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Who Inherits the State? Colonial Rule and Postcolonial Conflict

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Abstract: *Postulating grievance-based mechanisms, several recent studies show that politically excluded ethnic groups are more likely to experience civil conflict. However, critics argue that endogeneity may undermine this finding since governments' decisions to include or exclude could be motivated by the anticipation of conflict. We counter this threat to inference by articulating a causal pathway that explains ethnic groups' access to power independently of conflict. Focusing on postcolonial states, we exploit differences in colonial empires' strategies of rule to model which ethnic groups were represented in government at the time of independence. This identification strategy allows estimating the exogenous effect of inclusiveness on conflict. We find that previous studies have tended to understate the conflict-dampening impact of political inclusion. This finding suggests that grievances have been prematurely dismissed from conventional explanations of conflict, and that policy makers should consider conflict resolution methods based on power sharing and group rights.*

Replication Materials: The data, code, and any additional materials required to replicate all analyses in this article are available on the *American Journal of Political Science* Dataverse within the Harvard Dataverse Network, at: http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/GKASQ5.

Do political inequalities between groups cause civil conflict? Stressing the impact of ethno-nationalist grievances, a series of studies suggests that ethnic groups excluded from central state institutions are more likely to engage in ethno-nationalist civil conflict than those that have more secure access to power (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Gurr 1993, 2000; Petersen 2002). This stream of research has significant theoretical implications, since it questions the proclaimed irrelevance of ethnic grievances and the dominant focus on structural factors of opportunity (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Moreover, it also bears direct policy implications for many cases—including present-day Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Nigeria—because the effectiveness of power sharing as a way to overcome conflict in ethnically divided societies hinges on the validity of the exclusion-conflict link (e.g., Mack 2002). If ethnic exclusion causes conflict, then inclusion of ethnic groups should produce peace, otherwise inclusive policy advice loses much of its attractiveness.

Given the importance of this claim, it is hardly surprising that it has come under attack. Specifically, critics have asserted that the exclusion-conflict result may be the result of reverse causality. Indeed, if the anticipated consequences of ethnic exclusion affect governments' decisions on whom to exclude in the first place, then studies that falsely assume exclusion to be an exogenous "treatment" may generate biased and misleading inference (Blattman

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and Miguel 2010; Fearon 2010; Fearon, Kasara, and Laitin 2007).

Addressing this challenge of endogenous institutions head-on, we analyze the impact of exclusion on civil war onset in postcolonial Africa and Asia using a novel identification strategy. We follow Fearon, Kasara, and Laitin (2007, 192–93), who advise that in order to "deal with this problem," one needs to "find a factor correlated with ethnic minority rule but uncorrelated with ... civil war risk (an 'instrument')." We exploit the fact that the French and British empires differed systematically in the manner by which they administered their overseas colonies. As opposed to the centralistic approach pursued by the French, the British doctrine stressed maintaining preexisting ethnic governance structures and devolving decision-making power to local, traditionally legitimized elites. This difference in colonial policy had a substantial subnational impact on ethnic groups' abilities to gain access to state power in the transition to independence. The British approach meant that traditionally legitimized ethnic leaders were able to consolidate their power during colonial rule, leading to a network of rural despots with relatively tight control over their coethnic subjects. Consequently, at independence, even peripheral ethnic groups had good chances of gaining access to the central government because rural ethnic leaders could offer urban elites quickly mobilizable political support in exchange for political power. In contrast, French policy marginalized traditional governance structures and concentrated decision-making powers in the colonial center. Here, groups that found themselves far removed from centralized decision-making institutions had fewer chances to gain access to state power.

Exploiting this differential within-country variation between former French and British colonies, we use the combination of ethnic groups' geographic location and the identity of the imperial ruler as an instrumental variable for ethnic inclusion in postcolonial states. Because the ethno-political power constellations established at the moment of independence are generally very persistent, we are able to demonstrate that initially included groups are significantly less likely to fight in the subsequent postcolonial period. Rather than undermining the exclusion-conflict nexus, our findings thus suggest that previous, uncorrected attempts to estimate the effect of ethnic groups' power status on conflict have most likely *understated* the peace-inducing effect of ethnic inclusion. In short, by accounting for endogeneity, our evidence suggests that ethnic inclusion *is* causally linked to peace, at least in postcolonial states.

In terms of theory, these findings suggest that the grievance skeptics have been right about endogeneity, but instead of weakening exclusion's impact on conflict onset, they actually strengthen the empirical support for the grievance-based account that links political inequality with civil war. Moreover, the implications for policy are just as important: Our analysis indicates that ethnically inclusive power-sharing institutions reduce conflict more effectively than existing studies tend to suggest, precisely because such arrangements are typically invoked in the shadow of potential future conflict. There are thus good reasons to be skeptical of much of the empirical critique that has been targeting power sharing, at least to the extent such studies fail to account for endogeneity.

The article begins by reviewing the role of ethnic power access and its effects on conflict. This discussion allows us to explore the problem of endogeneity and highlights the need to explain ethnic power access independently of conflict before it can be used to explain conflict. Thus, we proceed in two steps. First, we turn to colonial politics in order to explain postcolonial power status. Using geospatial data at the level of ethnic groups, we demonstrate the differential effects of French and British rule on postcolonial ethnic power configurations. Second, drawing on this rationale as an instrumental variable, we turn to assessing the exogenous effect of initial inclusion on postcolonial conflict. The final section draws conclusions for theory and policy.

Ethno-Nationalist Exclusion and Conflict

There is a long theoretical tradition linking political exclusion of ethnic groups to the outbreak of violence (e.g., Brass 1991; Horowitz 1985; Rothchild 1981; Williams 2003). In particular, scholars argue that grievances associated with alien rule and foreign domination serve as powerful mechanisms translating objective power asymmetries into mobilization and grievances, which themselves lower the threshold of violence (see, e.g., Gellner 1983).

Much of the evidence for this exclusion-conflict link can be found in the qualitative literature (e.g., Lemarchand 2004; Petersen 2002). Offering a broader perspective in a series of influential publications, Gurr (1993, 2000) brought systematic data to bear on the postulated link between exclusion and discrimination, on the one hand, and conflict, on the other hand. Using more recent data, Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010) come to similar conclusions, especially as regards the central role of political inequalities in conflict-generating processes. In sum, this literature argues that those groups that governments

marginalize or discriminate against are much more likely to rebel against the state than those that enjoy more secure access to power.

The Challenge of Endogeneity

Although the linkage between ethnic power access and civil conflict appears strong and robust, it is not immune to criticism. In particular, problems of endogeneity may bias the empirical estimates. Broadly speaking, endogeneity occurs when there exists an alternative causal pathway between the treatment and outcome that has not been accounted for in empirical modeling. Specifically, such bias occurs if the treatment variable is itself responsive to the outcome (i.e., reverse causality), or if an unmeasured confounding factor affects both the treatment and the outcome (i.e., omitted variable bias). Econometrically, these scenarios imply that the correlation between the treatment variable and the stochastic component is nonzero, thus leading to biased estimates.

This challenge is not uncommon; despite increasing scholarly awareness, problems of endogeneity continue to undermine current research on civil war (Blattman and Miguel 2010). Critics of the exclusion-conflict link point to reverse causality as the key threat. If exclusionary policies are chosen in part with an eye to their anticipated consequences, then a causal arrow operates from (potential) conflict to exclusion. This makes it difficult to discern the actual effect of political exclusion on conflict because the anticipation of conflict determines whom governments exclude from power in the first place. How this potential source of endogeneity affects empirical estimates of the exclusion-conflict link depends on the manner in which governments deal with potentially dangerous groups:

1. *Inclusion of Potential Belligerents.* According to this scenario, governments include those groups with the largest conflict potential and exclude groups that are unlikely to rebel to begin with. This will be the case if governments generally seek to avoid conflict and expect that including potential troublemakers will reduce overall conflict risk. In other words, "governments tend to calibrate the level of exclusion to what they can get away with" (Fea 2010, 19; see also Svolik 2009). If this mechanism applies, "naïve" comparisons of the frequency of rebellion between included and excluded groups will *underestimate* the peace-inducing effect of inclusion. The reason is that even though inclusion actually reduces conflict risk, only groups that are particularly conflict-prone for reasons other than power access are being included in the first place.
2. *Exclusion of Potential Belligerents.* Another possibility is that governments strategically exclude those groups with the highest conflict potential. This is the exact opposite of the above scenario. One possible explanation for this logic is that governments assume that exclusion *reduces* conflict risk, perhaps because potentially belligerent groups are then denied access to state resources that could be used for mobilization. Alternatively, governments may exclude conflict-prone groups, even though they believe that exclusion increases conflict risk, because they fear coups d'état by included rivals more than they fear civil wars by excluded rivals (Roessler 2011; Svolik 2009). If this is the case, "naïve" comparisons between the frequency of rebellion between included and excluded groups will *overestimate* the peace-inducing effect of inclusion because conflict-prone groups tend to be politically excluded.

To understand the reasoning underlying these arguments more clearly, a medical analogy for the inclusion-of-potential-belligerents mechanism is useful. Compared to most other people, hospital patients generally suffer from poorer health. The corresponding naïve conclusion would be to infer that hospitalization is detrimental toward one's state of health. Needless to say, such an inference omits that poor health is usually the cause of the treatment in the first place. Once this reverse causality is factored in, the correct inference is, of course, that hospitals are generally health-improving. Analogously, following Scenario 1, more conflict-prone groups (i.e., ill patients) may be more likely to be included (i.e., hospitalized) in the first place, thus understating any conflict-dampening (i.e., healing) effect.

3. *Unobservable Confounders.* Finally, the estimates presented in the studies that link exclusion to internal conflict could suffer from endogeneity in the form of omitted variable bias if exclusion were to correlate with unobservable confounders that independently drive the probability of conflict. In this context, Fearon (2010, 20) stresses opportunities to rebel, such as group size, peripheralness, and mountainous terrain.

Again, it is critical to theorize the potential consequences of this type of endogeneity. If omitted variables that make rebellion more feasible correlate positively with exclusion, then the exclusion-conflict finding will at least

in part be spurious (i.e., overestimated). As such, this scenario bears some resemblance to the exclusion-of-belligerents mechanism if factors of opportunity operate in part *through* exclusion.

One effective way of overcoming the problem of endogeneity is instrumental variable estimation, which is the approach we pursue in this article (for an overview, see Sovey and Green 2011). The basic idea behind this approach is to find a variable, referred to as the *instrument*, that correlates with the potentially endogenous regressor but is otherwise unrelated to the dependent variable (for recent applications to civil conict, see Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004; Savun and Tirone 2011). Put otherwise, in order to assess the validity of the exclusion-conflict nexus, we need to articulate a causal pathway that directly affects inclusion but is otherwise unrelated to conflict. The next section thus lays out the logic of what we believe constitutes a suitable instrument.

Explaining Ethnic Power Access

We introduce an argument that relates the ethno-political power constellation in postcolonial states to differences in colonial policy between the French and British empires. Whereas the European ethno-political power constellation emerged from an extensive period of state formation and nation building, this is not the case for most postcolonial states. Here, particular groups' chances of gaining access to state power in the postindependence period depended heavily on colonial policy, which typically treated its subjects very differently conditional on ethnic affiliation (Horowitz 1985; Reno 1995; Young 1994).

Our argument follows a sizable literature that traces the long-term effects of colonial rule on a variety of contemporary outcomes, especially economic development (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Hariri 2012). In particular, it is often argued that European metropoles employed distinct strategies in governing their overseas dependencies, which in turn impacted differently on subsequent economic development (e.g., de Sousa and Lochard 2012; Englebert 2000; Lange, Mahoney, and vom Hau 2006; Mahoney 2010), democratic survival (Bernhard, Reenock and Nordstrom 2004), coups (Jenkins and Kposowa 1992), or conflict (Blanton, Mason, and Athow 2001; Lange and Dawson 2009). Our argument about the ethno-political power constellation in postcolonial states explicitly builds on such differences between empires, but it also makes specific predictions about geopolitical patterns *within* postcolonial states. It proceeds in two steps. First, a stylized comparison of colonial rule between the two most important colonizers, France and Great Britain, demonstrates how these empires differed systematically with respect to customary institutions and local autonomy, which both shaped ethno-political configurations. Second, we discuss how the locally confined consequences of these different modes of colonial governance carried over to the postcolonial state and affected which groups gained access to power after the colonizers' retreat.

Colonial Period

It is often argued that whereas the British adhered to "indirect rule," the French relied on "direct rule" (e.g., Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004; Jenkins and Kposowa 1992; Lange 2004; Lange, Mahoney, and vom Hau 2006; Miles 1994).[1] Scholars have been debating whether the difference between French direct rule and British indirect rule is historically accurate. In fact, there is evidence that both the British and the French relied at least in part on both principles (see Herbst 2000; Lange 2009). The problems relating to this distinction stem at least partially from attempts to characterize entire colonies when both forms of rule were often used in the same country (Crowder 1964; Lange, Mahoney, and vom Hau 2006). Indeed, given the vastness of the colonial empires and the relatively small numbers of colonial administrators, ruling indirectly through a principal-agent structure was often the only feasible way of making peripheral areas governable at all, while a strong colonial presence at the center generally favored direct rule (Gerring et al. 2011; Herbst 2000; Mamdani 1996, 869). Acknowledging these arguments, we contend that France and Britain differed systematically in both the *frequency* and especially the *manner* in which they implemented indirect rule in practice. In the following, we elaborate on these differences by focusing on two key factors that affect the ethno-political landscape: (1) customary institutions and (2) local autonomy.

First, sharp differences characterize the empires' approaches with respect to customary institutions. The British tended to keep precolonial power structures in place wherever possible. Formulated eloquently by Lord Lugard (1922) as the de facto doctrine for governing the empire's colonies, British indirect rule left local administration to native chiefs, kings, or other authorities with

[1]Defining these concepts, Gerring et al. (2011, 377) propose that "a 'direct' style of rule features highly centralized decision making while an 'indirect' style of rule features a more decentralized framework in which important decision-making powers are delegated to the weaker entity."

traditional claims to power, allowing them to rule in a largely autonomous manner as long as they cooperated with colonial officials (Crowder 1964; Lange 2004). In contrast, French colonial rule relied heavily on the principles of *centralization* and *assimilation*. The French empire generally organized the local administration of its colonies with little regard to preexisting institutions and minimized the degree of local decision making in favor of centralized planning, even where indirect rule was applied (Mamdani 1996).

Thus, under French indirect rule, local conditions and institutions were often deliberately ignored. Local leaders primarily served the function of "agent[s] of the administration" (Crowder 1968, 187). In order to ensure loyalty with the empire, the French not only chose as their agents "those from the ruling lineage who spoke French and were known to be loyal to France, but often they imposed men without any traditional right to rule. These included clerks, old soldiers, and in some instances even personal servants of administrators" (Crowder 1968, 190). Indeed, in choosing their agents, the French were more concerned about potential efficiency than legitimacy.

This does not imply that the French refrained from employing locals for administrative positions within the French colonial apparatus. On the contrary, Richens (2009) shows that the ratio between European colonial administrators and the local African populace did not differ significantly between French and British possessions in Africa. However, whereas the British typically employed traditional authorities to reign over their own tribal communities, the French implementation of indirect rule recruited native administrators to act as representatives of the colonial empire, rather than traditionally legitimized rulers. Hence, British indirect rule meant the "incorporation of indigenous institutions – not simply individuals – into an overall structure of colonial domination" (Lange 2004, 906).

A second distinctive property of British indirect rule was the comparatively large degree of autonomy that was granted to local agents, including "executive, legislative, and judicial powers to regulate social relations in their chiefdoms" (Lange 2004, 907). Local agents had the obligation of collecting taxes for the administration and following the guidelines set by the British Resident, but they remained largely autonomous otherwise (Crowder 1968, 217–18). This concentration of power within a single position has led Mamdani (1996) to describe the effective system of governance that would emerge from British indirect rule as "decentralized despotism."

In contrast, a key objective of French colonial policy was to fully integrate overseas colonies into the French state. In the words of Arthur Girault, who contributed to shaping French colonial policy in the late 19th century, the "colonies 'are considered a simple prolongation of the soil of the mother country,' merely as 'départements more distant than the rest'" (quoted in Lewis 1962, 132). Consequently, the political administration of the colonies aimed to mirror the centralistic French system, leaving little room for local idiosyncrasies. Moreover, centralization implied that decision making was carried out at the highest possible level, and that local administrators' duty was merely to implement these decisions. Native administrators in French colonies were expected to execute orders from the French *Commandant de Cercle* in accordance with a strictly hierarchical chain of command (Calori et al. 1997; Crowder 1968, 188).[2] In fact, the French actively prevented local concerns from entering the decision-making process by frequently rotating colonial governors and administrators, leaving them with little time to learn the local language or ethnography (Cohen 1971, 504).

These distinct strategies of colonial rule created very different ethno-political configurations in British and French colonies. The British strategy of supporting traditional rulers and granting them significant authority led to the emergence of networks of powerful rural despots controlling ethnically delimited constituencies. In contrast, the French approach of abandoning traditional institutions and centralizing decision making was much less conducive to rural administrators building their own ethnically determined power bases. As a consequence, at the time of independence, political power was much more consolidated in the form of ethnically delimited chiefdoms in British colonies than it was in French colonies.

Postcolonial Period

Next, we discuss why and how the ethno-political landscapes shaped during colonialism carried over to the postcolonial state and affected which ethnic groups were able to fill the emergent power vacuum at the center. In former British colonies, where political power in the periphery was in the hands of largely autonomous ethnic leaders, peripheral ethnic groups were more likely to gain access to power in newly independent states than comparable groups in former French colonies. At the time of independence, urban elites who had spearheaded the struggle for independence against their colonial rulers found themselves in competition over which group, or coalition

[2] Senegal is a notable exception.

of groups, would achieve control of the postcolonial state apparatus. In this struggle,

> the lines of cleavage were drawn not so much on ideological, class, economic, or professional differences as on ethnoregional divisions [...] It was, therefore, imperative for the western-educated elements to strike a deal of co-operation with the traditional authorities who would supply the vote. (Azarya 2003, 12-13; see also Mamdani 1996, 877-78)

Where available, these competing elites could secure their place in power by cooperating with rural ethnic power holders who were able to quickly mobilize support, in the form of votes or otherwise. This was the case especially in former British colonies, where autonomous ethnic leaders had consolidated power thanks to British indirect rule and its focus on customary institutions. In exchange for support, urban elites offered these ethnic leaders a say in the central government and ensured that the latter's hold on power in their respective chiefdoms was secure (Kenny 2015, 147; see also Mamdani 1996). This is well illustrated by the example of Nigeria, where the indirectly ruled Hausa-Fulani from the northern part of the country together with the Igbo provided the basis of the People's Congress–led coalition's (NPC) electoral victory in 1959 (Horowitz 1985). In Burma, nondemocratic elite-level bargaining resulted in Burman state builders led by General Aung San to include representatives of the relatively small Shan and Kachins groups from the north of the country in the Panglong Agreement of 1947 (Callahan 2003).[3]

In contrast, in French colonies, where there were fewer rural power holders who could quickly provide support (in the form of votes or otherwise) to ambitious urban elites, political competition focused more exclusively on the urban center. Thus, because they lacked the network of decentralized despots present in the British colonies, rural ethnic groups in former French colonies were rarely represented in the central institutions of newly independent states, as illustrated by Mali, Algeria, and Vietnam, among others. Analyzing the presence of state institutions in rural Côte d'Ivoire in the 1960s and 1970s, Boone (1998, 11) observes:

> Even as the administrative grid tightened over the countryside, there were few official sites, positions, or organisations in the rural areas that offered local people direct access to state resources, or that invited them to use proximity to the state to enhance their own local standing.

[3] See the supporting information for more details.

FIGURE 1 Colonial Rule and Group Power Access



In sum, our argument broadly supports the notion that the legacy of the colonial state was regularly incorporated into the postcolonial state through "natural inertial forces" (Mamdani 1996; Young 2004, 29). Whereas in the British cases the newly independent center often interacted with the periphery through a network of political machines operating via patronage, the French postcolonial state was largely absent in the periphery. Thus, at the time of independence, in the British cases, peripheral ethnic groups played a strong role vis-à-vis urban groups since rural ethnic leaders had consolidated constituencies and an autonomous power base. In contrast, in the French cases, peripheral ethnic groups were generally substantially less likely to be represented in the central state's government since they were less useful to urban elites in the competition over the state apparatus. These expectations are visualized in Figure 1.

Large-*n* Analysis

This section presents large-*n* evidence in order to demonstrate that the probabilistic logic postulated above holds ceteris paribus across a large number of observations. This establishes our instrument for the later parts of the article. In line with the instrumental variable approach, the primary purpose of these analyses is to demonstrate an *independent effect* of our colonial legacies argument about the inclusion of particular groups. In addition to

the statistical analyses presented here, we also probed several select cases, including Algeria, Nigeria, and Burma, to illustrate the plausibility of our argument. Space limitations prevent us from discussing particular cases in detail here; however, a series of case vignettes and indicative maps is contained in the supporting information.

Our primary source is the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR-ETH) dataset.[4] EPR-ETH identifies all politically relevant ethnic groups worldwide, 1946–2009, along with an indicator that codes groups' access to the state's executive (*inclusion*), meaning "control over the presidency, the cabinet, and senior posts in the administration, including the army." Wucherpfennig et al. (2011) provide a spatial extension named GeoEPR that codes the geographic settlement areas for regionally confined groups. We use these geospatial data to derive our measure of peripheralness. Finally, in order to identify colonial legacies, we combine EPR with the ICOW Colonial History Data Set (Hensel 2009).

Using these data, we analyze the subset of groups with distinct settlement patterns[5] in Asian or African countries that gained independence from either France or Britain after 1945.[6] We omit groups from countries that broke away from other colonizers because we are primarily interested in the stylized differences between the main colonial empires, and because other empires (e.g., Belgium or Portugal) were generally too small to offer meaningful geopolitical within-variation.[7] Moreover, we exclude Latin America, as well as Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, from our sample since their status as settler colonies has led the ethno-political configuration at the time of independence to be shaped predominantly by the monopolization of power by European elites, rather than colonialist strategies of rule.

Given our interest in the effects of colonial strategies on postcolonial conflict through the initial ethno-political configuration left after decolonization, our data set is a cross-section of 169 politically relevant ethnic groups in 36 postcolonial countries in Africa and Asia at the time of independence of their host country. A map of the countries included in our sample is given in Figure 2.

Next, we turn to the operationalization of our key variables. Because of its extractive objective, colonialism generally extended its reach from the coast toward the hinterlands.[8] Thus, we conceptualize peripheralness as relative distance from the coast and construct our measure by calculating the distance between the group's settlement area (centroid) and the colonial center (i.e., the coast). For landlocked countries without direct access to the sea, we subtract the minimum (country) distance to the coast in order to arrive at a standardized measure. We then use the natural logarithm of the measure.

In terms of econometric modeling, our argument can then be represented as the interaction between the colonial ruler and the physical location of the group with respect to the colonial center. In addition, we include the constitutive terms of the interaction term, that is, a (binary) indicator for the respective colonial power and the (continuous) measure of remoteness (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006; Braumoeller 2004).

The instrumental variable approach requires us to establish an independent effect of the instrument (see discussion below). We therefore consider other, confounding mechanisms that are likely to affect an ethnic group's access to state power and include a number of theoretically relevant control variables. The model features both country-level and group-level covariates. As regards the former, a key variable is the relative size of a group since larger groups can ceteris paribus be expected to be more influential. Thus, we use the ethnic groups' relative demographic size with respect to their host country's entire population, taken from EPR-ETH. Based on our theoretical discussion, as well as the case vignettes, other factors of mass and concentration are also likely to be critical. In order to capture geographic concentration, we also include the area of a group's settlement, as well as the area of the country (both in kilometers squared, logged). It can be expected that larger countries tend to contain more peripheral areas. We also include logged population and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita data for the year of independence. Finally, we account for instances in which independence was achieved by violent means, again relying on data by Hensel (2009).

Results

The estimation results are given in Table 1. We compare two specifications: a conventional model that reflects the

[4]See www.growup.ethz.ch and Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013). The original dataset was introduced by Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010).

[5]For example, ethnic groups in Burundi and Rwanda are coded as not settling distinct geographic areas in GeoEPR (see Wucherpfennig et al. 2011).

[6]This leads us to exclude, for example, South Africa.

[7]However, see the supporting information for further discussion and analyses.

[8]This is well illustrated by the fact that the vast majority of colonial railroad lines—which served the purpose of exploiting natural resources—run perpendicular to the coast toward the interior (van de Walle 2009, 317).

FIGURE 2 Countries Included in Analyses



standard center-periphery logic (Model 1), and the full structural model that captures the logic of the ethnopolitical legacies of French and British rule through an additional interaction term (Model 2). This comparison yields interesting results. Model 1 suggests that there is neither a straightforward center-periphery effect, nor do British and French colonial rule differ with respect to the prospects of a group being included in the initial postcolonial government. However, these results only stand at first sight. Once the logic of differential colonial legacies is factored in, a more nuanced picture emerges that is strongly in line with our theoretical expectations. This is visualized in Figure 3. Here, the left panel depicts the predicted probabilities that a given group is included in the initial postcolonial state as a function of the colonizer and peripheral remoteness.[9]

The plot closely mirrors our theoretical expectations (recall Figure 1). We find that groups in former French colonies follow a center-periphery logic; the more peripheral a group, the less likely it is to be included in the initial postcolonial state. By contrast, in line with our argument about the British implementation of indirect rule, this does not hold for groups in former British colonies, where peripheral groups stand a good chance of being included, especially in comparison to French groups.

The right panel in Figure 3 depicts these differences between groups in French and British colonies. Here, the solid black line represents the difference between the predictions from the left panel, whereas the gray lines display the variation across simulations.[10] The figure demonstrates that the differences between groups in former French and British colonies are substantial and systematic, both at the center as well as in the periphery. Overlaid are density plots of the distributions of ethnic groups in former French and British colonies in terms of their relative

[9]Rather than generating predicted values for imagined cases that set the remaining variables to arbitrary values (such as the mean), we prefer the "average effect in the population" (i.e., our data set; Gelman and Hill 2007; Hanmer and Kalkan 2013) across 1,000 draws from the estimated parameter distribution of Model 2. These were obtained by sampling 1,000 sets of values from the estimated parameter distribution of Model 2. For each (real-world) observation from our data set, we then computed the mean predicted values at different values of the colonizer dummy, distance to the coast, and their interaction term by using each of the sampled parameter sets.

[10]Discarding the top and bottom 2.5%, this corresponds to a 95% confidence interval.

TABLE 1 Explaining Initial Inclusion

	(1) Center-Periphery	(2) Differential Legacies
British Colony	−0.03	−3.72*
	(0.33)	(1.45)
ln Distance to Coast	−0.02	−0.55*
	(0.18)	(0.24)
ln Distance to Coast × British Colony		0.68*
		(0.27)
Group Size	2.30*	2.33*
	(0.95)	(0.93)
ln Group Area (km^2)	0.06	0.10
	(0.14)	(0.14)
ln Country Area (km^2)	−0.33	−0.34
	(0.19)	(0.18)
ln Population	0.20	0.18
	(0.11)	(0.11)
ln GDP p.c.	0.34	0.24
	(0.23)	(0.24)
Violent Independence	0.23	0.23
	(0.34)	(0.34)
Constant	−1.88	1.72
	(2.49)	(2.67)
Observations	169	169
Log-Likelihood	−98.18	−94.34

Note: Robust standard errors are clustered by country in parentheses.
*p < .05, **p < .001.

location. The density plots show that former French and British colonies are very similar in terms of geographic composition, and large parts of the empirical cases are affected by the differential.

Turning to the control variables, as expected, large populations and higher GDP per capita tend to increase initial inclusion, but neither of these effects is statistical significant. However, we find a strong and significant effect for group size. Somewhat surprisingly, group settlement area seems largely irrelevant. However, groups in particularly large countries appear less likely to be included, although this effect barely misses statistical significance. Finally, whether colonial independence was achieved in a violent manner does not have a significant effect. In sum, we find considerable empirical evidence consistent with our theoretical argument about the differential ethno-political legacies of French and British rule as a strong and systematic driver of the initial power constellation in postcolonial states.

Explaining Conflict

In this section, we detail how the differential between French and British rule can be exploited to assess the validity of the nexus between ethnic power access and conflict. We begin by noting that the *conditional* effect of a group's relative location on inclusion, depending on the colonizer, is fundamentally different from the *uniform* center-periphery gradient established by the literature on conflict. Indeed, peripheralness is widely argued to be conducive to conflict (e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2003). As such, the differential logic established above operates *independently* of conflict.

How can this information be used to study postcolonial conflict? Whereas existing work relies on time-varying data on the political status that incorporate the risk of endogeneity (as discussed above), we here focus on the snapshot of the initial postconflict constellation that allows us to overcome such problems. More specifically, our conflict analyses rely on a cross-sectional design that regresses whether a group was involved in civil conflict during the postcolonial period (i.e., from the time of independence until 2009) on initial power status.[11]

This cross-sectional design makes sense because the initial constellation in newly independent states is remarkably persistent (van de Walle 2009, 321) and can therefore serve as a reasonable proxy for later constellations. Under the principle of nationalism, ethnic identities manifest themselves when group members hold key positions in the administration or army since ingroup recruitment is possible. This in turn secures the group's position in the long run. In short, we argue that due to ingroup recruitment, power configurations tend to be quite persistent across time (see Rothchild 1981; Wimmer 1997).

The claim that power access is persistent across time can be evaluated empirically. Based on time-varying group-level EPR-ETH data, Figure 4 displays a group's yearly probability of being included given that it was included in the initial postcolonial power constellation. As can be seen, inclusion is highly persistent; with a .85 probability, initially included groups will also enjoy access to state power 50 years later. Thus, due to persistence, inclusion in the *initial* postcolonial state is likely to have long-term consequences for the political status of ethnic groups. Moreover, Figure 4 also demonstrates that there is no obvious pattern for the timing of postcolonial conflicts.

[11]Thus, by design, our analyses cannot speak to the timing or dynamics of conflict.

FIGURE 3 Ethnic Groups' Power Access in the Initial Postcolonial Period as a Function of Colonial Legacy and Location



FIGURE 4 Persistence of Initial Inclusion



Our full identification strategy is visualized in Figure 5. We treat the interaction effect between the colonial powers and our measure of remoteness as the instrumental variable to overcome possible endogeneity problems depicted by the dashed arrows.[12] The figure also highlights those pathways (dotted arrows) that could undermine the validity of the instrumental variable setup. We discuss these in detail below.

Data, Method, and Results

Our measure of conflict is a dummy indicating whether the ethnic group has ever experienced ethnonationalist conflict during the period between independence

[12]See Auer (2013) for an analogous research design.

FIGURE 5 Identification Strategy



and 2009. It is derived from the group-specific data set ACD2EPR that links the UCDP/PRIO conflict data (Gleditsch et al. 2002) to EPR groups via the data sets by Wucherpfennig et al. (2012) and Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2009). Because the dependent variable (conflict) and endogenous regressor (inclusion) are both binary, a nonlinear model is appropriate.[13] Thus, we rely on a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit estimator. This is a framework suitable for two processes with dichotomous outcomes for which the error terms are correlated. Maddala (1983, 122) shows that the binary dependent variable of the first equation can be an endogenous regressor in the second equation (see also Wooldridge 2010, 594ff.) and that a model specified in this way yields consistent estimates. Specified this way, the estimator has been used widely in political science (e.g., Christin and Hug 2012; Maves and Braithwaite 2013; Smith 1999; Sondheimer and Green 2010).

Intuitively, the bivariate probit models the correlation between unobserved factors that simultaneously determine both access to state power and conflict through the coefficient ρ, thus capturing the relationship between the two processes. This allows for concrete interpretations with respect to endogeneity: Whereas a negative ρ would suggest evidence in favor of the exclusion-of-belligerents mechanism, a positive ρ is consistent with the inclusion-of-belligerents mechanism.

In estimating the bivariate probit model, we specify two jointly estimated equations. The equation explaining inclusion is specified in the same way as Model 2 in Table 1. For the conflict equation, we rely on the same set of covariates, but instead of the interaction term between colonial power and remoteness, we include the endogenized regressor, ethnic inclusion. Our main results are contained in Table 2. The upper half of the table displays the first equations that explain the endogenous variable ethnic inclusion, analogous to the analysis conducted above. The lower half of the table contains the equations in which conflict is the dependent variable.

For the purpose of comparison, Model 3 displays the estimates from two separate probit models that neglect the possibility of endogeneity, whereas Model 4 is the bivariate probit. Thus, the first part of Model 3 is a repetition of Model 2 in Table 1. Having discussed the inclusion equation in the previous section, we focus on the conflict equation given in the lower part of the table. The control variables indicate that there is some evidence in favor of a center-periphery gradient, although the effect is not statistically significant. Yet, groups in former British colonies are statistically less likely to fight. Population size and per capita GDP show the expected signs, but neither is significant at conventional levels. We find no effects for group settlement or country area. Somewhat surprisingly, the coefficient for group size is negative, but also insignificant and reversed in the bivariate probit. Finally, where colonial independence was achieved in a violent manner, postcolonial conflict is less likely.

Turning to our main variable of interest, power status, we find a strong negative effect of ethnic inclusion on conflict. Based on the naïve assumption of exogeneity, Model 3 suggests a negative and highly statistically significant effect that matches the findings of recent studies (e.g., see Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010). Explicitly accounting for endogeneity, Model 4 reports an even stronger effect for this coefficient. In keeping with the inclusion-of-belligerents mechanism, this result reflects a larger marginal peace-inducing effect of inclusion on conflict. Figure 6 visualizes this finding in terms of conflict

[13] As is well known, conventional instrumental variable techniques, in particular projection methods like two-stage least squares (2SLS), do not carry over to the case of limited dependent variables, especially when the endogenous regressor is not continuous (Rivers and Vuong 1988). Indeed, such a two-stage logit/probit is generally inconsistent (Wooldridge 2010, 597).

TABLE 2 Full Results

	(3) Separate Probits	(4) Bivariate Probit
Equation 1: Explaining Inclusion		
British Colony	−3.72*	−4.28**
	(1.45)	(1.27)
ln Distance to Coast	−0.55*	−0.65*
	(0.24)	(0.22)
ln Distance to Coast × British Colony	0.68*	0.77**
	(0.27)	(0.23)
Group Size	2.33*	1.75
	(0.93)	(0.92)
ln Group Area (km^2)	0.10	0.15
	(0.14)	(0.13)
ln Country Area (km^2)	−0.34	−0.40*
	(0.18)	(0.18)
ln Population	0.18	0.18
	(0.11)	(0.13)
ln GDP p.c.	0.24	0.26
	(0.24)	(0.23)
Violent Independence	0.23	0.23
	(0.34)	(0.33)
Constant	1.72	2.51
	(2.67)	(2.59)
Equation 2: Explaining Conflict		
Inclusion	−0.73*	−2.03**
	(0.30)	(0.25)
British Colony	−0.68*	−0.48
	(0.33)	(0.25)
ln Distance to Coast	0.20	0.16
	(0.18)	(0.11)
Group Size	−0.91	0.46
	(1.00)	(0.69)
ln Group Area (km^2)	−0.11	−0.05
	(0.14)	(0.11)
ln Country Area (km^2)	0.15	−0.08
	(0.19)	(0.15)
ln Population	0.14	0.23*
	(0.14)	(0.12)
ln GDP p.c.	−0.13	0.06
	(0.29)	(0.20)
Violent Independence	−1.53*	−1.12*
	(0.53)	(0.50)
Constant	−2.73	−2.30
	(2.64)	(1.74)
Observations	169	169
ρ		0.94
Prob > χ^2		0.03
Log-Likelihood	−4.34/−76.22	−168.09

Note: Robust standard errors are clustered by country in parentheses.
*p < .05., **p < .001.

probabilities. Simulating the effect for ethnic groups contained in our data set by means of average predictive comparisons (Gelman and Hill 2007), on average, a change from exclusion to inclusion decreases the predicted conflict probability by around 20% under the naïve model (Model 3). Once we account for endogeneity (Model 4), this difference roughly triples in magnitude, to more than 60%. In short, we find that once the exogenous part of inclusion has been isolated, its peace-inducing effect becomes much more pronounced.

The coefficient ρ measures the correlation between the error terms (i.e., possible endogeneity). The coefficient is positive and thus in line with the inclusion-of-belligerents logic since stochastic factors that predict inclusion also have a positive effect on conflict. Moreover, ρ is also statistically significant at $p = .027$ (Wald test). In sum, we find considerable empirical support for the inclusion-conflict linkage.

Validations and Sensitivity Analyses

How credible is this result? In this section, we sketch a series of validity checks of our instrumental variable approach, as well as some sensitivity analyses. Due to space limitations, these are detailed in the supporting information.

In order for our colonial argument to serve as a valid instrument that can account for potential endogeneity, it must meet two key criteria. First, it should have sufficient *instrument strength* in explaining ethnic inclusion after controlling for covariates. Above, we provide theoretical and empirical evidence that this is indeed the case. Second, it must meet the *exclusion restriction* by precluding any correlation between the instrument and the error term (see gray dotted arrows in Figure 5). Specifically, the exclusion restriction will be violated if *and only if* any of the following conditions apply (cf. Wooldridge 2010, 89–90):

1. There exists reverse causation between the conflict potential of groups and systematic differences in the direction of the center-periphery logic.
2. The instrument correlates with an omitted determinant of conflict.
3. The instrument has an effect on conflict through an omitted variable (i.e., a variable other than inclusion).

Thus, the exclusion restriction imposes no restriction on potential correlation (or causation) between the

FIGURE 6 Marginal Effects of Inclusion on Conflict



instrument and any observed variables, provided they are included in the model.

According to Condition 1, our argument will be void if the British Empire deliberately chose to colonize areas with potentially belligerent groups in the periphery, whereas the French followed the reverse strategy. This seems highly unlikely since borders of colonized territories were typically demarcated arbitrarily, and often prior to explorations on the ground (e.g., Englebert, Tarango, and Carter 2002; Herbst 1989, 2000).

Condition 2 arises if a causally deeper omitted variable correlates with the instrumental variable. A possible violation along these lines might stem from the fact that many former French colonies are Sahel-Saharan states whose peripheral groups are likely to be poorer and thereby more conflict-prone. Thus, peripheralness in French colonies, which corresponds to our instrument, could correlate with the error term through poverty as an omitted variable. Yet, controlling for underlying group-level economic and climatic preconditions that can be expected to impede economic development makes no difference to our results. In Models 5–9 in the supporting information we account for the share of a group's territory used for agricultural production, agricultural territory per capita, soil quality, and latitude, as well as a dummy for North Africa as additional controls. Although measures proxying for underdevelopment generally lower the prospects of inclusion, we consistently find that this occurs independently of our proposed instrumental variable logic, thus further supporting our main result that inclusion breeds peace.

Condition 3 requires us to consider potential consequences of the instrument that do not operate through inclusion. Specifically, it is possible that the type of colonial rule shaped not only the political but also the economic center-periphery gradient in postcolonial states. In this case, peripheral groups would be relatively more developed in British colonies than in French colonies, again resulting in a problematic omitted variable that correlates with the instrument. However, there is no evidence for such an effect because our instrument does not explain economic development at the level of ethnic groups (see Model 14 in the supporting information).

Two additional arguments could be seen to undermine the validity of our findings. These further elucidate the role of the covariates included in the model. First, Posner (2005) argues that British indirect rule led to the genesis of smaller, rather than larger, ethnic groups. This is because the British mode of governance incentivized chiefs to underscore their local identities and cultures in order to maximize their legitimacy. By extension, this could result in more peripheral groups. While it is true that groups in British colonies are smaller on average (but not more peripheral; see the densities in Figure 3), we emphasize that the instrumental variable logic is immune to any correlation (and even causation) between the instrument and the covariates because the exclusion restriction focuses entirely on the error term. Thus, the fact that

group size and peripheralness are already included in our model renders concerns of this type void.[14]

Second, one might wonder whether the colonizers themselves had any impact during the postcolonial period. For example, French foreign policy toward its former colonies has arguably been more proactive than its British counterpart. If this entails the systematic protection of governments, then excluded groups might be deterred from challenging the state. Substantively, this argument implies that inclusion should be more persistent in French colonies. However, Figure 4 indicates that group-level persistence of access to power does not differ between the two empires. More importantly, this objection hinges on between-empire effects, yet these are systematically accounted for through the dummy for colonial empire (which, incidentally, is not the instrument). In short, by design, our findings must stem entirely from *differential* variation *within* French and British colonies, respectively.

Beyond these considerations, our results also hold up to a battery of sensitivity tests. First, we find that controlling for, or limiting the sample to, countries with coastal access does not alter the main findings. Second, we obtain similar results using alternative instruments (distance to major city) or alternative estimation techniques (two-stage estimation). Third, using alternative dependent variables that capture conflicts within, and after 10 years of independence, we show that the peace-inducing effect of inclusion operates both immediately and in the long run. Other historical aspects, such as the duration of colonial rule or the strength of precolonial institutions, do not impact our main findings. We also control for the influence of ethno-political contextual factors, such as the number of groups in the country, as well as the share of included groups other than the group itself, again finding no substantial differences in our main results. Finally, we provide some evidence that "other" colonizers seem to have followed the British model (cf. Mamdani 1996, 86).

Conclusion

In the civil war literature, quantitative methods have proven very helpful in adjudicating between competing and complementary explanations for the occurrence of violence. Yet, without careful attention to the threat of endogeneity, such approaches may yield erroneous conclusions. In the debate about whether grievances over political exclusion trigger violent rebellion, critics have rightfully pointed out that previous findings may have been affected by endogeneity, and thus any conclusions about the grievance-conflict link may have been premature.

This article addresses this issue head-on by proposing an identification strategy that exploits differences in colonial empires' administrative policies to arrive at an exogenous instrument for ethno-political inclusion. While the centralistic French approach has made geographically peripheral groups mostly irrelevant during the transition to independence, the British focus on indirect rule has produced networks of rural ethnic despots that could leverage their autonomous power base in exchange for representation at the center at the end of colonial rule. We find systematic evidence for this logic, which we believe to be of interest in its own right. It certainly calls for further historical research to establish to what extent these differences can be validated with colonial data.

More importantly, however, based on this exogenous variation in terms of colonial strategies and group locations, our findings suggest that groups that were included in government at the time of independence were considerably less likely to engage in rebellion in the subsequent postcolonial period. Viewed as a contribution to the long-standing debate about the causal effect of grievances on civil war, our results reaffirm previous studies that postulate grievances as parts of a causal chain that connects exclusion with conflict. Given the assertiveness and prominence of the grievance skeptics' arguments (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003), these findings are of considerable importance to the civil war literature, not the least since some of the grievance critics have relied on endogeneity objections as a way to question the role of inequality and grievances in conflict processes. In contrast to this critical line of argumentation, however, our analysis suggests that the literature on ethnic exclusion and civil war appears to have underestimated rather than overestimated the actual conflict-inducing impact of blocked power access, precisely because governments tend to include rather than exclude threatening groups.

Against this backdrop, we believe that our findings provide further evidence in favor of the exclusion-conflict link because they are based on a large number of ethnic groups in developing countries where internal conflict is most likely to occur. Of course, it could be that the effect is different for other parts of the world, but since we have no particular reason to believe this to be the case, we conclude that explanations highlighting political

[14]In any case, we find no evidence that group size is determined by a center-periphery logic, neither unconditionally nor differentially between the empires; see Models 15–16 in the supporting information.

inequality and grievance-related mechanisms have gained considerable credibility through our analysis.[15]

In addition to their theoretical gravity, our results also have important implications for conflict prevention and resolution. Indeed, if the grievance skeptics are right, then policy makers should consider boosting state capacity rather than seeking to reduce grievances by mitigating nationality problems through compromise and accommodation (Mack 2002, 522). While this study has not been able to disentangle specific dimensions of ethnic power sharing in any detail, the findings suggest that the inclusion of ethnic groups has a strongly conflict-reducing effect. For sure, power sharing should not be seen as a panacea since it may lead to infighting and civil war in some cases. Yet, on balance, its overall effect appears to be stabilizing. In view of these results, there is good reason to be skeptical of empirical studies that reject power sharing in favor of partition or even ethnic dominance. Rather than "giving war a chance" or striving for "a clean divorce," policy makers are thus well advised to go the extra mile toward finding inclusive compromises that allow potential present or past conflict parties to share power.

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[15] In fact, the main argument pointing in the opposite direction has been applied to African cases included in our sample (see Roessler 2011). It should also be noted that our sample features regions where the power of ethnonationalism is especially weak. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the effect of ethnonationalist exclusion would apply more strongly to more developed parts of the world.

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Supporting Information

Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher's website:

- Case Vignettes
- IV Validations and Sensitivity Analysis