Empowerment or Backlash? How women's participation in mass uprisings provides a rising tide

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Abstract

Women have always been key players in political history, often using the upheaval caused by war and mass movements to create social and political change. Yet patriarchy is still pervasive, and feminist gains, including women's rights and increased gender equality, are difficult to consolidate after uprisings end. This paper examines the crucial role women's inclusion plays in shaping the success of mass movements and the longer-term prospects for equity. Using a new dataset on Women in Resistance (WiRe), we first examine the effects of women's participation in frontline roles on violent and nonviolent movement outcomes. We then investigate the effects of such participation on post-contention politics after the conflict or movement has ended. Not only does women's participation at the frontlines of armed and nonviolent movements alike increase the chances of campaign success, it also often helps them achieve and consolidate gender equality in the years that follow. Moreover, women's participation serves as a rising tide for all boats, leading to significantly more egalitarian distributions of rights and freedoms, resources, and access to power across all social groups five years after the movement ends. However, these effects are highly conditional on whether the campaign itself succeeds - suggesting that while women's frontline participation is often crucial for campaign success, campaign success is also critical in ushering in opportunities for women to expand and consolidate their institutionalized empowerment. The fact of social upheaval alone does not explain transformations in gender equality. Rather, women's participation on the winning team is what drives women's empowerment in the aftermath of mass uprisings.

Introduction

Several generations of women and girls, mostly in the United States, have found inspiration in the quote "well-behaved women seldom make history." Variously attributed to Marilyn Monroe, Eleanor Roosevelt, or no one, perhaps it is unsurprising that the woman who first wrote this feminist slogan is little known despite her famous

words: historian Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, who has even written a book about the phenomenon of her disembodied quote (2008). Like Ulrich herself, many women who *do* help make history - well-behaved or otherwise - do so in relative obscurity, shining brightly during upheaval and change, before being lost in history to a male cast of characters. This paper examines how women make history, through the lens of women's so called ill-behavior in transgressive, disruptive mass mobilization in violent rebellions, mass protest, and campaigns to overthrow the state.

With fascism, nationalism, and populism on the rise globally, understanding the bones of protest and resistance - how it arises, who participates, when it succeeds - is urgent and timely. Studying mass movements enables us to see the pro-democratic, coalitional forces pushing back against proto-authoritarianism in global perspective. Both phenomena have gendered dynamics that shape their outcomes. Fascism and nationalism have historically featured particularly high levels of gender differentiation, "traditional gender roles", and patriarchal retrenchment (Herzog 2005). Moreover, misogyny and patriarchal backlash have characterized the repressive responses to prior mass movements focused on rights and equality, such as the abolition movement, woman suffrage, and other women's rights campaigns (Faludi 1991, Lepore 2018). Of women's participation in contentious politics, most existing literature focuses on formal institutional settings or violent conflict. In recent years, numerous published studies have examined women's participation in armed groups and the crucial role they can play in sustaining rebellion. Relatedly, the gender, peace, and security literature stresses the importance of gender in peace talks, quotas, and other realms of formal politics. Yet, the space between violence and voting is a vast landscape through which women exercise collective action that ranges from participation in civil society, to protests, strikes, and other forms of civil resistance. Building on previous research that asks *why* women participate in local and national protests, we examine what the effects are when women do participate.

Does women's participation at the frontlines of mass mobilization increase violent and nonviolent movements' chances of success? Does women's inclusion lead to better outcomes not only for the campaign, but also for women in society more broadly? To answer these questions, we take a bird's eye view that focuses on a narrow upper echelon of risky mass action: violent and nonviolent maximalist campaigns (i.e. movements that seek to either overthrow the sitting government or win territorial autonomy) in the post-1945 period. This offers a particularly tough test for examining the dynamics of how women make history - for themselves and for others - by measuring the effect of their presence and participation *en masse* in creating country-level changes.

Our large-*n* approach makes three important empirical and theoretical contributions. First, we present new global data on women's participation in nonviolent campaigns from 1945-2019, so that they can be understood and analyzed alongside the more heavily studied phenomenon of civil wars. Both types of mass uprisings often articulate similar aims but do so through fundamentally different strategies and tactics. Second, we add to efforts to write back into history the effects of women's participation in contentious unarmed politics, which is often considered not only "ill-behaved", but is risky and illegal in repressive states. Third, our approach begins to address an enduring question for people pursuing freedom and equality: when is women's participation and mobilization likely to achieve gender equality and increased democratic access to power, and when is it not? Our dataset excludes the vast majority of smaller protests, riots, reformist campaigns, and other collective endeavors in dissent that do not meet the "maximalist" threshold. We want to emphasize that the local effects of sub-national political movements may be similar or wholly different to those threatening the central state and warrant further research. As a starting point, however, large-*n* analysis of maximalist campaigns allows us unprecedented insight into the processes and outcomes associated with women's participation in particularly high-risk collective action.

We find that not only does women's participation at the frontlines of armed and nonviolent movements alike increase the chances of campaign success, it also often helps achieve and consolidate gender equality in the years that follow. Moreover, extensive frontline women's participation can serve as a rising tide for all boats, leading to significantly more egalitarian distributions of rights and freedoms, resources, and access to power across all social groups at least five years after the movement ends. However, these effects are highly conditional on whether the campaign itself succeeds - suggesting that while women's frontline participation is often crucial for campaign success, campaign success is likewise critical in ushering in new opportunities for women to expand and consolidate their empowerment.

Women's Participation in Mass Mobilization: A look at the literature

When it comes to women making history in 2019, few have been as prominent as women in Sudan, who first joined mass protests to overthrow former president Omar al-Bashir, and subsequently became the most resilient participants in an ongoing movement for a democratic, civilian-led political transition. Protests began in December 2018 and by February 2019, Bashir declared a state of emergency, by turns cracking down on female protestors and then releasing women political prisoners in a bid to quell the unrest. Far from placating Sudanese people, mobilization increased as tens of thousands filled the square in front of Army Headquarters with protest songs, chants, and tea and food that sustained a many-weeks sit-in. Women food vendors, students, and housewives have featured prominently throughout (Ali 2019). Tahani Abbas, co-

founder of the group No to Women's Oppression, described women's experiences of the uprising to Sudanese journalist Yousra Elbagir: "We are the ones bearing the brunt of the violence, facing sexual harassment and rape, to organize and propel the movement on the street level" (Kirby 2019). Sudan's successful overthrow of a 30-year reign illustrates the importance of women participating in mass movements to help them succeed, as well as the high stakes women confront when demanding political change outside of formal politics.

Until recently, women's participation in political uprisings has mostly been examined through the lens of insurgency and violent conflict. The women, peace and security (WPS) research and policy agenda (growing since 2000 from UNSCR 1325 and subsequent resolutions) has been particularly attentive to the role of women in war, and to the four pillars of achieving women's participation and protection, conflict and violence-prevention, and gender-sensitive relief and recovery efforts. As a result of this emphasis, a cohesive research agenda has emerged that outlines the diverse and important roles female participants and fighters play in armed groups (for example, cross-national studies include Alison 2009; Braithwaite and Ruiz 2018; Henshaw 2016; Marks 2014, 2017; Thomas and Wood 2017). In addition to outlining *how* women participate, numerous studies have also focused on explaining *why* they do. Structural approaches articulate group-level and country-level correlates of women's participation, such as forced recruitment and gender-equitable ideologies (e.g. Cohen 2013; Henshaw 2016; Loken 2018; Thomas and Bond 2015; Wood 2019), whereas a rich case-specific literature outlines a diversity of motives and factors operating at the national and sub-national level (Alpern 2011; Anagnostopoulou 2001; Cohen 2013; Eggert 2018; Gonzalez-Perez 2006; Israelsen 2018; Kampwirth 2002; King 2015; Klouzal 2008; Lobao 1990; Marks 2019a, 2019b; Mason 1992; Penn 2005; Shayne 1999; Tripp 2015). As Viterna convincingly argues, there are as many reasons why women participate in armed conflict as reasons men do (2013).

In parallel to the extensive and growing research on gender and armed conflict is a smaller body of work focused on how gender and women's participation affects dynamics of *non*violent resistance. For example, case studies of women's participation in nonviolent movements have focused on how women's participation in one movement can transform over time into a new movement (Meyer and Whittier 1994), how women activists navigate opportunity structures and constraints (Berry 2019; Taylor 1989), which types of dissent organizations include or exclude women (Bakken 2021), or how women leaders create political change in diverse contexts (Badri and Tripp 2017). Shaaftenaar finds that increases in gender equality - proxied by the proportion of women in the workforce - are associated with increased onset of nonviolent campaigns (2017; see also Baldez 2002), whereas Costain argues that women have prioritized nonviolent strategies and tactics in their political mobilization. Other authors have

made the case that nonviolence is an "inclusive strategy" (Beckwith 2002) and that higher rates of women's participation should make nonviolent resistance campaigns more effective by adding numbers, legitimacy, and a collaborative ethos to mass movements (Codur and King 2015; Principe 2017). Notably, the vast majority of research on women's nonviolent activism focuses on women mobilizing *as women* - for supposedly "gender-specific" goals such as women's rights, reproductive justice and freedom, and increasingly, peace (Cockburn and Enloe 2012; El Bushra 2007; Ferree and Mueller 2004; Htun and Weldon 2012; McAllister 1992). Some recent work suggests that warfare expands space for women's claims and access to equality because of shifting power relations within society that occur as large numbers of men are killed or wounded in conflict (Berry 2018; Webster, Chen, and Beardsley 2019)—particularly when international peace agreements incorporate provisions for women's empowerment (Bakken and Buhaug 2021). Yet, relatively little research looks more generally at women's participation in national political movements themselves as a way of understanding those campaigns' chances for success, or their immediate or longer-term outcomes.

To date, there has been a lack of global, cross-sectional data on women's participation in nonviolent campaigns analogous to that available for armed groups. This has hampered the basic descriptive task of knowing how often women participate in popular uprisings, in what roles, and at what scale, as well as answering more complex questions about which women participate and why, and how their presence (or absence) may shape campaign success. A recent report finds a strong correlation between high rates of women's participation and short-term campaign success (i.e. successful overthrow), but offers no explanation for this finding—nor does it evaluate the medium term implications on democracy and women's rights (Chenoweth 2019).

In the sections that follow, we build on the WPS agenda by bringing together women's participation in both nonviolent and violent uprisings and analyzing them side by side. This is different than analyzing women as peacemakers and peacebuilders, or as violent actors *per se* - both of which are questions the WPS community has taken up and is continuing to unpack. Instead, we focus on the fact of variation in the proportion of women participants in campaigns globally and assess women's impact on immediate and medium-term campaign outcomes.

Women's Participation and the Success of Mass Uprisings

In terms of immediate outcomes, we argue that women's participation in violent and nonviolent campaigns should make them more likely to succeed - to be the *winning team* - for three key reasons. First and most obviously, women's active participation in resistance provides a higher possibility of mass mobilization - it opens up "*half the sky*"

(Kristof and WuDunn 2008). Campaigns in which men are the primary combatants or dissidents - either intentionally or unintentionally shortchanging their mobilizable base - are likely to suffer in numbers, thereby reducing their disruptive potential. Large-scale participation is critical for the success of maximalist campaigns (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), and campaigns that prohibit, discourage, or fail to attract participation from half of the population on the basis of gender are severely limited on that front.

Second, as participants, women may increase campaigns' perceived legitimacy and catalyze broader mobilization. Drawing on insights from the literature on rebel groups, campaigns which prominently feature women are more likely to invoke the universality of their cause, deploy gendered narratives of "country" and "motherland" that call for household-level participation, or be able to use women's frontline presence to shame and cajole men's participation (Herrera and Porch 2008; Loken 2018). During the Egyptian Revolution, for example, a 25-year-old woman named Asmaa Mahfouz famously took to YouTube to call on the men of Egypt to show up for their sisters, daughters, and mothers, shaming those who wouldn't as cowards. In her vlog, she said:

> If you think yourself a man, come with me on 25 January. Whoever says women shouldn't go to protests because they will get beaten, let him have some honor and manhood and come with me on 25 January. … If you have honor and dignity as a man, come. Come and protect me and other girls in the protest. If you stay at home, then you deserve all that is being done, and you will be guilty before your nation and your people. And you'll be responsible for what happens to us on the streets while you sit at home (quoted in *Democracy Now*, Feb 8, 2011).

Third, women's frontline participation may increase the likelihood of tactical innovation, as organizational diversity is linked with creativity (Marks, Chenoweth, and Okeke 2019). Precisely because of gender roles and gender stereotypes, women participants have the potential to wield transgressive and politically meaningful methods that would not be available to all-male groups. For instance, in the midst of tense confrontations between protestors and security forces, women have innovated defensive tactics - such as accompanying students, creating human shields, or stripping naked where such actions bring shame upon observers - which provide protection without the need for armed defensive action or escalation. In various contexts, women have drawn on their societal roles as mothers and grandmothers to appeal to or scold political opponents, allowing them access to relational power dynamics that are unavailable to men, who are more traditionally conceived of as politicized actors (Ukeje 2004). Women can also innovate recruitment techniques that support the movement's growth and vitality, such as Mahfouz's vlog, described above.

These theoretical mechanisms lead us to the following two hypotheses:

H_1: *Half the sky* - Higher proportions of women's participation is associated with increased violent and nonviolent campaign size, *ceteris paribus*.

H_2: *Winning team* - Higher proportions of women's participation is associated with increased chance of campaign success, *ceteris paribus*.

The Aftermath of Uprisings: Women's empowerment or patriarchal backlash?

The high stakes and potential human and material costs of civil war are well understood; less often do we examine the potential costs of nonviolent unrest. Returning to the Sudanese political situation helps underscore the high stakes of all mass movements. It also pinpoints some of the risks of nonviolent mass action for women and for democracy more generally. Although Sudanese protestors were successful in getting Bashir deposed by the military, the Transitional Military Council has been fending off demands to cede power to civilians with increasingly lethal crackdowns. More protestors have been reported killed under the TMC than during Bashir's state of emergency, and women have been excluded from peace and transition talks (Kirby 2019). In spite - and because - of this, women continue to lead a sit-in in Khartoum (Awad 2019). As one woman participant, Wifag Gorashi, described, "We have to remain on the streets to protect our rights that Islamists fundamentalists always tried to push back against under the name of Sharia" (Awad 2019).

Sudanese women's continued mobilization as self-proclaimed "protectors of the revolution" underscores the difficult task of consolidating democratic gains in the aftermath of political transition. Their high rates of participation also reflect a more specific desire to change the status of women in Sudanese society; as described by Eiman, a young participant in the March protests: "Women are constantly harassed, either because of the clothes they wear, or because they are in the street late at night, or in a cafe, or in a public place. They are victims of discrimination at work. Moreover, the government is trying to prevent them from working, to stay at home and to be housewives. So each of us has a different reason for wanting to protest against this regime" (RFI 2019). What is the likelihood of increased democracy in Sudan as a result of the April uprising? And what are the unique stakes for Sudanese women who hope to improve gender equality and women's civil liberties in the country (SIHA Network 2017)?

A great deal of feminist research, largely built on detailed case studies, finds that the relative opening and social transformation of gender roles that is possible during armed conflict can be quickly contested or fleeting in its wake. There are numerous ways that

gender roles can change as a result of armed conflict, not only from women and girls engaging in violence, but also as a result of their increasingly taking up previously masculine labor, managing households and bureaucratic tasks, and other traditionally male social roles (Wood 2008). Yet, as Enloe articulates, even these gendered transgressions and "new" forms of femininity can work in service of militarization and patriarchy (1983, 2000). They do not necessarily lead to feminist emancipation or more modest inroads toward gender equality during war, nor in its aftermath. Moreover, some gains for gender equality - such as female-headed households, women becoming the sole or primary breadwinners in their households, and women's increased mobility and decision-making power - come as a result of devastating tragedy and loss at the personal level. They often arise from women being widowed, displaced, and losing loved ones to violence and repression (Rajasingham-Senanayake 2004).

Despite these dubious origins, feminist activists and technocrats alike have searched for women's empowerment in the rubble of mass political uprisings. There have been some prominent indications of positive change for women. For example, across the African continent since 1990, women's inclusion in formal politics vis-a-vis legislative representation has increased dramatically, a change driven by countries that experienced armed conflict (Hughes and Tripp 2015). Insofar as conflict is correlated with increased women's representation in politics, their presence can lead to better prospects for peace (Shair-Rosenfield and Wood 2017). Moreover, new cross-national research finds that women's empowerment and improved gender equality seems to have some staying power after war (Webster, Chen, and Beardsley 2019). Yet, at the individual and national level, there is abundant anecdotal, case-based, and historical evidence that gains in women's rights are both subtly and violently contested by stakeholders in political patriarchy.

As the caveats to the women's empowerment thesis indicate, a countervailing theory suggests that far from mass mobilization leading to women's emancipation, violent and nonviolent campaigns are often followed by patriarchal backlash (Faludi 1991). Perhaps none is so striking as the backlash against women's political participation and social emancipation described by Nawid in post-Marxist Afghanistan:

> "The campaign of the Marxists to promote revolutionary women's emancipation provided an ample pretext for the conservative elements to mount concentrated resistance (71) … The general reaction against the feminist movement…was so strong that many PDPA members…prevented their wives from participating in public affairs for fear of terrorist attacks against them (70)" (2007).

Other cases seem to indicate that initial gains in women's rights may subsequently backslide, if not face an outright backlash (Berry 2018). Berry poignantly calls state-sponsored women's empowerment in Rwanda a case of "bright futures fading", in which

ordinary women's lives have seen little transformation despite historic levels of women representatives in formal politics (2015). MacKenzie writes, "the term 'empowerment' has been generously employed and woefully ill-defined" in reconstruction efforts, where development and security are understood to go hand-in-hand (2009). In the case of Sierra Leone, women and girls went from mass mobilization - with tens of thousands forcibly recruited in the country's civil war - to being "reintegrated" into traditional gender roles, where development initiatives, not political mobilization, were presented as a path to equality (MacKenzie 2013; Maclure and Denov 2008). In demobilization and reintegration campaigns globally, female fighters' reentry into civilian life has often been understood to equate with being accepted by, and again made acceptable to, patriarchal norms and structures (MacKenzie 2013; on militarized masculinities see Theidon 2009).

There have thus been ambivalent findings on whether armed conflict leads to women's individual or collective empowerment - political, economic, or otherwise; and no studies to our knowledge examining outcomes for women in the wake of mass nonviolent uprisings. Some potential gains in gender equality have been attenuated by the persistent exclusion of women from peace talks and political settlements, where power is brokered and redistributed after upheaval (NiAolain 2016). Far from women missing opportunities of social and political opening, then, we might understand post-campaign patriarchal consolidation as the active exclusion and repression of women. Sudanese women are reporting this in real time. In contexts where peace negotiations or other formal political processes *do* include female participants, they tend to be more successful in the short term and more durable in the long term (O'Reilly, Paffenholz, and Súilleabháin 2015; Paffenholz et al. 2016). Similarly, positive outcomes have been observed regarding women's participation in peacekeeping missions, which is correlated with reduced violence and anti-civilian abuse (Karim and Beardsley 2017; Pruitt 2016). Despite this growing evidence base on the positive effects of women's participation in peace talks and peace missions, however, we are aware of no studies have evaluated the effect of women's frontline participation in movements themselves on democracy and gender equality in the aftermath.

In light of evidence that armed conflict (and by our intuition, mass nonviolent movements) may lead to gender equality (Webster et al 2019), broader democratization, and women's political representation (Hughes and Tripp 2015), we examine the impacts of women's campaign participation on two distinct county-level outcomes: egalitarian democracy in general, and women's empowerment specifically. We focus on egalitarian democracy as the measure that best proxies for the positive effects of a democratic society on peoples' daily lives. As defined by V-Dem, "The egalitarian principle assumes that the material and immaterial inequalities inhibit the exercise of formal rights and liberties, and diminish the ability of citizens from all social groups to participate.

Egalitarian democracy is achieved when rights and freedoms of individuals are protected equally across all social groups; resources are distributed equally across all social groups; and access to power is equally distributed by gender, socioeconomic class, and social group" (V-Dem). We have chosen this substantive measure of democracy because it explicitly aims to capture inclusion of minorities and reduced inequalities. It therefore functions as a high bar for measuring whether women's participation in campaigns serves as a *rising tide* that can lift all boats in the aftermath of mobilization. This responds to profound feminist critiques that women's participation in elite politics is often window dressing for - and sometimes reinforcing of - social inequalities, male-dominated political systems, and semi-authoritarian democracies. In the appendix, we discuss more procedural and substantive measures of democracy to show that our results hold even regarding these more institutional or procedural aspects of democracy (Hughes and Tripp 2015).

To study women's *empowerment* outcomes after the upheaval of war and mass movements, we utilize the gender empowerment variable from V-Dem. This variable is constructed as an index, which we also disaggregate in order to test potential component mechanisms that might drive gender equality, including measures of women's civil liberties, women's formal political participation, and women's participation in civil society. We expect women's participation in armed and nonviolent uprisings may lead to gender equality through a number of mechanisms, including women's increased social and economic mobility compared to pre-campaign gender norms, women's increased political participation, and the activation of women in civil society as a result of both protest and peace processes. These may act as forces that directly inform formal politics, or that activate women's mobilization more broadly for ongoing political actions after the mass campaign has ended.

Following the above research on reactionary forces that may reassert hegemonic masculinities and patriarchal power structures, we also examine *backlash* outcomes cross-nationally in all countries that experienced maximalist campaigns. Attempts to restore societies' gender order in the aftermath of highly visible, transgressive, and disruptive women's involvement in political life may lead to overt or covert attacks on civil rights protections for women, reducing women's political participation, and shutting down or closing space for women's civil society organizations. The backlash effect is conceived as a negative coefficient, or decrease, in gender equality five years after the conflict, as compared to one year before the campaign began. In short, a backlash outcome would mean that women are worse off after a campaign than before it, presumably as a result of failed outcomes, repression, and retaliation.

Finally, we test for the interaction of strategic choice - violence versus nonviolence - and outcome - winning versus losing - on the below hypotheses to identify the conditions

under which women's participation may lead to positive and negative outcomes for egalitarian democracy and gender equality. This is important because previous research has often overlooked the matrix of possible outcomes of mass mobilization in its entirety and focused on particular subcategories, such as post-conflict peace dividends without regard to the winning team, or women's participation in nonviolent campaigns without studying the alternative predicted outcomes had the campaign been waged as a violent rebellion.

> H_3: *Rising tide* - A higher proportion of women's participation is associated with increased egalitarian democracy five years after the campaign ends, *ceteris paribus* (v2x_egaldem).
>
> H_4: *Empowerment* - A higher proportion of women's participation is associated with a higher degree of women's empowerment five years after the campaign ends, *ceteris paribus* (v2x_gender).
>
> > H_{4a}: A higher proportion of women's participation is associated with increased women's rights (measured as civil liberties, v2x_gencl)
> > H_{4b}: A higher proportion of women's participation is associated with increased women's political empowerment (measured as formal political participation, v2x_genpp)
> > H_{4c}: A higher proportion of women's participation is associated with increased participation of women in civil society (measured as women's participation in civil society, v2x_gencs)
>
> H_5: *Backlash* - A higher proportion of women's participation is associated with decreased women's empowerment five years after the campaign ends, *ceteris paribus* (changev2x_gender).
>
> > H_{5a}: A higher proportion of women's participation is associated with decreased women's civil liberties (v2x_gencl)
> > H_{5b}: A higher proportion of women's participation is associated with decreased women's formal political participation (v2x_genpp)
> > H_{5c}: A higher proportion of women's participation is associated with decreased women's participation in civil society (v2x_gencs)

Research Design and Description of the Data

We rely on the Women in Resistance (WiRe) dataset to systematically analyze descriptive patterns of women's participation in maximalist campaigns in the post-WWII world. The WiRe data, described below, provide our independent variables for assessing the impact of women's participation on movement success and on gender equality outcomes. The dataset integrates and extends variables from several other datasets outlined below, including the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and

Outcomes (NAVCO) data project and, for the purposes of this article, the Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) data project.

The WiRe dataset is the first of its kind to catalog women's participation in all known maximalist resistance campaigns (i.e., those campaigns that call for the toppling of an oppressive government, or territorial independence) worldwide (Chenoweth 2019). The first version of the dataset identifies both nonviolent and violent maximalist campaigns in every country in the world from 1945 to 2014, providing a systematic look at various dimensions of women's participation in both types of campaigns. Using the campaign as the unit of analysis helps smooth out uneven reporting of events over time and maximizes the likelihood of observing women's real inclusion in the campaign (something history has shown to be underreported). We are currently completing the second version of the dataset, which covers dozens of new cases from 2015-2019, and will update the analysis using these new data when they are available.

The WiRe dataset expands upon the NAVCO dataset by creating new variables that identify the scope, type, and degree of women's participation in maximalist campaigns. Maximalist campaigns are those that call for the removal of an incumbent national leader or the independence of a country through self-determination, secession, or the expulsion of a colonial power or military occupation. These campaigns have broadly anti-government or territorial goals; campaigns seeking more moderate reformist goals are not included in WiRe data. A minimum threshold of at least 1,000 participants have to be observed coordinating their tactics over time to make it into the dataset. This may exclude smaller fringe collectives that claim maximalist goals.

NAVCO classifies those mobilizations according to whether they relied on primarily nonviolent or violent methods. Each campaign is coded as a success or failure; successes are those campaigns that remove the incumbent national leader by irregular means or achieve territorial independence within a year of the peak of the campaign's mobilization. They had to have had a discernible impact on those outcomes to qualify as successes. If they did not meet any of these three criteria, they are coded as failures; campaigns that were ongoing as of the end of 2014 were counted as failures as well. For more on the inclusion criteria and coding rules for the NAVCO data set, please see http://www.navcodata.org.)

The appendix contains the WiRe dataset codebook, which details source materials, data collection and coding procedures, and the results of inter-rater reliability and content validity tests. For our purposes, the WiRe dataset introduces five variables identifying whether women were observed as participants at different levels/categories in nonviolent mass movements or armed campaigns, including: frontline roles, support roles, leaders, figureheads, or symbolic roles. Not mutually exclusive, these dichotomous

variables identify the presence or absence of women in those roles as reported in available source material. To add nuance to the measures, WiRe data also identifies the *extent* of women's participation as frontline participants at four levels:

> 0 – *Not observed*: no observed/reported frontline role for women.
> 1 – *Limited* participation: a handful of observed frontline women participants (i.e., women are less than 25 percent of frontline participants).
> 2 – *Moderate* participation: women are clearly and routinely involved in the front line of the campaign, and the proportion of women campaigners is significant (between 25 percent and 50 percent of frontline participants).
> 3 – *Extensive* participation: women frontline campaigners comprised the majority (at least 50 percent) of observed participants.

To capture some of the gendered context and underlying political dimensions of women's participation, the WiRe dataset includes an ordinal indicator of whether the campaign has a gender-inclusive ideology; we adapted this measure from similar measures used by Thomas and Bond (2015) and Asal, et al. (2013):

> 0 – Gender inclusive ideology *not observed*: no segments of the campaign were observed explicitly mentioning that the ideology is gender-inclusive (i.e., that women should be included in politics/public life).
> 1 – *Observed*: segments of the campaign called explicitly for the inclusion of women in politics/public life.
> 2 – *Contested*: segments of the campaign were observed actively debating the inclusion or exclusion of women in politics/public life.

The WiRe dataset also includes variables that capture whether women's groups call directly for peace/peaceful mobilization (Costain 2000), as well as movements' capacity for sustained organizing and engagement (Codur and King 2015; McAllister 1999; Tripp 2019). These include dichotomous measures of whether formal women's groups or associations were involved in campaign, and whether formal women's groups were observed explicitly calling for peace (including nonviolent methods, e.g., sex strikes, candlelight vigils, etc.).

In addition to the success outcomes, we draw our other outcome variables from the V-Dem dataset. We focus in particular on two index variables and their component measures:

> *v2x_egal:* The egalitarian component index variable combines three different component variables that measure equal protection, equal access, and equal distribution of resources within a country. This is an interval-level variable, scaled from low (0) to high (1), by averaging the score on these three component variables. (We tested other measures of democracy in the appendix: polyarchy, participatory democracy, and deliberative democracy, with similarly robust findings.)
>
> *v2x_gender*: The women's political empowerment index assessed the degree to which women are politically empowered in the society. V-Dem defines this "as a process of

> increasing capacity for women, leading to greater choice, agency, and participation in societal decision-making. It is understood to incorporate three equally-weighted dimensions: fundamental civil liberties, women's open discussion of political issues and participation in civil society organizations, and the descriptive representation of women in formal political positions." This is also an interval variable scaled from low (0) to high (1), averaging the values of V-Dem's women's civil liberties index, women's civil society participation index, and women's political participation index.

We also examine constituent measures that are potential causal drivers of gender empowerment, including: women's participation in civil society (v2x_gencs); women in formal politics (v2x_genpp); and women's civil liberties (v2x_gencl).

Women's Frontline Participation Patterns

Frontline women's participation is pervasive among both nonviolent and violent maximalist resistance campaigns. About 89 percent of all campaigns in the dataset featured some degree of frontline women's participation. Moreover, fully 99 percent of nonviolent campaigns featured women at the frontlines; only one campaign during the postwar era, the anti-Chaudry campaign in Fiji in 2000, did not feature any observed women's frontline participation. A slightly lower portion - 76 percent - of violent campaigns featured frontline women combatants (76 percent is considerably higher than previous estimates from smaller samples of armed group-specific data; for example, Henshaw finds just 32 percent of armed groups have female combatants (2015)). This difference between armed and unarmed campaigns is statistically significant at $p < .001$. However, it bears noting that, nearly a quarter of violent movements having no observed women's frontline participants does not imply they did not have female supporters or women in unobserved but essential rearguard roles (Parkinson 2013). In fact, 88 percent of all violent movements saw women participating in support roles.

Nonviolent campaigns have significantly higher rates of moderate or extensive (upwards of 25 percent) frontline participation by women than do violent campaigns. None of the violent campaigns in the dataset had extensive levels of women participants. Yet, from 2010 to 2014, fully 70 percent of nonviolent campaigns had moderate or extensive levels of women at the frontlines (Figure 1). As Figure 2 illustrates, nonviolent campaigns have increased in number over time - seemingly displacing violent movements - and, as both Figures 1 and 2 illustrate, they have featured increasingly high levels of frontline women participants. Comparatively, the 1970s and early 1980s appear to have been a passing heyday for frontline women fighters in violent movements. This dovetails with changing international norms about gender equality and women's participation in politics (see Hughes and Tripp 2015, Webster et al. 2019); however, it does not necessarily follow that women's rights or their inclusion in formal politics would translate to them taking

to the streets in mass uprisings. In fact, it could be an inverse role model effect: that when women are denied rights and freedoms nationally, but see winds of change afoot internationally, they may be more likely to mobilize for what they want but do not yet have. We leave aside the question about international norms shifting over time in this paper, but future iterations will account for temporal effects. (We do account for country-level political dynamism, i.e. multiple simultaneous or overlapping campaigns that might drive or influence mobilization, as discussed below.)

Figure 1: Percentage of Campaigns with Moderate or Extensive Women's Frontline Participation, 1945-2014



Figure 2: Levels of Women's Frontline Participation, 1945-2014



Analysis and Results

Because the unit of analysis is the campaign, we employ various estimation strategies designed for cross-sectional analysis. As noted above, the dataset includes 338 observations, which are distributed roughly equally between nonviolent and violent campaigns. For all hypotheses except for H_2, our dependent variables are continuous and normally distributed except where otherwise noted. As such, we employ ordinary least-squares regression with robust standard errors clustered around the location to account for heteroskedasticity in the cross-sectional unit. For H_2, whose dependent variable is dichotomous, we employ logistic regression with standard errors clustered around the location. For postestimation, we rely on the margins commands suite in STATA 15 to estimate the marginal effects of each covariate of interest and to depict these marginal effects in graphical form.

Women's Participation and Campaign Outcomes

Recall that H_1 specifies a positive association between higher proportions of women's participation and campaign size, *ceteris paribus*. The dependent variable, *peak participation*, reports the maximum number of reported participants confronting their opponents at single event during the campaign. We operationalize this variable in two ways: (1) as a raw count; and (2) as a logged measure, accounting for skewness. In this model, our primary covariate is the ordinal variable *extent of frontline women's participation*, which our table reports as a factorial variable (with no women's frontline participation as the reference category). Because we expect countries with larger populations to boast larger peak participation, we control for the *logged population size* of the country in which the campaign takes place, although doing so requires us to drop a number of observations on account of missing data for both peak participation and national population size. Table 1 reports the results.

Based on this analysis, we find support for H_1 - a strong positive association between women's frontline participation and both operationalizations of peak participation - although we caution that this finding is correlational and not necessarily causal. One could imagine, for instance, that larger campaigns attract higher proportions of women on the frontlines because of the perceived safety in numbers that large-scale movements elicit. To determine whether the results are causal or merely correlative, further research is required.

Table 1: Half the Sky? Association between Women's Frontline Participation and Peak Participation

	(1) Peak participation	(2) Logged peak Participation
Low women's frontline participation	53,739*	1.106***
	(29,791)	(0.286)
Moderate women's frontline participation	361,344*	1.606***
	(213,063)	(0.355)
Extensive women's frontline participation	438,014**	2.572***
	(198,121)	(0.643)
Logged population	67,877**	0.306***
	(33,167)	(0.113)
Constant	-639,204**	5.703***
	(315,612)	(1.103)
Observations	243	243
R-squared	0.042	0.144

Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Regarding H_2, which postulates that higher rates of women's participation are associated with an increased chance of campaign success, we specify a logistic regression where the dependent variable is *campaign success*. We rely on the short-term outcome definition - i.e. winning - that is defined in NAVCO as the removal of an incumbent national leader through irregular means, or total national independence, depending on the campaign objective. Our primary explanatory variable is an interaction term between peak participation and the extent of frontline women's participation. We expect that as campaigns grow, those with higher rates of women's participation in frontline roles will have better chances of success, all things being equal. We know that campaign success is a complex phenomenon and that women's participation may be shaped by factors internal to the campaign. Therefore, we control for whether women's issues are central to the campaign's claims, whether the campaign has a gender-inclusive ideology, whether women's organizations call for peaceful mobilization, all of which we expect to increase women's enthusiasm - and whether the ruling regime engages in violence against the campaign, which we might expect to decrease women's participation. We cluster standard errors around the campaign country location to account for internal political dynamism. We test the results for all campaigns, and then for nonviolent and violent campaigns. As Figure 3 illustrates, campaigns that feature higher proportions of women frontline participants have a substantially higher likelihood of success. With 250,000 or more participants, campaigns that are at least 50 percent women have nearly guaranteed predicted success

rates. The same is not true for violent movements, which have a lower predicted chance of winning because of lower rates of women's participation (there were no violent campaigns that featured extensive frontline women's participation). Thus, while Figure 3 shows the combined predicted probability of campaign success, we would caution aspiring rebel leaders that the nonviolent movements are driving the results.

Figure 3: Winning team? Effect of Women's Frontline Participation on the Predicted Probability of Campaign Success as a Function of Peak Participation



Notes: Marginal effects calculated following a logistic regression controlling for women's issues as central to the campaign, gender-inclusive ideology, women's organizations calling for peaceful mobilization, and regime violence against the campaign. $n = 293$; $p < .001$. Standard errors are clustered around country.

Perhaps most surprising, aside from the winning strategy of women's participation is the finding that when men significantly outnumber women on the frontlines of mass movements, increased campaign size is not associated with an increased probability of success. (Interestingly, when examining the predicted success of violent movements, we find campaigns with moderate levels of women's frontline participants fare worse than those with low levels of women participants. Returning to Figure 2, above, we can see that these violent movements are clustered in the 1970s and 1980s and may face particular geopolitical temporal effects depressing their success that can be examined more closely in future research.)

Women's Participation and Campaign Aftermath

We now turn to our hypotheses on the aftermath of mass mobilization, looking at the effects of varying levels of women's participation on egalitarian democracy, gender equality, and backlash effects five years after campaigns end. H_3 posited that increased women's participation in frontline roles would lead to higher levels of egalitarian democracy across society - the "rising tide" effect. Here we develop several models in which the egalitarian democracy index is the dependent variable; we control for the typical suite of control variables introduced above as well as the level of egalitarian democracy one year prior to the campaign's onset. In addition, we look at the impacts of women's participation on other indices of democracy, such as participatory democracy (model 2), deliberative democracy (model 3), and polyarchy (model 4). Although we do not further discuss these findings in this paper, they show similar results to the egalitarian democracy model and provide proof of concept that egalitarian democracy is capturing more narrow conceptions of procedural democracy.

Table 2: Rising tide? Association between Women's Frontline Participation and Different Measures of Democracy, 5 years after campaigns end

	(1) Egalitarian democracy index (eyear+5)	(2) Participatory democracy index (eyear+5)	(3) Deliberative democracy index (eyear+5)	(4) Polyarchy index (eyear+5)	(5) Egalitarian democracy index (eyear+5)
No frontline role, violent campaign	0	0	0	0	0
	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
No frontline role, nonviolent campaign	0.00765	0.0227	0.0615**	0.104***	0.0634
	(0.0196)	(0.0186)	(0.0291)	(0.0360)	(0.0398)
Low frontline role, violent campaign	0.0204	0.0195	0.0322	0.0223	0.0295
	(0.0142)	(0.0137)	(0.0233)	(0.0246)	(0.0338)
Low frontline role, nonviolent campaign	0.0869***	0.0851***	0.122***	0.115***	0.175***
	(0.0199)	(0.0196)	(0.0264)	(0.0281)	(0.0369)
Moderate frontline role, violent campaign	0.0332	0.0234	0.0399	0.0187	0.0850
	(0.0244)	(0.0270)	(0.0365)	(0.0423)	(0.0612)
Moderate frontline role, nonviolent campaign	0.0822***	0.0667**	0.104**	0.106**	0.219***
	(0.0297)	(0.0288)	(0.0408)	(0.0420)	(0.0619)
Extensive frontline role, violent campaign	0	0	0	0	0
	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
Extensive frontline role, nonviolent campaign	0.140*	0.135**	0.197**	0.197**	0.251***
	(0.0710)	(0.0567)	(0.0818)	(0.0802)	(0.0774)
Women's empowerment index	0.179***	0.196***	0.303***	0.353***	
	(0.0577)	(0.0519)	(0.0649)	(0.0789)	
Regime change claim	-0.0158	-0.00672	-0.0102	-0.0103	-0.0144
	(0.0135)	(0.0145)	(0.0206)	(0.0228)	(0.0297)
Campaign duration	1.14e-06	2.27e-06	4.60e-06	5.21e-06	8.09e-06
	(2.62e-06)	(2.61e-06)	(4.23e-06)	(4.49e-06)	(8.25e-06)
Women's issues central to the campaign					-0.0239
					(0.0400)
Campaign has gender-inclusive ideology					0.00533
					(0.0226)
Egalitarian democracy index (byear-1)	0.614***				0.673***
	(0.0763)				(0.101)
Participatory democracy index (byear-1)		0.578***			
		(0.0811)			
Deliberative democracy index (byear-1)			0.410***		
			(0.0783)		
Polyarchy index (byear-1)				0.403***	
				(0.0888)	
Constant	0.00822	-0.0212	-0.0292	0.0139	0.0439
	(0.0171)	(0.0173)	(0.0258)	(0.0283)	(0.0297)
Observations	299	297	299	299	136
R-squared	0.534	0.495	0.420	0.461	0.485

Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Our primary interest is in egalitarian democracy, which arguably has the most promising and sustainable qualities for women's equality among the different democratic systems. We show in Figure 4 that there is strong evidence that women's participation does indeed lead to rising tides in terms of egalitarian democracy, but only when campaigns succeed. This makes sense intuitively, as we can expect longer-term effects of campaigns primarily when those campaigns have been victorious in assuming power. Moreover, nonviolent campaigns dramatically increase the predicted level of egalitarian democracy in the countries in which campaigns have taken place: extensive levels of women's participation nearly double the predicted scores as compared to no women participants, and even low and moderate levels of women's frontline engagement lead to big bumps in predicted egalitarian democracy. The results are more moderate (and less significant, conditional on success) for violent campaigns.

Figure 4: Rising tide? The Effect of Women's Frontline Participation on Predicted Levels of Egalitarian Democracy, 5 years after campaigns end



This positive story is accompanied by a more ominous one: failed nonviolent campaigns are followed by a precipitous drop in egalitarian democracy as more women participate in the campaign, showing declines equivalent to or greater than the gains following movements that succeed. This may indicate an authoritarian backlash after campaigns call for equal access to rights and resources, with a particular focus on retaliating against women for challenging the system through movement participation. Figure 4b sharpens the point, using change in egalitarian democracy (the difference between the score five years after the campaign ends, and the score the year before it begins) to capture whether the country is more or less egalitarian in the aftermath of an uprising. Here, we

can see that the decline in egalitarianism is particularly grave after *failed* nonviolent campaigns as higher levels of women participate.

Figure 4b: Rising tide? Levels of Women's Participation and Predicted Change in Egalitarian Democracy, *(t+5)-(t-1)*



The more subtle trends after violent campaigns are positive for egalitarian democracy in spite of campaign failure, which may be counterintuitive. We postulate that the peace and recovery industry that often follows armed conflict can act as a brake on authoritarian retrenchment and repression - a brake that is still missing in the international system following mass nonviolent movements. As a result, high levels of women's participation in campaigns that are effectively civil wars is correlated with overall positive increases in egalitarian democracy, regardless of the victor. In short, while we can confirm H_3 - that increased levels of women's participation are positively associated with higher levels of egalitarian democracy five years after the campaign (a rising tide) - it comes with the great risk that failed nonviolent campaigns with high levels of women participants are followed by much lower democratic outcomes across society.

It is possible that this finding is driven by gender-specific backlash in particular. However, as Table 2 indicates, narrower measures of formal/procedural democracy show patterns similar to egalitarian democracy, which accounts for women's and other groups' rights. Our next set of analyses turns specifically to the question of whether and how different levels of women's frontline participation in mass campaigns may generate positive changes in gender empowerment or lead to patriarchal backlash. We examine H_4 and H_5 on women's empowerment and backlash, respectively. Because the

associations between frontline women's participation and gender empowerment outcomes might drive in either direction, two-tailed tests are applied.

We find that increasing levels of women's frontline participation leads to moderate increases in the country's gender empowerment index overall (Figure 5). As before, nonviolent campaigns with extensive women's involvement are the most dynamic in improving women's empowerment five years after the campaign ends. But, again, these gains are conditional on the movement succeeding. There is a substantial predicted *backslide* in women's empowerment where nonviolent campaigns with extensive women's participation fail. Surprisingly, violent campaigns are as likely as nonviolent campaigns to see gains in women's empowerment five years after they end, suggesting that the frontline involvement of women in successful campaigns - rather than the tactic or strategy of (non)violence - may be doing the transformative work.

Figure 5: Empowering women? The Effect of Women's Frontline Participation on Predicted Change in Women's Empowerment, *(t+5)-(t-1)*



In Figures 6, 7, and 8, we present the effects of increased levels of women's frontline participation on disaggregated measures of gender empowerment - women's civil liberties, formal political participation, and civil society involvement - to see if any of these features of women's engagement might be driving the broader empowerment findings. As above, these graphs illustrate the change in women's political status five years after the campaign ends, as compared to the year before the campaign began. We can see that in every category of women's political equality, increased levels of women's

participation lead to a positive increase in women's status when campaigns succeed. The trends are generally similar to the broader empowerment predictions. Nonviolent movements show a bit more dynamism in predicted women's empowerment outcomes at different levels of women's participation, but all aftermath measures point in a positive direction.

Conversely, across both violent and nonviolent categories, women's political inclusion drops significantly in all three categories when campaigns fail. Moreover, nonviolent mass uprisings with extensive women's participation see the most dramatic risk of a backlash or backslide effect (though the confidence intervals are particularly large, because this type of campaign - massive and nonviolent, with extensive women participants - rarely fails).

Figure 6: Civil liberties for women? The Effect of Women's Frontline Participation on Predicted Change in Women's Civil Liberties, *(t+5)-(t-1)*



Figure 7: Women's political participation? The Effect of Women's Frontline Participation on Predicted Change in Women's Political Participation, *(t+5)-(t-1)*



Figure 8: Women in civil society? The Effect of Women's Frontline Participation on Predicted Change in Women's Civil Society Involvement, *(t+5)-(t-1)*



We interpret the backlash results with caution. While we find preliminary evidence that higher levels of women's participation does indeed predict patriarchal backlash and gendered backsliding (H_5), these dynamics obtain only when mass uprisings fail and are not statistically significant across all models. Conversely, the positive women's empowerment effects (H_4) that follow campaigns with high rates of women's frontline participation are reliably statistically significant. Further research is needed to indicate whether such predicted gains in gender equality, civil liberties, and women's participation in formal politics and civil society are likely to compound and consolidate over time, or eventually erode. A five-year window is a relatively short "aftermath" overall, but one that allows us to more directly attributing gender and democracy outcomes to the recent campaign, rather than interceding events that might affect these outcomes regardless of the campaign's dynamics and outcomes.

We have presented a number of different findings in multiple formats. To summarize, Table 3 contains a report our findings with regard to our core hypotheses.

Table 3: Summary of Results and Findings

Hypothesis	**Source**	**Finding**	**Interpretation**
H_1: *Half the sky*	Table 1	Support	There is a strong positive correlation between women's frontline participation and the peak participation of resistance campaigns.
H_2: *Winning team*	Figure 3	Support	There is a strong positive correlation between women's frontline participation and the success of resistance campaigns.
H_3: *Rising tide*	Table 2, models 1 & 5 Figure 4 & Figure 4b	Qualified support, conditional on campaign success	Campaigns in which women are involved in extensive frontline participation are associated with gains in egalitarian democracy, but only when they succeed. They are associated with declines in egalitarian democracy when they fail.
H_4: *Empowerment*	Figure 5	Qualified support, conditional on campaign success	Countries in which campaigns have featured extensive frontline women's participation are associated with gains in egalitarian democracy, but only when they succeed.
• H_{4a}: *Civil liberties*	Figure 6	Qualified support, conditional on campaign success	Countries in which campaigns have featured extensive frontline women's participation are associated with gains in women's civil liberties, but only when they succeed.

• H_{4b}: *Political participation*	Figure 7	Qualified support, conditional on campaign success	Countries in which campaigns have featured extensive frontline women's participation are associated with gains in women's political participation, but only when they succeed.
• H_{4a}: *Civil society*	Figure 8	Qualified support, conditional on campaign success	Countries in which campaigns have featured extensive frontline women's participation are associated with gains in women's civil society involvement, but only when they succeed.
H_5: *Backlash*	Figure 5	Qualified support, conditional on campaign failure	Countries in which campaigns have featured extensive frontline women's participation are associated with declines in women's empowerment only when they fail.
• H_{5a}: *Civil liberties*	Figure 6	Qualified support, conditional on campaign failure	Countries in which campaigns have featured extensive frontline women's participation are associated with declines in women's civil liberties only when they fail.
• H_{5b}: *Political participation*	Figure 7	Qualified support, conditional on campaign failure	Countries in which campaigns have featured extensive frontline women's participation are associated with declines in women's political participation only when they fail.
• H_{5a}: *Civil society*	Figure 8	Qualified support, conditional on campaign failure	Countries in which campaigns have featured extensive frontline women's participation are associated with declines in women's civil society involvement only when they fail.

Conclusion

This paper is motivated by a fundamental question for feminists: how can women expand their rights in the aftermath of mass uprisings? While much of the existing literature specifies that women's mobilization generates either empowerment or backlash, we find conditional support for both of these expectations. Yet, we also find solid support that women's participation is essential for movements to succeed. Therefore, extensive frontline participation of women in mass uprisings helps such campaigns to succeed - and success is critical in securing longer-term empowerment for women, as well as to lift all boats through egalitarian democracy. This points to a critical symbiosis between women's participation in nonviolent campaigns and the fate of the resistance campaign itself.

Although more work is need to better specify the mechanisms leading to these outcomes, our findings point to a crucial contribution so far: the mere fact of social upheaval cannot explain transformations in gender equality. Rather, women's participation on the winning team is what drives women's empowerment in the aftermath of mass uprisings. This is true for both nonviolent and violent campaigns, although nonviolent campaigns tend to boast higher levels of both women's frontline participation and rates of success. Our findings also have important implications for existing research on women's political representation after war. Previous work has found both increased women's representation in formal politics and increased gender empowerment (Hughes and Tripp 2015; Webster et al. 2019). This study confirms these findings (Fig. 7) but qualifies that these outcomes are predicted only when campaigns win. Moreover, we have extended the evidence base to nonviolent campaigns, finding similar patterns with even more powerful potential for positive transformation - and backlash.

Our next steps are multifold. First, we will complete the update of the WiRe dataset and replicate our analysis on data extending through 2019. Second, we will refine and nuance our statistical procedures by performing a number of robustness checks and model specifications. We are particularly interested in integrating multi-stage regression analyses that might assist in untangling the covariation in some of our VDEM-based indices, as well as additional covariates that might help to control for potential unobserved factors. In particular, we plan to conduct two-stage analyses—a first stage that identifies correlates of women's participation levels, and a second that evaluates the impacts of those correlates on peak participation. We will conduct parallel analyses for all of the hypotheses – those focused on movement success as well as longer-term changes in empowerment and egalitarian democracy. This is necessary to account for alternative explanations such as the modernization hypothesis, which has found some support in research scholarship on women's empowerment (Norris 2020). Third, we aim to deploy hazard analyses to examine the endurance of different improvements in women's empowerment, following other recent analyses examining the effects of war on women's empowerment (Webster, et al. 2019). Second, we aim to draw in further material from various case studies in which frontline women's participation did and did not lead to significant gains in women's empowerment. This will allow us to refine our theoretical discussion and articulate the mechanisms by which these changes occur, as well as to identify potential omitted variables that we might need to include in further model specifications and/or data collection.

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