

Notes from the literature

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ABSTRACT

This is a document for keeping notes from what I read in one place. One document for writing and one for reading. Section headers are works (books or articles etc.), and should contain the reference. Subsections describe, chapter or heading from the source, and the page number. Paragraphs are individual quotes. Any commentary by me should be below the note and in bold font.

1. Nation Building - Why Some Countries Come Together While Others Fall Apart (Wimmer, 2018)

1.1. Introduction, p.3

Locals might resist a national government that intruded more into their daily lives than did its colonial predecessor. Political elites competed over who controlled the new center of power. Economic poverty, artificially drawn boundaries, the legacies of colonial divide-and-rule policies, and the weakness of postcolonial states made national political integration difficult.

1.2. Introduction, p.8

Such voluntary organizations facilitate building alliances across ethnic communities and regions, I will argue. They bundle individual interests, as it were, such that politicians or state agencies can respond to them more easily. In patronage systems, by contrast, each alliance needs to be managed separately: a patron needs to provide political protection or government favors to each of his clients on an individual basis.

1.3. Introduction, p.8

How far such voluntary organizations have developed matters especially in early years after a country transitions to the nation-state - when an absolutist monarchy is overthrown or when a former colony becomes independent. If a dense web of such organizations has already emerged, the new power holders can tap into these networks to extend relationships of authority and support across the country.

1.4. Introduction, p.17

Rather, both high diversity and low capacity to provide public goods emerge in societies without a historical legacy of centralized states, as argued throughout the preceding chapters.

1.5. Chapter 1, p.31

The reach of political alliance networks - rather than communication in a shared language per se - turns out to be crucial. Where these networks were confined by political boundaries such as imperial provinces, nationalists divided the space of a shared language, as in Latin America. Where language barriers within imperial domains hampered the establishment of such ties, linguistic communities were imagined as nations. This happened in Romanov Russia. Where civil societies flourished early, as in Switzerland, or where states were exceptionally capable of providing public goods, political networks stretched across ethnic divides and the nation was imagined as polyglot. In other words, the contours of political alliance networks

determine which communities emerge as nations.

1.6. Chapter 1, p.66

Because voluntary associations facilitate horizontal linkages across a territory, the more associational networks have developed during the period leading to the creation of a nation-state the easier it will be for the new governing elites to build alliances across ethnic divides by relying on these networks.

Conversely, HSE's create *vertical networks*. Potentially facilitating both mobilization of said networks, but also patronage networks.

1.7. Chapter 2, p.97

The administrative footprint, however, of both the Ottoman Empire and the Zanzibari Sultanate was extremely light and consisted of a handful of representatives and tax collectors per town only. The city-states never managed to subdue the nomads of the hinterland. These could mobilize tens of thousands of warriors against which the feebly fortified coastal cities stood little chance (Lewis 1988:34-35). Only the Majeerteen Sultanate (a clan of the Darood family) situated at the Horn managed to gain effective control over the interior and represented a territorial state comparable to some of the more powerful and populous Tswana kingdoms. It remained independent from both the Ottoman Empire and the Oman Sultanate by signing a treaty with Britain in 1839. In the 1920s, Italy ended its long-lasting sovereignty through military conquest.

1.8. Chapter 3, p.103

This fragmented, embryonic, politicized administration had virtually no tax base beyond the tariffs it collected from imports and exports—a legacy of the resistance that the interior clans had mounted against any form of taxation, in turn the consequence of long centuries of living without a state. Somalia therefore became one of the most aid-dependent countries in Africa

1.9. Chapter 3, p.105

The expanded political arena also offered incentives to found new parties with both northern and southern clan elements, as the short-lived Somali Democratic Union and the more stable Somali National Congress show (Lewis 1988: 176). The latter included northern Dir and Isaaq clans but also important Hawiye elements from the former Italian parts of the country—all united in the attempt to counter the dominance of Darood, particularly Majeerteen politicians during the first decade of independence. Indeed, it seems that the politically dominant clans during that first decade were the Hawiye from central Somalia, the Isaaq from the north and especially the Majeerteen from the former eponymous sultanate on the Horn (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 92), who supplied one out of two presidents and two prime ministers out of three.

1.10. Chapter 3, p.105

Further fragmentation followed. In the 1969 elections 62 parties, most of which represented narrower clan interests, competed with each other. The more broadly based SYL won again. Indicating the opportunistic nature of politics in independent Somalia, all but one member of the opposition parties defected after the election to join the government party SYL, hoping to get a piece of the pie and distribute it to their clan supporters.

1.11. Chapter 4, p. 148

Third, the memories of independent statehood provided politically ambitious Polish noblemen with a model for the future. They thus confined their networks of alliances to other Polish nobles (who made up as much as 20% of the population in order to one day achieve the dream of renewed independent statehood, a dream first couched in terms of rights to dynastic succession rather than modern nationalist discourse. The peasant population, whether speaking Polish, Belorussian, Lithuanian, or Ukrainian, as well as Jewish town dwellers, remained largely excluded from these networks of agitation and mobilization and thus indifferent to the proto-nationalist cause of the Polish nobility.

2. How State Presence Leads to Civil Conflict (Ying, 2020)

2.1. Abstract

Argues that conflict occurs when states attempt to penetrate areas or groups it has not controlled previously.

He tests both at *province* and *ethnic group* level, using the accuracy of census data in the first and global ground transportation data in the second analysis.

2.2. State Weakness and Civil Conflict

Two concepts are crucial in understanding state power: (1) state capacity, i.e. the overall power of a nation-state to administrate its territory (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985), and (2) state presence, i.e. the allocation of state power at the sub-national level. The lower the state-capacity the more likely is state presence to be insufficient and uneven across regions. Existing literature terms this phenomenon as limited statehood (Risse 2011) or incomplete sovereignty/inefficient governance (Lee 2018).

2.3. From State Capacity to Civil Conflict

Similar to Koren and Sarbahi 2018 but focuses on low intensity state-based violence instead of civil war.

References

Wimmer, Andreas, *Nation Building: Why Some Countries Come Together While Others Fall Apart*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey (2018).

Luwei Ying, "How State Presence Leads to Civil Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, SAGE Publications (2020).