis. Based on the results of the tests show that it is possible to go through with a multilevel analysis with these variables.

6.2 Data Sources

The data for analysis consists of two dataset; the Afrobarometer[29] round 6 and the Geo-Refugee[30] dataset. The Afrobarometer round 6 collected data in 2014 and was released in 2015, and the Geo-Refugee dataset which includes the populations in refugee settlements in Kenya and Tanzania from the year 2000-2017. The datasets are described in greater detail below, in addition an assessment of the data's reliability.

6.2.1 Geo-Refugee: A Refugee Location Dataset

Fisk (2021) created Geo-Refugee to investigate the presence of refugees and armed conflict, but the Geo-Refugee dataset can be used to investigate other refugee related issues. The data assigns administrative units, geographical coordinates to refugee camps/centres, and locations hosting dispersed (self-settled) refugees (Fisk 2021). [31] These numbers are gathered from the UNHCR location data which also includes the total population in these camps/settlements for each year. The Geo-Refugee dataset includes population data for 17 years in total (2000-2017), and this data is also sorted into different administrative units; country, county, and refugee camp/centre.

[28] Skewness is defined as the lack of symmetry in a distribution, and a normal distribution has a skewness value of 0. Kurtosis is if a distribution has too many observations close to the mean (Mehmetoglu & Jacobsen 2017:326-327) .
[29] The Afrobarometer is a public attitude survey focusing on democracy, economy, governance, and society in 30 (+) African countries on a regular basis (Afrobarometer 2021).
[30] Geo-Refugee provide data on the geographical location, population sizes and accommodation type for refugees in Africa (Fisk 2021).
[31] In Kenya and Tanzania, the refugee-population is mainly hosted in refugee camps, with some exceptions (Alix-Garcia & Saah 2010).

To be categorised as a refugee by the Geo-Refugee dataset a person is either recognised as a *refugee* under the 1951 Convention[32], or living under what is called a *refugee-like situation*. According to these sources, a refugee is recognized in accordance with the UNHCR statute; "individuals granted complementary forms of protection and those enjoying temporary protection" (UNHCR 2013). The difference between what the UNHCR (2013) define as people in a refugee-like situation and people being acknowledged as refugees, are the fact that people in refugee-like situations "includes groups of people who are outside their country of origin and who face protection risks similar to those of refugees, but for whom refugee status has, for practical or other reasons, not been ascertained" (UNHCR 2013). Since Geo-Refugee collects data on people living in both situations, one can see the numbers of refugees in a region, in addition to people who simply are not able to be acknowledged as refugees.

Geo-Refugee sums up the total population living under these conditions listed above and administer them into three different administrational levels: by country, region, and camp or settlement location. The numbers for the *population_total* variable include the number of people living in the following settlements (see table below):

Table 2: Description of Settlements in the Geo-Refugee dataset

Unit	Description
Camp_Centre	Number of people living inside a refugee camp.
Urban_Dispersed	Refugees with individual accommodation in urban areas.
Rural_Dispersed	Refugees with individual accommodation in rural areas.
SS_Camp	Settlement in camps independent of assistance from local government or the aid community.
Undefined	Refugees at unknown locations within a country.
Population_Total	Summarised numbers of population living in any of the settlements above for each location within a region for each year.

Source: (Fisk 2021).

A refugee location, is defined as a geographical unit with a known refugee population, recorded by UNHCR country offices (Fisk 2021). An updated version of the Geo-Refugee was provided directly from Kerstin Fisk for the purpose of this thesis, including new data from the UNCHR that were not present in the previous version of the dataset[33]. Originally, the data only included

[32] Under the 1967 protocol and the 1969 OAU Convention regarding Africa's refugee problem.
[33] This version of the dataset was made available the 20th of December in 2020.

population info for areas with over 100 refugees present. In this newly updated version, the UNCHR provides additional data from areas that are hosting under 100 refugees within this timeframe. This allows for a more comprehensive view on the refugee-situation in these different regions.

At a first glance one can clearly see differences in refugee-settlement patterns of Kenya and Tanzania. Kenyan refugee camps tend to be localised in fewer regions, where more camps are located in the same area, such as Dadaab in the region of Garissa. This is in accordance with the outline of settlement patterns from the case chapter (Bhagat 2020) where the hosting of refugees often takes place in large camp settlements.

The Geo-Refugee also includes geocoded data, which provides the exact coordinates for the different refugee settlements. Fisk (2021) utilized the database from the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to assign the coordinates for the refugee-settlements. These coordinates are one central strength of this dataset, making it one of the most accurate data sources on refugee settlement, but sadly geocoded data was not possible to utilise for this specific thesis, with its limited timeframe. If additional time were provided one could have requested a geo-coded version of the Afrobarometer data. This requires an application with detail questions on variables and rounds, and due to a high request for these data there were expected delays in delivering it. I saw it as impossible to request this data during my limited timeframe. In combination, this could have gathered data on how far a respondent is located from a refugee-settlement.[34] But I had to focus on using the data that was available for me. Delays in receiving geo-coded data could have risked the completion of this thesis. This was something that I did not want to do, although it has set some limitations to my research.

The Geo-Refugee dataset allows this research to create a variable measuring the presence of a refugee camp at the regional level. This is a simplified approach to measuring refugee-presence but is one alternative solution since geo-coded data were not applicable. The variable *refugee_camp*[35] only shows a simplified picture, but this measurement works for a multilevel analysis at the regional level. It does not show the ethnicity or nationality for the refugees. Total numbers of the population in the camps are present in the Geo-Refugee data, bur is not included

[34] Gathering data on the exact distance between a respondent and a refugee-camp could have showed a more comprehensive picture of how the effects on institutional trust. This can be interesting for further research.
[35] See section 6.5.

as an independent variable due to restrictions on the number of level-2 variables that can be included in the multilevel analysis.[36]

Gathering settlement information at the regional level had its consequences. Therefore, a discussion of this dataset's reliability is needed. Simply put, reliability reflects whether repeated measurements with the same instrument would provide the same result. In measuring refugee presence, the Geo-Refugee dataset has its limitations, and there were cases where one had to recode which regions some camps belonged to because of regional changes in Kenya and Tanzania (in 2010 and 2012)[37].

In addition, the reliability of a study is affected by measurement errors which represent an unreliable portion of variance of an indicator variable (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen 2017:320). This can be caused by random error or systematic error, and the random errors are the one that influence a study's reliability, which occurs when: "repeated applications of a given measurement procedure yield inconsistent results" (Adcock & Collier 2001:531). The information on camp-settlements come from records from UNHCR, and therefore it is considered as reliable for analysis. Also, all camps that are on record have been cross-checked from alternative sources to make sure that Geo-Refugee inherit the correct regions. Lastly, I want to add that this is the only available dataset which provides these kinds of data, and therefore this thesis is fully reliant on this.

Some changes had to be made to prevent measurement errors and improve reliability. Through the process of merging the Geo-Refugee dataset with the Afrobarometer data there appeared missing values in the dataset. Firstly, some camps listed in the Geo-Refugee datasets had a population total of zero and had to be recoded. The solution was to recode these camps into missing, which was done in instances where the variable for number of camps, *campcount* (counting the number of camps at the ID_2 level[38]), were equal to one and the population total was zero.

Secondly, there were some instances where camps were marked as undefined, with marks that the UNHCR location names were "various/unknown". These could not be included in the dataset and were because of this recoded to missing values. The latter case is a measurement error which introduces noise in the data material. After these variables were recoded into

[36] For more discussion around this topic, see section 6.7.
[37] For specific examples of how the different regions were recoded and developed, see section 6.4.
[38] Geo-Refugee utilise three administrational levels: ID_0 = Country level, ID_1 = Regional level, ID_2 = Camp/settlement level.

missing, *campcount* was created to count the camps that were present in the entire dataset, which showed that a higher mean of camps was found in Tanzania in comparison to Kenya (see table below).

Table 3: Summary Statistics of Campcount

Country	mean	sd
Kenya	1.556	1.7
United Rep. of Tanzania	2.507	2.671

In addition, there were some specific cases where settlements were not connected to any of the regional units or settlements, which made it impossible to state where these camps are exactly located. For these unknown values, the only administrative unit was available at the country level. Since this study focuses on regional placement of camps, I saw this as problematic. The various and unknown settlements are present in Tanzania for the most part (12 cases), Kenya has one unknown location in Geo-Refugee. These missing or unknown locations are easily identified through looking at the regional level variable (ID_1) which is left blank, and at the exact location names from the UNHCR. Therefore, the unidentified locations were thoroughly assessed and recoded into missing values. Although the management of these missing locations are carried out, it is important to note that this change affects this study's findings. By recoding these unknown camps, one can isolate the cases where refugees are settled in an area which is not specified, but it also excludes refugee-locations where one could have had more extensive settlement data. On the other hand, this study relies on correct location data to research how refugees affect institutional trust on different administrational levels. If these camps were not dropped it could have had a large impact on this study's results. This could have created noise in the data and could have assigned refugee-settlements where there was no concrete evidence for where these camps were placed.

6.2.2 Afrobarometer Data

The Afrobarometer survey measures citizen attitudes on democracy and governance, the economy, and other topics making national headlines. The survey is a pan-African, non-partisan survey collecting high-quality, reliable data on what Africans are thinking. The data are characterised by: nationally representative samples, face-to-face interviews in the language of the respondent's choice, and it allows for comparisons between countries, and over time (Afrobarometer 2021a). Round 6 of the Afrobarometer survey was conducted in 36 countries in total, and the fieldwork for Kenya and Tanzania was conducted in 2014 (Afrobarometer 2021b). The chosen variables from this round of the survey will be described in section 6.4 and 6.5.

By including one round of the Afrobarometer survey one is not able to look at how institutional trust varies over time. This is a result of the process of merging Afrobarometer with the Geo-Refugee data at the regional level. The process of merging the two datasets was time consuming due to inconsistencies occurring along the way, in particular due to regional reform, administrational units, and missing values.[39] Based on these considerations, I limited my research to one round of the Afrobarometer survey instead of including more rounds, since this would not have been possible within the research's timeframe. There is more information and discussion on this in section 6.2.3.

It is crucial to reflect on the limitations this choice has for this thesis. Will opinion data from one year, be able reveal how institutional trust is shaped by refugee camps? The answer lies in the respondents of the Afrobarometer data, and which variables that are included. In sum, the biggest beneficial factor of including more rounds, is that it would have led the research to see how institutional trust varies over time. Fortunately, the number of respondents is high in round 6, for both countries, which lies a good research foundation at the individual level. At the regional level, the number of regions opens for contextual explanations for institutional trust, but regions vary in regards to their number of observations within one group, which can be seen in chapter 7.

6.2.2.1 Unweighted Data

This section discuss why the multilevel analysis were kept unweighted,[40] excluding the weighting variable *withinwt*[41] from the analysis. I want to emphasise that this decision is taken to deliver the most reliable results possible for both countries, for the diverging level of observations in the two selected case countries. If I had accessed Geo-Refugee data from Uganda, I could have a better basis for comparison across contexts. The Afrobarometer data includes a population weight which weights the observations within the country. The weight adjusts the distribution of the sample based on individual selection probabilities (Isbell 2017:72).[42] The inclusion of weights is essential for uncovering causal relationships which can be generalised for the entire population for the country/countries in question (Mehmetoglu &

[39] I had to contact Kerstin Fisk personally to gain more in-depth information on the different settlements and specific cases where for example regional reform changed the location of camps.
[40] I want to specify that all the upcoming models have an weighted version in the appendix, which is not present in the result section but can be discussed in comparison to the unweighted results.
[41] The weighting factor withinwt was based on region, and was design to take the rural-urban distribution into account in addition to gender, household size, and enumeration area (EA) (Isbell 2017:72).
[42] This is created on the basis of region, gender, urban-rural distribution, and size of household and enumeration area (Isbell 2017).

Jakobsen 2017:331). One of the strengths of multilevel analysis is that one does not need an equal number of observations within each group, one can find the variance which is caused from the variables on for example individual and at the regional level. From a substantive view we might want to weigh them since the size of one group might be a result of chance (Mehmetmoglu & Jakobsen 2017:203).

This must be further discussed. This analysis limits itself to researching two countries, with limited number of regions. Based on this it might be problematic to include weights. For example when a weight is based on the entire region's gender distribution, urban-rural distribution, etc. this could have led to incomplete results. All variables that are include in the models, also the independent variable, *refugee_camp* have been recoded for missing values, and this can create errors which could be damaging.

In addition, it was clear from an early stage that Kenya did not have as many observations per group as Tanzania. Where Tanzania had a minimum of 23 observations for each group, Kenya had a minimum of one observation per group. Kenya also had half of the average number of observations for each region in comparison to Tanzania. To treat the data as equally as possible, I chose to exclude weights since Kenya is affected by having a few minimum observations. If this limited number of observations were to be weighted in relation to gender, age, and the basis of rural-urban distribution, the results would provide insufficient results which could not provide answers to this thesis' hypotheses. Although they are not included in the thesis, results of weighted data are included in appendix C2-C4, which leaves the impact of weighted data explored.

6.3 Measuring Institutional Trust

The dependent variable for my analysis is individual level *institutional trust*, reflecting the individuals' trust in different political and government institutions. To measure institutional trust, I created a scale based on the following indicators from the Afrobarometer survey which handles trust towards: the President, the Parliament, the National Electoral Commission, the Tax department, the Police, the Courts of Law, and trust in the Local Government Council.

6.3.1 Institutional Trust's Content Validity

To create a scale which measures what it is intended to, it needs to be evaluated in terms of its content validity. I conducted both a factor analysis and a correlation matrix to make sure the indicators could be added to a scale, measuring the same phenomenon. Before I can go further

into the results from the analyses, I want to comment on the process of deciding which factors to include in a scale.

According to Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen (2017), it is vital to evaluate how many factors which are to be included in a scale (2017:276), which is critical for content validity which relates to: "the degree an indicator represents the universe of content entailed in the systematised concept being measured" (Adcock & Collier 2001:537). Institutional trust is not supposed to measure the performance of the person sitting in office or working in these positions (Mattes & Moreno 2018:357), but the trust the individual has to the political institution as a whole. Hutchison & Johnson (2011) note that a citizen's political trust can be related to political actors such as the president, and/or to the political institutions which comprise the state (2011:739). In this study's analysis I want to include trust in political actors comprising the system of government (such as the President) and political institutions (such as the Courts of law) to get a complete view of trust in Kenya and Tanzania's institutions which comprise the state.

I want to focus my research on the institutions which are representing its citizens and are performing essential government duties (such as the National Electoral Commission and the Tax Department). As reflected in the case chapter, Tanzania lacks an opposition which is powerful enough to overthrow the sitting government through an electoral process (UN 2020). The president was therefore one of the institutions I must assess before including it into my scale. Having a sufficient oppositional option which could overthrow power is crucial for a democracy (Uddhammar 2011), but it is important to evaluate this in accordance with the cases the research handles. To research institutional trust in areas of increased refugee-presence, especially in the cases of Kenya and Tanzania, one must be inclusive in the approach to gain results which are in accordance with reality in both case countries.

In addition, Godefroidt et al. (2017) adds what institutional trust should inherit: "enhancing the legitimacy, efficiency, and sustainability of governments by linking citizens to the institutions created to represent them" (2017:906). I want to measure institutional trust in a way which contributes to sufficient analysis for both countries. Although Tanzania is characterised highly trusting towards their president, since the citizens see the CCM as a maintenance for peace and stability (2012:314), there is no good reason to exclude this indicator from Kenya's case where a transition of power has occurred after an election. Based on this logic, if I am going to research both Tanzania and Kenya's institutional trust, I will *not* exclude a central aspect of their executive power which the president represents. These two states are dissimilar in this aspect,

and this will be kept in mind during the analysis. Including the president in the institutional trust scale can contribute with valuable discoveries for Kenya and Tanzania, which will be further discussed in this thesis.

Certain indicators were not included in the institutional trust scale. These were omitted since they were related to political parties and the opposition. The reason for leaving these out are based on this research's area of interest. By excluding trust in oppositional parties, political parties, and the ruling party, I can separate between trust in political institutions, and political parties which will include party politics. This research is strictly connected to measuring Kenya and Tanzania's trust in central institutions of the state apparatus controlled for refugee presence. For this reason, I chose the following indicators for my new dependent variable: trust in president, trust in parliament, trust in national electoral commission, trust in tax department, trust in police, trust courts of law, and trust in local government council. I have excluded trust in opposition or ruling party since these are not a concrete institution in relation to the other indicators for the trust scale.

When the Afrobarometer survey round 6 is asking for the level of trust the respondent has to each of the following: the President, the Parliament, the Electoral Commission, the Elected Local Government Council, the Tax Department, the Police and the Courts of law (Isbell 2017:31-33). The respondent then answers within four categories according to the level of trust they have in the previously stated institutions. These range from having no trust at all, just a little, somewhat=2, or a lot=3. In STATA I recoded the answers to missing if the respondent answered any of the following: "Don't know/Haven't heard enough, refused to answer and missing" (Isbell 2017:31-33). The remaining four categories range from 0 to 3, which makes scale for the institutional trust continuous.

Based on the already discussed differences in trust regarding the president especially, it is interesting to see how this plays out in the two different case countries. Therefore, it is necessary to assess the correlation matrix and conduct the factor analysis for each country. Throughout this thesis the specified models relating to each country will be marked as "a" for Kenya and "b" for Tanzania. There is from now on always one specified model for each of the countries in question. A correlation matrix tells how indicators correlate with each other, and as seen in the table below each indicator is perfectly correlated with itself showing a coefficient 1.00 for all seven variables.

Table 4a: Correlation Matrix for Institutional Trust in Kenya

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)

(1) President	1.000						
(2) Parliament	0.557	1.000					
(3) Elec. Com.	0.638	0.505	1.000				
(4) Tax Dep.	0.399	0.446	0.486	1.000			
(5) Local Council.	0.336	0.459	0.343	0.457	1.000		
(6) Police	0.335	0.353	0.364	0.320	0.359	1.000	
(7) Courts of Law	0.413	0.458	0.435	0.445	0.398	0.445	1.000

Table 4b: Matrix of Correlations for Institutional Trust in Tanzania

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
(1) President	1.000						
(2) Parliament	0.619	1.000					
(3) Elec. Com.	0.621	0.662	1.000				
(4) Tax Dep.	0.500	0.583	0.674	1.000			
(5) Local Council.	0.526	0.514	0.573	0.586	1.000		
(6) Police	0.399	0.443	0.451	0.488	0.459	1.000	
(7) Courts of Law	0.450	0.475	0.509	0.498	0.479	0.596	1.000

As one can see in both Kenya and Tanzania's case (Table 4a and 4b) there is a positive correlation between all seven variables. Pearson's correlation coefficient (also called Pearson's r) measures the strength of the linear relationship between two variables, and varies from -1 and 1, where levels below zero indicate that low levels of one of the variables are connected to higher values on the second (showing a negative relationship). If the score is above zero higher values on one variable tend to go together with higher values on the second variable. The closer the value are to 1 or -1, the stronger the effect is (Pripp 2021). For Kenya, the average correlation was at 0.43 which is well above the recommended level of 0.3. The same goes for Tanzania which shows a higher average correlation at 0.53.

As seen Table 4b, the highest correlation between the National Electoral Commission (3) and the Tax Department (4) with a correlation coefficient of r=0.67. Other high correlation coefficients are found between the President (1) and the National Electoral Commission (3) for both countries, which is understandable since the president often are controlled by the national electoral commission, controlling for free and fair elections. The lowest correlation coefficient, r=0.320, is seen in table 3a between the Tax Department and the Police.

The covariance for the included indicators in the scale is measured by Cronbach's alpha (α). It is called a measurement of reliability by Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen (2017) and for the included variables it showed a score at 0.867, which is satisfactory since it is well above the recommended level of 0.7 (2017:288).

To further research the scale's content validity a factor analysis is a is used to detect if there is smaller set of underlying factors which could explain the covariance/correlation among a larger set of observed variables (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen 2017:270). This is explored through a factor analysis. According to Ulleberg & Nordvik (2001), there are three main steps in factor analysis:

first the calculation of factors to be included, second the rotation of factors, and last the interpretation of the factors (2011:26). Step two is irrelevant here since I am only researching one factor in this dependent variable. The factor analysis showed that the scale measures the same underlying phenomenon, which is a prerequisite for creating a scale (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen 2017:272). In this case I executed a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test to the variables included. KMO varies from 0-1, where 0 is an unacceptable score, and a score close to 1 show that the variable is useful in a factor analysis. Overall the score the seven factors gained a KMO at 0.89 which is categorised as a satisfactory score (STATA 2021).

The results from the factor analysis[43] show that all indicators load on one dimension (Skog 2015:96), and the factor loadings show the correlation between the observed variables and factor (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen 2017:288). The factor loadings vary between 0.535 (police) and 0.709 (Parliament) in Kenya's case. This can explain 28.6 percent of the variance of the police variable, and 50.3 percent of the variance of the parliament variable. For Tanzania, the factor loadings varied between 0.638 for the police variable (40.7 percent) and 0.811 for the national electoral commission variable (65.7 percent). Based on the results I keep all the seven factors in my scale. Although the loading is low in the case for the police, I find the indicator essential for this scale since I am researching the safety of the individuals in hypothesis H_{3a} and H_{3b}.

Eigenvalues tells us how the amount of common variance (communality) each factor has, this can be calculated by the Eigenvalues divided on the numbers of variables and then translate this to percent (by multiplying with 100) (Ulleberg & Nordvik 2001:8). In the case for the president in Tanzania, this factor had an Eigenvalue of 3.697, which then can explain 52 percent of the total variance in all seven observed variables. This is somewhat lower in Kenya's case with an Eigenvalue of 2.980. In Factor four to seven (tax department, elected local government council, police and courts of law) all inherit negative Eigenvalues, ranging from -0,016 to -0,196 (see appendix A).

6.3.1 Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variable

Based on the previous analysis and different tests the following tables show the included variables for the scale for institutional trust. Table 5a and 5b contains the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the dependent variable institutional trust for both Kenya and Tanzania. It includes the number of respondents (N), the minimum and maximum values for

[43] The results of the factor analysis can be found in appendix A, table A1 and A2.

each indicator (min, max), mean and standard deviation. One might argue that this is overinclusive, but in order to gain quality data at the individual and regional level these variables were essential to include in the scale for institutional trust. Also by including more factors in a scale one can compensate for measurement errors. To check if the scale is overinclusive a robustness check is done where a scale with fewer indicators is tested, this can then be compared to the original scale (see appendix X).

Table 5a: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variable for Kenya

	N	min	max	Mean	Std. Dev.
The President	2380	0	3	2.04	1.008
The Parliament	2322	0	3	1.566	.949
The Electoral Commission	2263	0	3	1.428	1.131
The Tax Department	2060	0	3	1.59	.957
The Elected Government Council	2307	0	3	1.526	.971
The Police	2377	0	3	1.168	1.001
The Courts of law	2282	0	3	1.674	.935
Institutional trust	1954	0	3	1.56	.708

As seen in Table 5a, the mean for the president variable is highest at 2.122, which tells us that the Kenyan's that were asked answered that they trusted their president "somewhat". This was expepected when including the president in this scale and is interesting to compare with Tanzania's levels of trust. The lowest mean value is found for the police with a mean value at 1.168, indicating that people in Kenya trust their police "Just a little". The variable with the largest standard deviation is the electoral commission at 1.131, followed by the president and police at 1.008 and 1.001. The police show the lowest mean value, 1.168. Lastly one can see that the scale of institutional trust has a mean value at 1.727 and the lowest standard deviation in this table at 0.73.

In table 5b (below) the police has the lowest mean value (1.707), and the largest standard deviation. The president has the strongest mean value at 2.205 which were expected since the case chapter already have argued for that trust in the president is stronger in Tanzania (Uddhammar 2011:1168). The lowest standard deviation is found for the variable institutional trust at 0.717, and the highest standard deviation is at 0.948 for the police which also has the lowest mean value.

Table 5b: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variable for Tanzania

	N	min	max	Mean	Std. Dev.
The President	2357	0	3	2.205	.903
The Parliament	2342	0	3	1.945	.948
The National Electoral Commission	2258	0	3	1.864	.933
The Tax Department	2225	0	3	1.731	.931
The Elected Government Council	2345	0	3	1.936	.907
The Police	2359	0	3	1.707	.967
The Courts of law	2330	0	3	1.866	.904
Institutional trust	2154	0	3	1.878	.717

6.4 Regional Variable for Multilevel Analysis (Level-2)

Before going further into the independent variables I describe the level-2 variable used for identifying different regions in Kenya and Tanzania. It was created in order to merge the Afrobarometer data and the Geo-Refugee datasets. This variable was recoded from a string variable to a numerical one and include all regions in Tanzania and smaller districts in Kenya. The only official region which is missing is the region of Songwe in Tanzania. This region was not present in either the Afrobarometer or Geo-Refugee data, and as a result this region is not present in this data either.

The variable *regionkt* lists all the different regions in Tanzania and districts in Kenya. The variable is based on the different regions from Geo-Refugee which then are merged with the variables from the Afrobarometer. Merging the regions for Tanzania were straight forward since the Afrobaormeter variable for region matched the regions in Geo-Refugee with one exception[44]. These regions had each one unique three-numbered code starting with 7, and all 30 official regions are inluded[45]. In Kenya's case this had to be handled differently since the Afrobarometer variable for region only included eight regional units, which were too few for my analysis. This led the use of the variable for district, which includes all 166 districts in Kenya, which then were matched to the correct regions from Geo-Refugee. All these smaller districts are located within the 47 administrational regions in Kenya (KNBS 2019). Using this variable was the simplest way to connect the camps to the correct regions, and since the multilevel models will be run separately of Kenya and Tanzania, the main independent variable will only trace the correctly. *Regionkt* includes all 47 regions, ranging from 15 to 166 (see Table 6a).

[44] The region of Songwe was established in 2016 from the western part of the Mbeya region (NBS 2015). This is two years after the timespan of interest for this study (2000-2014).
[45] Tanzania's regions were not chronological, but all 29 regions had unique values varying from 740-769 (see table 6b).

Adjustments in *regionkt* had to be made because of regional reform. For Tanzania I had to recode the regions of Katavi and Rukwa into one common region, called Katavi since the refugee camp Katumba was first present in the region of Rukwa up until 2010, and after Tanzania's regional reform in 2010 (NBS 2011), the camp then was recoded as located in Katavi. This issue occurred since Katumba camp was placed right at the regional border between Katavi and Rukwa.

Table 6a: Descriptive Statistics of *regionkt* for Kenya

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
regionkt	2397	94.999	43.292	15	166

Table 6b: Descriptive Statistics of *regionkt* for Tanzania

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
regionkt	2386	752.594	8.384	740	769

6.5 Main Independent Variable: Refugee_camp

In the following section I want to outline the main independent variable *refugee_camp*. First, the process of constructing the main independent variable *refugee_camp* using data from Geo-Refugee will be outlined, in addition to describe what it measures. As described in section 6.2.1, Geo-Refugee lists all refugee-settlements in Kenya and Tanzania (Fisk 2021). Based on this one can identify which settlements are: camps, settled in urban/rural areas, camps that are independent of assistance, or simply unidentified (see table 2).

The main independent variable for this thesis is based on camp settlements, which includes the official camps, and independent refugee-camps that are present in the region from 2000-2014. This research aims at seeing how refugee-presence can affect institutional trust, and it is more likely that the host-communities will be aware of these kinds of camp-settlements, in contrast to refugees living as urban or rural dispersed people. This is main logic for excluding the unknown settlements and the urban/rural self-settled refugees but focusing on official and independent refugee camps.

Refugee_camp is based on data of the total population in refugee-settlements from Geo-Refugee (see table 2), which is merged at the regional level, and subsequently are recoded to show the regions with refugee camps present for each year from 2000-2014. The variable is dichotomous, and if there is a refugee camp present in a region the variable will have a value of 1, and if that there are no refugee camps present the variable will have a value of 0. Originally, this research also included refugees which were rural dispersed and urban dispersed in addition to refugees living in camps. As a robustness test I will include the more general variable *refugee* which

includes more regions as a result of adding urban/rural dispersed people in the variable (see appendix C for results).

Another ruling in *refugee_camp* was to include only the official refugee-camps, and not the independent ones. It was clear that this could have excluded many relevant regions from the data, with precise locations and population numbers. Excluding these regions was seen as something that could lead to an inadequate measure refugee camps in a region. Based on this, I chose to include both kinds of camp settlements in the analysis, since it is best fitted to test H_1: *people in regions with refugee camps express lower institutional trust than people in regions with no refugee camps present*. When the two different categories of camps (official and independent) were included, the variable asserted whether these refugee camps were influential for an individual's institutional trust. Other control variables will include camp settlement data from shorter time-period, for example from the five more recent years, this follows in section 6.7.

In creating the variable *refugee_camp* it was essential to exclude years after 2014, since this was the year the Afrobarometer survey was conducted in Kenya and Tanzania. This collected data on refugee camps from the year 2000-2014 (14 years), excluding data from 2015, 2016 and 2017 since they are not of relevance for this study since the Afrobarometer round 6 collects data from their respondents in the year of 2014. Including data from later years would therefore be problematic. Based on this timespan the variable refugee provides the following overview over regions in Kenya and Tanzania where refugee camps are present (see table 5 below).

Table 5: Number of regions in refugee_camp from 2000-2014

Regions	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Garissa	1	14.28	14.28
Turkana	1	14.28	28.57
Katavi	1	14.28	42.85
Kagera	1	14.28	57.14
Kigoma	1	14.28	71.52
Tabora	1	14.28	85.71
Tanga	1	14.28	100.00
Total	7	100.00	

6.6 Explanatory Variables

The following section will describe the explanatory variables that included to answer the three remaining hypotheses from chapter 5. All variables presented here are level-1 variables. First the different variables will be presented in reference to the hypothesis they are going to test, and further I will present the control variables for the models.

The first of the explanatory variables is connected to hypothesis H_2*: which expect that the negative impact of refugees on institutional trust will be stronger among unemployed people.* In order to test this, the variable *employment* is included from the Afrobarometer where the respondent is asked the following: "Do you have a job that pays a cash income? If yes, is it full-time or part-time? If no, are you presently looking for a job?" (Isbell 2017:63). This variable have the following response alternatives: "0=No (not looking), 1=No (looking), 2=Yes, part time, 3= Yes, full time" (Isbell 2017:63). I recoded the variable into three based on the current employment status of the respondent. The category unemployed is recoded to 0 and includes the respondents which do not have a job, either they are looking for one, or not (value 0 and 1). The people working full-time are recoded to value 1, and the remaining people which are working part time is recoded to 2.

As outlined by hypothesis H_{3a} and H_{3b}[46] the effect of having refugees present in your community will lead to a stronger negative effect for institutional trust among people who feel less safe in their neighbourhoods. This is tested for with the variable *safety* where the respondent is asked: "Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family: Felt unsafe walking in *your* neighborhood?" (Isbell 2017:14). The answers are then coded into the four following categories: "0=never, 1=just once or twice, 2=several times, 3=many times, 4=always" . The missing values are recoded, and the variable is seen as best fitted to test for this with its initial form with five categories ranging from 0-4.

The fourth and final hypotheses, H_{4a} and H_{4b}, relates to the urban-rural variable from Afrobarometer which categorise the sampling of respondents, which are done by the interviewers, this variable are has two categories, "1= urban sampling unit and 2=rural sampling unit" (Isbell 2017:3), which is measured at the individual level. The variable is recoded into to *rural* [47] with urban as category of reference (coded to 0).

The following variables are not directly connected to a hypothesis, but these variables are important since they test sociodemographic elements which can further explain institutional trust in different regions. These variables are seen as explanatory variables since they can enhance the causal relationship on how refugee camps influence institutional trust. *Education*

[46] H_{3a}:The negative effect of refugees on institutional trust is stronger among people who feels less safe in their neighbourhoods. H_{3b}: Kenya will show a stronger negative effect of refugees on institutional trust among people who feel less safe in their neighbourhoods Tanzania.
[47] H_{4a}: Higher numbers of refugees in urban areas will decrease institutional trust. H_{4b}: Higher numbers of refugees in rural areas will increase institutional trust.

is a variable where the respondent is asked for their highest level of education. This variable ranges from 0=No formal schooling to 9=Postgraduate,[48] after missing variables are excluded (Isbell 2017:63). The variable *age* tells the age of the respondent, which ranges from 18-105, in this case missing values are also recoded to missing (Isbell 2017:10). *Woman* is a dichotomous variable showing the respondent's gender with two categories, where male is recoded as a category of reference, with a value of 0, and woman has value of 1. (describe percentage of women/men) (Isbell 2017:67).

6.7 Alternative Camp Measurement and Control Variable for Violence

The final section of this chapter will focus on the variables which are included to test if there are alternative ways of operationalising the main dependent variable *refugee_camp*. This method chapter has already mentioned robustness checks which will be conducted to test whether the models are fully reliable (see 6.1.1), but these variables relate to testing alternative ways of measuring refugee camps.

Looking at camp data from 14 years back, the older data from the early 2000's might not be as relevant as the more recent numbers. To solve this issue, I created a variable which covered camp data from five years back, called *camp5yr*. This is the second level-2 variable used in the multilevel analysis. The variable is based on the *refugee_camp* variable. *Camp5yr* includes camp settlement data from the years 2010-2014, excluding data from 2000-2009. Through this variable the analysis can spot whether more recent trends in refugee-settlements can be more influential for institutional trust.

The final level-2 variable of this thesis is called *prevviol* and is categorised as a control variable. It focuses on the three regions in Kenya which has an especially low degree of institutional trust due to Somali-Kenyans engaging in riots against the Kenyan state (Lochery 2012:615). The three regions of Garissa, Wajir and Mandera are affected by this. I used the regional variable *regionkt* and found the value for these three regions. The *prevviol* variable is dichotomous and the regions of Garissa, Wajir and Mandera are given the value 1 and all other regions have the value of 0.

[48] "0=No formal schooling, 1=Informal schooling only (including Koranic schooling), 2=Some primary schooling, 3=Primary school completed, 4=Intermediate school or Some secondary school/high school, 5=Secondary school/high school completed , 6=Post-secondary qualifications, other than university e.g. a diploma or degree from a polytechnic or college, 7=Some university, 8=University completed, 9=Post-graduate" (Isbell 2017:63)

Below, descriptive statistics are included for all independent variables, and additional information is provided in appendix B for the dichotomous variables.

Table 7: Descriptive Statistics of Independent variables for Kenya and Tanzania

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
refugee camp[a]	4783	.115	.319	0	1
camp5yr[a]	4783	.143	.546	0	5
prevviol[a]	4783	.0234	.151	0	1
employment	4778	.8725	.740	0	2
safety	4780	.343	.475	0	1
rural[b]	4783	.357	.479	0	1
education	4782	3.517	1.804	0	9
woman[b]	4783	.499	.5	0	1
age	4762	37.234	13.883	18	99

a=variables at level-2 | b=dummycoded variables (where umemployed=0, working full-time =1 and part-time=2, urban=0 and rural=1 and man =0 and woman=1).

Chapter 7: Results

The main purpose for this chapter is to present the results of the analysis. As outlined in the method section, I conduct the analysis separately for each country, using two-levelled multilevel analysis, at the regional and the individual level. Five models are being presented in this chapter, these models are estimated by maximum likelihood, which in sum, finds the coefficients that make the data most likely (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen 2017:199). The first model to be presented is the empty or intercept only model.

7.1 Intercept-Only Model and Random Intercept Model I

The following section present the results from the first (empty) model and the second random intercept model for Kenya and Tanzania. First, I start with model I called an empty- or intercept-only model[49], which is the simplest model presented in this thesis. A two-level intercept-only model is given by:[50]

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_0 + u_{0j} + e_{ij}$$

Based on the result from the intercept-only model one can calculate the variance partition coefficient, or VPC. V*ar(e)* pics up the amount of variance of the dependent level-1 variable, which can be explained at the individual level, and *var(u_0)* shows the explained variance at the regional level (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen 2017:203). VPC is a measure of the share of variance in the dependent variable that comes from the regional level, and has the following formula:

$$VPC = \frac{var(u_0)}{var(e) + var(u_0)}$$

The VPC from model I for Kenya (see Table 8a)[51] explains 18.56 percent of the variance in the dependent variable is at the regional level (level-2), and 81,44 percent of the variance is at the individual level (level-1). There is a rule of thumb in evaluating these results, and if the lion's share of the variance is at the individual level, and the VPC is 5 percent, or more, it should not be ignored (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen 2017:203). The intercept-only model for Tanzania[52] showed a VPC which explained 8.21 percent of the variance in the dependent variable was explained at the regional level, and 91.79 percent of the variation is explained at the individual level (see Table 8b). The VPC is above 5 percent, but it is significantly lower than Kenya's.

[49] See appendix C.
[50] Where Y indicate institutional trust for individual *i* in region *j*. β_0 is the total mean value of the dependent variable in region *j*.U_{0j} is the variance of the level-2 error term, and e_{ij} is the variance of the level-1 error term (Mehmetoglou & Jakobsen 2017:201).
[51] See appendix C1a.
[52] See appendix C1b.

This means that the regional context is more influential for Kenyans' institutional trust than for Tanzanians, where institutional trust is explained to a larger extent at the individual level.

Model II includes six independent variables measured at the individual level. By only including the level-1 variables, one can see the independent variables without level-2 variables' interference. In the formula below, the X-variables mark the independent variables which are included, with a suffix *ij* showing the variance in the independent variable for the individual (*i*) living in region (*j*).

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{1ij} + \beta_2 X_{2ij} + \beta_3 X_{3ij} + \beta_4 X_{4ij} + \beta_5 X_{5ij} + \beta_6 X_{6ij} + \beta_7 X_{7ij} + u_{0j} + e_{ij}$$

As seen in the table below, the VPC decreases from 18.56 to 16.41 percent for Kenya in the second model, and all six independent variables lowers the share of variance in the dependent variable that comes from the regional level. Significant results are found for the variables *rural* (-0.080) and *safety* (-0,242), which relates to hypothesis three (safety) and four (urban/rural divide).

Table 8a: Model I & II with Level-1 Variables for for Kenya

		I	II
insttrust	_cons	1.564	1.690
		(32.33)***	(21.01)***
lns1_1_1	_cons	-1.188	-1.285
		(10.01)***	(10.52)***
insttrust	employment		-0.019
			(0.96)
	safety		-0.242
			(7.96)***
	rural		-0.080
			(2.16)**
	education		-0.014
			(1.55)
	woman		0.033
			(1.12)
	age		0.002
			(1.41)
lnsig_e	_cons	-0.449	-0.468
		(27.72)***	(28.85)***
N		1,954	1,943
Var (e)		0.408	0.392
Var (u)		0.093	0.077
VPC		18.56	16.41

* $p<0.1$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$

For Tanzania (see Table 8b below), model II has a lower the VPC which goes from from 8.21 percent in model I, to to 8.17 percent. However, in comparison to Kenya, one finds a higher

number of significant relationships in model II. These are found for the variables *safety* (-0.165) and *rural* (-0.091), which shows that if you are feeling more unsafe this will have a negative impact on your institutional trust, and that if you are living in a rural area this will affect institutional trust negatively in comparison to if you were living in an urban area, supporting H_{3a}[53], $H4_a$ and $H4_b$.[54] In addition hypothesis H_{3b}[55] where the expected negative relationship is expected be stronger for Kenya in comparison to Tanzania, and this is found to be true in model II.The variables *woman* (0.127) and *age* (0.003) show a positive relationship for institutional trust. Women do often show a stronger institutional trust than men, and it becomes stronger with age (add general trust literature here), and this is in accordance with this second model's findings.

Table 8b: Model I & II with Level-1 Variables for Tanzania

		I	II
insttrust	_cons	1.873	1.798
		(44.87)**	(22.93)***
lns1_1_1	_cons	-1.577	-1.594
		(9.95)**	(9.88)***
insttrust	employment		-0.032
			(1.52)
	safety		-0.165
			(4.35)***
	rural		-0.091
			(2.38)**
	education		-0.009
			(0.83)
	woman		0.127
			(4.22)***
	age		0.003
			(2.99)***
lnsig_e	_cons	-0.370	-0.384
		(24.13)**	(24.97)***
N		2,154	2,145
Var(e)		0.477	0.463
Var(u)		0.043	0.041
VPC		8.21	8.17

* $p<0.1$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$

[53] The negative effect of refugees on institutional trust is stronger among people who feels less safe in their neighbourhoods.

[54] H_{4a} Having a refugee camp present in a region will decrease institutional trust in urban areas. H_{4b} Having a refugee camp present in a region will increase institutional trust in rural areas.

[55] Kenya will show a stronger negative effect of refugees on institutional trust among people who feel less safe in their neighbourhoods Tanzania.

7.2 Random Intercept Models with Level-2 Variables

In model III the main independent variable *refugee_camp* is included in the model. In addition to another measure for measuring camp presence with *camp5yr* and the *prevviol* variable for Kenya's case. When the first level-2 variable is added to model III can be formally be written as:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{1ij} + \beta_2 X_{2ij} + \beta_3 X_{3ij} + \beta_4 X_{4ij} + \beta_5 X_{5ij} + \beta_6 X_{6ij} + \beta_7 X_{7ij} + \beta_8 X_{8ij} + u_{0j} + e_{ij}$$

A rule of thumb in regression states that there should be at least 10 observations for each independent variable. If there are fewer than 15-20 level-2 units (regions in this case) this leads to confidence intervals that are unreliable (Stegmueller 2013). It is important to mark that this thesis has a minimum of 29 level-2 units, which are the number of regions in Tanzania's case, and a maximum of 46 regions in Kenya's case. This means that one can only include two level-2 variables in Tanzania's case, and four level-2 variables in Kenya's case. This will be implemented in model IV, which include more level-2 variables.

In Kenya's case when the *refugee_camp* is included in model three one can see that it is not significant in either model three or four. There is still a negative relationship for the variables *safety* and *rural* in both models. In model IV, p*revviol* does not show significant results for institutional trust in Kenya. These areas in Kenya are known for having a more tense relationship between the Kenyan hosts and the refugees. In these regions, close to the border of Somalia, one find many of Kenya's refugee camps (Lochery 2012). This can make *prevviol* unfit to use for the regional variable *refugee_camp*. But will be further explored in model V.

Table 9a: Model III & IV for Kenya

		III	IV
insttrust	refugee_camp	0.190	0.250
		(0.86)	(1.07)
	employment	-0.020	-0.020
		(0.99)	(1.00)
	safety	-0.242	-0.243
		(7.97)***	(8.00)***
	rural	-0.081	-0.081
		(2.17)**	(2.17)**
	education	-0.013	-0.013
		(1.48)	(1.48)
	woman	0.033	0.033
		(1.14)	(1.12)
	age	0.002	0.002
		(1.44)	(1.42)
	_cons	1.679	1.687
		(20.66)***	(20.60)***
lns1_1_1	_cons	-1.295	-1.302
		(10.56)***	(10.59)***
	prevviol		-0.141
			(0.73)
lnsig_e	_cons	-0.468	-0.468
		(28.85)***	(28.85)***
N		1,943	1,943
Var(e)		0.392	0.392
Var(u)		0.075	0.074
VPC		16.05	15.88

* $p<0.1$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$

Model III (see Table 9b) includes the same variables for Tanzania as Kenya, and the variable *refugee_camp* still does not provide significant results in model III. Therefore, for Tanzania there is added an alternative variable measuring the number of refugee camps from a 5-year period was added in model IV, *camp5yr*.[56] This variable does not provide significant results, and the variables for camp settlement will have to be further examined. On the other hand, model III and IV captures a negative relationship for the variables *safety* and *rural*, and a positive relationship for the variable *age* for institutional trust in Tanzania.

[56] I did not include the variable *prevviol* in Tanzania's model since it does not include the three Kenyan regions.

Table 9b: Model III & IV for Tanzania

		III	IV
insttrust	refugee_camp	0.116	
		(1.11)	
	employment	-0.032	-0.032
		(1.50)	(1.52)
	safety	-0.165	-0.165
		(4.36)***	(4.36)***
	rural	-0.090	-0.091
		(2.36)**	(2.37)**
	education	-0.008	-0.008
		(0.78)	(0.81)
	woman	0.127	0.127
		(4.23)***	(4.22)***
	age	0.003	0.003
		(3.00)***	(2.99)***
	_cons	1.774	1.791
		(21.91)***	(22.24)***
lns1_1_1	_cons	-1.618	-1.596
		(9.97)***	(9.90)***
insttrust	camp5yr		0.028
			(0.34)
lnsig_e	_cons	-0.384	-0.384
		(24.97)***	(24.97)***
N		2,145	2,145
Var(e)		0.463	0.464
Var(u)		0.039	0.041
VPC		7.77	8.12

* $p<0.1$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$

7.2.1 Alternative Variables for Measuring Refugee Presence

From the results presented so far it is evident that the variables measuring camp settlement needs further work. The results are shown in model V, which includes…

I have three choices here: 1) try to weigh the data and see if this can provide sig.levels for refugee-presence or 2) conclude that I was not able to conduct a multilevel analysis with a regional variable measuring refugee presence and discuss the results from model 1-4.

Weighted and unweighted variable refugee_camp for Kenya:

		Unweighted	Weighted
insttrust	refugee_camp	0.250	0.265
		(1.07)	(4.52)***
	prevviol	-0.141	-0.136
		(0.73)	(2.13)**
	employment	-0.020	-0.017
		(1.00)	(0.73)
	safety	-0.243	-0.242
		(8.00)***	(5.28)***
	rural	-0.081	-0.080
		(2.17)**	(2.60)***
	education	-0.013	-0.010
		(1.48)	(1.10)
	woman	0.033	0.020
		(1.12)	(0.72)
	age	0.002	0.002
		(1.42)	(1.34)
	_cons	1.687	1.682
		(20.60)***	(17.70)***
lns1_1_1	_cons	-1.302	-1.297
		(10.59)***	(14.10)***
lnsig_e	_cons	-0.468	-0.465
		(28.85)***	(13.31)***
N		1,943	1,943

* $p<0.1$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$

Weighted and uweighted variable camp5yr for Kenya:

		Unweighted	Weighted
insttrust	camp5yr	0.046	0.052
		(0.62)	(2.21)**
	prevviol	-0.139	-0.140
		(0.64)	(1.84)*
	employment	-0.020	-0.017
		(0.98)	(0.72)
	safety	-0.243	-0.241
		(7.97)***	(5.24)***
	rural	-0.081	-0.080
		(2.18)**	(2.60)***
	education	-0.014	-0.011
		(1.54)	(1.14)
	woman	0.032	0.020
		(1.11)	(0.71)
	age	0.002	0.002
		(1.39)	(1.32)
	_cons	1.695	1.690
		(20.72)***	(18.13)***
lns1_1_1	_cons	-1.292	-1.286
		(10.55)***	(14.45)***
lnsig_e	_cons	-0.468	-0.465
		(28.85)***	(13.31)***
N		1,943	1,943

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Tanzania: None of the refugee-variables for Tanzania provides sig. results for refugee presence.

7.3 Model V's Explanatory Power *(finish after model V is completed)*

One can calculate this models' explanatory power by comparing this model to the intercept-only model (Hox 2010; Raudenbush & Bryk 2002), and based on this calculate how much of the level-1 and level-2 variance is explained by independent variables which are included. We use the following equation for level-1 (Mehmetoglou & Jakobsen 2017:208):

$$R^2 = \frac{var(e)_b - var(e)_m}{var(e)_b}$$

Where var(e)$_b$, is the residual variance for the baselime model (Appendix C1) and var(e)$_m$ is the level-1 variance for the present model .

7.4 Robustness Checks

To check if the previously presented models are best fit to research if refugee camps are affecting citizen's institutional trust this section is added where different robustness checks are being tested for. First, a limited scale for institutional trust is explored to see if this can have significant changes for the explained variance at level 2, and further see if this can better some of the random intercept models. Second, (*add other tests).*

A limited scale for institutional trust is explored to see if excluding some of the variables from the institutional trust scale (see section 6.3), can improve the random intercept models. First of all an intercept-only model was run with the limited trust scale variable (*limtrust*), which exclude the variables: Trust in tax department and trust in police. *Limtrust* showed a VPC in Kenya's case at 19.71 percent of the variance in institutional trust is located at the regional level, and for Tanzania 9.69 percent of the variance in institutional trust is found at the regional level (see appendix D1). Both countries' VPC was increased by this limited trust scale from 18.56 to 19.71 percent for Kenya and 8.21 to 9.69 percent for Tanzania.

When it comes to the random intercept models the limited trust scale did improve the VPC in the for model IV, and the results showed in both instances to increase in VPC explained by the regional level, but it did not change the results for hypothesis 1 and were still not sufficient to find a significant effect of refugee presence and institutional trust.

Is there any relevant test which I should include in this chapter? A linktest for example?

Chapter 8: Discussion and Conclusion

A discussion of the results from chapter 7 will take place here. First the results from the final random intercept model will be discussed in relation to the four hypotheses, second the main findings will be compared for Kenya and Tanzania, third the limitations for this research will be elaborated on in addition to suggestions for future research, lastly I conclude .

Include:

Points to include in the discussion of results:

- Keep it centred around the hypothesis for the thesis!
- The difference in VPC in the two countries (empty model), in Tanz institutional trust is mostly explained at the individual level, and Ken has a more regional explanation of *insttrust*.
- Discussion of results and see if they are: "Da kan du vise til tilsvarende tabell i appendiks og si om resultatene endrer seg eller ikke (robust to the use of weights)."
- Since this is an area of newer research, there might be other variables which could have been explored in addition to the chosen ones in the hypothesis, and in the control variables.
- Write about interaction effects as impossible for this kind of study since there is too little variance at the regional level to see these kinds of connections.

Kenya:

- The low number of observations within one region makes it difficult to find explanations which are sufficient enough to generalise for the population (see example Kenya where region was omitted since it did not have 3 respondent present!)

Tanzania:

- Add differences in trust in the President for Tanzania! – this might have an influence on the results!

Limitations for this research:

- Not looking at areas such as ethnicity since this is was not poss. In the given timeframe. – not present in the geo-ref. data. But I could have added this if I had additional time.
- 1 round of ab -- Not looking at variation over time
- This is an area of minimal research, so this thesis is exploring only a few of the possible variables which can be influential: if I had more time, I would have looked at civil liberties.

What this literature contributes with:

- This research on the effects of migration on public attitudes is highly relevant here since international migration is at its all-time high, Alrababa'h et al. (2021) argues.

Although this is an international trend, it is obvious that most of this literature focus on developed countries, which have relatively fewer migrants and a higher capacity to absorb them (2021:33). This claim is also supported by Böhmelt, Bove, & Gleditsch (2019), stressing the importance of the state managing security consequences of hosting refugee populations in developing countries (2019:73). This is the gap which this research aims to fill.

Theory to discuss results with:

- Host experiences differ:
    - In Whitaker's research, these experiences were also contingent on settlement patterns, pre-existing socio-economic conditions, and the nature of host – refugee relations. Logically, the hosts who already had access to resources, education, or power, were better positioned to benefit from the refugee presence. In comparison, those who already was disadvantaged in the local context became even further marginalised (2002:339).
- Uddhammar
    - constitutional values feeds support in different ways in the three countries: it gives support to the opposition in Kenya and Uganda, but it does not do so in Tanzania (Uddhammar 2011:1184)
    - that the evaluation of government significantly affects how citizens trust its government and the opposition. This goes for issues such as: handling of the economy, corruption, crime, health and infrastructure, and control of disorder. Thirdly, free elections, and a high level of democracy will give support to the government. If elections are unfair and there is a low level of democracy in the country the support will go to the political opposition. Interestingly, in Kenya, if you have a strong adherence to democratic constitutional values, it is the one most important factor for voting for the political opposition. In Tanzania these values tend to *increase* support for the government and ruling institutions (Uddhammar 2011:1186).
- Jacobsen (2002:580).
    - Although every host country in Africa has its own set of studies describing the burdens of hosting refugees, Jacobsen marks that the presence of refugees can have positive effects as well. Some of them being international refugee assistance, human capital, and economic activities.
    - Increased demands for government bureaucracy in areas where the state might be absent or weakly represented.
    - Higher demands for the state's security apparatus to control borders and manage security threats.
    - Increased needs for the state apparatus to control and manage contested refugee resources, either for their own state building purposes, or to ensure that its citizens benefit from these allocated resources (Jacobsen 2002:588).

Is institutional trust an adequate indicator for political stability?? Discuss.

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Appendix

Appendix A: Separate Factor Analysis for Kenya and Tanzania

Table A1: Factor Analysis for Kenya:

(obs=1,954)
Factor analysis/correlation Number of obs = 1,954
Method: principal factors Retained factors = 1
Rotation: (unrotated) Number of params = 7

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor1	2.980	2.746	1.080	1.080
Factor2	0.234	0.197	0.085	1.165
Factor3	0.037	0.053	0.013	1.179
Factor4	-0.016	0.092	-0.006	1.173
Factor5	-0.108	0.065	-0.039	1.134
Factor6	-0.173	0.024	-0.063	1.071
Factor7	-0.196	.	-0.071	1.000

LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(21) = 4577.84 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances

Variable	Factor1	Uniqueness
President	0.705	0.503
Parliament	0.709	0.497
Elec. Com.	0.723	0.477
Tax Dep.	0.642	0.587
Local Council.	0.585	0.658
Police	0.535	0.714
Courts of Law	0.646	0.582

Table A2: Factor Analysis for Tanzania:

(obs=2,154)
Factor analysis/correlation Number of obs = 2,154
Method: principal factors Retained factors = 1
Rotation: (unrotated) Number of params = 7

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor1	3.697	3.449	1.047	1.047
Factor2	0.248	0.208	0.070	1.117
Factor3	0.040	0.075	0.011	1.128
Factor4	-0.036	0.063	-0.010	1.118
Factor5	-0.099	0.051	-0.028	1.090
Factor6	-0.150	0.017	-0.043	1.047
Factor7	-0.167	.	-0.047	1.000

LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(21) = 7362.32 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances

Variable	Factor1	Uniqueness
President	0.713	0.491
Parliament	0.758	0.425
Elec. Com.	0.811	0.342
Tax Dep.	0.766	0.414
Local Council.	0.709	0.497
Police	0.638	0.593
Courts of Law	0.677	0.541

Figure A3: "Normalfordeling" for institutional trust scale



Appendix B: Additional descriptive statistics of independent variables

B1: Descriptive Statistics of Level-2 Independent variables

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
refugee camp	4783	.115	.319	0	1
camp5yr	4783	.143	.546	0	5
prevviol	4783	.007	.082	0	1

B2: Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Level-1 Independent Variables

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
safety	4780	.343	.475	0	1
education	4782	3.517	1.804	0	9
age	4762	37.234	13.883	18	99
demsat	3784	2.734	.855	0	4

B3: Tabulation of employed

employment status	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	1654	34.62	34.62
1	3124	65.38	100.00
Total	4778	100.00	

B4: Tabulation of rural

urban/rural sampling unit	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	3075	64.29	64.29
1	1708	35.71	100.00
Total	4783	100.00	

B5: Tabulation of woman

gender of respondent	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	2395	50.07	50.07
1	2388	49.93	100.00
Total	4783	100.00	

B6: Summary statistics: campcount

cntry	mean	sd
Kenya	1.556	1.7
United Rep. of Tanzania	2.507	2.671

Appendix C: Random Intercept models

C1a: Empty random intercept model for Kenya

```
Mixed-effects ML regression                     Number of obs     =      1,954
Group variable: regionkt                        Number of groups  =         47

                                                Obs per group:
                                                              min =          1
                                                              avg =       41.6
                                                              max =        212

                                                Wald chi2(0)      =          .
Log likelihood = -1946.1984                     Prob > chi2       =          .
```

insttrust	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
_cons	1.564458	.0483971	32.33	0.000	1.469601	1.659314

Random-effects Parameters	Estimate	Std. Err.	[95% Conf.	Interval]
regionkt: Identity				
var(_cons)	.0929186	.0220539	.0583544	.1479558
var(Residual)	.4077589	.0131959	.3826987	.4344602

LR test vs. linear model: chibar2(01) = 301.87 Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000

C1b: Empty random intercept model for Tanzania

```
Mixed-effects ML regression                     Number of obs     =      2,154
Group variable: regionkt                        Number of groups  =         29

                                                Obs per group:
                                                              min =         23
                                                              avg =       74.3
                                                              max =        255

                                                Wald chi2(0)      =          .
Log likelihood = -2287.0818                     Prob > chi2       =          .
```

insttrust	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
_cons	1.873163	.0417456	44.87	0.000	1.791344	1.954983

Random-effects Parameters	Estimate	Std. Err.	[95% Conf.	Interval]
regionkt: Identity				
var(_cons)	.0426788	.0135274	.0229307	.0794342
var(Residual)	.4769013	.0146345	.4490638	.5064645

LR test vs. linear model: chibar2(01) = 106.89 Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000

C2a: Model II: Independent Level-1 Variables for Kenya with weights

```
Mixed-effects regression                        Number of obs     =      1,943
Group variable: regionkt                        Number of groups  =         47

                                                Obs per group:
                                                              min =          1
                                                              avg =       41.3
                                                              max =        210

                                                Wald chi2(6)      =      41.57
Log pseudolikelihood = -1913.8019               Prob > chi2       =     0.0000

                                (Std. Err. adjusted for 47 clusters in regionkt)
```

insttrust	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
employment	-.0165439	.0237036	-0.70	0.485	-.0630022	.0299143
safety	-.2401727	.0459728	-5.22	0.000	-.3302778	-.1500676
rural	-.0794303	.0309542	-2.57	0.010	-.1400994	-.0187613
education	-.0107279	.0092767	-1.16	0.248	-.02891	.0074542
woman	.0200518	.0280257	0.72	0.474	-.0348776	.0749811
age	.0015623	.0011682	1.34	0.181	-.0007274	.003852
_cons	1.686009	.0901664	18.70	0.000	1.509286	1.862732

Random-effects Parameters	Estimate	Robust Std. Err.	[95% Conf.	Interval]
regionkt: Identity				
var(_cons)	.0775576	.0135062	.0551307	.1091078
var(Residual)	.3943995	.0275733	.3438959	.45232

C2b: Model II: Independent Level-1 Variables for Tanzania with weights

```
Mixed-effects regression                        Number of obs     =      2,145
Group variable: regionkt                        Number of groups  =         29

                                                Obs per group:
                                                              min =         23
                                                              avg =       74.0
                                                              max =        253

                                                Wald chi2(6)      =      53.86
Log pseudolikelihood = -2156.7009               Prob > chi2       =     0.0000

                                (Std. Err. adjusted for 29 clusters in regionkt)
```

insttrust	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
employment	-.0055485	.037527	-0.15	0.882	-.0791002	.0680031
safety	-.1584592	.0534708	-2.96	0.003	-.26326	-.0536584
rural	-.1011839	.0272308	-3.72	0.000	-.1545554	-.0478125
education	-.0092108	.0112087	-0.82	0.411	-.0311794	.0127577
woman	.1182758	.0315501	3.75	0.000	.0564387	.1801129
age	.0024108	.0010802	2.23	0.026	.0002936	.004528
_cons	1.829321	.0797854	22.93	0.000	1.672945	1.985698

Random-effects Parameters	Estimate	Robust Std. Err.	[95% Conf.	Interval]
regionkt: Identity				
var(_cons)	.0356176	.009069	.0216237	.0586677
var(Residual)	.4251283	.0248689	.3790765	.4767746

C3a: Model III: Random Intercept for Kenya with weights

Mixed-effects regression — Number of obs = 1,943
Group variable: **regionkt** — Number of groups = 47

Obs per group:
min = 1
avg = 41.3
max = 210

Wald chi2(7) = 56.53
Log pseudolikelihood = -1913.3557 — Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

(Std. Err. adjusted for 47 clusters in regionkt)

insttrust	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
refugee_camp	.2104445	.1027465	2.05	0.041	.009065	.411824
employment	-.01702	.0236003	-0.72	0.471	-.0632757	.0292358
safety	-.2405216	.0457708	-5.25	0.000	-.3302307	-.1508124
rural	-.0798105	.0308136	-2.59	0.010	-.1402041	-.019417
education	-.0100587	.0092325	-1.09	0.276	-.0281541	.0080367
woman	.0206826	.0280484	0.74	0.461	-.0342912	.0756564
age	.0015972	.0011739	1.36	0.174	-.0007035	.003898
_cons	1.673569	.0935121	17.90	0.000	1.490289	1.856849

Random-effects Parameters	Estimate	Robust Std. Err.	[95% Conf.	Interval]
regionkt: Identity var(_cons)	.075619	.0136111	.0531397	.1076078
var(Residual)	.3944132	.0275802	.3438977	.452349

C3b: Model III: Random Intercept for Tanzania with weights

Mixed-effects ML regression — Number of obs = 2,145
Group variable: **regionkt** — Number of groups = 29

Obs per group:
min = 23
avg = 74.0
max = 253

Wald chi2(7) = 60.30
Log likelihood = -2247.4114 — Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

insttrust	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
refugee_camp	.1164002	.1051248	1.11	0.268	-.0896406	.322441
employment	-.0317115	.0210976	-1.50	0.133	-.0730622	.0096391
safety	-.1648519	.0378373	-4.36	0.000	-.2390117	-.0906921
rural	-.0899675	.0381299	-2.36	0.018	-.1647008	-.0152342
education	-.008149	.0103835	-0.78	0.433	-.0285004	.0122023
woman	.1270548	.0300572	4.23	0.000	.0681437	.1859659
age	.0033062	.0011006	3.00	0.003	.001149	.0054634
_cons	1.774246	.0809773	21.91	0.000	1.615533	1.932959

Random-effects Parameters	Estimate	Std. Err.	[95% Conf.	Interval]
regionkt: Identity var(_cons)	.0393111	.0127644	.0208031	.0742854
var(Residual)	.4639578	.0142706	.4368143	.492788

LR test vs. linear model: chibar2(01) = 84.29 — Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000

C4a: Model IV: Random Intercept for Kenya with weights

Mixed-effects regression — Number of obs = 1,943
Group variable: **regionkt** — Number of groups = 47

Obs per group:
min = 1
avg = 41.3
max = 210

Wald chi2(8) = 94.17
Log pseudolikelihood = -1913.1134 — Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

(Std. Err. adjusted for 47 clusters in regionkt)

insttrust	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
refugee_camp	.2645607	.0585735	4.52	0.000	.1497589	.3793626
prevviol	-.1357216	.0637259	-2.13	0.033	-.2606219	-.0108212
employment	-.0171937	.0235885	-0.73	0.466	-.0634263	.0290389
safety	-.2415754	.0457277	-5.28	0.000	-.3312001	-.1519507
rural	-.0797417	.0307118	-2.60	0.009	-.1399358	-.0195477
education	-.0101705	.0092687	-1.10	0.273	-.0283367	.0079958
woman	.0201447	.0280417	0.72	0.473	-.034816	.0751055
age	.0015743	.0011747	1.34	0.180	-.0007281	.0038767
_cons	1.681971	.0950185	17.70	0.000	1.495738	1.868204

Random-effects Parameters	Estimate	Robust Std. Err.	[95% Conf.	Interval]
regionkt: Identity				
var(_cons)	.0746696	.0137373	.0520649	.1070884
var(Residual)	.3944117	.0275698	.343914	.452324

C4b: Model IV: Random Intercept for Tanzania with weights

Mixed-effects regression — Number of obs = 2,145
Group variable: **regionkt** — Number of groups = 29

Obs per group:
min = 23
avg = 74.0
max = 253

Wald chi2(7) = 53.90
Log pseudolikelihood = -2156.6892 — Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

(Std. Err. adjusted for 29 clusters in regionkt)

insttrust	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
camp5yr	.0116283	.0651023	0.18	0.858	-.11597	.1392265
employment	-.0055178	.0375273	-0.15	0.883	-.0790701	.0680344
safety	-.1584821	.0534636	-2.96	0.003	-.2632689	-.0536954
rural	-.1011037	.0272615	-3.71	0.000	-.1545352	-.0476722
education	-.0091592	.0111493	-0.82	0.411	-.0310114	.0126929
woman	.1183053	.0315631	3.75	0.000	.0564427	.1801678
age	.002414	.0010824	2.23	0.026	.0002926	.0045354
_cons	1.826557	.0825251	22.13	0.000	1.664811	1.988303

Random-effects Parameters	Estimate	Robust Std. Err.	[95% Conf.	Interval]
regionkt: Identity				
var(_cons)	.0356562	.0090818	.0216436	.058741
var(Residual)	.4251185	.0248704	.3790642	.4767682

Appendix D: Robustness Checks

Table D1a: Limited Scale for Institutional Trust for Kenya

```
Mixed-effects ML regression                     Number of obs     =      2,114
Group variable: regionkt                        Number of groups  =         47

                                                Obs per group:
                                                              min =          5
                                                              avg =       45.0
                                                              max =        226

                                                Wald chi2(0)      =          .
Log likelihood = -2206.4189                     Prob > chi2       =          .
```

limtrust	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
_cons	1.647289	.0519318	31.72	0.000	1.545504	1.749073

Random-effects Parameters	Estimate	Std. Err.	[95% Conf.	Interval]
regionkt: Identity				
var(_cons)	.1104664	.0254866	.0702818	.1736272
var(Residual)	.448767	.0139514	.4222391	.4769616

LR test vs. linear model: chibar2(01) = 366.55 Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000

Table D1b: Limited Scale for Institutional Trust for Tanzania

```
Mixed-effects ML regression                     Number of obs     =      2,214
Group variable: regionkt                        Number of groups  =         29

                                                Obs per group:
                                                              min =         24
                                                              avg =       76.3
                                                              max =        259

                                                Wald chi2(0)      =          .
Log likelihood = -2391.8972                     Prob > chi2       =          .
```

limtrust	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
_cons	1.941897	.0458641	42.34	0.000	1.852005	2.031789

Random-effects Parameters	Estimate	Std. Err.	[95% Conf.	Interval]
regionkt: Identity				
var(_cons)	.0530134	.0163599	.0289537	.0970658
var(Residual)	.4941356	.014954	.4656786	.5243317

LR test vs. linear model: chibar2(01) = 131.37 Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000