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Africa's Illegitimate Surrogate Wars: Disastrous and Stealthy Cross Border Acts of Aggression That Have Never Been Acknowledged nor Discussed

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ABSTRACT The recruitment and arming of dissident groups in neighboring countries has been one of Africa's most significant causes of humanitarian disasters since the end of colonialism. Liberia, Rwanda, and Côte d'Ivoire have been particularly hard hit by externally driven "insurgencies." The African Union and the international community consistently consider these conflicts to be "civil wars" requiring conflict resolution. What is really needed is heavy international pressure to force the perpetrators to cease and desist and to refrain from interfering in the affairs of neighboring countries through the support of surrogate rebels. Particularly egregious have been the actions of presidents Museveni of Uganda and Compaore of Burkina Faso. The United States tends to follow the lead of the Africans in ignoring the illegitimate surrogate nature of some civil conflicts, thereby indirectly encouraging others with evil intent. The cost of humanitarian emergencies, of course, is borne mainly by the United States and other international donors.

KEYWORDS conflict resolution; Côte d'Ivoire; humanitarian emergencies; Liberia; Rwanda; surrogate war

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Since the end of the colonial era (1850–1965), sub-Saharan Africa has suffered more than its fair share of humanitarian disasters. Most of these resulted from internal conflicts arising from a number of causes:

- Several new African countries had independence thrust upon them with virtually no preparation. The former Belgian Congo and the former Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique were plunged into devastating civil conflict and lengthy instability immediately after becoming independent.
- Several former African colonies did have adequate preparation for self-government but harbored smoldering flames of ethnic-based civil conflict that burst into the open shortly after independence. Nigeria

and Sudan are the two main examples. In addition, Ethiopia, one of only two African nations that escaped European colonialism, became a colonial power in its own right by subjugating the former Italian colony of Eritrea. Ethiopia's refusal to grant Eritrea the right of self-determination gave rise to one of Africa's longest and most destructive civil wars.

All the major civil conflicts mentioned above had internal origins. None could be blamed even remotely on deliberate external machinations. Certainly, international actors, both African and others, took an interest in these conflicts for a variety of reasons, providing intermittent assistance to one or more armed factions. The reasons included ideology connected to the cold war, ethnic affiliations, economic ambitions, and a desire to weaken potential enemies. For the most part, insurgents seeking to weaken or topple post-independence regimes could not survive without outside partners. Nevertheless, these conflicts have all been internally driven.

Unfortunately for the continent of Africa and its peoples, some of the most destructive internal conflicts have been, and in some cases continue to be, externally driven. The African perpetrators of these "illegitimate surrogate wars" have never been held accountable and, in some cases, have been lauded for their work in mediating the conflicts that they themselves initiated.

What are the essential elements of an "illegitimate surrogate war" in the context of Africa?

- Within the "target country," no strong public sentiment exists in favor of the violent overthrow of the regime in power, even if it is less than popular.
- The security forces of the "target country" are usually capable of controlling unarmed civilian populations, but generally lack the morale, motivation, and professionalism to take on determined, trained fighters coming in from the outside acting as surrogates for a regime in the same subregion. The invading fighters, of course, are recruited from among opposition elements in the "target country."
- The invading surrogates are totally dependent on their sponsors for arms, logistics, safe haven, and medical care and evacuation as needed.
- Since the sponsors of these surrogate wars do not openly declare responsibility, even though their roles are difficult to keep hidden, the African Union immediately designates these wars as civil conflicts and automatically enters into conflict-resolution mode. The African Union cannot declare that one of its member heads of state is committing aggression against another member state when the aggressor state has none of its own troops visibly doing any fighting—and the perpetrator head of state denies all involvement.

Surrogate wars in Liberia (1980–1997), Rwanda (1990–1994), the Democratic Republic of Congo (1996 to the present), and Côte d'Ivoire (1999–2010) were totally unjustified, unnecessary, and left indelible bloodstains on the hands of their still unaccountable sponsors. Above all, these wars resulted in hundreds of thousands of unnecessary dead, wounded, and displaced. In addition, economic development in the "target countries" was set back many decades.

LIBERIA: THE "GANG OF THREE" THRUSTS AN ALREADY POOR COUNTRY INTO SEVEN YEARS OF HELL

Historical Perspective

The Republic of Liberia was one of only two sovereign sub-Saharan African nations that was never a colony. Despite the encroachments of British and French colonies on its borders, Liberia remained independent from its founding in 1824 to the present day.

The founders of Liberia in the nineteenth century were freed American slaves who accepted that they would never be able to assimilate into white American society and would be better off returning to the land of their ancestors in West Africa. White American intellectuals who propagated this idea also raised money to finance the voluntary emigration of several thousand former slaves to Africa.

The initial group of former slaves, who arrived on the coast of West Africa in what was to become Liberia, was eventually able to overcome the hardships of tropical disease and the hostility of native Africans, who strongly objected to being invaded

and displaced from their lands. With superior technology and educational development, the American settlers were easily able to establish dominance over the native populations. Thus, a form of internal colonialism developed in which the former American slaves and their descendants ruled as a minority over a majority population of indigenous Africans.[1] Over time, this minority came to be called "Americo-Liberians."

Governance under Americo-Liberian rule resembled, to a great extent, the American South under segregation prior to the enactment of the civil rights legislation of 1964. Educational opportunities and employment were available only to Americo-Liberians. Indigenous Liberians, known as the "Country People," were relegated to subsistence agriculture and physical labor in the capital city of Monrovia and other towns. The major industry was the production, harvesting, and export of tropical rubber on a giant plantation owned by the American multinational Firestone.

In terms of international relations, the Americo-Liberian rulers consistently supported the United States. The U.S. Air Force had unlimited access to the well-managed Roberts Field International Airport, located about 25 miles from Monrovia. Both the Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Information Agency had large antenna fields near Monrovia that allowed their signals to reach all of Africa and the Middle East. In the United Nations General Assembly, the Liberian delegation could always be counted on to support the U.S. position.[2]

In 1980, the Americo-Liberians saw the beginning of the end of their privileged status. One evening, a group of inebriated Liberian soldiers went to the presidential mansion to ask for better living conditions for themselves and their families. These enlisted men were all "Country People." When they arrived at the mansion, they found the place unguarded and the door unlocked. They went inside and found President William Tolbert. They killed him and took over power. They later executed other Americo-Liberian government leaders to consolidate their power.

This military coup was initially quite popular in Liberia. The leader of the group was Sgt. Samuel Doe, who was proclaimed president of Liberia. Samuel Doe was a member of the majority "Country People." For the first time in 180 years, one of their fellow indigenous Liberians was in power. The end of ethnic segregation and discrimination appeared to be in sight.

Unfortunately, President Samuel Doe governed like so many other African heads of state. He favored his own ethnic group, the Krahn, who constituted only about 11 percent of the Liberian population. Thus, the minority rule of the Americo-Liberians was replaced by the minority rule of the Krahn, with much less sophistication and far more corruption. Already significantly behind its neighbors in West Africa in terms of economic development, Liberia under President Doe was doomed to slide even further behind. In a very short time, Doe's popularity as the first "country boy" to hold power faded. He was just another corrupt dictator, with the added handicap of being functionally illiterate.

Between 1980 and 1989, the Doe rule was relatively stable. He withstood one attempted coup and won a rigged presidential election in 1985. Since Liberia's support for U.S. foreign policy was total, relations with the United States remained "special."

Christmas Eve 1989: The Surrogate War Begins

On the night of December 24, 1989, about 300 armed fighters crossed the border from Côte d'Ivoire into Liberia in Nimba County near the town of Saniquellie, about 150 miles northeast of Monrovia. The fighters were all Liberians under the command of Charles Taylor, an Americo-Liberian and a fugitive from both Liberian and American law.[3]

The invading band was carrying arms of Libyan origin that were transported in Libyan aircraft to Burkina Faso where the government took responsibility for outfitting the Liberian guerrillas and transporting them and their equipment through Côte d'Ivoire to the Liberian border. The government of Côte d'Ivoire provided protection for the guerrilla convoys and arranged for safe haven and medical evacuation for wounded guerrillas. In short, it was a three-nation surrogate war, with Charles Taylor and his band serving as the Liberian surrogates.

The initial incursion on Christmas Eve was essentially unopposed because the Liberian villagers had no particular love for Samuel Doe, who was from another ethnic group, and no Liberian security units were in the area. The Liberian army was slow to

react, but sent their units to fight the guerrillas in Nimba County within a few days.

The Liberian military response to the incursion was to shoot up and burn every village where the guerrillas were reported to be hiding. This action angered the villagers enormously and allowed Charles Taylor to recruit additional fighters from among the youth of the aggrieved populations. With his small army enlarged by recruitment, Taylor was able to advance rapidly toward Monrovia.

As in all military actions of that type, the fighting caused tens of thousands of civilians to flee their homes seeking safety. Most of the internal refugees came to Monrovia—where sanitary and health conditions quickly collapsed.[4]

The Liberian army was predominantly composed of members of President Doe's Krahn ethnic group. Taylor and his fighters were particularly cruel to the Krahn, exercising a policy of taking no prisoners. This caused the Krahn to fight even harder, knowing that surrender or capture meant death.

Taylor and his tri-national sponsors were hoping to capture Monrovia and take over power within six weeks. Because the Krahn army that was backed into Monrovia with all the refugees was fighting to the death, Taylor and his men were delayed.

Because of the suffering of the refugees in Monrovia and the threat of widespread disease, the heads of state of the Economic Community of West African States held a summit meeting in May 1990 to debate humanitarian military intervention. The heads of state of Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso, two of Charles Taylor's sponsors, argued vigorously against intervention. They wanted their surrogate to continue his advance, overthrow the Doe regime, and take power. The other heads of state argued for intervention and decided to assemble a peacekeeping force that was called "ECOMOG." The peacekeepers arrived in June and announced that they wanted to end the fighting and start a transition leading to free and fair elections.[5]

Under orders from his sponsors, Charles Taylor refused to stop fighting, and made war against the peacekeepers who had opened the port of Monrovia, rescued the refugees, and helped the Liberian military return to the fight.

The fighting between Charles Taylor and ECOMOG lasted seven more years until 1997 when a cease-fire was finally agreed to and a free and fair election was organized. Charles Taylor won the election because most of the voting citizens feared that, if he lost, he would return to war.

The three governments that had financed, equipped, and sustained Charles Taylor's war for power in Liberia had their victory. Pres. Samuel Doe was gone and Charles Taylor was the new head of state. The price for that victory, of course, was beyond outrageous. Before the conflict, Liberia was one of least-developed countries in Africa. Liberia was set back many decades as the conflict destroyed what infrastructure the country had—especially the electric power system and the main ocean ports.

RWANDA: UGANDA'S PRESIDENT YOWERI MUSEVENI SOLVES AN ETHNIC PROBLEM IN HIS COUNTRY BY DESTABILIZING NEIGHBORING RWANDA

Historical Perspective

The tiny country of Rwanda (10,000 sq. mi.) is situated in the hills overlooking Lake Kivu in the Rift Valley of East Africa. With rich volcanic soils, Rwanda has attracted immigrants since the fifteenth century. Hamitic pastoral peoples and their livestock arrived in Rwanda from southern Ethiopia and came to be known as "Tutsi." Bantu-speaking African farmers arrived in Rwanda from west and central Africa from the Congo River valley. These people came to be known as "Hutu." Over time, the population ratio in Rwanda became 85:15 Hutu to Tutsi. The common language was Kinyarwanda, and there has been considerable intermarriage.

Rwanda was colonized first by Germany as an adjunct to its control over Tanganyika. After its defeat in World War I, Germany released its African colonies to League of Nations control. Rwanda became a trusteeship territory of Belgium because of its control over the adjacent giant colony of Congo. Of particular interest during both the German and Belgian periods of colonization of Rwanda was the general belief among the Europeans that the Tutsi minority were more intelligent and more advanced culturally than the Hutu majority. As a consequence, Tutsis received a disproportionate share of education and dominated both the civil service and private

business. Long-term resentment was thus engendered within the Hutu community.

In line with the general trend among the European colonial powers, Belgium granted independence to Rwanda in 1961. The initial election that was organized by the Belgians gave power to political parties belonging to the Hutu majority. Thus, for the first time in the history of Rwanda, Hutus were in positions of authority, with the Tutsi elites finding themselves in opposition.

Immediately after the election of 1961, the Hutu community's long-term grievances against the Tutsi minority exploded. Pogroms were instituted against Tutsi—including physical violence and the burning of property. A mass exodus of Tutsi families ensued; they became refugees in neighboring countries, mainly into Uganda to the north and Burundi to the south. Approximately 250,000 Tutsis fled Rwanda.

To make matters worse, the Rwandan government declared that the refugees would not be allowed to return at any time because the country was overpopulated and there was no room. The refugees were, therefore, condemned to permanent exile and had to adapt to life in their new homes.

Three Decades Later: Uganda's Surrogate War against Rwanda

Flash forward 30 years to October 1, 1990. President George H. W. Bush was in New York for his annual speech to the United Nations General Assembly. As he did every year, the president hosted a reception at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel for all African heads of state who were in New York to address the General Assembly. In the midst of the event, an officer from the U.S. Mission to the UN came in with urgent news: armed troops had crossed the Ugandan border into Rwanda and were fighting with Rwandan security forces.

Both Rwandan president Habyarimana and Ugandan president Museveni were in the same room. I showed the news item to both of them and ushered them into a private room to discuss it. After a half hour, they came out. I cornered President Habyarimana to ask him about Museveni's reaction to the news. He told me, "Museveni claims that he does not know anything about it."

The next day, Museveni was in Washington. I requested a meeting and was received very quickly. I asked about the military invasion from Uganda to Rwanda. Museveni was visibly angry. He told me that the invaders were Ugandan army officers and men who were from the Tutsi ethnic group. They were the sons of the Rwandan Tutsis who had fled to Uganda in 1961 and who were making their careers in the Ugandan army. Indeed, Museveni told me that when he was leading an insurgency against the Ugandan government of Milton Obote in 1984–1986, his Tutsi officers and men were instrumental to his victory.

Museveni was indignant. "Those men of the Ugandan army are deserters. They will be apprehended and punished." He insisted that he had no advance notice of the action.

Within days, we received intelligence that Museveni's people were fully implicated in the Tutsi incursion into Rwanda. Logistics bases and field medical units had been located on the Ugandan side of the border to handle the wounded. All of this was visible on satellite imagery.

Combat between the Tutsi invaders and the Rwandan security forces continued for several weeks after the initial incursion. The international community treated the crisis as a civil war rather than a surrogate war initiated by Museveni. It was a question of exiled Rwandans trying to fight their way back because no other way was available for them to return to their native land.

The East Africans started promoting negotiations within a month of the incursion. The Tutsi invaders had a political organization—the Rwandan Patriotic Movement. They called their military grouping the "Rwandan Patriotic Army" (RPA). At first, the RPA rejected negotiations. They considered the Habyarimana regime to be illegitimate. Only after the United States put pressure on the Ugandan government did the RPA agree to begin negotiations under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity. The mediation was under the control of diplomats from Tanzania. The United States had an observer at the talks, Ambassador David Rawson.

As the negotiations unfolded during 1992, what became clear was that the current government of Rwanda was very different from the one that had sponsored pogroms against Tutsi citizens in 1961. The Rwandan government had been successfully implementing macroeconomic reforms for the previous five years and was quite popular with the

World Bank and the international donor community. In addition, under pressure from the United States, President Habyarimana had agreed to end the one-party state political system and was accepting multiple opposition parties. These parties were distinguished by the fact that both Hutu and Tutsi politicians were cooperating within them to advance the cause of democracy.

Because Habyarimana had opened up the political system to include members of the minority Tutsi ethnic group, no support could be found for the RPA invaders within Rwanda. In addition, Habyarimana was beginning to talk about taking measures to bring back the refugees who had gone into exile in 1961. Unfortunately, the RPA insurgency frightened both the Rwandan government and the Hutu majority; a tremendous amount of money was spent on increasing the size of the military and on the purchase of equipment, badly hurting the economy and undercutting the macroeconomic reforms.

The RPA and the Rwandan government signed an agreement in August 1993 in Tanzania. RPA leaders were authorized to take up residence in the capital city of Kigali to prepare for a transition and an eventual election. They were also authorized to have fighters with them in Kigali for protection.

Between August 1993 and April 1994, tension grew among extremist Hutu elements of President Habyarimana's immediate supporters, particularly within his wife's family. They were fearful that democratic elections would be a disaster for their own hold on power. They were right. In early April 1994, the president was killed when his airplane was destroyed as it was about to land in Kigali. This was followed immediately by a well-prepared effort to kill as many Tutsi citizens as possible. This was the infamous Rwandan genocide of 1994 that resulted in the death of as many as 800,000 people.

There was absolutely no justification of any type for the October 1, 1990, incursion by the Rwandan Patriotic Army. The operation was truly an illegitimate surrogate war.

The Tutsis in the Ugandan army were nostalgic for the homeland they themselves had never known. When they arrived in Uganda in 1961, they were either young children or not yet born. Over drinks after army duty, they talked about a return of traditional Tutsi hegemony over Rwanda. Contemptuous of the Rwanda regime dominated by Hutus, they believed that their actions would easily topple the government. What they did not anticipate was that no one in Rwanda had either the interest or desire for a military action, including the Tutsis who had not fled into exile in 1961.

President Museveni saw the Tutsi element in his army becoming too strong, too influential, and too dangerous. He was happy to support the Tutsis in their attempt to realize their ambition of returning to Rwanda. In general, the Tutsis caused resentment among the Ugandans—who found them too successful, too intelligent, and too arrogant. This presented Museveni with a political problem, so, he was very happy to encourage the return of the Tutsis to Rwanda.

Museveni's wish was fulfilled. Immediately after the end of the genocide in June 1994, with the RPA in power in Kigali, the entire Tutsi refugee population residing in Uganda returned to Rwanda with their livestock. The price paid by so many Rwandans in the genocide was too horrible to contemplate and far too high to justify the RPA's actions and Museveni's support.

CÔTE D'IVOIRE: BLAISE COMPAORE, THE PRESIDENT OF BURKINA FASO, SPONSORED A DEVASTATING SURROGATE WAR IN AN EFFORT TO PUT HIS MAN IN POWER IN THE COUNTRY IMMEDIATELY TO THE SOUTH

Historical Perspective

Among France's 13 colonies in Africa, Côte d'Ivoire was by far the most successful. Côte d'Ivoire's founding president, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, a prosperous commercial farmer and an experienced political leader in both France and his own country, governed wisely and shared the nation's wealth with the people. Under Houphouet's leadership, Côte d'Ivoire became the world's largest producer of cocoa, as well as a number of other tropical products. Because of his willingness to share the wealth, a substantial middle class was able to form and prosper.

The environment for private investment in Côte d'Ivoire was quite favorable under Houphouet. By the mid-1990s, 75,000 expatriates were working in Côte d'Ivoire in various private sector enterprises.

Against this background of good governance and relative prosperity, one important socio-political problem tended to be ignored or put off to an uncertain future: the agricultural workers from neighboring Burkina Faso who were brought into Côte d'Ivoire to do the labor-intensive work involved in cocoa farming. By the mid-1990s, this immigrant labor population constituted about 25 percent of the entire population of Côte d'Ivoire. Most of these immigrant families, called "Burkinabe," had been in the Côte d'Ivoire for several generations, but they had no rights of citizenship. They also represented a religious issue for much of the citizenry of the country. The majority of the indigenous Ivoirien people are Christian; the northern part of the country does have a Muslim minority. Virtually all of the Burkinabe farmworkers, however, are Muslim. Thus, giving them full citizenship rights was seen as upsetting the religious balance in the country.

Burkina Faso depends on the remittances sent back by the immigrant farmworkers in Côte d'Ivoire for a significant element of the country's national income.

During Houphouet's time in office (1960–1994), the Burkinabe immigrant issue was not significant. He made sure that they were well-treated and even allowed them to cast a token vote in presidential elections because he had no credible opposition.

The political climate began to change in 1986 when Côte d'Ivoire was in the midst of an economic crisis. The country had over-borrowed and the currency was overvalued; the economic prescription was to begin a period of austerity. President Houphouet, however, saw that any Ivoirien politician who attempted to impose economic restraints would be badly punished by the voters. In response, he conceived and implemented a plan of bringing in a qualified "foreigner" to take the position of prime minister to put Côte d'Ivoire's economic house in order. Alassane Ouattara, a citizen of Burkina Faso, had a brilliant record as an international financial expert and had served in high positions at the International Monetary Fund and as a governor of the Central Bank of West Africa; accordingly, he was appointed to the prime ministerial post—he performed brilliantly and, by 1992, had brought Côte d'Ivoire out of its economic crisis.

In early 1992, Ouattara was in Washington for consultations at the World Bank and asked to call on me as I was assistant secretary of state for Africa. He told me that he was transmitting a message from President Houphouet, who planned to stand for reelection later in 1992. The plan was to then serve for one year and announce his retirement. According to Ouattara, Houphouet had decided that Ouattara would be his anointed successor.

Houphouet was reelected in 1992, but he did not retire in 1993. Despite his declining health, Houphouet remained in power, spending a lot of time in France for medical treatment and leaving Ouattara in charge; he died in 1994. The Ivoirien constitution directs that, should the presidency become vacant, then the president of the National Assembly becomes president and remains in power for the remainder of the term of the deceased president. Accordingly, Henri Konan-Bédié, president of the National Assembly, acceded to the presidency. Between Houpouet's death and Konan-Bédié's swearing in, Prime Minister Ouattara conspired with military officers and high-level politicians to prevent Konan from assuming office. This effort failed, and Konan subsequently dismissed Ouattara from his office.

Konan was reelected to a term in his own right in 1997. Fearing Ouattara and the potential rise of the immigrant Burkinabe community, Konan began talking about the concept of "Ivoirité"—a term that can be translated as "Ivoirienness." The idea: the only truly indigenous people of Côte d'Ivoire, with ancestors going back many generations as citizens of Côte d'Ivoire, should be eligible for high office. Subsequently, the National Assembly passed a series of laws that reserved eligibility for the elected office of president to native-born citizens of Côte d'Ivoire who could prove that their parents and grandparents, on both sides, were native-born citizens of Côte d'Ivoire. The main objective, of course, was to permanently prevent Ouattara, a citizen of Burkina Faso, from running for president.[6]

Outtara fought back, arguing that his ancestors came from a village on the border between two French colonies: Côte d'Ivoire and Upper Volta. The latter became Burkina Faso after independence.

He claimed that his ancestral village was actually on the Côte d'Ivoire side of the border, but he took advantage of proximity to Upper Volta to be educated there. He had traveled to the United States on a college scholarship under the Upper Volta quota and held an Upper Volta passport—nevertheless, Ouattara claimed Ivoirien citizenship.

Ouattara was supported in this claim by the president of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaore, who believed strongly that it was Burkinabe migrant labor that had made Côte d'Ivoire a prosperous middle-class country and that the Burkinabe were being treated like second-class citizens. The Côte d'Ivoire rulers, who hailed from the southern Baoule/Arkan ethnic nations, were discriminating against the Burkinabe peasants. Compaore saw in Ouattara the Burkinabe hero who would elevate the dignity and status of Burkinabe peasant labor. He was determined to do everything possible, therefore, to make Ouattara president of Côte d'Ivoire.

BURKINA FASO'S SURROGATE WAR AGAINST CÔTE D'IVOIRE BEGINS IN 1999

On Christmas Eve 1999, President Konan-Bédié was surprised at home by the arrival of a group of army enlisted men claiming that they had not received the money they were owed for their service in United Nations peace-keeping forces in several African countries. He responded angrily and ordered them to leave. They refused and Konan-Bédié had to flee.

Konan-Bédié went to a French military camp for protection. Through the camp commander, he requested French military intervention against the mutinous soldiers. French prime minister Lionel Jospin (Socialist) refused. Accordingly, the mutinous soldiers were able to take over power. They then made the smart move of locating retired General Gueye, the former chief of staff of the army, and asking him to take over as interim president. Gueye did so.

Gueye ruled as a military dictator until October 2000 when he decided to hold an election. He was contacted by his military colleague, President Compaore of Bukina Faso, who asked him to make sure that Alassane Ouattara would be a candidate. Gueye, however, had decided that he wanted to be elected president in his own right. He ruled that Ouattara was ineligible to run based on the country's laws of "Ivoirité." The only other candidate who could be eligible would be Laurent Gbagbo, the perennial token opposition candidate who had lost every previous presidential election.

General Gueye had no doubt that he had become so popular that he could not lose. As the election offices closed, Gueye went on television to announce his victory, even though the ballots had not been counted. With a very good grassroots organization based on his labor union support, Gbagbo called for an uprising against Gueye's arbitrary decision. The street demonstrations were enormous and forced Gueye to resign and declare Gbagbo the winner.

Shortly after Gbagbo was sworn in as president, armed bands from the Burkinabe neighborhood of the capital city Abidjan started shooting at police stations and army barracks. The military managed to overcome the surprise and force the rebels to flee northward. When these rebels reached the northern capital of Bouake, they effectively took over power. By September 2002, Côte d'Ivoire was divided into two regions. The rebels, who depended on Burkina Faso for finance, arms, and logistical support, were able to start a civil war in an effort to force Gbagbo from office.

The civil war devastated the economy and much of the country's infrastructure. About 50,000 expatriates, who had served as managers at the height of the economy, were forced to flee. The war lasted until 2010, with neither side able to subdue the other. A French peacekeeping force, under UN auspices, was sent in June 2010 to serve as a buffer between the two enemy zones.[7]

African Union mediation was assigned to President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso, the very man who was the sponsor of the rebels. He managed to negotiate a cease-fire and an election; he made sure that his man, Allasane Ouattara, would be a candidate.[8]

The election was held in December 2010 under heavy UN supervision. The final count gave the victory to Ouattara. However, President Gbagbo persuaded the Constitutional Court to invalidate most of the votes cast in the rebel-controlled north,

arguing that the rebel forces did not allow a free vote. This was the last straw for the international community; in response, it asked French peacekeepers to go into the Ivoirien capital of Abidjan to oust Gbago and install Ouattara as president. After several days of fierce fighting, Gbagbo was captured and Ouattara acceded to the presidency.

The surrogate war did great damage to the people and economy of Côte d'Ivoire. As of mid-2014, full national reconciliation has not yet been achieved, but the economy had started to come back to pre–civil war levels, with President Ouattara working to repeat his successful economic management of two decades earlier when he was prime minister. Nevertheless, political and security problems linked to the long civil war, remain.[9]

This article does not discuss the devastating surrogate war waged against the Democratic Republic of the Congo by Rwanda and Uganda between 1998 and 2013. Indeed, that war persists in a limited way. The origins of that war were described in this journal in an earlier issue.[10]

Illegitimate surrogate wars in sub-Saharan Africa have been very destructive and have caused major setbacks in economic development. The perpetrators of these wars have never been called to account and, indeed, the very subject of surrogate war has never been the focus of a serious debate within the African Union.

Notes

1. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/globalconnections/liberia/essays/index.html: A PBS historical documentary about Liberia described the close relationship between Liberia and the United States after World War II.
2. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/globalconnections/liberia/essays/index.html: This PBS documentary summarizes the history of U.S.–Liberia relations.
3. Taylor was indicted for embezzlement when he served as head of the Liberian General Services Agency in 1986. He escaped to the United States and subsequently broke out of prison in Massachusetts while awaiting extradition papers from Liberia. From the United States, he went to Libya—where he and his Liberian recruits underwent training in guerrilla warfare.
4. James Youboty, *Liberian Civil War: A Graphic Account* (Philadelphia: Parkside Impressions Enterprises, 1993).
5. Herman J. Cohen, *Intervening in Africa; Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000). Chapter 5, beginning on page 126, provides a detailed description of the war from its beginning until the arrival of the ECOMOG troops in June 1990.
6. The Ivoirien constitution does not prohibit the appointment of a non-Ivoirien citizen as prime minister. Hence, Ouattara's enemies could argue that his appointment as prime minister in 1988 did not make him an Ivoirien citizen.
7. ''Côte d'Ivoire; International Response and Origins of the Conflict,'' United Explanations, www.unitedexplanations.org/2011/04/04.
8. François Barrot, ''How the Ivoirien Crisis Serves the Interests of the Ruling Power in Burkina Faso,'' March 2003, quoted in Cyberscopie, June 29, 2014, http://www.cyberscopie.info/pages/art_decryp/art13_decryp.html.
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