

Kappa (working title)

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Abstract

Keywords—

1 Introduction

In North West Indonesia 1976, GAM (Gerkan Aceh Merdeka: Free Aceh Movement) declared independence for the province of Aceh, under the leadership of Hasan di Tiro, a descendent of the last Sultan of the Aceh region. Initially the movement consisted of the remnants of an old religious network, with its roots in the old Sultanate and armed struggle against the Dutch. The resulting conflict lasted until 2005 and resulted in an estimated 3402 combat related fatalities after 1989 (Aspinall, 2009; Pettersson and Eck, 2018; Sundberg and Melander, 2013).

In Ethiopia 1975, the Dirge regime tried to arrest the Sultan of Aussa. However, anticipating the move, the Sultan's son had already sent men to neighboring Somalia to train in guerilla warfare (Shehim, 1985). The Sultan evaded arrest and launched the Afar Liberation Front (ALF) organized around the men trained in Somalia. The heavy handed response of the Ethiopian military left over a thousand civilian casualties (<https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/363>).

In 1960, in the newly formed Republic of the Congo (Léopoldville) (current Democratic Republic of the Congo) South Kasai declares unilaterally to have seceded from the nascent Republic under the leadership of traditional chief Albert Kalonji (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002). He then preceded to have his father declared the new Mulopwe, thus resurrecting the royal title of the Luba kingdom (1585-1889). His father promptly abdicated handing the title to Kalonji (now styling himself Albert Ditunga, "homeland"). South Kasai fought for independence for just over two years, provoking a campaign by the Congolese armed forces that at the time was characterized by UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld as an act of genocide (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002).

There is no shortage of examples where previously independent states are involved in outbreaks of organized violence. Yet, both in the media and in the academic literature these examples are referred to as ethnic conflicts, and surprisingly little attention has been given to their connection to past statehood. On the other hand, there are also examples of old state institutions working for peace, mediation and reconciliation. For example [that guy in Burkina Faso]. [Another example of peace inducing]. The nascent academic literature on organized violence and the legacies of past statehood reflects these diverging sets of examples.

While some, in line with the examples given above, find a conflict inducing effect of past states (Englebert et al., 2002; Paine, 2019), others argue that past experience of statehood provides experience and institutions that are peace inducing (Wig, 2016; Wig and Kromrey, 2018; Depetris-Chauvin, 2016). Yet, all but one of these articles conceptualize states in terms of currently (politically relevant) ethnic groups and to what degree these groups have connections to past states. This risk excluding states that are not readily tied to a current politically relevant ethnic group. It further risks discrediting experiences of statehood of groups who have lived as part of states for hundreds of years, without being the dominant ethnic group. Additionally, this literature has been almost exclusively limited to Africa. The diverging conclusions in the literature could in part be a result of the paucity of quantitative data on past statehood. The literature has been limited to using either the Murdoch map, which codes ‘jurisdictional hierarchy’ of ethnic groups, or the State Antiquities Index, which measures country level experience of statehood (including from foreign rule). In summary, there is a need for more and better data, in order to answer the puzzle of whether there is a positive or negative association between state histories and organized violence. Potentially, both statements are true, but vary according to circumstances. In which case, what determines when and where past statehood is conflict inducing or peace inducing?

How is organized violence shaped by the underlying topography of historical statehood? This thesis seeks to answering this overarching research question, adding to our general understanding of organized violence. While increasing the general understanding of key concepts is a goal in itself for any academic discipline, this understanding will hopefully contribute to the vital goals of conflict prevention and de-escalation, however small and indirect this contribution may be.

The thesis addresses this research question across four individual articles and contribute to the literature through substantial data collection[?], and novel theory building, which breaks new ground on a so far ‘under-researched’ part of the larger peace- and conflict research. The thesis has contributed to two data projects. The Anatomy of Resistance Campaigns (ARC) and the Geo-International Systems Data (Geo-ISD). The ARC project collected yearly data on 1,426 organizations engaging in maximalist dissent (non-violent and violent) in Africa from 1990 to

2015. The Geo-ISD geocodes the borders of independent states in Africa from 1800 to 1900, which are used to generate a measure of their respective historical presence per 0.5 X 0.5 degrees grid cell.

When historical state legacies are located far from the capital, they provide *symbols of sovereignty* that can be use to mobilize for violence, and *local elite networks* are often left behind and can mobilize their networks if their interests are threatened by the government. While on the other hand, when located near the capital, historical state legacies provide a *foundation* on which modern states could be built. Both in terms of institutions and legitimacy.

The number of historical state legacies within a country matters because the more of these there are, the more likely that one or more of them will be located in a remote part of the country (and thus be conflict inducing). Furthermore, increasing the number of potential claims making actors incentivises the government to punish (engage in conflict) groups it would otherwise accommodate in order to prevent other groups to make similar demands.

Whereas local elite networks might have incentives to violently oppose the government, they also have incentives to minimize the amount of violence between local groups and communities. Just as the state does on a country level, and just as historical states did in their time. Therefore, historical state legacies provide local institutions and traditions of conflict resolution, as well as build up trust between communities, which prevent outbreaks and escalation of communal violence. Where little or no historical state legacies exist, and the modern state is weak or absent, groups are limited to less effective mechanisms (such as intra group policing) to keep the peace. In other words, when it comes to *communal violence* there is an inverse relationship between historical state legacies and organized violence.

In summary, the thesis finds that the historical legacies of statehood's relation to organized violence varies according to:

- 1) Where in the modern state the historical state legacies are located. More historical state legacies being conflict inducing far from modern capitals, and conflict reducing when close.

2) How many distinct historical state legacies there are within a country's boundaries. More distinct historical state legacies leading to more conflict.

3) Type of organized violence. While there is more state-based violence in areas with historical more historical state legacies, there is less communal violence.

[Relate this last part more directly to each paper? 'In paper 1...']

2 Concepts

The following section will discuss some of the key concepts of the thesis, and in so doing elaborate on the broader academic literature and tradition on which it builds and of which it is a part.

2.1 Statehood and historical legacies

2.1.1 Degrees of statehood/'stateness'

[Three conceptualisations of the state from Clapham - admin, idea and system.]

At the core of the thesis lies the concept of 'the state'. However, the term is ambiguous. Three of the four individual articles in the thesis use a specific operationalisation, derived from Butcher and Griffiths (2019) and Butcher and Griffiths (2017), but the concept merits further discussion than what the article format allows. The subject of the thesis requires a definition that is broad enough to include African and Asian states in the nineteenth century and modern European states. It needs to be flexible to the changes in how we think of the state across time (even in Europe, states were very different from today), as well as across space. While at the same time it needs to draw the line at some point to say what is not a state. To this end the thesis employs Clapham (1996)'s three aspect of the state, which allows assessing degrees of statehood along three axes.

The first aspect of the state is the *administrative*. The ideal of which is an organization (government) which exercises sovereign jurisdiction (the final legal arbiter) over a given population and territory. To exercise this sovereignty the

government controls a coercive apparatus (military and police forces), which is usually financed by taxing the population. In return, modern states are usually expected to ensure the welfare of its citizens/population (externalities, health, security, education etc.). A state in this sense may be more or less able to control its population, and more or less able/willing to provide welfare.

The second aspect of the state is the ‘idea of the state’, as constructed in the minds of at least those who run it, but usually also a portion of the population living within a state. This construction provides legitimacy for its institutions and its use of coercive force (governmental legitimacy), and for who, or where it should rule (territorial legitimacy). Today most states draw their governmental legitimacy, their right to rule, from claiming (more or less truthfully) to rule on behalf its citizens through democratic principles.¹ Historically, various forms of religious justification has been the norm (divine right of kings in Europe, the mandate of Heaven in China, or rulers claiming to be gods or dependents of gods themselves [what’s the legitimation for caliphs and amirs?]). Claims to territorial legitimacy (or lack thereof) usually rests on a mix of historical precedence and the principle of national self determination. Past claims include, rights to inheritance, religiously based rights to world conquest, or the infamous ‘white mans burden’. The ‘idea of the state’ and legitimacy is key to ensuring compliance with minimal use (or threat) of coercion. [Reference Buzan and others in this section]

The third aspect of the state is the system of international recognition. States recognising each other, and respecting (or even protecting) each others sovereign territories. In the current globalized world, international recognition has become essential to participate in international transactions. States that are lacking in the first and second aspects of statehood can lean more on the international system, through aid (both from other states but also non-state actors) and ideology. Prior to the twentieth century, multiple international state systems existed. Even as late as the nineteenth century what mattered to most Muslim rulers was recognition by the Caliph in Istanbul, not what the kings or queens of Europe considered had to say on the matter. Similarly in East Asia China (the Middle Kingdom) was at the center of its tributary-based international system, while South East Asia was

¹Even the most blatant autocracies make this claim. [cite Fukuyama?]

organized in the Mandala state system [Northedge and others?].

States can conform to each of these three aspects to a greater or lesser extent. In other words, states have an overall degree of statehood, but also a qualitative variation in terms of the individual aspects. [Poor performance] in one aspect can be compensated, but only in part by strong performance in other. Taiwan for example, has a robust and well functioning state apparatus, and is de facto in undisputed control of its territory, enjoys a high degree of legitimacy and [compliance] from its citizens, but struggles with a lack of full international recognition. Israel has a [strong] administrative statehood, and enjoys recognition from the most relevant actors (the exception being several Muslim majority countries), but is viewed as largely illegitimate among many of its Palestinian population [fair assumption?] (roughly 20% of its population). Somalia (and other so-called ‘failed states’) [score] poorly across all three aspects of statehood. The Somali government barely functions in and around the capital, let alone the rest of its [purported] territory. Its government is viewed as corrupt and illegitimate. Its borders do not reflect the settlement of the Somali ethnic group, lacks any historic president, and are the product of exogenous factors (external diplomatic negotiations). What little claim to statehood Somalia has rests almost exclusively on the international system. [Link to artificiality here?]

[Relevance of state creation/formation/building. Contrasting the ‘natural’ process with the artificial? Or is that going too deep?]

Because this thesis is concerned with differences between state composition relative to the local histories of statehood, I need to discuss how these compositions can come about. I separate between endogenous forms of state formation and exogenous forms of state formation. Relative to the three aspects of state endogenous state formation relies on administrative state capacity and the idea of the state, while exogenous forms of state formation relies almost exclusively on the international system of states.

Scott (2017) Against the grain - state formation - a look at how states first emerged

Vast majority were non-state until at least 1600. -Frontiers Most of the history of the state is about its interactions (trading and raiding) with the ‘barbarians’

beyond its frontiers. Stable, lasting states are rare outside, and prior to, the Westphalian state system (Egypt, China and Rome are notable exceptions). The default is a perilous existence, where states rise, thrive and fall in rapid succession. Ending at the hand of other states, barbarian invasions, population exodus or any combination of the above. The arrival of gunpowder is the game changer. Led to a period of state ‘building’ or stating in Africa (and elsewhere?) prior to the arrival of European colonialists [Source on this?]. For many states, or parts of the world, this was still the reality in the nineteenth century. As described by Scott (2009). States ruling an agrarian core surrounded by a large, permeable frontier. State penetration into the frontier was in the form of relations with groups, ranging from tributary, through allied or hostile to extracting ‘protection’ payments from the state. The point of this discussion [which should be made clear earlier, or perhaps means that this belongs elsewhere] is that drawing a line on a map between what is and is not part of a state, or what areas belong to what state, prior to the globalisation of the Westphalian model allowed for a great deal of variation in the frontier zone, based on what ones conceptualisation of statehood. A more accurate representation would be shade/gradient of statehood that fades into the frontier, for most of Africa and Asia in the nineteenth century. Boundaries between states, when they occurred, would usually be in the frontiers of each state, where neither would have full control.

The extent of states then, would vary according to their ability to project military power outside their alluvial/grain producing core(s). This, in turn rested on their administrative and ‘idea of state’ aspects of statehood, as the limited and often local systems of statehood had limited influence. Clapham (1996)’s argument is that post-independence Africa represents a new model of statehood, where statehood rested almost exclusively on the international system. They were in large part created by (large and important wars of liberation/de-colonization notwithstanding) and eventually sustained by the international system. At the very least their *extent* was. This amounted to a novel form of limited, or artificial statehood. I argue that this process is not unique to Africa. In Asia too, Europeans created colonial states, and left countries with limited degrees of administrative statehood and vague ‘ideas of state’.

[Empirical implications of artificial states – ethnic groups]

This limited statehood has been linked to a number of empirical outcomes. For example, Alesina et al. (2011) uses ‘squigglyness’ of international boundaries as a measure/instrument for whether the boundaries were drawn with local knowledge (endogenously), or not (exogenously). They find that straightness of international boundaries, what they term artificial borders, are linked with lower levels of economic development. The presumed mechanism (which is not tested) is that artificial borders, borders drawn by an exogenous process, group together multiple ethnic groups and split others. These ethnic constellations then make it difficult for the state to create a sense of nationhood and get people to work toward common goals. Englebert et al. (2002) tests this more explicitly and find that states whose borders split ethnic groups more, are more often involved in international disputes. They also find that countries whose boundaries group together ethnic groups with more different forms pre-colonial political organization², are more susceptible to civil wars, political instability and secession attempts. Following Englebert et al. (2002) the conflict-literature has also uncovered links between ethnic partitioning and civil conflict (Ito, 2020), as well as links between resulting trans-border ethnic kin relations and conflict (Cederman et al., 2013; Salehyan, 2009; Weidmann, 2015). [Tie back to (limited) degrees of statehood]

2.1.2 Legacies of statehood past

Legacies of states, institutions and conflict

How states are composed today clearly matter for economic development, levels of violence and a host of other things, but a major/pivotal/? argument of this thesis, and a emerging literature, is that *past* states matter as well. On every continent there are hundreds of states, than until relatively recently were independent and sovereign entities, much like the those who survived until today. Many, if not most, of them were amalgamated into larger states through the process of colonisation³. There is a growing literature demonstrating how these past states

²As measured by the standard deviation of Murdock (1967)’s jurisdictional hierarchy index.

³The two major exceptions are the unification of Germany and Italy.

and institutions still have lasting legacies today. Most of this literature has examined the effects of past statehood (Bockstette et al., 2002; Borcan et al., 2018) and institutions related to statehood (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013, 2018; Englebert, 2000) and largely agree on a positive effect of statehood and institutions (Nunn, 2020; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2016), although there are notable exceptions (Acemoglu et al., 2002).

A smaller/different branch of research has examined political implications of state legacies. Acemoglu et al. (2002) argues that European colonialism lead to a ‘reversal of fortunes’ for the areas it affected. Poorer areas with less population density (areas less likely to be at the center of states), were less likely to be colonised early, ‘deeply’, and with European settlers (in part because of states more effectively resisting colonization). This lead to a larger transfer of European institutional innovations, and consequently a reversal of economic development (Acemoglu et al., 2002). Building on this research, Hariri (2012) test parts of the proposed mechanism and finds that more pre-colonial experience of statehood decreased the likelihood of being colonised, while it increased the likelihood of only being *indirectly* colonised. Furthermore, not being colonised, or being so indirectly, depresses post-colonial democracy (Hariri, 2012). On the other hand, through a number of case studies Wilfahrt 2018; 2021 has documented how areas and groups with pre-colonial experiences of statehood are better at distributing public goods equitably and efficiently, and are generally more likely to adopt [non-partisan (non-group based)] legislation and politics. The actors themselves ascribe this to their history of cooperation (under the umbrella of pre-colonial states). This is even true in Senegal, the poster child of French direct rule and dismantling of pre-existing institutions (Wilfahrt, 2021).

Living up to the second part of the quote attributed to Charles Tilly, ‘War made the state, and the state made war.’, past states also left legacies of conflict. Historical levels conflict in Africa has been found to positively affect modern levels of conflict (Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2014), although the direction of the relationship is does not hold in a global sample, and depends on colonial experiences and wars of liberation (extra systemic conflicts) (Fearon and Laitin, 2014).

2.1.3 Historical state entities and Pre-colonial states

At this point a further clarification of the terms ‘past states’, ‘pre-colonial states’, and ‘historical state entities’ (the term used in the second article of the thesis) is needed, as these terms are used more or less interchangeably in this [introductory chapter/narrative]. The reason they are used interchangeably is that they do refer to the same *concept*. However, they [apply to/are used in] different *contexts*. Specifically, I use ‘pre-colonial states’ in the context of Africa, where the majority of states were at some point colonies. The other two terms are used in the global context and refers to states that now form parts of sovereign states. The latter refers is further restricted to the time period of the second article of the thesis (1816-1939).

2.2 Maximalist dissent and organized violence

Another key [aspect] of the thesis is collective action; people cooperating in a more or less organised fashion, to a achieve more or less common goals. [Add bit about how all forms need to overcome the collective action problem?] Specifically, this thesis is concerned with two [types/different conceptualizations] of collective action, namely *maximalist dissent* and *organized violence*.

2.2.1 Maximalist dissent

Tarrow 1998, ‘power in movement is cumulative’

A central concept in the first article of the thesis is maximalist dissent. The concept builds on Tilly (1978)’s definition of collective dissent as observable action involving multiple people, beyond normal institutional procedures for realizing political goals. This could include anything from strikes, sit-ins, shirking, large scale demonstrations and other non-violent tactics, to riots, terrorism or armed rebellion. It does not include acts of dissent executed in an individual capacity, acts that lack clear political goals and acts within institutional political bounds (regular functioning of political parties, lobbying, electoral participation etc.). The second part of the concept, maximalist, refers to the political goals of the act (event). The definition builds on the criteria used by the NAVCO 1 data set,

which only includes resistance campaigns where the objective was maximalist (i.e. regime change, secession, or self-determination) as opposed to limited (i.e. greater civil liberties or economic rights) [cite online appendix of NAVCO]. The ARC data (presented in article 1) clarifies this further as demands that calls for changes in the political structure that would significantly alter the executive’s access to state power, the rules with which executives are selected, or the policy or geographic areas for which the executive has the right to make laws (Butcher et al., 2022).

While the remaining articles of the thesis are concerned with organized violence, most of which represent the violent specter of maximalist dissent (more on this below), the literature on the non-violent form of dissent has [informed] the thesis in a number of ways as well. Understanding how, and when, nonviolent forms of dissent work and when they do not can help us understand when and why people choose to pick up arms and use violence. There is general agreement in the literature that nonviolent dissent (or resistance) is the most effective of achieving maximalist political goals (Chenoweth et al., 2011; Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008) such as regime change and democratization (Celestino and Gleditsch, 2013; Bethke and Pinckney, 2019). Why then do some actors still chose violence? Part of the answer could be the size of the target audience (Gleditsch et al., 2021). Groups whose goals appeal to a large part of the population (such as overthrowing an unpopular autocratic regime) find the mass mobilization that is necessary for non-violence to be successful easier than groups who appeal to more narrow bases (such as self determination for minorities)(Gleditsch et al., 2021). Economic structures could matter as well (Butcher and Svensson, 2014). A substantial literature is also arguing that repression of nonviolent campaigns or protests, can cause escalations to violence, although there is conflicting evidence (Chenoweth et al., 2017; Lichbach, 1987).

Furthermore, a key reason for employing the term maximalist dissent is that there is no sharp dividing line between violent and nonviolent forms of dissent. In her study of the civil war in El Salvador Wood (2003) highlights how rebel groups cooperate and work closely with civil society, and how individual rebels shift between violent and nonviolent forms of dissent. Many predominantly nonviolent movements have violent wings, who increase the likelihood of violent escalation –

especially if the nonviolent campaign fails to make progress (Ryckman, 2019).

2.2.2 Organized violence

There are many forms of organized violence, most of which are captured by maximalist dissent. I follow the UCDP and Melander et al. (2016) in treating organized violence as the aggregation of the mutually exclusive typologies of one-sided, non-state and state-based violence. One-sided violence is violence committed by formally organised non-state groups or governments against unarmed civilians. State based is what one usually thinks of as armed conflict, or simply war. More accurately, it is armed conflict where at least one side is a government (and the other is not unarmed civilians). This includes inter state conflicts (conflict between states), extrastate conflict (decolonization-conflicts), intrastate conflicts (conflicts within states, i.e. civil conflicts) and internationalised internal conflicts (intrastate conflicts in which at least one party receives troops from another state). Non-state violence is violence perpetrated by named organizations (criminal organizations, political parties, rebel groups etc.) or identity groups (ethnic or religious groups), against one another (without the involvement of government). Non-state violence therefore is seldom driven by maximalist dissent, although clashes between political parties or politicised ethnic groups could be potential borderline cases.

This thesis focuses on three forms of organized violence: intrastate, internationalised internal conflict (hereafter referred to collectively as civil conflict) and non-state violence. Historical state entities could matter for interstate conflict. For instance in cases where the borders of historical state entities cross international boundaries, old borders could form the basis of claims making and disputes, such as with the borders of the former empire of Bornu (Hariri, 2012). However, as in the case of Bornu, such disputes can be solved peacefully in international courts. Additionally, three of the four papers use an African sample and the continent have seen only one interstate conflict and no extrastate conflicts in the time period covered in the papers.

There is a substantial literature explaining the occurrence (and re-occurrence) of civil conflict.

Relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970) and ‘revolution of rising expectations’ (Davies,

1962) focuses on widespread individual discontent. Applied to structural inequalities (Muller, 1985; Muller and Seligson, 1987; Scott, 1977). This grievance focus was criticised by Charles Tilly and others for a lack of empirical support (Oberschall, 1978; Brush, 1996), coupled with the proliferation of grievances and relative lack of revolutions/civil conflict (Snyder and Tilly, 1972; Tilly, 1978; Skocpol, 1979). Meanwhile Olson (1965) and Tullock (1971) emphasise the difficulty of overcoming the barriers to collective violent action and the free rider problem.

Response is group focus, moving away from strict Marxist/materialist explanation. Hechter (1978) cultural division of labor, when cultural and economic groups coincide. Competition between ethnic groups for scarce resources (bar, 1969). Horowitz (1985) ethnic groups intense feelings of belonging, collective self-esteem and group worth. Not just competition for scarce resources, *also* for political influence. Response: Empirical drive, minorities at risk (MAR) Gurr (1993b,a), also add some opportunity to the general argument of grievance ('pursuit of political interests, as formulated by group leaders and political entrepreneurs.'). Collier and Hoeffler (2004) came out swinging, but calmed down a bit by Collier et al. (2009) (moving from greed to opportunities). Fearon and Laitin (2003) peripheries, rough terrain, state weakness and corruption due to oil. Fearon (2004) on duration, echoes Weiner (1978) 'Sons of the soil', concentrated peripheral ethnic groups react violently to perceived incursions. Response: Dissagregate! Tighten the logic of causal inference! Kalyvas (2006) and Kalyvas (2008) interpersonal grudges. Wood (2003) moral outrage, sense of doing the right thing. Gilley (2004) and Chandra (2006) sceptical of ethnic identities in civil conflict, essentially undetectable and or too fluid. Ethnic defection is more common than commonly assumed (Kalyvas, 2008).

Critique of measures like ethnic fractionalization (Alesina et al., 2003; Posner, 2004) and polarisation (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005) is that they are politically blind. The state is not ethnically neutral (Cederman, 2013). Goldstone et.al. 2010 finds that state led discrimination (economic or political) increases the likelihood of future conflict onset, using the MIR data. Cederman (2013) find that horizontal ethnic grievances increases the likelihood of conflict.

The role of climate and environmental factors.

Non-state

Electoral violence (Fjelde, 2020) Rebel on rebel violence (Fjelde and Nilsson, 2012)
Refugees (Böhmelt et al., 2018)
Communal violence
(Fjelde and Østby, 2014)

3 Theoretical/conceptual framework

Looking for the connection(s) between the two overarching concepts. What links has been found? What has not been done? What is this thesis adding to this literature?

Institutionalist/longe durée? Acemoglu and Robinson - persisting institutions and stickiness.

Main ‘thrust’ is that ‘it depends’. Expand on the answer to the puzzle in the introduction. It depends on the relationship between the modern state and old state(s), and on the type of violence.

Some more prior literature: Griffiths (2016) Ahram (2019)

4 Analytical approach

Data narrative (inductive/deductive). Empirical tradition.

Discussion of maps to uncover the state?

Discussion of ‘state presence’?

5 Article summaries

6 Concluding remarks

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