

# Geo-ISD vs Paine

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**Abstract**

***Keywords—***

# 1 Introduction

The literature on historical state entities (hereafter HSE's), pre-colonial states and so on, and conflict has drawn mixed conclusions. The general tendency has been toward that HSE's are often locally peace inducing (Wig 2016, Wig & Kromrey 2018) but nationally conflict inducing (Paine 2019). Employing new data allows this paper to test the existing theories in the literature, and answer the question of where, relative to HSE borders, does modern (post 1946) conflict occur.

## 2 Literature/theory

### 2.1 Recap Wig (2016) and counterpoints

Wig (2016) argues that ethnic groups with ties to pre-colonial statehood are more likely to have inherited institutions that allow the ethnic group to punish defections and hold their leaders accountable. In this way, ethnic groups with ties to pre-colonial statehood are better able to make credible commitments, than 'non-state' ethnic groups. Credible commitments help such groups both prevent conflict from occurring in the first place, but also make them better able to end conflicts when then they have broken out. Empirically Wig (2016) finds that groups with histories of statehood do indeed experience less dyadic conflict with their government. Depetris-Chauvin (2016) makes a similar argument and finds that regions with exposure to pre-colonial statehood are more peaceful, *ceteris paribus*.

On the other hand, someone else found the opposite. Possibly Besley & Reynal-Querol (2014).

### 2.2 Recap Paine (2019)

### 2.3 Conflict reducing

#### 2.3.1 Internal monopoly of violence

The Tilly (1990) argument, TODO: infuse more Tilly into the mix, other relevant authors? States as stationary bandits gradually remove internal competitors. Over

time this reduces the number of actors within the borders of a state that are able to wield organized forms of violence, and the remaining ones' ability to do so. In the case of pre-colonial states, they are now either once again 'the' state (for example Morocco or Ashanti/Ghana), have been incorporated into a larger state as part of its apparatus, or had its institutions destroyed by some larger state (colonial or indigenous) consolidating its role as the sole stationary bandit within its borders. In other words within the former borders of a pre-colonial state there should be a reduced number of potential wielders of organized violence (*ceteris paribus*) depending on the pre-colonial states centralization/consolidation, itself a product of time, reforms/political organization/idiosyncrasies and the proximity to its capital. If the pre-colonial state was incorporated only partially into the modern state, it could still pose a threat to the central state through desertion (more on this later). If the pre-colonial state was destroyed, for example by colonizers, without new state (colonial or post-colonial) entering the resulting power vacuum other actors would do so, and become new stationary bandits rivalling the state. How does this compare to other areas not formally part of a pre-colonial state? These areas could inhabit roving bandits (Scott 2009) or other actors already having filled an equivalent vacuum of power. In other words, in this scenario pre-colonial state areas should be no worse than other areas in terms of violence. Any resulting conflict running through this mechanism should occur shortly after decolonization.

### **2.3.2 Better Angles**

Building on among others Tilly (1990)

### **2.3.3 Alternatives to Violence**

Institutions of conflict resolution and bargaining

#### **2.3.4 Economic advantage?**

### **2.4 Conflict inducing**

#### **2.4.1 Distance from capital**

#### **2.4.2 Central State Weakness/Collapse**

#### **2.4.3 Political Inequality**

Paine (2019)'s argument. State groups either exclude other groups that eventually revolt, or they are excluded themselves, and will reclaim their dominating position.

#### **2.4.4 Multiple HSE's**

Bargaining problems and multiplies any other effect.

#### **2.4.5 Resistance to western influence**

## **3 Data**

## **4 Research design**

## **5 Preliminary results**

Awaiting fully formed theory and theoretically founded model specifications.

## **6 Conclusion**

## References

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## 7 Appendix