Democratization bonus or penalty? Voter turnout after democratic transitions

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Abstract:

How do democratization processes affect voter turnout in new democracies? Existing work highlights the existence of an electoral democratization bonus because popular mobilization transitions can develop new political attitudes and behaviours, or because democratization leads to enthusiastic voters during in the founding election. While intuitive and normatively appealing, these explanations have not been theoretically nor empirically scrutinized in the literature. This paper develops and tests novel theoretical expectations on the dynamics that explain the democratization bonus in new democracies. Using electoral turnout data from 1024 national elections between 1946 and 2015, and turnout survey data of over 1 million respondents between 1979 and 2015, we find that the democratization bonus (1) exists only for the first election after transition, (2) affects only individuals that experienced a transition during their formative years (15 to 29 years old) and (3) it is not dependent on the type of transition.

Introduction

How do democratization processes affect voter turnout in new democracies? Existing explanations converge towards the existence of an electoral democratization bonus as newly democratic citizens ache to participate politically after a period of political repression. One set of explanations focus on the potential of civil resistance transitions to develop democratic political behaviours and attitudes within the citizenry (Bayer et al., 2016; Bethke & Pinckney, 2021; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Pinckney, 2020). Another set of explanations highlight the importance of enthusiasm and euphoria about democracy for the first elections after the transition (i.e., founding elections) (Kostelka, 2017; Pettai, 2012). While intuitive and normatively appealing, existing work has not systematically unpacked whether type of transition impacts voter behaviour or which of the two explanations drives the democratization bonus. Existing explanations either rely on anecdotal evidence (Bayer et al., 2016; Bethke & Pinckney, 2021; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Pinckney, 2020) or do not distinguish empirically between the effect of transition type and founding elections on voter turnout (Kostelka, 2017)[1].

The evolution of electoral turnout in Spain and Portugal after their democratization in the 1970s illustrates the importance of distinguishing between the effect of transition type and founding elections. Figure 1 below compares the rates of electoral turnout since democratization (the black line) with the ones in established democracies[2] (the blue line). Spain's electoral turnout after its elite pacted transition in 1976 was about 5% below the turnout

[1] Section A1 of the Online Appendix contains a replication and discussion of the results by Kostelka (2017). In short, a test of coefficients between the variables that capture transition type show that we cannot distinguish between the effects of transition in which the opposition was involved and of transitions that were imposed by foreign actors on voter turnout in new democracies. This indicates that the results are driven by the effect of the founding election, and not by transition type.

[2] These are countries that have been continuously democratic since 1946 and have been used as an example of normal electoral turnout rate for a healthy and strong democracy (Klingemann, 2014; Kostelka, 2017). Such countries include Australia, Belgium, Canada, United Kingdom, Norway, Japan or the United States. There are 22 such countries in the sample and the full list of countries included in the analysis can be found in Table A2 of the Online Appendix.

rate of established democracies during its founding election of 1977. Spain's electoral turnout varied drastically since then, at times with higher rates of participation than the rate in established democracies. In turn, Portugal's electoral turnout immediately after its civil resistance transition was extremely high at 92%, about 12% higher than the yearly average electoral turnout in established democracies, only to decline dramatically since then to a low of 50% in the beginning of 2000s. Spain's evolution seems to contradict the founding election explanation, as the low rates of participation can be explained by the absence of a popular mobilization campaign that drove the transition. In contrast, Portugal's electoral turnout in the founding election seem to support the enthusiasm of the founding election, likely reinforced by the participation of the citizens in the transition process. Yet, the quick decline in voter turnout raises doubts about the enduring effects of the change in political behaviours and attitudes that the civil resistance transition may have developed within the citizenry.

Figure 1. Electoral turnout in Spain and Portugal.



Against this background, this paper revisits the democratization bonus by examining how types of democratic transitions (civil resistance vs other types) impact voter turnout in

new democracies. The key distinction between transition types is whether a peaceful, organized campaign from the bottom up was involved in initiating, leading and bringing to fruition democratization through a campaign of nonviolence[3] (Pinckney, 2020: 3). Using this distinction between transition types, the paper develops novel and alternative theoretical propositions on the democratization bonus. Firstly, it highlights how challenges in maintaining mobilization potential after democratization, the enthusiasm of a founding elections and diverging preferences about the democratic future can squander the effects of the democratization bonus in the long run. Secondly, it discusses how choosing the proper counterfactual matters in identifying evidence and drawing observable implications on the existence of the democratization bonus. More simply, a transition through civil resistance may lead to higher rates of electoral turnout in new democracies only relative to other transitions, not relative to established democracies (Kostelka, 2017). Finally, the paper proposes that we should expect heterogeneous effects of transition modes on individual turnout as cohorts that experienced the event during their formative years are more likely to be affected by it (Bartels and Jackman 2014).

These theoretical expectations are tested in the most comprehensive time series cross-sectional research design to date using electoral turnout data at the country and individual level from new and established democracies between 1946 and 2015. The analysis leverages data on democratic transitions from Geddes et al. (2014) and Pinckney (2020), election turnout data from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) (Coppedge et al. 2019) and a harmonized public opinion data on voter turnout of close to 1.2 million respondents. At the country-level, the analysis compares rates of voter turnout in 1026 democratic, national-level elections from 102 democracies between 1946 and 2015. At the individual level, the paper uses cohort analysis and a difference-in-difference setup to compare how cohort experience with different transition

[3] These are referred interchangeable as popular, nonviolent or civil resistance/mobilization throughout the paper.

types affects self-reported participation in national elections of close to 1.2 million respondents from 85 democracies between 1979 and 2015.

The results of the empirical analysis qualify our understanding of the electoral democratization bonus after democratic transitions. Firstly, the country-level analysis shows that there is no difference in aggregate levels of voter turnout between established democracies and new democracies conditional on the process that established the new democratic regime under observation. However, the democratization bonus seems to exist for the first election after transition, regardless of the type of transition. These results raise doubts regarding the contention that new norms of participation and decision making trickle down in new democracies in the post-mobilization phase (Bayer et al., 2016; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Kostelka, 2017; Pinckney, 2020). Secondly, the individual level analysis qualifies the democratization bonus further by showing that the both transition types affects individual electoral turnout based on the life-cycle during which respondents had experienced the transition. More specifically, the cohort analysis shows that individuals that experienced civil resistance transitions during their formative years are more likely to having participated in the most recent election, while older individuals are less likely to participate in elections under the same conditions. Similarly, this effect is mostly driven by having experienced a transition, rather than the type of transition one experienced. These results are robust to a battery of alternative model specifications, alternative explanations, confounding factors and estimation strategies.

This paper brings several contributions to the literature on democratization processes and democratic consolidation (Linz & Stepan, 1996; Schmitter & O'Donnell, 1986), nonviolent resistance (Bayer et al., 2016; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Pinckney, 2020) and legacies of contention (Davenport et al., 2019). Firstly, the paper provides novel theoretical propositions on why the democratization bonus may not work as proposed in the literature (Bayer et al.,

2016; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Kostelka, 2017) and highlights the importance of contentious events during an individual's formative years (Bartels & Jackman, 2014; Rodon & Tormos, 2022). Moreover, it highlights the theoretical and empirical importance of separating between explanations focusing on transition types and founding elections (Kostelka, 2017). Secondly, the empirical evidence clearly shows the heterogeneous effects that nonviolent resistance has on individual's political behaviour, as it is more likely to positively affect the individuals that are more likely to participate in (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017) and benefit from nonviolent resistance (Goldstone, 2002). Finally, the paper contributes with novel data and empirical evidence to the literature on the long-term effects of contentious events on political attitudes and behaviours, a literature that is still in its infancy and requires more theoretical and empirical attention from scholars (Davenport et al., 2019).

The democratization bonus of nonviolence

The methods through which political change can be achieved (Abrahms, 2006; Pape, 2006; Sharp, 1973) and the conditions under which democracy arises has received a lot of attention from scholars (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003; Dahl, 1973; Geddes, 1999; Przeworski, 2000). Starting with work of Stephan & Chenoweth (2008), an entire empirical literature on the effects of nonviolence has developed showing that the strategic use of nonviolence and its inherent strategic advantages help society enact political change that is more meaningful than using violence (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Gleditsch et al., 2022; Sharp, 1973). This literature shows that that nonviolence is more likely to achieve its stated objectives (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008), reduces autocrats' survival in office (Chenoweth & Belgioioso, 2019; Gleditsch et al., 2022), has a higher likelihood of bringing democracy (Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Kim & Kroeger, 2019; Pinckney, 2020), make democracies more likely to survive (Bayer et al., 2016; Kadivar, 2018) and increases the quality of democracies (Bethke & Pinckney, 2021). These joint set of findings

point to an electoral democratic bonus of nonviolence resistance (Bayer et al., 2016) as the characteristics of nonviolent resistance that make it more likely to achieve success (e.g., lower barriers of participation, diverse membership, consensus decision making, etc.) also extend beyond the existence of the campaign in helping post-transition societies keep a check on the new regime's power (Bethke & Pinckney, 2021).

Several reasons have been proposed as to why successful nonviolent mobilization is likely to lead to stronger democracies, even after the mobilization activities have dimmed down: (1) the active participation of citizens in the mobilization develop norms of behaviour likely to enhance the prospects of political engagement after the transition (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011), (2) the participants in the campaign are more likely to become involved in politics afterwards (Bayer et al., 2016) and produce political leaders with more pro-democratic preferences (Pinckney, 2020), (3) the culture of cooperation and compromise inherent to nonviolent mobilization strengthen citizens' expectations of a peaceful post-conflict political regime (Bayer et al., 2016; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011), (4) creates an active civil society that will defend democracy against erosion by resorting to mobilizing citizens (Bayer et al., 2016), and (5) diffuses power from elites to citizens by creating a sense of people's ability to enact political change through individual and collective political participation post-mobilization (Pinckney, 2020).

While these explanations differ in form as to why successful nonviolent resistance has positive effects on democracy and its consolidation, they all point to same general direction: nonviolence has the power to shape political attitudes in society and to change the political behaviour of elites and citizens to the point that democracy becomes the only game in town (Linz & Stepan, 1996). Moreover, the change in political attitudes and behaviours happens concomitantly, reinforcing each other, which leads to long term effects on political participation in new democracies. The direct implication of these arguments is that this change

in political attitudes and behaviours should translate into an electoral democratization bonus for democracies emerging out of nonviolent resistance. There are several reasons why this electoral democratization bonus should exist based on the changes in political attitudes and behaviours produced by nonviolence. Firstly, elections represent the main mechanism through which individuals in a democratic society solve the underlying conflict over distribution of power and resources in a nonviolent and peaceful manner (Dahl, 1973). In the absence of free and fair elections, the pro-democratic change in political attitudes of the citizens could not manifest themselves. Secondly, if nonviolence produces political leaders with a more pro-democratic stance, which is also (presumably) preferred by the electorate, then we should observe more political participation of this pro-democratic public to ensure their preferences are represented in the new democracy. Finally, electoral participation in a democracy has even lower barriers of participation than nonviolent resistance as there are no physical sanctions associated with voting. If indeed nonviolence generates new and enhanced norms of political participation among citizens, then we should observe these directly in levels of electoral participation in new democracies. The discussion above points to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: *Democracies formed through nonviolent resistance have higher rates of electoral participation compared to democracies formed through other transition modes or established democracies.*

Unpacking the democratization bonus

While the arguments underpinning the logic of democratization bonus of nonviolence seem to make sense at face value, they rely mostly on anecdotal evidence and there has not been much empirical testing of its long-term effects on political attitudes or behaviours (Davenport et al., 2019; Kostelka, 2017). Moreover, theoretical arguments and empirical evidence from the literature on electoral habit formation (Neundorf & Niemi, 2014; Neundorf & Northmore-Ball, 2021; Vowles et al., 2017), elections in new democracies (Pettai, 2012;

Tavits, 2008), autocratic legacies (Neundorf & Pop-Eleches, 2020) and political socialization (Bartels & Jackman, 2014) point to a more complicated legacy of nonviolence and the electoral bonus of democratization through nonviolence. Precisely, the expectation laid out in Hypothesis 1 can be challenged on several theoretical and empirical grounds. These refer to (1) the challenge of maintaining mobilization potential and making decision on the institutional setup of a new democracy, (2) the problem of counterfactuals for comparing the effect of nonviolence on electoral turnout, and (3) the potential heterogeneous effects of nonviolence on individuals' political attitudes and behaviours.

Mobilization potential and democratic choices

Campaign demobilization can happen quite quickly once the main objective of the campaign has been achieved because the complicated realities of building democracy set in, and societal actors are faced with complicated choices for subsequent political development (Munck & Leff, 1997; Stradiotto & Guo, 2010). Transitions are generally situations characterized by high levels of uncertainty as state-society relations change drastically and the rules of the political game are in flux (Pinckney, 2020). If activist cannot maintain their mobilization during the transition period to shape the rules of the democratic game more towards the citizens' preferences, then old elites will simply game democracy in their favour (Albertus & Menaldo, 2018; Pinckney, 2020). The challenge of maintaining pressure on decision makers after transitions comes also from the very strategic choices that activist make to maximize support and participation from within society during the mobilization phase. More simply, nonviolent resistance aimed at political change is built on the lowest common goal and a single-issue item (i.e., political/democratic change) (Bayer et al., 2020). Counterintuitively, this might actually be the "easier" objective of dissidents, as building and consolidating democracy can be a more complicated task than anticipated.

After transition, society and its various actors may be split on their preferences and views of how the future looks like and are put in front of making complicated decisions (Beissinger, 2013). Moreover, some actor may attempt to highjack the process to make sure their vision of the future is implemented as it happened after the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Decisions about the future of the country are generally made in formal and informal negotiations between old and new elites (Dudouet & Pinckney, 2021; Schmitter & O'Donnell, 1986) which are then cemented through democratic elections. These first elections have been labelled founding elections as the political choice of voters is split between an uncertain future with losers and winners of the transition, pitting against each other opponents and supporters of the previous authoritarian regime (Pettai, 2012). Voter turnout is expected to be high in founding elections because citizens, after a period of political repression, have the chance of expressing their political preferences (Klingemann, 2014). However, this turnout may be dependent on the strength of ties between parties and social groups of voters as electoral competition between old and new political parties tends to split the electorate (Tavits, 2008). Moreover, the political preferences of newly democratic citizens are very divergent given their experience under authoritarianism (Dinas & Northmore-Ball, 2020; Neundorf et al., 2020; Neundorf & Pop-Eleches, 2020; Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2020). Then, if the election fails to deliver a democratic system that matches citizens' expectations of democracy, this will discourage voters from participating in future elections. However, subsequent elections will shift away attention from the drivers of the founding elections (i.e., nonviolent mobilization) into other aspects of more salience to electoral competition (e.g., economic concerns, provision of public goods, civil liberties, etc.). Then, we expect:

Hypothesis 2*: The first (founding) election after transition through nonviolence should have higher levels of voter turnout compared to elections from democracies that were formed through other transition modes or elections from established democracies.*

Hypothesis 3*: The difference in voter turnout between democracies formed through nonviolence and other democracies (new and established) should disappear when considering all elections.*

Selecting the counterfactual

Secondly, the proposition that nonviolence generates a stronger political culture and norms of political participation is theoretically unspecified regarding the counterfactual. Put differently, the counterfactual is anything except nonviolence, but this counterfactual group is quite heterogeneous and never directly specified by existing literature (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Pinckney, 2020). For example, in the counterfactual group we could include established democracies (which never experienced any transitions through mobilization or otherwise)[4], but also countries that experienced other modes of transitioning to democracy. Yet, theoretical expectations about the effect of nonviolent mobilization on political attitudes and behaviours may be dependent on which group we are comparing the effect of nonviolence to.

At an individual level, the literature on voter turnout habit formation (Vowles et al., 2017) shows that established democracies develop their citizens' voting habits by emphasizing the opportunities to vote and participate politically. In contrast, autocracies that hold elections actively engage in electoral manipulation (Schedler, 2013) that aim to depress and discourage the electoral participation of citizens (Birch, 2011). Moreover, voting in uncompetitive elections held under authoritarianism creates less engaged voters that do not have the chance to develop the same electoral habits as their democratic counterparts (Neundorf & Northmore-Ball, 2021). In other words, the development of voting habits works as a stock variable that accumulates over time and which hardly changes once it forms. Then, it matters under which conditions individuals develop their voting habits because it will affect nonviolence's ability

[4] This point applies to the existing datasets that capture methods of contention (i.e. NAVCO 1.3) and which are used in existing empirical work examining the effects of methods of contention on political outcomes.

to change that. It is not entirely clear how nonviolent mobilization could trump the habits developed under autocratic conditions such that they become normatively better than the ones of voters from established democracies.

Alternatively, comparing nonviolent transitions with other transition types brings about other theoretical and empirical challenges. For example, comparing the effect of nonviolence to violence can be difficult because the literature on exposure to violence and political attitudes is split between the pro and anti-social behaviour camps. The former stresses the importance of post-traumatic growth and finds that individuals who were exposed to war and violence during their lifetime are more likely to engage in prosocial and cooperative behaviour and to participate politically (Bauer et al., 2016; Blattman, 2009). The latter stresses the alienating role of exposure to violence and finds that individual exposure to violence reduces interest in politics and electoral turnout (Alacevich & Zejcirovic, 2020; Zhukov & Talibova, 2018). Given the lack of theoretical consensus and generalizable results of the effect of violence on political participation, it becomes challenging to compare it with nonviolence. There are two additional empirical challenges when comparing the effect of violence and nonviolence on political attitudes. Firstly, there are too few cases of violent mobilization that led to democracy (Bayer et al., 2016) as violent mobilization has been found to be associated with transitions to authoritarianism (Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013). Secondly, exposure to violence can also happen during nonviolent mobilization as in the vast majority of cases (over 80%) autocracies rely on lethal repression to break the campaign. Then, one would need to separate between exposure to violence versus the type of tactics[5] (and its associated norms) to understand what affects political attitudes and behaviours.

[5] This is worthwhile avenue for future research, but it is not included in the current manuscript due to space constraints and the focus of the paper on the effects of the mode of transition. This question is the focus of another ongoing project by the author(s).

Finally, conflating other transition types (e.g., elites pacts, foreign imposition, elections, coups, etc.) into one category may provide some empirical leverage to examine the effect of nonviolent transitions on political attitudes, but it may be difficult to understand what processes may be driving the underlying relationship. However, we could expect that transition types that prevent the larger society from participating in the process may not affect their propensity to vote as the exclusion of citizens from the process that established democracy may reinforce the alienation from politics that citizens have experienced under authoritarianism. Then, we can expect:

Hypothesis 4: *Voter turnout in national elections should be higher in democracies emerging out of nonviolence compared to other new democracies, but it should be lower compared to established democracies.*

Political socialization of younger cohorts

The third and final challenge that could be raised about the effect of nonviolence on political attitudes refers to whether nonviolence exerts homogeneous effects on all citizens in a society. In other words, does nonviolence have the same impact on everyone's political behaviour? Or are certain groups of citizens more likely to be impacted by the consequences and lessons imparted by the changes produced by the mode of transition? The political socialization literature indicates that individuals' formation of political attitudes is influenced by the life period during which they go through certain experience or are exposed to certain events (Bartels & Jackman, 2014). Of particular importance in the formation of political attitudes is the so-called formative period, between childhood and adulthood (15 to 29 years of age), during which citizens form their core political attitudes and behaviours which remain constant over their lifetime (Bartels & Jackman, 2014; Neundorf & Niemi, 2014). During this period, individuals are more easily influenced by external factors that shapes their understanding of life and society (Sears & Valentino, 1997). Then, if nonviolent resistance has

the power to shape individuals' political attitudes and behaviours, it is more likely that it will affect individuals who experienced it during their formative years rather than later in life.

The reasons for why this happens are two-fold. Firstly, younger individuals are more likely to mobilize and participate in social mobilization as they are more receptive to new and unorthodox ideas that aim to challenge old forms of power (Goldstone, 2002). Also, younger cohorts may act as movement entrepreneurs as these movements often emerge from student movements and organization, which in general are also more likely to accept the potential risks associated with challenging an autocracy (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017; Ritter & Conrad, 2016). Additionally, these individual's electoral habits have not formed yet, which increases the potential impact that nonviolence will have on their political attitudes and behaviours. Secondly, older generations may be less likely to participate and show support for nonviolent mobilization as they are more risk-averse and have more to lose if punished, but also because they may have been exposed to a longer period of regime indoctrination. Then, younger cohorts may value more the democratic gains of nonviolent mobilization as they endured the cost of participation and its potential consequences. Then, we can expect that nonviolent resistance may impact more strongly the political attitudes and behaviours of younger cohorts that experienced it compared to similar cohorts or older cohorts from established and new democracies. To summarize:

Hypothesis 5: *Individuals that experienced a transition through nonviolent mobilization during their formative years are more likely to turnout to vote compared to individuals that experienced other types of transitions or individuals from established democracies.*

Research Design

The observable implications of the democratization bonus are tested in a sample of new and established democracies with national-level election turnout data from 1024 elections from

102 countries between 1946 and 2015 from Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) (Coppedge et al., 2019), and with individual survey-level data of over 1 million respondents from 85 countries. The electoral turnout data is matched with data on transition modes from Pinckney (2020) and Geddes et al. (2014) for 148 democratic spells. Each democratic spell that started after 1946 is coded based on its mode of transition to democracy[6], while countries that have been continuously democratic since before 1946 are considered established democracies and are used as a reference point for comparing the effect of nonviolence on electoral behaviour. They are used as the reference point due to having cemented their citizens electoral habits through free and fair repeated electoral cycles (Vowles et al., 2017), thereby offering an aspirational level of electoral turnout for new democracies based on a developed culture of political participation (Klingemann, 2014).

Electoral turnout data

The country-level electoral turnout data is culled from V-Dem and it captures the percentage of all registered voters that cast a vote according to official results in executive and legislative national elections[7] (Coppedge et al., 2019), ranging between 18.75% and 99.2%, for a total of 1024 elections between 1946 and 2015[8].

At the individual level, we use individual survey-level data from 86 countries that were designed as academic studies to be fielded in several countries, which have questions that are less country-specific, and which are comparable across borders. Survey respondents are asked whether they participated in the most recent national election, and the dependent variables takes a value of 1 if they respondent "Yes", and 0 if they say "No". This harmonized public opinion

[6] If countries have multiple transitions in and out of autocracy, each democratic spell is coded separately based on the type of transition that led to the creation of the democratic spell.
[7] For cases when executive and legislative elections were held in the same day, the variable captures the turnout in executive elections for that day (see Coppedge et al., 2019).
[8] This is almost double the number of elections that Kostelka (2017) includes in their study.

dataset contains 782 (country x wave x study) existing surveys (Neundorf et al., 2020; Neundorf & Northmore-Ball, 2021) from the following projects:

- World Values Survey (WVS), 1981-2014
- International Social Survey Project (ISSP), 2002-2013
- Asian Barometer (ANB), 2001-2014
- Afrobarometer (AFB), 1999-2015
- Americas Barometer (AB), 2004-2014
- European Social Survey (ESS), 2002-2014
- Eurobarometer (EB), 1979-1995
- Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), 1996-2015

The final dataset that consolidates the individual and country level independent and control variables gives us a total sample of 1,070,972 respondents from 85 countries between 1979 and 2015[9].

Transition types

The key independent variable of this study is the mode of transition to democracy for each democratic spell in the regime data from Geddes et al. (2014) that has been updated until 2015 by Derpanopoulos et al. (2016) and by Pinckney (2020). Firstly, a democracy is coded as having been formed through nonviolent resistance when the political change (to democracy) "was initiated, led and brought to fruition through a peaceful, organized campaign from the bottom up, a campaign of nonviolent resistance" (Pinckney, 2020: 3)[10]. Otherwise, new democracies are coded as having been formed through other modes of transitions (including coups, elite pacts, civil wars/insurgencies, elections, foreign imposition, etc.) if they became a

[9] The Section A2 from the Online Appendix lists all the countries, their transition type and years for which survey data is available.
[10] See pages 153-155 of the Online Appendix from Pinckney (2020) for more details on coding of these transitions.

democracy after 1946. Finally, all democracies that have had an uninterrupted democratic spell since at least 1946 are considered established democracies and are always coded as 0 on the mode of democracy formation as these cases serve as the reference point for comparing rates of electoral turnout. Separate binary variables are then generated to capture the mode of transition for each democratic spell (nonviolent resistance or other mode of transition) and used to compare rates of electoral turnout to established democracies. Next, to compare rates of turnout between founding elections and subsequent elections (Hypothesis 2), a variable that captures whether an election was the first one in the new democratic spell after a transition to democracy is interacted with the mode of transition variables.

The experience of individuals with transition type is captured by matching the modes of transition variables with the life cycle during which an individual respondent has experienced the transition. Precisely, using the birth-year of each respondent we generate cohort variables capturing whether an individual experienced the transition during their formative years (15 to 29 years old), taking a value of 1. Then, the binary variable capturing the life cycle during which an individual experienced a transition allow us to unpack which cohorts are more likely to be affected by the mode of transition. The reference category (taking a value of 0) are formed of cohorts in which individuals were under 15 years of age (or unborn), were older than 20 years, or lived their entire lives in consolidated democracies.

Control variables

At the country-level, several variables are included to account for alternative explanations of voter turnout in national elections (Geys, 2006; Kostelka, 2017; Kostelka & Blais, 2021). Firstly, turnout in the most recent election and average closeness of the most recent election are included in the models. Turnout in the most recent election captures the fact that higher election turnout may have a diffusion effect in the electorate making other citizens more likely to turnout to vote, while competitive elections have been found to increase voter

turnout (Franklin, 2004)[11]. Secondly, the natural log of the population in 1000s (from the World Bank data) and natural log of GDP/capita at t-1 are included as controls as well. The former reduces the importance of one individual's vote (Blais, 2000), while the latter should account for the fact that voters may be driven to vote due to economic concerns (Anderson, 2000). Finally, the number of years since the democratic transition (or the formation of the democratic regime for established democracies) is included to account for the development of voting habits under democratic norms of political participation.

For the individual level analysis, the control variables are selected based on meta-analysis by Smets & Van Ham (2013) showing which individual characteristics affect voter turnout. The individual level models include age, age squared, gender, level of education (primary or less, secondary or post-secondary), and a binary variable capturing whether the respondent is working.

Empirical Analysis

Strategy 1: Country-level electoral turnout

The paper uses three different estimation strategies to unpack the effects of the democratization bonus on voter turnout. Firstly, Hypothesis 1 to 4 are tested using an Ordinary Least Squares model with democracy-election/year as unit of analysis that accounts for country unobserved heterogeneity using country random effects[12] and clustered standard errors by country. Next, the model includes decade fixed effects to account for changes that drive the decline in voter turnout across countries reported by previous studies (Kostelka, 2017; Kostelka & Blais, 2021). Finally, the model also includes regional fixed effects to account for regional

[11] For the first election held in a new democracy, these values are generated from the most recent election in an autocracy. If there were no elections, then the competitive and turnout measure receive a 0. If there was only a regime front participating in an autocratic election (i.e. elections in the former communist states of Eastern Europe), then the competitive and difference measure receives the value of the reported votes for the regime front, and turnout respectively.

[12] The time invariant measure of transition type precludes the use of country fixed effects as these would be perfectly colinear with the key independent variables.

democratization waves (Huntington, 1993) and other potentially unobserved geographic or cultural specificities that may drive the results.

Table 1 below summarizes the results of the models estimating the effect of transition type on aggregate electoral turnout in all post-1945 democracies in the world compared to rates of turnout in established democracies directly testing *Hypothesis 1 and 3*. Model 1 estimates the effect of transition type while accounting only for temporal and regional unobserved heterogeneity, while Model 2 accounts for some of the main drivers of voter turnout in

Table 1. Electoral turnout in new and established democracies, 1946-2015.

VARIABLES	(Model 1) Election turnout	(Model 2) Election turnout	(Model 3) Election turnout	(Model 4) Election turnout
Civil resistance regime	-18.845***	-2.649	-3.125	-2.964
	[3.768]	[2.114]	[2.039]	[2.085]
Other transition type regime	-19.168***	-2.243	-1.997	-2.450
	[3.601]	[1.990]	[1.947]	[1.956]
Founding election	--	--	1.556	3.080**
			[2.317]	[1.409]
Civil resistance regime * Founding election	--	--	2.807	--
			[2.941]	
Voter turnout in previous election	--	0.548***	0.558***	0.552***
		[0.081]	[0.082]	[0.083]
Closeness in previous election	--	-0.046	-0.058	-0.056
		[0.035]	[0.037]	[0.037]
Log population t-1	--	-0.630*	-0.559	-0.579*
		[0.357]	[0.345]	[0.348]
Ln GDP/capita t-1 (KSG)	--	0.600	0.520	0.508
		[1.296]	[1.322]	[1.337]
Liberal democracy t-1	--	7.668*	10.379**	10.272**
		[4.441]	[5.124]	[5.156]
Years of democracy	-0.247***	-0.036	-0.035	-0.035
	[0.056]	[0.032]	[0.031]	[0.031]
Constant	85.094***	28.600***	25.744***	26.463***
	[4.493]	[7.695]	[7.509]	[7.588]
Decades FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of elections	1,026	1,006	987	987
Number of countries	105	102	102	102

Clustered standard errors in brackets: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

democracies (Geys, 2006). Finally, Model 3 and 4 tests *Hypothesis 2* on the effect of founding elections on turnout after transitions through civil resistance. The results found in Table 1 point in the same general direction: the electoral bonus of civil resistance does not seem to exist at an aggregate level as the transition coefficients are either negative (Model 1) or statistically insignificant (Model 2 and 3). Moreover, the democratization bonus of founding elections (Kostelka, 2017) after civil resistance transitions is not moderated by the type of transition as the interaction coefficient is not statistically significant. The democratization bonus seems to exist for founding elections as these have about a 3% rate higher levels of participation compared to "normal elections" (Kostelka 2017) (Model 4), regardless of transition type[13].

More generally, these results cast doubt on the proposition that civil resistance creates an electoral democratization bonus through their potential to change political attitudes and behaviours on an aggregate level. Moreover, the higher level of participation in founding elections compared to "normal elections" (Kostelka, 2017) lends support to the explanation that democratization, regardless of the process, spurs enthusiasm within society, which in turn may drive electoral turnout. Finally, the results indicate that contemporary factors matter more for aggregate electoral turnout compared to historical processes that brought about democracy. Precisely, higher levels of turnout in the previous election and the level of democracy have a positive effect of turnout in the current election, further reinforcing the argument of electoral turnout as a habit formed under conditions of democratic politics (Neundorf & Northmore-Ball, 2021; Vowles et al., 2017).

Strategy 2: Individual-level electoral turnout

Next, the paper uses a Linear Probability Model to estimate the effect of experiencing a transition during one's formative years on self-reported turnout in the most recent election.

[13] Plotting the marginal effects of the interaction, as advised by Berry et al. (2012) and Brambor et al. (2006), shows a similar non-significant difference for founding elections after civil resistance. Not included due to space constraints, but it can be plotted using the replication files.

This model follows the logic of Hierarchical Age-Period-Cohort (HAPC) models (Neundorf & Niemi, 2014) that attempt to identify cohort effects through the proxy of events taking place during respondents' formative years. Then, these models include the independent variables capturing experience with transition type based on formative years, the individual and macro control variables discussed above, region fixed effects, and country random effects to capture unobserved heterogeneity[14]. The identification of the cohort effect (i.e., experience with transition type) is ensured through the inclusion of age and age squared and survey fixed effects that capture period effects (events taking place at the time of survey) (Smets & Neundorf, 2014) with standard errors clustered at the country-year level.

Table 2. HAPC Models of individual turnout in most recent election, 1979-2015.

VARIABLES	(Model 5) Individual turnout	(Model 6) Individual turnout	(Model 7) Individual turnout	(Model 8) Individual turnout in new democracies
Civil resistance transition during formative years	0.034***	0.031***	0.030***	0.021***
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.002]
Other transition type during formative years	0.026***	0.023***	0.023***	0.016***
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]
Age	0.025***	0.022***	0.023***	0.027***
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Age sq.	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Constant	0.063***	0.036***	-0.064*	-0.131***
	[0.009]	[0.009]	[0.034]	[0.048]
Individual controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,197,819	1,070,600	1,067,671	554,529
Number of groups	624	591	589	322

Clustered standard errors in brackets: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

[14] The full regression tables of models from Table 2 and 3 can be found in section A3 of the Online Appendix.

Table 2 above summarizes the effect of experience with transition on individual self-reported turnout in the most recent national election while accounting for alternative explanations. Model 5 includes only the key independent variables and controls, while Model 6 accounts for individual level characteristics and Model 7 accounts also for country-level factors. Finally, Model 8 runs the same analysis only on countries that have gone through a transition after 1946. The results from Models 5 to 8 consistently show that individuals that experienced a transition through nonviolent resistance during their formative years (15 to 29 years old) are about 3 percentage points more likely to have participated in the most recent national election compared to democratic cohorts (Models 5 to 7) and compared to other cohorts from new democracies, that were below 15 years or above 29 years of age at the moment of transition (for Model 8)[15]. Moreover, we also observe a 2 percentage point higher likelihood to have participated in the most recent national election for individuals that have experienced other types of transitions during their formative years. A significance test of the two coefficients capturing experience with transition type shows they are statistically significant from each other, with a slightly bigger effect size for transitions through nonviolent resistance. These results lend support to Hypothesis 5 which posits the effect of transition on electoral behaviour is driven by the life period during which an individual experiences it. This is based on the intuition that younger individuals may be more receptive to the ideals of democracy and are more likely to fight for it, while for older cohort a change in the socio-political organization of society brings about major uncertainty about the future and less satisfaction with democracy as democratization creates winners and losers (Neundorf et al., 2020). However, this effect seems to hold for both transition types.

[15] Model 5 to 7 compare from both new and established democracies, while Model 8 compares only cohorts from new democracies.

To examine whether the null effect of transition type on aggregate levels of electoral turnout might be driven by an opposite effect of individuals that experienced the transition later in life, we estimate the same models from Table 2 with an additional variable that captures whether the transition happened after an individual turned 30 years old. Table 3 above summarizes the results and show that individuals that experienced a transition after their formative years are less likely to turnout in elections, with a much bigger effect size for individuals that experienced other types of transitions. Interestingly, the effect of transitions during and after formative years tends to be negative when comparing only cohorts from new democracies, effect that could be driven by the lack of electoral turnout habits of newly democratic citizens.

Table 3. HAPC Model of individual turnout in most recent election, 1979-2015.

VARIABLES	(Model 9) Individual turnout	(Model 10) Individual turnout	(Model 11) Individual turnout	(Model 12) Individual turnout in new democracies
Civil resistance transition during formative years	0.025***	0.021***	0.021***	-0.017***
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]
Other transition type during formative years	0.007***	0.009***	0.010***	-0.026***
	[0.002]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]
Civil resistance transition after formative years	-0.016***	-0.017***	-0.016***	-0.073***
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.003]
Other transition type after formative years	-0.035***	-0.025***	-0.024***	-0.084***
	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.004]
Age	0.025***	0.023***	0.023***	0.030***
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Age sq.	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Individual controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,197,819	1,070,600	1,067,671	554,529
Number of groups	624	591	589	322

Clustered standard errors in brackets: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Strategy 3: Difference-in-difference estimation

While the HAPC models summarized in Table 2 and 3 above allow us to identify cohort effects (i.e., experiencing the transition during or after the formative years), the reference category includes both young and old individuals from a new democracy, but also individuals living in established democracies. Then, our counterfactual is muddled as we do not know whether the effect of a democratic transition during formative years is driven by an age effect in new democracies (where the older are simply more likely to obey to the rules of democratic norms, while the younger are more rebellious against the status quo), or by a period effect which capture the decline in voter turnout in established democracies. More simply, the HAPC model cannot (entirely) solve the issue of using a counterfactual of "strong voting habits" to examine the electoral bonus of nonviolence. To circumvent this issue, the paper uses a difference-in-difference (DiD) estimation strategy that uses individuals from established democracies as a reference (or placebo category) for both types of transition experience. This allows us to compare the difference in propensity to vote in the most recent election *within* a cohort by comparing individuals that had experienced a civil resistance transition during (15 to 29 years old) or after (29+ years old) their formative years with individuals from democratic cohorts in a similar point in their life-cycle that never have experienced a transition to democracy.

Using democratic cohorts as a reference has the advantage of using the same reference group to estimate the effect of transition experience, eliminating the potential confounding effect of age, and it eliminates the potential confounding effect of unobservables (or period effects) that might affect people's willingness to participate in an election (Dinas & Northmore-Ball, 2020; Dinas & Stoker, 2014). To estimate the DiD model, we need to select a democratic cohort that has developed strong voting turnout habits and could serve as a comparison for "best practices" in electoral turnout. Existing work on voter turnout identifies cohorts that

became of age between 1960 and 1970 as the one with the highest propensity to turnout in elections in established democracies (Franklin, 2004; Kostelka, 2017; Kostelka & Blais, 2021). Then, by comparing the same cohorts of different group of countries (new versus established democracies) we do not have to assume that aging and period effects are zero. More simply, we assume that aging and period effects operate the same way across new and established democracies, assumption that can be tested by including period-fixed effects and age polynomials in the model thereby meeting the parallel trends assumption required in more

Figure 2. Reported election turnout by age in new and established democracies, 1979-2015.



traditional difference-in-difference setups (Dinas & Northmore-Ball, 2020; Dinas & Stoker, 2014). Figure 2 above shows this graphically as reported turnout in the most recent election has similar trends across age groups in new and established democracies. We use the following model specification to estimate the difference-in-difference:

$$(1)\ y_{ijt} = \alpha + \beta_1 CivilResistance\_Transition_j + \beta_2 Other\_Transition_j + \gamma_m Cohort_m + \beta_m CivilResistance\_Transition_j * Cohort_m + \beta_m Other\_Transition_j * Cohort_m + \delta * T_\tau + Survey_k + \varepsilon_{ijt}$$

where y_{ijt} capture the survey response in voting in the most recent election, where the *m* subscript of the *Cohort* variable capture whether an individual was during (15-29 years old) or after (29+ years old) their formative years at the moment of transition, or in 1970 respectively for established democracies. β_1 and β_2 capture the type of transition a country has experienced. The coefficient β_m gives us the difference in propensity to have voted in the most recent election for each cohort in new democracies (during or after their formative years) based on the transition type compared to the equivalent cohort (entered or after formative years by 1970) from established democracies. The DiD model includes survey fixed effects to account for period effects, age polynomials to account for parallel age effects, four-time polynomials that capture years of democracy ($T\tau$), individual control variables (education, employment and gender), regional fixed effects and pre-treatment controls[16] (5-year average of turnout and competitiveness of the last election(s) before transition, log of GDP/capita, log of population size and level of democracy) to eliminate the potential confounding of observables on cohorts.

The main results[17] of the DiD model are summarized in Figure 2 below and provide further evidence of the democratization bonus of nonviolent resistance at the individual level by showing that cohorts that experienced a transition through nonviolent resistance are more likely to turnout to vote compared with equivalent cohorts from established democracies. In contrast, cohorts that experienced transition through other modes are not more likely to turnout to vote compared with equivalent cohorts from established democracies. Similarly, the negative effect

[16] The pre-treatment controls for established democracies are centered at 1970, which means that the 5-year average of the pre-treatment controls for established democracies is the average of the country control variables for the 5 years prior to 1970.
[17] See Table A6 of the Online Appendix for the full results of the DiD estimation.

of experiencing a democratic transition after one's formative years remains negative, but only for individuals that experienced a transition through nonviolence.

Figure 2. Within cohort comparison of transition type for newly democratic cohorts vs cohorts from established democracies



The standard errors are clustered at the country-year level. The bars around the coefficient estimate show the 95% confidence interval.

Robustness checks

The first potential concern about these results is over-reporting of election turnout by survey respondents, especially in a context with strong norms and generally higher levels of electoral participation (Jackman & Spahn, 2019; Karp & Brockington, 2005). These findings would point towards over-reporting being more common in established democracies. In contrast, one could also expect that there might be a strong desirability bias in democracies formed through civil resistance as non-participation in elections might be seen as a failure to live up to the expectations of the transition (Pinckney, 2020) . Table A7 of the Online Appendix estimates the effect of transition type on over-reporting in democracies[18] and finds that over-reporting tends to be by about 7 percentage points lower in new democracies, regardless of

[18] The value of over-reporting is obtained by subtracting the actual turnout value in an election-year from the average value of self-reported turnout in the surveys at the country-year. If elections were not held in the year of the survey, then the turnout data for the most recent election before the survey is used to calculate the rate of over-reporting.

transition type. Then, the effects reported using the individual level data capture a conservative estimate of the democratization bonus.

The models from Table 2 account for country unobserved heterogeneity using a random effects model at the country-year level to allow unobserved period and country specific factors to vary. An alternative to estimating the effect of cohort transition events would be to use country and year fixed effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity that is specific to each country in the sample, and which does not vary over time. Then, Table A8 from the Online Appendix reports the same HAPC models from Table 2 estimated using country, year and survey fixed effects to account for current context of a country that might drive individual voter turnout (see Neundorf & Niemi, 2014; Neundorf & Northmore-Ball, 2021). This model specification does not change the results reported in Table 2, as the variables capturing experience with transition types are statistically significant, with a bigger effect size for experiencing a civil resistance transition during formative years.

Several institutional factors also affect decisions to turnout to vote in democratic elections and may affect whether one is more likely to participate political based on their experience during the transition. Precisely, presidential systems tend galvanize higher levels of participation due to the focus on choosing a single candidate (Geys, 2006), while also proportional systems are conducive to more participation since voters get to elect directly their representatives while parties have incentives to mobilize voters (Stockemer, 2015). Similarly, compulsory voting increases the level of participation in elections, while a higher legal voting age reduces voter turnout (Franklin, 2004; Kostelka, 2017). Accounting for these alternative explanations, does not seem to affect the main results reported in Table 2 as experiencing a transition during your formative years still increases the likelihood of turning out to vote in the last national election, with a bigger effect size for transitions through civil resistance. Moreover, we also account for the previous regime type and the number of elections held in an

autocracy because past electoral mobilization (even under autocratic conditions) impact contemporary voter turnout at an aggregate and individual level (Kostelka, 2017; Neundorf & Northmore-Ball, 2021). Accounting for past regime characteristics or previous number of autocratic elections does not affect the main results reported in the paper[19].

Finally, we test the sensitivity of our results by adjusting the threshold for what we consider the formative years in which an individual could experience a transition. Precisely, Models 7-8 from Table 2 and Models 11-12 from Table 3 were replicated with the formative years bounded between 18 and 29 years old, as 18 years old is the median age at which respondents can legally vote in new democracies. Then, there is the possibility that individuals more likely to be impacted by nonviolence would be the individuals that are at least of voting age when the transition happened. However, changing the threshold for what constitutes the formative period in an individual's life does not affect the positive, statistically significant effect of the electoral bonus of nonviolence, but it reduces the coefficient size for this variable. Otherwise, all the reported results in the paper remain substantively identical[20].

Conclusion

The paper revisits the democratization bonus of electoral participation in new democracies by developing and testing alternative hypothesis on how modes of transition affect aggregate and individual turnout in national elections. Existing works converged towards the idea that democratic transitions in which citizens participated develop novel political attitudes and behaviours which bring a boost in electoral turnout in new democracies (Bayer et al., 2016; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Kostelka, 2017; Pinckney, 2020). While intuitive and normatively appealing, this proposition has only been partly tested by existing research (Kostelka, 2017) and did not receive systematic empirical and theoretical scrutiny despite being

[19] See Table A9 of the Online Appendix.
[20] See Table A10 of the Online Appendix.

a key insight of the literature on nonviolent resistance (Bayer et al., 2016; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Pinckney, 2020). Moreover, understanding the connection between nonviolent resistance and electoral participation is key considering that the two phenomena have moved in completely opposite directions: there has been an increase in nonviolent resistance aimed at political change (Chenoweth et al. 2019), potentially signalling more demand for democracy, while the very essence of project democratic power (i.e., participation in elections) has been constantly in decline since the 1970s.

This paper challenges the democratization bonus by highlighting several theoretical and empirical challenges to it. Precisely, it discusses how the challenge of maintaining mobilization post-transition and the complicated decisions about the democratic future may squander the enthusiasms of the transition that drives electoral participation in the long run. Secondly, it highlights how choosing a counter-factual may impact our empirical expectations about the democratization bonus. More simply, whether the democratization bonus exists may depend to what we consider to be evidence of solid turnout in national elections. Finally, the paper proposes that individuals that experience the transition during their formative years are more likely to be impacted by it, thereby becoming more likely to participate in national elections compared to other cohorts.

The empirical implications of this discussion are tested in the most comprehensive time series cross-sectional design with electoral turnout data from over 1026 national elections from 102 new and established democracies between 1946-2015, and over 1 million survey respondents from 85 countries between 1979 and 2015. The results show that a democratization bonus exists, but it is different than the one proposed in existing literature (Bayer et al., 2016; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Kostelka, 2017; Pinckney, 2020). Precisely, at an aggregate level, the mode of transition (nonviolence vs other type) does not affect aggregate levels of election turnout in new democracies in the long run. The democratization bonus exists for the

first election after the transition (also called founding elections), but this disappears afterwards, and it is not dependent on the type of transition (Kostelka, 2017). In other words, all new democracies get a boost in electoral turnout when citizens have the chance to elect their representatives after an autocratic spell. Next, the results show that the democratization bonus exists for individuals that experienced a transition during their formative years, with a slightly bigger effect for transitions that happened through nonviolent resistance.

The results of this paper have several important implications for our understanding of democratization processes, nonviolent resistance, and legacy of contention. Firstly, the paper shows that modes of democratization shapes not only political attitudes, but also the political behaviour of newly democratic citizens. Secondly, it offers a more nuanced understanding of the long-term effects of contentious events on individual political behaviours, an area of literature in need of further attention from scholars (Davenport et al., 2019). Finally, it shows that all new democracies experience a democratization bonus in their founding election, regardless of their mode of transition which contradicts explanations focusing on pre-transition processes.

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Online Appendix "Democratization bonus or penalty? Voter turnout after democratic transitions"

A1. Replication of Kostelka (2017)

In their 2017 article in the American Political Science Review, Kostelka investigates how democratization processes and democratic consolidation affects voter turnout in legislative elections in consolidating and consolidated democracies between 1939 and 2015. One key proposition and finding of the article is that higher levels of involvement of the opposition in the transition to democracy brings a boost in electoral participation in the founding elections (Hypothesis 1). This is tested using Huntington's (1993) classification of transition types:

- *Replacement* - regime change brought about by opposition forces
- *Transplacement* - a pact between opposition and government
- *Transformation* - transition initiated by government forces
- *Adverse Intervention* - domestic dictatorship terminated by hostile external forces
- *Foreign liberation* - foreign occupation terminated by allied external forces
- *Decolonization* - regime change resulting from independence

The ordinal variable capturing the transition type takes a value of 1 for the first (founding) election that took place after each election type and 0 otherwise. Table A1 below replicates the exact model (Model C in Table 1 in the original article) that Kostelka (2017) uses to examine the effect of each transition type on voter turnout compared to "normal elections in democracy" (all other democratic elections after the founding one). The results show that democracies in which the opposition was involved in the transition (replacement and transplacement) have higher rates of participation in the founding election compared to "normal politics" elections. The results also indicate a positive effect on voter turnout in founding elections for democracies formed through adverse intervention of hostile external forces. Founding elections in

democracies formed through other transition types do not have rates of voter turnout that are statistically different than the ones of "normal elections".

These results do not offer support to the contention that "the democratization bonus tends to vary depending on the democratization path and, in particular, on the involvement of the opposition" (Kostelka 2017: 662) for two reasons. Firstly, the variables capturing involvement of the opposition in transition (replacement and transplacement) have the same effect as the one in which hostile external forces imposed democracy, *and in which, by definition, the opposition did not participate* (emphasis added). Moreover, Table A1 below shows that the confidence intervals of these positive coefficients overlap, raising further doubts about whether democratization path matter independently of each other in this case. Secondly, a test of coefficients for these variables shows that these coefficients are not statistically significant from each other. A test of coefficients between *replacement* and *transplacement* variables gives a p-value of 0.143, between *replacement* and *adverse intervention* variables a p-value of 0.107, and between *transplacement* and *adverse intervention* variables a p-value of 0.864. Considering there is no difference in electoral turnout for the coefficients capturing different levels of opposition participation in the transition to democracy, we cannot simply conclude that "the democratization bonus tends to vary depending on the democratization path and, in particular, on the involvement of the opposition" (Kostelka 2017: 662). More simply, we can conclude that this effect might be driven by founding elections as these could capture citizens' enthusiasm to express their political preferences after a period of political repression (Klingemann 2014) since the ordinal variable captures only the effect of founding elections (see cross-tabulation of transition type variable and founding election variable from Kostelka 2017 in Table A2 below).

Table A1. Replication of Model C (Table 1) from Kostelka (2017) – Effect of transition type on electoral turnout in legislative elections, 1939-2015.

VARIABLES	Model A1 - Turnout
Replacement	12.230***
	[6.455 - 18.006]
Transplacement	6.918**
	[0.389 - 13.447]
Transformation	-2.836
	[-8.908 - 3.236]
Adverse intervention	6.229**
	[0.276 - 12.183]
Foreign liberation	5.095
	[-2.713 - 12.903]
Decolonization	-2.833
	[-11.671 - 6.005]
Authoritarian Mobilization	12.278***
	[6.110 - 18.446]
Closeness	-0.094**
	[-0.183 - -0.005]
Decisiveness	-0.137*
	[-0.280 - 0.006]
(Semi-)Presidential System	-4.826**
	[-8.752 - -0.899]
Concurrent elections	6.429***
	[2.945 - 9.913]
Compulsory voting	9.639***
	[5.124 - 14.155]
Compulsory voting enforced	7.940***
	[4.507 - 11.373]
Average District Magnitude	-0.002
	[-0.027 - 0.023]
Voting_age	-1.235**
	[-2.413 - -0.057]
Electorate Size (ln)	-2.630***
	[-4.561 - -0.698]
GDP (ln)	4.444***
	[1.810 - 7.077]
1940s	11.513***
	[3.946 - 19.080]
1950s	9.670***
	[2.649 - 16.691]
1960s	9.671***
	[4.857 - 14.486]
1970s	6.128***
	[3.626 - 8.631]
1980s	3.617***
	[2.064 - 5.171]

2000s	-3.258***
	[-5.185 - -1.331]
2010s	-4.022***
	[-6.384 - -1.659]
Continent Dummies	Yes
Constant	60.503***
	[35.533 - 85.473]
Observations	533
R^2	0.55

Table 2. Cross-tabulation of founding elections and transition type from Kostelka (2017)

Transition type	Regular election	Founding election
Normal Politics	453	0
Replacement	0	11
Transplacement	0	20
Transformation	0	30
Adverse intervention	0	4
Foreign liberation	0	6
Decolonization	0	9
Total	453	80

A2. Summary statistics for transition type and year, and number of respondents per country

Table A3. Summary statistics of survey level data, 1979-2015.

Country	*Number of respondents*	*Year of other transition type*	*Year of civil resistance transitions*
Albania	2167	0	1991
Argentina	4574	0	1983
Australia	11148	0	0
Austria	11686	0	0
Belgium	37750	0	0
Bolivia	2946	0	1982
Brazil	12503	0	1985
Bulgaria	14503	0	1990
Canada	13587	0	0
Chile	8443	0	1989
Taiwan	13096	2000	0
Colombia	8083	0	1958
Costa Rica	5881	1949	0
Croatia	8144	0	2000
Czech Rep.	24746	0	1989
Denmark	34269	0	0
Dominican Rep.	9718	1978	0
Ecuador	7404	1979	0
El Salvador	6004	1994	0
Estonia	12689	0	1991
Finland	24104	0	0
France	38634	0	0
Georgia	2909	0	2003
Germany	53133	0	0
Ghana	6666	0	2000
Greece	22312	0	1974
Guatemala	5913	1995	0
Guinea	1902	2010	0
Haiti	6410	2004	0
Honduras	6333	1981	0
Hungary	18723	0	1990
Iceland	7624	0	0
India	2241	0	1947
Indonesia	4981	0	1999
Ireland	36021	0	0
Israel	20388	0	0
Italy	14592	0	0
Côte d'Ivoire	2281	2011	0
Japan	14816	0	0
Kenya	5853	2002	0
South Korea	12234	0	1987

Lesotho	3395	0	2002
Latvia	7706	0	1991
Liberia	2277	0	2003
Lithuania	8727	0	1991
Luxembourg	7541	0	0
Madagascar	1326	0	2002
Malawi	5565	0	1994
Mali	2571	2013	1991
Mauritius	2381	1968	0
Mexico	19057	0	2000
Mongolia	2390	1993	0
Moldova	995	1991	0
Netherlands	38981	0	0
New Zealand	11261	0	0
Nicaragua	5836	1990	0
Niger	1896	2011	0
Nigeria	6905	0	1999
Norway	33912	0	0
Panama	6050	0	1989
Paraguay	5422	1993	0
Peru	9504	0	2000
Philippines	11594	0	1986
Poland	25496	0	1989
Portugal	38508	0	1974
Romania	7945	1989	0
Senegal	2346	0	2000
Sierra Leone	1847	1998	0
Slovakia	14802	1993	0
Slovenia	18534	0	1991
South Africa	21749	0	1994
Spain	42218	1976	0
Sweden	23759	0	0
Switzerland	23488	0	0
Thailand	2947	2007	1992
Tunisia	2163	0	2011
Turkey	8993	1983	0
Ukraine	10433	0	2004
Egypt	1181	2012	0
Great Britain	40713	0	0
United States	13494	0	0
Burkina Faso	580	0	2014
Uruguay	10459	0	1984
Serbia	1051	0	2000
Zambia	2262	2011	0
Total	**1,067,671**	**26**	**40**

A3. Full regression tables of models from Table 2 and 3 from the main text, and difference-in-difference estimation

Table A4. Full results of the Models 5 to 8 from the main text (Table 2)

VARIABLES	(Model 5)	(Model 6)	(Model 7)	(Model 8)
Civil resistance during formative years	0.034***	0.031***	0.030***	0.021***
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.002]
Other transition type during formative years	0.026***	0.023***	0.023***	0.016***
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]
Individual controls				
Age	0.025***	0.022***	0.023***	0.027***
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Age sq.	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Secondary education completed		0.026***	0.026***	0.014***
		[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
University degree		0.094***	0.094***	0.085***
		[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.002]
Employed		0.042***	0.042***	0.036***
		[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Female		0.001	0.001	0.000
		[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Country-level controls				
Voter turnout previous election			0.004***	0.003***
			[0.000]	[0.000]
Competitiveness previous election			-0.001**	-0.000
			[0.000]	[0.000]
Log population t-1			0.000	0.002
			[0.002]	[0.004]
Ln GDP/capita t-1 (KSG)			-0.030***	-0.012
			[0.009]	[0.011]
Liberal democracy t-1			-0.063*	-0.105**
			[0.038]	[0.047]
Years of democracy	-0.000**	-0.000***	-0.000**	-0.001**
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Constant	0.063***	0.036***	-0.064*	-0.131***
	[0.009]	[0.009]	[0.034]	[0.048]
Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,197,819	1,070,600	1,067,671	554,529
Number of groups	624	591	589	322

Clustered standard errors in brackets: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A5. Full results of the Models 9 to 12 from the main text (Table 3)

VARIABLES	(Model 9)	(Model 10)	(Model 11)	(Model 12)
Civil resistance transition during formative years	0.025***	0.021***	0.021***	-0.017***
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]
Other transition type during formative years	0.007***	0.009***	0.010***	-0.026***
	[0.002]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]
Civil resistance transition after formative years	-0.016***	-0.017***	-0.016***	-0.073***
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.003]
Other transition type after formative years	-0.035***	-0.025***	-0.024***	-0.084***
	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.004]
Individual controls				
Age	0.025***	0.023***	0.023***	0.030***
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Age sq.	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Secondary education completed		0.025***	0.025***	0.014***
		[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
University degree		0.093***	0.093***	0.085***
		[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.002]
Employed		0.042***	0.042***	0.035***
		[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Female		0.001*	0.001*	0.000
		[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Country-level controls				
Voter turnout previous election			0.004***	0.003***
			[0.000]	[0.000]
Competitiveness previous election			-0.001***	-0.000
			[0.000]	[0.000]
Log population t-1			0.000	0.003
			[0.002]	[0.004]
Ln GDP/capita t-1 (KSG)			-0.032***	-0.016
			[0.009]	[0.011]
Liberal democracy t-1			-0.066*	-0.110**
			[0.038]	[0.047]
Years of democracy	-0.000***	-0.001***	-0.000***	-0.002***
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Constant	0.059***	0.034***	-0.055*	-0.154***
	[0.009]	[0.009]	[0.034]	[0.048]
Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,197,819	1,070,600	1,067,671	554,529
Number of groups	624	591	589	322

Clustered standard errors in brackets: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A6. Full results of the Difference-in-Difference estimation

VARIABLES	(Model A1) Difference-in-Difference
Formative years * civil resistance transition	0.033***
	[0.012]
Formative years * other transition	0.024
	[0.021]
Post-formative years * civil resistance transition	-0.029**
	[0.013]
Post-formative years * other transition	-0.031
	[0.022]
Formative years cohort (C:1970)	-0.021***
	[0.005]
Post-formative years cohort (C:1970)	-0.010
	[0.009]
Civil resistance regime	0.202***
	[0.034]
Other transition regime	0.191***
	[0.032]
Individual controls	
Age	0.025***
	[0.001]
Age sq.	-0.000***
	[0.000]
Secondary education completed	0.022***
	[0.004]
University degree	0.088***
	[0.005]
Employed	0.043***
	[0.002]
Female	0.001
	[0.001]
Pre-treatment variables (C:1970 for democracies)	
Voter turnout previous election	0.003***
	[0.000]
Competitiveness previous election	-0.001***
	[0.000]
Log population t-1	-0.008***
	[0.003]
Ln GDP/capita t-1 (KSG)	-0.044***
	[0.011]
Liberal democracy t-1	0.231***
	[0.045]

Constant	-0.259*** [0.076]
Survey Fixed Effects	Yes
Region Fixed Effects	Yes
Time polynomials	Yes
Observations	864,942
R-squared	0.114

Clustered standard errors in brackets: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

A5. Turnout over-reporting in new and established democracies

Models A2 and A3 from Table A7 below estimate the rates of electoral over-reporting by survey respondents in new and established democracies. The over-reporting rate is calculated by subtracting the actual turnout value in an election-year from the average value of self-reported turnout in the surveys at the country-year. If elections were not held in the year of the survey, then the turnout data for the most recent election before the survey is used to calculate the rate of over-reporting. Model A2 shows the difference in over-reporting rates between new and established democracies, while Model A3 show this difference based on the transition type that lead to the creation of democracy. We observe that over-reporting is almost 7 percentage lower in new democracies, but only at the 10% confidence level.

Table A7. Electoral turnout over-reporting in new and established democracies, 1979-2015.

VARIABLES	(Model A2) Turnout over-reporting	(Model A3) Turnout over-reporting
New democracies	-0.067*	--
	[0.035]	
Civil resistance regime	--	-0.068*
		[0.037]
Other transition regime	--	-0.066*
		[0.037]
Voter turnout previous election	-0.003***	-0.003***
	[0.001]	[0.001]
Competitiveness previous election	-0.001**	-0.001**
	[0.000]	[0.000]
Log population t-1	0.002	0.002
	[0.005]	[0.006]
Ln GDP/capita t-1 (KSG)	-0.038*	-0.038*
	[0.020]	[0.020]
Liberal democracy t-1	-0.015	-0.012
	[0.076]	[0.079]
Years of democracy	-0.001*	-0.001*
	[0.000]	[0.000]
Constant	0.516***	0.513***
	[0.095]	[0.101]
Observations	623	623
Number of countries	86	86

Clustered standard errors in brackets: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

A6. Accounting for country unobserved heterogeneity

Table A8. Full results of HAPC Models with country and year fixed effects, 1979-2015.

VARIABLES	(Model A4) Individual turnout	(Model A5) Individual turnout	(Model A6) Individual turnout	(Model A7) Individual turnout
Civil resistance during formative years	0.035***	0.031***	0.030***	0.021***
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.002]
Other transition type during formative years	0.024***	0.021***	0.021***	0.014***
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]
Individual controls				
Age	0.025***	0.023***	0.023***	0.027***
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Age sq.	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Secondary education completed		0.026***	0.027***	0.013***
		[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
University degree		0.094***	0.095***	0.086***
		[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.002]
Employed		0.042***	0.042***	0.037***
		[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Female		0.001	0.001	-0.000
		[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Country-level controls				
Voter turnout previous election			0.001***	0.002***
			[0.000]	[0.000]
Competitiveness previous election			-0.000***	-0.001***
			[0.000]	[0.000]
Log population t-1			0.088***	0.256***
			[0.013]	[0.020]
Ln GDP/capita t-1 (KSG)			-0.053***	0.014
			[0.005]	[0.010]
Liberal democracy t-1			-0.030***	-0.140***
			[0.010]	[0.022]
Years of democracy	0.003***	-0.001	0.001	0.002*
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Constant	-0.141	0.215**	-0.927***	-2.024***
	[0.089]	[0.102]	[0.196]	[0.186]
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Data Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,197,819	1,070,600	1,067,671	554,529
R-squared	0.115	0.125	0.126	0.119

Clustered standard errors in brackets: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

A7. Accounting for historical and contemporary institutional factors

Table A9. Institutional factors and individual turnout, 1979-2015.

VARIABLES	(Model A8) Individual turnout	(Model A9) Individual turnout	(Model A10) Individual turnout	(Model A11) Individual turnout
Civil resistance during formative years	0.030***	0.021***	0.036***	0.023***
	[0.001]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]
Other transition type during formative years	0.023***	0.016***	0.028***	0.021***
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.003]
Individual controls				
Age	0.023***	0.027***	0.023***	0.029***
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Age sq.	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Secondary education completed	0.026***	0.014***	0.025***	0.012***
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.002]
University degree	0.094***	0.085***	0.087***	0.070***
	[0.001]	[0.002]	[0.001]	[0.002]
Employed	0.042***	0.036***	0.040***	0.034***
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Female	0.001	0.000	0.001	-0.002
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Country-level controls				
Voter turnout previous election	0.004***	0.003***		
	[0.000]	[0.000]		
Competitiveness previous election	-0.001**	-0.000		
	[0.000]	[0.000]		
Log population t-1	-0.000	0.001		
	[0.002]	[0.004]		
Ln GDP/capita t-1 (KSG)	-0.039***	-0.008		
	[0.009]	[0.012]		
Liberal democracy t-1	-0.038	-0.112**		
	[0.039]	[0.048]		
Years of democracy	-0.000***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.002***
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.001]
Characteristics of previous autocracy				
No. of elections under autocracy	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.003
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.002]
Previous single party regime	-0.010	0.007	-0.031	-0.057**
	[0.018]	[0.020]	[0.025]	[0.028]
Previous personalistic regime	-0.034***	0.019	0.027	-0.019
	[0.013]	[0.020]	[0.023]	[0.028]
Previous military regime	-0.009	0.036*	0.034	-0.054*
	[0.012]	[0.019]	[0.024]	[0.029]
Pre-treatment variables (C:1970 for democracies)				
Voter turnout previous election			0.003***	0.002***
			[0.000]	[0.000]

Competitiveness previous election			-0.000*	-0.001***
			[0.000]	[0.000]
Log population t-1			0.002	0.005
			[0.002]	[0.005]
Ln GDP/capita t-1 (KSG)			-0.004	0.002
			[0.010]	[0.012]
Liberal democracy t-1			0.128***	0.011
			[0.033]	[0.052]
Constant	-0.041	-0.122**	-0.180***	-0.154**
	[0.034]	[0.048]	[0.046]	[0.075]
Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,067,671	554,529	864,942	404,933
Number of groups	589	322	491	241

Clustered standard errors in brackets: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

A8. Changing window of formative years

Table A10. Formative years based on median voting age in democracy, 1979-2015.

VARIABLES	(Model A12) Individual turnout	(Model A13) Individual turnout	(Model A14) Individual turnout	(Model A15) Individual turnout
Civil resistance during formative years (18-29 years)	0.023***	0.008***	0.011***	-0.029***
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]
Other transition type during formative years (18-29 years)	0.024***	0.009***	0.016***	-0.027***
	[0.002]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]
Civil resistance transition after formative years (29+ years)		-0.026***		-0.080***
		[0.002]		[0.003]
Other transition type after formative years (29+ years)		-0.028***		-0.084***
		[0.003]		[0.003]
Individual controls				
Age	0.023***	0.023***	0.027***	0.031***
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Age sq.	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Secondary education completed	0.026***	0.025***	0.014***	0.015***
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
University degree	0.094***	0.093***	0.085***	0.085***
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.002]	[0.002]
Employed	0.042***	0.042***	0.037***	0.035***
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Female	0.001*	0.001*	0.001	0.000
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Country-level controls				
Voter turnout previous election	0.004***	0.004***	0.003***	0.003***
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Competitiveness previous election	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.000	-0.000
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Log population t-1	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.003
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.004]	[0.004]
Ln GDP/capita t-1 (KSG)	-0.030***	-0.032***	-0.012	-0.016
	[0.009]	[0.009]	[0.011]	[0.011]
Liberal democracy t-1	-0.058	-0.057	-0.101**	-0.102**
	[0.037]	[0.037]	[0.047]	[0.047]
Years of democracy	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.001**	-0.002***
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Constant	-0.063*	-0.059*	-0.134***	-0.170***
	[0.034]	[0.034]	[0.048]	[0.048]
Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,067,671	1,067,671	554,529	554,529
Number of groups	589	589	322	322

Clustered standard errors in brackets: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1