# Communal violence and the legacy of precolonial states

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**Abstract**

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The level of violence in non-state societies is qualitatively different from that within states with rates of violence often being several orders magnitude higher in the former (Diamond 2013, Steven A. LeBlanc 2003, Pinker 2012). Part of this can be explained by that states' primary objective and defining characteristic is to solve the security dilemma (Hobbes 2005, Lake & Rothchild 1996). Several states in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa are judicially effective, but empirically less so (Jackson & Rosberg 1982). This has resulted in pockets where resolution of violent conflicts is mainly left to local traditional mechanisms without a neutral arbiter to mediate or enforce peace should things get out of hand. There might be important variations in this semi-anarchic situation, however, as some areas have a long precolonial legacy of statehood which previously addressed the security dilemma between ethnic groups. Some claim that the existence of precolonial states has caused legal ambiguities that are important causes of intergroup violence (Eck 2014), others hold that remnants of precolonial institutions directly (Herbst 2014, Wig & Kromrey 2018) or indirectly reduce the overall number of inter-ethnic (non-state) conflicts.

# 1 How conflicts are prevented or resolved without the state

In order to explain how areas where precolonial states existed reduce communal violence today, we first outline mechanisms regulating inter-communal conflicts in contexts of weak statehood, before we investigate how precolonial states might moderate these. While the quantitative literature on communal violence has focused much on the type of issues that can trigger conflict between groups (Döring 2020, Eck 2014, Elfversson 2015, Fjelde & Østby 2014, Fjelde & von Uexkull 2012, Hillesund 2017, Theisen 2012), the theoretical literature preceding statistical studies emphasized structural factors that affect the underlying rationale of resolving disputes peacefully or not. A more systematic understanding of how the history of statehood shapes such structural characteristics is therefore wanting in the quantitative literature.

With the lack of an overarching authority to arbitrate between groups or provide physical security, strategic interaction between groups arises in which physical security is paramount. Problems related to interpersonal crime or competition over resources are ubiquitous both within and between groups, and while they might be systematically related to the outbreak of communal violence, they often seem quite banal.[1] Strategic interactions make otherwise mundane problems of criminal punishment or competing policy preferences potential triggers of intergroup violence (Diamond 2013, Eaton 2008, Fearon 1995, Fearon & Laitin 1996, Lake & Rothchild 1996). Since conflict is costly, however, there should be a rational interest in a bargained solution short of violence (Fearon 1995),

[1] Hence Roy's (Roy 1994, 1) seminal study's titled *Some Trouble with Cows* starts with: 'In a remote village somewhere in South Asia, someone's cow ate someone else's crop. Within two days, tens of thousands of men were ranged against each other...'.

but the problem is, when strategic dilemmas arise, such bargained solutions are hard to establish and uphold. Three related phenomena — information problems, commitment problems, and the security dilemma — are each sufficient in causing armed conflict, but very frequently co-occur (Lake & Rothchild 1996, 46). While our contention is that states reduce these, we first present them separately.

## 1.1 Problems with information, credible commitments, and the security dilemma

While dense networks within ethnic groups facilitate information exchange in turn preventing opportunistic behaviour as individuals can be identified and punished, in cross-ethnic interactions, identifying individuals is often much harder due to less frequent interactions, thinner networks, and cultural differences making it harder to identify opportunists (Fearon & Laitin 1996, 719).[2] Consequently, individual punishment of noncoethnics is difficult. Generally, information problems tend to grow more acute with increasing state weakness (Fearon 1995, Lake & Rothchild 1996, 46).

Relatedly, ethnic groups cannot credibly commit to mutually beneficial agreements. At least they cannot be certain that other groups stay true to their promises. Thus, the credibility of agreements between ethnic groups are often premised on a supra-ethnic authority, and they are often initiated by the weaker group that have most to fear from unregulated interaction (see below on intragroup policing as an example)(Lake & Rothchild 1996, 50). In the absence of such working arrangements, chronic insecurity about the other group's intentions ensues with conflict representing a realistic alternative (Lake & Rothchild 1996, 51).

The semi-anarchic situation found in areas where no supra-ethnic authority can bind parties to their promises induces groups to apply self-help strategies. The information problem renders groups chronically uncertain about others' true intentions, making defensive moves by one group look suspicious causing other groups to safeguard themselves. While it may be collectively rational to reveal private information to counterparts as part of a bargain to avoid conflict, groups can have strategic incentives to withhold information, particularly if revealing it make them vulnerable to an early confrontation from the other group [3] or make them more vulnerable in the future. This can cause bargaining to crash and conflict to start as there might be a preference to attack early rather than being victimized at a later occasion. Subsequently, this makes all groups less safe, in particular when there are clear advantages to use pre-emptive tactics[4], as Lake and Rotchild puts

[2]This should depend on the degree of interethnic interaction, which in turn can be facilitated by states – see discussion below.

[3]For instance, Eaton (2008) notes that pastoral groups in East Africa are reluctant to invite members from adversaries to peace negotiations in their territories as they may use the opportunity to scout for future raids.

[4]Since mobility increases the advantages of offensive relative to defensive tactics, one expectation could be that pastoralist groups whose livelihoods depend on mobility are more likely to resort to preemptive

it 'Fearful that the other might preempt, a group has an incentive to strike first and negotiate later' (Lake & Rothchild 1996, 53).

## 1.2 Interethnic institutions that address the security dilemma

Minor crimes or disagreements between individuals of different ethnic groups are liable to trigger asymmetric reprisals by the victim's group in which all members of the perpetrator's group are legitimate targets.[5] While likely triggering escalatory cycles of counter-reprisals, the information-problem initially prevents individual punishment of crimes, leaving the alternative to collective retaliation to infringements by outsiders being no punishment at all. The fear of collective retaliation must be sufficiently likely and brutal to deter, making this mechanism of fear very vulnerable to minor incidents (Fearon & Laitin 1996). An earned reputation for ruthlessness, even in the face of superior groups, can therefore work to uphold the peace, but only to a limited extent [insert brief example from Omo where an inferior group launched a suicidal attack in order to make the peace pact more credible]. Very high compensation rates, such as 50-100 heads of cattle for each adult male killed, once parties lie down their weapons, makes payment a collective effort making the commitment more credible by signalling a collective will to break the spiral and uphold peace. Where such compensation rates are institutionalized the potential costs of conflicts create an additional incentive to prevent minor infringements that could trigger spiralling.

Minor frictions potentially causing costly feuding, has frequently led to the development of in-group policing (IGP) (Fearon & Laitin 1996, 723). Here groups use their superior within-group information to punish individuals in their own ranks that have committed crimes against outsiders. The victim's group, reasonably certain of culprits being punished, refrain from collective reprisals, making IGP quite robust to smaller infringements. For IGP to be effective, information about punishment must be received by the victims to signal reciprocity in punishing one's own bad apples, and generally good intentions by taking punishment seriously (Fearon & Laitin 1996). Alternative versions exist where the perpetrator's group may help the victim's group apprehend the culprit or simply hand him over [insert from Eaton on this]. More institutionalized forms of IGP is frequently found where some form of overarching authority is present, such as in pre modern Europe and empires and/or when trade ties are important (Fearon & Laitin 1996, 728).

## 1.3 An example from East Africa

Pastoral societies in East Africa plagued by frequent cattle-raiding illustrate these mechanisms well. Most groups rely on similar livelihoods, with limited mutual benefits from economic exchange. The

tactics and therefore see more violence in the end.

[5] Whether all member or e.g. all adult male relatives or some other collectively derived criteria makes member of the perpetrator's group legitimate targets depends on the context, but secondary to our argument. The point is that retribution is based on collective characteristics.

majority favours peace, but individual short-term benefits from taking cattle from outsiders are substantial, despite seriously jeopardizing peace. Victims can choose to ignore the infringement knowing that redress is difficult, or ask the locals where tracks are found for help. If the latter are of a different community, chances are low, as groups practice covering their man ['kimuk ekile'], essentially worsening the information problem. Due to the insecurity of venturing into others' territory, language issues, and a lack of information, pursuers are likely unsuccessful on their own. If assisted and apprehending the cattle or getting compensation, then peace will hold, representing a very crude version of IGP. When not helped, the situation is ripe for asymmetric collective retaliation, and likely counter-retaliation (Eaton 2008, 104ff). Here expected future gains of peaceful relations are reduced and so is the inclination to uphold them creating 'a large temptation to defect on purpose since a breakdown is likely anyway' (Fearon & Laitin 1996, 724). Combined with low levels of economic interdependence these strategic dilemmas could go some way in explaining the higher frequency of communal violence in this region. This region had very low levels of precolonial state penetration [refer to maps/figure?], includes the last British controlled area in Africa to be pacified (Lamphear 1992), and is currently less well integrated into the East African states.

# 2 How did precolonial states reduce these three dilemmas?

Precolonial states had roughly the same overarching core aims as modern states — increasing economic prosperity[6] and, to attain this, reducing the level of violence unrelated to state enforcement of power. This was achieved by increasing state military and policing capacity, but also by softer measures such as constructing institutions for resolving peaceful disputes and settling violent ones, and the enforcement of contracts. Evidence of the success of this can be seen in the dramatic decline in the incidence of killings when societies moved from non – state to state – based societies (Pinker 2012, 64ff). By both clamping down on interethnic feuds as well as providing means of resolving them peacefully or at an early stage of escalation, precolonial states reduced (if not resolve) two of the three dilemmas that plague interethnic relations, namely the security dilemma and the commitment problem respectively. In turn, the reduction of these led to an increase in interaction, economic and other, which helped reduce the information problem, as individuals could travel into other groups territory without risking one's life. Over time, this increased the long-term *individual* gains for cross-ethnic cooperation relative to the individual gains from defecting today. Since the frequency of interethnic interaction affects the proclivity to behave nicely towards outsiders (Fearon & Laitin 1996, 721), more frequent cross-ethnic interaction implied more chances of building an individual reputation for trust; more to gain from trade; and less effective anonymity for outsiders of one's own

[6]Or simply to maximize tax revenue for the state, according to the 'stationary bandits' argument of Tilly (1985) and Olson (1993). The outcome of reducing the level of non-state violence remains.

ethnic community. For the fear of spiralling to be effective, immediate gains from cheating must be lower than (potentially lost) future gains from cooperating. Conversely, substantial immediate individual gains from cheating outsiders and limited future gains from cooperation, increases the risk of cheating. For instance, Olsson argues that three decades of drying removed the basis for trade between different livelihood groups in Darfur causing markets to collapse. As groups became more autarkic, the division of resources became less mutually beneficial and more conflictual, laying the ground for appropriative conflicts from the mid-1980s onwards (Olsson 2016).

Over time this also led to mixed settlements, and in some cases assimilation into and consolidation of new ethnic group through state building (Anderson 2006)[7]. In short, by reducing the security dilemma and commitment problems between ethnic groups, precolonial states set about virtuous cycles that increased interaction and interdependence. Figure 1 below gives a schematic overview of this process.




Figure 1: Causal diagram

[7]For example the assimilation of the Haussa-Fulani ethnic group under the Sokoto Caliphate.

# 3 What lingering effects do precolonial states have today?

In the postcolonial period, we expect there to be a general reduction in communal violence over time, in all areas, as they are now under the control of a state that tries to assert a monopoly of violence. Similarly to how precolonial states have reduced communal violence, the (national) state resolves the security dilemma, commitment issues, and gradually reduce information problems over time. However, there are a few key differences. We assume that postcolonial states are generally more multiethnic than precolonial states, due to their larger average size. Simultaneously (especially in the initial period after indipendence) they are relatively lacking the capacity to project force (equally) across its whole territory.[8] We argue that areas differ both in their initial level of communal violence (as outlined in the following paragraph), but also in the rate at which new national governments have been able to reduce it further.

## 3.1 The leftover effect

Precolonial states were able to solve the security dilemma, commitment issues and information problems between different communities in the past, setting in motion virtuous cycles of increased interaction, trade and mixed settlement. This shifted individual motivations toward long term cooperation and against defecting/cheating in the short term, leading to a reduction in communal violence. This reduction should be stable or even improve further with time for as long as there is a state to uphold order. While in most cases pre-colonial states were either conquered by other precolonial states or colonisers, even in the few cases where previously state controlled ares have descended into statelessness, improvements to the information problem could linger. We argue that in areas with a history of precolonial statehood there is a 'leftover effect' from its time as an independent state. Because the virtuous cycles that reduce the information problem over time have been in effect for a relatively longer period, these areas start at a lower relative level of communal violence in the postcolonial period. Because the establishment and consolidation of states is what has had the most direct effect on suppression of raiding and feuding (Pinker 2012), we argue this is the main avenue through which precolonial states affect postcolonial levels of communal violence.

## 3.2 Ease of integration

Areas above a certain minimum level of precolonial state presence generally had some existing institutions (formal or informal) and at the very least vertical social networks that could be leveraged by colonizers. This facilitated integration into the framework of colonial administration through

[8] Keep in mind that unlike a multiethnic precolonial state like Kanem Bornu, the multiethnic state of Kenya never used its *own* instruments/institutions of power to establish its borders, and incorporate its various ethnic groups.

systems of indirect rule, whereby local kings, chiefs and leaders retained their position at the local level with the colonial power placing itself on top. Even in the case of more direct forms of rule, in which local rulers were replaced, integration was probably relatively easier than in places with little to no experience of statehood. The difference being the relative difficulty of replacing one hierarchy with another relative to building a hierarchy were non had previously existed. Additionally, areas outside the reach of precolonial states were so for a reason. Usually due to the effective distance (in travel time) from areas able to produce a large enough surplus of food to provision armies. The relative differences of such conditions had not fundamentally changed despite European and more modern armies greater ability to reach such remote areas. Integrating remote areas was still relatively more difficult. Being better integrated into the colonial administration, and subsequently the nation state, means that the conflict reducing mechanisms of state, outlined above, continue to work and even at a higher level (of colony and nation state).

On the other hand, higher levels might be more difficult to integrate directly, which usually resulted in indirect rule during the colonial era, and more local autonomy in the post-independent era. This increased local autonomy implies that such areas are less integrated into modern states than areas of more moderate levels of precolonial state presence, and thus enjoy less of the modern states conflict reducing effects. However, they do start at a higher level of intercommunal interaction (larger 'leftover effect'), therefore we argue the overall effect of precolonial state presence should remain positive.[9]

## 3.3 Local institutions

Whether formal or informal, or considered part of indirect rule or not, precolonial states often left behind institutions in the territories they ruled (Wig 2016, Wig & Kromrey 2018). These institutions should generally be more closely tailored to local conditions than ones created by colonial administration or an often remote modern state. By being aware and understanding of local traditions, customs and culture, such institutions might also prove more effective. Precolonial states may for example have left specific mediation mechanisms such as councils or courts for dealing with potential triggers that exist between two communities. Additionally, by tying agreements to its own institutions, the breaking of which would jeopardize the institutions themselves or, if tied to formal (though not necessarily state recognized) institutions, contract-breaking would require that the very same institution overturn its own previous decisions. Such institutions make inheritor groups more credible partners (Wig & Kromrey 2018).

A more general institution that frequently transfer from precolonial states into the postcolonial period is leadership. Sometimes they were officially incorporated as part of the state apparatus (as

[9]This lack of integration is perhaps evident in the finding that such areas are more frequently engaged in violent conflict with the central government, especially in areas of high precolonial state presence far from the capital (Wishman Forthcoming).

in the case of Rwanda [DOUBLE CHECK]), sometimes recognised as official ceremonial leader or at times not recognised by the state at all. Nevertheless leaders can influence the level of communal violence in at least two ways. Leaders occupy a unique role that allow them to act mediators. Both preventing conflicts from escalating to violence and help bring an end violence once it is a fact. Even ceremonial leaders have acted as key mediators in national level events as in the case of the Mogho Naba, who played a key role in brokering the return of civilian rule to Burkina Faso following a military coup in 2015 (BBC). Leaders are also uniquely placed to make more credible commitments as they are better placed to prevent and punish potential spoilers (Wig 2016).

### 3.4 Economic development?

Better integration with colonial administration and national state could give precolonial state ares a competitive edge relative to other areas when it comes to developmental projects and priority from the government. If so that should be reflected in higher levels of economic development, which is famously linked to lower levels of conflict. However, this relationship could have been turned on its head by the "reversal of fortunes" (Acemoglu et al. 2002). Additionally, finding accurate measures of subnational (or even national) economic development is a while can of worms.

## 4 Observable implications

### 4.1 Communal violence

Based on the theoretical discussion our main theoretical expectation is an inverse relationship between precolonial state presence and communal violence. In other words, areas that have spent more time as part of a precolonial state, should experience fewer instances of communal violence. Additionally, areas more thoroughly under the control of a precolonial state should experience relatively fewer instances of communal violence than areas closer to the periphery of the precolonial state's territory. Because the theory only speaks to horizontal conflicts between different groups we do not expect this relationship to hold for other (vertical) types of conflict, even other forms of non-state violence.

### 4.2 Mixed settlement

The causal relationship we suggest implies that there is a positive feedback loop running between less communal violence and more mixed settlement. On the face of it, it might seem counter intuitive to expect less communal violence in areas with more mixed settlement. And that intuition is right. In a setting of mixed settlement there are a lot more potential triggers to conflict as people are interacting more frequently, simply as a consequence of proximity. This is precisely why

communities tend to cluster [SOURCE], and we argue, especially so when settling outside any state umbrella.

If the relationship between precolonial state presence and communal violence follows the causal mechanisms in Figure 1, there should be evidence of more mixed settlements in precolonial state areas. While in areas brought under the state umbrella by colonizers or the modern state, we expect ethnic groups to live in clearly separated clusters. In order to maximise intragroup cohesion, necessary for IGP to function.

## 4.3 Interethnic trust

The hypothesised increased interethnic interaction and longer periods of stability between ethnic groups within precolonial state areas should over time lead to a relative increase in trust toward other groups. While the increased interaction only happens among the groups within the precolonial state territory and neighboring communities, these groups are also likely to be the reference point for people when asked about trust in non-coethnics.

## 4.4 Norms of hospitality and conformism in nonstate societies?

This creates cultures that encourage nosiness in coethnics affairs, and norms of thick-skinedness, extreme self-restraint, generosity, hospitality and politeness towards outsiders[10], and strongly discourage hot-headedness. In the words of Colson (1974, 37) cited in (Cohen & Vandello 2004, 199) 'people live in what appears to be a Rousseauian paradise because they take a Hobbesian view of their situation...' going out of their way to avoid those single acts of aggression they fear will cause long spirals of violence. However, as the strong emphasis on norms of 'niceness' towards outsiders in peacetime reflects, these societies are found to be much less effective at containing violence once cross-ethnic disputes occur as the failure to retaliate violently would reduce the credibility of this deterrent strategy (Fearon & Laitin 1996, 723f).

## 4.5 Stronger effect of PCS presence in British colonies?

If the assumption that the British to a larger degree ruled their colonies through indirect rule than other colonisers, then according to our hypothesised ease of integration and local institutions mechanisms should work better in such areas. However, this difference in colonial strategy is often exaggerated and stems more from different official aims than form any real difference in de facto policy on the ground.

[10] Thus the first section of the main text Hávámal on Norse norms, literally 'the guest's section' (Gestaþáttr) of Hávamál contains maxims allegedly given by the head deity Odin to men for proper conduct in a nonstate society inducing almost sacred norms of hospitality and reciprocity towards stranger guests, but also patience and cautiousness on behalf of the visitor.

# 5 Research design

## 5.1 Main analysis

Our main independent variable of interest, our explanatory variable is time invariant. This means that we are limited to doing a cross sectional analysis. If we were to attempt to panel data analysis we would essentially be repeating the same experiment multiple times with observations that are wrongly assumed to be independent of each other. Because our inquiry is spatial in nature we use 1°by 1°grid cells, using the PRIO-grid id's and corresponding R-package. Using such a grid cell aproach has the benefit of avoiding any potential bias introduced by using, for example, administrative units that might be derived from precolonial borders.

Similarly, the treatment is assigned far ahead of measuring its effects which exposes potential posttreatment bias. This means that in selecting control variables we have to weigh the potential for introducing posttreatment bias against the potential for omitted variable bias.

For the baseline models we use only geographical controls that should avoid post treatment bias. While for the extended controls we include population density in 1600 and distance to borders. 1600 should be far enough back in time to be before the establishment of most of, although not all, of the precolonial states in the data, and thus also avoid post treatment bias. This measure is however partly based on interpolation back in time, and so is excluded from the baseline model out of caution.

### 5.1.1 Dependent variable

Our dependent variable is communal violence events per grid cell in the 1946-2020 period, as captured by the 'Organizational level 3' variable from the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) and corresponding UCDP Non-state conflict dataset. This corresponds to events in which conflicts between 'informally organized groups' surpass a yearly threshold of 25 battle-related deaths in a year, and is meant to capture 'communal conflicts'.

### 5.1.2 Independent variable

The main explanatory variable is precolonial state presence, as measured by the main aggregated variable of the Georeferenced International Systems Data (Geo-ISD) (Wishman Forthcoming). Based on hundreds of maps from the period 1800-1914, complimented by historical atlases compiled by later historians, it measures state presence by counting how many maps places any given state from the ISDv2 within each PRIO-grid cell per year. This captures the dynamism of borders. Both within a given year, assuming that the more maps agree that a state controlled an area the more real this control was, and across time, as state rose and fell some areas were under state control for more years than others. The definition of state that is used is derived from the ISDv2 (Butcher & Griffiths 2020). The ISD records sovereign states across the 1814-2016 period, defined as political

entity with a population of at least 10,000, autonomy over a specific territory and sovereignty that is either uncontested or acknowledged by relevant international actors (Butcher & Griffiths 2020).[11] We use the measure of state presence that includes interpolated years from historical atlases (shapes are drawn across all years in which historical atlases depicted borders over a range of years). For a further discussion of the precolonial state presence measure see Wishman (Forthcoming).

### 5.1.3 Controls

We control for how mountainous a grid cell is on average because this could influence state building, by making it more difficult for people to leave the oppression of a state, and by providing natural defences. At the same time mountains affect population density negatively which affects both state building and conflict events. Generally speaking fighting occurs where there are at least some people. Lastly, mountainous terrain can be more difficult for a modern state to reach, and so the same mechanisms we describe for the state ability to repress communal violence might work independent of precolonial state presence.

Similarly, access to water is a key ingredient of state building, while it also proxies population densisty to some degree (people tend to live near water). Additionally, communal conflicts could erupt over access to water (either drinking water, for people or herds, or for irrigation).

We also included a measure of how much of a cell is barren, as a proxy for population density. People generally do not live in barren areas, and so we do not expect a lot of fighting there. At the same time we do not expect states to proliferate in barren areas.

The mean distance to coast of each cell could be positively correlated with state building and economic development. The latter of which is expected to reduce the risk of conflict.

As already mentioned, population density (log) predicts statehood because states need a certain level of population density in order to form. At the same time there are a great deal of grid cells on the African continent that are without population and we expect very little fighting to occur in these. The data was source from the Maddison project.

All controls except population density are sourced from the PRIO Grid project.

## 5.2 Settlement patterns

Using the SIDE data, which provides high resolution data on ethnic group settlement patterns, we hope to do a "proper" analysis using this data, but the non-random sample of countries for which the data is available is a problem. We might be stuck with a handful of within country analyses.

[11] For a more in depth discussion of the definition of and criteria for statehood that the ISD is based on, see Butcher & Griffiths (2017).

### 5.3 Afrobarometer on trust

We have got a lot of geocoded Afrobarometer questions we hope will allow us to "triangulate" our results and proposed mechanisms further, although we have not yet gotten started on this, apart from manually correcting a lot of geocoding errors (big thanks to Ole Magnus).

## 6 Preliminary Results

Preliminary results look solid. The results hold for just about any model specification we have tried. We include in the appendix one that did not. When including controls for temperature and precipitation the effect of precolonial states disappears for the model using the square root transformation. However, when running the same regression after excluding cells with no population, results are once again as expected.




Figure 2: Marginal effects of state presence (sqrt)

| | Baseline | Extended Controls | Baseline | Extended Controls |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Precolonial state presence (log) | 0.02 | $-0.32^{***}$ | | |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | | |
| Mountainous terrain | $1.83^{**}$ | $1.72^{***}$ | $2.26^{***}$ | $1.95^{***}$ |
| | (0.56) | (0.51) | (0.56) | (0.51) |
| Water (%) | $-0.04^{***}$ | $-0.03^{**}$ | $-0.04^{***}$ | $-0.03^{**}$ |
| | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Barren (%) | $-0.03^{***}$ | $-0.00$ | $-0.02^{***}$ | $-0.00$ |
| | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Distance to coast | $-0.00$ | $0.00^{\cdot}$ | $-0.00$ | 0.00 |
| | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Population density (log) | | $1.91^{***}$ | | $2.03^{***}$ |
| | | (0.20) | | (0.20) |
| Distance to border | | $-0.00$ | | $-0.00$ |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Precolonial state presence (sqrt) | | | 0.02 | $-0.13^{***}$ |
| | | | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| AIC | 3331.33 | 3259.48 | 3327.30 | 3260.05 |
| BIC | 3382.14 | 3324.80 | 3378.11 | 3325.36 |
| Log Likelihood | $-1658.66$ | $-1620.74$ | $-1656.65$ | $-1621.02$ |
| Deviance | 484.10 | 505.10 | 485.35 | 503.49 |
| Num. obs. | 10492 | 10482 | 10492 | 10482 |

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\cdot}p < 0.1$

Table 1: Communal violence events

| | Baseline | Extended Controls | Baseline | Extended Controls |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Precolonial state presence (log) | $0.20^{***}$ | $0.14^{***}$ | | |
| | (0.04) | (0.04) | | |
| Mountainous terrain | $2.07^{***}$ | $2.30^{***}$ | $1.86^{***}$ | $2.00^{***}$ |
| | (0.25) | (0.24) | (0.25) | (0.24) |
| Water (%) | $0.02^{***}$ | $0.02^{***}$ | $0.02^{***}$ | $0.02^{***}$ |
| | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Barren (%) | $-0.03^{***}$ | $-0.02^{***}$ | $-0.03^{***}$ | $-0.02^{***}$ |
| | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Distance to coast | $-0.00^{**}$ | $-0.00$ | $-0.00^{**}$ | $-0.00$ |
| | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Population density (log) | | $1.06^{***}$ | | $1.11^{***}$ |
| | | (0.09) | | (0.09) |
| Distance to border | | $-0.00$ | | 0.00 |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Precolonial state presence (sqrt) | | | $0.06^{***}$ | $-0.00$ |
| | | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| AIC | 14248.68 | 14125.84 | 14260.63 | 14135.40 |
| BIC | 14299.48 | 14191.16 | 14311.44 | 14200.71 |
| Log Likelihood | $-7117.34$ | $-7053.92$ | $-7123.31$ | $-7058.70$ |
| Deviance | 2341.13 | 2364.66 | 2338.65 | 2363.76 |
| Num. obs. | 10492 | 10482 | 10492 | 10482 |

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\cdot}p < 0.1$

Table 2: Non-state conflict events

# References


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# 7 Appendix

| | Baseline | Extended Controls | Climate | Baseline | Extended Controls | Climate |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Precolonial state presence (log) | 0.02 | $-0.32^{***}$ | $-0.23^{**}$ | | | |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | | | |
| Mountainous terrain | $1.83^{**}$ | $1.72^{***}$ | $3.55^{***}$ | $2.26^{***}$ | $1.95^{***}$ | $2.98^{***}$ |
| | (0.56) | (0.51) | (0.55) | (0.56) | (0.51) | (0.56) |
| Water (%) | $-0.04^{***}$ | $-0.03^{**}$ | $-0.04^{**}$ | $-0.04^{***}$ | $-0.03^{**}$ | $-0.05^{***}$ |
| | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Barren (%) | $-0.03^{***}$ | $-0.00$ | $-0.00$ | $-0.02^{***}$ | $-0.00$ | $-0.00$ |
| | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Distance to coast | $-0.00$ | $0.00^{\cdot}$ | 0.00 | $-0.00$ | 0.00 | $-0.00$ |
| | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Population density (log) | | $1.91^{***}$ | $1.99^{***}$ | | $2.03^{***}$ | $1.94^{***}$ |
| | | (0.20) | (0.21) | | (0.20) | (0.21) |
| Distance to border | | $-0.00$ | $-0.00$ | | $-0.00$ | 0.00 |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) | | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Temperature (SD) | | | 0.07 | | | 0.25 |
| | | | (0.41) | | | (0.42) |
| Temperature (mean) | | | $0.24^{***}$ | | | $0.21^{***}$ |
| | | | (0.04) | | | (0.04) |
| Precipitation (SD) | | | $0.05^{***}$ | | | 0.01 |
| | | | (0.01) | | | (0.01) |
| Precipitation (mean) | | | $-0.01^{***}$ | | | $-0.00$ |
| | | | (0.00) | | | (0.00) |
| Precolonial state presence (sqrt) | | | | 0.02 | $-0.13^{***}$ | 0.00 |
| | | | | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| AIC | 3331.33 | 3259.48 | 3250.94 | 3327.30 | 3260.05 | 3255.51 |
| BIC | 3382.14 | 3324.80 | 3345.25 | 3378.11 | 3325.36 | 3349.82 |
| Log Likelihood | $-1658.66$ | $-1620.74$ | $-1612.47$ | $-1656.65$ | $-1621.02$ | $-1614.76$ |
| Deviance | 484.10 | 505.10 | 510.28 | 485.35 | 503.49 | 506.47 |
| Num. obs. | 10492 | 10482 | 10453 | 10492 | 10482 | 10453 |

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\cdot}p < 0.1$

Table 3: Communal violence events

| | Baseline | Extended Controls | Climate | Baseline | Extended Controls | Climate |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Precolonial state presence (log) | 0.20*** | 0.14*** | 0.15*** | | | |
| | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | | | |
| Mountainous terrain | 2.07*** | 2.30*** | 2.28*** | 1.86*** | 2.00*** | 1.80*** |
| | (0.25) | (0.24) | (0.26) | (0.25) | (0.24) | (0.26) |
| Water (%) | 0.02*** | 0.02*** | 0.02*** | 0.02*** | 0.02*** | 0.02*** |
| | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Barren (%) | −0.03*** | −0.02*** | −0.02*** | −0.03*** | −0.02*** | −0.02*** |
| | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Distance to coast | −0.00** | −0.00 | 0.00 | −0.00** | −0.00 | 0.00 |
| | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Population density (log) | | 1.06*** | 1.17*** | | 1.11*** | 1.24*** |
| | | (0.09) | (0.10) | | (0.09) | (0.10) |
| Distance to border | | −0.00 | −0.00 | | 0.00 | −0.00 |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) | | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Temperature (SD) | | | 0.16 | | | 0.19 |
| | | | (0.20) | | | (0.20) |
| Temperature (mean) | | | −0.03 | | | −0.05** |
| | | | (0.02) | | | (0.02) |
| Precipitation (SD) | | | 0.01 | | | 0.01 |
| | | | (0.01) | | | (0.01) |
| Precipitation (mean) | | | −0.00*** | | | −0.00** |
| | | | (0.00) | | | (0.00) |
| Precolonial state presence (sqrt) | | | | 0.06*** | −0.00 | −0.01 |
| | | | | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| AIC | 14248.68 | 14125.84 | 14085.64 | 14260.63 | 14135.40 | 14094.60 |
| BIC | 14299.48 | 14191.16 | 14179.96 | 14311.44 | 14200.71 | 14188.91 |
| Log Likelihood | −7117.34 | −7053.92 | −7029.82 | −7123.31 | −7058.70 | −7034.30 |
| Deviance | 2341.13 | 2364.66 | 2363.01 | 2338.65 | 2363.76 | 2361.71 |
| Num. obs. | 10492 | 10482 | 10453 | 10492 | 10482 | 10453 |

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\cdot}p < 0.1$

Table 4: Non-state conflict events