

The Plan

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Abstract

A plan for how to restart after parental leave and eventually finish the PhD.

‘Plans are worthless, but planning is everything.’ — Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Keywords— Productivity, goals, plan

1 Main Paper on HSE's and conflict — Send to journal before the summer

1.1 Literature — Deadline: End of March

- ☐ The State and violence. General theories. Along the lines of Pinker (2012) and Tilly (1990). With increasing state penetration comes an increasing monopoly on violence (Tilly 1990) and with this, certain cultural/psycho-social effects that translate into a generally more peaceful citizenry.
- ☐ Internal organized (as opposed to communal) violence.
- ☐ How old institutions affect current institutions (formal and non-formal or networks). How old institutions were integrated into the new states. There is going to be endless variation on this, so I will need to find some illustrative examples. Emphasize that in the cases of formal integration and continued existence, these institutions will probably have *some* effect on conflict because of their legacy and continued involvement in local (if not national) conditions. In addition, I should emphasize that even when no formal institutions survive, HSE's can still affect current politics and conflict. Use good illustrative examples to make these points. Could refer to some of the examples in the first paper to save some labor.

1.2 Theory — Deadline: Early version by end of April

- ☐ As predicted by the literature.
- ☐ Old institutions represent a measure of "governing capacity" that has hitherto been modestly explored. The more historical state presence the more people are used to and accept state intervention.

The state monopoly on violence should also be more consolidated. The degree of consolidation would probably vary with the degree of continuity between the historical state and the present state, but it should be a positive relationship in both cases.

The more historical state presence, the more time the cultural or psychosocial effects that Pinker (2012) hypothesize have to affect the people in the area.

1.3 Hypothesis

H_1 : *Grid cells with higher levels of historical state presence experience less conflict.*

1.4 Variables — Deadline: Mid March

- ☐ Theoretical and/or methodological grounding.
- ☐ Finding measures (data).
- ☐ Incorporate with the Geo-ISD data.
- ☐ Geography
 - ☐ "Ruggedness", mountains or elevation.

Provides shelter for rebels and prevents "exit-options" for subjects, to the benefit of stationary bandits (states).

What is more, ruggedness could affect (negatively) the chances that cartographers and (to a lesser extent) historians have place a state there.
 - ☐ Rivers. Provide natural boundaries useful for state building. Navigable rivers bind cities together (again useful for state building). Rivers could often be navigated by explorers, thus increasing the likelihood that maps include a state there.
 - ☐ Jungle. Potentially some circumscription/limiting escape option effects, and certainly an impediment to Western explorers and surveyors.
- ☐ Distance from X.

- Capital. In many cases the old capitals became the new capitals, around which I expect relatively high levels of HSP (historical state presence). Capitals probably (source) experience more of some forms of violence (coups, violent protests, etc., and less of other forms (combat deaths).
- Coast. Helpful for trade and communication and this state building. Dramatically increases the odds of being discovered by Western explorers. Also increases the odds of early colonization. Increases odds of being involved in slave trading. Connection to conflict is less clear, but perhaps through Nunn (2008) slave trade leads to lasting trust issues leads to conflict-mechanism.
- Europe. Institutional "spillover" could lead to increased chance of HSP. Ease of discovery (when distance to coast and desert is taken into account) is certainly affected. Proximity to Europe could be correlated with conflict due to increased likelihood of being a transit-country for drugs and/or people being smuggled into Europe across the Mediterranean, and potentially through increased exposure to European neo-colonial interests.
- Exposure to slave trade. Partially explained in the distance to coast variable. Can be measured directly for some countries at least using data from Nunn (2008). Can be related to statebuilding in coastal regions, and potentially state "de-building" inland. To capture slaves you must have an army. As stated by Tilly (1990) among others, an increasing army creates the need for a state. Someone must surely have written something about this for East Africa. Inland I believe the slave trade (capturing of slaves) primarily led to devastation and not the "Tillian", *conflict* → *state* → *conflict* → *etc.*, but I will need some sources on this.
- Population. Madison project data for historical population. Correlates with current population which affects the likelihood of conflict events. Related to state building (and thus HSP) because states need a certain population to coalesce and an inclusion criteria in the ISD.

- Disease prevalence. Missionary mortality rate if no other measure is available. Could be better than extrapolating current levels of disease prevalence backwards. Disease levels affect both state building and the penetration of European explorers. The connection to conflict is less clear.
- Resources. Potentially correlated to state building through trade, coinage and weapons (iron) and modern conflict through competition over resources. Only for extended controls models. Most likely not relevant. Good measures will be hard to come by.
 - Gold.
 - Silver.
 - Copper.
 - Iron.
- Spatial interdependence. I need to think more about this. How big of a problem is it? How best to deal with it?
- Past Conflict. Brecke (1999) data to control for the Tilly (1990) mechanism of war made states and states made war.
- Regional and country-fixed effects. This should further alleviate some of the selection bias issues of the old maps as well as omitted variables bias.

1.5 Data

- How the old maps were made. They were very much part of the colonialist/imperialist project, despite professed scientific integrity (I get the sense that the two were not seen as mutually exclusive). Nevertheless they seem to have strived for accuracy. Indeed, that is also to the benefit of the colonialist project, as expeditions (military and exploratory) depended on accurate maps of the regions they entered. And these maps, or in most cases, the maps on which ‘our’ maps were based, *were* the maps used in the field. The cartographers thus had clear incentives not to exaggerate colonial domains

or make light of local kingdoms. Their main purpose was functional aids to navigation first, propaganda pieces second, if at all.

- ☐ I could test the colonial bias by comparing maps published in Paris (most French maps) and see if they are more accurate in the areas of French colonial expansion than elsewhere, and likewise for maps published in London. The British maps would be the best test, as we have more of them, and they colonised more coast (where we have measures of accuracy).
- ☐ Compare old maps to new. Do they agree on the core areas? How often do old maps place a HSE entirely outside the area given by a historical atlas.
- ☐ Benefits of the Geo-ISD. More states. Not tied to currently politically relevant ethnic groups. Does not include colonial rule as part of state experience or presence (as does State Antiquities Index). Provides a fine grained measure (I am considering using a finer mesh than the PRIO-GRID) of historical state presence that is not bound by current administrative boundaries (I think the closest is region versions of State Antiquities Index). Not only measure of historical state presence, but also of overlaps, borderlands and data on every state that make up these measures (through the tie to the isd).
- ☐ Drawbacks. Only Africa. Does not include all the states of the ISD. Old maps are skewed toward finding states along the coasts and navigable rivers. Historical atlas maps tend to draw borders as overly static. Has not been tied to ethnic groups, past or present.
- ☐ Alternative measures. States Antiquity Index. Murdock (1967) map.

1.6 Analysis — Deadline: Start running models by late March

- ☐ Cross section to avoid post-treatment bias.
- ☐ Alternative models.

2 Communal violence

- ☒ Talk to Ole Magnus.
- ☐ Try to piece together some preliminary data for him to work on while I am on parental leave.
- ☐ Afrobarometer data will not come in time.
- ☐ Find and include as many relevant (control) variables as possible.

3 Paper on civil resistance

I am hoping that this idea will mature a bit while I am on leave. I will try to keep it in the back of my mind.

4 First paper

- ☐ Get back from review.

References

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5 Appendix