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The legacies of the Sokoto Caliphate in contemporary Nigeria

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Abstract

Contemporary Nigeria is a product of multiple historical experiences dating back to the antiquities. The nation's uncommon diversity of language, culture, and religion are mostly encapsulated in the foundation and continuing relevance of the Sokoto Caliphate, an Islamic polity founded on the principles of reform and restoration by Usman Dan Fodio in 1804. In this article, I explore how this immense geographical entity of intercontinental resonance was governed, and the lessons of history that Nigeria can draw from its success and tribulation.

1 | INTRODUCTION

The Sokoto Caliphate remains a symbol of the capacity of the African peoples to administer their affairs on a grand scale. At its height, some 200 years ago, it was one of the largest political institutions in Africa and one of its most stable polities. Its influence and reach had reverberated as far as the Americas, encompassing Jamaica, Brazil, and parts of the Unites States (Bugaje, 2015). It was "a revolution in history" (Sulaiman, 1986) "… analogous to the French revolution" (Lovejoy, 2016, p. 26), which was taking place at the same time as the period leading to the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate in 1804. The caliphate was a political institution with a theology of Islam and literacy at its core, hence the caliphal affiliation. Its headquarters in Sokoto continues to serve as a symbol of the power, influence, and majesty of the old empire, with the Sultan of Sokoto still wielding influence as the commander of the (Muslim) faithful in Nigeria. It was without a doubt the "salad bowl" of a universe of diverse ethnic and linguistic groupings, all subscribing either to the tenets of Islam or adhering to a strict code of inter-religious and inter-ethnic relations within the boundaries of the caliphate (Bobboyi, 2016). Perhaps, because of its reach, penetration, and theocratic underpinning, the Sokoto Caliphate is also a point of departure for groups within and outside its control that likened it to a behemoth of imperial proportion (Ochonu, 2014). Its legacy, therefore, is bound to cause applause and apprehension in equal measure.

At its outset, the Sokoto Caliphate wanted to be seen as a reformist movement, with its founder and spiritual head, Usman Dan Fodio ("the Shehu," henceforth), stressing knowledge dissemination as the bedrock of the caliphate's reformation agenda. Knowledge was indeed enshrined as the first criteria for the appointment of an Amir or emir among the local populace (Bobboyi, 2016). The Shehu thought that the ruling Habe dynasties in a large part

of present-day northern Nigeria had lost their way, and in turn, led ordinary people to the path of religious syncretism (Brenner, 2000; Talata Mafara, 1999). Syncretism, the mixing of the old religious Hausa belief in *bori*, with its many spirits and Islamic monotheism was seen as the ideal condition for a *Jihad*, a call to one God, Allah, through preaching, teaching, and where this fails, through acts of war and conquest. Gobir, occupying much of present day north west of Nigeria and parts of Niger Republic, was, at the time, a major empire of the Hausa, and it was where the Shehu felt his reformist teachings were most wanted (Balogun, 1975). He met with stiff resistance from the ruling Hausa group, who sought to ban practices, such as the veil for women and turban for men by Muslims (Junaidu, 1956). These were important contrarian gestures that the Shehu encouraged his adherents to practice, not only as acts of defiance but also as markers of group identity and solidarity. In the end, a truce was reached between the Shehu and Bawa, which allowed him to engage in limited clerical activities within the Gobir Empire. But the truce collapsed, not because of the perceived harassment of Shehu's followers, but mainly because the Shehu felt sufficiently prepared to confront Bawa in the battlefield, which eventually led to the collapse of the Gobir Empire and the beginning of a theocracy modelled on the teachings and practices of the Islamic Caliphates of the Rashidun, the rightly guided Caliphs who ruled the Islamic world between 632 and 661, following the death of Prophet Muhammad.

With the establishment of the caliphate between 1804 and 1808, an elaborate system of administration and governance came into being (Lovejoy, 2016). The Shehu and his immediate successors used this period of consolidation to write about basic principles of governance and ethics, as well as worship. They wrote prodigiously about their Islamic movement, as they expanded the frontiers of the caliphate through conquest, treaties and regency. In these two facets of public life — policy and practice — are to be found some of the major legacies of the Sokoto Caliphate in contemporary Nigerian society.

2 | THE LEGACY OF SCHOLARSHIP

In a number of important works since the 1960s, historians have documented the huge number of Jihadists' manuscripts that highlighted the Islamic principles upon which the entire stretch of the caliphate was governed (Last, 1967; Talata Mafara, 1999). Prior to the emergence of the caliphate, Islam was practiced as an aspect of the cultural landscape of the community, albeit an important element. It shared both public and private space with certain pre-Islamic practices centred on healing and the management of illnesses. In fact, so central was this aspect of Hausa culture and society that its overarching belief structure of *bori* became a central consideration in declaring many Hausa states as polytheistic, hence the justification for waging war against them. Through their writings, which often, were commentaries and exegeses of other commentaries on the Quran and Prophetic traditions in Arabic, Fulfulde and Hausa *ajami*, they sought to establish a state of Islamic purity (Balogun, 1975; Talata Mafara, 1999; Talata Mafara, 2016). The institutionalisation of the *sunna* tradition and the eradication of *bidi'a* innovation was later to become the major clarion call of the *izala* movement, which appropriated the language of the Shehu to proclaim a new wave of reformist campaign as early as 1949, led by the Sokoto jurist, Sheikh Abubakar Mahmud Gumi (Gumi, 1992). In the ensuing period since then, Gumi's legacy, which he attributed to the Sokoto Caliphate has led to further religious transformation of the Muslim majority north, with the veil, the turban and Sharia returning to become parallel modes of regional and national identity among Muslims in Nigeria (Kane, 2003).

In today's contemporary Nigeria, their legacy of scholarship is evident in the proliferation of centres of Islamic studies and colleges of Sharia, where scholars continue to collect, document and translate Jihadists' literature. This literature numbers into the hundreds (Balogun, 1975). The Shehu, alone, authored more than 90 Arabic books (Talata Mafara, 1999). Additional activities of such centres cover lectures and Quranic competitions, which have now assumed a global dimension, such as the International Quranic Competition, held annually in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In this respect, it is important to note the King Faisal Award given to Sheikh Abubakar Mahmud Gumi, the founder of the *izala* brotherhood, in 1986 for services to the Islamic sciences. In a number of universities, such as

Usmanu Danfodio University, named after the Shehu, and Bayero University Kano, law students graduate with combined degrees in Sharia and Common Law, enabling them to practice and be judges at both secular and Islamic courts.

In addition, tens of dissertations have been produced since the publication of Professor Murray Last's influential, *The Sokoto Caliphate*. The book was the result of the author's meticulous research, residency and pupilage in Sokoto under the guardianship of Late Waziri Sakkwato Junaidu NNOM, the distinguished laureate and scholar of the Sokoto Caliphate, and until his death, the custodian of the largest collection of manuscripts on the Sokoto Caliphate (Junaidu, 1956). It is largely through the archival initiatives of Waziri Junaidu that we now know of the parallel but equally important scholarship of Nana Asma'u (1793–1865), daughter of the Shehu and wife of Waziri Gidado. Her works have been critically discussed in Jean Boyd's *The Caliphs Sister*, which heralded a revision of the caliphate as an exclusive scholar-prince theocracy, given the more than 60 works published by Nana Asma'u in at least four regional languages of Africa (Boyd, 1989). Since then, other female scholars living and teaching in Sokoto in the ensuing period have been studied and documented, for example, Modibbo Kilo (Omar, 2013).

Among the 300 plus books that they left were treatises on politics, law and justice, education and training, ethics and good conduct, governance and administration, and science and medicine. The overriding theoretical and methodological framework in all of their academic pursuit was based on Quranic epistemology and Hadith interpretations, which then became core elements of analysis in the light of prevailing sociocultural and religious needs. So, for example, all of the three leading lights of the Sokoto Caliphate wrote on governance and politics. Their observations, though products of the time and informed by their religious conviction, can provide valuable insights for Nigeria in this moment of uncertainty and deficit in leadership (Falola, 2016). Shehu's *Bayan Wuju Al-Hijra ala'l-Ibad*, on the necessity of the Hijra, written in 1804, contains chapters relating to "good governance," in which the first Caliph outlined some of the principles without which a state can be categorised as a failed state. He pointed to the importance of fairness, equity and inclusiveness: "one of the swiftest ways of destroying a kingdom is to give preference to one particular tribe over another, or to show favour to one group rather than another" (El-Masri, 1978, p. 7). Knowledge also featured prominently in his list of the good society: "the finest [qualities] in a ruler, in particular, and in people in general, are the love of learning, the desire to listen to it and holding the bearers of knowledge in great respect" (El-Masri, 1978, p. 8). The Shehu advocated for a leadership at the centre, which is compassionate, righteous, and welfarist, with religion underpinning these ethical values.

In the case of Sultan Muhammadu Bello (1817–1837), his *Usul Al-siyasah* concerning the principles of politics, written around 1806, outlined the principles of statecraft, the aim of which was to respond to a request for such a guide by the Emir Umaru Dallaji (1806–1835). While Sultan Bello described leadership as a "… serious misfortune that may … befall a servant … for the consequences of giving many accounts of the office," he singled out public office as "… one of the greatest blessings" (See B. Uthman B. Foduye, n.d., p. 11). The blessings relate to the "endless happiness" that the leader derives in the discharge of their duties. And, like his father, Sultan Bello listed the attributes of piety, learning, justice, and accountability among the seven core values that a leader must possess, or at least, aspire to attain in order to govern effectively. These qualities were the foundation of the governance structure that helped Sultan Bello to administer such a huge territory of diverse ethnic and religious communities. And it was to form the basis for the colonial rule and its subsequent adoption and modification as a principle of governance of Nigeria as a plural society (Paden, 2008).

There is no mistaking the Islamic doctrines from which both the Shehu and Sultan Bello derived their principles and the organisation of the Sokoto Caliphate. But underlying these doctrines is the Sufi brotherhood of Qadiriyya to which the Sokoto Sultans belonged through the centuries (Mustapha, 2014). Its emphasis on ascetism, piety, learning, and (partial) withdrawal from public affairs were to create a broader layer of respect and acceptability for the leadership of the *Toronkawa* Fulani aristocracy at the centre. Thus, throughout the Sokoto Caliphate during this period, Sufism, Islamic mysticism, especially the Qadiriyya, was a dominant religious doctrine practiced by the Shehu and his followers (Lovejoy, 2016; Talata Mafara, 1999). Even now, the local Sokoto town crier can be heard calling on all *Qadirawan Shehu* to begin their fast or stop it on the sighting of the lunar moon for the Muslim fasting period and the subsequent Eid festival. Sufism, in the form both of the Qadiriyya and Tijjaniya, is still the main morality

religious doctrine of the Nigerian Muslim establishment (Paden, 2008). In fact, both the political and aristocratic leadership of most northern states is today in the hands of such order, although it appears that this class has inherited more of the organisational and political astuteness of their forebears than the moral restraint, compassionate leadership, and educational ethos of the Shehu and his immediate successors.

It is therefore not surprising if claims were made by scholars that the greatest legacy of the Sokoto Caliphate remains the legacy of great learning that they have bequeathed to Nigeria and throughout West Africa. It is widely known in the literature that the founders of other reformist movements in Africa in the 18th century, for example, Al-Hajj Umar and Seku Amadou were greatly influenced by the successes of the Sokoto Jihad, as were the Mahdist movements in the Sudan. This literature of governance, administration, resistance, and revolution continues to guide local claims and counterclaims of legitimacy and disavowal within the Muslim discourses of politics in northern Nigeria, as noticeable in the political engagement of late Sheikh Abubakar Mahmud Gumi and his son, Dr Ahmad Abubakar Gumi, for example, and across the subregional groupings in Nigeria on the agitation for restructuring, resource control, and related ethno-religious conflicts.

However, it will appear to be a cruel irony to highlight the enlightenment (educational) credentials of the Sokoto Caliphate in a regional enclave with one of the lowest literacy levels and the highest number of out-of-school children in the world, according to UNICEF.

Yet there are extenuating circumstances that one can elaborate upon here. When the Shehu began his campaign for reform and re-Islamisation of Hausaland, he met a society in which oral culture and practices predominate. And the power of the ruler was unassailable and without debate or opposition, as it was the "the rule of despotic warlords" (Lovejoy, 2016, p. 246) "… who even though Muslims, ruled with oppressive monarchical powers" (Bobboyi, 2016, p. 50). There was almost the absence of the clerical class, and in their place were medicine men, whose healing practices of *bori* served both as a therapy for the oppressed and a source of majesty for the oppressor rulers of Hausaland. To this day, aspects of *bori* practice have endured, perhaps, on account of their appropriation by local *malams*, as they asserted a hegemonic hold on the alternative medicine enterprise in the north and beyond (see Buba, 2016; Falola, 2001).

The Hausa language, in its spoken and written *ajami* script was a major vehicle for the Islamic reform message that the Shehu and his followers were promoting throughout the Hausa states during that period. Hausa was used in the delivery of oral speeches in town squares, as well as in the production of religious primers on prayer and other obligatory rituals of Muslims through *wake* versification poetry. Moreover, as the language of the majority, Hausa also became a symbol of cultural and religious identity throughout the caliphate, and later a lingua franca in colonial northern Nigeria.

But the imposition of romanisation on the overwhelmingly Muslim Hausa severed the link of Hausa with its religious and literary roots in *ajami*, turning the vast number of scholars, administrators and young learners throughout the old Sokoto Caliphate into overnight illiterates, who must now start the process of romanised literacy from scratch. Their libraries were to become irrelevant to training and scholarship, and therefore consigned to the backrooms of homes and specialised knowledge acquisition. This was perhaps the fundamental shift in the literary and educational fortunes of the Muslim north. This singular act of "repeal and replace" had additional far reaching consequences for literacy in the Muslim north today. Hausa *ajami* is clearly more than a writing system. It is a cultural tool with which the clerical class through the centuries have documented, preserved and disseminated a knowledge system. Nor was Hausa *boko* a superior orthography, given its opacity and under-determination of the most important linguistic contrast in the language.

It is instructive, however, that a "restoration" of Islamic literacy of some sort is taking place not only in the Muslim north, but also throughout Nigeria. This started as a national initiative to recognise the increasing number of Muslim families choosing to send their children to private Islamiyya schools. These schools promised a Muslim-compliant environment, where boys and girls are taught in separate sections of the school, where an all-Muslim teaching workforce teach an "integrated" curriculum of Islamic and Arabic studies along side the "secular" national curriculum of science and humanities education. The recognition of these schools have not only led to the establishment of

state-sponsored boards of Arabic and Islamic studies to regulate the variety of the schools under the Islamiyya and Quranic Education (IQE) system but also a huge international donor-led policy framework and activities for the integration of the schools into mainstream numeracy and literacy education. The Hausa Language is at the heart of virtually all of the programmes as the preferred medium of instruction in the schools.

In the private sector, faith-based universities, such as Al-Qalam University and Al-Hikmah in the northern cities of Katsina and Ilorin, as well as Fountain University in in the Southwestern city of Oshogbo sprung up with the mission of providing liberal education "… influenced by Islamic ethics and cultural philosophy," as Fountain University described its philosophy of education. Underlying these initiatives is a reconfiguration of the educational system from below, in order to address the perceived aggressive onslaught of globalisation, which in many Muslim circles, is a new form of cultural colonialism (Bugaje, 2015, 2016).

3 | THE LEGACY OF GOVERNANCE AND ADMINISTRATION

Throughout the history of the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate, the governance structure was characterised by a loose federation of flag-bearing emirates and their subsidiary *amana* non-Muslim frontier territories. The Sultan ruled through emirs and local chiefs, who were in total control of the affairs of their domains, but would indicate their loyalty and allegiance through periodic visits to Sokoto for meetings and for homage after coronation, often bearing gifts and presents. Intervention in the affairs of the respective emirates rarely took place, unless there was a significant indication of breakdown in law and order, usually during succession crisis or inter-emirate territorial conflicts (Abubakar, 1980). The Sultan was also the spiritual head of the theocracy to which all the emirates sought proclamations, guidance and leadership. In modern political structure, the Sokoto Caliphate bore more resemblance to the European Union than to the United States, and *could* even serve as a model of a restructured Nigeria, when the time for its implementation comes! And Sultan Muhammadu Bello, the successor to the Shehu, meticulously documented not only how this union works but also how the respective emirs could further deepen the franchise using his methods and principles. These principles, Bello wrote, derived from the administration of the first Muslim Caliphate of Abubakar al-Siddiq, who was the first Caliph of the Muslim world. And ultimately, their foundation comes directly from the Hadith and Quran, the major sources of governance or Sharia within Islam. Up to today, the Sultan of Sokoto continues to exercise very strong influence not only on matters relating to the proclamation of the beginning and end of the Muslim fasting in Nigeria but also in national affairs concerning inter-ethnic and inter-religious affairs through such national and regional institutions as the Nigeria Inter-religious Council (NIREC), the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (SCIA) and Jama'atul Nasril Islam (JNI; Paden, 2008).

However, this looseness in governance structure should not detract from the extremely close ethnic and familial relationships connecting the various outposts with the Sokoto ruling Fulani aristocracy (Last, 1967). Many scholars have also pointed out that the conquest of the Sokoto Caliphate in 1903 did not lead to the total collapse of the administrative structure of the system (Last, 2014; Reynolds, 1997; Yakubu et al. 2005; Yakubu, 2006). Rather, Lugard sought to govern the old empire in the same way as the Sultan ruled; maintaining existing local authority and only overlaying it with the administrative machinery of empire under the resident and district officers who report, not to the traditional rulers under whom they were purportedly serving, but to the central colonial government in Kaduna (Bourne, 2015; Kumo, 2016; Yahaya, 2005). So cohesive and comprehensive was the administrative structure of the emirates that there was official recognition of the entire north as a Muslim state under the rule of emirs, thus further reinforcing the notion of a monolithic north with its own Islamic government and judicial system.

The legacy of the administrative structure left behind by the caliphate as well as its adoption as a colonial enterprise was to usher in the creation of the northern Nigeria socio-political and economic machinery at the dawn of independence in Nigeria. The regional structure favoured a bi-cameral legislature, whose leadership and membership clearly derived its powers from the old caliphate structure. Many of the elected members of the legislative assembly in Kaduna as well as those representing the north in Lagos, particularly elected members of the ruling Northern

Peoples Congress (NPC), were drawn from the ruling Fulani families in the various emirates of northern Nigeria (Yakubu, 2006). The semblance to the old caliphate also went beyond the personalities. It was vastly accommodated in the new colonial and post-colonial regimes. In fact, the British extended its influence. It has had to happen this way, because the new north at the dawn of independence was a vast territory with one of the most diverse ethnicities in the world. Differences in cultures, language and religious beliefs, often sharply highlighted by the colonial masters, and at times undermined by the linguistic and religious advantage of Hausa and Islam, made political representation at the centre an important rallying point for the North's perception as a solid and united entity (Reynolds, 1997).

However, the crisis that continues to engulf Nigeria since Independence has not abated, leading to perennial calls by all sections of the country for restructuring, partition and redistribution of the country and/or its resources. This "… sense of victimhood as entitlement …" (Bourne, 2015, p. 50) is echoed even in the north, with a prominent scholar of the Sokoto Caliphate recently noting that as Muslims "… we have to live under a system with which we have little sympathy and which have very little sympathy for us" (Kumo, 2016, p. 28). The phenomena of militancy, insurgencies and terrorism have also contributed to a seeming ideological rift and balkanisation of the north, and with it, the dissipation of the stronghold of the old caliphate. These "internal" conflicts in the north mirror some of the internal intrigues and contestations that persisted in the caliphate long after the founding members of the theocracy had left. In fact, as early as the reign of the second Sultan, Muhammadu Bello, concern was raised about the excessive force and autocratic highhandedness of some of the residual flag bearers on the periphery of the caliphate. It is instructive that late Sheikh Abubakar Mahmud Gumi was to use the same concerns and accusations against northern emirs of bringing: "… back to life all the corrupt practices against which Sheik Dan Fodio went to war with the former Hausa rulers … [that] they had become kings with big palaces full of servants and courtiers … and concubines" (Gumi, 1992, p. 108).

This concern is today viewed as a recurring phenomenon in Nigeria, with the herdsmen conflict, in especially the north-central, being described, particularly in the affected middle belt and in the south of Nigeria as a new form of Jihad by a martial race in the grip of a Fulani polity and military elite actively supporting the encroachment of the umbrella Fulani *Miyetti Allah* organisation and its caliphal patrons, who are the Sultan of Sokoto and the Emir of Kano. At least, three states have so far enacted laws against herdsmen activities within their states, while at the same time voicing concerns that the Federal Government is deploying its military might to protect Fulani herdsmen, because of their ethnic affinity with the current Nigerian president and the leading politicians in his government.

Interestingly, this locational identification of support base of the Fulani parallels the pyramidal colonial structure of the north, with Sokoto, Kano and Kaduna as its spiritual, commercial, and administrative centres. Kaduna, in particular, was deeply enmeshed in the political and religious legacy of the caliphate. It was the favoured capital of Northern Nigeria, where both Lord Lugard and Premier Ahmadu Bello Sardauna purported to "rule" the Nigerian polity at various times. Today, it is still viewed as the location of the "deep state" "Kaduna mafia," which apparently continues to influence the affairs of Nigeria through its anointed leadership at the centre. While this may not be true, the city, with its central location between the major commercial city of Kano and the federal capital city of Abuja, remains the favoured location for regional pronouncements relating to the existential discourses of a nation in perpetual revolution. Kaduna and its environ bore the scars of the assassination of Premier Ahmadu Bello in 1966, the eruption of the Nigerian Civil War in 1967, as well as scores of other tragedies including the Zangon Kataf crisis.

In life, as in death, Ahmadu Bello remained a complex and divisive character, revered and vilified in equal measure throughout the country, and in the north in particular. For one, he was the bearer of the caliphate as the great-grandson of Sultan Muhammadu Bello, and saw himself as someone who was on "… a personal mission, which had been given to him by history" (Gumi, 1992, p. 101). Even his name change to Ahmadu Bello Sardauna in the 1950s bore the imprint of his full subscription to the legacy of the Sokoto Caliphate (Peel, 1988). On the other hand, he was in policy and practice, a man driven by the passion to protect the interests of the north in the face of regional politics of the new Nigeria. As late J D Y Peel observed, he wanted "… to enable the north to catch up in development, and to exercise the influence in national affairs which its size justified" (Peel, 1988, p. 146). Northern people across the religious and ethnic divide appeared to enjoy a certain amount of freedom of worship and participation

in both local and regional affairs of the north, although the Premier was always on the lookout for more converts to Islam during his tours (Gumi, 1992, p. 111). So inclusive was Sardauna's government that the Premier was commonly referred to as *Amadu Mai Mutane* "the people's Ahmadu" in Sokoto, in reference to the diverse friends and political allies that the Sardauna used to bring to Sokoto to pay homage to the then Sultan Abubakar III. Today's politicians from Kogi to Sokoto can, in one sense, be defined as northern in their politics, outlook and orientation, because of the political legacy of inclusion that Premier Sardauna laid down. But pockets of resistance to the ideals of a monolithic north have always acted as sharp reminders to the revolutionary origins of this part of the country. The Mahdist' uprisings of Satiru and Sudan, the trenchant and resistant politics of Aminu Kano and his radical followers since the 1950s, the full emergence of *izala* brotherhood as a parallel *sunni* brotherhood under Sheikh Abukakar Gumi in the 1990s, the continuing contestation for a space and a voice by other religious and political groups in the north, all have to be seen as part of the legacies of "dissent" in the Sokoto Caliphate (Last, 2014).

4 | THE LEGACY OF SHARIA AND THE WELFARE STATE

In recent times, there has been resurgence in recovering the legacy of the Sokoto Caliphate as a welfare state, partly because of a perception by Muslims in Nigeria that "… our corporate interest has remained marginal in the affairs of the nation" (Gbadamosi, 2016, p. 62). The Sharia debate and the subsequent adoption and incorporation of many of its tenets in the laws of the core northwestern states of Nigeria in the 1990s has led to the unfolding of a new benefactive and welfarist programme in at least 12 northern states in Nigeria. In virtually all of these states, these programmes are backed by laws enacted by the states' House of Assembly. Whether this relates to food distribution during the Muslim Ramadan period, or the periodic communal "mass weddings," or the season of Zakat collection and distribution, there is a concerted effort by these state governments to provide some form of social service for the poorest members of the Muslim community in these areas. The legacy of the Sokoto Caliphate in these welfare programmes is many, including its very legitimacy and the role of the emirate system in the collection and distribution of the Zakat collected. Wealthy Muslims contribute to the Zakat programme in accordance with Islamic principles. These are then supplemented by a monthly subvention from the government running into hundreds of thousands of dollars. In Sokoto State, for example, the state government claims to spend close to one and a half million dollars annually on these religious activities, including subvention to the Zakat Commission.

The increasing revenue and assets in the hands of state-sponsored Islamic institutions in many of the northern states have naturally led to the establishment of Sharia compliant financial services. Commercial banks in Nigeria, such as Jai'z Bank, practice Islamic banking, which prohibits payment of interest, speculation and investment in non-Halal sectors, such as casino and brewery businesses. In recounting the history of Islamic banking in Nigeria, reference has been made to its practice during the Sokoto Caliphate (Yahaya & Mohammed, 2014). Ja'iz's active financial role in Muslim pilgrimage activities in Nigeria serves to further highlight its Islamic affiliation. In fact, the Nigerian government recently resorted to a *sukuk* Islamic bond, which raised more than the issued 100 billion naira, in order to provide road infrastructure across the country. And although pension funds and conventional banks were among the subscribers to the bond, concerns were raised by Christian organisations that the bond was part of an attempt to Islamise Nigeria, a recurring decimal in the ethno-religious politics of Nigeria.

5 | CONCLUSION

In this article, the legacies of scholarship, governance and administration, and Sharia and the welfare state are highlighted because of their continuity and resonance through the centuries. There are other legacies of the caliphate, such as those of slavery, land use and ownership, as well as commerce that have continued to play a role in the national life of Nigeria. Their impact will require a separate survey, given the disruptive effect of the abolition of slavery in the caliphate by the British, the promulgation of Land Use Act of 1976 by the military, and the discovery of oil

in Nigeria. However, the intermittent discussion of dissent and disclamation of the Sokoto Caliphate and its values in this article does serve to indicate the complex interaction of many factors in fully assessing the role it continues to play in a more diverse polity than the founding leaders of the caliphate had even envisaged. Indeed, recent developments in Nigeria, particularly in the northern part, where there have been calls for citizens to defend themselves, and Christian groups increasingly dissociating states in the middle belt from the rest of the north, may well point to the continuing relevance of legacies of subordination and subjugation of vulnerable groups throughout the history of the Sokoto Caliphate (Lovejoy, 1998). Islam, Sharia, "Muslim" tenure of Muhammadu Buhari and the perceived dominance of the Hausa-Fulani in the affairs of the current political regime in Nigeria all seem to have immediate impact and resonance both for the minority ethnic groups in the north and for the rest of Nigeria. Echoes of Jihad and Fulani terrorism only add to a feeling of isolation by the Muslim north, leading to a "quit notice" given by a Muslim youth group to the Igbo to leave the north, in response to an earlier call for Muslim Hausa-Fulani to leave the south of Nigeria. It remains to be seen whether these agitations and counter agitations will lead to further reconfiguration of the polity, with the legacies of the Sokoto Caliphate continuing to exert their influence on the larger Nigeria Muslim society and beyond.

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