

# Notes from the literature

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## **Abstract**

This is a document for keeping notes from what I read in one place. Section headers are works (books or articles etc.), and should contain the reference. Subsections describe, chapter or heading from the source, and the page number. Paragraphs are individual quotes, except when written in bold font, which is commentary by me.

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# **1 Nation Building - Why Some Countries Come Together While Others Fall Apart (Wimmer 2018)**

## **1.1 Introduction, p. 3**

Locals might resist a national government that intruded more into their daily lives than did its colonial predecessor. Political elites competed over who controlled the new center of power. Economic poverty, artificially drawn boundaries, the legacies of colonial divide-and-rule policies, and the weakness of postcolonial states made national political integration difficult.

## **1.2 Introduction, p. 8**

Such voluntary organizations facilitate building alliances across ethnic communities and regions, I will argue. They bundle individual interests, as it were such that politicians or state agencies can respond to them more easily. In patronage systems, by contrast, each alliance needs to be managed separately: a patron needs to provide political protection or government favors to each of his clients on an individual basis.

How far such voluntary organizations have developed matters especially in early years after a country transitions to the nation-state - when an absolutist monarchy is overthrown or when a former colony becomes independent. If a dense web of such organizations has already emerged, the new power holders can tap into these networks to extend relationships of authority and support across the country.

### 1.3 Introduction, p. 17

Rather, .I both high diversity and low capacity to provide public goods emerge in societies without a historical legacy of centralized states, as argued throughout the preceding chapters.

### 1.4 Chapter 1, p. 31

The reach of political alliance networks-rather than communication in a shared language per se - turns out to be crucial. Where these networks were confined by political boundaries such as imperial provinces, nationalists divided the space of a shared language, as in Latin America. Where language barriers within imperial domains hampered the establishment of such ties, linguistic communities were imagined as nations. This happened in Romanov Russia. Where civil societies flourished early, as in Switzerland, or where states were exceptionally capable of providing public goods, political networks stretched across ethnic divides and the nation was imagined as polyglot. In other words, the contours of political alliance networks determine which communities emerge as nations.

### 1.5 Chapter 1, p. 66

Because voluntary associations facilitate horizontal linkages across a territory, the more associational networks have developed during the period leading to the creation of a nation-state the easier it will be for the new governing elites to build alliances across ethnic divides by relying on these networks.

**Conversely, HSE's create "*vertical networks*." Potentially facilitating both mobilization of said networks, but also patronage networks.**

## **1.6 Chapter 2, p. 97**

The administrative footprint, however, of both the Ottoman Empire and the Zanzibari Sultanate was extremely light and consisted of a handful of representatives and tax collectors per town only. The city-states never managed to subdue the nomads of the hinterland. These could mobilize tens of thousands of warriors against which the feebly fortified coastal cities stood little chance (Lewis 1988:34-35). Only the Majeerteen Sultanate (a clan of the Darood family) situated at the Horn managed to gain effective control over the interior and represented a territorial state comparable to some of the more powerful and populous Tswana kingdoms. It remained independent from both the Ottoman Empire and the Oman Sultanate by signing a treaty with Britain in 1839. In the 1920s, Italy ended its long-lasting sovereignty through military conquest.

## **1.7 Chapter 3, p. 103**

This fragmented, embryonic, politicized administration had virtually no tax base beyond the tariffs it collected from imports and exports—a legacy of the resistance that the interior clans had mounted against any form of taxation, in turn the consequence of long centuries of living without a state. Somalia therefore became one of the most aid-dependent countries in Africa.

## **1.8 Chapter 3, p. 105**

The expanded political arena also offered incentives to found new parties with both northern and southern clan elements, as the short-lived Somali Democratic Union and the more stable Somali National Congress show (Lewis 1988: 176). The latter included northern Dir and Isaaq clans but also important Hawiye elements from the former Italian parts of the country—all united in the attempt to counter the dominance of Darood, particularly Majeerteen politicians during the first decade of independence. Indeed, it seems that

the politically dominant clans during that first decade were the Hawaiye from central Somalia, the Isaaq from the north and especially the Majeerteen from the former eponymous sultanate on the Horn (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 92), who supplied one out of two presidents and two prime ministers out of three.

### **1.9 Chapter 3, p. 105**

Further fragmentation followed. In the 1969 elections 62 parties, most of which represented narrower clan interests, competed with each other. The more broadly based SYL won again. Indicating the opportunistic nature of politics in independent Somalia, all but one member of the opposition parties defected after the election to join the government party SYL, hoping to get a piece of the pie and distribute it to their clan supporters.

### **1.10 Chapter 4, p. 148**

Third, the memories of independent statehood provided politically ambitious Polish noblemen with a model for the future. They thus confined their networks of alliances to other Polish nobles (who made up as much as 20% of the population in order to one day achieve the dream of renewed independent statehood, a dream first couched in terms of rights to dynastic succession rather than modern nationalist discourse. The peasant population, whether speaking Polish, Belorussian, Lithuanian, or Ukrainian, as well as Jewish town dwellers, remained largely excluded from these networks of agitation and mobilization and thus indifferent to the proto-nationalist cause of the Polish nobility.

## 2 How State Presence Leads to Civil Conflict (Ying 2020)

### 2.1 Abstract

Argues that conflict occurs when states attempt to penetrate areas or groups it has not controlled previously.

He tests both at *province* and "*ethnic group*" level, using the accuracy of census data in the first and global ground transportation data in the second analysis.

### 2.2 State Weakness and Civil Conflict

Two concepts are crucial in understanding state power: (1) state capacity, i.e. the overall power of a nation-state to administrate its territory (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985), and (2) state presence, i.e. the allocation of state power at the sub-national level. The lower the state-capacity the more likely is state presence to be insufficient and uneven across regions. Existing literature terms this phenomenon as limited statehood (Risse 2011) or incomplete sovereignty/inefficient governance (Lee 2018).

### 2.3 From State Capacity to Civil Conflict

Similar to Koren and Sarbahi 2018 but focuses on low intensity state-based violence instead of civil war.

### 3 A Short History of the Cartography of Africa (Stone 1995)

#### 3.1 Chapter 5 The Nineteenth Century: Golden Age of the Cartography of Imperialism, p. 47-48

The 19th century is a transition period leading up to the revolution of the 20th century cartography of colonialism.

Cartography in Africa is still a mix of measurement, less accurate observations, word of mouth, previous maps and sources, educated guesses and pure conjecture. Nevertheless a distinct improvement on the maps of previous periods.

Maps are generally published in the year following the return of an expedition. However, expeditions could last for years, so observations could be several years after the fact by the time they met print.

#### 3.2 Southern Africa, p. 49-50

It was the use of instruments, including a sextant, an artificial horizon, chronometer, compass and measuring chain for traversing but corrected by means of daily observation of latitude and occasional observation of longitude (de Smidt 1896), which resulted in John Barrow's influential *"General chart of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope"*, accompanying his *"Travels into the Interior of Southern Africa"*, published in 1801 (Penn 1994).

The missionary thrust northwards through the eastern Kalahari was continued by Robert Moffat, whose map of SOUTH AFRICA *"compiled for the Revd. R. Moffat's work by James Wyld"*, published in Moffat's *"Missionary Labours and Scenes in Southern Africa"* (1842) improved considerably on Campbell's depiction in the amount of geographical and ethnographic information and its accuracy. **While our data do not include the maps in**



question, we do have two maps by James Wyld among our sources.

The information which was forthcoming in the aftermath of the Great Trek duly made its appearance in contemporary maps, notably in the maps of John Arrowsmith (Schrive 1965). **Our data includes four maps by John Arrowsmith.**

### **3.3 East Africa, p. 53**

A "*Sketch Map of Eastern Africa*" accompanied Speke's journal, engraved by W. & A.K. Johnston. It contained much less of the detail which he had recorded and which was contained in the map accompanying Burton's account, with one significant difference. It showed the 'Mountains of the Moon 6000 to 8000 feet by estimation' as a horseshoe forming the catchment at the north end of Lake Tanganyika. **Our data includes a map of Africa by the same Johnstons from 1961 (two years after the first publication from Bruton and Speke's expedition). The map is clearly based on the one mentioned by Stone (1995), and includes the infamous Mountains of the Moon, as described above, and with Speke's name attached. In our next map by the Johnstons (from 1879) the erroneous mountains have been removed. In total our data contains five maps by one or more of the Johnston's.**

### **3.4 East Africa, p. 58**

Further detailed observations by subsequent explorers followed, in turn to be compiled into route maps which could be used as sources by the great nineteenth century atlas publishers such as W. & A.K. Johnston, John Bartholomew and the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, but the hydrographical framework had now been provided for east and central Africa. **As mentioned previously, our data contains five Johnston maps. We also have one map by John Bartholomew and two maps by the Society**

for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge.

### 3.5 West Africa, p. 59-60

The map which accompanies Denham and Clapperton's *Narrative of Travels and Discoveries in Northern and Central Africa* (1826) extends from the Gulf of Sirte to the Bight of Benin and is a typical explorer's transect, with comments about wells, oases, wadis and villages. The western shores of Lake Chad are firmly mapped, but the northeast shores are shown tentatively and the lower course of the Niger is speculative. The map made an immediate impact with those searching for source material to update their maps of Africa, as can be seen in John Cary's *New Map of Africa Exhibiting the Recent Discoveries constructed from the most recent travels*, published in 1828. Denham, Clapperton and Oudney's route stands out by comparison with the scarcity of information elsewhere in the Sahara, as it does on Sidney Hall's map of Africa of 1829. **Our data contains one map by Cary and one by Hall. However, not they are not the ones mentioned here.**

### 3.6 The Momentum Sustained, p. 61-62

The published findings of the explorers of West Africa fed rapidly into the mainstream of map and atlas publishing. In larger scale maps which carried forward much of the detail of the explorer's originals, the task of combining a large number of sources into a single mosaic at the selected scale was clearly a major work of cartographic compilation. This is very well seen in the atlas of *Maps of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge* (1844), which contains a small scale map of the African continent, supplemented by larger scale maps of parts of the continent. West Africa is divided into two sheets (I and II) at a scale of c.1:5,600,000 extending from Timbuktu to the Guinea Coast and from Cape Verde to Lake Chad. The extremely detailed content of the two maps includes the routes of more than twenty explorers, includ-

ing Beaufort, Gray, Mollien, Winterbottom, Caillié, Park O'Byrne, Liang, Dupuis, Bowdien, Dochart, Houghton, Dickson, Clapperton, Denham, Oudney, Lander, Hornemann, Laird, Allen, Oldfield, Coulthurst and Toole. **Not one of the two included in our data.**

### **3.7 The Momentum Sustained, p. 62**

The maps were published in 1839, (earlier then the atlas) and the explorers' dates range from Houghton in 1791 to Oldfield in 1836. **The atlas referred to is the one in the above subsection, published in 1844. In other words, in this illustrative case, maps were published three years after the expedition and was published in an atlas after eight.**

### **3.8 The Momentum Sustained, p. 63**

These 'stay-at-home scholars' (Bridges 1987b) re-examined the classical sources, and they sought to learn from anyone with recent experience of Africa. The maps of armchair geographers such as William Desborough Cooley, James McQueen and A.G. Findlay were published by the RGS and are properly part of the evolving map of the African interior in the 1850s.

### **3.9 The Momentum Sustained, p. 65**

By the End of the nineteenth century, mapping by military personnel had been instituted elsewhere in Africa, not only by French and British military authorities. However, in the context of the nineteenth century as a whole, it was peripheral in its location and limited in its extent, by comparison with the work of the explorers.

### **3.10 The Characteristics of the Cartography of Imperialism, p. 69**

The imperial relationship with Africa was essentially international in character, in the sense that the European powers shared a common purpose in the continuation of access to trade at the coast of Africa. ... On the other hand, the colonial period which was to follow can be differentiated by parochial exclusivity and nationalism within colonial boundaries in a continent partitioned among seven European powers, in contrast to the common attitudes and access among European powers which characterised the previous imperial relationship. The Europeans who made maps of Africa prior to colonial partition subscribed to common attitudes of the imperial powers. The subject matter of their maps cannot easily be differentiated by their particular European country of origin. They were a part of an imperial relationship which was international in character.

### **3.11 The Characteristics of the Cartography of Imperialism, p. 70**

Professor Bridges (1982) is able to talk about unofficial planning amongst Europeans for direct intervention in East Africa by 1876, interventions which would amount to interference in the lives of Africans. Such actions were thought of as part of a laudable civilizing process involving European organizational and technological skills. It was in this context that the compilation of maps of the highest possible scientific calibre, using instrumentally determined data to measure and locate places with optimum accuracy, contributed to legitimizing European penetration and even Interference in Africa. This background situation influenced the form of the growing number of explorer's maps in the late nineteenth century.

**The rest of the page is very relevant as well, but I cannot rewrite the whole thing here.**

### **3.12 The Nineteenth Century Atlas Map of Africa, p. 72-73**

The picture of Africa which atlas publishers were presenting at the beginning of the nineteenth century was not consistent. For example, de la Rochette's *Africa* dated 1803, published by W. Faden (Tooley 1969) incorporates recent explorations in West Africa. It shows an eastward flowing upper Niger (but not the as yet undiscovered outlet to the Gulf of Guinea) and the sources of the Blue Nile. South of the Equator, it continues to rely heavily on the long standing Portuguese sources for the lower Congo and Zambezi basin, with extensive intervening otherwise blank areas containing a curious mix of textual descriptions, either of an ethnographic nature or about potential routs. On the other hand, James Cundee's *New Royal Atlas Engraved from the best modern authorities*, of 1810, includes a map of Africa *Engraved for the Revd. Mr. Evans's New Geographical Grammar* in 1809, which is much more concerned with ethnic names distributed evenly across the entire face of the continent, albeit with the recent knowledge of the drainage of West Africa as a part of the background information.

**The map published by W. Faden is not in our data, but two later ones are. Cundee is not in our data.**

### **3.13 The Nineteenth Century Atlas Map of Africa, p. 73**

Nevertheless, the great weight of new information becoming available from explorers' maps was clearly making an impact. This is particularly well seen in the four maps compiled in 1839 under the auspices of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, founded in 1826 to promote 'the moral improvement of the great body of the population', in part by means of publishing and distributing suitable books (Smith 1974). Their atlas entitled *Maps of the Society...* published by Chapman and Hall in 1844, contained

four maps of Africa mostly dated to 1839, one of the entire continent, one of South Africa (dated 1834), plus cover of West Africa at a larger scale in two maps. The contents of the two maps of West Africa have already been described in the context of the exploration of West Africa, but an aspect worthy of mention is their total reliance on recent explorers as their sources. This is also true of the relatively large scale maps of South Africa but less so in the case of the map of the continent on a single sheet.

**This map of the whole continent is in our data.**

## References

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