Security Assistance and Political Militarization

Jesse Dillon Savage*[1] and Adam Scharpf†[2]

[1]Trinity College Dublin
[2]University of Copenhagen

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Abstract

How does foreign military training shape civil-military relations in recipient states? Existing works have mostly analyzed aggregate indicators of foreign training programs, while paying little attention to the content that soldiers are exposed to. Studies also have often fallen prey to "coupism," thereby ignoring more subtle ways in which soldiers can influence politics. In this paper, we disaggregate foreign military training to assess how different course types influence military involvement in politics beyond coups. We argue that soldiers exert higher levels of political influence when they receive domestically oriented training, such as counterinsurgency courses. Empirically we leverage the wide-ranging dissemination of counterinsurgency training after the Cuban Revolution. Analyzing original course data from the School of the Americas, our results show that counterinsurgency courses increased soldiers' influence over politics, whereas training in conventional warfare rather stabilized civilian control. The findings have implications for understanding why and when soldiers capture political institutions and dictate policies.

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*Email: dillonsj@tcd.ie

†Email: adam.scharpf@giga-hamburg.de

And the new generation of military leaders has shown an increasing awareness that armies cannot only defend their countries—they can help ... to build them.

—John F. Kennedy

Introduction

On October 24, 2014 Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro appointed active duty officer Vladimir Padrino López as Minister of Defense. Padrino, a graduate of the School of the Americas where he had attended courses on psychological operations and infantry tactics, was then put in charge of overseeing commercial activities and social programs including the distribution of food and medicine. The appointment of an US-trained officer as the "second most powerful man in Venezuelan politics" is puzzling given Venezuela's strained relationship with the United States (Martín 2016).

This paper makes two innovations to understand why soldiers become politically involved and what role foreign military training plays in this. First, we dissagregate foreign training. Research has largely used aggregate measures of military education (e.g., Atkinson 2006; Böhmelt, Escribà-Folch and Pilster 2019; Martinez Machain 2020; Ruby and Gibler 2010; Savage and Caverley 2017). However, if external training is really changing the skills and attitudes of trainees, these effects should vary according to course content. We compare different course types to better capture the effect of foreign training on soldiers' willingness to involve themselves in politics. Second, we move beyond the literature's focus on coups and examine more common forms of political influence such as influence over policies or service in the executive. In doing so, we are moving the literature on security assistance in step with the new research on civil-military relations, which has increasingly sought to avoid problems associated with "coupism" (e.g., Beliakova 2021; Brooks 2019; Croissant et al. 2010).

We argue that graduates of foreign training programs become involved in politics when push factors meet pull factors (Bove, Rivera and Ruffa 2020). On the pull side, we argue that training will increase competence and human capital, making trainees generally more attractive to government leaders. On the push side, we argue that only *some* forms of training will increase the belief of officers that their

political involvement is necessary and beneficial. We expect that training in irregular warfare motivates soldiers to influence politics and policies. Counterinsurgency courses highlight the importance of integrating security operations with state-building efforts thereby politicizing officers. In contrast, we expect that courses on conventional warfare orient officers towards operations abroad, which does not require meddling in domestic politics and thus stabilizes civil-military relations.

To test how training content influences soldiers' political behavior requires an empirical set-up with a high variation in courses and a low number of confounders. We leverage the wide-ranging dissemination of counterinsurgency training after the Cuban Revolution. In response to Fidel Castro's unexpected victory in 1959, the United States fundamentally reoriented its security assistance. Besides courses on conventional warfare, Washington now also provided training on all matters of irregular warfare. We exploit this change by bringing to bear original, hand-coded course data from the School of the Americas—one of the key institutions in charge of educating Latin American officers. In line with our argument, findings show that counterinsurgency courses increased militarization, while training in conventional warfare rather reduced it. Additional tests suggest that the militarization effect stems from the state-building focus and the standardized format of counterinsurgency courses. Our results thus show that not all training politicizes recipients, for both good and ill, the type of training and how training is structured affects whether or not militaries push into or stay out of politics.

Along with extending the literature on security assistance, this paper makes three key contributions to the broader literature on civil-military relations. First, a large literature has highlighted the influence of security threats on the quality of civil-military relations (e.g., Bove, Rivera and Ruffa 2020; Desch 1999; Ezrow and Frantz 2011; Goemans 2008; Piplani and Talmadge 2016; Powell 2012; Svolik 2012). We contribute to this research by introducing foreign military training as one link connecting threat environments to officers' involvement in politics. Inspired by classical works (Huntington 1985; Stepan 1986), we offer systematic evidence on how training geared towards countering internal enemies strengthens the military's political role.

Second, the paper responds to recent calls for uncovering the mechanism through which military education impacts civil-military relations (e.g., Böhmelt, Escribà-Folch and Pilster 2019; Brooks 2019). We demonstrate that training highlighting social and economic problems motivates officers to exert political pressure. Our findings thereby qualify arguments that see foreign training programs as an inexpensive instrument for military professionalization and democratic stabilization in recipient countries.

Third, the paper highlights the interrelations between geopolitical crises and domestic regimes. Our findings demonstrate how providers of security assistance, by responding to their own threat concerns, can have a profound influence on politics in recipient states. Empirically, we link the United States' fear of spreading communism to the rise of new military professionalism in Latin America in the 1950s and 1960s (Stepan 1986; Wolpin 1972). With this, our paper contributes to the broader literature on the international origins of regime characteristics (e.g., Casey 2020; Hyde and Saunders 2020).

Research on political militarization

The relationship between governments and their militaries is shaped by one of the "oldest dilemmas of governing" (McMahon and Slantchev 2015, 297). As guardian of the state the military must possess enough power to defeat enemies, but soldiers may abuse their capacity to force their will on the polity (Feaver 1999, 214). Governments therefore have to carefully balance the protection from threats on the one hand and the risk of militarization and coups on the other (Brooks 2019; Huntington 1985; Svolik 2012).[1] The "Guardianship Dilemma" is particularly prevalent under imminent security menaces (Desch 1999; McMahon and Slantchev 2015).

Research generally agrees that external threats, such as looming invasions by foreign armies, lower the risk of soldiers' political involvement (e.g., Desch 1999; Talmadge 2015). External threats can politicize officers, but commonly orient them

[1]Many governments pursue strategies to keep their militaries in check. Coup-proofing strategies can include balancing the military's power through parallel security organizations (De Bruin 2018), co-opting soldiers through patronage (Quinlivan 1999), exploiting officer's career concerns (Scharpf and Gläßel 2020), and selectively placing loyal officers (Harkness 2016; Hassan 2017).

towards a foreign adversary (e.g., Andreski 1980; Desch 1999; Kim 2019). Moreover, officers have fewer opportunities to coordinate and execute political interventions during campaigns against other countries (Piplani and Talmadge 2016). International conflict thereby often strengthens civilian control.[2]

In contrast, internal threats often provide the military with both the opportunity and the motivation for political interference (e.g., Beliakova 2021; Bove, Rivera and Ruffa 2020; Desch 1999; Powell 2012; Thyne 2010). Research suggests that in conflicts against terrorists or insurgents, authorities are likely to demand officers' expertise and provide cabinet seats in return (Bove, Rivera and Ruffa 2020; Svolik 2012). In addition, influential elites may help soldiers to become politically involved (Aksoy, Carter and Wright 2015; Casper and Tyson 2014; Gläßel, González and Scharpf 2020; Wig and Rød 2016). Officers, in turn, commonly develop the willingness to influence politics when they feel that the government is withholding critical resources or sabotages their operations (Eibl, Hertog and Slater 2019). This is particularly likely in campaigns against subversive groups whose true capabilities are unknown (Gläßel, González and Scharpf 2020). In such situations, officers often fear for the well-being of the military and the entire country, which fosters their political involvement (Bell and Sudduth 2017; Ezrow and Frantz 2011; Nordlinger 1977).

While research largely agrees on the link between domestic threats and militarization, it remains unclear how exactly officers develop beliefs that their political involvement is necessary. We believe that military education plays a key role here. Studies suggest that training crucially shapes perceptions and convictions within the military (Böhmelt, Escribà-Folch and Pilster 2019; Stepan 1986). It not only determines military skills, but also the way officers think about different threats and the strategies they deem necessary to counter them (Long 2016). Military training is therefore likely to shape soldiers' interests in political engagement, and this probably extends beyond domestic military education.

[2]According to Belkin and Schofer (2005), coup-prone leaders may even initiative international conflict to protect themselves from military uprisings.

The importance of foreign military training

In many countries, soldiers receive a significant amount of their training through security assistance programs (e.g., Atkinson 2014; Martinez Machain 2020; Scharpf 2020). Since the early 20th century, foreign military training has played a key role in professionalizing militaries (e.g., Janowitz 1977; Nunn 1975). Today, thousands of officers are educated at foreign academies or undergo training programs offered by countries such as Canada, China, France, Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom. In the United States alone, foreign soldiers can study over 4,100 subjects at more than 270 military institutions (AI 2002).

Experts have long speculated about the effects of foreign training on civil-military relations in recipient countries (e.g., Gates 2010; Turse 2017).[3] Some have questioned if external training programs have an effect at all. For example, Huntington (2006, 193) believed that training would be politically sterile and thus unrelated to political interventions. Others concluded that "almost nothing is known about the political impact" of foreign training programs (Janowitz 1977, 173).

More recent studies suggest that external training can strengthen civilian control. For example, Atkinson (2006, 2010) argues that foreign training socializes foreign officers with liberal values, thereby fostering democratization and respect for human rights. Similarly, Mujkic, Asencio and Byrne (2018) hold that external programs convey democratic values and Ruby and Gibler (2010) find that training in US War Colleges reduces coup risk. Together these studies suggest that foreign-trained officers adopt convictions supportive of military subordination.

In contrast, several works have argued that foreign training may undermine civilian authority. Fitch (1979), Maniruzzaman (1992), and Rowe (1974) contend that training programs augment competence and unity within the officer corps, which increases the military's power to remove civilian leaders. Wolpin (1972) suggests that

[3]There is also an ongoing debate on how external training influences military effectiveness (e.g., Bapat 2011; Boutton 2021). Foreign training can enhance effectiveness when governments in recipient states are interested in enrolling their forces in fitting programs (Scharpf 2020). Often, however, leaders undermine assistance efforts because they reject accompanying political reforms (Biddle, Macdonald and Baker 2018; Ladwig 2017).

external programs during the Cold War inculcated officers with conservative ideas, which motivated them to move against dissenting governments. More recently, Savage and Caverley (2017) have argued that foreign military training can increase technical competence which helps officers in carrying out coups.

We believe that the lack of convergence in the literature exists in part due to failure to account for differences in training content and the strong focus on extreme outcomes. First, studies commonly base their findings on aggregate measures of foreign training (Atkinson 2006, 2010; Savage and Caverley 2017) or assess how general course types influence a small sample of elite trainees (Mujkic, Asencio and Byrne 2018; Ruby and Gibler 2010).[4] However, lumping together different course content ignores that courses often focus on different security threats and teach soldiers distinct strategies and tactics. In the following, we disaggregate training content to scrutinize how courses on irregular and conventional warfare shape trainees' motivation to influence politics.

Second, research on foreign military training has tended to focus on grand political outcomes such as coups or democratization (Atkinson 2006; Ruby and Gibler 2010; Savage and Caverley 2017). Such "coupism" may conceal more subtle ways through which officers exert political power (Beliakova 2021; Croissant et al. 2010).[5] In fact, officers may simply refrain from staging coups because their power is large enough to render illegal takeovers redundant (Desch 1999; Eibl, Hertog and Slater 2019). To uncover more nuanced effects of external training on civil-military relations, in the following we scrutinize "the relation of the [military] expert to the politician" (Huntington 1985, 20).

Foreign training content and militarization

Soldiers' political involvement commonly results from push and pull factors (Bove, Rivera and Ruffa 2020; Zimmermann 1979). As we explain in this section, on the pull side foreign military training increases competence and human capital, making

[4]A notable exception is Atkinson (2014) who utilizes a survey to capture the micro-political effects of US training on foreign soldiers.

[5]Military interventions are as "often latent or indirect as they are overt or direct" (Finer 1988, 4).

trainees generally more attractive to civilian leaders. However, these pull factors need to be acted on by soldiers. If soldiers lack the propensity they will not take up these opportunities. On the push side, we argue that only *some* forms of training will increase beliefs among officers that their political involvement is necessary and beneficial. We expect that only training on internal warfare such as counterinsurgency courses, which calls for integrating security operations with development and state-building efforts, motivate soldiers to become politically involved. Before we explain how courses alter the relations between governments and officers, we next detail why recipient states draw on foreign military training in the first place.

Why recipient states use foreign military training

Enrolling troops in foreign training programs is beneficial for recipient states (Scharpf 2020). To understand why, it helps to look at domestic training. Perhaps most obviously, military training increases the skills of soldiers from basic tactics to grand strategy (Böhmelt, Escribà-Folch and Pilster 2019; Toronto 2017). Soldiers learn about which "resources will be employed, how they will be used, and where" (Desch 1999, 17). In addition, military education is also a powerful instrument for transmitting core beliefs about the military organization and its mission (Böhmelt, Escribà-Folch and Pilster 2019; Long 2016).[6] It shapes the soldiers' value compass on what they deem "correct, effective, and appropriate" (Long 2016, 15). Training impacts how soldiers perceive threats, which strategies and tactics they use, and how they see their role vis-á-vis the government.

Like domestic education, foreign training influences both the skills and outlook of soldiers. External training gives recipients access to knowledge and infrastructure unavailable at home (Savage and Caverley 2017). To officers and governments this is particularly attractive when security threats demand the quick and cost-efficient increase in military capacity (Scharpf 2020). Moreover, recipient states can benefit from the socialization of foreign-trained soldiers (Atkinson 2006, 2014). Many

[6]Bonding and socialization helps "the formation and transmission of shared beliefs, cohesive preferences, and norms," which is crucial for "instilling corporate values and preferences" in the military organization (Böhmelt, Escribà-Folch and Pilster 2019, 1117).

graduates become part of exclusive, tightly knit alumni networks. Governments can use these close personal ties to reinforce their relations with donor states (Martinez Machain 2020; Scharpf 2020).[7] How does foreign training shape the institutional relations between recipient governments and foreign-trained officers?

Why governments pull foreign-trained officers into politics

We argue that governments have a general interest in pulling foreign-trained soldiers into the political arena. Political decision-makers usually seek to maximize their chances of political survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). They may thus try to benefit from the competence and reputation of foreign-trained officers (Bove, Rivera and Ruffa 2020). As long as courses increase the trainee's human capital or standing, civilian leaders will have an interest in politically involving foreign-trained soldiers. Pull factors are therefore likely to work independently of training content.

Leaders may involve foreign-trained officers to benefit from their strategic knowledge and managerial skills (Brooks 2008). Graduates of renowned military academies and staff colleges usually possess expert knowledge of international defense and security (Brooks 2008; Toronto 2017). Returning from abroad, officer are familiar with foreign weapon systems and arms. Leaders can utilize this expertise to inform threat assessments, intelligence analyses, and defense acquisitions (Martinez Machain 2020). In addition, leaders may exploit the managerial and technical competences of foreign-trained officers to accomplish important non-military tasks such as disaster relief (Pion-Berlin 2016).

Governments may also pull foreign-trained officers into politics because of their esteemed reputation. In many countries, the military is among the most well-respected institutions (Johnson 2018). Leaders may thus attempt to benefit politically from the prestige of officers who graduated from renowned institutions such as West Point, Saint-Cyr, or Fort Leavenworth. To elites or voters, the inclusion of foreign-trained officers in the cabinet is likely to signal political competence (Golby, Peter and Kyle

[7]Graduating from foreign academies or renowned programs also improves the career prospects of officers (Atkinson 2014; Martinez Machain 2020).

2018). Especially in times of crisis, government leaders can hope to boost their popularity through the impeccable reputation of generals.

Finally, governments may provide foreign-trained officers with political influence to prevent out-right coups. Foreign-trained officers commonly occupy key positions within military hierarchy, which they can use to recruit conspirators (Atkinson 2014; Singh 2014). Moreover, graduates often have advanced command and coordination skills that are helpful for staging successful takeovers (Savage and Caverley 2017). Government leaders therefore have an incentive to provide foreign-trained officers with lucrative posts in the cabinet or the larger state administration to defuse coup risks (Svolik 2012).

However, for these pull factors to change the level of military participation in government, soldiers must have a willingness to accept these opportunities. If soldiers lack the disposition for it or they see themselves as unsuited to the role they will turn down opportunities to enter the civilian sphere.

Why officers trained in internal warfare push into politics

We argue that officers are more motivated to take the opportunity of political involvement when they receive training in internal warfare. Soldiers generally want the military and the state to prosper (Geddes 2004).[8] They have an interest in becoming politically involved when they suspect that the government undermines this goal. As we describe next, training in irregular warfare can strengthen the officers' perception that their political involvement is necessary for ensuring the country's stability and the military's well-being.

Training in internal warfare commonly alters how officers perceive the risks of domestic instability (Long 2016). In contrast to training on warfare against conventional armies, counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism courses highlight threats that emerge from within the population. Students learn that it is of utmost importance to detect and defuse subversive plots of an enemy that hides in the civilian population (Kitson 1971; Trinquier 1964). Consequently, officers trained in counterintelligence or counter-terrorism often become highly sensitive to domestic forms of opposition

[8]Note that the protection of the nation presupposes the military's organizational well-being.

(Gläßel, González and Scharpf 2020).[9] In this mindset even protests or strikes can be harbingers of a larger subversion, which must be prevented at all costs. Officers are therefore likely to see their political involvement as a necessary step for guaranteeing effective countermeasures.

Furthermore, training in irregular warfare often propagates comprehensive strategies to defeat domestic enemies. Officers learn that effective counterinsurgency missions remove the insurgents' breeding ground by merging security operations with larger economic and social projects (Kilcullen 2010; Nagl 2002). Since the 1960s, leading foreign instructors have argued that insurgents need to be separated from their civilian supporters through a combination of psychological operations and state-building efforts (Galula 1964; Kitson 1971). First adopted by the British forces in Malaya and the French army in Indochina, these measures aim at winning the civilians' hearts and minds through improved governance and better infrastructure (Porch 2013). Officers trained in internal warfare are thus likely to see influence over non-military policies as a precondition for operational success.

The heightened sensitivity towards domestic opposition and the call for comprehensive countermeasures often motivate foreign-trained officers to re-define their professional role (Stepan 1986). Since training in internal warfare commonly identifies development issues and weak governance as the root-cause of domestic instability, officers are likely to strive for more effective policy-making on issues that go far beyond security policies. Convinced that weak governance plays into the hands of internal enemies, officers are likely to conclude that restoring stability necessitates the military's broad political engagement. Officers trained in internal warfare are therefore likely to see their political involvement as indispensable.

HYPOTHESIS 1: Foreign training in counterinsurgency warfare increases military involvement in politics.

[9]Soldiers may even deem it necessary to use "dirty methods" like torture to detect and eliminate enemies (Trinquier 1964).

Why officers trained in conventional warfare stay outside of politics

Other than operations against insurgents or terrorists, conventional warfare prepares officers for wars with foreign adversaries that operate along clear front lines (Stepan 1986). Foreign training in conventional warfare therefore commonly directs officers' attention to developments abroad (Desch 1999). It teaches officers that the clear separation between military and political affairs promises the highest chances of victory against high-powered armies. Students learn that their subordination to civilian authority is a prerequisite for successful operations against such enemies (Huntington 1985).

Foreign training in conventional warfare focuses on conveying specialized skills for sophisticated military missions and maneuvers (Biddle 2006). Particularly, US instructors are likely to emphasize that officers cannot be an "expert in the management of violence for external defense" and equally "skilled in either politics or statecraft" (Huntington 1985, 32). Conventional training is thus likely to convince officers about the benefits of separating military and civilian affairs. Officers trained abroad in conventional warfare should therefore have little incentives to undertake political tasks or influence policies beyond military matters.

The empirical implication of this is that we should expect to see a reduction of military involvement in politics. While FMT will increase the attractiveness of officers and thus increase the incentives of civilians to try to use them, officers will turn down these roles at higher rates. Conventional military training by reducing the propensity to take advantage of opportunities will drive down militarization of politics.

HYPOTHESIS 2: Foreign training in conventional warfare decreases military involvement in politics.

Addressing potential counterarguments

We argue that foreign training in irregular warfare increases the willingness of officers to meddle in politics, whereas training in conventional warfare reduces it. Before moving to the empirics, we address two potential objections to our argument.

First, one might argue that if soldiers deem their political influence necessary, they could simply seize power through a coup. This overlooks, however, that staging a coup is highly risky and that most attempts actually fail (Singh 2014; Powell 2012). Failed takeovers can rupture the entire military organization leaving the country defenseless against internal and external threats (Bell and Sudduth 2017; Geddes 2004). In light of these risks, officers are probably more likely to influence policies without violently overthrowing the government.[10]

Second, government leaders could simply adopt the military's preferred policies to keep soldiers out of politics. As explained above, experts of internal warfare commonly see comprehensive and efficient policy-making as essential for solving domestic security problems. Officers are thus likely to question if the government is both capable and willing to maintain policies that the military deems necessary. Officers also often perceive policy-makers as corrupt or dishonest, which probably exacerbates the credibility problem. Foreign-trained officers therefore have an incentive to take important policies in their own hands.

Empirical case

Testing how training content influences soldiers' political behavior demands an empirical case with large variation in courses and a low number of confounders. We draw on the Cuban Revolution in the empirical analysis. In 1959, Fidel Castro and his insurgents overthrew the government of Fulgencio Batista, which caught the United States and most Latin American governments by surprise. Gripped by fear of Communism taking a hold across the region, Washington responded with a complete overhaul of its security assistance programs. Besides conventional warfare, the United States started to instruct Latin American officers on all aspects of counterinsurgency warfare.

We exploit the change in US security assistance by bringing to bear original, hand-coded course data from the School of the Americas (SOA)—one of the key

[10] Officers may try to oust the government later on, which is probably easier when soldiers are already politically involved.

institutions in charge of educating Latin American militaries during the Cold War. Before the Cuban Revolution the school offered training in conventional warfare. Yet, after Castro's victory it was pivotal for the dissemination of counterinsurgency skills.[11] This provides us with the unique opportunity to study whether course attendance in conventional and irregular warfare motivated soldiers to become politically active.

Our empirical set-up aims at increasing confidence in internal validity. We study military and political developments in Latin American countries ten years prior and ten years after the Cuban revolution. We rely on this time window for two reasons. First, it provides us with a relatively clean and homogeneous data sample while holding constant a plethora of variables that might confound large cross-sectional analyses. This specifically alleviates problems with omitted variable bias (Clarke 2005). Second, the time window also allows us to be more certain of the treatments. Course content may change over time due to donor interests. By limiting our empirical analysis to a time span of 21 years, we increase the construct validity of our independent variables.

Cuban revolution

Fidel Castro's surprising victory over Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista on the eve of 1959 sent shock waves through the Americas (Wright 2001, 39). Comprising not more than several hundred fighters, the insurgents overthrew a dictator who enjoyed ample support from the United States. In the months before the revolution, most experts had been convinced that Castro's group posed a marginal threat, if any. In November 1958, a CIA report stated that "Fidel Castro [...] probably cannot overthrow the government in the next few months" (Central Intelligence Agency 1958, 1).

Following Castro's takeover, Havana began to export the Communist revolution across the region (Brands 2010, 25-6). Based on Che Guevara's foco theory, which proclaimed that a small number of committed guerrilleros would be sufficient to bring down a reactionary government, Cuba trained insurgents, "sent propaganda and money to fidelista groups, and occasionally dispatched arms and even personnel to support

[11] The scholarly debate on the effects of foreign military training resembles the controversy about the SOA. Some argue that it led to militarized governments while others suggest that the school had little influence, if any, on militarization.

guerrilla activities" (Wright 2001, 39-40). In 1962 alone, Havana trained 1,000–1,500 foreign fighters (Brands 2010, 42). To goal was to weaken Washington's influence which would then allow the Communists to fill the opening power vacuums.

With Cuban and Soviet influence growing across the region, Washington's influence seemed in decline. Both Havana and Moscow celebrated the possibility that successful revolutions could now create pro-Soviet regimes. As an official stated: "At any time other Latin American countries may follow after Cuba, [...] Venezuela may blow up at any moment. There are mass strikes in Chile. The same applies to Brazil and Guatemala" (Brands 2010, 41). In Washington and many Latin American capitals these developments caused outright panic.[12] The United States feared that the Cuban revolution would generate Soviet satellites in Americas' backyard; to Latin American leaders the Castro regime was the root cause of all their internal problems.

Washington's response

In fear of further communist revolutions, Washington fundamentally re-oriented its security assistance. Shortly after taking office, the Kennedy administration started to develop strategies for countering the guerrilla threats. According to Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, the goal was now to protect countries from "covert intrusion and internal subversion designed to create dissidence and insurrection" (Wright 2001, 62). Instead of supplying military hardware only, Washington sought to equip Latin American officers with skills for rectifying those conditions that had given rise to the insurgent threat in the first place (Barber and Ronning 1966, 53).

US foreign training started to propagate counterinsurgency through social and economic development. By reducing poverty and delivering economic growth, experts argued, recipients could shift the loyalty of the population away from insurgents and to the governments (Barber and Ronning 1966, 53). In this mindset, the military became the only actor capable enough to provide roads, schools, clinics, and other public services (Wright 2001, 63). Once regarded by Washington as "a major impediment to

[12]The CIA warned that revolutions were "definite possibilities in twelve of the twenty-three [Latin American] countries" (Brands 2010, 40).

the development of democracy," Latin American officers were now seen as the architects of progress and reform (Barber and Ronning 1966, 27).

Training at the School of the Americas

The reorientation of US military assistance turned the SOA into the main institution for educating Latin American officers in counterinsurgency warfare. During the 1960s the school was attended by more than 20,000 officers (Wright 2001, 64).[13] While its curriculum had emphasized hemispheric defense and provided only some courses on military intelligence, the 1961 catalogue had a clear counterinsurgency focus. The school now offered courses on counter-resistance, anti-insurrection, and jungle operations. Officers learned about "counter-espionage, counter-subversion, the study of Communist objectives" (Weeks 2003, 16).

In the mid-1960s, courses went even further now propagating the military's role in economic development. For example, a conference at the school in 1967 outlined the importance of the military for promoting education, agriculture, and medicine, for building airports, roads, homes and schools, for constructing dams, canals, and bridges, for responding to natural disasters, and for providing postal service (Weeks 2003, 17). Courses now covered "every aspect of counterinsurgency: military, paramilitary, political, sociological, and psychological" including strategies to stimulate "economic growth" (Barber and Ronning 1966, 147).

Despite the clear focus on internal security, the school also maintained courses on conventional warfare covering "the entire spectrum of military arms and services" (Barber and Ronning 1966, 146-7). This makes the SOA a formidable case to assess how foreign training in conventional and counterinsurgency warfare influenced the political ambitions of its graduates.

[13]During the Cold War, Latin American personnel was trained at over 100 US service schools and US instructors also taught soldiers on-site (Wright 2001, 64). The SOA educated the largest share of officers from the region (GAO 2018, 1).

Data and method

Our time-series cross-sectional dataset covers all independent Latin American countries between 1949 and 1969—ten years before and ten years after the Cuban Revolution. The dependent variable of our analysis is military involvement in politics. It is based on Kenwick (2020), who unifies various indicators of militarization in one continuous measure. We rely on these data for two reasons. First, it reduces the risk that our results are driven by data choice.[14] Second, the measure closely matches our argument. It captures more subtle forms of the military's political influence beyond coups.

Higher values on the dependent variable denote more political influence by officers. We inverted the original measure to ease interpretation. Counterinsurgency training should therefore be correlated with higher values whereas training in conventional warfare should be correlated with lower values. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the dependent variable in our sample. Military influence over politics was the strongest in Argentina under military dictator Juan Carlos Onganía (1966-1969) and it was the lowest in Costa Rica where the armed forces were replaced by a militarized police (1948).

Given the nature of our dependent variable, we employ linear regressions in the statistical analysis with robust standard errors. All specifications include country fixed effects to account for time-variant differences between countries. These variables also ensure that our results are not driven by structural differences in demand for certain training types. Our modeling choice thus exploits for each country the annual variation in officers' political engagement before and after the Cuban Revolution.

We construct our independent variables using original, hand-coded data on 22,075 course attendances at the SOA. Information stems from the SOA Graduate Database (SOAW 2018). In the main analysis, we use course counts rather than the number of trained individuals to capture heightened exposure and competence of students who participated in multiple courses. As shown in the SI, our results fully replicate when using student numbers. The independent variable for testing Hypothesis 1 is *Counterinsurgency courses*. It counts for each country in the dataset the annual

[14] See Kenwick (2020) for a complete list of all indicators and the underlying measurement model. We use the dynamic measure in the main analysis.

Figure 1. Distribution of dependent variable, 1949-1969.



Note: Gaussian kernel density estimates. Data stem from Kenwick (2020).

number of courses on counter-resistance, counter-insurrection, irregular warfare, jungle operations, intelligence interrogator, urban counterinsurgency operations, and military intelligence.

The independent variable for testing Hypothesis 2 is *Conventional warfare courses*. For each country, it counts the annual number of courses in, among others, command and general staff, field artillery, or heavy weapons. To ensure robustness, we create four different measures for each independent variable: the annual sum, the three-year sum, the cumulative sum of attended courses, and the share[15] of both course types. This provides us with eight different independent variables.[16] In the main analysis, we lag all independent variables by one year.

Despite the relatively short data sample, we control for various time-variant variables that may confound the hypothesized relationship or drive selection into different training types. First, we control for both international and domestic threats. The binary variables *Guerrilla attack*, *Strike*, *Demonstration*, and *Riot* capture domestic turmoil and subversion threats (Banks 2008). *Militarized interstate dispute*

[15]We divide all annual topic-specific attendances by total number of annual attendances.

[16]We logarithmize the variables to reduce the influence of large values.

Table 1. Course titles.

	Counterinsurgency warfare	%	Conventional warfare	%
1	Military Intelligence	21.3	Military Police	20.1
2	Jungle Warfare Operations	16.8	Cadet Orientation	10.3
3	Irregular Warfare Orientation	13.6	Wheeled Vehicle Mechanics	7.1
4	Counter Insurrection Operations	13.4	Engineer	4.5
5	Counter Insurrection Operations Orientation	6.7	Radio Repair	4.0
6	Counter Intelligence	5.7	Radio Operator	3.9
7	Cadet Irregular Warfare Orientation	4.9	General Supply	3.0
8	Irregular Warfare Operations	3.3	Infantry Weapons	2.9
9	Small Unit Warfare	3.0	Communications Chief	2.5
10	Civic Action	2.9	Radio Maintenance	2.0
11	Basic Internal Security Operations	1.6	Combat And Construction	1.9
12	Counter Resistance	1.5	Tactics	1.9
13	Jungle Warfare Training	1.3	Command And General Staff	1.7
14	Civic Action Planning	0.9	Field Kitchen	1.4
15	Military Intelligence Phase I	0.9	Infantry Tactics	1.4
16	Special Tactics	0.9	Repair Small Arms	1.4
17	Counterinsurgency Operations	0.4	Vehicle Maintenance Officer	1.4
18	Counter Intelligence Phase II	0.3	Anti-Aircraft Artillery And Weapons	1.3
19	Military Intelligence Phase II-III	0.3	Communications Officer	1.3

is a binary variable measuring external tensions ranging from display of force to full military conflict (Palmer et al. 2015).

Second, we include *GDP growth* to capture economic shocks and *Military expenditure per soldier* to proxy for the quality of military training at home (COW 2010; Gleditsch 2002). Both variables account for soldiers' corporate grievances. Finally, we also include *Years since coup* to control for soldiers' political ambitions and experiences in takeovers (Powell and Thyne 2011). We lag all control variables by one year.

Empirical results

We expect that training in counterinsurgency warfare at the SOA increased soldiers' motivation for political involvement whereas training in conventional warfare decreased it. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this was the case. General Omar Torrijos, the de facto ruler of Panama between 1968 and 1981 and a graduate of a counter-insurrection course at the SOA, explained: After the Cuban Revolution US security assistance "has born fruit in the creation of a new generation of young men [...] that speak, think, and live the language of development, and who, little by little, are occupying key decision-making positions in Latin American countries" (Ropp 1972, 54). "After

Cuba," he elucidated, we "came to the conclusion that there was a direct relationship between social justice and social violence" (Ropp 1972, 54).

Main analysis

The statistical results in Table 2 lend further support to this description. In line with Hypothesis 1, all four measures of *Counterinsurgency courses* are positively and significantly correlated with military involvement in politics.[17] In contrast, as suggested by Hypothesis 2, courses in *Conventional warfare* are negatively correlated with officers' political involvement. This suggests that US-sponsored training at the SOA, geared towards countering internal threats, increased militarization. Conversely, training in conventional warfare, which lacked the strong focus on social and economic development, decreased it.

Table 2. Training content and military involvement in politics (dynamic measure).

	Annual sum	Three-year sum	Cumulative sum	Course share	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Counterinsurgency courses	0.072*	0.070**	0.072**	0.490*	
	(0.034)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.246)	
Conventional warfare courses	−0.067*	−0.089**	−0.088*		−0.467†
	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.044)		(0.242)
GDP growth	0.012	0.012	0.011	0.009	0.010
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Military expenditure per soldier	0.306***	0.330***	0.324***	0.376***	0.376***
	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.071)	(0.071)
Guerrilla attack	−0.146	−0.147	−0.143	−0.015	−0.012
	(0.092)	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.095)	(0.095)
Strike	0.010	0.013	0.013	−0.018	−0.018
	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.110)	(0.135)	(0.134)
Demonstration	0.183†	0.187†	0.190†	0.251*	0.251*
	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.108)	(0.112)	(0.112)
Riot	−0.073	−0.070	−0.065	−0.054	−0.053
	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.080)	(0.084)	(0.085)
Militarized interstate dispute	0.038	0.056	0.045	0.059	0.060
	(0.094)	(0.097)	(0.096)	(0.110)	(0.110)
Years since coup	−0.045	−0.063	−0.050	−0.052	−0.050
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.063)	(0.064)
Constant	−2.088***	−2.166***	−2.043***	−3.151***	−2.681***
	(0.506)	(0.494)	(0.490)	(0.598)	(0.609)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	515.82	511.33	516.15	427.29	427.67
Adjusted R^2	0.50	0.51	0.50	0.54	0.54
Observations	302	302	302	253	253

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

[17] We include course shares in different models as both variables are highly co-linear by construction.

To ease interpretation, Figure 2 visualizes marginal effects. As is visible, a doubling of counterinsurgency training increased the military's subsequent political involvement by 19%. In contrast, the doubling of conventional warfare training lowered officers' political involvement by more than 10%. Together, the results offer first evidence on how foreign military training influenced civil-military relations. Training in irregular warfare seems to have politicized officers, motivating them to push into the political arena, while training in conventional warfare seems to have kept officers out of politics.

Figure 2. Marginal effects of course types on militarization.



Note: Calculations are based on Model 1, Table 2, using observed values for all control variables. Vertical lines give 95% confidence intervals.

Robustness checks

We undertake six robustness checks. Results are shown and described in the Supporting Information (SI). First, we show that our results remain unchanged when extending the length of the analysis window to thirty years (Table SI.3.1, 20). Second, we replicate our results with the static measure of militarization (Table SI.3.2, 21). Third, our results are robust when using student numbers instead of course attendances (Table SI.3.3, 22). Fourth, our results hold when introducing lagged dependent

variables to address autocorrelation (Table SI.3.4, 23). Fifth, our results also replicate with higher-order lags of the independent variables (Table SI.3.5, 24). Sixth, the results remain unchanged when controlling for regime type, US affinity, and the post-Cuban revolution period (Table SI.3.6, 25, and Table SI.3.7, 26).

Testing additional implications

This section unpacks SOA training to probe how counterinsurgency training harmed civil-military relations.

Course content

We first probe which aspects of counterinsurgency training at the SOA fueled militarization. With course manuals being unavailable for our analysis period, we exploit the three main changes in the SOA curriculum during the 1960s to proxy for course content. According to various works (e.g., Barber and Ronning 1966; Weeks 2003), the SOA provided conventional training until 1961. The school then started to also offer training in anti-guerrilla operations. From 1966 onward courses also highlighted the military's importance for political, social, and economic development. If our argument is correct, we should thus observe that course attendances first stabilized civilian control but gradually increased military involvement in politics after 1961.

We introduce to our analysis an interaction between each course type variable and a categorical variable that identifies the school's major curriculum changes.[18] Figure 3 depicts substantive results. As expected, training in conventional warfare decreased the officers' involvement in politics (left panel). This changed notably when the school started to offer counterinsurgency training (center panel). The focus on state-building fully reversed the original relationship leading to an increase in militarization (right panel). Together this suggests that officers became politically involved after foreign instructors had exposed them to modernization ideas.

A residual concern may be that changes in the curriculum were responses to the developments in the Americas. However, Latin America made up only a small part of the US policy makers' concern when designing the specificities of counterinsurgency aid.[19] The Special Group on counterinsurgency—Kennedy's top advisory body

[18] See SI for a detailed variable description and statistical results.

[19] In addition, Shafer (2014) has shown that Washington's recommendations were largely driven by abstract beliefs in the precepts of modernization theory.

Figure 3. Effects of different course content.



Note: Calculations are based on Model 4, Table SI.2.1, using observed values for all control variables.

on internal warfare—maintained a strong South East Asia focus throughout. For obvious reasons, Vietnam received much of the attention, regularly referred to as the "laboratory" for counterinsurgency assistance (Michaels 2012, 53). Overall, there is good historical reason to believe that much development in counterinsurgency training in our analysis period was largely independent of the countries in our sample.

Course structure

Next, we assess how the structure of counterinsurgency training and specifically how content was taught at the SOA incentivized foreign students to become politically involved. Since it is impossible to obtain information on class-room delivery, we use information on course lengths to proxy for how counterinsurgency training was structured. In particular, we exploit that short courses probably sought to swiftly teach students standardized, off-the-shelf tactics for combating subversive movements. This may have left little room for nuanced discussions or adapting content to the trainee's home political environment. We therefore expect that it was particularly short counterinsurgency courses that fostered militarization.

Figure 4 visualizes our hand-coded course length data for counterinsurgency and conventional warfare courses. While most courses lasted between two and four months,

Figure 4. Course lengths.



some counterinsurgency courses were significantly shorter, lasting only two to three weeks. To test how this influenced subsequent political activities by SOA graduates, we interact our course attendance variables with the respective course length variables. Figure 5 visualizes effects in a marginal effects plot. It shows that there is a noticeable difference in the moderating effect of course lengths across course types. As expected, counterinsurgency courses specifically increased militarization when they lasted less than two months and this effect becomes smaller with counterinsurgency courses lasting longer. In contrast, course length does not exert a strong moderating effect on the relationship between conventional warfare training and the military's involvement in politics. If any, conventional warfare training of the common two-month duration seem to have reduced militarization. Overall, this offers suggestive evidence that training in internal warfare increased militarization when trainee's received only short primers in counterinsurgency operations that left little room for highlighting civil-military relations problems.

Figure 5. Moderating effect of course lengths.



Note: Graph shows marginal effects of the number of courses attended on military involvement in politics (y-axis) at different course lengths, measured in months (x-axis). Calculations are based on Model 2, Table **??**, using observed values for all control variables.

Government posts

This check probes the effect of counterinsurgency training beyond control over policies. If training in internal warfare motivates soldiers to push into politics, then counterinsurgency training should also eventually increase the likelihood that officers seek high government posts. We test this implication with data by Eibl, Hertog and Slater (2019) and Svolik (2012). The dependent variable identifies regimes with civilian rule (value of 0), regimes where the head of the executive is a civilian but officers intervene in policies unrelated to national security (value of 1), and regimes where the head of the executive is a professional soldier (value of 2). Results in Table SI.2.4 show that attending counterinsurgency courses at the SOA is correlated with a subsequent increase in the likelihood that active-duty officers became part of the government. In contrast, training in conventional warfare is correlated with a decrease in the likelihood of a military-dominated government. Together the findings offer additional support for our argument that foreign training in irregular warfare motivates soldiers to step into the political arena.

Cuban revolution shock

This test exploits the shock of the Cuban Revolution to offer further evidence on the militarization effect of counterinsurgency training using a difference-in-differences design (Angrist and Pischke 2009). When Castro managed to conquer Havana, allies of the ousted Batista regime became deeply frightened about also falling victim to a Communist uprising. Our treatment group therefore consists of Latin American governments that were allied to the Batista regime before the Revolution. We rely on international affiliation scores to distinguish close Batista allies from other states (Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten 2017). For each country we identify the average affiliation score before the 1959 Cuban Revolution, i.e. in the pre-treatment window. Countries with average scores equal to or higher than the 75th percentile serve as treated cases, while the others are part of the control group.

If our argument is correct, in aftermath of the Cuban Revolution allies to the former Cuban dictator Batista should have experienced a steeper political militarization than non-allied countries.[20] Figure 6 shows first descriptive evidence. Countries in the treatment and control group followed a remarkably similar trend prior to the Cuban Revolution. However, three years after Latin American officers had first attended counterinsurgency training at the SOA, countries allied to pre-revolution Cuba experienced a significant steeper increase in the military's political involvement than countries without close relations to the old Batista regime. This pattern is corroborated by a statistical analysis.[21] Militarization increased systematically among Batista allies following the introduction of counterinsurgency training at the SOA.

Next, we triangulate the temporal effect of the Cuban Revolution and the accompanying change in SOA courses on militarization using a saturated difference-in-differences analysis (Angrist and Pischke 2009).[22] To this end, we include different leads and lags of the interaction between the Cuban Revolution and countries allied to Batista in the statistical models. Figure 7 shows that SOA training did not significantly influence the officers' political influence before, during, and right after

[20] See SI for evidence on course enrollments.

[21] See SI for results.

[22] See SI for results.

Figure 6. Military influence over politics before and after Cuban Revolution.



Note: Treatment group consists of Latin American countries with an average Cuban affiliation score (1949-1958) equal or higher to the 75th percentile. Control group contains all other countries in the region.

the Cuban Revolution. Yet, from 1965 onward, when courses started to propagate the military's expansion into civilian sectors, officers became politically involved. This corroborates the evidence presented above, which suggests that training subsequently eroded civil-military relations when the school added a state-building topics to its counterinsurgency courses.

Governments' threat perceptions

Finally, we address potential concerns that our results are driven by the threat perception of Latin American governments only. While we control for various domestic threat types in the main analysis, one might argue that all Latin American leaders who feared for their stay in office may have enrolled soldiers in counterinsurgency courses and simultaneously pulled officers into the political arena. We undertake two tests to assess whether threat perceptions confound our analysis. First, we replicate our main analysis while controlling for ongoing insurgencies. Uprisings by Cuban-style guerrilla groups probably induced high fears in governments. We employ two measures of insurgencies to ensure that our results are not driven by date choice (Kalyvas and

Figure 7. Temporal effect of Cuban Revolution.



Note: Graph shows coefficient estimates for a saturated differences-in-differences analysis including lags and leads of the Cuban Revolution in 1959.

Balcells 2010; Lyall and Wilson 2009). In line with our expectation, Table SI.2.7 shows that our results remain unchanged when controlling for insurgencies.

Second, we re-run our analysis but only utilize temporal variation in SOA training for countries allied to the pre-revolution Batista regime. The idea here is that in this sample threat perception is constant by design and should therefore not influence results. Statistically, this is a strong test since results also need to withstand a significant drop in observations. Results in Table SI.2.8 show that counterinsurgency courses are still positively and significantly correlated with the military's involvement in politics. Our key finding does not seem to be driven by the threat perceptions of Latin American governments. This makes us confident that counterinsurgency courses increased militarization independent of the government's original sending decision.

Conclusion

How does security assistance shape civil-military relations in recipient states? We scrutinize the influence of foreign military training content on the willingness of soldiers

to become politically involved. We argue that training geared towards countering domestic security threats, such as counterinsurgency warfare, politicizes officers and motivates them to influence policies. Training in conventional warfare, by contrast, should convince officers to stay clear of politics.

Focusing on the Cuban Revolution and the subsequent re-modeling of US security assistance, the empirical findings demonstrate how different course types lead to distinct patterns of militarization. Participation in counterinsurgency courses at the School of the Americas increased officers' political involvement, whereas attendance in courses on conventional warfare decreased it. Our findings also suggest that the militarization effect resulted from the state-building focus of counterinsurgency training, which aimed at the swift imparting of standardized tactics. To our knowledge, this is the first time quantitative evidence shows that military training in irregular warfare led to a change of civil-military relations during the Cold War.

The findings have important implications. First, beliefs once injected into military organizations are commonly passed on from one officer generation to the next. Foreign military training such as IMET is therefore likely to shape the minds and behavior of future officers. Our findings may thus mark a first step in understanding why officers in Brazil and elsewhere once again seem willing to assume cabinet posts or serve as political advisers. Future research may study how changes to training curricula can replace dangerous norms previously instilled in military organizations.

Second, the influence of security assistance on military thinking in recipient countries highlights an important trade-off for donor states. To protect states and citizens, foreign training programs aim to swiftly transmit politically neutral skills. Our findings indicate that seemingly unproblematic training in population-centric warfare or hearts-and-minds operations can have detrimental effects, if not carefully designed. Content that seems apolitical can have profound political implications for soldiers and might unintentionally empower military organizations at the expense of civilian institutions (Brooks 2020). Future research may want to scrutinize how foreign trainees perceive training content and which lessons soldiers take away.

Finally, our findings have implications for research on domestic military training and professionalism. As with studies on foreign training, findings for domestic

education on soldiers' political role have been mixed, particularly in the context of states with weak institutions. Our results suggest that a narrow focus on military professionalization is unlikely to explain the variation in political outcomes such as coups. Training content and how officers understand professionalism may be as important (Stepan 1986). As with foreign training, what domestic training conveys is likely to have important consequences for the military's behavior.

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Supporting Information (SI)

SI Contents

SI.1 Descriptive statistics

This section offers descriptive statistics.

1) Table SI.1.1 gives summary statistics for variables of the main analysis, the analyses that probe additional theoretical implications, and the robustness checks.

2) Table SI.1.2 gives summary statistics for variables used in the difference-in-differences analysis.

3) Table SI.1.3 gives summary statistics for variables used in the global analysis that probes the external validity of the theoretical argument.

4) Figure SI.1.1 shows the distribution of course contents. Content information of topics was extracted from course titles. For each course type, titles are sorted from the highest relative number of attendances to the lowest.

5) Figure **??** shows the spatial-temporal variation in attendances in counterinsurgency and conventional warfare courses. Attendances varied across countries of the Americas as well as within them, i.e. over time.

Table SI.1.1. Summary statistics.

	Type	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.
Military involvement in politics (Kenwick dynamic measure)	Continous	399	0.39	0.82	-1.89	2.69
Military involvement in politics (Kenwick static measure)	Continous	399	0.29	0.92	-0.89	2.25
Military involvement in politics (Svolik measure)	Binary	377	0.33	0.47	0.00	1.00
Military involvement in politics (Svolik measure)	Categorical	377	0.47	0.72	0.00	2.00
Counterinsurgency courses (Annual sum)[a,b]	Count	399	0.87	1.26	0.00	5.38
Conventional warfare courses (Annual sum)[a,b]	Count	399	2.71	1.80	0.00	5.97
Counterinsurgency courses (Three-year sum)[b]	Count	399	1.29	1.66	0.00	5.86
Conventional warfare courses (Three-year sum)[b]	Count	399	3.75	1.91	0.00	6.81
Counterinsurgency courses (Cumulative sum)[b]	Count	399	1.75	1.98	0.00	6.60
Conventional warfare courses (Cumulative sum)[b]	Count	399	4.96	2.01	0.00	8.11
Counterinsurgency courses (Course share)[a]	Continous	313	0.11	0.18	0.00	1.00
Conventional warfare courses (Course share)[a]	Continous	313	0.87	0.20	0.00	1.00
Counterinsurgency students (Annual sum)[a,b]	Count	399	0.86	1.25	0.00	5.38
Conventional warfare students (Annual sum)[a,b]	Count	399	2.65	1.77	0.00	5.74
Counterinsurgency students (Three-year sum)[b]	Count	399	1.28	1.65	0.00	5.80
Conventional warfare students (Three-year sum)[b]	Count	399	3.63	1.94	0.00	6.55
Counterinsurgency students (Cumulative sum)[b]	Count	399	1.74	1.97	0.00	6.57
Conventional warfare students (Cumulative sum)[b]	Count	399	4.81	2.02	0.00	7.89
Counterinsurgency students (Course share)[a]	Continous	313	0.12	0.19	0.00	1.00
Conventional warfare students (Course share)[a]	Continous	313	0.89	0.19	0.00	1.00
All courses[b]	Count	399	2.98	1.78	0.00	5.97
Counterinsurgency courses[b]	Count	399	0.98	1.31	0.00	5.38
Conventional warfare courses[b]	Count	399	2.84	1.76	0.00	5.97
Curriculum	Categorical	399	0.62	0.79	0.00	2.00
Counterinsurgency course length (Average)[a]	Count	399	0.66	1.09	0.00	4.00
Conventional warfare course length (Average)[a]	Count	399	2.21	1.64	0.00	6.00
Counterinsurgency course length (Minimum)[a]	Count	399	0.50	0.93	0.00	4.00
Conventional warfare course length (Minimum)[a]	Count	399	1.24	1.28	0.00	6.00
Counterinsurgency course length (Maximum)[a]	Count	399	0.87	1.40	0.00	5.00
Conventional warfare course length (Maximum)[a]	Count	399	3.72	2.96	0.00	11.00
Insurgency (Lyall & Wilson)[a]	Binary	399	0.07	0.25	0.00	1.00
Insurgency (Kalyvas & Balcells)[a]	Binary	399	0.01	0.10	0.00	1.00
Batista ally	Binary	399	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00
GDP growth[a]	Continous	342	4.83	5.33	-16.84	40.05
Military expenditure per soldier[a,b]	Continous	344	7.35	0.93	4.31	10.95
Guerrilla attack[a]	Binary	399	0.21	0.40	0.00	1.00
Strike[a]	Binary	399	0.13	0.33	0.00	1.00
Demonstration[a]	Binary	399	0.17	0.37	0.00	1.00
Riot[a]	Binary	399	0.37	0.48	0.00	1.00
Militarized interstate dispute[a]	Binary	399	0.17	0.37	0.00	1.00
Years since coup[b]	Count	380	1.30	0.93	0.00	3.00
Democracy[a]	Binary	399	0.42	0.49	0.00	1.00
US affinity[a]	Continous	399	4.05	0.43	3.06	4.88
Post-Cuban revolution period	Binary	399	0.52	0.50	0.00	1.00

Note: [a] Variable lagged by one year. [b] Variable logarithmized.

Table SI.1.2. Summary statistics (difference-in-differences analysis).

	Type	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.
Military involvement in politics (Kenwick dynamic measure)	Continous	399	0.39	0.82	-1.89	2.69
Post-revolution$_{t\geq 1960}$	Binary	399	0.48	0.50	0.00	1.00
Post-revolution$_{t\geq 1961}$	Binary	399	0.43	0.50	0.00	1.00
Post-revolution$_{t\geq 1962}$	Binary	399	0.38	0.49	0.00	1.00
Post-revolution$_{t\geq 1963}$	Binary	399	0.33	0.47	0.00	1.00
Post-revolution$_{t\geq 1964}$	Binary	399	0.29	0.45	0.00	1.00
Post-revolution$_{t\geq 1965}$	Binary	399	0.24	0.43	0.00	1.00
Revolution$_{t-1}$	Binary	399	0.05	0.21	0.00	1.00
Revolution$_{t}$	Binary	399	0.05	0.21	0.00	1.00
Revolution$_{t+1}$	Binary	399	0.05	0.21	0.00	1.00
Revolution$_{t+2}$	Binary	399	0.05	0.21	0.00	1.00
Revolution$_{t+3}$	Binary	399	0.05	0.21	0.00	1.00
Revolution$_{t+4}$	Binary	399	0.05	0.21	0.00	1.00
Revolution$_{t+5}$	Binary	399	0.05	0.21	0.00	1.00
Revolution$_{t+6,\ldots,10}$	Binary	399	0.24	0.43	0.00	1.00
Batista ally	Binary	399	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00

Table SI.1.3. Summary statistics (external validity analysis).

	Type	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.
Military involvement in politics (Kenwick dynamic measure)	Continous	2939	-0.20	1.01	-3.10	3.44
Number of US-trained soldiers[a,b]	Count	2751	2.09	2.01	0.00	6.71
Post-September 11	Binary	2939	0.45	0.50	0.00	1.00
GDP growth[a]	Continous	2868	3.63	11.07	-65.32	186.20
Military expenditure per soldier[a,b]	Continous	2726	9.47	1.41	1.26	14.70
Guerrilla attack[a]	Binary	2912	0.10	0.30	0.00	1.00
Strike[a]	Binary	2912	0.08	0.27	0.00	1.00
Demonstration[a]	Binary	2912	0.24	0.43	0.00	1.00
Riot[a]	Binary	2912	0.14	0.35	0.00	1.00
Militarized interstate dispute[a]	Binary	2914	0.31	0.46	0.00	1.00
Years since coup[b]	Count	2937	2.89	1.02	0.00	4.11

Note: [a] Variable lagged by one year. [b] Variable logarithmized.

Figure SI.1.1. Course contents

(a) Counterinsurgency



(b) Conventional warfare



Note: Graph shows proportion of topics among all attended counterinsurgency courses as well as proportion of topics among conventional warfare courses.

Figure SI.1.2. Spatial-temporal variation in course attendances

(a) Counterinsurgency



(b) Conventional warfare



Note: Graph shows number (raw and smoothed) of attended courses across countries and over time.

SI.2 Testing additional implications

This section offers regression results and visualizations that underlie the tests of theoretical implications.

1) **Course content.** This test probes how the changes in the SOA curriculum influenced militarization. The SOA provided conventional training till 1961, it then offered training in anti-guerrilla operations, and from 1966 onward courses highlighted the military's importance for political, social, and economic development. Based on our argument, we expect that course attendance first stabilized civilian control but then gradually increased militarization after 1961. Models in Table SI.2.1 contain interactions between the course type variables and the categorical variable, *Curriculum*, which captures the increasing focus on counterinsurgency warfare (1=1949-1960; 2=1961-1965, 3=1966-1969). Results from linear fixed effects regressions show that the effect of course type on military involvement in politics increases at higher values of *Curriculum*. In line with our argument, the interaction effect is strongest for *Counterinsurgency courses* (Model 3 and 4) and weakest for *Conventional warfare courses* (Model 5 and 6). Together the findings show that comprehensive counterinsurgency training increases militarization while conventional warfare rather stabilizes civilian control.

2) **Course structure.** This test probes how the structure of SOA counterinsurgency training influenced militarization. We expect that short, standardized counterinsurgency courses that left little room for nuanced discussions fostered military involvement in politics. We employ hand-coded data on course lengths. To ensure robustness, we code six versions of the variable *Course length* using the respective average, minimum, or maximum length in each country-year for each of the two course types. We interact each variable with their respective course attendance variable. Table SI.2.2 shows results. In line with our expectation, the interaction term between *Counterinsurgency courses* and *Course length* are negative and statistically significant for Models 1–4. Shorter (longer) course lengths of counterinsurgency courses increase (decrease) the effect of this course type, leading to higher (lower) values of military involvement in politics. As can be seen in Model 5–6, this effect is statistically insignificant for the maximum course length variable, which offers additional support. The maximum course length variable captures the upper bound of course duration thereby indicating that longer counterinsurgency courses lower the otherwise militarizing effect of this course type. In addition, the coefficient estimates for the interaction term between *Conventional warfare courses* and *Course length* is statistically insignificant throughout. The effect of training in conventional warfare is not influenced by the length of these courses. Together the results suggest that training in internal warfare increased militarization when trainee's received only short primers on counterinsurgency.

3) **Government posts.** This test analyzes how course types influence the likelihood of officers holding government posts. We follow Eibl, Hertog and Slater (2019) and replicate our analysis with two alternative measures of militarization based on data by Svolik (2012). The first measure is binary. It assumes the value of 1 if military involvement in politics is either direct or indirect, and 0 otherwise. The second measure is categorical. It is 0 for civilian regimes without military involvement, 1 if military involvement in politics is indirect, and 2 if military involvement is direct.

Indirect involvement means that the head of the executive is a civilian but that officers intervene in policies unrelated to national security. Direct involvement describes regimes where the head of the executive is a professional soldier. Results in Table SI.2.3 and Table SI.2.4 show that our main results replicate for both dependent variables, the only exception being the cumulative sum of courses (Model 3, Table SI.2.4). Overall, *Counterinsurgency courses* increase the likelihood of officers holding high government posts, whereas *Conventional warefare courses* decrease it.

4) **Cuban shock.** This test uses difference-in-differences analyses to scrutinize whether the shock of the Cuban Revolution and the subsequent dissemination of US counterinsurgency training led to significantly higher levels of militarization among allies of the old Batista regime. We expect that, in contrast to other countries, Batista allies were highly concerned about facing the same fate as the Cuban dictator, which led them to boost participation in courses on internal warfare training at the SOA. Figure SI.2.1 shows that the soldiers of Batista allies participated in more counterinsurgency courses than soldiers from other countries.

   The first difference-in-differences analysis interacts a group variable, which is 1 for Batista allies (treatment group) and 0 otherwise (control group), with the treatment variable, which is 0 before the Cuban Revolution (pre-treatment period) and 1 after the Revolution (post-treatment period). In order to be sensitive for changes to the SOA curriculum and the availability of counterinsurgency courses (see results above), we run models with different versions of the treatment variable. Results in Table SI.2.5 show that military involvement in politics significantly increased after the Cuban Revolution. This effect is particularly strong for the period after 1964 when SOA training started to have clear state-building focus.

   The second difference-in-differences analysis relies on saturated models (Angrist and Pischke 2009). The models include several interaction effects consisting of the group variable (1=Batista ally, 0=otherwise) and different versions of the treatment variable. These treatment variables slice up the pre- and post-treatment periods to triangulate anticipatory and lagged effects. Results in Table SI.2.6 show again that militarization significantly increased when SOA counterinsurgency training included state-building topics. Results of Model 2 are depict in Figure 7 in the manuscript.

5) **Governments' threat perceptions.** We undertake two tests to address the potential concern that results are driven by the threat perceptions of Latin American governments only. First, we replicate the main analysis while controlling for ongoing insurgencies. Uprisings by Cuban-style guerrilla groups probably induced high fears in governments. To ensure the robustness of our results, we generate two different versions of the variable *Insurgency* using data by Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) and by Lyall and Wilson (2009). Table SI.2.7 shows that our results remain unaffected by the inclusion of the insurgency variables.

   Second, we re-run our analysis but only utilize the temporal variation in SOA training of countries allied to the pre-revolution Batista regime. In this sample, threat perception is constant by design and should therefore not influence our results. In addition this is a strong test since results also need to withstand a significant drop in observations. Table SI.2.8 shows that the variable *Counterinsurgency courses* remains positively and significantly correlated with military involvement in politics, whereas coefficient estimates for *Conventional warfare courses* drop below conventional levels

of statistical significance in some specifications. Together our key findings do not seem to be driven by the threat perceptions of Latin American governments.

Table SI.2.1. Training and focus of curriculum.

	All courses		Counterinsurgency courses		Conventional warfare courses	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
All courses X Curriculum	0.043†	0.054*				
	(0.025)	(0.026)				
Counterinsurgency courses X Curriculum			0.133**	0.118**		
			(0.043)	(0.041)		
Conventional warfare courses X Curriculum					0.046†	0.049†
					(0.026)	(0.027)
All courses	−0.054**	−0.081**				
	(0.021)	(0.031)				
Counterinsurgency courses			−0.145**	−0.104*	−0.047	−0.012
			(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.037)	(0.040)
Conventional warfare courses			−0.033	−0.054†	−0.049*	−0.077*
			(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.022)	(0.032)
Curriculum	−0.095	−0.055	−0.077	−0.027	−0.049	−0.023
	(0.096)	(0.105)	(0.074)	(0.081)	(0.094)	(0.103)
GDP growth		0.010		0.011		0.010
		(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.008)
Military expenditure per soldier		0.294***		0.276***		0.294***
		(0.065)		(0.064)		(0.065)
Guerrilla attack		−0.161†		−0.161†		−0.158†
		(0.092)		(0.089)		(0.092)
Strike		0.011		0.026		0.008
		(0.108)		(0.105)		(0.109)
Demonstration		0.158		0.126		0.163
		(0.106)		(0.106)		(0.107)
Riot		−0.061		−0.048		−0.066
		(0.080)		(0.081)		(0.080)
Militarized interstate dispute		0.040		0.009		0.039
		(0.095)		(0.097)		(0.095)
Years since coup		−0.085		−0.085		−0.087
		(0.057)		(0.055)		(0.056)
Constant	0.104	−1.890***	0.086	−1.798***	0.075	−1.907***
	(0.171)	(0.499)	(0.166)	(0.489)	(0.175)	(0.502)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	642.39	513.67	630.92	509.55	643.83	517.02
Adjusted R^2	0.58	0.50	0.60	0.51	0.58	0.50
Observations	399	302	399	302	399	302

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SI.2.2. Course lengths, training content, and military involvement in politics (dynamic measure).

	Average course length		Minimum course length		Maximum course length	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Counterinsurgency courses X course length	−0.003*	−0.003*	−0.005***	−0.005***	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Counterinsurgency courses	0.203***	0.211***	0.212***	0.223***	0.132*	0.130*
	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.058)	(0.058)
Counterinsurgency course length	0.001	0.001	0.003	0.003†	−0.000	−0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Conventional warfare courses X course length		0.000		0.001		−0.000
		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.000)
Conventional warfare courses	−0.067*	−0.092*	−0.067*	−0.103**	−0.068*	−0.059
	(0.027)	(0.040)	(0.026)	(0.037)	(0.028)	(0.036)
Conventional warfare course length		−0.001		−0.002		0.001
		(0.001)		(0.002)		(0.001)
GDP growth	0.011	0.012	0.011	0.011	0.012	0.012
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Military expenditure per soldier	0.275***	0.279***	0.259***	0.259***	0.298***	0.300***
	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.067)	(0.067)
Guerrilla attack	−0.124	−0.118	−0.140	−0.132	−0.134	−0.128
	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.094)	(0.093)	(0.093)
Strike	−0.021	−0.025	0.003	−0.010	−0.012	−0.003
	(0.107)	(0.110)	(0.103)	(0.108)	(0.112)	(0.112)
Demonstration	0.198†	0.206†	0.183†	0.192†	0.202†	0.197†
	(0.104)	(0.105)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.105)	(0.103)
Riot	−0.115	−0.117	−0.106	−0.099	−0.096	−0.099
	(0.080)	(0.081)	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.081)	(0.082)
Militarized interstate dispute	0.035	0.038	0.014	0.007	0.030	0.034
	(0.098)	(0.099)	(0.094)	(0.092)	(0.099)	(0.099)
Years since coup	−0.048	−0.049	−0.061	−0.063	−0.046	−0.045
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.054)
Constant	−1.866***	−1.880***	−1.732***	−1.715***	−2.026***	−2.063***
	(0.494)	(0.500)	(0.465)	(0.470)	(0.512)	(0.514)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	507.97	510.88	495.56	496.10	517.54	520.60
Adjusted R^2	0.52	0.51	0.54	0.54	0.50	0.50
Observations	302	302	302	302	302	302

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SI.2.3. Training content and military involvement in politics (Binary Svolik measure).

	Annual sum	Three-year sum	Cumulative sum	Course share	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Counterinsurgency courses	0.051*	0.045**	0.042*	0.358*	
	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.148)	
Conventional warfare courses	−0.050*	−0.063**	−0.055†		−0.354*
	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.033)		(0.144)
GDP growth	0.015*	0.015*	0.014*	0.013†	0.013†
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Military expenditure per soldier	0.213***	0.229***	0.223***	0.272***	0.272***
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.048)
Guerrilla attack	−0.112	−0.111	−0.107	0.012	0.013
	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)
Strike	0.075	0.079	0.074	0.070	0.069
	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.087)	(0.087)
Demonstration	0.099	0.103	0.102	0.148*	0.148*
	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.071)	(0.073)	(0.073)
Riot	−0.023	−0.020	−0.017	−0.008	−0.007
	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)
Militarized interstate dispute	0.135†	0.143†	0.134†	0.154†	0.156†
	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.085)	(0.085)
Years since coup	−0.001	−0.012	−0.004	−0.010	−0.009
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Constant	−1.173**	−1.226***	−1.139**	−2.087***	−1.736***
	(0.357)	(0.351)	(0.346)	(0.354)	(0.379)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	279.75	277.04	283.25	207.76	207.63
Adjusted R^2	0.38	0.38	0.37	0.44	0.44
Observations	284	284	284	236	236

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SI.2.4. Training content and military involvement in politics (Categorical Svolik measure).

	Annual sum	Three-year sum	Cumulative sum	Course share	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Counterinsurgency courses	0.090*	0.075*	0.046	0.612*	
	(0.040)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.265)	
Conventional warfare courses	−0.089*	−0.074*	−0.006		−0.607*
	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.045)		(0.258)
GDP growth	0.021*	0.020*	0.020*	0.018*	0.018*
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Military expenditure per soldier	0.368***	0.394***	0.389***	0.478***	0.479***
	(0.083)	(0.082)	(0.080)	(0.082)	(0.082)
Guerrilla attack	−0.195†	−0.200†	−0.205†	−0.045	−0.044
	(0.116)	(0.115)	(0.116)	(0.117)	(0.117)
Strike	0.076	0.078	0.077	0.046	0.045
	(0.123)	(0.120)	(0.118)	(0.139)	(0.138)
Demonstration	0.129	0.129	0.119	0.194	0.195
	(0.119)	(0.118)	(0.121)	(0.127)	(0.126)
Riot	−0.059	−0.054	−0.056	−0.050	−0.048
	(0.093)	(0.092)	(0.094)	(0.093)	(0.093)
Militarized interstate dispute	0.133	0.134	0.108	0.160	0.164
	(0.115)	(0.116)	(0.114)	(0.128)	(0.128)
Years since coup	0.021	0.002	0.009	0.031	0.033
	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.075)	(0.075)
Constant	−2.231***	−2.347***	−2.416***	−3.639***	−3.039***
	(0.608)	(0.595)	(0.588)	(0.617)	(0.660)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	567.13	568.58	573.53	464.90	464.70
Adjusted R^2	0.34	0.33	0.32	0.38	0.38
Observations	284	284	284	236	236

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SI.2.5. Difference-in-Differences for military involvement in politics (dynamic measure).

	Without controls						With controls					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Batista ally X Post-revolution$_{t\geq 1960}$	0.250						0.470**					
	(0.195)						(0.178)					
Batista ally X Post-revolution$_{t\geq 1961}$		0.294						0.493**				
		(0.200)						(0.183)				
Batista ally X Post-revolution$_{t\geq 1962}$			0.349†						0.551**			
			(0.207)						(0.193)			
Batista ally X Post-revolution$_{t\geq 1963}$				0.419†						0.649**		
				(0.217)						(0.206)		
Batista ally X Post-revolution$_{t\geq 1964}$					0.498*						0.744***	
					(0.230)						(0.222)	
Batista ally X Post-revolution$_{t\geq 1965}$						0.547*						0.750**
						(0.254)						(0.248)
Post-revolution$_{t\geq 1960,\ldots,1965}$	−0.154†	−0.118	−0.077	−0.031	0.032	0.042	−0.276**	−0.234*	−0.207*	−0.182†	−0.152	−0.136
	(0.093)	(0.096)	(0.099)	(0.104)	(0.110)	(0.118)	(0.092)	(0.094)	(0.097)	(0.103)	(0.110)	(0.119)
Batista ally	0.040	0.033	0.026	0.020	0.017	0.029	−0.460***	−0.447***	−0.443***	−0.449***	−0.442***	−0.395***
	(0.124)	(0.118)	(0.112)	(0.107)	(0.103)	(0.099)	(0.119)	(0.113)	(0.107)	(0.101)	(0.098)	(0.098)
Constant	0.417***	0.395***	0.373***	0.354***	0.335***	0.334***	−1.202***	−1.260***	−1.307***	−1.361***	−1.393***	−1.366***
	(0.059)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.316)	(0.315)	(0.315)	(0.313)	(0.310)	(0.315)
Time varying controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	972.82	973.10	972.42	970.39	966.53	965.59	703.75	704.36	703.46	700.97	697.63	698.54
Adjusted R^2	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.12	0.12
Observations	399	399	399	399	399	399	318	318	318	318	318	318

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

Post-revolution dummies assume value of one for years equal to or greater than the indicated one.

Batista ally variable assumes value of one for all countries with pre-treatment affinity score equal to or larger than 75th percentile.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SI.2.6. Probing anticipatory and lagged effects.

	(1)	(2)
Batista ally X Revolution$_{t-1}$	0.177	0.191
	(0.497)	(0.374)
Batista ally X Revolution$_{t}$	−0.080	0.080
	(0.359)	(0.305)
Batista ally X Revolution$_{t+1}$	−0.072	0.148
	(0.355)	(0.298)
Batista ally X Revolution$_{t+2}$	−0.089	0.089
	(0.346)	(0.303)
Batista ally X Revolution$_{t+3}$	−0.097	0.008
	(0.343)	(0.278)
Batista ally X Revolution$_{t+4}$	−0.052	0.125
	(0.347)	(0.309)
Batista ally X Revolution$_{t+5}$	0.180	0.550
	(0.391)	(0.399)
Batista ally X Revolution$_{t+6,\ldots,10}$	0.544*	0.855**
	(0.276)	(0.268)
Revolution$_{t-1}$	−0.133	−0.216
	(0.231)	(0.203)
Revolution$_{t}$	−0.262	−0.268
	(0.221)	(0.198)
Revolution$_{t+1}$	−0.308	−0.371†
	(0.221)	(0.202)
Revolution$_{t+2}$	−0.337	−0.353†
	(0.220)	(0.197)
Revolution$_{t+3}$	−0.347	−0.363†
	(0.219)	(0.191)
Revolution$_{t+4}$	−0.390†	−0.392†
	(0.221)	(0.205)
Revolution$_{t+5}$	−0.132	−0.330
	(0.247)	(0.238)
Revolution$_{t+6,\ldots,10}$	−0.077	−0.320*
	(0.126)	(0.126)
Batista ally	0.031	−0.492***
	(0.139)	(0.133)
Constant	0.453***	−1.101***
	(0.065)	(0.312)
Time varying controls	No	Yes
AIC	980.97	714.48
Adjusted R^2	0.02	0.11
Observations	399	318

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SI.2.7. Fixed effects regressions with controls for insurgencies.

	Lyall & Wilson measure					Kalyvas & Balcells measure				
	(1) Annual sum	(2) Three-year sum	(3) Cumulative sum	(4) Course share	(5) Course share	(6) Annual sum	(7) Three-year sum	(8) Cumulative sum	(9) Course share	(10) Course share
Counterinsurgency courses	0.079*	0.073**	0.075**	0.515*		0.076*	0.073**	0.075**	0.516*	
	(0.035)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.250)		(0.034)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.250)	
Conventional warfare courses	−0.073**	−0.091**	−0.091*		−0.491*	−0.075**	−0.095**	−0.094*		−0.493*
	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.044)		(0.246)	(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.045)		(0.246)
Insurgency	−0.336*	−0.298†	−0.283†	−0.239†	−0.236†	−0.535**	−0.538**	−0.485**	−0.389*	−0.385*
	(0.157)	(0.166)	(0.160)	(0.142)	(0.142)	(0.188)	(0.171)	(0.174)	(0.175)	(0.175)
GDP growth	0.013	0.013	0.011	0.010	0.010	0.013	0.013†	0.011	0.010	0.010
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Military expenditure per soldier	0.307***	0.333***	0.326***	0.371***	0.371***	0.323***	0.350***	0.342***	0.383***	0.383***
	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.071)	(0.071)
Guerrilla attack	−0.121	−0.124	−0.121	0.003	0.005	−0.121	−0.122	−0.121	−0.003	−0.001
	(0.093)	(0.092)	(0.093)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.093)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.096)	(0.096)
Strike	0.014	0.017	0.016	−0.017	−0.017	0.014	0.017	0.016	−0.017	−0.017
	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.111)	(0.135)	(0.135)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.111)	(0.136)	(0.135)
Demonstration	0.175	0.179†	0.184†	0.241*	0.242*	0.181†	0.184†	0.188†	0.245*	0.246*
	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.108)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.105)	(0.104)	(0.108)	(0.112)	(0.112)
Riot	−0.096	−0.090	−0.084	−0.071	−0.070	−0.089	−0.086	−0.080	−0.065	−0.063
	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.082)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.080)	(0.078)	(0.081)	(0.085)	(0.085)
Militarized interstate dispute	0.034	0.052	0.041	0.052	0.053	0.039	0.058	0.046	0.055	0.056
	(0.095)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.111)	(0.112)	(0.095)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.111)	(0.111)
Years since coup	−0.040	−0.058	−0.046	−0.045	−0.043	−0.036	−0.055	−0.042	−0.041	−0.039
	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.065)	(0.065)
Constant	−2.104***	−2.189***	−2.060***	−3.126***	−2.632***	−2.219***	−2.312***	−2.167***	−3.218***	−2.722***
	(0.495)	(0.483)	(0.481)	(0.592)	(0.607)	(0.515)	(0.506)	(0.500)	(0.605)	(0.611)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	514.89	510.95	516.05	427.95	428.36	514.50	509.89	515.39	427.93	428.34
Adjusted R^2	0.50	0.51	0.50	0.54	0.54	0.50	0.51	0.50	0.54	0.54
Observations	302	302	302	253	253	302	302	302	253	253

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SI.2.8. Results for allies of the pre-revolution Batista regime.

	Annual sum	Three-year sum	Cumulative sum	Course share	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Counterinsurgency courses	0.179**	0.155***	0.105*	1.107**	
	(0.061)	(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.394)	
Conventional warfare courses	−0.078	−0.090	0.056		−1.057**
	(0.052)	(0.081)	(0.079)		(0.393)
GDP growth	−0.002	0.003	0.004	−0.009	−0.008
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Military expenditure per soldier	0.661***	0.685***	0.754***	0.770***	0.767***
	(0.128)	(0.124)	(0.123)	(0.102)	(0.103)
Guerrilla attack	−0.235	−0.226	−0.184	−0.106	−0.098
	(0.205)	(0.196)	(0.180)	(0.242)	(0.239)
Strike	0.029	0.081	0.096	−0.164	−0.166
	(0.178)	(0.181)	(0.170)	(0.214)	(0.212)
Demonstration	0.481*	0.473*	0.450*	0.596**	0.597**
	(0.184)	(0.181)	(0.185)	(0.200)	(0.200)
Riot	−0.176	−0.165	−0.131	−0.145	−0.132
	(0.158)	(0.157)	(0.162)	(0.167)	(0.168)
Militarized interstate dispute	0.168	0.135	0.091	0.194	0.203
	(0.160)	(0.161)	(0.156)	(0.198)	(0.200)
Years since coup	−0.021	−0.057	−0.086	0.046	0.055
	(0.118)	(0.121)	(0.120)	(0.144)	(0.145)
Constant	−5.324***	−5.411***	−6.817***	−6.590***	−5.518***
	(1.302)	(1.356)	(1.258)	(1.048)	(0.960)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	189.07	187.78	188.45	158.36	158.81
Adjusted R^2	0.48	0.49	0.48	0.54	0.54
Observations	90	90	90	74	74

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Figure SI.2.1. Share of counterinsurgency training before and after the Cuban Revolution.



Note: Treatment group consists of Latin American countries with an average Cuban affiliation score (1949-1958) equal or higher to the 75th percentile. Control group contains all other countries in the region.

SI.3 Additional robustness checks

This section demonstrates the robustness of the statistical results.

1) **Extended analysis window.** This check extends the original analysis window by additional ten years, covering 1949 to 1979. We therefore run the analysis on twice the number of observations in the post-Revolution period. Results presented in Table SI.3.1 are similar those of the main analysis. *Counterinsurgency courses* are positively and significantly correlated with military involvement in politics, whereas *Conventional warfare courses* are negatively correlated with militarization. Interestingly and in contrast to the main results, training in conventional warfare fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance in most models. This might suggest that training in counterinsurgency warfare politicizes soldiers thereby, over time, crowding out the norm of keeping political and military affairs separately, as propagated by training in conventional warfare.

2) **Static measure of militarization.** This check replicates the main findings using the static measure military involvement in politics. Table SI.3.2 shows that coefficient signs remain unchanged but for some coefficients statistical significance falls below conventional levels. This finding is not surprising. The static measure is blind for "norm emergence and learning" (Kenwick 2020, 71). Yet, as we explain in the manuscript both components are key to foreign military training and its influence on trainees. We therefore have more confidence in the results for the dynamic measure of military involvement in politics as well as for the measures of Eibl, Hertog and Slater (2019) and Svolik (2012).

3) **Student numbers.** This check tests whether our results hold when using student numbers instead of course attendances. We draw on our original course attendance data to identify the number of students that attended counterinsurgency courses and courses in conventional warfare. Results in Table SI.3.3 show that *Counterinsurgency trained students* are positively and significantly correlated with military involvement in politics across all fixed effects regression models, whereas *Conventional warfare trained students* are negatively correlated with militarization. Together results corroborate our main finding that training in irregular warfare fosters militarization.

4) **Autocorrelation.** This check addresses potential concerns with autocorrelation using lagged dependant variables. To avoid problems with the Nickell bias, we estimate both fixed effects and pooled regressions. Note that the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable changes the results' substantive interpretation since it contains higher order lags of the independent variables. The coefficient estimates of *Counterinsurgency courses* and *Conventional warfare courses* therefore give short-term effects only. Table SI.3.4 shows that results for *Counterinsurgency courses* generally hold, whereas estimates for *Conventional warfare courses* fail to reach conventional levels of significance. Results are particularly robust for cumulative measures of *Counterinsurgency courses*. This is underlines that foreign training in irregular warfare influences militarization over longer periods of time.

5) **Lagged effects.** This check replicates the main findings using higher-order lags of the independent variables. Results in Table SI.3.5 show that *Counterinsurgency courses* are robustly correlated with the military's heightened involvement in politics. The effect is strongest for lag t-4. This supports the idea that over time the skills and norms

of internal warfare spread within the military organization, therefore strengthening officers' willingness to become politically involved. The opposite seems to be true for foreign training in conventional warfare. The coefficient estimates of *Conventional warfare courses* for lags t-3 and t-4 are negative but weaker in statistical significance. This suggests that training in irregular warfare crowds out norms that emphasize the separation between civil and military matters.

6) **Additional controls: regime type, US affinity, post-revolution period.** This check adds additional control variables to the analysis. First, we include the binary variable *Democracy* (Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2014) and the continuous variable *US affinity*, which measures a country's political proximity to the US based on UN voting patterns (Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten 2017). We omitted both variables from the main analysis since they potentially introduce post-treatment bias. Results in Table SI.3.6 remain largely unaffected by the variables' inclusion. Second, we add the binary variable *Post-Cuban revolution period* as an additional control. The variable ensures that our results are not driven by two types of 0s in the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution, with some governments categorically not sending personnel to the SOA while others only sending personnel in some years. Results in Table SI.3.7 remain unchanged. The coefficient estimate for post-revolution period indicates that overall militarization rather declined in Latin America after Castro assumed power—a trend that works against our main finding. Nevertheless, foreign training in counterinsurgency warfare remains positively and significantly correlated with military involvement in politics, whereas training in conventional warfare is negatively correlated with it.

Table SI.3.1. Fixed effects regressions with extended analysis window (t-10, ..., t+20).

	Annual sum		Three-year sum		Cumulative sum		Course share		Course share	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Counterinsurgency courses	0.053**	0.065**	0.063***	0.074***	0.088***	0.103***	0.305*	0.198		
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.132)	(0.131)		
Conventional warfare courses	−0.029	−0.045†	−0.020	−0.048†	−0.048	−0.073			−0.293*	−0.195
	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.047)			(0.124)	(0.129)
GDP growth		0.009		0.008		0.008		0.006		0.006
		(0.007)		(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.007)		(0.007)
Military expenditure per soldier		0.376***		0.367***		0.329***		0.410***		0.409***
		(0.038)		(0.039)		(0.044)		(0.040)		(0.040)
Guerrilla attack		−0.080		−0.080		−0.099		−0.015		−0.015
		(0.064)		(0.062)		(0.061)		(0.065)		(0.066)
Strike		0.009		0.013		−0.006		−0.036		−0.037
		(0.087)		(0.086)		(0.083)		(0.091)		(0.091)
Demonstration		0.143*		0.136†		0.132†		0.154*		0.155*
		(0.071)		(0.070)		(0.071)		(0.076)		(0.076)
Riot		−0.193**		−0.200**		−0.180**		−0.156*		−0.156*
		(0.064)		(0.063)		(0.064)		(0.066)		(0.066)
Militarized interstate dispute		0.090		0.093		0.073		0.055		0.055
		(0.077)		(0.077)		(0.075)		(0.081)		(0.081)
Years since coup		−0.191***		−0.206***		−0.230***		−0.180***		−0.181***
		(0.033)		(0.033)		(0.034)		(0.036)		(0.036)
Constant	−0.209	−2.595***	−0.210	−2.491***	−0.151	−2.075***	−0.395†	−3.151***	−0.100	−2.954***
	(0.130)	(0.273)	(0.132)	(0.288)	(0.162)	(0.355)	(0.209)	(0.347)	(0.234)	(0.380)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	1120.09	859.11	1110.83	851.05	1091.41	836.61	862.21	675.13	862.21	675.13
Adjusted R^2	0.53	0.59	0.54	0.60	0.55	0.61	0.52	0.55	0.52	0.55
Observations	589	492	589	492	589	492	466	406	466	406

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SI.3.2. Training content and military involvement in politics (static measure).

	Annual sum	Three-year sum	Cumulative sum	Course share	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Counterinsurgency courses	0.061	0.066†	0.048	0.538	
	(0.046)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.329)	
Conventional warfare courses	−0.076†	−0.094*	−0.050		−0.510
	(0.042)	(0.047)	(0.064)		(0.320)
GDP growth	0.024*	0.024*	0.023*	0.022	0.022
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Military expenditure per soldier	0.437***	0.467***	0.458***	0.512***	0.511***
	(0.097)	(0.095)	(0.093)	(0.109)	(0.109)
Guerrilla attack	−0.184	−0.191	−0.187	−0.020	−0.017
	(0.127)	(0.126)	(0.127)	(0.141)	(0.140)
Strike	0.142	0.144	0.142	0.061	0.061
	(0.144)	(0.143)	(0.141)	(0.179)	(0.179)
Demonstration	0.185	0.187	0.182	0.275†	0.276†
	(0.140)	(0.139)	(0.142)	(0.147)	(0.147)
Riot	−0.060	−0.057	−0.057	−0.037	−0.036
	(0.110)	(0.108)	(0.110)	(0.114)	(0.115)
Militarized interstate dispute	0.053	0.074	0.048	0.053	0.055
	(0.125)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.145)	(0.146)
Years since coup	−0.080	−0.099	−0.082	−0.116	−0.114
	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.085)	(0.085)
Constant	−3.035***	−3.145***	−3.109***	−4.295***	−3.781***
	(0.730)	(0.712)	(0.715)	(0.855)	(0.889)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	715.98	713.62	718.67	594.73	595.04
Adjusted R^2	0.35	0.35	0.34	0.37	0.37
Observations	302	302	302	253	253

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SI.3.3. Student numbers and military involvement in politics (dynamic measure).

	Annual number	Three-year number	Cumulative number	Student share	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Counterinsurgency trained students	0.073*	0.072**	0.074**	0.462*	
	(0.035)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.234)	
Conventional warfare trained students	−0.069*	−0.090**	−0.090*		−0.412
	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.044)		(0.256)
GDP growth	0.012	0.012	0.011	0.010	0.010
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Military expenditure per soldier	0.307***	0.332***	0.326***	0.375***	0.376***
	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.071)	(0.071)
Guerrilla attack	−0.142	−0.147	−0.143	−0.009	−0.007
	(0.092)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.095)	(0.095)
Strike	0.009	0.013	0.013	−0.017	−0.021
	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.110)	(0.135)	(0.134)
Demonstration	0.183†	0.187†	0.191†	0.252*	0.250*
	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.108)	(0.112)	(0.113)
Riot	−0.072	−0.070	−0.066	−0.053	−0.052
	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.080)	(0.085)	(0.085)
Militarized interstate dispute	0.037	0.055	0.044	0.057	0.054
	(0.095)	(0.097)	(0.096)	(0.109)	(0.111)
Years since coup	−0.043	−0.061	−0.051	−0.053	−0.043
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.063)	(0.064)
Constant	−2.098***	−2.185***	−2.054***	−3.142***	−2.741***
	(0.504)	(0.494)	(0.490)	(0.595)	(0.608)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	516.03	511.56	515.96	427.56	429.53
Adjusted R^2	0.50	0.51	0.50	0.54	0.54
Observations	302	302	302	253	253

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SI.3.4. Fixed effects and pooled regressions with lagged dependant variable.

	Annual sum		Three-year sum		Cumulative sum		Course share		Course share	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Counterinsurgency courses	0.045†	0.038	0.043*	0.035*	0.044*	0.035*	0.319†	0.268		
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.172)	(0.177)		
Conventional warfare courses	−0.026	−0.022	−0.027	−0.019	−0.028	−0.019			−0.307†	−0.262
	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.027)	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.013)			(0.169)	(0.176)
GDP growth	0.004	0.002	0.004	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.003	−0.000	0.003	−0.000
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Military expenditure per soldier	0.065	0.003	0.074†	0.007	0.073†	0.007	0.132**	0.001	0.132**	0.001
	(0.040)	(0.018)	(0.040)	(0.018)	(0.039)	(0.017)	(0.047)	(0.021)	(0.047)	(0.021)
Guerrilla attack	−0.094†	−0.075	−0.097†	−0.077	−0.099†	−0.078	−0.047	−0.055	−0.045	−0.054
	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.054)	(0.050)	(0.060)	(0.050)	(0.059)
Strike	−0.107	−0.111†	−0.106	−0.111†	−0.105	−0.112†	−0.122	−0.114	−0.122	−0.115
	(0.071)	(0.062)	(0.072)	(0.063)	(0.069)	(0.063)	(0.085)	(0.071)	(0.085)	(0.072)
Demonstration	0.020	0.015	0.021	0.013	0.022	0.015	0.058	0.031	0.058	0.031
	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.058)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.067)
Riot	−0.030	−0.015	−0.029	−0.016	−0.028	−0.016	−0.025	−0.019	−0.024	−0.019
	(0.051)	(0.043)	(0.050)	(0.043)	(0.050)	(0.043)	(0.056)	(0.047)	(0.056)	(0.046)
Militarized interstate dispute	0.043	0.049	0.047	0.047	0.044	0.044	0.072	0.053	0.073	0.052
	(0.075)	(0.064)	(0.078)	(0.063)	(0.076)	(0.063)	(0.089)	(0.075)	(0.090)	(0.076)
Years since coup	−0.089†	−0.076*	−0.097*	−0.080*	−0.097*	−0.079*	−0.115*	−0.077*	−0.114*	−0.076*
	(0.047)	(0.035)	(0.048)	(0.036)	(0.048)	(0.036)	(0.053)	(0.038)	(0.053)	(0.038)
Constant	−0.358	0.176	−0.397	0.154	−0.369	0.160	−1.000**	0.144	−0.691*	0.404†
	(0.279)	(0.148)	(0.271)	(0.143)	(0.263)	(0.142)	(0.341)	(0.161)	(0.333)	(0.220)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Lagged Dependant Variable	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	252.69	241.93	249.69	239.99	249.21	239.37	221.38	219.91	221.63	219.93
Adjusted R^2	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.80	0.78	0.80	0.78
Observations	302	302	302	302	302	302	253	253	253	253

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SI.3.5. Lagged influence of training content on military involvement in politics (dynamic measure).

	Lag t-2	Lag t-3	Lag t-4
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Counterinsurgency courses	0.123***	0.102*	0.131**
	(0.036)	(0.040)	(0.043)
Conventional warfare courses	−0.065*	−0.047	−0.047
	(0.029)	(0.037)	(0.039)
GDP growth	0.014*	0.010	0.008
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Military expenditure per soldier	0.208**	0.152*	0.115†
	(0.064)	(0.060)	(0.059)
Guerrilla attack	−0.201*	−0.147	−0.150
	(0.098)	(0.106)	(0.114)
Strike	−0.036	−0.045	−0.064
	(0.118)	(0.130)	(0.133)
Demonstration	0.122	0.044	−0.030
	(0.103)	(0.098)	(0.109)
Riot	−0.162†	−0.105	−0.072
	(0.085)	(0.087)	(0.092)
Militarized interstate dispute	0.061	0.051	0.009
	(0.101)	(0.117)	(0.121)
Years since coup	−0.068	−0.077	−0.070
	(0.054)	(0.058)	(0.060)
Constant	−1.412**	−1.107*	−0.920†
	(0.504)	(0.477)	(0.481)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	491.26	485.87	455.89
Adjusted R^2	0.46	0.41	0.39
Observations	280	261	242

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SI.3.6. Fixed effects regressions with controls for regime type and US affinity.

	Annual sum	Three-year sum	Cumulative sum	Course share	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Counterinsurgency courses	0.061†	0.059*	0.077**	0.239	
	(0.031)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.216)	
Conventional warfare courses	−0.049†	−0.050	−0.088*		−0.467†
	(0.026)	(0.033)	(0.043)		(0.242)
Democracy	−0.827***	−0.813***	−0.848***	−0.809***	
	(0.113)	(0.116)	(0.114)	(0.126)	
US affinity	−0.124	−0.077	−0.069	−0.245**	
	(0.084)	(0.091)	(0.086)	(0.086)	
GDP growth	0.008	0.007	0.006	0.005	0.010
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Military expenditure per soldier	0.161**	0.178**	0.170**	0.202**	0.376***
	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.056)	(0.069)	(0.071)
Guerrilla attack	−0.137†	−0.138†	−0.136†	−0.023	−0.012
	(0.080)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.083)	(0.095)
Strike	0.039	0.036	0.038	0.032	−0.018
	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.106)	(0.127)	(0.134)
Demonstration	0.108	0.109	0.117	0.165†	0.251*
	(0.086)	(0.085)	(0.087)	(0.095)	(0.112)
Riot	−0.061	−0.061	−0.054	−0.030	−0.053
	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.073)	(0.085)
Militarized interstate dispute	−0.051	−0.042	−0.040	−0.031	0.060
	(0.089)	(0.093)	(0.092)	(0.111)	(0.110)
Years since coup	−0.090†	−0.095†	−0.092†	−0.127*	−0.050
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.064)	(0.064)
Constant	−0.554	−0.811	−0.650	−0.770	−2.681***
	(0.578)	(0.587)	(0.548)	(0.696)	(0.609)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	446.28	445.54	442.62	359.79	427.67
Adjusted R^2	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.65	0.54
Observations	302	302	302	253	253

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table SI.3.7. Fixed effects regressions with control for post-Cuban Revolution period.

	Annual sum	Three-year sum	Cumulative sum	Course share	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Counterinsurgency courses	0.114**	0.116***	0.127***	0.648*	
	(0.038)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.266)	
Conventional warfare courses	−0.064*	−0.071*	−0.038		−0.613*
	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.047)		(0.263)
Post-Cuban revolution period	−0.188*	−0.255**	−0.395***	−0.146†	−0.140†
	(0.079)	(0.077)	(0.104)	(0.081)	(0.082)
GDP growth	0.012	0.011	0.010	0.009	0.009
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Military expenditure per soldier	0.287***	0.300***	0.290***	0.370***	0.369***
	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.070)	(0.070)
Guerrilla attack	−0.138	−0.135	−0.140	−0.004	−0.001
	(0.090)	(0.089)	(0.087)	(0.093)	(0.092)
Strike	0.004	0.006	0.011	−0.033	−0.032
	(0.112)	(0.111)	(0.106)	(0.132)	(0.131)
Demonstration	0.192†	0.197†	0.203†	0.258*	0.259*
	(0.105)	(0.104)	(0.107)	(0.110)	(0.110)
Riot	−0.064	−0.059	−0.053	−0.056	−0.054
	(0.080)	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.084)	(0.085)
Militarized interstate dispute	0.050	0.065	0.055	0.054	0.055
	(0.095)	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.111)	(0.112)
Years since coup	−0.025	−0.040	−0.030	−0.039	−0.037
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.064)	(0.064)
Constant	−1.883***	−1.875***	−1.787***	−3.012***	−2.402***
	(0.497)	(0.482)	(0.477)	(0.590)	(0.628)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	512.84	506.16	506.70	426.15	426.77
Adjusted R^2	0.51	0.52	0.52	0.54	0.54
Observations	302	302	302	253	253

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

SI.4 External validity

This section shows that the main findings might also hold beyond Cold War Latin America.

1) **9/11 terror attacks and militarization.** This test offers suggestive evidence that foreign military training in irregular warfare may also shaped militarization in the post-Cold War period. To increase comparability with the main analysis, we focus on the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 as an external shock. Like the response to the Cuban Revolution, the US re-oriented its security assistance program after 9/11. Training aimed at building capacity for effective counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency operations in recipient states.

   The test utilizes data of the US International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. The data sample contains yearly observations for all countries from 1991, the end of the Cold War, up to 2009, the last year for which IMET data are available (Savage and Caverley 2017). Each model contains an interaction between the variable *Number of US-trained soldiers*, the annual number of IMET-trained soldiers, and the binary variable *Post-September 11*, which is 0 for 1991-2001 and 1 for 2002-2009. The dependent variable is political militarization and based on data by Kenwick (2020). To ensure robustness, we estimate country fixed effects models and random effects models and we employ conventional as well as clustered standard errors.

   Results in Table SI.4.1 show that IMET training increased military influence over politics after the 2001 terror attacks. While levels of statistically significance vary across specifications, coefficient estimates for the interaction term are positive across all models. This suggests that the re-orientation of US security assistance in the aftermath of 9/11 increased militarization. Moreover, estimates for the variable *Post-September 11*, which are statistically significant and negative across all specifications, indicate that in countries without US assistance the 2001 attacks have rather stabilized civilian control over the military.

Table SI.4.1. US foreign training and military involvement in politics before and after September 11 attacks (1991-2009).

	Fixed effects models		Random effects models	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Number of US-trained soldiers X Post-September 11	0.018***	0.018†	0.019***	0.019†
	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.010)
Number of US-trained soldiers	−0.010*	−0.010	−0.010*	−0.010
	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.009)
Post-September 11	−0.130***	−0.130***	−0.124***	−0.124***
	(0.016)	(0.037)	(0.016)	(0.037)
GDP growth	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Military expenditure per soldier	0.006	0.006	−0.006	−0.006
	(0.009)	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.016)
Guerrilla attack	0.053*	0.053*	0.057*	0.057*
	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.026)
Strike	−0.041*	−0.041	−0.040†	−0.040
	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.025)
Demonstration	0.019	0.019	0.020	0.020
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Riot	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007
	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.020)
Militarized interstate dispute	0.024†	0.024	0.025†	0.025
	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.021)
Years since coup	−0.104***	−0.104**	−0.111***	−0.111**
	(0.011)	(0.038)	(0.011)	(0.037)
Constant	0.086	0.086	0.226*	0.226
	(0.088)	(0.152)	(0.107)	(0.160)
Standard Errors	Conventional	Clustered	Conventional	Clustered
R^2	0.14	0.14	0.19	0.19
Observations	2513	2513	2513	2513

Note: Values are coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

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