Ingrid Vik Bakken

Women and Dissent:

Opportunities, Barriers and Empowerment

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Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU)
Faculty of Social and Educational Sciences
Department of Sociology and Political Science

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I. Bakken, Ingrid Vik and Halvard Buhaug (2019) Civil War and Female Empowerment. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 65(5): 982-1009.

II. Butcher, Charles, Jessica Maves Braithwaite, Jonathan Pinckney, Eirin Haugseth, Ingrid Vik Bakken, and Marius Swane Wishman. Introducing the Anatomy of Resistance Campaigns (ARC) Dataset, *Journal of Peace Research*.

III. Bakken, Ingrid Vik (2021) Women's Participation in Organizations in Dissent.

IV. Bakken, Ingrid Vik (2021) Between patriarchs and patrons: Women's rights organizations and regime resistance.

V. Nordås, Ragnhild and Ingrid Vik Bakken (2021) Gendered backlash: Sexualized state repression and women's protest.

Summary

Armed conflicts persist in many countries today—causing instability, destruction and displacement. But an increasing number of contemporary conflicts are largely nonviolent—people worldwide have demanded political change with strikes, street protests, sit-ins and non-cooperation. In fact, the number of nonviolent uprisings now exceeds the number of armed conflicts, and they have significant consequences for the societies in which they take place. While existing studies have advanced scholarly knowledge of the causes and consequences of violent and non-violent contention, we lack data and theory on the gender dimensions of nonviolent dissent. To what extent do women take part in nonviolent uprisings—and why do women protest? In this thesis, I focus on understanding i) the link between internal armed conflict and women's empowerment; ii) the composition of resistance campaigns in terms of formal organizations and women's participation; and iii) the drivers of female participation in civil resistance. To these ends, the thesis introduces new theory on the determinants of women's participation and presents new data on the organizational composition of resistance episodes and women's participation in them. These contributions address several gaps in the existing literature. Firstly, the thesis complements the expanding scholarship on gender and armed conflict by switching the focus to nonviolent uprisings, where we know little about the drivers of women's participation. Secondly, the thesis expands civil resistance studies by zooming in on women—one of the actors that have received scarce attention. These are important steps forward for understanding contemporary political conflict and the potential for improvements in female empowerment during, and in the wake of, contentious dissent.

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Chapter 1

Why Women and Dissent

1.1 Background and motivation

In December 2018, thousands of Sudanese women and men took to the streets to call for the end of the dictatorial regime of President Omar al-Bashir. Following months of unrest and protests, the military intervened and forced the president to resign in April 2019. But the military coup spurred renewed protests, and following an intense period of civil resistance and lethal repression by the regime, the military government handed over power to a civilian transitional administration in July of that same year. The Sudanese uprising is an example of the tactical advantages of nonviolent resistance, where the people succeeded in toppling a regime without the use of armed force.[1] Furthermore, a key feature of the protests was the prominence, if not the dominance, of women. The nonviolent uprising attracted international attention when a picture of a young woman, standing on top of a car, dressed all in white and chanting to the crowd, was shared across the globe. The woman was Alaa Salah, who quickly became an icon of how Sudanese women were standing up and demanding reform, not only in terms of democratic governance but also for improvements in women's rights. Importantly, female participation was not limited to young, educated and urban women—the mobilization of women went beyond social class or age, and included women from all social layers and various regions (al Nagar and Tønnessen, 2021).

[1] In the introduction I use the terms dissent and resistance to refer broadly to contentious collective action outside institutional channels, which I define in section 1.2.1. When I talk about sustained acts or events of dissent, I use the words uprising, conflict or campaign. Sometimes I refer specifically to violent dissent—in this case, I use violent campaign or armed conflict. To refer to nonviolent dissent, I use the words civil/nonviolent resistance, or protests.

The dramatic events of 2018-2019 are not the first time that Sudan has witnessed conflict, but conflicts in the past have been far more violent as the country has experienced long episodes of civil war.[2] The dominance of women during recent episodes of civil resistance raises the question of whether the high levels of female participation are linked to the country's violent conflict history. Could it be that women, over these years of contention, have been more empowered, and become more vocal? Historically, there is anecdotal evidence that war transforms gender roles—when countries are ravaged by conflict, it often requires women to step up to roles that are traditionally assigned to men, in spheres of labor, finance, decision-making and governance. Recently, new empirical evidence has supported this notion too. The potential link between war and the empowerment of women caught my attention, and the thesis's first objective is to unpack the conditions under which internal armed conflict impacts women's empowerment.

While violent patterns of the past might explain in part why women had such a prominent role in the Sudan uprising of 2018-2019, it is unlikely to provide the whole explanation. The story of the courageous female protesters in Sudan begs a bigger question that has been largely overlooked by scholars: Why do women participate in high-risk nonviolent action? Is extensive female participation this common, or is Sudan something of an anomaly? The Sudan case caught our attention largely because it reached the media spotlight—but in other cases, and more generally, we have very little knowledge about women's participation, or the gendered participation patterns. We also have scant knowledge on the social and organizational composition of resistance campaigns. Inspired by the example from Sudan and other contemporary political conflicts, the second objective of the thesis is to map and understand the composition of resistance campaigns in terms of formal organizations and women's participation. Finally, the third objective of the thesis is to theorize and explain variation in women's participation in civil resistance.

Before moving on and placing these research topics in the existing literature, I briefly summarize the main contribution and take aways of the papers in the thesis.

In the first paper of the thesis, published in *Journal of Conflict Resolution* and co-authored with Halvard Buhaug, we ask: How does civil war affect women's empow-

[2] Civil wars are internal armed conflicts of high severity. Sudan's first civil war in the post-independence era was from 1955 to 1972, the second from 1983 to 2005. Other parallel state-based conflicts have taken place in Darfur and other regions. In the negotiated agreement of 2005, the South was granted independence from the North, resulting in South Sudan appearing as a sovereign country in 2011 after a referendum.

erment? We show that the aftermath of internal armed conflict is associated with improvements in female empowerment especially after major conflicts, and we find strong evidence of the importance of policies focusing on women after armed conflict: The biggest improvements in empowerment are found after conflicts terminated by peace agreements, and particularly agreements explicitly mentioning women. The findings contribute to the gender and conflict literature by adding further substance to the hypothesis that war, somewhat paradoxically, might lead to the increased empowerment of women.

The second paper, published at *Journal of Peace Research*, is a coauthored data feature. We introduce a unique subnational dataset—the Anatomy of Resistance Campaigns (ARC) dataset—featuring detailed information on organizations waging dissent, and the alliances they form. The paper shows that organizations engaged in dissent—even if united over a shared determination to confront the regime—often have varied and potentially conflicting goals, ideologies, and resources. The paper significantly improves the current data availability in the field of civil resistance and enables the development and testing of new and existing theories.

In the final three papers of the thesis, women in civil resistance is the main topic. Paper III, "Women's participation in Organizations in Dissent", introduces new subnational data—ARC-Women—which provides information about women's participation at various levels of dissenting organizations, ranging from leadership to the grassroots. The paper shows that women are excluded from the majority of the organizations carrying out dissent, but the large-N analyses find that there is important variation depending on organizational ideologies—women are more likely to be part of organizations with a leftist or liberal ideology. Paper IV, "Between patriarchs and patrons: Women's rights organizations and regime resistance", zooms in on women's rights organizations and their incentives to oppose the regime with protest. I show that women's organizations are less likely to participate when episodes of resistance are overshadowed by male-dominated organizations and patriarchal networks. Finally, in Paper V—"Gendered backlash? Sexualized state repression and women's protest" — my co-author Ragnhild Nordås and I study how state sexualized violence, or sexualized repression, affects women's protest activity. In Sudan, we witnessed the state security apparatus targeting women in hideous and sexualized ways.[3] But rather than reacting with withdrawal or shame, women and their male compatriots reacted with outrage—they united around

[3] During the infamous "Khartoum massacre", where security forces stormed a sit-in, there were several reports of rape.

the victims and called out the regime for the atrocities (Al-Karib, 2019). We therefore ask, do targeted and egregious forms of repression fuel rather than depress women's subsequent resistance?

Overall, the thesis shows that women and dissent is a story of barriers, opportunities and empowerment. Patterns of gender inequality, which are manifest worldwide across various social, public and political domains, are also evident in the context of dissent. Women might face significant barriers to participation—they are more often than not excluded from the organizations that form the backbone of civil resistance campaigns. But moments of dissent might also represent an opportunity for women to raise their voices—as seen in the case of Sudan. Conflicts have the potential to disrupt the status quo and inject new opportunities for women's empowerment.

In the remainder of the introduction chapter, I review the relevant literature and show how the thesis complements and expands the scholarship on gender and conflict, and the literature on nonviolent resistance. Next, I present the theoretical framework for analyzing the research questions, and the analytical approach for testing the theoretical expectations. Then, the five research papers that make up the foundation of the thesis are summarized. I end with a conclusion of the main findings, avenues for future research, and policy relevance.

1.1.1 Gender and armed conflict

Gender is an important theoretical lens for understanding armed conflict, but it took time before this was taken seriously in the "mainstream" literature. Peace and conflict studies were for a long time, at best, gender-blind, due to a lack of interest in gender and women as important for explaining conflict (Bjarnegård et al., 2015; Gizelis, 2018). The links between international security, militarism, conflict dynamics, and gender, were first established by critical scholars applying a feminist lens to the study of international relations (Enloe, 1989; Tickner, 1992; Murphy, 1996). They criticized existing scholarship for ignoring key demographics, like women, and hence obscuring key dynamics in international politics and conflict, and they also warned against data-driven research which had a male bias. The major turning point for placing gender into the 'mainstream' was the book by Goldstein (2001), *War and Gender*, which comprised a thorough investigation of the roles played by women in war, in a long historical perspec-

tive, showing how gender relations have influenced the dynamics of war. The empirical research agenda has since multiplied.[4]

To begin with, the predominant topic of empirical studies was how gender and the status of women could influence the security of states and the onset of conflict. Some of the first works using quantitative methods to evaluate some of the hypotheses that had been made in feminist scholarship were provided by Caprioli (2000, 2005), who found that gender equality reduces the number of conflicts between and within states. The argument that women are linked to peace has since been replicated in several places. Some argue that one of the main pacifying forces in modern history is the fact that women have increased their influence and power in society, a 'feminization' of society (Pinker, 2012). An inherent logic in this line of thought is that women are overall less prone to violence and less likely to support war than men (Fukuyama, 1998). The 'feminist peace' hypothesis has been tested extensively and there seems to be a robust relationship between gender equality at the country level and a lower risk of armed conflict outbreak (Dahlum and Wig, 2020). Studies find that the risk of armed conflict is lowered as the proportion of women legislators rises (Melander, 2005; Rosenfield and Wood, 2017), and that the extension of women's suffrage corresponds with lower levels of violent conflict (Barnhart et al., 2020). Other studies find that female empowerment influences the success of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations (Gizelis, 2009, 2011) and the likelihood that warring parties are willing to enter peace negotiations (Nagel, 2020) Several mechanisms have been suggested to explain these patterns, but few make the simplistic argument that the primary cause is women's allegedly peaceful 'nature'. Rather studies point to societal factors and socialization, showing how norms of inequality are linked to norms of violence (Bjarnegård et al., 2017; Forsberg and Olsson, 2021). Another mechanism is that women prioritize differently than men, being more likely to want to spend national income on welfare than the military (Rosenfield and Wood, 2017). Yet another explanation is that gender inequality is linked to demographic patterns causing more men to be available for recruitment to violence, for example through practices of polygamy and bride price (Hudson and Matfess, 2017; Hudson et al., 2012).[5]

As a research field, the empirical literature on gender and conflict has demonstrated that gender is integral to understanding the onset and dynamics of armed conflicts. But we can also flip the question by asking: How does armed conflict affect

[4] See a summary article by Reiter (2015) as well as a recent review by Cohen and Karim (2021).
[5] See also McDermott (2015) for a review of some of these studies.

gender relations and women's status? The consequences of armed conflict for women are undoubtedly extensive. Studies have demonstrated that there are differential effects of conflict on men and women. For example, while men are more likely to get killed during conflict, studies find that the long-term consequences of armed conflict may affect women's health and quality of life more starkly (Plümper and Neumayer, 2006). Studies also draw attention to types of violence that are more targeted toward women, such as sexual violence (Cohen, 2013; Cohen and Nordås, 2014) which is perpetrated by both rebel groups and state armies and leaves millions of victims, a majority of them women (Nordås and Cohen, 2021). But the focus of policy and research has centered predominantly on women's victimization. Few studies have looked at whether armed conflict might spur positive changes for women. It could be that violent conflicts, in their destructiveness, open a window of opportunity for rapid improvements in women's status. Armed conflicts might cause demographic changes, spurring women's entry into new arenas, including the job market and the economy.

In one of the first studies to test the hypothesis that war creates space for women, using a quantitative approach, Hughes and Tripp (2015) analyzed changes in the parliamentary representation of women in sub-Saharan Africa, comparing countries escaping internal armed conflict with non-conflict countries. They found that the growth in female legislators was much more pronounced in countries experiencing civil war than in countries that had remained peaceful.[6] A subsequent article by Webster et al. (2019) tested the relationship using a broader concept measuring women's empowerment and an extended time frame and a global sample of countries, confirming the finding that, overall, countries that experienced war see an improvement in the empowerment of women. This fairly new research agenda is still developing, and several questions remain unanswered: Is the effect only an effect of war, i.e. armed conflicts above a certain magnitude, or also of minor armed conflicts? How does the mode of conflict termination influence this?

With Paper I, I remedy these shortcomings by investigating some of the conditional effects of conflict on women's empowerment and it is the first large-N piece of research to focus exclusively on civil conflicts as windows of opportunity. The article shows that not all conflicts are game-changers for women — only conflicts of a certain magnitude have a robust effect on women's subsequent political empowerment, and the effect is strongest when civil conflict is terminated by a negotiated settlement and women are explicitly mentioned in the peace agreement.

[6] Peaceful as in the absence of armed conflict—it could still be an authoritarian peace.

More recently scholars have shown how women are also important *within* armed conflict. For years, war was assumed to be exclusively a man's world, and studies—implicitly and explicitly — neglected women as potential recruits of rebel groups, or agents of political violence.[7] This assumption lacked empirical support, and new empirical evidence has demonstrated that women's participation in rebel groups, including as front-line combatants, is far from as rare as was presumed. (Henshaw, 2016a; Thomas and Bond, 2015).[8] The field has since moved on to exploring and testing the drivers of female participation, and scholars have shown that factors at both the organization- and country-level help explain variation in female participation in rebel groups (Wood and Thomas, 2017; Wood, 2019; Henshaw, 2016b; Thomas and Wood, 2017). Subsequent studies have tested the effects female combatants have on the dynamics of conflict, showing that women rebels can improve sympathy for the insurgents (Manekin and Wood, 2020) and attract international support (Mehrl and Dworschak, 2021). Studies also show that rebel groups with female combatants are more likely to win the conflict (Braithwaite and Ruiz, 2018), and they have improved resilience, which in consequence increases the conflict's duration (Giri and Haer, 2021).

The literature on women's roles in rebel groups has effectively changed the image of women as only passive victims of war. Thanks to these studies, we have better descriptive knowledge about women's participation in political violence and rebel groups, we better understand what drives women's participation in rebel groups, and we have empirical evidence of the effects of female rebel participation on conflict dynamics. In the context of women and nonviolent conflict, however, we lack important knowledge about all of these dimensions: We have not mapped women's status in organizations using nonviolent tactics, we have not theorized the determinants explaining variation in female participation, and there are few studies on the effects of female participation. To fully understand women's roles in conflict settings requires moving beyond armed conflict or political violence, and this is why I in the thesis focus on women's experiences and contributions to nonviolent conflicts. Women are still minorities in armed

[7] See Henshaw (2016b) for some concrete examples.

[8] Existing studies vary somewhat in sampling strategy and scope, but they estimate women to take an active part (any position) in around 50 percent of rebel groups. For combat positions specifically, it is estimated that women occupy such roles in up to a third of rebel groups (Thomas and Bond, 2015; Henshaw, 2016a). These numbers are relatively crude and do not take into account that women's roles might have changed over time. See also Nagel (2019).

conflict,[9] and most likely, women engage in larger numbers in conflicts with *nonviolent* tactics—although this is an assumption that needs empirical substantiation.

In three papers of the thesis, I address the gap in existing literature by zooming in on women and nonviolent resistance. With new meso-level data, I describe and analyze women's roles in organizations engaged in nonviolent dissent. Next, I show in more detail why we should study nonviolent conflicts, why we need more data on the actors that participate, and why understanding women's roles in such contexts is important.

1.1.2 Actors in nonviolent resistance

Nonviolent conflicts might not be as consequential as armed conflicts in terms of deaths and destruction, but they have significant transformative potential, as the case of Sudan, mentioned in the introduction, shows. Nonviolent resistance has the potential to dismantle existing regimes, to lead to democratization, and to prevent a relapse into civil war. Overall, countries going through nonviolent conflict transitions, as compared to experiencing either violent conflict or the absence of any resistance campaign, have a higher likelihood of democratizing (Lambach et al., 2020; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Pinckney, 2020; Celestino and Gleditsch, 2013). Moreover, the majority of conflicts today are fought without weapons; they are, as shown in Figure 1.1, (primarily) nonviolent conflicts.[10] Not only do we see a larger number of nonviolent campaign beginning, in the past few years the number of ongoing nonviolent campaigns has also exceeded the number of ongoing violent campaigns. The so-called Arab spring in 2010-2011 also contributed to generating renewed interest in nonviolent resistance. The rapid dismantling of several stable autocratic regimes, mainly by the use of 'people power' by civilian populations, surprised most scholars, and caused a spike in interest.

Empirical work on civil resistance has focused on the effectiveness of nonviolence, as compared to violent conflict, the conditions under which resistance campaigns are more likely to succeed, and the dynamics of campaigns, for example repression-dissent cycles (Sutton et al., 2014). Scholars have argued that nonviolent tactics are superior to violent strategies because they are more likely to generate security defections, mobilize

[9] Even if women have served in all-female military units, in mixed-gender units, among state armies and as military leaders, in a historical perspective, it is estimated that less than 1 percent of warriors have been women (Goldstein, 2001).

[10] The graph was generated with data from the The Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) Data Project (Chenoweth et al., 2018). NAVCO defines campaigns as "a series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective" (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013b, 416).



Figure 1.1. Resistance campaigns, 1990-2019 (data from NAVCO 1.3)

broader segments of the population, and muster international support (Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). Studies have argued that nonviolent campaigns are more effective in generating regime transition and the installing of democracy (Karatnycky and Ackerman, 2005; Celestino and Gleditsch, 2013). Other studies have sought to understand why some nonviolent campaigns escalate and end in devastating, years-long civil wars (Ryckman, 2020). Some studies focus on the onset of resistance campaigns, finding that economic structures are important (Butcher and Svensson, 2016), with mixed support for structural factors in general (Chenoweth and Ulfelder, 2017). One study also finds that higher levels of gender equality improve the likelihood that nonviolent campaign get started (Schaftenaar, 2017).

Importantly, the literature on civil resistance has contributed to opening up the concept of conflict by showing that societies at 'peace', meaning the absence of state-based armed conflict, still may be the site of large-scale disruptive social and political conflicts. However, the literature is still in its early stages when it comes to moving beyond the level of states and campaigns and analyzing the effectiveness and dynamics of civil resistance. The campaign level has been the most central unit of analysis,[11] and there is a need for more disaggregation. Some recent contributions highlight specific

[11] This has been enabled by the NAVCO data project.

social actors, such as ethnic minorities (Manekin and Mitts, 2021; Thurber, 2018), different employment groups (Dahlum et al., 2019), trade unions (Butcher et al., 2018), and students (Dahlum and Wig, 2017), but most of these studies look at actors, broadly defined. We know from the case literature that organizations are often key participants. The centrality of organizations for driving resistance campaigns has been demonstrated widely in studies of violent organizations. Studies show how rebel organizations operate and collaborate with the civilian community (Wood, 2000; Lewis, 2020) and highlight how organizational characteristics and network ties are important for understanding where and how mobilization occurs, and whether it is successful (Staniland, 2014). Extensive data collection efforts have offered detailed and subnational data on the actors participating in conflicts[12], enabling large-N testing of theories of mobilization at the meso level. This has furthered the field's understanding of how rebel groups mobilize, and helped (re-)evaluate arguments about how and why rebellion occurs (Gurr, 1970).

In the nonviolent context, however, there is great need for more data to identify the participants — specifically, the organizations — in resistance campaigns. This way, we can test theories of how the social and organizational composition of campaigns matters for understanding the onset of dissent, campaigns' success or failure, and the long-term consequences. Paper II helps remedy the gap by introducing the new ARC dataset, featuring around 1,400 unique organizations in episodes of dissent. The data will facilitate and enable the analysis of how the organizational composition of nonviolent and violent resistance campaigns affect onset, dynamics and consequences.

Furthermore, another substantive gap in the civil resistance literature, also related to the need for disaggregating the actors that participate, is that *women* have mainly been an ignored demographic. Zooming in on women's participation and gender dynamics in nonviolent conflict can significantly improve our understanding of nonviolent resistance—given the centrality of gender in armed conflict, we should expect that gender is integral also to nonviolent conflict. A handful of studies do focus on women. For example, a recent report finds that democratization is more likely after nonviolent campaigns if women are included in the transitional institutions (Dudouet and Pinckney, 2021). The only study to date that aims to explain variation in female participation in nonviolent dissent is by Murdie and Peksen (2015), who provide one of the few systematic large-N studies on the determinants of women's social protest. But this data is on the country level, summarizing the number of total events as picked up by news wires.

[12] For example the Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict Dataset (Cunningham et al., 2013), the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Actor Dataset (Pettersson et al., 2021), and the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (Wimmer et al., 2009), among others.

Schaftenaar (2017) shows that countries with higher levels of gender equality have an increased likelihood of nonviolent campaigns getting started, but the study does not test female participation directly due to the lack of gender-disaggregated data on resistance. Another recent addition is the Women in Resistance Dataset (Chenoweth, 2019), complementing the NAVCO dataset with indicators on women's participation.[13]

Despite there being few systematic studies, several claims about women's participation nonetheless exist. For example, scholars argue that women are more likely to use nonviolent tactics (Codur and King, 2015; Principe, 2017). Another hypothesis is that women's presence in dissent improves nonviolent discipline within campaigns and lowers the levels of internal rivalries, and that in addition, women are likely to organize in less hierarchical and more horizontal ways (Codur and King, 2015). It has also been proposed that the presence of women has an effect on the adversary by making it harder for security forces to target the campaign (Chenoweth, 2019).[14] But none of these hypotheses on a potential "female effect" have been tested systematically in large-N research.

In sum, there is both a theoretical and empirical gap in understanding the role of women and gender in the civil resistance scholarship. Moreover, existing hypotheses suggest that gender, and women, have observable effects on the course and outcome of nonviolent conflicts. But we first need more theory on what drives female participation in the first place. Any analysis of the potential strategic effect of female participation risks conflating causal effects with selection effects. Female participation might be systematically correlated with other factors that make campaigns more likely to succeed in the short-term or democratize in the long-term. I help remedy this gap by introducing theory and a new dataset, ARC-Women. Building on the ARC dataset, introduced in Paper II, I identify the participation of women in organizations engaging in dissent, from the leadership to the ideology to the grassroots of the organization. I also provide new theory on the determinants of female participation, including explanations at the organizational and country level. The original meso-level data introduced in the thesis might subsequently be used to test some of the hypotheses in the existing literature on potential female effects.

Next, the theoretical concepts and overall framework of the thesis is presented.

[13] These data will likely generate new and important empirical studies, but there is important variation in female participation that is not captured when women's presence is observed at the campaign level.

[14] In the report, they show that female participation in campaigns is correlated with more security defections, but no multivariate empirical analysis is offered, and there is no analysis of the determinants of female participation (Chenoweth, 2019).

1.2 Theoretical framework

The thesis consists of five independent articles, all of which deal with women, organizations and dissent. In the following, I discuss the central concepts of the thesis, before presenting my main theoretical arguments and explanations.

1.2.1 Concepts

Contentious collective action

The concept of resistance—also referred to as "contentious collective action" or "contentious dissent"—is central to all papers of the thesis. While collective action can entail any action where groups or individuals come together and work for a goal, *contentious* collective action—also called collective dissent or simply resistance—takes place outside conventional political institutions: "Collective dissent is observable action involving multiple people, beyond normal institutional procedures for realizing political goals" (Tilly, 1978). Note that it needs to be 'observable action'. This means that I do not focus on resistance that happens more covertly. Further, acts of contentious collective action can manifest in single events, but sometimes these events together form a campaign, a sustained effort of political action which can last from a few days to several years.

Although all five papers center around contentious dissent, some of them feature different aspects of contentious dissent in terms of the type of tactics (violent/nonviolent) used or the goals aimed at (maximalist/non-maximalist). Nonviolent tactics include numerous methods, for example non-cooperation, sit-ins, demonstrations, and petitions (Sharp, 1973), whereas violent tactics refer to organized violence (e.g. the use of lethal weapons). Very few campaigns are exclusively violent or nonviolent, but these are ideal-types.[15]

The first four papers all focus on resistance for maximalist goals. Maximalist goals are defined as "calls for changes in the political structure that would significantly alter the executive's access to state power, the rules with which executives are selected, or the policy or geographic areas for which the executive has the right to make laws. Exam-

[15] In nonviolent campaigns there can still be individuals promoting violence, sometimes referred to as the 'radical flank' (della Porta, 2018), and violent and nonviolent campaigns sometimes occur simultaneously. The distinction is still important conceptually; a burgeoning literature on resistance has shown that the mechanisms through which people participate, and the outcomes of campaigns, vary significantly depending on whether violence or nonviolence is the principal method (e.g. Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Lambach et al., 2020).

ples of maximalism include demands that a head of state resign via a non-institutional method, for democratization in autocratic settings, to enfranchise an excluded social group, and for regional or ethnic autonomy or independence" (Butcher et al., 2022). An example is the resistance campaign in Sudan in 2018-2019 mentioned in the introduction. Goals that are not maximalist are referred to as non-maximalist, or alternatively social protest. Only Paper V takes a wider approach by also including non-maximalist protest—here no strict definition is used other than the difference to maximalism. This could for example be protests for women's rights or economic matters.

The first paper focuses on internal armed conflict, which is very close to the definition of a violent campaign. Paper II and III focus on organizations that mobilized for maximalist goals and both violent and nonviolent tactics are implicitly included, while papers IV and V are focused primarily on mobilization with nonviolent tactics. In section 1.3.3, an overview of the scope of each of the papers is given.

There are some drawbacks with only selecting maximalist goals and observable action. Some argue that the distinction between maximalism and non-maximalism is not as clear as proposed here. For example, some scholars focus on everyday resistance, and show how merely existing and practicing one's culture and ways of life are themselves acts of resistance that directly flout the authority of the regime (Scott, 2008). Also, the focus on public participation might ignore the fact that people mobilize in more covert ways. Especially in contexts of extreme repression, the ability to take to the street with banners demanding the removal of the regime is simply not an option, but there might still be significant activities of resistance present, like online dissent. These forms of dissent are not the focus of the thesis and the results should be interpreted to apply to observable forms of dissent and not extrapolated further.

A central question is whether women's resistance in particular is more likely to take covert forms and to formulate goals that are seemingly 'apolitical'. If so, we might systematically miss acts of resistance by women more so than with other actors. This is unknown, but the approach of the thesis at least brings us one step forward in terms of mapping the variation in women's participation in public, collective dissent, and the inferences are probably bound to these scope conditions. While all research needs to limit its scope, especially empirical large-N research often makes a tradeoff between what we want to capture, and what we can find information on and systematically collect in a way that is comparable across time and space.

Women and gender

The thesis focuses on 'women' as actors and a social group. With women, I refer to a specific demographic based on a dichotomous view of gender/sex—male and female. While in reality gender identities are more fluid and less rigid, such nuances are hard to capture in large-N empirical analyses. When I refer to gender distribution, gender balance, or gender composition, I refer to the relationship/share of men versus women. Women are not however a homogeneous group — their group identity might be stronger within for example an ethnic group or religious affiliation. As put by Beckwith (2000, 432): "*women* as a category of research is of necessity complex, heterogeneous, and informed by differences of race, class, ethnicity, nationality, generation, and religion". Naturally, aggregate factors measuring women's inclusion do not imply the empowerment or inclusion of all women (Arat, 2015), but this is a limitation of most quantitative approaches to studying women and gender. It is still analytically important to look at women as a category of research. Moreover, given how women have explicitly been ignored in much of the 'mainstream' conflict research, the category 'women' deserves attention. Future work should add nuances to this.[16]

Gender is in the thesis also used as a theoretical concept—a theoretical lens. Analyzing social phenomena through a gender lens means studying the structures and norms that shape societies' expectations of men and women, or masculinity and femininity. Gender is socially constructed, varying across time and space. In the words of Beckwith (2010, p. 161): "Gender, conceptualized as a process, functions to identify how apparently gender-neutral structures and policies work upon women or men, and upon masculine or feminine actors, as well as on the interactions among individual women or men to shape structures and policies to a specifically gendered outcome". For example, in Paper III, I argue that organizations are not gender-neutral, and that patterns of gender inequality influence women's access and opportunities to participate in them.

Organizations

A central focus of the thesis is the emphasis on the organizational level for understanding the dynamics of nonviolent dissent. Organizations are defined as individuals bound by some purpose or objective (North, 1990), with some structure for coordinating activities and resources (Daft, 2013). While each individual makes the decision to participate in a resistance campaign for him or herself, that decision is never made in a vacuum.

[16] This could mean moving into the specifics of particular groups of women, exploring intersectionality, or being more nuanced in terms of gender identities.

Individuals taking part in contentious and high-risk collective action are typically part of preexisting organizations, or they come together to create organizations for the sake of the campaign. The thesis thus takes as a premise that the decision to engage in collective dissent is not always made at the individual level. Rather it is the decision of groups of individuals (Goldstone, 1994, p. 156): "Only if (...) existing groups find it worthwhile to engage in protest will protest occur, and it will occur in the framework of those existing groups". Network ties, norms, and social pressure within organizations often function as the main motivating force for actually taking part in dissent (Thurber, 2019). Furthermore, it is organizations that typically make the decisions related to the strategy and tactics of dissent (Cederman et al., 2013). The theoretical framework of the thesis therefore centers on organizations, arguing that they are the key actors to analyze if we want to understand the onset, dynamics, and outcomes of collective dissent.

Explanations

Having laid out how I use the central concepts, I now turn to the theoretical framework. One of the papers is simply about data (Paper II). For this section, I focus on laying out the theoretical framework for papers I and III-V. Most of these papers are focused on nonviolent dissent, and as such, one of the thesis's main contributions is to develop new theory for understanding women's participation in such activities. In summary, I argue that participation by women is a combination of structural factors and agency/strategic decision-making. I sketch explanations taking in both the state and organization level.

Conflicts as windows of opportunity

The thesis builds on the concept of opportunity windows. Opportunity windows are moments of political opening, and could be caused by an external shock, something disrupting the status quo. In the first paper, I argue that internal armed conflicts are shocks to society that can catalyze social change. While others have looked at war in general, I contend that the shocks argument should apply specifically to internal conflicts, as we can imagine that they are more directly destructive to the society—both in terms of infrastructure and social ties—in which they take place. At the same time, I argue that there are two conditional mechanisms to this theory. One, the more destructive the conflict is, the bigger improvement we should see to post-conflict female empowerment. Two, the opportunity to influence any new state arrangements depends

greatly on the form of conflict termination. I argue that conflicts terminated by negotiated agreements are more likely to be open to the influence of female political entrepreneurs.

The argument that conflicts are opportunity windows for women can be applied to the context of civil resistance campaigns too. One could imagine that resistance campaigns, which also are moments of disruption, represent an opportunity window, a political opening for women to take advantage of. In Paper IV, however, I argue that it is not automatic that the resistance moment is an opportunity window for improving women's empowerment. Rather, and particularly for organizations working for women's rights, the resistance moment can spell uncertainty and risk of backlash, especially if the resistance is driven by conservative ideology organizations. Also, where the state is expanding women's rights, women political entrepreneurs might be more risk-averse and favor the status quo. In this sense, I argue that the nonviolent resistance campaign is not automatically viewed as a window of opportunity by women — it depends on characteristics of the state and the other actors in the campaign. As such, an overarching argument is that particular conditions need to be met for either violent conflicts or nonviolent conflicts to be windows of change.

Explaining women's participation in civil resistance

To understand the variation in women's participation in civil resistance, I emphasize both structure and agency. I furthermore argue that we need to look for explanatory factors at both the state- and the organization-level.[17] More generally, the thesis takes seriously that the mobilization process of women is shaped by their gender and requires a distinct theoretical framework. This is not to diminish the influence of other social structures; class, age, geography and ethnicity could all shape the determinants of women's participation. Still, the social structure of gender is an overarching and deep cleavage that defines women's room for maneuver, and most likely also their grievances. Social structures and patterns of political participation have significant gendered patterns. For example, there is a gender gap in participation in political action, whether we look at conventional political participation or participation in violent dissent.

It is thus highly likely that participation in nonviolent resistance is a gendered process, requiring theory that is specific to women. My approach to understanding

[17] Individual-level explanations clearly matter too, but they are not the explicit focus of the thesis.

participation is to take some of the existing theories as departure points and look at how they can be enlarged with a focus on gender.[18]

State-level explanations First, I argue that gendered structural factors determine female participation in organizations in dissent. Women's social, economic and political position determines their opportunities in life, all else being equal. While protest might seem like an impulsive choice — an action that does not require resources, political power, or particular skills—as I argue elsewhere in the thesis, it is organizations that usually take the lead in organizing any collective dissent. Organizations are central because they have pre-existing structures through which they can mobilize. They have human and financial resources to wage dissent, and they have experience that is useful when organizing resistance campaigns. Given that most organizations are pre-existing, it also means that they are embedded in existing societal structures. These existing societal structures are also gendered—meaning that there are significant differences, in the aggregate, in women's opportunities and status, compared to men's. To understand women's participation in organizations' resistance requires understanding women's position in society overall. I therefore argue, and specifically so in Paper III, that women's participation is determined by gendered structural factors at the country level. This means for example women's socio-economic position, as shaped by education level and participation in formal paid work. These structures shape women's overall barriers and opportunities, and they also influence the demand for women by organizations themselves, given that organizations are more likely to invest in people with skills.

I furthermore argue that there are particular state-level policies that are more strategic and dynamic than slow-changing socio-economic factors. The state-level strategic policies that I focus on are repression and (attempts at) cooptation. States can deal with threats by coercion and violence (Davenport, 2007), or they can pre-empt dissent by alleviating grievances (Cunningham, 2011). The thesis argues that states use gendered tactics to target women. Paper IV makes the case that states aim at lightening women's grievances by improving their rights. Paper V argues that instead sometimes the state uses coercion and violence to threaten women: States use gendered repres-

[18] I do not focus on men in the theoretical framework, even if gendered structures influence men too. By implication, much of the existing explanatory frameworks for mobilization is theory that applies to men, even if that is not made explicit. Theorizing women's participation is an important step forward and can enable future research to develop comparative approaches to mobilization.

sive tactics, specifically sexual violence, also called sexualized repression, to intimidate women.

Both strategies aim at reducing or pre-empting the risk that certain groups will oppose or threaten the states. But do they work? I argue that rights expansion is more effective than violent repression. This is not necessarily because women are easily bought off, but when regimes expand women's rights it is rarely the result of an exclusively top-down policy. Rather, important changes in legislation and improvements in women's political power follow from the lobbying efforts and influence of women's rights entrepreneurs. The policy of extending women's rights might therefore 'work' in reducing the likelihood that organizations working for women's rights oppose the state through direct confrontation, as in maximalist resistance campaigns. Participation, I argue, is a strategic rational choice. It is determined by what the regime has to offer women, versus the likely outcome of a resistance campaign. The decision depends on the relative level of rights and access offered by the current regime, and the goals of the other organizations behind the resistance campaign. Thus it is possible women might prefer the status quo. Treating women's participation as a strategic choice instead of a passive action or something determined solely by external factors is an important theoretical advance.

Furthermore, I argue in Paper V that direct repression is more likely to backfire on the regime, especially if the type of repression is particularly illegitimate. This, we argue, is the case with sexual violence, or sexualized repression. Violent tactics like rape and sexual assault target women more than men. We argue that when women feel threatened as a group, it makes it more likely that they mobilize as a response. Furthermore, the perceptions of women as victims, and the particularly atrocious nature of sexual violations, might lead to widespread fury and mobilization. Paper V argues that women are not only passivized and victimized after being subjected to violence — rather they are likely to become aggrieved and fight back when they are targeted.

Meso-level explanations In addition to state-level factors, the thesis emphasizes meso-level explanations of variation in female participation. Organizations or campaigns in the same structural environment likely display variations in the degree to which they include women. Thus, meso-level factors make up an additional dimension that determines female participation. At the organization-level, I argue that ideology and goals are some of the most important features shaping the participation of women—this is a central theoretical argument in both Paper III and IV. I argue that ideology shapes women's incentives for joining a dissenting organization, and that it also shapes the

degree to which organizations value women's inclusion. Moreover, organizations in resistance could be viewed as a collective of organizations, sometimes explicitly (if organized in fronts) or implicitly, appearing alongside each other in the same campaign but without formal inter-organizational ties. In Paper IV I argue that the dominance of organizations with conservative ideologies or a patriarchal composition, should influence the strategic dimensions of women's organizations' choice to participate or not. Moving beyond the campaign level when looking for theoretical explanations is a first attempt at generating meso-level explanations for women's participation, or the lack of such, in nonviolent dissent.

Structure and agency In sum, what determines female participation is necessarily complex, and the theoretical framework proposes new avenues for understanding variation. While the empirical analyses do not confirm all the proposed hypotheses, the theoretical framework overall helps us better understand women's participation in nonviolent dissent. The papers, as a whole, emphasize the importance of both structure and agency. Paper III puts more weight on structural factors, showing how they shape opportunity, while Paper IV and Paper V stress an agency-based approach to understanding women's participation.

Moreover, the explanatory framework for understanding women's participation in nonviolent dissent revolves mainly around two levels: One, at the level of the state, and two, at the level of organizations. These two explanatory levels are complementary and hence important to view in tandem, and thus both Paper III and IV incorporate both levels when looking for determinants of women in dissenting organizations, and women's rights organizations in dissent.

1.3 Analytical approach

The thesis combines rigorously derived theoretical claims with a quantitative approach to empirical testing. Analyzing patterns across countries and over time allows for detecting general associations. Each of the analytical models are designed to reduce the most common risks of obtaining spurious results, but given that this is a fairly new field of research, and the thesis explores new empirical data, we cannot confidently conclude that these are causal effects. Nonetheless, the associations in this thesis are interpreted as potential causal relationships to be unpacked in future research. Moreover, some papers report null findings, such as Paper IV and V, meaning that I do

not find enough evidence to reject the null hypotheses of no association. However, the novel theoretical claims in the thesis are backed by real-world examples throughout the papers to illustrate the plausibility of the mechanisms. Rather than taking the lack of findings as evidence that there is no relationship between the phenomena under study, I suggest that continued data collection efforts in these areas might help detect clearer associations in the future. In sum, the findings (and non-findings) represent promising explanations that can be followed up in further research, and should be interpreted as tentative causal mechanisms.

Three papers in the thesis look at female participation in resistance at different levels of aggregation. Paper III looks at how meso- and macro-level structures shape women's inclusion in organizations in dissent. Paper IV looks at how resistance networks facilitate (or hinder) women's participation. Paper V looks at how interactions with state repressive actors influence women's street-level protests. The disaggregation to different levels responds to a general call for moving beyond the macro-level in empirical analyses of civil resistance.

1.3.1 Meso-level data

To enable more detailed analyses of organizations in resistance, the thesis has contributed to the development and collection of the ARC dataset, a new subnational database covering 1,400 unique organizations that engaged in maximalist dissent in Africa in the period 1990 to 2015. For each organization, the dataset provides 18 variables describing the characteristics of the organization, such as its goals, social base, size, age, ties to regime, and alliances with other groups. The ARC dataset is now publicly available[19] and can be used to analyze how the social composition of resistance campaigns influences the evolution of resistance campaigns and whether they succeed or not. The data covers 3,407 country-organization-years in total. Paper II describes the codebook and the variables, while also exploring some empirical patterns. Some organizations are pre-existing organizations and make the decision to get involved in dissent. Others are new and formed specifically for the purpose of prosecuting dissent (in the social movement literature they are referred to as social movement organizations, SMOs). Fronts represent both types: They are new constellations but typically still involve preexisting organizations. All these types of organizations are captured by the ARC data.

[19] see https://www.arc-project.net/



Figure 1.2. Female participation in organizations in dissent, based on the ARC-Women data

As an independent add-on to the ARC dataset, the thesis introduces a new dataset *ARC-Women*, describing the inclusion of women in the organizations in the ARC. This enables us to understand patterns of women's participation and opens up for testing hypotheses on what explains variation in female participation. ARC-Women identifies women at four organizational levels: women's access to the top leadership, whether the organization has a women's section as part of its formal organizational structure, what proportion women are of the membership/social base, and whether the organizational ideology promotes the inclusion or exclusion of women in public life. Figure 1.2 shows the different dimensions of female participation (here, some of the variables have been recoded to dummy variables for illustration). The most common dimension of inclusion is ideology or having a women's section, while very few organizations have woman as a leader. The four dimensions (leadership, ideology, women's section, membership) can be summarized with an ordinal scale and used as an indicator ranging from high to low participation. As seen in Figure 1.3, more than half of all observed organizations lack women on all of these dimensions, and very few match all the dimensions of female participation. In Paper III, I define organizations as "women-inclusive" when they have female participation on two or more dimensions. In Figure 1.4, the absolute number of organizations active in episodes of maximalist dissent per country is visualized, and the colors illustrate how many of them are women-inclusive.

In these figures, I have not ranked the dimensions of participation. Alternatively, one can view the dimensions as a hierarchical relationship: Leadership is likely the most influential and important level of participation, while participation at the grassroots



Figure 1.3. Dimensions of female participation in organizations in dissent, based on the ARC-Women data



Figure 1.4. Organizations in dissent, with and without women (as measured in ARC-Women)

is the lowest. Women's sections may reflect a high level of representation, but may also mean that women's issues have been sidelined. For organizations that have women represented through several or all of the dimensions on female participation, it is most likely that women are an integral part of the decision-making of the organization. Also, street-level participation in dissent by women is implied when women are present in the organizations, as measured by ARC-Women. But it is important to note that even if women are absent from organizations, street-level participation by women might still be substantial.

The variables are described in more depth in Paper III, including the codebook. These data are an important contribution for mapping female participation and open up for exploring how organizational gender dynamics affect the dynamics of resistance campaigns.

1.3.2 Methodological challenges

When collecting information on organizations in dissent, we relied on publicly available sources like existing datasets, general encyclopedias, journal articles, other published works, organizational websites and news articles. This has some limitations. Firstly, when identifying organizations there will be cases where we haven't captured every single organization that participated. When news media mention the names of particular organizations that engaged in protest events, there is most likely a bias in favor of singling out the more sizable organizations, including political parties and trade unions. There might also be a better coverage of urban organizations than ones operating in rural areas, although these biases could partially be controlled for in quantitative analyses.[20] For fronts, we have a fairly good coverage. Fronts are created by existing organizations for maximalist collective action, and they will often publish the names of each constituent organization. Because we searched extensively to identify the organizations in fronts, not only relying on news wires, we have gone beyond existing datasets, and identified a longer and more diverse list of participants. Secondly, after identifying organizations, we would search for information about each one. Also here, it is typically easier to find information on larger organizations, and on organizations that compete for power like political parties, and so on. This means that there are most likely systematic patterns of absences in the data.

[20] For example by controlling for news coverage, as I do in Paper III-V.

While these are some overarching methodological issues, there might also be particular issues with observing women in events. In general, women's participation is likely to be underreported. For one thing, women are more likely to organize in civil society organizations (CSOs). CSOs are often not among the big powerful political actors and would therefore be less likely mentioned as participants in news sources. Also, there is a general problem that news coverage depicts women as victims rather than agents, especially in conflict settings (Pompper, 2014). This is why in Paper IV I add robustness tests analyzing the presence of women's organizations in fronts, where it is more likely that we pick up most of the constituent organizations.

At the same time, this shows the need for searching specifically for women, not assuming that general searches and coding of social actors in resistance will automatically pick up female participation. ARC-Women is in this sense a significant improvement, as it is based on extensive searches aiming at explicitly identifying the presence of women in organizations in dissent. Searching actively for women is a better way of knowing whether women were there, although this is still limited by what we can find in publicly available information. Future research could look into social media accounts and other more informal sources to identify female activists (c.f. Pan and Siegel, 2020).

While underreporting of women in events is one problem, another is the difficulty of finding information on female participation (and other organizational characteristics) in the organizations identified as participating in dissent. Organizations operating in countries where civil society and civil liberties are restricted are unlikely to post detailed information about the people involved in their group. One of the main difficulties was therefore establishing whether the absence of clear indications of women's presence meant *de facto* the absence of women or simply a lack of information. How I ended up coding organizations is further described in Paper III, but because lack of information was a problem for many of the variables on women, I relied on multiple imputation to replace missing values. This method is not flawless, but it increases the number of data points, and scholars interested in using the ARC-Women data will have access to both the imputed and non-imputed data upon publication of the data.

1.3.3 Scope

Table 1.1 summarizes the scope and variables of each study. While two papers analyze a global sample of countries, three of the papers, including the new data, cover the African region in the period 1990 to 2015. This is an interesting sample for sev-

eral reasons. Africa's first protest wave was an uprising against colonial rulers in the 1940s to the 1960s, and this period has been the focus of much scholarly attention. The next protest wave began in the late 1980s and early 1990s when considerable resistance pressured single-party rulers to resign and several states transformed into multiparty regimes with improved civil freedoms. A third wave started around 2011 in response to democratic backsliding, poverty and inequalities (Mueller, 2018). While the middle-class and students are often viewed as main actors in dissent, African protests have tended to mobilize the lower social classes, the poor and the marginalized (ibid.). However, contentious collective action in sub-Saharan Africa is typically "dismissed as riots" and has received significantly less attention than the uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East (Branch and Mampilly, 2015). In the words of Branch and Mampilly (2015): "Africa has been largely left out of the debate over global protest" (p. 200 Branch and Mampilly, 2015). Instead, scholars studying sub-Saharan Africa have focused predominantly on armed conflict. As such, the thesis covers an important period of protest in Africa and highlights nonviolent conflict dynamics that have not received as much scrutiny as other conflicts.

The geographic and temporal scope is also interesting in terms of women's activism and female empowerment. Political participation in Africa is in general lower by women than by men (Isaksson et al., 2014), and Afrobarometer data shows that women are, on average, less likely than men to participate in protest (Mueller, 2018). Still, the number of women's organizations has surged in the post-1990 era (Tripp, 2001; Tripp et al., 2008). Moreover, women have worked for increased access to political power, and the number of female legislators has taken a big jump in several African countries, many of which have experienced internal armed conflict (Tripp, 2015; Hughes and Tripp, 2015).

In summary, while the findings from the papers using data on African countries might not travel across regions, their importance still stands out. African countries have been studied very extensively when it comes to war, but the dynamics of (nonviolent) contentious collective action and women's participation in (nonviolent) dissent in Africa has received far less attention.

Table 1.1. The scope of each of the papers

#	**Type of protest or conflict**	**Violent/ nonviolent**	**Dependent variable**	**Independent variable(s)**	**Level of analysis & coverage**
I	Civil war (maximalist)	Violent	Women's political empowerment	Aftermath of civil war	Country-year analysis. Global, 1960-2015
II	Maximalist dissent	Both	Organizational participation	Structural variables, organizational composition	Country-year analysis. Africa, 1990-2015
III	Maximalist dissent	Both (but theory focused on nonviolent)	Organizational participation (by women) in dissent	Women's socioeconomic status, women's freedom, organizational ideology.	Organization-year analysis. Africa, 1990-2015
IV	Maximalist dissent	Nonviolent	Organizational participation by women's movements	Relative women's rights, organizational composition of resistance movements	Country-year analysis. Africa, 1990-2015
V	Nonviolent protests (minimalist or targeting government)	Nonviolent	Number of women's protest events	States use of sexualized repression	Country-year analysis. Global, 1991-2013

1.4 Summary of papers

1.4.1 Paper I. Civil war and female empowerment

Co-authored with Halvard Buhaug.

The negative short-and long-term consequences of war for women are extensive and well-documented. At the same time, some of the most important improvements in women's access to political power have taken place in countries escaping civil war. Recent studies show that somewhat paradoxically, the destructive effects of war may open a window of opportunity for women to strengthen their position in society (Tripp, 2015; Berry, 2018). Existing cross-national studies seem to confirm this, finding that the ending of civil conflict enables higher growth in women's legislative representation in Africa (Hughes and Tripp, 2015). Webster, Chen, and Beardsley's (2019) comprehensive global analysis of war and female empowerment provide compelling empirical evidence that conflict can disrupt societies and foster transformational changes in women's role in society, at least in the short to medium term. However, there might be conditions under which such improvements are more likely to happen. In this paper, we focus specifically on internal armed conflict and investigate how the severity of civil conflict and its mode of termination influence women's post-conflict empowerment.

First, we argue that the more destructive the conflict in terms of material costs and loss of lives, the greater the shock to society. We therefore hypothesize that women's empowerment increases more after major civil wars than after minor conflicts. Second, we hold that we should see the bigger improvements in female empowerment after wars that were terminated by a negotiated agreement. Peace processes imply a rebuilding of society and a reevaluation of current political institutions, and they offer a room for political entrepreneurs and female activists to influence. We thus hypothesize that women's empowerment increases more after formal peace agreements than after other civil conflict endings. Third, some peace agreements contain explicit references to gender or women, while others don't. The mentioning of women reflects awareness of the significance of gender equity in the negotiations and an agreed-upon intention to strengthen women's position in society. Our third hypothesis is therefore that peace agreements that explicitly address women's status have a larger positive effect on subsequent female empowerment than other peace agreements.

To test the hypotheses, we analyze a global sample of 160 independent countries from 1975 to 2017. We define the post-conflict period as one of decay, where the effect is biggest immediately after the conflict ends, before fading. We measure female

empowerment at the institutional level (women's inclusion in politics) and at the individual level (women's civil liberties). We find that countries escaping major civil war experience substantial improvements in women's civil liberties and political participation during the initial post-war phase whereas no effect is detected for minor conflicts. However, the severity of civil war also affects its mode of termination; many of the most severe conflicts end by a negotiated settlement. In subsequent tests, we find that much of the post-war improvement of female empowerment attributed to conflict severity is driven by negotiated settlements. Peace agreements containing references to women or gender have a particularly large effect on improvements in women's empowerment. The paper is an important contribution to the literature on gender and conflict, and shows the importance of including women in peace processes.

1.4.2 Paper II. Introducing the Anatomy of Resistance Campaigns (ARC) Dataset

Co-authored with Charles Butcher, Jessica Maves Braithwaite, Jonathan Pinckney, Eirin Haugseth, and Marius Swane Wishman.

Organizations are key actors in contentious collective action. They provide organizational resources, networks for mobilization, and have decision-making structures (Braithwaite and Cunningham, 2020; Cunningham et al., 2017a; McAdam, 2010; Tarrow, 2011). Therefore, they often enter negotiations with the regime, elaborate the goals and demands of the campaign, accept or reject concessions, and sometimes assume power in the aftermath of resistance campaigns (Haggard and Kaufman, 2016; Wood, 2000). However, even if existing literature emphasizes the key role of organizations in organizing dissent, to date we have lacked large-N data mapping the variety of organizational goals, tactics, identities and structures of organizations in dissent. Previous research has tended to focus on ethnonationalist uprisings, and on rebel groups.

In the paper, we introduce a new dataset, the Anatomy of Resistance Campaigns (ARC), which remedies these shortcomings. The ARC dataset covers more than 1,400 unique organizations that engaged in maximalist dissent in Africa between 1990 and 2015. For each organization, ARC provides information on the organization type, age, origins, goals, size, leadership, social base, and structure. In addition, ARC offers information about the inter-organizational ties that are important for understanding network structures. The data was coded based on existing datasets, but goes further in

identifying named organizations. When coding characteristics of the organizations, we relied on academic sources, encyclopedias, and news articles.

The paper shows that there are a variety of organizations involved in dissent. Although they all engage in dissent for maximalist goals, the paper shows that these organizations have various ideologies, goals, tactics and social composition. ARC is therefor an important contribution to the civil resistance and conflict scholarship. It goes beyond existing datasets on dissent, both by providing more detailed scrutiny of each organization's characteristics, and by expanding the scope of the organizations of interest. This is important for the study of dissent, enabling new empirical analyses and the garnering of important insights for how different organizational constellations influence the dynamics and the outcomes of resistance campaigns.

1.4.3 Paper III. Women's Participation in Organizations in Dissent

The scholarship on civil resistance is burgeoning, with studies showing the comparative advantage of nonviolent dissent in preference to violent tactics (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011) and prospects for democratization in the aftermath of conflict (Dudouet and Pinckney, 2021). Some studies also touch upon the potential strategic gains from women's participation (Codur and King, 2015). However, this literature has just begun teasing out the theoretical mechanisms which drive women's participation (Murdie and Peksen, 2015). In addition, there is an emerging scholarly field focused on describing and analyzing women's roles and experiences in armed insurgent organizations. This literature has demonstrated the strategic gains from recruiting women (Wood, 2019), and it has sought to estimate the proportion of women in rebel groups (Henshaw, 2016b), in support positions and on the frontline (Thomas and Bond, 2015; Wood and Thomas, 2017). Scholars have also written extensively about women's motivation and pathways to joining rebel groups (Viterna, 2006; Kampwirth, 2003). Considerably less is known about women in primarily nonviolent organizations, however. In the paper, I ask: What are the determinants of women's participation in organizations in resistance?

I argue that female organizational participation is shaped by country-level factors molding women's socio-economic resources and opportunity structure, and also by the ideology and goals of the organization. These variables should shape the supply of women, and influence the organizational demand for women. First, I hypothesize that the higher women's average education level and workforce participation is, the more likely it is they are included in organizations in dissent. Second, I hypothesize that

low fertility rates, high civil liberties, and norms valuing female empowerment should increase the likelihood that women have the opportunity to engage in organizations in dissent. Third, I hypothesize that organizations with leftist or liberal ideology have higher demand for women and are more attractive to women, increasing the likelihood that women are included.

I use the new dataset ARC-Women to test these relationships. ARC-Women provides information about the gender composition and the extent of female involvement in formal organizations participating in events of maximalist dissent. To glean the information from both the country- and organization-level, I run a multilevel analysis to test covariates of female participation. I estimate the likelihood that an organizations is inclusive of women. In summary, I find some evidence that country-level factors are predictors of women's inclusion in organizations in dissent, but organizational demand matters more: Organizations espousing a leftist or liberal ideology are significantly more likely to include women. By mapping the prevalence of women in organizations in dissent, and exploring why women get involved or choose not to, the paper contributes with new empirical and theoretical insights that should be of interest to scholars of civil resistance. The paper also complements previous work on women in rebel groups (Thomas and Bond, 2015), and reveal that women are in a minority in most organizations in resistance, even when excluding rebel groups.

1.4.4 Paper IV. Between patriarchs and patrons: Women's rights organizations and regime resistance

While Paper II establishes the importance of understanding the composition of formal organizations in resistance campaigns, this paper zooms in on an organizational type that has so far has been neglected in analyzes of social actors in resistance campaigns—formal women's rights organizations. Existing studies focusing on women's organizations and feminist movements have shown that women's groups exploit windows of opportunity opened by armed conflict to improve their own position (Tripp, 2015; Webster et al., 2019) and that they are prominent actors in peace activism (Chitando, 2021). In this paper, I aim at understanding their (non)participation in resistance campaigns for maximalist goals.

In the paper, I argue that there are strategic dimensions that that shape the choice of women's rights organizations to participate or abstain. I focus on two mechanisms that could explain the (non)participation of women's rights organizations. First, I argue

that women's rights organizations might prefer the status quo to an uncertain regime change when they experience improvements with the current regime. I therefore hypothesize that women's rights organizations are less likely to participate in resistance campaigns targeting the incumbent regime where improvements in female empowerment have been made. Second, I argue that women's rights organizations' incentives for participation are lower when the resistance campaign is dominated by patriarchal and conservative organizations. Patriarchal organizations — i.e. organizations dominated by men — likely ignore the demands of women's rights organizations. Conservative organizations, even if some of them include women, might oppose principles of gender equality. The second hypothesis is that women's rights organizations are less likely to participate in resistance campaigns in the dominance of conservative and patriarchal organizations.

I test these hypotheses analyzing a country-year dataset covering Africa from 1990 to 2015, summarizing the organizational composition of maximalist resistance campaigns as measured by the ARC and ARC-women datasets. Running logistic regression models, I show that the presence of conservative groups depresses the participation of women's groups, but I find no evidence that improvements in gender rights decrease the likelihood of participation by women's groups. The paper contributes to a larger literature on co-optation and dissent. States have a variety of means at their disposal to secure the loyalty of the population, and they might target specific groups with particular policies to help secure their support (alternatively they just use repression). I show that providing women with rights is not effective for silencing them, but I also do not find any clear indication that improved rights lead to more protest by women.

1.4.5 Paper V. Gendered backlash: Sexualized state repression and women's protest

Co-authored with Ragnhild Nordås.

The repression and dissent nexus is a topic that has been researched extensively, with mixed conclusions. Some report that repression effectively depresses dissent, others that repression fuels more dissent, and still others that there is a curvilinear repression, where repression at moderate levels is associated with more protest. In this paper, we disaggregate states' repressive repertoires by focusing on what we call *sexualized state repression* (SSR). SSR has gendered effects, and tends to target women specifically, or

at least that is the impression. Therefore, this paper asks: Does SSR lead to more or less female protest?

We argue that SSR is viewed as particularly illegitimate by the public—sexual violence is one of the clearest examples of what will typically be considered illegitimate, unjustifiable, and excessive state behavior. We therefore hypothesize that SSR should lead to more protests in general. In addition, we argue that SSR is a gendered type of repression—it is a type of violence that disproportionately targets women. As such, we expect women to mobilize as a group in response, and we hypothesize that SSR leads to more protest by women. At the same time, repression might stigmatize, shame and silence the victims of these types of violations, which suggests the opposite effect.

To test the hypotheses, we use a new global dataset on SSR. The SSR data is based on reported violations committed by the state or state actors. Analyzing a dataset covering 160 countries in the period 1991 to 2013, we find no specific evidence that SSR results in more or less protest by women. We discuss some potential explanations for the null findings, including the possibility that the effect is nullified as a consequence of the differential effects of SSR. If in some instances SSR has a pacifying effect, but in other contexts a mobilizing one, we can end up observing null effects in the aggregate. The paper shows the importance of investigating how different types of repression target different demographics. Repression targeting women has so far not been dealt with in the existing literature on repression and dissent. We show that this type of repression is widespread and used in all regions of the world, clearly showing the need to understand this phenomenon and not only in connection with armed conflict, which is the focus of most studies on sexual violence.

1.5 Conclusion

The first objective of the thesis was to unpack the conditions under which internal armed conflict impacts women's empowerment. Paper I finds that the end of internal conflict is associated with improvements in empowerment for women. But the paper shows that the effect is dependent on intensity; only conflicts of a certain magnitude have a positive effect, suggesting that small-scale conflicts do not create windows of opportunity. The findings confirm what previous studies have reported (Webster et al., 2019; Hughes and Tripp, 2015), but expand their findings by looking into the conditional effects of conflict severity and the mode of termination. The thesis shows that the association between severe conflicts and female empowerment is driven primarily by conflicts ended by negotiated agreements, and particularly agreements with specific reference to women. The findings on peace agreements are in accordance with another recent study by Joshi and Olsson (2021), who find that comprehensive peace agreements are more likely to result in improvements in women's rights.

The second stated objective was to map and understand the composition of resistance campaigns in terms of formal organizations and women's participation. The thesis contributes with new theory and data to the civil resistance scholarship, both by mapping organizations in dissent, and the participation of women in those organizations. Paper II introduces a new sub-national dataset and shows that some campaigns mobilize numerous organizations, while others consist of only a handful of groups. Moreover, some campaign networks mobilize across the political spectrum and across different organization types, while others are more narrowly defined. This clearly shows the importance of disaggregating the unit 'campaign' as the level of analysis; the organizational landscape is much more diverse than existing datasets have been able to pick up. Improving our knowledge of the formal actors who often form the organizational backbone of campaigns is an important step forward for the literature and the new dataset can be used widely to test existing and new theoretical hypotheses—for example on how diversity influences campaign outcomes. As shown in paper III, there is also considerable variation in the extent to which women take part in resistance. Women are included in only a minority of the organizations in resistance campaigns, even when we only look at the nonviolent organizations.

The third research objective was to theorize and explain variation in women's participation in civil resistance. Three of the papers approach this question from different angles. Paper III suggests that the organizational participation of women in maximalist dissent should be determined by structural factors shaping the economic resources

and opportunity of women, as well as the ideology/goals of the organization. The latter proposition found most empirical support, where leftist and liberal organizations are significantly more likely to be inclusive of women, partly because gender equality is more in line with their goals, and partly because their goals might be more attractive to women. It was however difficult to establish a clear relationship between country-level structural factors and variations in female participation. Furthermore, paper IV shows that the participation of formal women's organizations in nonviolent resistance for maximalist goals is rare overall, and suggests some mechanisms to explain patterns in participation: the state's relative level of women's rights and the organizational composition of the campaign should both affect the strategic choices made by women's rights organizations. Again, the organizational factors seem to matter more than the country-level structures: The analysis could not establish an association between women's relative rights on the country level and the participation of women's rights organizations, but resistance networks dominated by patriarchal organizations are associated with a lower likelihood of participation by formal women's rights organizations. Finally, Paper V investigates how the use of sexualized repression by states affects the rates of women's social protests. Using a new dataset on state sexual repression inside and outside the context of armed conflict, we argue — with support from the data—that states use this specific repressive tactic to target women more than men. We hypothesize that this could result in a backlash against the state in the form of protest, particularly by women. The empirical analysis did not provide any firm conclusions on this question, but we point toward more nuanced temporal and geographic analyses to tease out the dynamics.

Overall, Paper III, IV and V show that women's support for campaigns should not be taken as a given, but at the same time, their opportunity to participate is often restrained. In combination, the thesis shows that women's participation is a multifaceted phenomenon. Women can participate as individuals, but also as part of formal organizations, including women's organizations. I suggest that to understand women's participation we need to look for explanations on several levels: The aggregate structures that women are embedded in, as well as the organizational composition of resistance networks, might shape the overall opportunity for, and barriers to, their participation. The street-level interaction between protesters and state actors influences women's participation and grievances. And the strategic dimensions—specifically how women's organizations relate to the state—might influence the choice of whether to participate or not.

A main take away from the thesis is that there is a gender gap in participation, not only in conventional political participation or political violence, but also nonviolent resistance. The insights also contribute to the gender and conflict scholarship by switching the matters of contention to nonviolent conflict. A priori, we would have expected the participation of women in nonviolent organizations in dissent to be much higher than for violent political organizations, given that the bar to participation should be lower. I do find that participation in nonviolent organizations is more common in nonviolent organizations compared to armed organizations, but the gap in female participation rates is not as big as expected. Moreover I find that the determinants of female participation in nonviolent organizations are similar to those explaining the presence of women in rebel groups. Women not only need the motivation and opportunity to participate, but their inclusion is also shaped by organizational demand, which mirrors the findings by Thomas and Wood (2017).

Viewing the articles in combination, the question of conflicts as potential political openings stands out. While Paper I demonstrates that civil war is indeed a window of opportunity for women (under certain circumstances), the question of whether nonviolent conflicts have the potential to improve women's status has yet to be definitively answered. In a working paper, Marks and Chenoweth (2021) find evidence that women experience a backlash after nonviolent conflict. Whether women's empowerment is improved after nonviolent conflicts is not dealt with directly in the thesis, but the overall findings suggest that we should not be overly optimistic about the transformative potential of nonviolent conflicts for women. The studies show that women face substantive barriers to participation, and without representation, they most likely have no influence. Despite large-scale participation at the street level, as exemplified by Sudan, the low numbers of women in organizations show that gender inequality is inherent in the structures of the campaigns themselves. Women are rarely represented in the leadership of the organizations central to the campaign and the transition. In sum, this can explain why women might experience that they are left out or not empowered in the aftermath of such campaigns. While I find that women as a group are disadvantaged in resistance campaigns, they are far from a minority in society overall. There is thus a huge potential for mobilization, and for women influencing the course and outcomes of campaigns.

Although certain conclusions can be drawn from the empirical analyses in Papers III to V, the answer to what drives female participation in resistance is still an open field. I see three priorities for future research. One important next step is more disaggregation. Even if the thesis approaches the question of female participation at various

levels, including the sub national level, which provides far more nuance than existing studies have done, it is still a relatively aggregated approach to women. As summarized by Berkovitch and Moghadam (1999, p. 281), "within each society, different opportunity structures for collective action are open to different groups of women". Given that women's interests and opportunity structures might not be universal, but intersecting with their socio-economic position, other group identities, geography (urban/rural) and political preferences, future research should delve deeper into the questions raised in the thesis by zooming in on what kind of women participate, and how structural factors at the country- and organization level impact particular *groups* of women. A key challenge with testing the determinants of women's participation in dissent — which might explain why some of the papers do not have clear findings in either direction — is that the explanatory factors can have differential effects on the mobilization of different groups of women. For example, improvements in women's rights make women more likely to have the resources and opportunity to protest, but their grievances and incentives to protest should at the same time be less. Likewise with repression, it can anger and infuriate the population, but also make them more cautious about doing something about their grievances. A more disaggregated approach to 'women' might bring out more clearly which women we should expect to either act or keep a low profile.

The second important priority for future research is to analyze the effects of women's participation in dissenting organizations on the dynamics and impact of the resistance campaign. This is made possible by the new data introduced here. Gender diversity likely affects short-term outcomes, i.e. the likelihood of the campaign succeeding in its stated goals, for example by improving tactical innovation and providing the campaign with greater legitimacy. Women's presence, particularly in the leadership positions of organizations, might also influence long-term prospects for democratization. Also, it might be that women's participation makes resistance campaigns less likely to resort to violence. Hence if campaigns are more successful in bringing in women, it could transform their outcomes, and might also represent a window of opportunity for women to improve their own rights.

The third key pathway for future studies is to analyze women's participation in comparative perspective, comparing violent to nonviolent resistance. Even if nonviolent resistance is substantively different from violent dissent in some aspects, the potential similarities, further highlighted by the results displayed here, suggest that future research should compare women's participation in violent and nonviolent organizations. A comparative perspective also seems fruitful for analyzing the outcomes of conflict. How different are violent conflicts from nonviolent ones, in terms of the effects on female

empowerment? It would be interesting to investigate the similarities and differences between violent and nonviolent conflicts as windows of opportunity. Future work should try to identify the conditions under which women are able to influence the outcome of nonviolent conflicts, learning from armed conflict theory and the literature on women in peace processes.

At least two policy recommendations follow from the insights provided by the thesis. The WPS agenda shows how women, gender and armed conflict have become key priorities for the international community (Davies and True, 2019), and the finding that civil conflicts terminated by peace agreements are associated with improvements in the empowerment of women calls for a continued emphasis on women in the UN's efforts at peace-building and the WPS agenda. The thesis shows that an explicit focus on women in peace negotiations improves post-conflict empowerment. In addition, the thesis highlights and brings in new evidence of women's roles *nonviolent* in conflicts and the patterns I find suggest that women often find themselves in a disadvantaged position in this context as well. These insights point toward a broadening of the WPS agenda, an expansion toward enhancing women's representation in nonviolent conflicts. Securing women's representation in nonviolent transitions—for example by strengthening women's civil society organizations — would be an important way of supporting local women who struggle to have a voice among frequently male-dominated resistance networks.

Alaa Salah, the woman who caught the world's attention in April 2019, was in the aftermath of the transition invited to address UN Security Council about her experiences in the Sudanese resistance campaign. She, and her female fellows, continue to push for women's rights and to secure women's representation in the decision-making forums in Sudan. Unfortunately, at the time of writing, the democratic transition in Sudan has been stalled, and the future is uncertain. Scholars should continue to document and analyze civilian uprisings worldwide, including the dynamics of women's participation.

Chapter 2

Paper I. Civil War and Female Empowerment

Abstract

Recent research has directed attention to the transformative potential of war for female empowerment. As a disruptive shock, armed conflict can create a window of opportunity for advancing the societal role of women. We complement this research agenda by looking at how conflict severity and termination condition the outcomes for women in the aftermath of civil conflict. We expect that both level of violence and mode of resolution affect subsequent female empowerment, where severe conflicts ending by a negotiated settlement have the greatest transformative potential. Consistent with expectations, we find that post-conflict improvements in female empowerment occur primarily after high-intensity civil conflicts. However, subsequent tests reveal that this effect is driven largely by conflicts terminated by peace agreements. The greatest improvement in female empowerment is seen when peace agreements have gender-specific provisions. These results support calls for a sustained effort toward mainstreaming gender issues in conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes.

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2.1 Introduction

Women's status and political influence worldwide has improved substantially over the past decades, both in relative and absolute terms. For instance, progress is observed in girls' educational attainment, with gender parity in primary education being achieved in most countries (United Nations, 2015). Further, women's political influence has been fast-growing; women's average share of parliamentary membership nearly doubled between 1995 and 2015 (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2015). Yet, gender gaps are still persistent in most countries (UN Women, 2016; World Economic Forum, 2017)[1] These gaps are particularly extensive in non-democratic countries with low socio-economic development. Unsurprisingly, some of the worst-performing countries in terms of gender gaps in education, work force, and political participation are countries with durable civil war and fragile governance, such as Yemen, Chad, Syria, and Mali (World Economic Forum, 2017). As (Melander et al., 2016, 197) puts it, "the strongest pattern in civil war is probably its gendered nature".

Low female empowerment cannot by explained simply as an adverse outcome of armed conflict, however; incumbent regimes in many states willfully ignore demands for democratic reform or social justice, including calls for closing the gender gap. At the same time, the ending of destructive civil wars may create a potential for rapid and transformational normative and political change. Indeed, some of the most encouraging improvements in women's access to parliamentary power have been seen in post-conflict countries. Post-war countries like Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda are all above the global average in closing the gender gap (World Economic Forum, 2017).

This pattern can be detected not only in unique, well-selected cases; recent comparative research also shows how, somewhat paradoxically, the destructive effects of war may open a window of opportunity for women to strengthen their position in society (Anderson, 2016; Anderson and Swiss, 2014; Mageza-Barthel, 2015; Hughes, 2009; Hughes and Tripp, 2015; Tripp, 2015). In one of the first cross-national studies putting this to test, Hughes and Tripp (2015) find that the ending of civil conflict enables higher growth in women's legislative representation in Africa. More recently, Webster et al. (2019) Webster et al.'s (2019) comprehensive global analysis of conflict and female empowerment provide compelling empirical evidence that war can disrupt

[1] While we acknowledge that gender is not a binary category, the usage of that term in this study is meant to reflect women's rights and privileges relative to men's. To date, we lack systematic data on relevant gender-specific society-level characteristics that transcend these categories.

societies and foster transformational changes in women's role in society, at least in the short to medium term.

There are three ways in which civil conflict may stir up gender roles. First, war destructs the gendered divisions of labor and opens up space for women to enter traditionally male-dominated areas and professions. Second, war fosters women's mobilization and pro-social behavior, creating a push for continued mobilization. Third, women's entry into new jobs and the public sphere creates normative changes in attitudes toward women. In total, these processes are argued to contribute to increased political empowerment for women.[2]

We seek to advance the literature on civil war and female empowerment further by presenting theoretical and empirical innovations along three dimensions. First, much of preceding work centers on the consequences of major civil (and interstate) wars under the, often tacit, assumption that only large wars hold the potential to systematically change gender roles and attitudes. In contrast, we evaluate the sensitivity of women's standing to different levels of civil conflict severity. Second, while existing theory predicts conflict-driven impacts on gender roles and female mobilization to influence subsequent female empowerment, we argue that the nature of conflict resolution also plays a central role. Negotiated peace agreements, especially those that explicitly address women's role in society, are expected to facilitate greater improvements in formal gender equity than conflicts that fade away or end by military victory to one side. Third, empowerment is a multifaceted phenomenon, and the causal processes outlined above may have greater influence on some dimensions than other. In this study, we focus on two complementary aspects of female empowerment: individual civil liberties and political participation.

To test the empirical merit of the assumptions about gendered implications of civil war, we conduct a statistical analysis of changes in female empowerment across 160 independent countries for the period 1975-2017. We find that countries escaping major civil war experience substantial improvements in women's civil liberties and political participation the initial post-war phase whereas no effect is detected for minor conflicts. However, the lethality of civil war also affects its mode of termination; many of the most severe conflicts end by a negotiated settlement. In subsequent tests, we find that much of the post-war improvement of female empowerment attributed to conflict severity in fact is driven by negotiated settlements. Peace agreements containing

[2] These observations notwithstanding, we are certainly not arguing that civil war is good for society but rather that it holds potential to trigger positive change, despite obvious and profound human and material cost of fighting.

gender-specific provisions have a particularly large effect on improvements in women's political participation. The latter is powerful evidence in support of UNSCR 1325 and underscores the importance of involving women in negotiations and settlements in order to create a more egalitarian society.

The paper is structured as follows. First, we outline various ways in which civil conflict can increase female empowerment and develop a theoretical argument for how the severity and ending of the conflict shape this relationship. We then present the data material and research strategy, followed by a documentation and interpretation of the empirical findings. We end by considering some implications of these results for future research and policy.

2.2 Previous research and theory

In existing research on gender inequality and conflict, a near-consensus finding is that gender inequality is associated with increased risk of civil war (e.g. Dahlum and Wig, 2020). Emerging evidence also suggests that armed conflicts and wars, despite their many devastating impacts on society, can facilitate female empowerment (Webster et al., 2019; Hughes and Tripp, 2015). The main argument sustained through this research is that war constitutes a shock that shatters both institutions and society at large, creating a window of opportunity for women to advance their formal rights and privileges. In the following, we briefly discuss common theories about how armed conflicts can reshape societal gender roles, from which we develop a set of arguments and associated testable expectations relating to how the severity of civil conflict as well as the manner in which it ends inform the potential for subsequent improvements in women's role in society. We start by clarifying what we understand as women's empowerment and the scope of the paper.

Female empowerment is a wide notion encompassing several aspects of a woman's authority (see, for example, Narayan (2005)), but for the purpose of this study we focus on women's *political* empowerment.[3] We understand political empowerment as a multi-dimensional concept that covers inclusion and agency both at the individual level as well as at the level of formal political institutions. At the individual level, female empowerment includes women's right to discuss freely, engage in civil society organizations (CSO), and have access to a fair judicial system. At the institutional level,

[3] In the remainder of the article, generic references to women's 'empowerment' are intended to reflect their formal political status and agency.

women's empowerment concerns their formal participation and inclusion in decision-making institutions, such as national parliaments. Our understanding is in line with Sundström et al. (2017).[4]

We focus on civil conflict.[5] Although some of the arguments outlined below also apply to interstate war, we maintain that the defining character of internal conflict, pitting incumbent regimes against non-state challengers over incompatible political objectives, reflects a unique potential to reshape fundamental aspects of the society's polity.

2.2.1 Civil war as a critical juncture

Armed conflict is sometimes described as development in reverse (Collier et al., 2003; Gates et al., 2012). Aside from human and material losses in fighting, severe conflict often deters financial investments and long-term planning, ruins the tourism industry and other economic activities, causes massive human displacement, and erodes norms and the social fabric conducive to a prospering society. Some studies suggest that war has especially damaging consequences for women. For example, it has been shown that more women than men die in the aftermath of conflict (Ormhaug et al., 2009), that women's life expectancy is reduced more than men's (Ghobarah et al., 2003; Plümper and Neumayer, 2006), that more women than men are forcibly displaced as refugees (Buvinic et al., 2013), and that maternal mortality rates are elevated in the aftermath of conflict (Urdal and Che, 2013). In addition, sexual violence is directed (mostly) at women as a weapon of war (Cohen, 2013; Cohen and Nordås, 2014). Yet, the ways in which conflicts cause severe material and social damages may, paradoxically, serve as mechanisms that can facilitate increased space, opportunities, and privileges for women when the gun smoke clears.

Within research on female empowerment, women's advancement is often portrayed as an incremental process (Blumberg, 1984). The rise of women in politics and other traditionally male-dominated spheres of society is dependent on a gradual development where women expand their human capital through increased education and participation in the labor market. On the other hand, it is argued that in some cases, women

[4] We understand female empowerment at the individual level as a process of absolute dimensions, where the empowerment of women can be considered independently from men's situation, i.e. women's increased empowerment does not come at the cost of men's empowerment. At the institutional level, on the other hand, women's empowerment is relational and best understood as the ratio to men.

[5] We use the terms civil conflict and civil war interchangeably unless otherwise specified.

may take a sudden and big leap forward, helped by some dramatic event or crisis (Hughes and Tripp, 2015). The notion of critical juncture, a concept first developed by Rokkan and Lipset (1967) and further developed to explain regime dynamics(Collier and Collier, 1991), explains how a crisis or cleavage can create opportunities for political entrepreneurs to change the political status quo. Correspondingly, policy windows, a notion developed by (Kingdon, 1995), is an opening, commonly caused by crisis, where actors can push forward for a wanted development. Moreover, theory on social movements emphasize how mobilization is dependent on, inter alia, the opportunity structure, in which agents for change exploit political openings caused by landmark events (Tilly et al., 2001). While neither of these concepts was developed with a gender focus in mind, they are useful also for theorizing how women may exploit political openings and the power vacuum that sometimes appear in the wake of civil war.

From the extant literature we can identify three central mechanisms through which armed conflict facilitates positive change in women's empowerment. First, civil war may create a demand for women to take on new positions in society. Such new-earned responsibilities can extend from becoming head of the household and managing the family's economy via entry into traditionally male-dominated jobs to joining men in combat on the battlefield (Kaufman and Williams, 2010; Ní Aoláin et al., 2011; Thomas and Bond, 2015). Moreover, civil war may facilitate increased female participation in political decision-making. For instance, psychological experiments find that people perceive women to be better suited to lead in times of crisis (Bruckmüller and Branscombe, 2010). The demand for women to engage politically may be helped further by the framing of women as the more 'peaceful' gender (Rudman et al., 2004; Wood and Ramirez, 2018), who have a 'natural' aversion against violence (Caprioli and Boyer, 2001; Hudson et al., 2012), and who are less corrupt than men.[6]

A second pathway through which civil war may influence women's empowerment relates to female mobilization and increased pro-social behavior. Several studies document how, during war, many women enter the public realm through setting up grassroot projects, organizing peace movements, and mobilizing in civil society organizations, all of which can be crucial for advancing women's rights and participation in a post-war context (Anderson, 2016; Merrill, 2017; Tripp, 2015; Viterna and Fallon, 2008; Waylen, 2007). In parallel, conflict-related sexual violence can strengthen the social cohesion of a community, as well as trigger a collective solidarity response (Gilligan et al., 2014;

[6] Although people's impression of women as peaceful is indeed an essentialist understanding of women and not an empirical finding, the perceived gender differences are something that can be taken advantage of by women who aim at achieving political power(cf. Helms, 2003).

Voors et al., 2012; Berry, 2015; Kreft, 2018). For example, evidence from Sierra Leone shows that families of victims to sexual violence are more likely to engage in community organizations and social events (Koos, 2018). Unlike the first mechanism's emphasis on 'pragmatic' effects related to male vacuum and mistrust, the mobilization mechanism speaks of female agency and deliberate actions when the opportunity arises.

A third conflict-related pathway refers to normative changes that may emerge as a knock-on effect of the two previous mechanisms. Historically, women have been viewed as belonging to the private realm, leaving men to take on public positions, leadership roles, and to serve in the military. Changes to the division of labor also change perceptions of what a woman can or cannot do; when women assume these roles, it shows the society at large that women can perform the same tasks as men. In the words of an interviewee from Liberia, "the war brought a lot of evils, and a lot of good things. It brought out our leadership abilities in women" (Fuest, 2008, 202). Importantly, these processes also can increase women's self-awareness and reveal how important their contributions can be (Kaufman and Williams, 2010). Consequently, mobilizing for peace can be a stepping stone toward continued female mobilization and a normative acceptance of women's public engagement after war, resulting in (inter alia) increased share of women in formal political institutions and new opportunities for women to take part in peace-building processes (e.g., Tripp 2015).

There is emerging empirical support for each of these mechanisms, even if much of the evidence is indicative or case-specific due to data limitations that presently prevent investigating such processes in a more detailed, comparative causal inference framework. However, what is largely missing from this literature is a deeper understanding of the conditions that make these mechanisms most likely to manifest themselves in measurable improvements in women's empowerment after civil war. In the following, we outline a simple theoretical storyline that connects the empowerment mechanisms to three central features of the previous conflict: its level of severity, its mode of resolution, and its facilitation of a peace agreement with specific gender provisions.

2.2.2 Battlefield severity and post-conflict empowerment

Civil conflicts take on many forms, and it is often much easier to tell two conflicts apart than identifying their commonalities. Despite encouraging findings from recent scholarship about a general association between armed conflict and female empowerment (e.g., Hughes and Tripp 2015; Webster, Chen, and Beardsley 2019), it is clear that civil

conflicts vary widely in the extent to which they manage to inspire positive shifts in women's political status in society. An important reason for this variation, we contend, is contextual heterogeneity, or differences in fundamental features of the recently ended conflict.[7]

The first and arguably most defining feature of armed conflict that can have a substantial bearing on post-conflict sociopolitical development is its level of severity. The more destructive the conflict in terms of material costs and loss of lives, the greater the shock to society. An armed conflict that directly affects a sizeable share of the population will generate more opportunities for women to join new segments of the labor market, engage in social movements and community activities, and have greater influence on social and political norms, with cascading impacts on attitudes toward women through the pathways discussed above. This intuition is commonly, if sometimes tacitly, acknowledged in empirical research, which often is restricted to analysis of major civil (and interstate) wars.

Present evidence for a conditioning role of battlefield severity in shaping post-conflict empowerment is limited and mixed. Studies of female parliamentary representation in Sub-Saharan Africa have found a larger increase in response to major wars than low-intensity conflicts (Hughes 2009; Hughes and Tripp 2015) whereas Webster et al. (2019) report a negative but dissipating short-term effect of number of battle-deaths on women's empowerment. Notable differences in samples, conflict types, and analytical approaches between these studies complicate direct comparison but we conclude that current understanding suggests a positive association between civil conflict severity and post-conflict change. Our first testable hypothesis is:

H1: Women's empowerment increases more after major civil wars than after minor conflicts, ceteris paribus.

2.2.3 Peace agreements and post-conflict empowerment

The manner in which conflicts end can have a profound effect on subsequent state-building. For example, civil wars that end in military victory to one side generally tend to produce a more lasting peace than those that end in negotiated settlements, although peace agreements (PAs) can have a positive impact on the durability of peace under the right circumstances, and their record has improved considerably in the post-Cold

[7] There likely exist a number of society-level structural conditions (beyond those directly shaping the nature of the conflict) that also influence the female empowerment potential of war. We defer research on such conditions to future research.

War era (Caplan and Hoeffler, 2017; Hultman and Johansson, 2017; Licklider, 1995; Rosenfield and Wood, 2017).

The negotiated manner through which formal PAs are reached imply that competing stakeholders get a chance to voice their grievances and raise their demands. Since the number of issues on the table when post-conflict state-building is negotiated will be greater, required solutions will be more comprehensive than when the winners take all. Commonly, PAs involve power sharing arrangements with minority protection, which rarely can be designed and implemented without reforms to judicial and political institutions. It is unsurprising, therefore, that conflicts that are settled by a PA see larger improvements in civil liberties and are better at reducing socioeconomic inequalities (Stewart and Daga, 2017). Likewise, PAs may facilitate liberalization of the electoral system, such as the introduction of gender quota (Anderson and Swiss, 2014; Lukatela, 2012). This broader effort to achieve post-conflict stability and prosperity is likely to shape both men and women's civil liberties and political freedoms (e.g., through democratic reforms), but given that women on average have fewer rights from the outset, their potential for positive change is greater.

Post-conflict female empowerment also may emerge from more conscious processes. Even though women traditionally have been denied a seat at the negotiation table (Bell and O'Rourke 2010; Krause, Krause, and Bränfors 2018), the negotiation process may provide opportunities outside the formal channels, such as through reconciliation ceremonies, regional consultations, lobbying, and media campaigns (Bouta et al., 2005). For example, Bell (2018) shows how women can navigate the peace process at different stages to try to influence gender equality even in the absence of a stark focus on gender from the outset of the negotiations. The international community also has greater leverage to influence post-conflict development when the conflict is ended by a negotiated settlement. Among other things, countries with formal PAs receive more aid than other post-conflict countries (Stewart and Daga 2017), implying greater donor influence over recipient countries. Hence, female empowerment is expected to be a distinct outcome of a PA, also in the absence of an explicit focus on women's interests in the accords. Our second hypothesis is:

H2: Women's empowerment increases more after formal peace agreements than after other civil conflict endings, ceteris paribus.

2.2.4 Gender provisions and post-conflict empowerment

Just like conflicts come in many forms, so do peace agreements. Recent research has shown that there is considerable variation in the extent to which PAs are gender sensitive, i.e. whether they include specific provisions for empowering girls or women (Bell and O'Rourke, 2010). One manner in which the mechanisms presented above might materialize is through increased war-time female agency forming the contents of negotiated settlement (e.g. True and Riveros-Morales, 2019). The inclusion of gender provisions in a PA reflects an explicit awareness of the significance of gender equity in the negotiations and an agreed-upon intention to strengthen women's position in society. The explicit reference to gender or women can be leveraged by women's movements in the post-conflict environment to pressure the government to follow up on issues of gender equality. The extent to which women are recognized in the PA typically reflects their mobilizing capacity, their access to negotiation fora, and the presence of supportive international mediators (Bell 2018). All else equal, PAs focusing on women's rights thus should produce better outcomes for women in the post-conflict stage than PAs lacking such provisions.

An important policy relevant question remains, however: does the empowerment effect of gender provisions depend on successful implementation or is legal recognition of such policies in the PA framework sufficient to facilitate strengthening of women's political status? Providing a definitive answer to this question is challenging, although recent and emerging research suggests that gender provisions are most likely to engender real improvements in women's political status when women take active part in elite peace processes and the resulting PA provisions are accompanied by specific gender quotas (True and Riveros-Morales 2019). In other words, substantive involvement may matter more than token representation. However, separating between what is implementation of PA-specific gender provisions (*explanans*) and what are new liberating policies and regulations that emerge as a consequence of the PA (*explanandum*) is not trivial, especially when working with aggregate data in a comparative large-N framework. Given that our ambition is to evaluate and identify general conflict-related conditions under which female empowerment is most likely to materialize, we are unable to provide empirical insights into the question of *de jure* versus *de facto* gender provisions here. Instead, we more simply propose:

H3: Peace agreements that explicitly address women's status have a larger positive effect on subsequent female empowerment than other peace agreements, ceteris paribus.

Before presenting the research design and the results from the empirical analysis, two issues related to the temporal dimension of women's empowerment deserve attention. Although the causal pathways proposed above (participation, mobilization, normative change) describe processes emerging during civil war, a positive impact on female empowerment may not be detectable until after fighting stops. During civil war, a state of emergency likely prevents normative and livelihood changes from manifesting themselves in observable dimensions of formal individual- or institutional-level female empowerment due to postponement of national elections and reforms that otherwise would reflect shifting public sentiments. At the same time, the notion of civil war ending as a critical juncture implies that effects are immediate but not necessarily long-lived. Accordingly, our primary focus is on female empowerment during the immediate post-conflict years, and our argument is not necessarily inconsistent with views that women often experience a backlash in newfound freedoms in the aftermath of war (Ní Aoláin et al., 2011).

2.3 Data and methods

To test the hypotheses, we construct a country-year dataset covering all independent states between 1975 and 2017 (N = 6,131). The temporal domain is determined by the availability of the peace agreement data, and the same sample is used in all main models to facilitate direct comparison of results. We use two complementary dependent variables to capture theorized improvements in women's participation in society at large as well as in formal political institutions. To this end, we employ data available from the Varieties of Democracy project (V-Dem). The first outcome variable is an additive index, women's civil liberties index (CL), composed of three variables: women's freedom of discussion, women's participation in CSOs, and women's access to justice (Coppedge et al., 2019a). These components take into account both formal discrimination, e.g., due to governmental laws, as well as informal discrimination, e.g., from cultural norms, and reflect women's empowerment in an absolute sense. The second index, women's political representation (PR), is taken from V-Dem as is, and measures the extent to which women are descriptively represented in formal political positions, including in parliament.[8] Unlike CL, PR expresses the situation for women relative to men's. Both indices range from 0 to 100, with higher values signifying higher levels of empowerment.

[8] This index is referred to as "Women political participation index" in the V-Dem codebook (p. 69), available at https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/archive/previous-data/data-version-9/.

In accordance with the proposed hypotheses emphasis on growth, we operationalize our dependent variables as change in each of these indices, defined as $y_t - y_{t-1}$.

Data on civil conflicts are taken from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.19.1 (Pettersson et al., 2019; Gleditsch et al., 2002). Since we expect conflict-driven changes in women's political standing to materialize primarily in the immediate post-conflict phase, the independent variables are specified as decay functions, defined as $x = 2^{-\frac{t}{\alpha}}$, where t is time in years since the last year of conflict activity and α is the designated half-life parameter. Based on preliminary inspection, we set the half-life parameter to 2 years, which implies that the anticipated conflict-related effects of severity, PAs, and gender provisions will halve every other year after the conflict has ended.[9] We assign the first calendar year at peace after conflict (t) a decay value of 1; three years after the conflict (t+2) corresponds to a decay value of 0.5; five years at peace (t+4) gives $x = 0.25$ and so on. In other words, the decay function acts as a variable weight that reduces the influence of the conflict-specific variables as time passes. All countries are assigned the value 0 until they experience their first post-conflict phase, and the decay is reset to 1 in the initial year of the next post-conflict phase.

To test if the severity of the civil conflict matters for outcomes for women (H1), we specify separate decay functions for the aftermath of minor conflicts (less than 1,000 battle deaths) and major conflicts (at least 1,000 battle deaths). These variables are created by taking binary indicators of the accumulated intensity level (as coded in the UCDP dataset) multiplied with the decay, such that the minor conflict ending variable maintains a score of 0 (or continues its decay after an earlier minor conflict) after major conflict, whereas the same is true for the major conflict ending variable after minor conflict. In additional tests, documented in the online Appendix, we use the (log) accumulated number of battle-related deaths in the previous conflict in interaction with the decay as a more nuanced measure of intensity. Battle deaths data come from UCDP (Pettersson et al., 2019), supplemented with data from PRIO for the period before 1989 (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005). All models include a control for ongoing civil conflict, leaving peace as the reference category.

To test H2, we use data on peace agreements from UCDP, version 19.1 (Pettersson et al., 2019; Harbom et al., 2006). First, we identify the subset of civil conflicts that

[9] In sensitivity tests, we consider alternative values for the half-life parameters. When α is set to 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12 years, the substantial effect is somewhat attenuated, but the overall results still hold. See online Appendix, Tables A5–A9, for details. We also consider simpler dummy variables to represent characteristics of the ended civil conflict for the immediate post-conflict years, see online Appendix, Tables A10–A12.

ended in a peace agreement, signed during the last two years of the conflict. In a subsequent step, we generate a post-conflict PA decay using the same procedure as described above, i.e. interacting a PA dummy with the 2-year decay function, such that the influence of the settlement fades with time. Due to the scarcity of conflicts ending with PA, we do not distinguish between minor or major PA endings, but we control for major conflict ending in the PA models since conflict severity might affect the likelihood of a negotiated settlement, such that PA potentially acts as a mediator between severity and women's empowerment. In the PA models, we also control for conflicts ending in other ways (e.g., military victory or ceasefires without formal settlement), as well as ongoing civil conflict, implying that the reference category becomes country-years at peace.

The peace agreements dataset also includes information on whether the peace agreement included any gender provisions.[10] To evaluate H3, we thus code separate decay functions for PAs with gender provisions versus PAs without. We only look at the subset of peace agreements that ended the conflict (based on the dichotomous variable "Ended" in the UCDP peace agreement dataset). Again, we control for major conflict ending, conflicts ending without PA, and ongoing conflict, such that the estimated effect of gender provisions can be compared to other modes of resolution as well as to remaining at peace.

All models contain a limited number of control variables to minimize the risk of spurious results. First, since the potential for improvement in women's political power depends on the point of departure, we control for the *level* of female empowerment on the corresponding CL / PR dimension, measured in the previous year.[11] We also account for non-stationary variables by means of a linear time trend, defined as year minus 1974. We further control for income level using log-transformed real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in constant 2005 US dollar (Gleditsch, 2002). Economic development is linked to increased gender equality through improvements in education, job opportunities, and welfare (Dollar, 2004; Kabeer and Natali, 2013) , and wealthy

[10] UCDP codes whether a peace agreement contains gender provision by the following criteria: "To qualify as a gender variable, a provision may include men and boys, but must include either women, female pronouns, or reference specifically to gender" (see Codebook for UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset 19.1, available at https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/). An alternative would be the PA-X database which also codes gender provisions (https://www.peaceagreements.org/), but the PA-X data is only available from 1990 onwards.

[11] Because civil conflicts vary widely in duration, severity, and other temporal patterns (e.g., number and length of inactive phases, etc.), we are unable to provide a meaningful, cross-sectionally consistent assessment of the gain in women's post-war empowerment, relative to their situation prior to conflict outbreak.

countries also have less conflict (Gartzke, 2007). We also control for women's education level, using the mean years of schooling for women aged 20 to 24, expressed in years. The variable, taken from Wittgenstein Centre Data Explorer (Lutz et al., 2014), comes in five-year intervals and was linearly interpolated between observation points. To minimize influence of reverse causality, empowerment levels, education level, and GDP per capita are all specified with a one-year lag.

We do not include a control for democracy in the main models. Conceptually, democracy (however defined) refers to institutions, rules, and regulations that extend far beyond those enabling or limiting rights or privileges to specific gender categories. Accordingly, institutional reforms towards or away from democracy can happen without implications for women's political status, and changes in the latter need not be accompanied by, or have measurable implications for, other formal aspects of governance. However, because conflict resolution and peacebuilding sometimes imply democratic reforms that both affect the likelihood of a lasting peace and have direct implications for formal gender roles in society, controlling for democracy may lead to biased estimates. We test the inclusion of democracy in sensitivity tests and controlling for democracy does not substantively challenge the conclusions drawn here.

All statistical models presented below are estimated by means of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE). The PCSE model accounts for problems related to heteroskedastic residuals and autocorrelation (Beck, 2001; Beck and Katz, 1995). In sensitivity tests, we estimate OLS models with country fixed effects to isolate the cross-temporal drivers of women's empowerment. These tests, as well as descriptive statistics, are documented in the online Appendix.

2.4 Results and discussion

Before we put the formulated hypotheses to test, we briefly inspect some relevant patterns in the underlying data. Panel A in Figure 2.1 reveals growth in global average female empowerment, using the two complementary dimensions of civil liberties and political representation. While both dimensions follow the same overall upwards trajectory, women have always fared better with regards to civil liberties than formal political representation. Panel B provides deeper insight into how the two dimensions compare for individual country-years. As expected, most observations fall close to the 45° diagonal, meaning that countries score similarly good (or bad) on both indices, but we also note a number of deviations from this overall pattern.

Table 2.1. Conflict endings and change in female empowerment, 1975 to 2017

	Model 1 CL	Model 2 PR
Major conflict ending	1.059**	0.720*
	(3.62)	(2.41)
Minor conflict ending	0.347	0.181
	(1.28)	(0.71)
Major conflict ongoing	-0.527*	-0.003
	(-2.37)	(-0.01)
Minor conflict ongoing	-0.380**	-0.017
	(-2.65)	(-0.12)
Time	-0.016**	-0.008
	(-2.79)	(-1.62)
GDP per capita (t-1)	-0.103*	-0.044
	(-2.15)	(-1.08)
Education (t-1)	0.067**	0.052**
	(3.02)	(2.90)
CL level (t-1)	-0.020**	
	(-4.27)	
PR level (t-1)		-0.018**
		(-4.45)
Constant	2.329**	1.456**
	(4.64)	(3.79)
R^2	0.03	0.02
N	6131	6131

Note: OLS coefficients with t-scores based on panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. CL is civil liberties; PR is political representation. The conflict ending variables are specified as decay functions of time since the last year of the conflict. *p $<$ 0.05; **p $<$ 0.01.



Figure 2.1. Patterns of female empowerment

Next, we assess the extent of empirical support in favor of Hypothesis 1, that major internal conflict has a more pronounced effect on female empowerment than minor conflicts, other factors held constant. Table 2.1 reports the effects of civil conflict endings on women's civil liberties (Model 1) and political representation (Model 2). Judging by the sign of the coefficients for *major conflict endings*, the immediate aftermath of civil war is associated with a statistically significant improvement in both civil liberties and political representation. The coefficient for the civil liberties outcome implies an average increase of around 1% in the first post-conflict year, compared to a year at peace. Although this effect may seem small, and it tapers off over time, the cumulative effect over the first five years is nearly 3 points growth in CL. The corresponding effect for political representation is smaller, at around 0.7% for the first year at peace. Consistent with results from some earlier research (Hughes and Tripp 2015), we find that *minor conflict endings* have a weak and non-significant effect on women's formal political status. Although the estimated coefficients for *major conflict ending* in Model 1 and 2 are not significantly larger than those for *minor conflict ending* (i.e., their 95% confidence intervals overlap), the substantive difference in effect sizes still lead us to tentatively conclude in favor of Hypothesis 1, that major civil conflicts have a more pronounced effect on women's subsequent political empowerment than minor conflicts.

The controls in Table 2.1 behave mostly as expected; higher average levels of female education correspond to higher growth in women's political status, whereas level of economic development more broadly has a weak negative influence, all else equal. We also find that ongoing civil conflict has a larger and more consistent negative effect on

civil liberties than on political representation, reflecting a tightening of state security measures that often infringe on individual freedom and liberties during the height of war. Existing levels of women's CL / PR participation, captured by the lagged level of the dependent variables, are negatively associated with the likelihood of improvement. In other words: the growth potential is higher for less egalitarian societies. Overall, the coefficients for the controls are quite small, suggesting that female empowerment is not a phenomenon that exhibits high volatility from year to year.

We now turn to the evaluation of Hypothesis 2, that civil conflicts ending by a formal peace agreement are associated with a stronger post-war empowerment effect. In line with expectations, Table 2.2 shows that the average growth in women's civil and political privileges is much higher after a negotiated agreement (*conflict ending w/ PA*) than after military victory or stalemate (*conflict ending w/o PA*). In Model 3, the estimated increase in civil liberties exceeds 3% during the first post-conflict year, which accumulates to a 9-point growth in CL during the first five post-conflict years. This effect is more than three times as large as the effect we found for major conflict endings (Model 1) and also significantly larger than the effect for non-negotiated conflict endings. The effect of PA on institutional empowerment, Model 4, is twice as large as the effect of major conflict found in Model 2 and also much larger than the coefficient for conflicts terminating in other ways, even though there is a slight overlap in the 95% confidence intervals for the PA versus w/o PA variables in Model 4.

Interestingly, we note that major conflict ending, which was found to increase growth in women's civil and political rights, no longer is statistically significant once we account for how conflicts ended. In other words, there is little indication that conflict severity acts as a confounder that produces a spurious statistical relationship between conflict ending and female empowerment. Rather, we interpret this result as evidence that the *major conflict ending* effect reported in Table 2.1 was largely picking up the correlated but unobserved effect of PA. Taken together, these results undermine the empirical support for Hypothesis 1 but provide compelling evidence that negotiated settlements have especially beneficial societal consequences (H2).

Figure 2.2, panel A and B, provides a visual representation of the results documented in Table 2.2. The positive effect of the early post-conflict years on women's civil liberties and political representation are clearly detectable, but we also note the higher estimated growth rate and the narrower confidence interval for the first dependent variable, consistent with the coefficients in Models 3–4.

Table 2.2. Peace agreement and change in female empowerment, 1975 to 2017

	Model 3 CL	Model 4 PR
Conflict ending w/ PA	3.295**	1.564*
	(5.80)	(2.53)
Conflict ending w/o PA	-0.038	0.059
	(-0.14)	(0.23)
Major conflict ending	0.346	0.321
	(0.99)	(0.85)
Conflict ongoing	-0.418**	-0.005
	(-3.30)	(-0.04)
Time	-0.0167**	-0.00873
	(-2.93)	(-1.68)
GDP per capita (t-1)	-0.084	-0.036
	(-1.81)	(-0.89)
Education (t-1)	0.067**	0.052**
	(3.03)	(2.85)
CL level (t-1)	-0.021**	
	(-4.53)	
PR level (t-1)		-0.018**
		(-4.56)
Constant	2.261**	1.418**
	(4.52)	(3.69)
R^2	0.03	0.02
N	6131	6131

Note: OLS coefficients with t-scores based on panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. CL is civil liberties; PR is political representation. The conflict ending variables are specified as decay functions of time since the last year of the conflict. *p $<$ 0.05; **p $<$ 0.01.



Figure 2.2. Marginal effect of conflict ending by peace agreement on female empowerment. Note: A decay value of 1 refers to the first year after the conflict ending; three years after the conflict corresponds to a decay value of 0.5; five years at peace gives X = 0.25 and so on.

Table 2.3. Gender-sensitive peace agreement and change in female empowerment, 1975 to 2017

	Model 5 CL	Model 6 PR
PA ending w/ gender	3.343**	2.789**
	(4.10)	(3.09)
PA ending w/o gender	3.256**	0.559
	(4.67)	(0.83)
Conflict ending w/o PA	-0.034	0.162
	(-0.12)	(0.62)
Major conflict ending	0.339	0.143
	(0.98)	(0.37)
Conflict ongoing	-0.418**	0.004
	(-3.29)	(0.04)
Time	-0.017**	-0.009
	(-2.93)	(-1.68)
GDP per capita (t-1)	-0.085	-0.042
	(-1.81)	(-1.04)
Education (t-1)	0.067**	0.055**
	(3.02)	(3.03)
CL level (t-1)	-0.021**	
	(-4.54)	
PR level (t-1)		-0.018**
		(-4.63)
Constant	2.262**	1.458**
	(4.51)	(3.81)
R^2	0.03	0.02
N	6131	6131

Note: OLS coefficients with t-scores based on panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. CL is civil liberties; PR is political representation. The conflict ending variables are specified as decay functions of time since the last year of the conflict. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.

Hypothesis 3 stated that peace agreements containing specific gender provisions are associated with an even more pronounced positive effect on post-conflict female empowerment than PAs without such provisions or conflicts ending in other ways. The results from this test are documented in Models 5–6 in Table 2.3, and visual representations of the main effects are shown in Figure 2.2, panel C and D. Here, results differ somewhat between the two empowerment dimensions. For civil liberties, we observe little difference between peace agreements with versus without a gender profile; both outcome types are associated with significantly higher growth in women's status than the average country-year at peace, and the magnitude of the effect is similar to the aggregate PA effect reported in Model 3. For political representation, however, we find that the positive effect of peace agreements reported in Model 4 is attributable primarily to those agreements that explicitly address women; the estimated effect for *PA ending w/ gender* is five times greater than that for *PA ending w/o gender*, even though the large standard error around the latter point estimate implies overlap in 95% confidence intervals. A potential explanation for the relatively higher effect of gender provisions on political representation is that gender provisions address the political inclusion of women rather than their civil liberties. Post-conflict countries might be willing to improve the gender balance of the political institutions without simultaneously improving civil liberties. Again, major conflict endings are insignificantly related to female empowerment, implying that the positive effect in Table 2.1 is driven mostly by conflicts that ended by peace agreement (for political representation, mostly PAs with gender provisions). In sum, Hypothesis 3 receives mixed support; explicit gender provisions are important to strengthen the influence of PAs on women's representation in political office but they matter less for women's civil liberties, where the main distinction lies between PA of any kind and conflict ending in other ways.

2.5 Robustness

In order to assess the robustness of the results reported here, the models have been subjected to a number of sensitivity tests, all of which are reported in the online Appendix. First, we implement a complementary test of how the severity of civil conflict impacts women's post-conflict empowerment by replacing the binary minor vs. major conflict coding with the log of battle-related deaths accumulated over time, as well as a post-conflict battle deaths decay-function, analogous to the simpler minor and major conflict decays. The results, shown in Table A.4, reveal that a higher number of bat-

tlefield casualties is associated with a statistically significantly greater improvement in women's civil liberties and political representation, although when we also account for conflicts ending by peace agreements, the severity effect is no longer statistically significant (similar to the difference between Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 above). This supports our conclusion that conflict severity at most affects women's post-war empowerment indirectly, by increasing the likelihood of the hostilities terminating in a formal peace agreement, although the latter's effect is found to be more generic and robust (i.e., it applies also to minor conflicts).

Further, we test alternative half-life parameters for the decay function to see if the most basic effect of the post-conflict period can be reproduced. In the main models, we employed a decay variable that assumed a halving of the post-conflict effect every second year. In sensitivity tests, we use alternative half-life parameters, set to 4, 6, 8, 10, and 12 years. As we would expect, the longer we assume the post-conflict effect to last, the smaller the coefficient, but even when extending the half-life of the decay function to 12 years, we detect a positive and statistically significant effect of conflict endings by PA on both dimensions of female empowerment. These results are displayed in Tables A.5-A.9.

Next, as an alternative to the decay functions, we estimate a set of models where we use simpler dummies representing the first few years after the conflict is terminated. Specifically, we estimate alternative post-conflict dummies for the initial 2, 4, and 6 years after the conflict. These models, shown in Tables A.10-A.12, generally show weaker effects for major conflict ending but the PA effect on women's empowerment is reproduced.

Fourth, we check that observed improvements in the two dependent variable indices are not driven by only one of the indicators that make up the indices. In Tables A.13-A.15, we show that civil wars terminated by peace agreement are associated with a positive and statistically significant improvement on all individual indicators.

As a fifth sensitivity test, we re-estimate the main models while controlling for democracy, see Table A.16. This test serves to address possible concerns that the reported PA effect on women's civil liberties and political representation in essence is capturing general liberalization and democratization processes, correlated with female empowerment but not strictly addressing the status of women. As we would expect, democracy is associated with higher growth in female empowerment, all else equal, but even so, the results for the post-conflict variables remain largely unaltered.

In further tests, we re-run the models while excluding countries that never experience conflict in the analysis period, to allow for a more homogenous and relevant sample. As shown in Table A.17, this alteration did not significantly change our results. Next, to account for the changing international environment after the Women, Peace, and Security agenda was implemented with UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 in year 2000, which might have a systemic effect on the prospect for female empowerment, we interact the post-conflict variables with a dummy for years from 2000 onwards. The results, documented in Table A.18, remain consistent with those reported here, although we note that growth in female empowerment after conflict is not higher in the years after 2000, not even for conflicts that ended by peace agreement. This is contrary to the findings of Hughes and Tripp (2015). At the same time, UNSCR1325 has been criticized for slow implementation and lack of results (e.g. Pratt and Richter-Devroe, 2011), which could explain why we do not see a more pronounced growth in post-conflict empowerment after year 2000.

As a more flexible approach to pick up particular system-level effects that could affect empowerment, we also run models with calendar-year fixed effects, presented in Table A.19. Here, the parameter estimates for the post-conflict variables are less precisely estimated, due to multicollinearity correlations between a subset of the year constants and PA endings, although the size of the estimated effects are very similar to those included in Tables 2.1-2.3.

Lastly, we consider the robustness of the main results to including country-fixed effects to address potential concerns with omitted variable bias and to isolate the temporal dimension of the post-civil conflict effect on changes in women's legal and political standing in society. Reassuringly, the results are substantively similar to those reported above.

In sum, we find limited evidence to substantiate Hypothesis 1, since the effect of conflict severity on post-conflict empowerment is mediated by peace agreements, which are found to have a stronger and more consistent influence on women's subsequent political empowerment. We confirm Hypothesis 2, that civil conflicts (at any level of intensity) ending by peace agreement are associated with a substantial growth in post-conflict empowerment. We also find some support for Hypothesis 3, that the growth potential in post-conflict empowerment is especially high after peace agreements with gender provisions, although this effect was found only for women's formal political representation.

2.6 Discussion

Arguably the most important and policy-relevant finding from this study is that civil conflicts terminating in peace agreements produce better outcomes for women than conflicts terminating in other ways. The positive effect of peace agreements is very consistent and robust to alternative model specifications, supporting claims that the negotiated termination of civil war opens a window of opportunity for improving women's position in society. This also demonstrates that societal change does not always follow an incremental process but can sometimes be subject to rapid improvements when the moment is ripe.

The fact that peace agreements have a positive average effect on the empowerment of women may seem like a trivial discovery. Yet, this result was not necessarily a given, considering that women rarely enjoy the privilege of sitting by the negotiation table and most peace agreements fail to address the situation of women as victims of violence and marginalized members of society. However, after year 2000 and the adoption of UNSCR 1325, there has been an increase in the number of peace agreements that include reference to women (Bell and O'Rourke, 2010), and in some peace processes women also have played elite roles (True and Riveros-Morales 2019). Where women's access to the negotiations is more restricted, they can inform the process through more informal channels.

Post-war Liberia is one example where women gained some influence; not by invitation to the peace negotiations, but by extensive activism and political lobbying that contributed to placing women's rights on the agenda (Fuest 2008; Tripp 2015). The Accra Agreement that that marked the end of the civil war included references to gender, including institutional reform to promote women's rights. Another example is Nepal; The Comprehensive Peace Accord Signed between Nepal Government and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) in 2006 contained several references to women, including problems related to discrimination by gender, and violence against women, despite the fact that women were absent from the formal peace negotiations (Ariño, 2008). Subsequent interim political fora and institutions included women and there were some advancements in women's empowerment (e.g. Yadav, 2016). Absent the potential for societal transformation embedded in the peace agreement process, it is unlikely that the women's movement would have succeeded in their push for gender reforms in the aftermath of the conflict. However, the situation for women in post-conflict societies should not be idealized, as there is no shortage of documentation of women's suffering

during war and many have documented the potential backlash in women's status after progress have been achieved, showing that the effect does not automatically last forever.

The findings reported here support previous studies that find that female empowerment improves more rapidly in post-war countries (Hughes and Tripp 2015; Hughes 2009; Webster, Chen, and Beardsley 2019). What this study brings in addition is an explicit consideration of how key characteristics of recently ended civil wars shape subsequent opportunities for women to strengthen their formal role in society. In line with expectations, we find that more severe civil wars are associated with greater post-war improvements in women's empowerment. However, subsequent models revealed that the conflict severity effect works mostly through increasing the likelihood of negotiated settlements. Peace agreements, particularly those that contain gender-specific provisions, have a pronounced positive impact on post-conflict female empowerment whereas conflicts that end in other ways show little general tendency to catch up on (and exceed) what's lost in terms of gender equity during war.

2.7 Conclusion

This article investigates the conditions under which civil war can bring about increased political empowerment of women. We complement previous research on this topic by looking into how the severity and type of conflict ending play into post-war empowerment. Consistent with our theoretical argument, we find that civil wars that end by peace agreement are more likely to produce positive changes during the immediate post-conflict rebuilding phase that conflicts that end in other ways, and the effect is particularly notable for peace agreements with gender provisions. The results are robust to a wide selection of sensitivity tests.

These insights carry immediate policy relevance. First, the data provide compelling evidence that investing in negotiations that facilitate formal peace agreements are likely to produce important dividends for societal reconstruction and gender equity—as long as peace prevails. This should serve as a powerful voice in support of mediation efforts by the UN and the international community more generally. Settling armed conflict through comprehensive peace agreements also can be an important instrument in addressing many of the Sustainable Development Goals in conflict-affected regions, including on gender equity (SDG 5). The second significant take-away message from this research is the importance of mainstreaming gender in all aspects of conflict management and peace building, as called for by, e.g., the UN Women Peace and Security

agenda. Including women in peace processes is the right thing to do from an equity perspective, but it also is likely to have positive and far-reaching societal implications, not only in securing gender provisions in formal peace agreements but also in sustaining social development and political liberalization and reducing the risk of civil war recurrence (Melander, 2005; Schaftenaar, 2017; Rosenfield and Wood, 2017).

While this research has been able to respond to some pertinent questions about gendered implications of armed conflict, other puzzles remain unaddressed and new questions have emerged as a consequence of this work. Future research should seek to evaluate the relative importance of the three proposed mechanisms linking societal transformation during civil war with post-conflict empowerment for women. Quite likely that work will require a different analytical framework than the aggregated and generalizable approach taken here. Likewise, there is a need for more knowledge on long-term implications of conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes for gender equity. The results presented here demonstrate that the termination of civil war can serve as a critical juncture for women's empowerment, but less is known about whether and how this affects the risk of resurgence of violence, as well as the sustainability of such improvements in the medium and long term. Moreover, recent evidence suggests that countries with lower levels of women's participation in public life are less likely to engage in negotiations (Nagel and Doctor, 2020). The nexus between war-time female mobilization, peace agreements, post-conflict female empowerment, and peace duration deserves further exploration.

Although the results of this article show that women's political empowerment improves in the wake of a civil war, it should not be taken to mean countries escaping civil war score better on these indicators that they would have done in a counterfactual world without conflict. Nor does it mean that post-war improvements in women's status come naturally and effortlessly—quite the contrary, the increase in empowerment comes at a high cost and is only possible with the continuous and purposeful work of discriminated women.

Chapter 3

Paper II. Introducing the Anatomy of Resistance Campaigns (ARC) Dataset

Abstract

We introduce the Anatomy of Resistance Campaigns (ARC) dataset, which records information on 1,426 organizations that participated in events of maximalist violent and nonviolent contention in Africa from 1990-2015. The ARC data disaggregate episodes of contention into their organizational components and inter-organizational networks, containing 18 variables covering organization-level features such as type, age, leadership, goals, origins, social bases, and inter-organizational alliances. These data facilitate new measurements of key concepts in the study of contentious politics, such as the social and ideological diversity of resistance episodes, in addition to measures of network centralization and fragmentation. This paper outlines the core concepts underpinning the ARC data, the data collection method, and descriptive statistics that illustrate trends in organizational participation over time and how organization types vary in their main features. The paper also provides initial evidence that structural factors correlate with the participation of some organization types, but not others. Finally, we show how organization types cluster together or repel each other during periods of contention. The ARC dataset can resolve existing debates in the field and opens new avenues of inquiry in the study of contentious dissent. It should be useful to scholars of violent and nonviolent contention, repression and dissent, along with researchers aiming to understand the dynamics of revolution and democratization.

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3.1 Introduction

Most resistance movements are comprised of organizations that mobilize people, make tactical decisions, issue demands, and accept or reject concessions (Haggard and Kaufman, 2016; Metternich et al., 2013; Braithwaite and Cunningham, 2020; Cunningham et al., 2017a; McAdam, 2010; Tarrow, 2011). Organizations often head transitional regimes, assume power after post-conflict elections, and re-mobilize when democratic institutions are threatened (Haggard and Kaufman, 2016; Wood, 2000). However, we lack systematic cross-national data on dissident organizations spanning a variety of tactics, goals, and group identities.

This matters because organizational dynamics are often central to theories of the onset, dynamics, and outcomes of violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns (Bethke and Pinckney, 2019; Brancati, 2016; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Celestino and Gleditsch, 2013; Huang, 2016; Schaftenaar, 2017; Thurber, 2019; Sutton et al., 2014; Svensson and Lindgren, 2011; Belgioioso, 2018). Empirical analyses, however, usually depend on broad indicators of contention summarized over a campaign or campaign-year (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011), which leaves uncertainty around whether the theorized mechanisms drive observed effects (Schock, 2005). Case studies show that resistance campaigns involve complex networks of organizations and social groups (Metternich et al., 2013; Schock, 2005; Osa, 2003) and demonstrate—with detailed assessments of actors and their characteristics—that the features of these organizations and networks help explain tactical choices, campaign outcomes, and democratization (Pearlman, 2011; Thurber, 2019; Nepstad, 2011; Schock, 2005; Wood, 2000; Collier, 1999).

The Anatomy of Resistance Campaigns (ARC) dataset provides information on 1,426 distinct organizations across 3,407 organization-country-years associated with events of 'maximalist' collective dissent in Africa from 1990-2015. ARC includes information on organization types, origins, leadership, mobilization bases, goals, network ties, relationships with the state, and more. These data enable detailed observations of actor- and network-level characteristics across a large sample of cases, allowing scholars to unpack the organizational composition of resistance campaigns and their network structures. The ARC data can help answer lingering questions: how do ideological diversity and unity (through fronts and alliances) impact campaign outcomes and post-conflict institutional change (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Bayer et al., 2016; Celestino and Gleditsch, 2013)? Are some campaigns more resilient to repression than others because of their network structures or the nature of participating organizations (Sutton et al., 2014; Siegel, 2009)? How do coalitions evolve through periods of institu-

tional reform—especially democratic transitions (Pinckney, 2020)? To the extent that data availability shapes theoretical horizons (Gleditsch et al., 2014), ARC can stimulate additional research questions in myriad areas.

3.2 Core concepts in ARC

The ARC dataset focuses on *organizations* that participated in acts of *collective dissent* for goals of *maximalist* change. *Organizations* are structures designed to cohere people and resources—often through collective action—to pursue common goals (North, 1990; Daft, 1992, 2). The presence of a formal structure (however thin the hierarchy) intended to aggregate individual efforts towards a defined goal distinguishes organizations from broad social categories such as "students," "protesters," or the "working class." We discuss our operationalization of this concept in a subsequent section.

Collective dissent is observable action involving multiple people, beyond normal institutional procedures for realizing political goals (Tilly, 1978). This ranges from demonstrations and strikes to rebellion and terrorist attacks, while excluding actions lacking a clear political goal and everyday or institutional political activities such as lobbying politicians or electoral participation. Organizations engage in collective dissent when they deploy their mobilization infrastructure to encourage individual participation in these events.

We define *maximalist* demands as calls for changes in the political structure that would significantly alter the executive's access to state power, the rules with which executives are selected, or the policy or geographic areas for which the executive has the right to make laws. Examples of maximalism include demands that a head of state resign via a non-institutional method, for democratization in autocratic settings, to enfranchise an excluded social group, and for regional or ethnic autonomy or independence.[1]

Maximalist demands exclude calls that fall short of altering these fundamental aspects of executive power, such as improved human rights protections or changes in public spending. Demands by a disenfranchised group for better protections can be addressed with legislation that typically does not change the process for deciding who holds executive power or who has lawmaking authority. Demands for enfranchisement of that excluded group are maximalist because—if implemented—they would include a new group in the process of deciding who holds executive power.

[1] A series of borderline demands and their treatment can be found at the ARC project website.

3.3 Relationship to existing datasets

ARC is distinct from existing resources because it provides information on the features of organizations that participated in nonviolent *and* violent dissent, while also going beyond self-determination or ethnonationalist movements (Wilkenfeld et al., 2011; Cunningham et al., 2020), or armed rebel groups (Pettersson and Öberg, 2020; Harbom et al., 2008; Braithwaite and Cunningham, 2020; Stewart, 2018; Cunningham, 2013; Svensson and Nilsson, 2018; Cunningham et al., 2009). Events datasets often identify participating actors, but lack information on their features (Chenoweth et al., 2018; Chenoweth and Shay, 2019; Salehyan et al., 2012; Clark and Regan, 2021; Raleigh et al., 2010). The Revolutionary and Militant Organizations Dataset does provide information about resistance organizations but seems to oversample on violent organizations (75% of REVMOD organization-years are rebel or terrorist groups) and does not account for relationships between organizations (Acosta, 2019). ARC is unique in capturing inter-organizational ties that help us understand network structures in resistance episodes.

3.4 Creating ARC

To construct the ARC dataset, we first identified organizations that participated in events of maximalist collective dissent and then recorded information on the features of those organizations. To maximize transparency and replicability, coding decisions at each step were recorded in RMarkdown files.[2]

Identifying participants

Participating organizations were identified by drawing on five events datasets: the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (Sundberg and Melander, 2013), the Social Conflict Analysis Dataset (Salehyan et al., 2012), the Mass Mobilization Dataset (Clark and Regan, 2021), the Armed Conflict Location Event Dataset (Raleigh et al., 2010), and the NAVCO 3.0 data covering African countries (Chenoweth et al., 2018). Together, these datasets provide a comprehensive catalogue of nonviolent and violent collective dissent across Africa. We began by creating a list of *candidate* maximalist events by sub-setting on variables related to dissident demands and a customized text-matching string.

[2] Markdown files available on request.

We then determined whether event participants made maximalist demands and whether one or more named organizations participated by conducting newswire searches in FACTIVA and LexisNexis using a targeted search string. Event IDs from the events datasets are stored with the organization-year observations in ARC, allowing users to integrate variables from events data with ARC.

We added the constituent organizations of "fronts" according to a "three year" rule. Fronts are distinct, umbrella organizations coordinating the actions of member organizations. Some projects like the UCDP treat fronts as unitary actors, but this obscures variation in the preferences and features of member organizations. However, always treating fronts as decentralized organizational networks can be impractical—and empirically inaccurate. Fronts often become more unified over time (or they split apart) but systematically determining when a front ceases to consist of semi-autonomous groups and becomes a single organization is extremely difficult. We adopted an arbitrary but empirically informed rule to resolve this issue, whereby member organizations of a front were added as participants when those organizations had been members of the front for three or fewer years. Member organizations were identified in newswire databases, primary and secondary sources, and through an iterative process when information on their features was collected by coders. A more detailed description of the rules for coding fronts can be found in the codebook.

This three year rule means that some organizations may be included that were relatively new members of fronts but did not participate in protests, or played only a peripheral role. However, we argue that this risk is outweighed by the inclusion of organizations that often participate in protests but are overlooked by news media, such as local human rights organizations, women's organizations and youth groups. Since front participants are identified through newswires *and* primary and secondary sources, our inclusion criteria is less subject to media biases and provides a new, more comprehensive picture of opposition networks.

Coding organization features

This process produced a list of organizations linked to events of dissent. Organization-years of maximalist dissent were then generated from the events data and a team of coders recorded information on the features of participating organizations. Some variables are constant across organization-years (e.g. "birth date"), while others are dynamic. Organization-years were only coded when organizations were identified as

participating in collective dissent with maximalist demands in a given year. Organizations often continue to exist when they are not participating in dissent; however, their non-participation means these observations are omitted from ARC. Constructing a full panel for organizations between 1990-2015 is not possible for this reason and because we do not record if and when organizations cease to exist (versus entering into abeyance). Table 3.1 summarizes several organization-feature variables in ARC.[3]

Table 3.1. Organization-level variables

Variable	Description	Format
Type	Categorization of organization type	Categorical
Birthdate	Date organization was founded	Date: dd-mm-yyyy
Origins	How organization formed	Categorical: (Splinter, Merger, Other)
Goals	Primary organization goals	Open text
Size	Membership size in year	Numeric
Size Estimate	Approximate size	Ordinal
Leadership	Leader name/gender	Open text
Leadership Tenure	Date leader assumed position	Date: dd-mm-yyyy
Leadership Ties	Did leader serve at a high level in previous governments?	Categorical: (Yes/No)
Social Base	Main social group(s) in organization	Open text
Social Media	Extent of social media use	Categorical: (None, Some, Significant)
State Rel.	Relationship with state at t-1	Categorical
Formal Ties	Ties with other active organizations	String: Organization IDs
Structure I	Clear leadership/decision-making structure?	Categorical: (Yes/No)
Structure II	Characterised as 'decentralised'?	Categorical: (Yes/No)

[3] The full codesheet can be found in the supplementary materials.

ARC includes information on two types of ties between organizations: fronts and alliances. Front ties connect a constituent organization to a higher-level organization (a front) when the constituent organization is formally a member of the front, or its leaders participate in the front's leadership.[4] Organizations identified by the aforementioned "three year" rule have front ties to the main front.

Alliance ties connect two or more organizations that declared they were coordinating resistance activities, or sources indicated that organizations coordinated efforts, but they did not form a standalone organization (front) to manage coordination. Fronts and their constituent organizations can have alliance ties with non-front organizations. For example, in Malawi in 1993, the Public Affairs Committee (PAC, a front of CSOs and religious groups) allied with the Alliance for Democracy (a political party), which was not part of PAC. Users can assemble alliance-pairs with these front and alliance variables to explore factors driving inter-organizational ties.

Figure 3.1 illustrates these ties. The organization at the bottom-center has alliance ties to two other organizations and is a member of a front. That front is also a member of another front.

Our method for identifying organizations may create bias. Participation is coded when newswires identify named organizations engaged in maximalist dissent. Journalists may view some organizations—especially political parties and trade unions—as more deserving of a proper noun. Parties are skilled at attracting media attention and might be over-represented in reporting. Urban organizations may also be over-represented because events in cities receive more media coverage than events in rural locations (Kalyvas, 2004; Eck, 2012; Day et al., 2015).[5] Media biases could affect inferences drawn from ARC, so robustness tests such as those from Weidmann (2016) are recommended.

Maximalist demand-making is strategic and may occur after prior campaign-building, after high levels of past participation in non-maximalist protest, or when repression offers 'no other way out' (Goodwin, 2001)—factors that independently generate regime concessions or democratization (Brancati, 2016; Klein and Regan, 2018). Researchers should control for omitted variables capturing these selection processes wherever pos-

[4] In some cases, fronts themselves become constituent organizations in higher-level fronts. In this case, we only include ties from constituent organizations to the closest-level front in the hierarchy.

[5] Urban organizations may also be more frequent participants because organizations and collective action are more common in cities (Weidmann and Rød, 2018; Nicholls, 2008; Miller and Nicholls, 2013).



Figure 3.1. ARC ties example

sible and inferences from ARC should be informed by the limitations of selecting on maximalist demands.

ARC is limited to African countries from 1990-2015 for practical reasons driven by overlap in available events datasets. However, by building on existing datasets, we augment those resources while also maximizing compatibility. African countries' histories of contention, civil society, and statehood are unique and context-specific and we direct readers to studies that provide useful background (Boone, 2003; Branch and Mampilly, 2015; Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Herbst, 2014; Mueller, 2018).

While inferences drawn from ARC only apply with confidence to the African continent, our method of building upon existing event-based resources is transportable to other regions, time periods, and non-maximalist dissent—extensions we plan to offer in the future.

Table 3.2 shows continuous measurements of ideological diversity and opposition unity generated from ARC and compares them to similar (but categorical) measures in the NAVCO 2.1 dataset (Chenoweth and Shay, 2019) from Egypt between 2003-2015. ARC also encompasses years of democratic transition, identifies more organizations, and enables new measurements of features such as organization age. Figure 3.2 shows a network map for Egypt in 2011, generated using front and alliance variables in ARC.

Table 3.2. Comparison of ARC and NAVCO 2.1: Egypt 2003-2015

	NAVCO 2.1			ARC			
Year	Religious diversity	Unity[a]	New orgs	No. orgs	Unity[b]	Diversity[g]	Mean age[c]
2003	Yes	Seemingly united	3	10	0.750		17
2004	Yes	Moderate disunity	11	7	0.710		17
2005	Yes	Moderate disunity	6	9	0.765		23
2006	NA	NA	NA	9	0.793		24
2007	No	Seemingly united	1	9	0.793		25
2008	No	Moderate disunity	1	2	0		40
2009	No	Moderate disunity	1	3	1		29
2010	No	Moderate disunity	3	13	0.701		21
2011	Yes	Seemingly united	3	41	0.850		9
2012	NA	NA	NA	64	0.843		11
2013[d]	No[f]	Seemingly united[e]	6	74	0.874		9
2014	NA	NA	NA	30	0.901		9
2015	NA	NA	NA	15	0.846		12

[a] Measured with the 'camp_conf_intensity' variable. [b] Measured as the network centralization score, which captures the extent to which a network coheres around (or is united by) one focal point (often a single front in our case). [c] In years for valid observations. [d] NAVCO 2.1 features three campaigns in 2013. [e] All three campaigns were 'Seemingly United.' [f] No religious diversity was recorded across all three campaigns. [g] Legend is visualised in the network map below. Organizations that don't fit into these categories are grey. Embedded numbers are fractionalization index scores



Figure 3.2. Egypt 2011[g]

[g]Node sizes are proportional to degree centrality. Ideological positions were generated with text-matching on the organization-goals variable (see Appendix). Named organizations have a centrality score over > 0.6 or an estimated membership size of more than 100,000

3.5 Descriptive statistics

Political parties and rebel groups[6] are the most common types of organizations in ARC. Figure 3.3 shows the number of organizations in maximalist dissent by year and country. Stretches of little dissent are sometimes followed by bursts (Burkina Faso), while the number of organizations in dissent escalates over time in other cases (Sudan). Some countries exhibit consistently high numbers of organizations in dissent (Ethiopia) while others are stable and low (Namibia).



Figure 3.3. ARC organizations over time and space

Table 3.3 shows how ARC variables vary across organization types.

[6] We use the term rebel group to characterize armed groups explicitly organized to challenge the state using violence; this does not require involvement in conflicts with 25+ battle deaths as with UCDP coding rules, but rather follows the logic of Lewis (2020).

Table 3.3. Features of Organization-Years in Resistance by Type

Type	N	N Unique Orgs.	Splinter	Size Estimate	Age	Included in Regime	Legal	\# Ties	Female Leader	Decentralized	Alliances
Pol. Party	1143	532	0.27	3	6.51	0.08	0.7	1.2	0.02	0.05	NA
Trade Union	214	96	0.16	4	24.06	0.06	0.83	1.87	0.05	0.63	NA
Religious	101	42	0	3	32.85	0.02	0.95	1.38	0	0.63	NA
Student/ Youth	69	27	0.09	3	17.62	0.03	0.55	1.52	0	0.25	NA
Front	262	157	0.01	3	2.01	0.03	0.33	6.67	0.06	0.87	NA
Other CSO	558	297	0.08	2	10.13	0.01	0.72	1.51	0.19	0.21	NA
Rebel	1004	273	0.4	3	7.63	0.02	0.03	1.32	0	0.26	NA
Other	44	26	0.2	3	9.65	0.02	0.5	1	0.13	0.25	NA
Missingness (\%)			0.12	0.17	0.08	0.03	0.03	NA	0.12	0.01	0.01

All summary statistics are means except for the Size Estimate which is a median. *Included* measures whether the organization was formally or informally included in the governing coalition at $t-1$

Rebel groups and parties commonly split from other organizations. Rebel groups dissent for longer (3.6 years on average) and more continuously (they have the lowest variance around the mean participation year) than other organizations. Participation by other types of organizations in ARC is "bursty," perhaps concentrated around elections or other focal points. Trade unions tend to be large, old, and more connected to the state and other opposition organizations than most other organizations. As one would expect, fronts are the most highly connected, with ties to 5.67 other organizations on average. Only CSOs have moderate levels of female leadership. Decentralization is most common in fronts, religious groups, and trade unions.

3.6 Correlates of organizational participation

Different types of organizations should have distinct correlates of participation in resistance given their varied constituencies and goals.[7] We explore associations between socioeconomic factors and the number of organizations of different types active in maximalist dissent using Negative Binomial models for over-dispersed count data. Specifically, we examine inequality, economic modernization, industrialization, economic growth, natural resource wealth, democratic institutions, the number of other participating dissident organizations of various types and a lagged dependent variable. Past research highlights these possible explanations for participation in maximalist dissent (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005; Ansell and Samuels, 2014; Ross, 2001; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010; Haggard and Kaufman, 2016; Maves and Braithwaite, 2013; Aksoy et al., 2012).

Income inequality (and its square) is captured using Gini coefficients.[8] Economic development is measured with GDP per capita in constant 2000 USD, along with the GDP growth rate to proxy economic downturns. Value-added manufacturing as a % of GDP represents the strength of the industrial sector (Haggard and Kaufman, 2016; Butcher and Svensson, 2016) and oil revenues as a % of GDP proxy for natural resource dependency. We measure prior political institutions with the V-DEM Polyarchy score (Coppedge et al., 2019a), as well as its square (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). Repression is measured with the Physical Violence Index, also from VDEM. These variables are lagged one year. The number of organizations of other types engaged in maximalist

[7] Models were run in R 4.0.2
[8] Data come from the World Bank unless indicated otherwise.

dissent in year t is included to explore patterns of co-participation across organization-types.

Table 3.4 presents our findings. Visualizations can be found in the Appendix. The results for economic development are striking. More rebel groups mobilize in poorer countries, while more trade unions, student organizations, and other CSOs dissent in more developed countries. Broad, labor-based civil society coalitions may be an important link in the chain from modernization to democracy (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Celestino and Gleditsch, 2013; Bayer et al., 2016; Dahlum et al., 2019; Boix, 2003). Movements underpinned by thinner, technology-driven networks may be more brittle (Weidmann and Rød, 2018). Oil dependency is associated with fewer trade unions, student groups, "other" organizations, and religious organizations engaging in maximalist dissent, but more active rebel groups. These models are a first, descriptive look at patterns of participation that say little about the deeper mechanisms, however. For example, structural factors may alter the underlying organizational ecology, drive participation in maximalist dissent directly, or activate other processes, such as splintering.

Structural variables appear to be poor predictors of the number of fronts in dissent. Coalition formation may occur after shorter term shocks related to food prices (Abbs, 2020) or severe repression events (Chang, 2008). This is worth investigating in future work. Models addressing censorship and international media coverage (in the appendix) do not indicate strong media biases across most organization types.

	Political Parties	Trade Unions	Rel. Orgs	Student/Youth	Fronts	Rebel Groups	Other CSOs	Others
Oil (% GDP)	−0.01	−0.09**	−0.27**	−0.08*	−0.01	0.03***	−0.02	−0.61**
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.23)
Manufacturing (% GDP)	0.02	0.00	0.09	0.13***	−0.01	0.02*	0.01	0.07
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.07)
Polyarchy	7.19**	−2.23	17.24	1.76	2.79	−1.65	6.12	12.46
	(2.52)	(5.19)	(9.88)	(6.40)	(2.86)	(1.68)	(3.84)	(11.00)
Polyarchy ^{2}	−10.26***	0.42	−29.11*	0.31	−3.96	1.16	−5.76	−16.34
	(2.95)	(5.79)	(12.07)	(7.68)	(3.30)	(2.05)	(4.20)	(12.70)
Income Inequality ^{2}	0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income Inequality	−0.03	0.10	0.11	0.20	0.09	−0.04	0.24	−0.43
	(0.09)	(0.18)	(0.28)	(0.22)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.27)
Log GDP per Capita	0.03	0.79**	−0.33	0.85**	0.12	−0.51***	0.58**	0.94*
	(0.13)	(0.26)	(0.41)	(0.33)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.18)	(0.47)
GDP Growth	0.81	−4.24*	−1.07	−0.42	−0.29	0.09	−1.28	4.66
	(0.87)	(1.87)	(3.21)	(1.97)	(0.94)	(0.53)	(1.39)	(4.06)
Physical Integrity Rights	0.02	0.33	0.30	−4.96**	−0.96	−0.40	−1.40*	−3.90*
	(0.46)	(0.92)	(1.70)	(1.55)	(0.53)	(0.33)	(0.71)	(1.76)
Year	0.01	0.04	0.14**	0.03	−0.01	0.00	0.08***	0.07
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Population (Log)	0.08	−0.28*	0.47	0.13	0.04	0.26***	0.39***	0.78*
	(0.07)	(0.14)	(0.30)	(0.20)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.34)
No. Political Parties		0.11*	0.31***	−0.01	0.19***	−0.01	0.10**	0.02
		(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.06)
No. Trade Unions	0.06		−0.01	0.28**	0.29***	0.00	0.39***	0.25
	(0.09)		(0.23)	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.20)
No. Rel. Orgs	0.15	0.23*		0.24*	0.15*	−0.18	0.41***	0.21
	(0.09)	(0.12)		(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.14)
No. Student/Youth Orgs	−0.07	0.44	0.02		−0.24	−0.28	0.61**	−0.20
	(0.23)	(0.28)	(0.55)		(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.23)	(0.37)
No. Fronts	1.71***	0.88***	0.38	0.16		0.11	0.93***	0.18
	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.36)	(0.18)		(0.09)	(0.17)	(0.41)
No. Rebel Groups	−0.17***	−0.19	−0.18	0.25***	0.25***		−0.27***	−0.01
	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.23)	(0.05)	(0.03)		(0.07)	(0.24)
No. CSOs	0.01	0.16***	0.51***	0.10**	0.09***	0.00		0.15**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)		(0.06)
No. Others	−0.40*	−0.52*	−2.53***	0.01	−0.55***	0.12	−0.53*	
	(0.20)	(0.25)	(0.52)	(0.20)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.21)	
No. Political Parties (t-1)	0.11***							
	(0.02)							
No. Trade Unions (t-1)		0.33***						
		(0.10)						
No. Rel. Orgs (t-1)			0.47**					
			(0.17)					
No. Student/Youth Orgs (t-1)				0.38*				
				(0.18)				
No. Fronts (t-1)					−0.08			
					(0.09)			
No. Rebel Groups (t-1)						0.29***		
						(0.02)		
No. CSOs (t-1)							0.07*	
							(0.03)	
No. Others (t-1)								0.37*
								(0.19)
AIC	1918.39	606.68	334.35	270.20	798.84	1743.83	1018.85	177.61
BIC	2020.66	708.95	436.62	372.47	901.11	1846.10	1121.12	279.88
Log Likelihood	−938.19	−282.34	−146.17	−114.10	−378.42	−850.91	−488.42	−67.81
Deviance	592.27	202.48	85.70	128.22	359.43	699.10	332.07	84.89
Num. obs.	963	963	963	963	963	963	963	963

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 3.4. Correlates of Organizational Participation

Table 3.4 also reveals patterns of organizational cross-participation. Parties mobilize with fronts, but alongside fewer rebel groups. Trade unions and CSOs dissent alongside one another and with more parties, religious organizations, and fronts. Religious organizations have narrower co-participation profiles, mobilizing alongside other CSOs. Student groups dissent alongside rebel groups, in addition to trade unions, religious organizations, and other CSOs. Rebel groups tend to act without high numbers of other types of organizations. Finally, fronts assemble many group types including parties, rebels, trade unions, religious organizations, and other CSOs.

These findings highlight the usefulness of ARC for (re)examining mechanisms highlighted in theories of social change, as well as the ability to uncover novel, previously un(der)theorized relationships.

3.7 Conclusion

The ARC dataset advances our understanding of anti-government mobilization and has many potential applications. ARC provides details about organizations that engaged in violent and nonviolent dissent at various periods of their existence and could be used to identify correlates of tactical shifts. ARC should be useful to scholars of repression and dissent; connections to events datasets facilitate exploration of how organizational networks interact with repression to produce backlash and demobilization. ARC can also be collapsed into country-year format and merged with data on campaign outcomes (e.g. Chenoweth and Shay (2019), Kreutz (2010), regime change, and democratization (Goemans et al., 2009; Djuve et al., 2020; Coppedge et al., 2019a). Information on inter-organizational ties can be used to generate network maps that span conventional violent-nonviolent dichotomies and even link campaigns cross-nationally. We look forward to seeing how others engage ARC to expand our knowledge of the causes, dynamics, and consequences of maximalist dissent.

Chapter 4

Paper III. Women's Participation in Organizations in Dissent

Abstract

What explains female participation in organizations in resistance? While past research has focused on mapping and identifying causes of women's participation in rebel groups, in this paper I introduce and analyze new data mapping the participation of women in the formal organizations that typically form the backbone of *nonviolent* campaigns. This includes women's roles in the social base and leadership of trade unions, political parties, civil society organizations, and religious organizations that engage in anti-government protests. In the theoretical framework, I highlight three factors that shape the motivation and barriers for women to participate, and the extent to which organizations would be interested in strategically including women. These are: women's socio-economic position, women's freedom to engage in public activism, and organizations' ideology and goals. Analyzing more than 1,400 organizations in dissent in African countries between 1990 and 2015, the multilevel analysis—robust to various model specifications—finds that organizations with a leftist or liberal ideology are systematically more likely to include women. The results also show that when women have access to education and participate in the workforce, their representation in organizations engaging in dissent is higher. Moreover, the article shows that only about one fourth of organizations in dissent are inclusive of women, underscoring women's high bar to participation in resistance via organizations. Because these organizations often take a central role in organizing collective action, lead negotiations with the regime, and assume leadership in eventual transitions, this gender (im)balance likely influences the dynamics and outcomes of resistance campaigns.

4.1 Introduction

In recent years, empirical research has increasingly focused on women's role in armed insurgency and political violence (Alison, 2009). Cross-national data show that women are included in a majority of insurgent groups, sometimes even in frontline combat and leadership positions (Thomas and Bond, 2015; Henshaw, 2016b). Islamist terrorist groups also include women (Von Knop, 2007), despite their explicit aim of imposing sharia law and rigid gender-based hierarchies. There are strategic advantages to including women. For example, they often go under the radar for security forces and can move around more freely (Parkinson, 2013), they increase the rebel group's legitimacy (Manekin and Wood, 2020), and help expand their social base (Darden et al., 2019; Loken, 2020). The research agenda on women, gender roles and political violence has unearthed important data and conceived novel theory to broaden and improve our understanding of mobilization processes and the dynamics of conflict. However, even if female rebels are more common than was previously assumed, violence is not the primary mode of women's struggle for political goals. Case studies suggest that women's movements have almost exclusively used nonviolent tactics (Costain, 2000; Codur and King, 2015), and recent cross-national evidence shows that nonviolent conflict is more likely than armed conflict in more gender-equal societies (Schaftenaar, 2017).

However, compared to the literature on women in violent insurgency, we know less about how, when and why women participate in *nonviolent* dissent. Women's agency in social movements has been neglected in historical narratives of events, both by scholars and by politicians (West and Blumberg, 1991). This is despite the observation that women have led and formed the backbone of several contemporary movements, such as the uprisings in Sudan in 2019, Belarus in 2020, and Myanmar in 2021. In one of the few large-N examinations of female participation in resistance, Chenoweth (2019) finds that women are active on the frontline of most resistance campaigns,[1] and shows a positive association between female frontline participation, the use of nonviolence, and the likelihood of success. At the same time, we know little about why women get involved in civil resistance in the first place. Therefore, this paper asks: *What are the determinants of female participation in resistance?*

Instead of analyzing campaigns, this paper provides a more disaggregated and detailed study by focusing on *organizations* engaged in dissent. Even if we observe high female participation at peak protests during a resistance campaign (Chenoweth,

[1] Defined as campaigns that call for the toppling of an oppressive government, or territorial self-determination (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011).

2019), women do not necessarily have a voice within the *formal* organizations that often form the backbone of resistance movements. It takes resources, networks, and capacity to organize collective action, and formal organizations who possess these resources therefore typically assume leadership and influence the direction of resistance campaigns (Cunningham et al., 2017b; Zemni, 2015; Haggard and Kaufman, 2016; Wood, 2000). Further, new data reveals that the organizational composition of nonviolent anti-government protests is socially diverse: trade unions, political parties, CSOs and religious organizations form alliances, organize protest and provide organizational resources favorable to collective action (Butcher et al., 2022). However, this research has not mapped the diversity in terms of gender balance in these organizations. This is critical: Existing literature has shown that gender dynamics can impact not only whether organizations choose nonviolent tactics over violent tactics (Asal et al., 2013), but also the length (Giri and Haer, 2021) and outcome (Braithwaite and Ruiz, 2018) of violent conflicts. Further, existing studies suggest that women's participation in nonviolent resistance matters because of women's preference for nonviolence (McAllister, 1991; Costain, 2000),[2] women's coalition-building skills (Tripp, 2015), democratic and non-hierarchical way of organizing (Tripp et al., 2008), and tactical innovation (Codur and King, 2015).

Literature on women in rebel groups and participation in social protest and organizations shows that overall women are underrepresented in dissent. The underrepresentation of women is also underscored by the empirical data used in this paper. To understand the variation in female participation, I therefore synthesize existing work on women and dissent, and focus on identifying factors that should influence the participation of *women* specifically.[3] I single out a set of key country- and organizational level variables that should influence the degree of female participation in organizations in dissent: women's socio-economic position, women's freedom to engage in public activism, and the ideology of the organizations. These variables all shape the barriers and incentives for women to participate (i.e. supply), and they influence the extent to which organizations would be interested in strategically including women (i.e. demand). I hypothesize that women's participation is more likely where women have resources

[2] This does not suggest that women are more peaceful than men by nature, but women overall might be more socialized into norms of nonviolence, which does translate in observable gender differences when it comes to support for violence (e.g. Yablon, 2009).

[3] The absence of women in much of the existing scholarship shows the need to zoom in on explanations and develop theory for women as a group. A comparative design, evaluating the correlates of participation for women versus men, would be an interesting approach for future work.

and face few civil and normative restrictions. I also hypothesize that organizations with leftist or liberal goals are more likely to include women.

To map female participation in organizations in resistance and test the hypotheses, I employ an original dataset—ARC-Women—covering organizations that engaged in maximalist dissent in African countries between 1990 and 2015. The dataset builds on the Anatomy of Resistance Campaigns (ARC) dataset (Butcher et al., 2022) and expands the dataset with information on organizations' inclusion of women, including information on women's presence (or absence) in the organization leadership, the gender composition of the membership base, whether or not the organization has a formal women's wing, and the gender ideology of the organization. I analyze a hierarchical dataset with organizations embedded in countries with a multilevel model, leveraging both the country-level and organization-level variation. The results find weak and insignificant associations between female participation and women's civil and normative freedoms. But I find evidence that socio-economic resources, specifically education and workforce participation, matter for the inclusion of women. Another strong predictor of female participation is the goal/ideology of the organization, where organizations with leftist and liberal goals are significantly more likely to include women. These results are robust across various model specifications, and even though the empirical scope is limited to African countries, some of the findings might be applicable to comparable countries in other regions of the world. Importantly, African countries in the period under analysis exhibit variations in both gender equality and levels of protest, and the phenomena analyzed by the paper are not exclusive to the African region.

The paper contributes to an expanding literature on civil resistance seeking to explain the onset, tactics, and success of these movements, and it is one of the first attempts at systematically mapping the participation of women in these movements, and the first one to disaggregate female participation by single organizations. The data introduced in the paper indicate that women face high bars to participation in organizations, likely higher than barriers for participating as individuals at single events during resistance campaigns: only around a fourth of organizations engaging in dissent are inclusive of women, and even more rarely in their leadership. These insights are important for understanding contemporary transition processes initiated by civil resistance and the representation or absence of women in them. The international community places great emphasis on improving women's participation in conflict resolution processes, for example through the Women Peace and Security agenda, (e.g. Tickner and True, 2018), but scholars and practitioners interested in women's participation in conflict processes

should pay no less attention to the transitions that follow nonviolent conflict (Dudouet and Pinckney, 2021).

The paper is structured as follows. First, I present the theoretical framework and some central concepts. Next, I present three sets of determinants shaping the participation of women in organizations in dissent, before formulating a set of testable hypotheses. In the methods section, the new data on women's participation in resistance is presented together with the empirical strategy, before turning to the results and subsequently a concluding discussion.

4.2 Theoretical framework

First, some central definitions and the scope of the study should be explained. *Organizations* are structures designed to pool people and resources—often through collective action—to pursue common goals (North, 1990; Daft, 2013). Rebel groups, political parties, trade unions and CSOs are organizational types that we typically observe in dissent (Butcher et al., 2022). Thus, the study does not aim at explaining the participation of *women's organizations*, rather women's inclusion in gender-mixed (or male-dominated) organizations. For studies of women's organizations or women's movements specifically, see, for example, Bakken (2021a), Beckwith (2001), and Htun and Weldon (2012).

The organizations of interest are those that participated in acts of *collective dissent* with *maximalist goals*. Collective dissent is defined as political action outside conventional institutional channels (Tilly, 1978), and maximalist goals are defined as demands for significant changes to executive power, for example calls for democratization or demands that the incumbent steps down (Butcher et al., 2022). As such, other types of protest, like women's social protests, are not the focus of this paper (see e.g. Murdie and Peksen (2015), Kreft (2018), or Nordås and Bakken (2021) for studies capturing a broader set of female protests). Female participation is understood at the level of organizations, more specifically in the formal structures of the organization, like the leadership and the constituency.

When this paper talks about female participation and women as a demographic, it refers to sex as a dichotomy. This is a simplification and does not fully reflect the spectrum of gender identities, but future research might provide more nuanced approaches. I understand gender as a social construct that shapes the dynamics of female (but also by implication male) mobilization to organizations in dissent.

The aim of the article is to provide some explanations for variation in women's participation in dissent. This means evaluating existing theories of mobilization, and testing how they apply to women.[4]

Determinants of female participation in organizations in dissent

Why expect particular dynamics for female participation (as opposed to men's) and why does it require distinct theorizing? Put simply, organizations have gendered structures. Whether the domain is politics, the workplace, or the trade union, a recurring finding in the critical literature on gender and organizations is that organizations are primarily male-dominated (Acker, 1990), characterized by "the reproduction of men's power and masculinities" (Collinson and Hearn, 2005) and the valuing of "homosocial capital" (Bjarnegård, 2013). The literature on gender, organizations and politics emphasizes the stickiness of organizational structures, arguing that they reflect societal structures at large. It shows that the public space, whether it is political office or civil society, is not an equal playground for women and men. Knowing that women are on average underrepresented, there is still variation in the level of female participation, and that this variation should be explained. I therefore focus, in the following, on indicators at the macro and meso level affecting women's societal status, resources and agency.

Moreover, female participation in organizations in dissent is a hybrid type of political action. Participation in organizations (for example being a member of a political party or a trade union) is what we would call political action within established structures, while participation in dissent lies beyond normal institutional procedures for realizing political goals (Tilly, 1978). To understand variation in this phenomenon, I therefore incorporate literature on women, dissent and social protest, and studies of female participation in organizations, politics, and public life more generally. In the following, I draw on the concepts of supply and demand.

We can understand *supply* as a function of willingness and opportunity. At the most basic level, there is a huge supply of women, given that they make up 50 percent of the population. However, not all women are willing to participate, and not all women have the opportunity. Various factors could shape women's willingness and opportunity. Economic hardship, crises, or political grievances are all factors that could motivate people to rebel or push them into taking action (Gurr, 1970). One example

[4] Studies using individual-level data are better equipped at studying participation in comparative perspective and evaluating if the participation of women as opposed to that of men is substantively different.

of research that emphasizes push factors is Murdie and Peksen (2015), who argue that relative deprivation explains female protest activity, and find that women protest more when they lack social and economic rights. Other studies show that certain ideologies or visions could stimulate people's mobilization, and some studies focus specifically on ideologies attracting the support of women. Leftist or communist groups in Latin America, like the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, for example, had emancipatory and inclusive gender ideologies that aimed to change the existing status of women in society, which can explain why these groups had relatively high rates of female participation (West and Blumberg, 1991).[5] When it comes to opportunity, this is not so much about people's motivation, but rather whether the environment enables, or hinders, individuals to take action. Existing studies point to a favorable political environment and resources as an important factor for mobilization to take place (e.g. Tilly, 1978). Many of the existing studies on mobilization have not dealt explicitly with women, but given the marginalization of women in many aspects of life, women may have a particularly unfavorable opportunity structure due to gender imbalances in access to resources and political power and a discriminatory culture.

Where women are both willing to participate and have the opportunity to do so, they might still be impeded from participating if they are not wanted by the organizations themselves. Thus, a large supply of female participants does not by any means translate *automatically* into representation and participation. Demand for women by the movement or organization itself is an important factor that determines female participation. When are movements or organizations likely to have high demand for women? Existing research suggests that women are included when female participation is viewed as *strategic*, but also when the organizations have internalized equality norms and include women for *intrinsic* reasons.

In the following, I focus on three sets of factors that should influence female participation in organizations in dissent by improving women's opportunity to participate (supply),[6] and the degree to which women are attractive for organizations (demand): i) women's socio-economic resources and biographical availability, ii) women's political

[5] At the same time, women might not only be attracted to 'progressive' goals. We see women being involved also in right-wing groups and authoritarian/fascist movements (see e.g. Baldez (2002)). Thus, rather than being a homogeneous demographic, women are drawn by various 'pull' factors (Viterna, 2006).

[6] As mentioned, numerous factors influence the supply of women, particularly because women might be motivated for very different reasons. In the following I focus more on variables that shape opportunity, as it is central to understanding women's participation in an arena where we know that they are underrepresented. When I talk about organizational goals, however, I touch upon willingness, as ideology might be a motivating factor for women's participation.

and cultural freedom, iii) organizational goals and ideology. I end the theory section with a summary of the theoretical expectations and formulate testable hypotheses.

Women's socio-economic resources and biographical availability

The first set of variables that should shape the participation of women in dissent is their socio-economic position and biographical availability. By socio-economic position, I refer to education level and workforce participation, while biographical availability describes women's family obligations, best described by fertility rates. In simple terms, these variables shape the opportunity or barriers that affect female participation, and they influence the likelihood that organizations are interested strategically in recruiting women.

Why do resources matter? Resource mobilization theory emphasizes how economic resources, organizational resources, information flow, and education are prerequisites for dissent (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). Studies of women and rebel groups show that the more human resources women have, measured through national-level indicators of women's education level and workforce participation, the more likely it is that women take part in combat (Thomas and Wood, 2017; Wood, 2019). These studies argue that in societies in which women are valued and possess skills, rebel groups are more likely to recruit them.

The first factor that is likely an important requirement for being involved in organizations is education. While illiteracy might not be a problem for taking to the streets and protesting spiking food prices, it should be a much bigger problem for joining a political party or CSO. Education can be a door-opener into student networks, and it is important for acquiring the skills to understand and navigate public and political life. Where women are not highly educated, it is unlikely that they will get jobs that require skills. Furthermore, where women have poorer access to education, it is less likely that they will have the skills that organizations are interested in, and so demand will be lower.

The second socio-economic factor that likely shapes organizational participation by women is participation in the labor force. Participation in social activism depends on people's integration into pre-existing networks, and informal and formal connections (Klandermans and Oegema, 1987). Women's entry into paid jobs likely spearheads further development of capacities and economic resources. In addition, political engagement often starts in the workplace. By joining a workplace, women increase their representation in trade unions and improve their capacity for collective action (Ross,

2008). At the societal level, women's growing presence in the workforce improves their bargaining power and the formation of women's interest groups. At the level of the economy, women's economic empowerment exerts pressure on the government to enact more gender-friendly policies (ibid.). As such, inclusion in paid work is an important step for increasing women's capabilities and resources.

As women's education level and participation in paid jobs increases, we should also expect fertility rates to go down, as women are likely to postpone having their first child, and have less children in total. This should in turn increase women's participation in organizations, as women's biographical availability will be lower when they have to care for children. Biographical availability is related to the "absence of personal constraints that may increase the costs and risks of movement participation, such as full-time employment, marriage, and family responsibilities" (McAdam, 1986, p. 70).

Why expect country-level indicators of women's socio-economic status to influence individual women's access to organizations in dissent? Macro-level access to education and work for women should make it generally more likely that women are 'eligible' for participation in organizations that can eventually resist the regime, and make it more likely that organizations want to include them. As women enter the workforce and higher education, there will likely be a push for including more women—this push comes both from below (bottom up) by women themselves, but also from above (top down) as organizations find it more useful to capitalize on women's resources, skills and networks. There might also be critical mass dynamics, where once a certain level of female inclusion is reached it becomes self-sustaining and much more likely that women on average participate in public life.

The theoretical framework is not meant to capture all nuances of participation, and it is obvious that not all women will face the same level of barriers, and similarly, not all men will have access to organizations even if average education rates are high.[7] In some cases, female participation in protest might be driven by a subset of women who are overall more educated and have greater resources than the female population in general. In that case, the average socio-economic resources of the female population at large should not matter. But this is one of the first attempts at systematically identifying the drivers of female participation, and it is still important to test how structural societal structures shape women's participation on average. This study is partly exploratory

[7] In addition, women's status is determined not only by their gender, but also by their ethnic, geographic, economic and social belonging. This, however, is outside the scope of the current study.

and is one step toward closing the knowledge gap on female participation, and it sets the stage for further theorizing and testing.[8]

Women's freedom to participate

The second set of factors that should influence female participation is what I refer to as "freedom to participate" in public life. If women cannot participate freely in public life, the number of women who participate will go down, and it will also likely reduce the demand for female participants. In simple terms, freedom to participate could be summarized as a product of institutions and culture.

Institutions are complex, and focusing on all potential dimensions is outside the scope of this study. From existing literature, civil liberties stand out as one of the most important features driving organizational life and women's freedom to participate: "Case study evidence suggests that women's civil liberties were crucial for enabling women to organize, which initiated protests and led to transition in a range of countries" (Wang et al., 2017). Furthermore, there might be differences between civil liberties for women and civil liberties for men. General concepts like 'democracy' that do not take into account potentially gendered differences have been criticized.[9]

Gender roles and patriarchal values also shape women's freedom to participate. Stephen (1997) argues that women need to juggle their roles as wives, mothers and political activists, and that husbands may resist their political involvement. Furthermore, women who participate in public protests and activism might transgress existing gender norms and risk being punished for it. For example there have been reports of increased killings of female activist leaders in Colombia.[10] Religious or cultural norms may also prohibit women from moving freely, taking on leadership roles or engaging in politics. A general valuing of men over women would inhibits women from occupying important positions within a movement (Inglehart and Norris, 2003). Of course, these

[8] A number of studies aiming to explain the onset of dissent, mobilization and collective action have focused on explanatory factors in the aggregate, although this literature has more recently turned to more nuanced approaches with disaggregated data and case studies. Given how little attention female dissent has been given in the conflict literature, there is a need to map out and test various explanatory approaches, ranging from the country to the individual level.

[9] Democracies might still have unequal distribution of power by gender; studies of the relationship between democracy and female political representation present mixed findings (e.g. Fallon et al., 2012; Stockemer, 2011; Paxton et al., 2010). Democracies might on average have more power-sharing, but several semi-authoritarian regimes have focused on extending women's rights (Donno and Kreft, 2018) and some have a high share of elected women due to ambitious gender quotas (Tripp and Kang, 2007).

[10] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-rights-idUSKCN20K30O

disadvantages are not borne equally by all women, and they likely intersect with other factors such as ethnic group identity and socio-economic background.

Organization goals and ideology

The third factor that should matter for women's participation in organizations in dissent is the organizations' goals and ideology. While women's socio-economic resources and freedom to participate at the country level should affect female participation in resistance, there might still be variation between organizations in the same structural environment. Movements are often interested in recruiting women when the stakes are high and mass mobilization is crucial, for example in democratization or anti-regime movements. This has been seen for example in many anti-colonial nationalist movements in Africa (Makana, 2019).

Since I am interested here in explaining women's role in organizations that participated in nonviolent collective action for maximalist goals, they should in theory all be interested in recruiting women for strategic purposes. However, the mobilization of women during a critical period does not directly translate into the *organizational* integration of women. The variation in inclusion is therefore better explained by the organizations' underlying goals and ideology: Some goals imply that it is more strategic to include women, and some that it is intrinsically right to include them. Also, some goals are more likely to attract female participants, i.e. the supply of women. Two organization types stand out in this regard: those with leftist and liberal goals.

Several studies show that movements with leftist goals are both more likely to be attractive to women, and to want to recruit them. This finding is made in several studies on women and representation in politics, where left-wing parties are more likely to incorporate women compared to their right-wing counterparts (e.g. Caul, 1999). Also, studies on women and rebel groups argue that ideology helps explain variations in women's engagement in combat roles, and find that groups with left-wing or Marxist ideology are more likely to place women in combat (Wood and Thomas, 2017). Leftist movements have goals that (often) relate to power-sharing, social policies and equality. As women are most often the caregiver in households, they likely support causes for more welfare, redistribution and equality.

Liberal organizations are also more likely to have high female participation. Liberal goals include, for example, human rights, civil liberties, and egalitarianism. These goals align more with values of gender equality and female empowerment, making it reasonable to expect that women are drawn to these groups in higher numbers, and

that there is a higher demand by these organizations to incorporate women. Liberal organizations might have internalized gender norms, but they might also include more women for instrumentalist reasons. Given how the UN and other actors have emphasized female empowerment norms, for example through the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, as well as in one of the Sustainable Development Goals, it is plausible that organizations might adopt a more liberal and gender-equal agenda in order to get aid or other financial support. Whether for intrinsic or strategic reasons, liberal values should translate to higher female participation.

Summary and hypotheses

To summarize, participation by women in organizations in dissent is determined by the supply of women and the demand for women. Supply depends on women's motivation (push and pull factors), and barriers. Still, women might have grievances without having the opportunity to act on them—barriers that hinder women's opportunity to participate in organizational life are a product of socio-economic, political, and cultural factors. Specifically, I have argued that education level, workforce experience and fertility rates shape women's opportunity, in addition to civil liberties and gender equality norms. These structural factors also mold the organizational interest in recruiting women, i.e. demand. Finally, organizational demand is also determined by the goals or ideology of organizations.

In summary, I would expect high female participation when women are motivated to participate, and face few barriers to participation. At the same time, there is an inherent contradiction here. Where grievances (push factors) are hard felt, women might also face the highest barriers. Where women have most opportunity, their grievances will be lower. But this poses a problem only if we view grievance and opportunity as equally important, while in reality they might not be. Grievances are important because they function as a spark that fuels dissent. But without the opportunity to act, it is much less likely that dissent will take place. Women worldwide do not lack grievances; they face discrimination in most aspects of life. Their lack of motivation can hardly explain their absence and exclusion from political, social and public life.

Based on this, I formulate the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: The higher women's average education level, the more they participate in organizations in dissent.

Hypothesis 2: The higher women's average labor force participation, the more they participate in organizations in dissent.

Hypothesis 3: The lower women's fertility rates, the more they participate in organizations in dissent.

Hypothesis 4: The more women's civil liberties are protected, the more they participate in organizations in dissent.

Hypothesis 5: The stronger the norms of gender equality, the more women participate in organizations in dissent.

Hypothesis 6: Organizations in dissent with leftist or liberal goals have higher female participation.

4.3 Data and research design

Unit of analysis

To test the empirical merit of the hypotheses, I combine data on women's participation in organizations in dissent, with data on organizational features, and country-level variables (described more below). The data are hierarchical with two levels: organizations (level 1) nested in countries (level 2).[11] An example of the data structure is visualized in Table A.27 in the Appendix. The unit of analysis is an organization, observed within a certain country and year. Only years where at least one organization was active in dissent are included; some organizations are observed several times, others appear only once. I run a series of multi-level models, described in more detail shortly. In essence, the models compare organizations and estimate the likelihood of women's inclusion as a function of the main independent variables.[12]

Dependent variable

To measure women's participation in organizations in dissent, I employ an original dataset *ARC-Women*. ARC-Women builds on and extends the *Anatomy of Resistance Campaigns* (ARC) dataset which contains information on more than 1,400 unique

[11] In a few cases, organizations are crossed rather than nested, as they operate in several countries. This applies only to a few organizations like Al-Qaida and ISIS.

[12] This means that I do not have a full panel of country-years in Africa from 1990 to 2015. This is important because I do not want to compare women-inclusive organizations with the absence of any organization.

organizations (some observed over several years) that engaged in maximalist dissent in Africa between 1990 and 2015. Organization types include political parties, trade unions, civil society organizations, religious groups, fronts, and rebel groups.[13] I will come back to the data structure when describing the analytical method. ARC-Women complements the ARC dataset by adding four variables measuring women's participation: (1) Women's inclusion in the top leadership, (2) Whether the organization has a gender-ideology, inclusive or exclusive, (3) Whether or not the organization has a women's committee, (4) The gender composition of the organization's membership.

The four variables capture different types of participation and roles ascribed to women: leadership, ideology and lower-level participation, as shown in Table 4.1. A more detailed description of the variables and the data-collection process is available in the Appendix. The correlation between the variables in ARC-Women are displayed in Table A.24 in the Appendix.

Table 4.2 summarizes each of the gender features across different organizations types. In only 4 % of the organizations have women made it to the top leadership position. Political parties and trade unions rarely have a woman as leader but around a fourth of them have women represented in the top leadership. Around 20 % of the organizations in the dataset have a women-inclusive ideology, while a tenth of the organizations in ARC have a gender-*exclusive* ideology, i.e. they are committed to women's exclusion from public life. Rebel groups account for most of these observations. On average, 16 % of the organizations have a women's section, and only 14 % have a constituency comprising more than 20 percent women. Overall, these descriptive statistics confirm some of the insights from research on gender and organizations—that women face barriers to inclusion. Missingness ranges from 21 % to 34 % and multiple imputation was used to replace these values. This is described in more detail in the Appendix.

[13] As rebel groups might be substantively different from nonviolent organizations, I exclude rebel groups in some of the auxiliary analyses.

Table 4.1. Variables in ARC-Women

Variable	Values	Description
Women in top leadership	2 = leader is woman, 1 = the top leadership includes women, 0 = no women observed among top leadership	The top leadership is the most high-rank forum of that organization. Typically, it would be the national board or executive committee.
Women's section	1=Yes, 0=No	Women's sections (or women's wings or women's committees) are formal sections in the organizational structure devoted to women's issues. They typically also consist of women leaders, thus reflecting some degree of participation of women at the lower levels of the organization.
Gender ideology	0 = No ideology, 1 = Exclusive ideology, 2 = Inclusive ideology	Organizations were coded as inclusive when their goals—for example in their founding statements or in public statements made by the leader—mentioned women's equal rights in public life or gender equality. They were coded as gender-exclusive if they explicitly state goals opposed to women's participation in public life.
Gender composition of membership	1 = 0-19 %, 2 = 20-49 %, 3 = 50+ %	The membership is the constituency; the grassroots.

Table 4.2. Summary of gender features across organization types

Type	%	Woman as leader or executive	Women among leadership	Gender-inclusive ideology	Gender-exclusive ideology	Women's wing	Low female membership	Med./high female membership
Pol. Party	34	3	21	27	4	26	66	13
Trade Union	6	3	24	19	0	32	43	14
Religious	3	0	15	15	3	27	15	69
Student/Youth	2	0	10	14	0	4	26	23
Front	8	5	16	8	5	6	57	12
Other CSO	16	15	15	32	0	10	24	23
Rebel	29	0	2	9	23	4	97	1
Other	1	7	5	32	0	2	34	18
Total	100	4	14	20	9	15	63	13
Missing		14	14	11	11	9	23	23

Each column shows the percentage of organizations with the respective characteristic, rounded to the nearest integer.



Figure 4.1. Distribution of ordinal scale



Figure 4.2. Distribution of dummy variable

For the purpose of testing the hypotheses laid out in the paper, I measure *women-inclusive organizations* (WIOs) by constructing a dummy variable. I define an organization as women-inclusive if it meets at least *two* of the following criteria: a) the organization has women among its leadership, b) the organization has a women's committee, c) the organization has a gender-inclusive ideology, or d) the organization has a high share (more than 20 %) of female membership. The variable takes the value 1 if two or more of these criteria are met and 0 otherwise, and should capture some degree of substantive participation. In robustness checks I also employ an alternative dependent variable, which is an ordinal scale from 1-4, summarizing the number of dimensions of female inclusion per organization. In Figure 4.1 and 4.2, the distribution of the dependent variables are visualized. Visualizing time trends, Figure 4.3 summarizes the number of WIOs in dissent (as measured by the dummy) per year over time. The number of WIOs in dissent is increasing over time, but the curve corresponds more or less to the trend of the total number organizations in dissent, indicating that there is no particular shift where more organizations include women over time. The peak we see around 2011 reflects the uprisings in the Arab states in that period.

Independent variables

Women's education is defined as the mean years of schooling for women aged 20 to 24, expressed in years. The variable, taken from the Wittgenstein Centre Data Explorer (Lutz et al., 2014), comes in five-year intervals and was linearly interpolated between



Figure 4.3. Number of organizations in dissent, 1990-2015

observation points.[14] The variable *Women in workforce* is the number, expressed as a percentage, of female workers who have a paid job. The numbers come from the International Labour Organization (ILO).[15] Biographical availability is captured by fertility rates, also from the World Bank, defined as the average number of births per woman.[16]

To measure women's civil liberties, I use the women's civil liberties index from V-Dem (Coppedge et al., 2019a), ranging from 0 to 1 with 1 denoting high protection of civil liberties. The variable 'Female empowerment values' captures society's valuing of women's empowerment as measured by the World Values Survey (WVS). The variable is taken from the replication data by Dahlum and Wig (2020) and is based on two questions where respondents are asked to what extent they agree with the statements: (1) "When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women," and

[14] Linear interpolation assumes that the data follows a linear trend. Given that the average society-level education level tends to grow monotonically and incrementally, and the time period interpolated (four-year periods between observation points) is limited, linear interpolation seems to be a reasonable approximation.

[15] The variable specifically captures wage and salaried female workers as the & of female employment. The numbers were retrieved from the World Bank's database.

[16] All World Bank indicators are available at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/

(2) "On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do". Positive values denote more gender-equal responses.

To test organization goals, I use information from the ARC data and define a variable that captures whether an organization had a leftist or liberal ideology (the description of goals are further described in the Appendix). The correlation coefficient between these two variables (available in the Appendix) is at 0.12, meaning that they do not overlap extensively.

I control for the log of population size (also from the World Bank), which is an important predictor of the onset of resistance (Chenoweth and Ulfelder, 2017). As the model already includes several variables, I aim to keep the model parsimonious and avoid post-treatment bias. Instead of including a whole battery of controls in the main models I add some robustness checks where alternative control variables are tested. All variables at the country-level are lagged by one year.

Descriptive statistics for all variables are displayed in Table A.25 in the Appendix. The correlations between the variables are displayed in a correlation matrix in Table A.26. This shows that some of the structural variables are highly correlated, particularly women's workforce participation, women's education, and fertility rates, suggesting that these three variables should be tested separately and not in the same model.[17]

Empirical strategy

A multilevel model leveraging the information from both the organization- and country-level is suitable for modeling the data. By allowing the countries' intercept to vary, we account for the fact that countries tend to have different starting points on the explanatory variables. Moreover, the multilevel model controls for biases that might emerge as a result of the hierarchical structure, but we still do not control away all the between-country effects. Rather, the multilevel model preserves the information on differences between countries instead of treating unobserved country differences as merely nuisances, hence allowing the testing of covariates at both the country- and organization level (Gelman and Hill, 2006). The residual variance is divided into between- and within-group (level 2 and level 1) components. I refer to this model as the *country random effects model*.

[17] To further substantiate this choice, I run a full model (all variables included) and test the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), shown in Table A.29. The VIF values for education, work and fertility rates are above 2, indicating that the model does have problems with collinearity for these three variables.

Table 4.3. Organizational and country-level factors and women in dissent (random intercepts country)

	(Model 1)	(Model 2)	(Model 3)
Women education level (t-1)	0.15 (0.06)**		
Women workforce part. (t-1)		0.02 (0.01)**	
Fertility rates (t-1)			−0.18 (0.12)
Women civil lib. (t-1)	0.89 (0.58)	0.85 (0.59)	0.81 (0.59)
Female empowerment norms (t-1)	0.53 (0.36)	0.51 (0.36)	0.52 (0.36)
Org. with leftist goals	0.55 (0.13)***	0.54 (0.13)***	0.55 (0.13)***
Org. with liberal goals	0.66 (0.10)***	0.66 (0.10)***	0.65 (0.10)***
Population (t-1)	0.25 (0.15)	0.32 (0.16)*	0.28 (0.16)
Year (scaled)	0.16 (0.07)*	0.23 (0.06)***	0.21 (0.06)**
AIC	3156.86	3156.03	3160.84
BIC	3211.93	3211.11	3215.91
Log Likelihood	−1569.43	−1569.02	−1571.42
Num. obs.	3358	3358	3358
Num. groups: ccode	46	46	46
Var: ccode (Intercept)	1.25	1.30	1.36

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Furthermore, the data are characterized by having a repeated cross-sectional design, i.e. some organizations, but not all, are observed over several years. To account for time trends, I include a variable denoting the year which removes the linear time trend.[18]

4.4 Results

I first estimate an empty model with random intercepts for countries to calculate the intra-class correlation, i.e. how much of the variance in the dependent variable stems from the variation between countries.[19] For the empty model, the variance is 1.807, and the intra-class correlation is calculated to be 0.35.[20] Given that country-level variation accounts for such a big proportion of the variation in Y, it underscores the utility of

[18] Another option is to include year as an additional second level in the model and include random intercepts for each year. I run this model in robustness checks.
[19] I use the package *glmer* in *R* to run a logistic mixed model with a binomial distribution.
[20] 1.807/(1.807+3.29) = 0.35

a multilevel model with random intercepts allowing countries' starting point on Y to vary.

The results from the country random effects models are shown in Table 4.3. In Model 1, the effect of women's education level on the probability that an organization is inclusive of women is tested. Education has a positive and significant effect ($p < 0.05$) on the likelihood that the organization includes women. In Model 2, we also see that the effect of women's workforce participation has a positive and significant impact on the likelihood of female participation. The higher the average fertility rates, the lower the likelihood that women are included, although this association is not statistically significant. In summary, the evidence so far shows that women's resources matter for the likelihood that women participate in organizations in dissent. It is supportive of hypothesis 1 and 2, but displays little support for hypothesis 3, that fertility rates—one aspect of biographical availability—are key to female participation.

Across the three models, the effect of women's freedom, i.e. civil liberties and female empowerment norms, is also tested. The better women's civil liberties are protected, and the higher the support for female empowerment norms, the more likely it is that women are included in the organization, but these associations are not statistically significant. As such, Hypothesis 4 and 5 cannot be confirmed.

The hypothesis that organizations with leftist and liberal ideologies are more likely to include women receives strong support across the models: A positive association between organizations with leftist/liberal goals and female participation is statistically significant at the 1 % level.

In all the models I control for a linear time trend. Time has a positive and statistically significant effect on women's participation in organizations in dissent, indicating that there is a general trend toward more inclusion of women. I also control for population, and the more populous the country, the higher the likelihood of female participation. But this association is not significant.

Robustness

Judging from these results, we can tentatively confirm the hypotheses that organizations with leftist and liberal goals have a positive effect on the likelihood that an organization in dissent includes women, and that women's resources (workforce participation and education) matter for their participation. It cannot be confirmed, however, that

women's civil liberties or empowerment norms matter for women's inclusion. Next, I investigate the robustness of these results.

First, I test if the results change when substituting the dichotomous dependent variable with an ordinal scale ranging from 0 to 4. I therefore run a set of multilevel ordinal logistic regression models. The results are displayed in Table A.30. It shows that they stay largely the same even when measuring female participation on a scale.[21] Further, since organizations with liberal aims might have gender equality as a goal, there is the risk that gender-inclusive ideology is included on both sides of the equation. I therefore regenerate the WIO measure excluding gender-inclusive ideology. Using the alternative dependent variable, I find no deviations from the main results (see Table A.31).

I further test if the results are robust to changes in the sample and in the model specification. First, I exclude the two organization types that account for most of the observations: political parties and rebel groups. In Table A.32, we see that the relationship between leftist/liberal ideology and female participation holds when excluding rebel groups, but some of the effect of education disappears. In Table A.33, political parties are excluded from the analysis. The results show that having a leftist ideology is mainly a feature of political parties, as the coefficient is no longer statistically significant when we exclude this organization type. Future work should do more to tap into the heterogeneity in the empirical data material on organizations, as what explains female participation in a rebel group might be systematically different from what influences the number of women in political parties or trade unions. Second, another way of modeling the data is to include time as a random effect in the multilevel model, rather than a fixed covariate. I therefore test models where I allow a random intercept for both country and year. The results from the country and time random effects model is available in Table A.34, and reinforces the main results. In this model, the effect of fertility rates also becomes statistically significant.

Importantly, it might be that the relationship between organizational ideology and female participation is caused by omitted variables that both shape the stock of available liberal/leftist organizations, and an environment conducive to women's participation. In additional models I include alternative control variables which should shape organizational life and women's empowerment. These include democracy and its squared term (Table A.35), clientelism (Table A.36), GDP per capita (Table A.37), state repression (Table A.38), media freedom (Table A.39), news coverage (Table A.40), the

[21] This analysis was conducted in *Stata* using the command "meologit".

number of women's international non-governmental organizations (WINGOs) (Table A.41), and the total number of organizations in dissent (Table A.42.[22] None of these robustness tests transform the main findings, except the number of WINGOs which absorbs some of the effect of education. In sum, these robustness tests reinforce the importance of organizational ideology—as well education and work participation—for understanding female participation in organizations in dissent.

Next, I test whether other organizational features drive the results. As already mentioned, the effects of the independent variables on political parties and rebel groups, or other organization types, may be different. In Table A.43 I include a dummy set for the different organization types in the dataset. Due to the high correlation between some of these variables it is hard to interpret the actual significance, but the results at least indicate that women's participation is more likely in political parties, trade unions, and CSOs, while it is less likely in religious organizations, student/youth groups, fronts and rebel groups. This shows the potential for further and more detailed analysis of patterns in the data. Moreover, how does the size and the age of the organization influence the likelihood that women are included? We could speculate that newer organizations are more likely to include women because they are less traditional, while older organizations have an already established—and potentially patriarchal—structure. It is also likely that larger organizations have more women. I test this in Table A.44 and A.45, and the results show rather the opposite: The older the organization, the more likely it is to be inclusive of women. This could potentially be an effect of the often young age and short life span of some rebel groups (rebel groups often emerge and re-merge, they then appear as new organizations in the data). In addition, some of the old pre-existing religious organizations, such as church associations in Zambia, have high female participation. Moreover, as expected there are more women in large organizations.

Finally, I check if the independent variables measuring women's socioeconomic resources and freedom to participate have a curvilinear effect on female participation. The results are displayed in Table A.46. This yields some interesting results. Women's education level has an inverted U-shaped relationship with female participation, indicating that a certain level of education is positive for the participation of women, but above a certain level, it does not increase the rates of women in organizations. These patterns would be interesting to explore further in future work, as they also tap into a key question in the literature—namely whether inequality in resources leads to more protest because of grievances, or less protest because of lack of opportunity.

[22] I describe the variables and data sources in more detail in the Appendix.

4.5 Discussion and conclusion

In this paper, I set out to explain women's participation in organizations in dissent. I identify three factors that should influence levels of female participation: women's socioeconomic resources, women's freedom to participate, and organizational goals. To test the determinants of female participation in dissent, I employ an original dataset, ARC-Women, mapping women's participation in more than 1,400 unique organizations in dissent in Africa in the time period 1990 to 2015. In summary, the results show that resources and ideology stand out as the most important determinants of women's participation in organizations engaged in dissent. The analyses show that the higher women's average education level and level of participation in the workforce, the more likely it is that women participate in organizations in dissent. This is evidence that socio-economic resources both shape the opportunity of women (supply), and increase their value, making them more attractive to organizations (demand). The results further show that organizations with leftist and liberal goals or ideology are significantly more likely to include women, a finding that can be explained both by higher demands in leftist/liberal organizations, as well as these organizational goals being more attractive to women. The findings remain robust across different model specifications, although leftist ideology is an effect that is mostly tied to political parties.

The effects cannot be explained by the alternative explanation that there were simply more organizations in dissent, nor by factors that determine the stock of available organizations, like state repression and regime type. Interestingly, the findings mirror some of the results reported in studies aimed at explaining women's participation in combat roles in rebel groups (Wood and Thomas, 2017; Thomas and Wood, 2017). However, the relationship between resources, ideology and female participation in organizations found in this study is not driven by rebel groups exclusively. This suggests that female participation in organizations as different as political parties and rebel groups follows similar patterns. A more in-depth exploration of similarities and differences in women's pathways to violent and nonviolent political participation would be an interesting avenue for future research.

The analysis could not establish a relationship between women's civil freedoms, the normative environment, and female participation in organizations in dissent. I also did not find clear evidence that fertility rates, capturing biographical availability, are important for understanding the variation in women's participation in organizations in dissent, except in one of the alternative models. One explanation that might help explain the null results for some of the indicators (fertility rates, empowerment norms and

civil liberties), is that the supply and demand framework highlights a tension between conflicting theoretical expectations. Consider a scenario where women are subordinated in a culture that does not value female empowerment. This should lower the likelihood that they are included in 'mainstream' formal organizations because of lack of opportunity, but at the same time, women in this context would have strong grievances, which in turn could spark mobilization. Recall that the 'supply' mechanism can be divided into motivation and barriers—in this case there will be barriers, but motivation will be high. Other studies, for example (Murdie and Peksen, 2015), focus more on grievances, arguing that deprivation drives female protest behavior. But if motivation and opportunity are equally important, they could cancel out any observable effect. At the same time, we know little about the characteristics of the specific women who participate—whether they represent the 'average' woman, or are more likely to have ample resources or be more deprived. Therefore, more disaggregated studies, as well as qualitative research, is needed to understand patterns of participation of the heterogeneous category 'women'.

The data on female participation introduced for the first time in this paper shows that women remain under-represented in political organizations. Women are not only rare in rebel groups, they also clearly face barriers to joining mass organizations like political parties and trade unions, and particularly in terms of leadership positions. Even if the ARC-Women dataset only contains a subset of all organizations in a country (i.e. only those that visibly participated in maximalist dissent) it provides a sample of the overall level of gender representation in contemporary organizations in Africa. These descriptive insights should therefore be interesting to scholars interested in women and power in Africa, and to policy circles that work to improve the gender balance in public life. The results also question whether moments of contentious dissent and mass movements against a regime really represent a window of opportunity for women to gain more influence. In resistance campaigns women might be disadvantaged from the outset because they lack a voice in the formal organizations that make the decisions.

The results have several implications for future research. The research on nonviolent resistance is expanding rapidly. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) argue that one of the main advantages of nonviolent resistance is that barriers to participation are lower and that nonviolent protest is open to the participation of broader segments of the population. In theory, anyone can take to the streets and join a political protest, regardless of resources and networks, and the use of nonviolence makes it an easier choice in terms of its ethical implications. With this article, however, I show that organizations and resistance movements are not necessarily inclusive of women even if they capitalize on female participation and aim at mobilizing large numbers of women during

periods of contention. Women's formal representation among the organized actors in the movement is a rarer phenomenon than participation in single events; a consequence of organizations' often hierarchical and male-dominated structures. Only when organizations see women as valuable or important for strategic purposes will they include them in their ranks and organizational apparatus.

Several studies point to organizations as important hubs for organizing collective action (e.g. Staniland, 2014; Weinstein, 2006; Tarrow, 2011). Organizations mobilize people, make decisions, and choose whether to enter negotiations with the regime. Importantly, this article has shown that women are under-represented in the majority of organizations that wage resistance. What implications does this have? Several untested hypotheses have already been put forward suggesting that women's participation is crucial for the outcome of nonviolent resistance campaigns (Codur and King, 2015). With new data, like the dataset introduced in this article, this is something future research should investigate.

Chapter 5

Paper IV. Between patriarchs and patrons: Women's rights organizations and regime resistance

Abstract

Women participate in resistance campaigns worldwide, but little systematic large-N research exists on the determinants of their participation. In this paper, I focus on understanding the incentives of organizations working for women's rights, such as improving women's representation in politics or protecting women's economic rights, to participate in episodes of civil resistance against the regime. Do women's rights organizations view moments of resistance and unrest as windows of opportunity, or do they think they are better off with the incumbent regime? I argue that the relative level of women's rights, as well as the social composition of resistance movements, shapes the participation of women's rights organizations. States that accommodate women by improving women's rights should see a lower involvement of women's rights organizations in anti-regime dissent. In addition, resistance campaigns dominated by patriarchal and conservative organizations are less likely to see the participation of women's rights organizations. To test these hypotheses, I employ new data on the organizational composition of resistance campaigns in Africa 1990-2015. The results from the quantitative analysis show that the presence of patriarchal organizations in resistance discourages the participation of women's rights organizations, but the analysis is inconclusive on the hypothesis that improving women's rights reduces the likelihood of women's rights organizations confronting the regime.

5.1 Introduction

In Kenya in 2009, a resistance campaign against the regime was sparked by the *G10*, a network of women's rights organizations advocating for improvements in women's political power. Using tactics like sex strikes, the *G10* protested the Kenyan regime's lack of leadership and demanded the resignation of the vice-president (Aly, 2009). In Morocco in 2011, women's rights organizations were initially seen participating in the campaign against King Mohammed, but they withdrew after the state made concessions (Salime, 2012). In Senegal in 2011, a big campaign *Y'en a marre*, "I've had enough", was launched to counter the then incumbent president Abdoulaye Wade to prevent him from extending his presidential limits (Demarest, 2016). Women's rights organizations were not observed participating in these events, despite the opposition coalition spanning several political parties and civil society organizations. These anecdotal examples tap into the dynamics of large-scale maximalist resistance campaigns, and show how different they can be in terms of participation by formal women's organizations. In this paper I try to understand this phenomenon better by asking: *Under what circumstances are women's rights organizations (less) likely to participate in anti-regime resistance campaigns?* I understand women's rights organizations as organizations led primarily by women, and which have goals related to the interests of women.[1] By a resistance campaign, I mean acts of *nonviolent collective dissent* with *maximalist goals*.[2]

Previous literature has shown that women's organizations work to improve a variety of issues related to women, for example better protection from violence (Htun and Weldon, 2012), and studies document that women's groups use a variety of tactics, ranging from lobbying (Tripp, 2016b) to street-level protests (Murdie and Peksen, 2015). Moreover, research has shown how women's organizations exploit windows of opportunity opened by armed conflict to improve their own position (Tripp, 2015; Webster et al., 2019), and how women have been prominent in peace activism, in Africa and elsewhere (Chitando, 2021). These different studies are examples of the variation in both interests and tactics employed by women's organizations. However, no study has

[1] These do not have to be feminist goals.

[2] Nonviolent collective dissent refers to observable action involving multiple people beyond normal institutional procedures for realizing political goals (Tilly, 1978), without the use of armed force. Maximalist goals include demands for significant changes to executive power, for example calls for democratization or demands that the incumbent steps down. I rely on the definition from Butcher et al. (2022) who define maximalist demands as "calls for changes in the political structure which would significantly alter the executive's access to state power, the rules with which executives are selected, or the policy or geographic areas for which the executive has the right to make laws".

looked at the mobilization of women's rights organizations with large-N data in the context of nonviolent collective dissent against the regime.

During episodes of resistance, women's rights organizations have to make the decision of whether the status quo is better than conflict and a potential change of regime. Is regime change likely to improve gender equality and women's rights? Two factors should influence whether women's rights organizations participate in resistance: the current regime's policies towards women's rights, and the goals of the organizations taking the lead in the resistance campaign. Firstly, in states where women's rights are making progress, the status quo might be preferable to a change of regime where the question of who will end up in power is uncertain. When women's rights are being improved, it indicates the relative gains that women's rights organizations have made and could be indicative of a relationship of negotiation between the regime and the women's movement. Secondly, participation by women's organizations is also dependent on the organizational make-up of the resistance campaign. Campaigns that are dominated by organizations that are patriarchal, i.e. do not include women, or have conservative goals—for example religious fundamentalist or far right goals—should be less likely to attract the support of women's rights organizations. Patriarchal organizations might be ignorant of women's demands, while conservative organizations might have goals that are explicitly hostile to the goals of women's rights organizations. The potential coming to power of these organizations after a change of regime discourages women's organizations from participating.[3]

I test these theoretical expectations using the *Anatomy of Resistance Campaigns* (ARC) dataset, which provides data on the organizational composition of resistance campaigns in Africa from 1990 to 2015 (Butcher et al., 2022), and data on the gender composition of these organizations, *ARC-Women* (Bakken, 2021b). This sample, although geographically limited, spans more than 1,400 organizations, and the time period includes processes of nation-building, democratization, and political conflicts. African countries also display variation in terms of gender empowerment, and it is therefore an interesting sample to study women's rights organizations and dissent. I understand women's rights organizations as organizations working for some goals related to women's interests. Such goals can be explicitly feminist—for example working for for women's emancipation and against patriarchy by demanding reform of family

[3] This is not to ignore that there are barriers. In some places women's organizations do not have agency to choose because they barely exist. I discuss some potential alternative explanations in the methods section and I control for confounders like the stock of women's organizations in the analyses.

laws and improved female political representation. But the goals of women's rights organizations can also be more practical (Molyneux, 1985), for instance related to women's livelihood, access to health-care, and other more immediate needs. Some women's rights organizations may even explicitly reject liberal-feminist agendas.[4] Still, what women's organizations have in common is that they are rational actors trying to achieve some specific goals related to gender or women.[5]

To capture whether regimes have improved women's rights, I test the average changes in the variable "women's political empowerment index" taken from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data. To test the hypotheses on organizational features, I use data from the ARC dataset on the ideology and goals of the other organizations involved in resistance in order to code the presence of patriarchal and conservative organizations. I aggregate the data to a country-year setup, but only include country-years where at least one organization is observed in nonviolent dissent; this is indicative that there were both grievances and at least some opportunity to protest, and I include proxies to control for the stock of women's rights organizations. The empirical data mostly captures episodes of resistance in the context of hybrid regimes, i.e. neither fully-fledged democracies, nor extremely authoritarian states. In mixed regimes, there is at least some level of opportunity for mobilization, but also grievances. This is where most resistance campaigns materialize, and that is the context to which the theoretical mechanisms should apply. I run a set of logistic regression models estimating the likelihood that at least one women's rights organizations participated in resistance in that year.

In line with the theoretical expectations, I find that resistance campaigns with a high number of patriarchal and conservative organizations make it less likely that women's rights organizations participate in anti-regime movements. Also, the participation of organizations with an explicit conservative agenda is associated with a lower likelihood of participation by women's rights organizations. However, the results show no clear link between the participation of women's rights organizations and recent improvements in women's empowerment and political rights. One explanation for this is that the available time-series indicators on women's rights are highly aggregated and

[4] Women's interests likely also intersect with their socioeconomic position, ethnic background, political or religious affiliation, but such nuances could be further explored in future work.

[5] To some extent we can view women's rights organizations as representatives of women's movements. Women's movements are sociopolitical movements where "movement definition, issue articulation, and issue resolution are specific to women developed and organized by them with reference to their gender activity" (Beckwith, 1996, p. 1038). Importantly, the women's movement it is not a unitary actor, and that is why I do not use that concept in the paper. The range of women's interests are captured in a more nuanced way by focusing on, broadly defined, women's rights organizations.

not well-equipped for capturing smaller, but symbolic, gains for women's rights organizations. Bringing in countries from other regions of the world and extending the time period under study might result in more conclusive findings. In the paper's conclusion, I discuss this and other alternative explanations, and I include some real-world examples to illustrate the proposed mechanisms.

The paper advances the research agenda on civil resistance and the need for disaggregating the actors that participate by zooming in on one of the more neglected actors in research, and a disadvantaged societal actor — women. I focus specifically on the agency and incentives of women's rights organizations, thereby moving forward from the tendency in the literature to view women as mere bystanders or victims. I show that women's rights organizations sometimes choose not to participate; rather they prefer the status quo and non-confrontational strategies for achieving political change. Focusing on organizations instead of analyzing the women's movement as a whole is important for taking into account the heterogeneity of women's interests and the constellations they are part of. In conclusion, participation by formal women's rights organization in resistance campaigns should not be taken as a given.

This paper provides the first large-N study to look at the mobilization of women's organizations in the context of civil resistance episodes for maximalist goals. Why does it matter? Women's rights organizations could bring several strategic advantages to civil resistance campaigns, for reasons related to their gender, experiences and networks. For example, women's rights organizations might broaden the coalition, mobilize more segments of the population, attract international attention and support, and enhance the credibility and legitimacy of the campaign. As such, the participation of women's organizations should be a tactical advantage for any civil resistance campaign that is fighting for political change. Moreover, the participation of formal women's organizations is most likely important for women's ability to influence the outcomes of the movement (Ray and Korteweg, 1999). As women have historically been a marginalized demographic, deprived of political, social and economic rights, should they not therefore in principle endorse any movement campaigning for substantive political change? Not necessarily. As argued in this paper, the participation of women's rights organizations in campaigns against the state depends on the regime in power and what it offers women, and also on the resistance campaign; the goals of the organizations which compose it.

The paper proceeds as follows. First, I sketch the theoretical framework and formulate the hypotheses. The variables and the data are described in the methods chapter,

before turning to the results. I end by providing a discussion with some real-world examples of the theoretical dynamics, before concluding.

5.2 Theory

Below, I lay out the theoretical framework for understanding the participation of women's rights organizations in resistance campaigns. First, I argue that some regimes improve women's rights to secure the support of women, and I also show how women's rights organizations take advantage of this. In short, I make the case that relative gains in women's rights should impact their decision to join or stay away from maximalist protest campaigns. Second, I argue that the organizational composition matters. Specifically the presence of patriarchal or conservative organizations groups makes it less likely that we will observe the participation of women's rights organizations. At the end of the theory section, I account for some alternative explanations.

5.2.1 Women's rights organizations and the state

Women's political power in hybrid regimes is increasing. Several (semi-)autocracies show impressive patterns in terms of female political representation, the introduction of political quotas, and women's rights reforms (Paxton et al., 2010; Krook, 2006). Existing research gives several reasons for this, including the diffusion of norms (Zwingel, 2012),and the experience of armed conflict and peace agreements (Bakken and Buhaug, 2021; Webster et al., 2019; Joshi and Olsson, 2021). But it also stresses regimes' strategies of securing support from an important constituency by extending women's rights (Donno and Kreft, 2018; Tripp, 2019). By granting women political rights, the regime may lessen women's grievances, and thus reduce the chances of female mobilization (Donno and Kreft, 2018). In addition to introducing women-friendly policies that should benefit women in general, the regime can also organize in ways that directly target women's rights organizations. Several types of constellations exist between the regime and formal women's organizations (Beckwith, 2007). Some regimes have state-sponsored women's organizations, so-called "national gender machineries" (Gouws and Coetzee, 2019), others have some form of tutelage whereby, for example, the first lady leads the women's wing of the ruling party. This has been dubbed by some the "First Lady Syndrome" (Mama, 1995). In these regimes, women's rights organizations are less independent and more connected to the regime.

Importantly, however, gains in women's political power and rights, whether in semi-democracies, more stable autocratic contexts or after armed conflict, cannot be reduced to the consequence of top-down approaches; they are also a result of continuous work by women's movements and (mostly) female political entrepreneurs (Kang and Tripp, 2018). Women's rights organizations have fought hard to influence these windows of opportunity, for example in the context of conflict (Anderson, 2016; Tripp, 2016a). Moreover, as already alluded to, women's rights organizations do not have to be feminist in focus (And maybe most of them are not?). The goals that women's rights organizations work for might therefore not be threatening to the existence of the regime itself, meaning that there is potential for negotiation between women's rights organizations and the authorities. Other organizations might not have this opportunity as their demands are more in outright opposition to the existence of the regime. In short, women's rights organizations navigate the context and regime boundaries that they are embedded in. This might mean lobbying and negotiation, and pushing for reforms should the opportunity arise. In other contexts, confrontation with and direct opposition to the regime could be the preferred tactic. When does the onset of a resistance campaign represent an opportunity for improving women's rights? And under what conditions is the status quo and regime continuity a better option?

The first condition under which I argue that women's rights organizations would choose not to participate in resistance campaigns is when there have been gains in improving women's rights. When women's rights organizations successfully lobby the state and extract concessions, women's rights organizations should view non-confrontational tactics as more strategic for achieving their goals. Senegal is one example of a context where women's organizations have worked closely with the regime to reform gender legislation. In 2010, women's rights organizations achieved a major victory when a gender parity law was introduced (Tøraasen, 2019). The process was driven forward by an organization called the Senegalese Council of Women (COSEF), which was formed in 1994, with the aim of improving women's political representation. COSEF also collaborated with the Senegalese Association of Women Jurists (AFJ). As described in several accounts, the women's movement worked closely with Abdoulaye Wade, who came to power in 2000. "Abdoulaye Wade, who became president of Senegal in 2000, had made campaign promises regarding gender parity, and COSEF seized on this moment to advance the issue" (Tripp, 2016b, 387). This resulted in the parity law that, among other things, introduced gender quotas in political parties. In 2010-2012, there was significant opposition to Wade as he proposed changes to the electoral rules of the constitution (Demarest, 2016). This sparked protests, which were led by an opposition front named

"Y'en a Marre", which translates to "fed up". The campaign was constituted by young people, civil society organizations, trade unions and political parties. But no formal women's rights organizations are registered as participants.

Another example is Morocco, a country with 'state feminism', i.e. close ties between the regime and the feminist women's organization, since the 1950s (Ennaji, 2016). Women's rights organizations used the existing channels to negotiate, lobby and pressure the regime to implement reforms and policies, and they achieved a victory for these efforts in 2004, when they successfully persuaded the regime to reform family law, giving women more equal rights in the marriage vis-à-vis the husband. Some argue that this was possible because the women's organizations were seen as allies rather than opponents of the state (Naciri, 2014). When a maximalist resistance campaign was initiated in Morocco in 2011 by a broad coalition of organizations, the February 20th Front, none of the formal feminist organizations were formally part of the coalition (Salime, 2012). One source describes that "among February 20th activists, there is a real feeling of betrayal by the leadership of feminist organizations" (Salime, 2012, p. 104).

In summary, the decision to stay away from or participate in resistance campaigns can be viewed as a strategic choice based on a cost-benefit analysis from the point of view of the women's movement. The movement makes the best choice between two options, neither of which are necessarily optimal. As such, I am not arguing that regimes can easily buy the support of women, or that the women's movement uncritically endorses authoritarian rulers as long as they provide them with small concessions. This would be to reduce women's rights proponents to naïve supporters of non-democratic regimes. Rather, it is a strategic choice for women's rights organizations. But what does it take for women's rights organizations to side with the regime? Rather than being about the absolute level of women's empowerment, it might concern the relative level—improvements in female empowerment. If women's empowerment is increasing, it is indicative of a willingness by the regime to accommodate women, and it is also a token of the achievements of women's rights organizations.

In a state like Tunisia in 2011, women needed only look to adjacent countries to know that their rights and political representation were better than that of their female neighbors (Charrad and Zarrugh, 2014). Women's political power in Tunisia was steadily increasing (the share of women in parliament had reached 28 % in 2010) and president since 1987, Ben Ali, initiated a "wave of reforms" in gender legislation (Charrad, 2007, p. 1522). Women's rights organizations were vocal and active in these

efforts. In the words of Charrad (2007, p. 1522): "This was a period when women's rights advocates made their voices heard". In the resistance campaign that was sparked in 2010 by a street vendor setting himself on fire—and which ignited protests across the Arab world—female participation was extensive (Khalil, 2014). However, the data used in this article show that only one formal women's rights organization participated. This suggests that while women in general took to the streets, women's rights organizations were more hesitant about supporting the campaign, and most of them abstained from participating. Judging from available indicators this pattern cannot be explained by women's rights organizations being suppressed.[6]

To sum up, from the point of view of women's rights organizations, staying on the sidelines of a resistance campaign can be a rational choice, given a cost-benefit analysis. In a context where the regime has made progress toward improved women's rights and is willing to accommodate the demands of women's rights organizations, I expect lower rates of participation.[7] It does not mean that women's rights organizations do not have grievances vis-à-vis the current regime, but they might be more skeptical toward an uncertain future. This leads to the first hypothesis:

H1: In countries with recent positive change in women's rights, the likelihood that women's rights organizations will participate in resistance campaigns is lower.

5.2.2 The organizational composition of resistance campaigns

The choice for women's rights organizations to participate in resistance campaigns is also likely shaped by the composition of the other organizations in dissent. Organizations in resistance are overall male-dominated, as shown by Bakken (2021b), who finds that only a fourth of organizations in dissent are inclusive of women. However, there might be variations in the degree of patriarchy and differing organizational views on women and gender relations. On the one hand, we have what we can call patriarchal organizations—these are organizations that do not include women/have very few women members. They thus have a clear male bias, but they are not necessarily in favor of gender exclusion or the subordination of women. Trade unions are an example of organizations that we could describe as patriarchal. Such organizations could also be leftist organizations. On the other hand, we have organizations that explicitly reject a liberal

[6] For example when looking at data sources like V-Dem, which captures women's political empowerment, and the number of women's international NGOs.

[7] The argument is simplified, and there is likely variation among women's rights organizations as to whether they support or oppose the regime. But overall, I expect a negative effect.

agenda or that have goals related to a conservative or traditional view of society, including gender relations. These organizations might have a highly conservative outlook, but nonetheless include women (for example Ennahda in Tunisia). They might be for example Islamist organizations or right-wing groups. They often have a women's wing, but their goals are nonetheless conservative in terms of women's place in society.

When the resistance campaign is dominated by organizations that are patriarchal or conservative, it likely deters women's participation, as these organizations will influence the goals of the campaign, and they will have leverage in decision-making during the campaign and in the aftermath. Women's rights organizations and conservative organizations may have diametrically opposed goals, making it harder for women's rights organizations to be heard, and thus increasing the likelihood that they will favor the status quo. At the same time, one could argue that this should make women's rights organizations more likely to participate, as their absence gives them very little possibility to influence the campaign. But if women's rights organizations know that their demands will not be heard, which is quite likely if conservative organizations are dominant, they might think it safer to stick with the regime.

In Nigeria in May 2007, there were protests and strikes against electoral fraud, which mobilized, according to the ARC data, at least 26 formal organizations. Six of the organizations were patriarchal organizations, i.e. they had no women represented. Three women's organizations were also named participants: the Federation of Muslim Women's Associations of Nigeria, Women for a Representative National Congress, and the International Federation of Women Lawyers Nigeria. The strong presence of women's organizations in 2007 stands in contrast to protests in the same country in 2004, which were also against electoral fraud. In 2004, not a single women's rights organization was registered, but the number of patriarchal organizations was 17, out of a total of 32 organizations.

In the resistance campaign in Tunisia in 2010-2011, one of the dominant actors was the trade union, UGTT. The UGTT is described as patriarchal, particularly in its leadership: "A key paradox of UGTT has been its support of women's causes but without promoting many women at all to its leadership" (Omri, 2013), and that "despite the presence of women in all decision-making positions in the union, and in the National Council, or as members of the Administrative Authority, they are absent from the Executive Office" (Arab-Trade-Union-Confederation, 2016). In addition, the campaign came to be dominated by the Islamist party Ennahda, which may help explain why so few formal women's organizations participated. Even if the party had women

represented at all levels of the organization (Khalil, 2014), its Islamist view on women made the secular women's organizations cautious about what a regime dominated by Ennahda might entail (Charrad and Zarrugh, 2014).[8] After the revolution was a fact, and the new regime took shape during the summer of 2012, several women's rights organizations engaged in protests: "Large-scale demonstrations were promptly organised with as many as 6000 women in attendance at a demonstration in the capital city of Tunis on 13 August 2012 (...) Women in attendance were either unaffiliated with any organisation or identified with organisations such as the Democratic Women's Association, La Ligue Tunisienne des Droits de l'Homme (LTDH), and Association des Femmes Tunisiennes pour la Recherche sur le Développement (AFTURD)" (Charrad and Zarrugh, 2014, p. 236).

In Algeria, the Wasilla network, an organization bringing together women's rights organizations, took part in the protests against President Bouteflika, who announced in 2019 that he would seek a fifth term as president. However, co-operating with the other organizations in the campaign became so difficult that they withdrew from a national conference. Some of the other actors—including not only Islamist organizations, but also trade unions—were opposed to gender equality as a principle in the united statement (Chenaoui, 2019), a principle that was non-negotiable for the women's groups (Ouitis, 2019). Although women's rights organizations were initially part of the campaign, the case still illustrates the constant tension between women's rights organizations and other organizations that either oppose gender equality or do not care about women.

In sum, when patriarchal or conservative actors dominate the resistance campaign, the success of a resistance movement might be viewed as more unfavorable by women's rights organizations than the continuation of the current regime. Moreover, the difficulty in collaborating with organizations having conservative goals, or being indifferent to women's demands, likely decreases the participation of women's rights organizations. This leads me to formulate the second hypothesis:

H2: When the resistance campaign is dominated by patriarchal or conservative organizations, it is less likely that women's rights organizations participate.

[8] To what extent Ennahda was for or against a liberal vision of gender equality is debated (Khalil, 2014). In the end, the interim government, in which Ennahda formed the biggest group, initiated several gender equality reforms, but sources argue that this was helped by women's rights organizations' efforts to influence the new regime after the revolution was a fact, including by taking to the streets and protesting (ibid).

5.3 Empirical strategy

I analyze a country-year dataset covering African countries between 1990 and 2015. I exclude years where there was no active resistance episode, and years where only rebel groups are observed in dissent. This means that I am only analyzing country-years of nonviolent maximalist dissent and estimating the likelihood that a women's organization was participating or not. The reason for not including a full panel is that I want to compare cases of women's organizations' participation with cases of women's organizations' non-participation, but I am not interested in their non-participation in years where there was no dissent taking place at all (or where only rebel groups were dissenting). This is an effective way of ensuring that I am not comparing oppressive states that have eradicated civil society, with semi-democratic regimes where there is at least some opportunity structure for mobilization.[9]

Dependent variable

I use the Anatomy of Resistance Campaigns (ARC) and the ARC-Women dataset to identify the participation of women's organizations in maximalist resistance (Butcher et al., 2022; Bakken, 2021b). The ARC dataset maps all identifiable and named organizations that made maximalist claims during protest events in Africa in the period 1990-2015, and ARC-Women provide information on the inclusion of women at different levels of these organizations. I define organizations as women's rights organizations if they 1) have goals or ideology related to women's rights (broadly defined) and 2) have a woman as leader. It seems reasonable to assume that organizations that both have explicit goals related to women, and have women as their highest leader, make women's rights a primary objective. Moreover, selecting organizations on these criteria is a way of making sure that I am not picking up organizations that have women's rights as one of many different priorities, or organizations that have women included mainly as a means of window-dressing. For example, an organization like the Islamist party, Ennahda, states that it is in favor of gender equality, and has women represented at the highest level of organization. It still should not be counted as a women's rights

[9] This implies that I assume that a women's rights organization cannot trigger the onset of dissent. This might be unreasonable, but apart from the case of Kenya, mentioned briefly in the introduction, there are not many examples where a women's rights organization sparked an episode of maximalist dissent as defined here.

organization, however, because that is not a primary objective of the organization, and it does not have a female leader.

Combined, this results in a list of 74 organizations, making women's rights organizations a rare phenomenon among organizations in dissent in Africa 1990-2015. Examples of women's rights organizations include *COFEM: Collective of Women of Mali*, a CSO made up of women working for the emancipation of women and ending gender discrimination in Mali, active in resistance in 2011 and 2012. Another example is *Women in Nigeria*, active in the period 1992-1994, a CSO described as a feminist movement aiming to "organize and improve the condition of Nigerian women in all areas" (Agbakoba et al., 1994).

For the empirical analysis, I collapse the organization data to a country-year format and construct a dummy variable taking the value 1 when a women's organization was observed, and otherwise 0. An alternative would be to use a count variable measuring the number of women's rights organizations participation in each country-year, but there is too little variation in the data. Another alternative is to use the share of women's organizations observed in that country-year, but here also the variation is so small that this often ends up as a number close to zero. Instead I control for the total number of organizations in the regression models. Of the country-years included in the analysis, around 12 percent involve one or more women's rights organization(s).

Independent variables

To test how changes in indicators measuring female empowerment and women's rights impact the participation of women's rights organizations, I rely on two indicators. First, the women's political empowerment index, available in the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 2019a). Here, political empowerment is defined as "a process of increasing capacity for women, leading to greater choice, agency, and participation in societal decision-making. It is understood to incorporate three equally-weighted dimensions: fundamental civil liberties, women's open discussion of political issues and participation in civil society organizations, and the descriptive representation of women in formal political positions". It is difficult to estimate how long after women's rights were improved we should expect to see an effect on mobilization. I therefore construct a set of moving averages measuring the average improvement over the past three, five, and ten years.

To test the hypothesis that women's rights organizations are less likely to participate when patriarchal and conservative organizations dominate the resistance move-

ment, I again rely on the ARC data (Butcher et al., 2022), and ARC-Women (Bakken, 2021b). First, to capture patriarchal organizations I use a variable from ARC-Women that measures the extent to which women are represented at different levels of an organization. I define patriarchal organizations as those that have no women represented at any level of the organization. Of all the 2406 observations in ARC (rebel groups are excluded from this count), almost 45 percent are patriarchal organizations. No particular organization type accounts for a higher share of the patriarchal organizations—it is a feature across organization types—but interestingly, religious organizations have the lowest share of patriarchal organizations. This might be because many of the religious, and particularly Christian organizations, in Africa are dominated by women, at least on the grassroots level.

Second, to capture conservative organizations I use information about organizational goals from ARC and match a text string of words associated with a more conservative and patriarchal agenda.[10] 133 observations are counted as conservative, and political parties account for more than 80 percent of these. Of the conservative organizations, 55 percent of the organizations are also patriarchal, not surprising given the overlap with ideology/goals. It is therefore important to control for conservative organizations when estimating the effect of patriarchal organizations on the participation of women's rights organizations, because the fact that they are conservative should make them more likely to exclude women. However, I do not think that organizations are conservative because they are patriarchal, i.e. conservative ideology shapes the patriarchal nature, but not vice versa. When estimating the effect of conservative organizations, I therefore do not control for patriarchal organizations.[11]

I summarize the total number of patriarchal and conservative organizations in a country-year. This should capture the dominance of these organizations in absolute numbers. I also test alternative measures, like the share, in robustness tests.

Finally, I include a set of control variables. An alternative mechanism that can explain why there are few women's rights organizations might be that there are very few women's organizations overall, or that they consider it too dangerous and high-risk to participate. Some regimes keep women's activists in place with repression instead of aiming to secure their support by the extension of rights. This mechanism cannot

[10] The words I match to code organizations as conservative are fundamentalist, conservative, reactionary, salafi, sharia, traditional, ultra-rightwing, islamist.

[11] Patriarchal organizations could absorb the effect of conservative organizations, simply because there are so many more patriarchal organizations than conservative ones, and there is relatively high correlation between the two.

be tested directly with the current data, but I control for the stock of women's rights organizations by including the measure of women's international non-governmental organizations (WINGOs) (Hughes et al., 2018). WINGOs are defined as "organizations with women as the primary or named membership, and/or that focus on serving women and/or girls". As such, they only represent a subset of women's rights organizations, but can nonetheless serve as a proxy for the stock of women's organizations, assuming that countries with a high number of WINGOs also have a high number of women's organizations.

The possibility of 'band-wagoning' also cannot be ruled out. During times of resistance, there might be uncertainty about the current regime's ability to fulfill promises and the opposition's ability to win. If the regime shows weakness the possibility of an opposition victory is higher. Hence, the women's movement must choose between staying on the side of the regime or going out and supporting the opposition movement, and it may hedge depending on how it expects the outcome of the movement to play out. The possibility that women's rights organizations speculate and make their move according to which side is most likely to win is a complicating factor that is hard to separate with the current analysis, but I include a control for the total number of organizations active in dissent in a given year to account for the size of the campaign, making it more likely that women's rights organizations are among the participants.[12] The total number of organizations is highly correlated with the number of patriarchal organizations. This is because patriarchal organizations account for such a large proportion of all organizations. But without the control for the total number of organizations, it is likely that the number of patriarchal organizations is positively associated with the number of women's rights organizations, and this would be a spurious relationship if the total number of organizations were not included.

Next, I control for media coverage as captured by hits in the news database Factiva, the log of GDP per capita, and the the log of population. All three variables are lagged by one year. Media coverage is included to account for the fact that some countries get more news coverage than others, which might influence the number of organizations and resistance campaigns we observe. National income is associated with an increased likelihood of the onset of dissent, and the size of the population should influence the likelihood that resistance occurs in the first place. Finally, I also include a variable

[12] This might introduce post-treatment bias because the women's rights organizations might mobilize extra organizations.

measuring the year to capture a linear time trend, as it might be that the participation of women's rights organizations becomes more likely over time.

Summary statistics for all variables (and some additional variables used in robustness tests) are shown in Table A.52.

Estimator

As the outcome variable is binary, I use logistic regression. The model estimates the likelihood that women's rights organizations are present (value=1) in country-years of nonviolent maximalist dissent. An alternative set-up is to look at the share of women's rights organizations in dissent by dividing the number of women's rights organizations in dissent by the total number of organizations, but because the number of women's rights organizations as a whole is very low, there is little variation on this variable. The same goes for the alternative of using the count of women's rights organizations: most countries with positive values range between 1 and 3, so here again there is little variation. Also, given the possibility that some women's rights organizations are not picked up by the data, the count of women's rights organizations might be somewhat inaccurate, which also makes it more appropriate to use a binary variable. Where the ARC data registers zero women's rights organizations, the number of women's rights organizations is probably very small. Where the ARC data picks up at least one women's organization, women's rights organizations must have had a more visible role. As such, there should be a substantive difference between a 0 and a 1 on the dependent variable.

5.4 Results

In Model 1-3, I estimate the effect of relative rights on the probability of the participation of women's rights organizations in nonviolent resistance against the state. The coefficients measuring change in women's political empowerment, when measured as 3-, 5-, and 10-year moving intervals, are all consistently positive, contrary to expectations. Rather than relative empowerment reducing the likelihood that a women's rights organization participates, it is increasing that likelihood, and we cannot therefore confirm Hypothesis 1. However, none of these associations are statistically significant, making it difficult to conclude that the opposite is the case either.

In Model 4, the effect of organizations with a conservative ideology is tested. The coefficient is negative and statistically significant and shows that the higher the num-

Table 5.1. Determinants of women's rights organizations in resistance

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
3-year change in emp.	0.38					
	(0.63)					
5-year change in emp.		0.31				
		(0.96)				
10-year change in emp.			1.30			
			(1.58)			
No. conservative orgs.					-0.04^{**}	-0.02
					(0.01)	(0.01)
No. patriarchal orgs.				-0.04^{***}		-0.04^{***}
				(0.01)		(0.01)
No. orgs total	0.02^{***}	0.02^{***}	0.02^{***}	0.04^{***}	0.02^{***}	0.04^{***}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
WINGO (t-1)	0.01^{***}	0.01^{***}	0.01^{***}	0.00^{*}	0.00^{***}	0.00^{*}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
News coverage (t-1)	-0.00^{***}	-0.00^{***}	-0.00^{**}	-0.00^{*}	-0.00^{*}	-0.00^{*}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Log GDP per capita (t-1)	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Log of population (t-1)	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Year	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
AIC	85.47	85.73	80.85	42.93	78.13	42.79
BIC	120.69	120.95	116.05	78.15	113.35	81.93
Log Likelihood	-33.74	-33.87	-31.43	-12.46	-30.06	-11.40
Deviance	26.00	26.02	25.62	23.17	25.49	23.04
Num. obs.	370	370	369	370	370	370

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

ber of conservative organizations in resistance, the lower the likelihood that a women's rights organizations take part in the resistance campaign. In Model 5, the effect of patriarchal organizations is tested. Also here, the coefficient is negative and statistically significant, meaning that the more male-exclusive organizations there are in the resistance campaign, the lower the probability that any women's rights organizations participate. Because conservative organizations should on average be patriarchal, I also control for the presence of conservative organizations to see if the relationship holds. The results are shown in Model 6, where the effect of patriarchal organizations is still negative and significant.[13] The effect of conservative and patriarchal organizations on the probability that women's rights organizations participate is therefore in line with hypothesis 2; both organizational features are associated with a reduced likelihood that we see women's rights organizations joining campaigns against the state. The relationship holds when controlling for the total number of organizations in dissent, and the stock of women's organizations as measured by WINGOs.

Turning briefly to the control variables in the models, we see that the more organizations participate in general, the higher the likelihood that at least one women's rights organization is involved. The number of WINGOs is positively associated with the number of women's rights organizations in resistance. News coverage has a negative sign, which is not what we would expect, but the coefficient is close to zero. GDP per capita, population and year, have no particular influence on the probability of women's rights organizations taking part in resistance campaigns; none of the coefficients are statistically significant.

In summary, the analysis finds no support for the hypothesis that improvements in women's rights reduce the probability that women's rights organizations participate in episodes of anti-regime resistance. The coefficients rather suggest that more rights means more mobilization by women's rights organizations, but no conclusion can be drawn on an opposite direction of the relationship—that participation becomes more likely—because the estimates are not statistically significant. I do find evidence in favor of the second hypothesis that the higher the number of patriarchal and conservative organizations in resistance, the lower the likelihood that women's rights organizations take part in the resistance campaign.

[13] Notice that when both conservative and patriarchal organizations are included, the patriarchal organizations absorb some of the effect of conservative ideology, meaning that the estimate is no longer significant. But as mentioned in the methods section, the effect of conservative ideology is more correctly estimated in Model 5, because being conservative is not caused by organizations being patriarchal—it is more probable that conservative organizations cause there to be more patriarchal organizations.

Next, I explore additional patterns in the data material and test the robustness of the main results.

5.5 Robustness tests

Firstly, I test alternative samples. A first robustness test related to the sample is to investigate if the effects hold when excluding years of low activity; some years are registered as having a nonviolent resistance campaigns but there is only one organization engaged in resistance. These are therefore not years of large-scale resistance, rather some dissident organization (e.g. the Muslim Brotherhood) is in opposition to the state, but there is no episode of contention with diverse participation. I therefore exclude these years and estimate the effects on the sample (N=238). The results are displayed in Table A.54, and show largely the same results as in the main models, including a negative and significant relationship between women's rights organizations and conservative/patriarchal organizations.

Secondly, one concern is that the data do not record the entirety of women's rights organizations.[14] However, the data should have relatively good coverage of all organizations that participated in *fronts*, i.e. networks of pre-existing organizations that are created for the purpose of waging dissent. The coding of constituent organizations of fronts is based not only on news wires but on extensive additional searches (Butcher et al., 2022). We can therefore assume that for fronts, the absence of a women's rights organization is likely a true negative—not a function of missing data. As a complementary analysis, I therefore zoom in on fronts specifically, and test whether we see the same patterns here as in the main analysis. To make sure that I only capture fronts of a certain size and not small-scale alliances I include fronts with more than five constituent organizations.[15] The results from the analysis of fronts are displayed in A.55. Here, the number of patriarchal or conservative organizations is still negatively associated with women's rights organizations but the estimates are not statistically significant. This could be explained by the fact that the number of observations is much lower, but it could also indicate that something is different about fronts. Perhaps fronts are more likely to create bridges across ideological divides, and represent moments where 'nor-

[14] As the data is quite dependent on information from the media, it might be that women's rights organizations have been ignored or not picked up. It is hard to quantify the magnitude of this problem, but it could have influenced the analysis, especially if news media is systematically more likely to ignore women's rights organizations than other organization types.

[15] The share of fronts with at least one women's rights organization is 20 percent (N=129).

mal' divisions become less accentuated. However, the analysis gives no clear results in the opposite direction either, making it hard to be sure.

I furthermore test alternative specifications of the dominance of conservative/patriarchal organizations. While the absolute number of organizations with such characteristics is one way to measure dominance, another way would be to divide the absolute number by the total number of organizations. I test this in alternative models, and the results are shown in Table A.57. In these models, the share is negatively associated with women's rights organizations but not statistically significant at the 5 percent level. This might indicate that dominance is more about absolute dominance than share—resistance campaigns with many patriarchal organizations are less attractive to women's rights organizations than resistance campaigns made up of fewer, but *in relative terms* many, patriarchal organizations.

There was no clear effect of relative rights on the likelihood of seeing women's organizations participate in anti-regime dissent, but it might be that both relative rights and the presence of patriarchal or conservative organizations make it more likely that women's rights organizations abstain from participation. I test interaction terms between these two variables, and the results presented in Table A.56. There does not seem to be any clear interaction effects; none of the interaction terms are statistically significant. The association between the relative level of women's rights and the participation of women's rights organizations is thus still inconclusive.

Finally, I include a set of alternative control variables to test the robustness of the findings in the main models. Firstly, it has been shown that armed conflicts might spur women's mobilization, for example in the context of peace activism (Fuest, 2008), or after sexual violence (Kreft, 2018). I therefore test if the results remain when including a variable measuring whether the country had a major civil conflict in year t-1. In Table A.58, the effect of major conflict is shown—its impact on the mobilization of women's rights organizations is positive and statistically significant. When civil war is included in the models, the effect of organizations with conservative ideology disappears, but the negative relationship between patriarchal organizations and female participation holds. I furthermore test the inclusion of religious demographics, more specifically the share of the population that adheres to Islam, and the share of the population that belongs to Catholicism. High numbers here could both increase the likelihood that more conservative organizations mobilize, and have a negative effect on women's mobilization. The effect, shown in Table A.59, demonstrates that the main effect holds when con-

trolling for religious demographics. The variables measuring the dominance of Islam or Catholicism have a negative sign but the effects are not statistically significant.

5.6 Discussion

From the quantitative analysis, I find support for the idea that the presence of patriarchal organizations, and the number of conservative organizations, depresses the participation of women's rights organizations. As theorized, conservative organizations have goals that often conflict with the goals of women's' rights organizations, while patriarchal organizations are likely indifferent to women's demands. This makes it more likely that women's rights organizations side with the regime, or at least sit on the sidelines, rather than go with the opposition.

However, an alternative explanation is that the conservative and patriarchal organizations actively block the participation of women's movements. The negative relationship may be a consequence of women's rights organizations not being invited to join the movement. Moreover, if the regime has improved women's rights after the lobbying and work of women's rights organizations, it might make women's organizations unpopular among reactionary forces dedicated to toppling the regime, if these actors prefer a classical patriarchal society. The alternative explanation that women's rights organizations are blocked by the conservative organizations is hard to test and separate from the choice made by women's rights organizations. Most likely, these two explanations are both important and often present at the same time, and further looking into these mechanisms would be interesting to explore in future work.

The analysis could not establish any precise relationship between changes in women's rights, and the participation of women's rights organizations in resistance campaigns. The lack of findings might be explained by the fact that women's rights organizations, even if they share some common ground, are still heterogeneous when it comes to goals, strategies and organization. Attempts at co-optation might therefore have different effects on different women's rights organizations: Some women's rights organizations might have goals that are met by the regime's concessions while others might hold explicit anti-regime stances even if the regime expands women's rights in some domains. Importantly, we must remember that gains in women's rights cannot be reduced to a consequence of top-down approaches; they are also a result of continuous work by women's rights organizations and (mostly) female political entrepreneurs, and we should probably expect a stronger effect for the organizations that have direct ex-

perience of working with the regime to improve gender rights. Moreover, it is an open question as to which dimensions of empowerment or rights that women's rights organizations would be most concerned with. It could be that many of them care more about practical livelihood rights, or access to health care—dimensions that have been dubbed "practical gender rights" in the literature (Molyneux, 1985). With better data on some of these more practical dimensions of empowerment, we could test whether different types of rights induce women's rights organizations to opt for dissent or stick with the status quo. Moreover, the available time-series indicators on women's rights are highly aggregated and not well-equipped for capturing small, but symbolic, gains for women's rights organizations.

Furthermore, when states try to use co-optation or enact women-friendly legislation, they often target specific groups of women. It is not known which groups of women are the main beneficiaries of such policies. Some argue that in the Middle East women's rights organizations are mostly driven by urban, highly educated middle class women (see for example Arenfeldt and Golley, 2012). Also, some women's rights organizations have direct relations with the regime, but this probably does not apply to all. Unfortunately there is no cross-national data on the direct ties between the regime and the women's movement.[16]

One of the insights of the paper is that women's rights organizations, as defined here, are a relatively rare phenomenon. While I advance some explanations, there are many other factors that could be explored in future work.

One of the alternative explanations for the low number of women's rights organizations in dissent might be that the risk of opposing the regime publicly is too high. Going back to the Tunisia example, we know that most women's rights organizations did not endorse the campaign against Ben Ali. But could they? In the words of Charrad and Zarrugh (2014, p. 233), "given the authoritarian regime in place until its collapse in 2011, state control applied to women's associations as it did to others". However, this did not prevent some of the other organizations, also under the influence of the regime, openly confronting it. This goes, for example, for one of the trade unions central in the campaign, the UGTT. It was also under significant pressure and state influence; according to sources it had strong ties to the existing government in the years before

[16] V-Dem has a variable called "regime support groups" but this variable does not mention women, unfortunately. The data offered by Donno and Kreft on state-sponsored women's wings only cover party-based authoritarian regimes, not monarchies or personalist regimes. Htun and Weldon's data on the autonomy of women's movements only cover a sample of countries, and a mere handful of African ones.

the revolution (Netterstrøm, 2016), and the leadership and union membership was split in their view toward the regime. Nevertheless the UGTT ended up opposing Ben Ali. As such, the argument that the women's organizations could not have turned against the regime does not hold.

Another potential explanation for the low number of women's rights organizations in dissent is data bias, as there might be under-reporting of women's organizations in the media. Also, it could be that women's rights organizations are more informally structured than other organizations, and this makes it harder to detect their participation.

Could it be that more women's rights organizations form after protest? It might be that resistance campaigns solve collective action problems. When coming together for a joint political cause, women might also become more conscious about their gendered position. Tripp (2016a) argues that women's movements have developed in the context of armed conflicts: "autonomous women's movements emerged either as part of peace movements during the war or in the aftermath of conflict ... These movements had new priorities, new leaders, and new sources of funding independent of state patronage networks, which older women's organizations had depended on to a greater extent" (p. 82). Could this be the case also for women's movements experiencing large-scale nonviolent resistance campaigns, where the experience snowballs into a more organized and vibrant women's movement? In that case, we could expect women's rights organizations' activism to be higher after campaigns. Sudan might be an example of this dynamic. Not a single women's rights organization shows up in the data during the resistance campaign in 2011. While the data only cover years up until 2015, news reports and accounts of the resistance campaign in 2018-2019 suggest high participation by women's organizations, and an organized network for women's rights seems to have formed during the campaign in response to the gender-unequal distribution of the transitional council (al Nagar and Tønnessen, 2021). Testing this systematically would require more detailed data on women's rights organizations, perhaps tracking a set of countries over time, before, during, and after dissent (or non-dissent).

Finally, what might be the consequences of the low rates of participation by women's rights organizations? For example in Tunisia, where few women's rights organizations participated, women ended up being poorly represented in the transitional government that followed the resistance campaign's ousting of Ben Ali's regime (Khalil, 2014, p. 194). Marks and Chenoweth (2021) find that the aftermath of resistance campaigns is associated with a deterioration rather than an improvement in female em-

powerment. It might be that even if women participate informally—by taking to the streets and demanding change—they need organizational resources to truly be able to influence the campaign and the arrangements of a potential new regime. Moreover, how does the absence or presence of women's organizations influence the dynamics and outcome of the movement, if at all? This paper does not seek to answer that question, but several authors highlight women's organizations as important for the practice of democracy: As put by Moghadam (2013, p. 396): "Women's organizing tends to be inclusive, and women's movement activism often involves the explicit practice of democracy ... women's rights or feminist movements (...) often practice democracy internally as well as ally themselves with other democratic movements, organizations, or parties". It seems clear that a resistance campaign without women's rights organizations misses the opportunity to mobilize women, and male-dominated campaigns might end up being less successful.

5.7 Conclusion

This paper zooms in on one of the more neglected actors in studies of nonviolent resistance; formal women's organizations. Using new data on organizations in dissent in Africa in 1990 to 2015, the paper shows that the participation of formal organizations representing the women's movement is quite rare. This is puzzling, and it cannot be explained solely by a lack of opportunity or of resources. Some states have a vibrant women's movement and we still do not observe a high number of women's rights organizations in resistance campaigns in these countries.

Building on existing studies on women's rights in semi-democracies, and theorizing around the strategic interest of women's rights organizations, this paper has developed mechanisms that explain the variation in the participation of women's organizations. The results are in part inconclusive. The quantitative analysis finds little support for the hypothesis that improvements in women's rights influence the likelihood that women's rights organizations mobilize against the state. The clearest result was the finding that the presence of patriarchal organizations significantly reduces the likelihood that women's rights organizations will participate.

Future research should continue to disentangle how women's organizations navigate between the regime and the opposition, between autonomy and alliance-building, and which incentives they have for supporting or opposing the regime. With more data, it would be possible to test some of the hypotheses formulated here more directly. It is hard

to make inferences based on observational data that only covers those that participated, but with data on the organizations that did not participate, it would be possible to analyze how the characteristics of the non-participants influenced their decision to stay away from anti-regime protests. Moreover, qualitative in-depth comparative studies might also bring a clearer picture of the mechanisms at play. In conclusion, this paper shows the variation in women's organizations strategies, and the choice they face when, on the one hand, they aim to achieve specific goals vis-à-vis the regime, and at the same time encounter resistance movements that are sometimes more conservative than the incumbent regime.

Many of the resistance movements we have seen in Africa—both anti-colonial struggles and later democratization movements—have capitalized on the support and participation of women. However, women's own demands have often been sidelined or ignored in favor of the bigger cause, and these movements have therefore not always resulted in substantive change for women (Marks and Chenoweth, 2021). The paper shows that in times of upheaval, women's rights organizations might find it difficult to have a voice and get leverage in the resistance campaign. This is problematic as it makes women's voices and demands less likely to be heard among the main opposition groups driving the campaign. Would it then be better for women's rights organizations to participate even when faced with a campaign dominated by organizations that are not aligned with their goals? The paper suggests that women's rights organizations find themselves caught on the horns of a dilemma, i.e. between patrons and patriarchs: On the one hand, there is a regime or 'patron' that to a certain degree accommodates women, but might still be intolerable to women from the viewpoint of being citizens. On the other hand, there are organizations with revolutionary goals and seemingly democratic aspirations, but that might be patriarchal and have conservative or antiegalitarian goals. This question requires further scrutiny and more in-depth analysis.

Chapter 6

Paper V. Gendered backlash? Sexualized state repression and women's protest

Abstract

How does repression impact dissent? Studies addressing this question show mixed results. In this paper, we inquire as to whether state behavior as well as the citizens' specific assessments of the appropriateness of particular repressive repertoires matter for when we should expect dissent to occur, and who the protagonists are. Specifically, to better account for the group-specific nature of contention, we disaggregate the repression-dissent nexus by focusing on a selective form of repression referred to as *sexualized state repression (SSR)*, and disaggregate dissent by focusing on gender-based nonviolent protest. We propose that women in particular view SSR as an illegitimate and unjustifiable form of government behavior that is threatening to their physical integrity. In the wake of SSR, we expect that women would be led to engage in some form of dissent — either specifically directed against the state or more general protest. However, using a new dataset on SSR and existing data on protest events, we find limited support for the backlash hypothesis, both in terms of general protests and women's protest. The inconclusive results point to a need for a more temporally disaggregated analysis in order to more thoroughly investigate the dynamics of SSR and dissent. Although the hypotheses could not be confirmed, this study contributes a theoretical framework for understanding repression and women's protest, being the first study to systematically evaluate the consequences of sexualized state repression on protests.

This paper is co-authored with Ragnhild Nordås.

6.1 Introduction

Despite the existence of a large and growing literature on state repression, the findings on whether this behavior quells dissent or spurs more anti-state activity remain mixed between positive, negative and null effects. While scholars have explored a variety of different approaches, part of the explanation for these divergent findings could be the level of aggregation. Scholars of repression have started to recognize that different temporal and spatial units may be relevant, but have yet to resolve the problem (Zhukov et al., 2019). The present paper addresses the potential problem of over-aggregation from a different angle, by asking whether *particular forms of repression might have differential effects on different demographics, which in turn influences the particular forms dissent takes.*

Within this paper we consider the consequence of state-perpetrated sexual violence and sexual harassment, which we term "sexualized state repression" (SSR). This includes rape, forced prostitution, and sexual torture; as well as sexual harassment and sexual humiliation. These are an important but generally overlooked part of the repressive repertoire employed by political authorities. The new SSR data, based on human rights reports, reveal a wide range of forms of violations against various targets.[1] For example, women considering running for office have been harassed, intimidated and threatened with rape.[2] Members of high level security forces have been reported to publicly rape and sexually assault with weapons women associated with opposition groups.[3] Women engaged in activism have been subjected to repeated "virginity tests", amounting to torture or other ill-treatment, and women and girls taken into custody have been stripped of their clothes, photographed in pornographic positions, and sexually humiliated.[4] More recently, reports have come out that show how these types of violence and harassment continue. For example, the United Nations has received reports of sexual abuse against detained demonstrators in relation to the anti-coup protests in Myanmar,[5] and during the mass demonstrations in Hong Kong women were reportedly

[1] Reporting on sexual violence will never be a true reflection of the actual prevalence of the problem, as both under- and overreporting is likely for a variety of reasons. For more discussion of challenges in measuring sexual violence in general and also specifically in war contexts, see Cohen and Nordås (2014); Cohen (2016). However, in the current analysis we are primarily interested in what is reported and what people are therefore made aware of.

[2] For example, this was reported in Kenya in 2007.

[3] This was reported from Guinea in 2009.

[4] Reported i.a. in Sudan in 2012 and other years.

[5] https://asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/news-and-events/stories/2021/03/statement-on-myanmar-by-phumzile-mlambo-ngcuka

abused by police with rape and other forms of sexual violence and harassment. The instances of sexual abuse have subsequently been highlighted by female protesters on the banners that lay out the grievances and demands they are protesting about. Likewise, feminists in Mexico explicitly staged protests in 2021 against sexual violence by the state security apparatus and police against peaceful women demonstrators.[6]

SSR matters because we expect that illegitimate, unjustifiable and excessive state behavior will invite counter-mobilization and protest from the citizenry.[7] We also consider SSR to be one of the clearest examples of what will typically be considered illegitimate, unjustifiable, and excessive state behavior. Although both men and women can find sexual violence unjustifiable and wrong, sexual violence and sexual harassment disproportionately affects women.[8] The problem of SSR is therefore probably a more apparent threat to women, and we therefore anticipate that women will most likely be mobilized to take action in its wake.[9] We assess whether there is a mobilizing effect of SSR, and whether the response is gendered, by separating between protest overall and women's protest specifically.

Although we have some anecdotal evidence that SSR can trigger a backlash in the form of protest, we use new global data on SSR to test whether we find a more general connection between levels of SSR and protest.[10] The empirical analysis finds limited support for our proposition that state-sponsored sexualized repression is associated with more protest being enacted, either by women or men. The inconclusive results from the statistical analyses may suggest that the effect of SSR is nulled out in the aggregate because SSR has both a mobilizing and a deterrence effect—often referred to as a fear

[6] https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/03/mexico-autoridades-usaron-violencia-sexual-para-silenciar-mujeres/

[7] Some recent studies of sexual violence in war have also shown that experiencing or hearing about sexual violence can trigger emboldening emotions such as anger and moral outrage (Kreft, 2018), which could be a reaction to the illegitimate nature of these behaviors. These emotions could also cement and/or strengthen counter-mobilization.

[8] In the data on reported incidences of SSR we use in this paper, women constitute about 80 percent of the victims.

[9] Scholars and activists have recently started to draw attention to the problem of sexual violence against men in wartime. While this problem is more prevalent than was previously assumed (Sivakumaran, 2007; Schulz, 2020; Traunmüller et al., 2019), it is still a minority of the reported cases, and the problem of sexual violence directed against men is not widely understood or known by the public.

[10] For the time being, the data does not allow for a temporally disaggregated design and a study of the effects of changes in SSR. We determine the association between SSR and three outcomes: (i) antigovernment protests (ii) women's protests , and (iii) women's antigovernment protests, in the period 1991-2012. Women's protests are defined as protest events where women were the main organizers or where issue articulation was related to gender or women's issues (Murdie and Peksen, 2015), and women's antigovernment protests are a subset of women's protests where the state is explicitly targeted.

vs. anger response in the literature. It might also be that the country-year analysis is too highly aggregated, and does not capture the temporal dynamics of repression and dissent. This calls for more nuanced analyses of the effects of SSR and further tests of the theoretical arguments presented in this paper.

In the next section, we situate the current study within the broader literature of the repression–dissent nexus, and then present our theoretical argument as well as hypotheses on SSR and protest. Then, we present the data used to test our hypotheses. Third, we present our empirical findings, a set of robustness checks and alternative specifications, and discuss the wider implications of the findings. Finally we end with suggestions for how the specific arguments tested here and the approach regarding disaggregation of repression and dissent could be further investigated in the future.

6.2 The repression-dissent nexus

Within the now extensive literature on the repression-dissent nexus, it is still an open debate as to the effect (if any) of repression on dissent. In contrast, the debate is seemingly closed in the opposite direction where dissent leads to repression in almost every instance.[11]

The key to understanding the former, more contested, question normally resides in the characterization of state repression and here there are several general arguments. There are scholars who emphasize how individuals are rational actors who weigh the costs and benefits of protest, maintaining that people will recognize that repression increases the costs of dissent. Other scholars focus on whether repression produces fear or anger (Young, 2019), and assume that fear leads to demobilization and less protest, whereas anger has the opposite effect. Some scholars emphasize that individuals are driven by values that emerge though social processes and argue that individuals might protest against state behavior impelled by their moral values and deeply held beliefs about appropriateness (Pearlman, 2013).

Empirically, the existing literature shows a puzzling diversity in findings including increases, decreases, curvilinear effects, diminished effects over time, or no impact (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Davenport, 2007; Feierabend and Feierabend, 1966; Francisco, 1995, 1996; Gupta et al., 1993; Hirsch, 1990; Rasler, 1996; Lichbach, 1987; Moore, 1998; Sullivan, 2016; Sutton et al., 2014). Attempts have been made to un-

[11] While we know that dissent can threaten regimes and that this typically triggers repression, the effect of such repression on subsequent repression is less clear (Davenport, 2007; Earl, 2011).

derstand this variation. At the group and country levels, some have argued that the effect of repression on dissent is contingent on contexts such as regime type (Gupta et al., 1993), the relative consistency or inconsistency in accommodative or repressive policies (Lichbach, 1987), the exact timing of repression (Sullivan, 2016), third party involvement (Chyzh and Labzina, 2018), or particular combinations of factors such as extremely repressive regimes with weak military infrastructures (e.g. Ortiz, 2007). At the individual level, some have argued that the effect of repression on dissent is contingent upon an individuals' embeddedness and commitment to the organization that is being targeted with repression (Opp and Gern, 1993; Davenport, 2015).

Recently, the study of repression has rapidly expanded to include more advanced empirical modeling (Fariss, 2014; Hill and Jones, 2014, c.f.), experimental designs (Young, 2019), and new and more disaggregated data on sub-national units and events (e.g. Pan and Siegel, 2020; Zhukov et al., 2019). These applications have brought important advances to better capture repression-dissent dynamics. However, seemingly contradictory conclusions are still reported out of this newer work, leaving the repression–dissent puzzle unresolved. For example, while experimental evidence in Zimbabwe indicates that fear of repression "significantly reduces hypothetical and behavioral measures of dissent by substantively large amounts" (140 Young, 2019), big data on online dissent in Saudi Arabia suggests that repression can mobilize a wider constituency to voice protest (Pan and Siegel, 2020).

6.3 Disaggregating the nexus

Broadly consistent with the more recent attempts to address the paradox of the repression-dissent nexus, the current paper seeks to understand this process through studying the repression-dissent nexus based on theoretically disaggregating repression according to the salience of particular actions (as a function of indiscriminate vs targeted action) and the general illegitimacy of different forms of repression (related to group-specific vs general mobilization to dissent). We then use this framework to develop our argument and hypotheses about the consequences of SSR for protest.

Variation in (il)legitimacy and appropriateness by forms of repression

Drawing on work that discusses repertoires we maintain that among all the tactics that could be selected there is a small subset that are actually seen as legitimate and warranted and an accepted part of the repertoire that state agents are tasked with using.

Arrests and detention are the most clear example of a tactic that is a generally accepted method of state coercion and crime control. This designation is important because if the government selects a tactic that is seen as legitimate or appropriate, then we do not expect to see a negative reaction and a backlash from the citizenry. This expectation draws inspiration from innate principles of morality related to fairness and reciprocity. If, however, a government selects a tactic that is seen as (a priori) illegitimate, then individuals and groups would be less likely to see this government as being worthy of support. This could mean that they would be willing to directly challenge it in some manner. We believe that citizens connect sexual violence with private benefit for the perpetrator, rather than professional conduct, and that sexual violence is perceived as illegitimate and appropriate. For example, we can imagine that it would be hard for police or authorities to convincingly argue that sexual violence, rather than arrests, was the appropriate response to re-establishing order in a hypothetical context of widespread riots. To be clear, this assessment of the illegitimacy of sexual violence is a conjecture, and the exact evaluation of sexual violence relative to other forms of repression remains to be empirically established through surveys or experimental studies.

If this is true then this is important because different forms of repression might have different consequences for protest levels. Diverse researchers have come to similar conclusions. Daxecker (2017), for example, found differential effects between scarring torture and other forms of torture on terror; a difference she attributes to the more visible and less plausibly deniable aspects of scarring torture. Koopmans (1997, p. 149), similarly, found that situational police repression as a direct reaction to mobilization events had an escalating effect, whereas "more indirect, institutional repression such as bans of organizations and demonstrations or trials and court rulings against activists had a clear negative impact on the extreme right's level of mobilization" in Germany. Earlier work also found that the effects of repression vary based on its perceived (il)legitimacy by those who are repressed and their social environment (Opp and Roehl, 1990), but this notion has been less central in recent literature. However, variation in appropriateness and legitimacy might be important to consider, particularly if some types of repression are seen as *a priori* more legitimate or appropriate than other elements and therefore have different effects on dissent. If that is the case, we might end up with mixed results if we try to predict subsequent dissent using aggregate measures of all forms of repression though aggregate indicators such as, for instance, the Political Terror Scale (Wood and Gibney, 2010) and latent measures of human rights (Fariss, 2014).

Variation in salience: Targeting and threat perception

In addition to the perceived illegitimacy of a repressive tactic, we also propose that reactions to such actions are more likely to come from those who feel most targeted. Not all repressive behavior is likely to be important for all members of a nation-state, directly impacting their willingness to do something about it. The level of salience of repression for any individual or group can be an outcome of the degree to which the repression targets their existential being and thereby poses a threat to them. Our assumption is that individuals and groups who feel threatened by state repression are more likely to mobilize to counter that threat, and that therefore they are impelled to engage in protest behavior to do something about the problem that is affecting them.[12] In other words, specific targeting (i.e., behavior that is directed against particular individuals or groups because of a conscientious effort being made by political authorities to single them out) should induce a more specific reaction from the targeted population, and increase the salience of the identity that is the basis for targeting.[13] Indiscriminate repression is likely to have a more diffuse response in terms of who is activated. To get a better handle on the repression-dissent nexus we therefore argue that we need to consider who is being targeted. As a result, accounting for how repression affects different demographics differently is therefore going to be important in correctly identifying whether repression triggers dissent.

Sexualized state repression

We apply the above framework regarding salience and appropriateness to the case of sexualized state repression (SSR). We conceptualize SSR as sexual violence (such as rape, forced prostitution, sexual torture), and sexual harassment and sexual humiliation committed by a state's coercive apparatus)[14].

Focusing on sexualized forms of repression such as sexual violence is arguably an important addition to the overall repression literature due to the status of such

[12] An alternative to which we return below is that repression produces particularly strong fear in targeted populations and that fear leads to demobilization and less protest; or that SSR is seen as inherently illegitimate, or particularly illegitimate when targeted at victims who are seen as innocent.

[13] Indeed, repressive actions by states can in some cases even create the identity group in the sense that those who are targeted with repression did not initially perceive of themselves as a defined identity group, but are made to consider themselves a group due to the common reality of being repressed "as a group" (Nordas, 2011), as the relevant threat is group-specific.

[14] No existing definition of SSR exists. This paper and the data we use is based on the conceptualization that is the basis for the SSR dataset, which builds on the definitions of the SVAC dataset (Cohen and Nordås, 2014) but also adds reports of forms of sexual humiliation and verbal abuse.

violations as possible war crimes and crimes against humanity, as well as the serious harm of such abuses for those affected and their communities (Ba and Bhopal, 2017). We also know that state agents are reportedly frequent perpetrators of these types of violations of human rights in wartime (Cohen and Nordås, 2014). However, it is important to note that sexual violence by states can take place both during war and outside of war. For example, some of the most famous examples of state-perpetrated sexual violence are cases of sexual harassment and attacks against female protesters that took place during the Arab spring uprisings, most notoriously during the ousting of President Mubarak in Egypt in 2011. Currently, reports are surfacing about sexual violence or sexual harassment committed by state agents against detained individuals. For example, most recently, the United Nations and UN Women have raised the alarm over such targeted violence against women involved in anti-coup protests in Myanmar.[15]

Illegitimacy/appropriateness

SSR is an illegitimate behavior by state agents.[16] This could imply that SSR increases mobilization in opposition to the state, because moral shocks can shape attention, attitudes, and political action, and by some accounts help us understand the decision to protest (Brader and Marcus, 2013).

Socially constructed systems of norms, values, and beliefs suggest that sexual violence as a form of repressive activity has little if any *a priori* legitimacy. We understand legitimacy as "a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate" (Suchman, 1995; Tyler, 2006). Even when opposition violence and societal disorder legitimizes other forms of repression (or rather it is presented by authorities as reasons why repression is an appropriate and legitimate response), sexual violence cannot generally be couched as a justified form of coercive behavior by professional police and militaries for law and order or security purposes. This contrasts with, for example, arrests or surveillance, which—as types of tactics—also

[15] See statement released by UN Women on March 12, 2021: https://asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/news-and-events/stories/2021/03/statement-on-myanmar-by-phumzile-mlambo-ngcuka. Last downloaded 04/09/21.

[16] Sexual violations are generally perceived as egregious, salient, shameful and illegitimate state behaviors (Cohen and Nordås, 2015)—even if and when state perpetrators seemingly do not behave as if shamed (ibid.). States may use sexualized repression for various reasons (strategic, opportunistic or a practice—see Wood and Ramirez (2018) for a typology of these in wartime) and in different contexts (as a general tool for intimidation or to crack down on specific protest events). Here we do not try to discern which strategy, if any, was behind the use of violence.

have a generally accepted and recognized use that the citizenry will consider legitimate when used appropriately. "Appropriate uses" of sexual violence are hard to think of.

Despite frequent occurrences of abuse, governments will typically not argue for sexual violence being normatively appropriate statecraft. It is the citizens' beliefs about normative appropriateness which produces the legitimacy (or illegitimacy) of government structures, officials, and processes (Levi et al., 2009). State agents' repressive behavior can therefore shape whether the citizenry accepts and cooperates with the government, or defiantly challenges its authority. Repressive state action can therefore mobilize a counter-reaction among activists and bystanders as most perceive the action to be morally unacceptable, excessive and/or illegitimate relative to expectations about how authorities should act (Almeida, 2003; Moss, 2014).

Based on neuroscience and evolutionary biology, we might expect that reports of SSR are shocking to everyone, and can generate a reaction in the entire citizenry. From neuroscience, for example, evidence shows that emotionally valenced, visceral and taboo information that stands out will attract attention and generate strong emotional arousal. In this literature, information or words related to sex are classified as taboo (Janschewitz, 2008), which is associated with enhanced attention (Anderson, 2005), superior recall (e.g. Jay et al., 2008), and a heightened autonomic fight-or-flight response (Phelps, 2006). State-perpetrated sexual violence will also, in most circumstances, stand out from the non-sexual, neutral, or more 'bureaucratic' and routine ways state operate, and for that reason be associated with heightened attention, recall and autonomic responses. Evolutionary biology could also lead us to expect that sexual violence triggers a more generalized visceral response due to the fundamental role of reproduction in the human motivational system (Gat, 2006), which could imply that humans consider sexual violence inherently disturbing and salient.[17]

These particularities of sexual violence (irrespective of targeting) lead to the first hypothesis that SSR could spur protests by all groups, because the behavior *in and of itself* is shocking, inappropriate, and illegitimate. We state this possibility as a possible association between SSR and protest in general (by both men and women):

H1*: Reports of SSR triggers protests.*

[17] We could also expect a response to sexual violence by men, driven by ideas about protective paternalism; the belief that men should protect women (see e.g. Chapleau et al. (2007).

Targeting/salience

As typically conceived, women generally constitute the victims in the majority of reported cases of sexual violence, and sexual violence on war is often considered a "woman's issue".[18] Our data generally supports this perception: about 80 percent of reported cases are against women. Given the targeting of women in particular, SSR is not what scholars of repression would call indiscriminate, and we assume that sexual violence and harassment is a salient issue for women, something that represents an essential threat to women as a group. This echoes what Kreft (2018) argues in terms of conflict-related sexual violence. In a study of Colombia, she finds that in the context of the civil war in that country, women came "to understand sexual violence as a violent manifestation of a patriarchal culture and gender inequalities" (Kreft, 2018, p. 220), and perceived of it as a *collective threat* to women as a group. It also echoes studies from other contexts that highlight the strong fear of sexual assault among women, or its status as the "master offense" (Ferraro, 1996; Mellgren and Ivert, 2019). Scholars studying Egypt have also found that among activists and journalists there, sexual violence is referred to as a systematic political tool that the regime uses for "intimidating and terrifying women from publicly voicing their opposition ... by targeting their respectability" (Tadros, 2015, 1349) *as women*.

If dissent and protest is in part a function of whether you and/or your group is targeted with repressive action, we assume that because of the over-representation of women as victims of sexual violence and how sexual violence is perceived of as a tactic targeted against women, SSR can invoke protest from women in particular, as threats can trigger the automatic neurological threat-response system.[19]

Based on the characteristics of sexual violence outlined above, a tendency for backlash against SSR in the form of protest should therefore be more pronounced among women compared to men.[20] The flip side is also perhaps that because for men there is also strong stigma and shame following sexual violence, men might not want to mobilize around this and draw attention to their victimization. It is not only widely seen as a crime suffered by women, but also one that only 'weak' men would be subjected

[18] This is now being challenged in part due to more evidence of male victimization, but the popular perception is still that invariably it is women who are victimized.

[19] This is not to say that protest is driven solely by emotion; organization also matters.

[20] Even in highly patriarchal societies, state perpetrated sexual violations might be perceived as a comparably more justifiable (and less threatening to the gendered hierarchy) cause for counter-protest by women than protests over political issues, traditionally seen as male domains, as protesting sexual violations can be framed as a defense of women's honor and sexual purity.

to—and male victims are not seen as 'real men' (see e.g. Schwarz et al. (2020)). This leads to our second hypothesis:

H2: *Reports of SSR trigger women's protests.*

The next section outlines our data and how we test our hypotheses.

6.4 Research design and data

To test our hypotheses, we use a new dataset on SSR, explained in more detail below. This dataset accounts for variation over time and between countries in the reported use of sexual violence and sexual harassment by state actors. We pair this with existing datasets on protest in general and women's protest specifically. Our empirical analysis includes 109 countries in all regions of the world in the period 1991 to 2012.[21] The scope of the years covered in the analysis is conditioned by the coverage of the protest data. The unit of observation is the country-year.[22]

Currently, data limitations (discussed below) prevent us from pursuing a more temporally disaggregated design. However, we also do not have strong theoretical expectations to suggest which temporal aggregation is the more appropriate; or, in other words, how quickly or slowly we should expect a backlash against state repression to occur. This could be a function of the strength of relevant civil society organizations or considerations in terms of when the opportunity to launch an effective protest presents itself, and many other factors. The current analysis captures the association between SSR in one year and protest (in general and explicitly women's protests) in the next. Different reaction times could be explored empirically when data allows.

Dependent variables: Protest

Several datasets capture protest and dissent, with different data structures, ranging from the campaign level to day-to-day event level. Both of the sources we use to measure protest activity in this paper cover nonviolent protests. To measure general protest (where women could still be among the participants), we rely on the Mass Mobilization Dataset (MMD) (Clark and Regan, 2021). The data are human coded and identify

[21] Some observations also drop out depending on the selection of control variables. For consistency we include the same observations in all models and in the descriptive evidence.
[22] Different temporal units could be explored for specific cases in future research.

protest events with a minimum of 50 people where the government or a state actor is the target.[23] We summarize the total number of reported events associated with a given year in a country.

To measure women's protest, we use the best currently available data, which is a replication dataset from Murdie and Peksen (2015) with global coverage, where the unit of observation is the country-year.[24] They collected and coded protest events based on an automated newswire analysis,[25] and capture nonviolent events where the news story mentions "women", "woman", or "feminist". The variable female protest denotes all protest events by women, while female anti-government protest only includes events where the target was the government or some state actor. Although women could be part of the 'general' protest activity measured by the MMD dataset, general protests and female protests are not highly correlated.[26]

Yet, despite the arguably higher bar for women[27] to organize and participate in street protest in particular, women do protest. This has received increasing attention, and conceivably led to greater successes in protest campaigns (Chenoweth, 2019) in recent years, such as with the overthrow of the regime in Sudan in 2019 and the women-led opposition movement protesting in Belarus in 2020. Women's protests are therefore gaining recognition as important avenues for social change. Protest data, however, vi-

[23] The project defines a protest as a gathering of 50 or more people to make a demand on the government. A protest action must be targeted at the state or state policy. The project does not code protests in one country that are targeted at the policies of another country and in that sense, it captures only 'home grown' protest activities targeted at state policies.

[24] Using a monthly dataset would be preferable in order to better capture the causal direction and the potentially fast-changing dynamics of the repression-dissent nexus. There are a few other datasets that go some way to registering female participation. For example, the Women in Resistance dataset (WiRE) adds information on women's participation to the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes Data Project (NAVCO) (Chenoweth, 2019). These data are structured at the level of the campaign, and a campaign can go on for years, not allowing for capturing the dynamics we are interested in here. Another frequently used source, the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD) (Salehyan et al., 2012), also has a variable that registers if women were mentioned in the news sources for a given event, but the researchers did not specifically search for women's protest. In addition, both NAVCO and SCAD have a more limited geographic scope.

[25] The automated data is based on Reuters' newswires, which means that the sample can be biased toward protests of a certain size, while small protest events in regions not well covered are less likely to be picked up by the search.

[26] A correlation matrix is displayed in A.62 in the Appendix. Even if some of this non-overlap can be explained by differences in data collection methods, it still shows that these phenomena should be studied comparatively.

[27] This might be true in general, but in specific contexts and cultural settings, it could arguably be a particularly high bar for women to display their anger and displeasure through taking to the streets in protest.



Figure 6.1. Protest events, 1991-2013

sualized in Figure 6.1,[28] show that women's protest activity peaked as early as the mid-1990s.

The number of female protest events reached a high point around 1995, the year of the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, which created an action plan on gender equality and female empowerment and further sparked a series of UN resolutions on matters of interest to women (see e.g. Tryggestad, 2009).[29] The number of general protest events directed at the state, as measured by the MMD dataset, peaks around 2011, where anti-government protests surged in a number of Arab countries. As we see, the number of female protest events is much smaller than general protest events, even if our measure of general protest events only includes those events that target the state. Protest is only one of several methods of resistance, and organizing a public demonstration is arguably one of the most high-threshold ways of protesting, which can explain (together with reporting issues) why there are relatively few female events. Female protest events might also get less media coverage compared to other protests, for example if they are considered less important and/or less likely to turn violent.

In Figure 6.2, we zoom in on female protest events across different regions.[30] Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and North America are the regions with the most

[28] The data comes from the Mass Mobilization Dataset, and female protest data comes from Murdie and Peksen (2015), described in more detail in the methods section.

[29] This uptick might also in part be a function of more attention toward women's issues in the media in the wake of the Beijing Declaration relative to other times when female events might have been more likely to be overlooked by the media and others.

[30] We first summarize the total number of events per region per year, before adjusting for population numbers; the Y-axis represents the number of female protest events per 10 million inhabitants.



Figure 6.2. Women's protest events per 10 million inhabitants, 1991-2013



(a) Anti-government protest events

(b) All female protest events

(c) Anti-government female protest events

Figure 6.3. Density plots of the dependent variables

frequent protest activity. South Korea, Bangladesh and Venezuela are the countries with the highest number of protest events when summarized over the entire period. Overall, India, China and South Africa have the highest absolute numbers of female protests, and for female anti-government protest, China, Bangladesh and India are on top.[31]

Density plots for the dependent variables are displayed in Figures 6.3.

[31] Based on these examples it seems clear that the number of protest events is closely linked to population size, which we control for.

Independent variable

To measure a state's use of sexual violence we introduce a new dataset mapping these types of violations, the SSR dataset. The conceptualization of sexual violations in this dataset is an expanded version of the definition of sexual violence from the SVAC dataset (Cohen and Nordås, 2014)—including rape, sexual mutilation and sexual torture, among other forms of direct physical violence. The SSR data also include other reported abuses, such as acts of verbal sexual harassment, including sexualized insults or verbal humiliation, and forced nudity. The violence and harassment is committed by the state or state actors, such as police, military, and government affiliated militias. We include instances of these violations as they are reported, but do not purport to have anything near a full account of all instances of SSR given the challenges of observability for human rights violations generally, which are quite possibly compounded for sexual violations (Krüger and Nordås, 2020). Cases of sexual harassment (particularly verbal harassment), could be more underreported than other violations, particularly if they are very common, as they might not be considered worthy of reporting on in these contexts. The SSR data is hand coded and based on US State Department country reports and Amnesty International reports.

We have argued that women might be more likely than men to be activated by reports of SSR, as this is (or is perceived to be), a gendered threat. Our data on sexualized repression shows that reports of women being targeted with sexualized forms of repression are indeed more common than reports of such violations against men.[32] This common understanding of the problem makes this form of repression particularly relevant for women, and means sexualized repression is likely to generate strong emotional arousal and activate a counter-reaction in women in particular.[33]

Figure 6.4 shows where in the world we see most reported incidents of sexualized repression, and the development over time (notice that the graph uses the non-logged version of the variable, while in all analyses we use the logged version). The countries with the highest numbers reported are China, Sudan and DRC. The map shows that

[32] 891 entries in the SSR dataset mention male victims/targets, whereas 3,179 entries mention women. This is only one metric that suggests such a difference, and an accurate count of male vs female victims (even if an estimate) can have large bias and error due to reporting challenges for sexual violence generally (see, e.g., Cohen and Nordås, 2014; Krüger and Nordås, 2020). Underreporting is also likely to be a particularly acute problem when it comes to male victims (e.g. Traunmüller et al., 2019). However, as people arguably respond to reported incidents (as opposed to the real—unknown and/or unknowable—tally of incidents), the potential reporting bias here is less of a serious problem for our argument.

[33] An exception might be if sexual violations are so widespread and predictable that they dull the emotional effect due to habituation.

some countries, for example China and Russia, display increased numbers over time. Generally, more countries appear to have higher reported numbers of SSR in more recent years, compared to previous periods. It might be that the time trends in SSR reflect increased attention to such atrocities in the wake of the conflicts in Bosnia and Rwanda, where sexual violence was widespread. With the Beijing Declaration, and the subsequent United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, the international community emphasized the need to end impunity for such actions. These are legitimate concerns, but probably less of a problem given that our dependent variable, female protest, might be subject to the same issue—there might be increased attention to and reports of female mobilization in the wake of these events. Yet, we address a possible temporal shift in the robustness tests, and control for a possible time trend in the analysis.



Figure 6.4. Reported numbers of Sexualized State Repression globally. Victim numbers for each country are summarized across the different time periods (countries appearing in yellow are missing).

The main independent variable in the analysis is the best estimate of the number of victims of sexualized repression in a given country-year based on reported incidence rates and estimates of prevalence given the language used in the relevant human rights report to discuss prevalence.[34] In the analysis, we rely on the best estimate. Because the distribution is highly skewed toward zero, we log transform the variable.

Control variables

We control for variables that are likely related to the onset of protest, and what previous studies, such as Murdie and Peksen (2015), have found increase the likelihood of women's protest and could also be associated with SSR. We opt for a parsimonious model, and to ensure comparability across models with different dependent variables, we include the same battery of variables in all models.

In our theoretical argument we outlined how SSR could be distinct from some other repressive behaviors because it is generally perceived as illegitimate. However, different forms of repression are also arguably related. SSR is part of physical integrity rights violation, so it is plausible that it is associated with other forms of physical integrity violations captured by other measures of state repression. Therefore, the first variable we control for is protection of physical integrity rights, taken from the Cingranelli and Richards' (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset (Cingranelli and Richards, 2010). This index measures states' use of torture[35], extrajudicial killings, disappearances, and political imprisonment; and countries are rated with a score ranging from 0 (no government respect for these four rights) to 8 (full government respect for these four rights). We also tested the inclusion of the Political Terror Scale as an alternative measure of repression.[36]

How does the measure of SSR relate empirically to other indices of state repression? Some forms of repression—like spying, torture, and political killings—might be highly correlated, making it hard to disentangle the effects empirically (Davenport, 2007). Table A.60 in the Appendix presents the frequency distributions of cases of low and high values on SSR and CIRI physical integrity rights. Most countries that have a state

[34] For some of the violations, detailed information on the number of victims is available, but in many instances the available evidence only provides qualitative indications of the victim number. Thus, a high, low and best estimate was calculated for the victim number based on conservative decision rules translating specific wording in reports into numerical equivalents.

[35] We, and others, consider some forms of SSR to qualify as torture, but sexual violence acts are included in the CIRI measure

[36] This does not change the results substantially.

sexual violations value above the mean also have low respect for physical integrity rights, but not all countries that repress use sexual violence. The correlation between SSR and CIRI, displayed in Table A.62 in the Appendix, is at -0.52. This indicates that, despite some overlap (which we expect), there is variation left in SSR that is not explained by general repression. This underscores the importance of analyzing SSR as a part of the repertoire of state repression, but also as meaningfully distinct.

One element that could be important to consider when comparing SSR to state repression more broadly is whether repression in general has a specific effect on SSR observability[37], and that reporting biases therefore possibly influence what the correlations in the observed data look like. For example, this could be an issue if instances of sexual violation are systematically less likely to be reported on or revealed when other forms of repression are occurring on a massive scale. It is possible that, in these circumstances, sexual violence could be overlooked or seen as a lower priority to document, and the general repressive context might make all reporting on human rights violations less certain. On the other hand, these highly repressive contexts might also be the cases where the international community and human rights organizations are investing more energy and resources into documenting abuse, and the situation attracts more attention overall. This could result in a situation with a relatively larger share of the actual abuses that are occurring being recorded and reported on. The net effect is unclear.

Next, we include an indicator of the number of Women's International Non-Governmental Organizations (WINGOs). The variable is taken from the (Murdie and Peksen, 2015) replication dataset. This number reflects the overall strength of the women's groups in a given country and their capacity to mobilize, which should influence the likelihood of female protest activity. Much existing research in the social movements literature emphasizes the importance of civil society organizations for protests, in line with resource mobilization theory (Jenkins, 1983). Even if people feel frustrated about government actions, their frustration will more likely manifest in collective action if it is channeled and framed by organizations (Butcher et al., 2022). This should also apply to women's organizations. For example, Soule et al. (1999) find that women's social movement organizations in the United States increased mobilization events, such as protest events

[37] For more discussion of the general observability challenges and measurement issues for conflict-related sexual violence, see Cohen and Nordås (2014) and Krüger and Nordås (2020). Although these studies consider conflict-related sexual violence and not SSR, many of the concerns about reporting are shared.

by women. These organizations can also play a role in investigating and documenting cases of government abuse.

We control for the natural log of population size, which is an important predictor of protest events and of both violent and nonviolent protest campaigns (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013a).

We further control for the effect of economic development on women's collective action using the natural log of annual gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (in 2005 constant U.S. dollars). The level of economic development could influence general grievances leading to protest, but economic development is also associated with better outcomes for women, hence improved opportunity structure. And national wealth has been found to be positively associated with the onset of female protests (Murdie and Peksen, 2015). Population and GDP data come from the World Development Indicators dataset from the World Bank.[38]

We control for regime type using the index of electoral democracy (polyarchy) from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project (Coppedge et al., 2019a). This captures both the degree to which there are free and fair elections and the ability to freely express opinions. The political regime could influence both people's grievances against the government and therefore the motives and propensity for protesting, but also the opportunity to do so. For women's protest, Murdie and Peksen (2015) find that mass mobilization among women appears more common in semi-democracies compared to full democracies and autocracies. States' use of sexual violence as part of their repertoire of repression could also be related to the degree of democracy, as the status of women (i.e. by virtue of being voters) should be higher in democracies, all else being equal.

Summarized over the entire time period 1991-2012, we find that the DR Congo, Sudan and Angola are the countries with the most reported victims of state sexual violations. These are countries with long-lasting and severe armed conflicts. Moreover, since we know that much of the sexual violence committed by states happens during conflict we control for armed conflict in our statistical models. Conflict could also be related to female protest, as some previous research has shown how women's movements often are vocal and active protesters during conflict (Tripp, 2015) and that conflict might empower women (Webster et al., 2019; Bakken and Buhaug, 2021), perhaps spurring more visible female activism. The conflict data comes from the UCDP/PRIO database (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Pettersson et al., 2019).

[38] Available from https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators

We include a control for past female protest and past protest, using a one-year lagged dependent variable (LDV), as recent protest may imply that there was already a favorable opportunity structure for protesting. This also reduces problems with trending variables and endogeneity. We assume that the variable on women's organizations and a lagged dependent variable will capture much of women's protest capacity. We control for the possibility that both SSR and female protest are caused by periods of massive contentious action by also including the total number of MMD protests in the models on female protest. We also control for time trends using a year variable, defined as year-1990.

Descriptive statistics for all variables are included in the Appendix, and a correlation matrix showing the statistical association between each of the variables included in the model is displayed in Table A.62. None of the variables in the analysis show a problematic high correlation for use in the same model.

Estimation strategy

To estimate the effect of reports of SSR on the count of subsequent (next year's) protest events (in general) and women's protest events in particular, we run negative binomial regression models.[39] Given that the protest data are non-negative and over-dispersed, the negative binomial model allows the variation to be greater than the mean.

6.5 Results

Table 1 (below) shows the results from the models using the count of all protest events, female protest events, and anti-state female protest events as the dependent variables. In Model 1-2, we assess the effect of SSR on the likelihood of more general protest (not female-specific) targeting the government. The bivariate regression shows a positive and significant relationship, but when we introduce the control variables the coefficient is negative and not statistically significant. This goes contrary to Hypothesis 1—that SSR triggers protest in general. In other words, we do not find an association with SSR in one year and mass mobilization events targeting the government the next year.

In Model 3-6, we turn to assess our group-specific hypothesis that women are more likely to protest after reports of SSR by state actors. Models 3 and 4 concern women's protests in general, not necessarily specifically directed against the state. Here, we also

[39] We run all the analyses in Stata, using the *nbreg* function.

see a positive and significant bivariate relationship between SSR and female protests (M3), which is in line with H1. This relationship seems to disappear when we introduce controls in Model 4. In other words, a higher reported incidence of SSR is not associated with more nonviolent protest events by women in the subsequent year. In models 5 and 6, we look at the subset of protest by women and/or on women's issues that are explicitly anti-state. For these models we also do not find a significant effect of SSR on nonviolent protest activity. Taken together, these findings support neither Hypothesis 1, that reports of SSR trigger *general* anti-government protests, nor Hypothesis 2, that reports of SSR trigger *women's* protests. We do not however find a negative effect whereby SSR is associated with fewer protests. The analysis so far is thus inconclusive, and we explore whether these results hold when changing parameters of the model in a further exploration of the data material.

We will briefly comment on the other covariates in the models. Across all models, lack of respect for physical integrity rights more broadly (as measured by CIRI physical integrity rights (t-1)) is associated with less protest, and this finding is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The number of women's INGOs is positive and significantly associated with more female protest (models 3-6), probably reflecting women's capacity for mobilization by having civil society organizations that work to champion women's interests. As expected, there are more protest events, including women's protest, in countries with larger populations. More populous countries are generally found to have more conflicts of different types, and more groups and individuals who might have an interest in challenging the government. For both GDP per capita and our control for the level of electoral democracy (polyarchy), we find opposite effects on general anti-government protest (Model 2) and female protests (models 4 and 6). Anti-government protests are less common in highly economically developed countries, whereas women seem to stage more protest in economically more developed countries. We can speculate that this is because women in general tend to be more empowered in these countries, as participants in the formal economy. They might therefore be less willing to tolerate abuses and more willing to voice their grievances through protest.

Furthermore, the more democratic a state is, the more general protest events but fewer female protest events there are. This suggests that women have more grievances in non-democracies. Armed conflict is associated with less anti-government protest, but more women's protest. This might have a connection to women's peace activism (Tripp, 2015). The variable capturing time trends shows that there is a downward trend in women's protest events, but general protest events increase over the time period 1991 to 2012. The downward trend in women's protests might be explained by the spurt in

Table 6.1. Sexualized state repression and protest, 1991-2012

	(1) General antigov. protest	(2) General antigov. protest	(3) Female protest	(4) Female protest	(5) Female protest, antigov.	(6) Female protest, antigov.
Sexualized repression (log) (t-1)	0.054***	-0.024	0.185***	0.010	0.180***	0.014
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.030)	(0.034)
CIRI phys. int. rights (t-1)		-0.072***		-0.063**		-0.093**
		(0.020)		(0.027)		(0.043)
Women's INGOs (t-1)		-0.003		0.011***		0.011***
		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.003)
Population (log) (t-1)		0.174***		0.387***		0.424***
		(0.029)		(0.039)		(0.053)
GDP per capita (log) (t-1)		-0.103***		0.343***		0.255***
		(0.030)		(0.035)		(0.056)
Polyarchy (t-1)		1.152***		-1.358***		-0.912***
		(0.172)		(0.199)		(0.314)
Armed conflict (t-1)		-0.280***		0.346***		-0.039
		(0.088)		(0.109)		(0.171)
Time (year-1990)		0.011**		-0.076***		-0.089***
		(0.006)		(0.007)		(0.011)
General antigov. protest (t-1)		0.121***		0.020***		0.023***
		(0.007)		(0.006)		(0.008)
Female protest (t-1)				0.103***		
				(0.011)		
Female antigov. protest (t-1)						0.235***
						(0.042)
Constant	0.996***	-1.716***	-0.168**	-8.428***	-1.636***	-9.510***
	(0.038)	(0.522)	(0.066)	(0.681)	(0.082)	(0.932)
/ lnalpha	0.676***	0.172***	1.369***	-0.022	1.681***	0.479***
	(0.036)	(0.058)	(0.053)	(0.102)	(0.093)	(0.153)
Observations	2810	2810	2810	2810	2810	2810

Standard errors in parentheses
Negative binomial regression with White robust standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

women's protest around 1995, and the fact that our dataset only goes up to 2012. As expected, we find that the lagged dependent variable (the volume of protest events in the past year) is positively associated with protest the next year across all models; and we also see that specific LDVs for female protest (t-1) are positively associated with protest in the following year (models 4 and 6).

The analysis could not establish either a positive or a negative relationship between SSR and different forms of protest. We have explored several alternative specifications of the model without finding any particular patterns.[40] In the remainder of the paper, we discuss potential explanations for these null findings, provide some case examples, and put forward suggestions for how to address the research question in future work.

6.6 Discussion and conclusion

Although the quantitative analysis could not establish a statistical relationship in the empirical analysis, case examples indicate that women sometimes react to sexual violence with activism and protest. Sexual violence has often been assumed to prompt women to withdraw from public spaces, be shamed and traumatized, and pacified. Today however these notions of the silenced and passive victim are being challenged by scholars and women's own response to sexual violence and harassment by the state as well as to violence and abuse against women by people with power more generally. In Egypt, for example, women engaged in more public activism during and after the sexual harassment that took place during the 2011 revolution (Zakarriya, 2019; Tadros, 2015). Support programs for female victims of sexual and gender-based violence at the hands of state forces and other armed actors in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo

[40] We have tested alternative operationalizations of SSR—first, as a dichotomous (0/1) variable (Table A.63)—second, as three prevalence levels ranging from low to medium to high (Table A.64). We furthermore tested interactions to explore potential conditional effects. It might be that there is an effect of time, and we therefore interact SSR with a dummy for years after 2000 (Table A.65 and Figure A.3, A.4, A.5). We also tested an interaction between SSR and female empowerment norms (Table A.66). No specific or significant interaction effects were found. We explored alternative temporal sequences by checking if there is an association between SSR and protest in the same year (Table A.67). It could also be that some observations are outliers masking any result. We therefore ran models with jackknife standard errors, which excludes one and one observation, and this yielded the same results (Table A.68). Excluding years of active armed conflict also did not alter the results (Table A.69). We also checked if the results were region-dependent. The results indicate a positive and statistically significant effect of SSR in the MENA region, when compared to the reference category which is Sub-Saharan Africa (Table A.70—suggesting that regional conditions could be interesting to explore further. Finally, we switched the dependent variable with data from the WiRE dataset on women's frontline participation in resistance campaigns targeting the government (Chenoweth, 2019) but found no effect of SSR on women's frontline participation (Table A.71).

find that women rise up and spearhead activism for women's human rights and against gender-based violence even under extremely challenging circumstances (Amisi et al., 2018). Similarly, in Sierra Leone, incredible resilience has been documented among survivors of sexual violence and their families, in the face of attempts to shame and isolate them (Koos, 2018). In Mexico, Amnesty International has documented multiple cases in which police arbitrarily detain women protesters, beat them and use sexual violence against them to punish them for participating in demonstrations. However, feminists who have been sexually violated for their activism continue to protest violence against women.[41] In a report entitled "The (r)age of women: Stigma and violence against women protesters", Amnesty (2021) analyzes five protests that women and feminist groups carried out against gender-based violence in 2019 in the states of Guanajuato, Sinaloa, Quintana Roo, the State of Mexico (Edomex) and Mexico City. In the report they find that "on many occasions police officers resorted to the use of sexual violence as a tactic to teach them a lesson about daring to go out to protest in public and for behaving contrary to gender stereotypes". This suggests that there can be a reciprocal relationship whereby protests by women are met with sexual violence, but that this further encourages more protest; or that sexual violence has no effect, as those who were already protesting continue to do so despite experiencing sexual violence as a police tactic, and that protest therefore seems to continue on a similar level as before (despite, perhaps, an expectation from the perpetrators that this tactic will scare women out of protesting).

Generally, the participation costs of protest are assumed to be higher for women than for men, in part also due to fear of sexual harassment as a possible cost.[42] For example, Dorff and Braithwaite (2018) investigate how emotions and fear influence people's risk perception of nonviolent mobilization, and find clear evidence that women are more fearful than men of participating in nonviolent action, a finding they explain by the real risk of women becoming victims of violence, including sexualized assaults.

One potential explanation for the lack of a statistical finding in line with this dynamic in this paper is also that the effect is simply nullified as a consequence of the

[41] https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/03/mexico-autoridades-usaron-violencia-sexual-para-silenciar-mujeres-2/

[42] Women might therefore find other ways to voice concern or have political influence, perhaps through online dissent. Pan and Siegel (2020, 109) exemplify online dissent by women in Saudi Arabia by referencing the expansive #Women2Drive social media campaign, which "generated a tide of videos of women defying the Saudi ban on women driving, increasing the domestic and international visibility of protest against these Saudi policies", but do not address whether there is a particular gender difference in preference for or use of online dissent.

differential effects of SSR. If in some instances SSR has a pacifying effect, but in other contexts a mobilizing one, we can end up observing null effects in the aggregate. Another possible explanation is that the timing of a possible reaction to information about instances of sexual violence is hard to predict and model. Even if we think that sexual violence by state actors can and will lead to a reaction in the form of protest, it is not clear *when* exactly we would see protest taking place, and investigating both the timing and triggers of protest is a possible avenue to pursue in subsequent research. These dynamics and current data limitations on women's protest activities might obscure any real relationship between SSR and dissent in the current analysis. While we have relatively good coverage of *general* protest events globally (such as NAVCO, SCAD, MMD), women's roles in protest and female protests specifically have been largely neglected. Some exceptions do exist, such as the WiRE dataset (Chenoweth, 2019), and ARC-Women (Bakken, 2021b). However, the former is highly aggregated, focusing on campaigns, while the latter only covers one region, Africa. The data used in this paper, collected by Murdie and Peksen (2015), only goes up to 2012. It might be that the changing norms against sexual violence and the tendency for women to take to the streets in protest have grown stronger in the last few years and are not yet covered by the data we have available, so it is worth revisiting this possible relationship in future research. Moreover, the data are based on an automated search of news wires. As much as the media's coverage of women's protests is still improving, we should be cautious about assuming that the media captures a full picture of women's protest events, especially in countries that receive less coverage, and in rural areas.

Identifying the conditions under which we would expect SSR to spur protest or demobilize the public is an important next step. One such potential condition is the existence of organizations. Studies show that organizations are key players that enable collective action (Butcher et al., 2022), also by women (Htun and Weldon, 2012). The measure we use to capture women's organizations in this paper, WINGOs, only covers a small subset of women's organizations, and it does not pick up local grassroots organizations. Many examples show how survivors of sexual and gender-based violence are standing up and engaging in political acts, but protest and activism are not necessarily only or even primarily driven by survivors of violence. Rather, they can mobilize women in general who connect with the cause as women because of the unique threat that sexual violence and sexual harassment is perceived to pose to women as a group. As social networks matter for protest participation (Larson et al., 2019), it is as likely that bystanders—indirect victims, the wider network of those directly repressed—are pulled into the conflict as a counter-reaction to repressive abuse (Pan and Siegel, 2020),

and that we see protest stemming from the activation of broader networks of women in particular. The response by women is likely dependent there being an organized women's movement that has the resources and infrastructure to counter such violence by the state. At the same time, the existence of a strong women's movement in opposition to the state might pose a threat to it, and thus lead to more targeted repression. The conditional effect of an active women's movement, and that movement's role in a potentially circular relationship between sexualized repression and protest, should be further theorized and tested in future work.

The relationship between SSR and the public's, in particular women's, responses, should be further investigated in future work. This study suggests a more nuanced approach as a solution to the repression–dissent puzzle, and adds an often overlooked gender lens to repression research. We hope that the analysis of sexual violence repression will open up a new avenue of research that not only takes into account gendered dimensions of repression and dissent, but also disaggregates the repression–dissent nexus in terms of the possible divergent effects of specific repressive activities and targeting practices. Future research into these repression-dissent dynamics could also probe in more detail the specific issues and highlight the kind of individuals involved in anti-government protest in particular cases of interest, as well as exploring more nuanced and temporally disaggregated analyses through case studies. Women's protest behavior is still an understudied phenomenon, and we lack knowledge about who is involved and why. It would also be interesting to investigate if backlashes and counter-reactions take forms other than street-level protests, as well as exploring the back and forth dynamics between repressive events and types of dissent. More careful case analyses, such as Kreft (2020, 2019) conducted for wartime, might also be able to shed additional light on the gendered dimensions of women's and civil society organizations' responses to particular forms of state repression, including different forms of SSR. More could also be done to explore the potentially circular relationship between repression and dissent whereby state actors are more likely to start using sexualized forms of repression in response to more protest activity by women. In Egypt, for example, sexualized repression by the state was used strategically to silence women during the so-called Arab Spring. As such, it confirms that sexual violation is aimed at women in particular and highlights the analytical importance of understanding this particular type of repressive tactic. However, in line with our hypothesis about group-specific backlash, it also looks like this state strategy has not achieved the intended effect, and instead we saw women engaging in more public activism during and after the 2011 revolution (Tadros, 2015; Zakarriya, 2019).

New data on sexual violence by states facilitates a more systematic analysis of the consequences of this facet of state repression. Yet, the study of sexual violence in general is often fraught with data challenges which affect how results can be interpreted. There is ample evidence that sexual violence is underreported in official sources, including reports to police and public authorities, which should be particularly pronounced when the state is itself responsible for abuse. Underreporting is likely as sexual violation might be a covert activity that happens outside public view, and also be something that those with experiences to report might choose not to talk about for various reasons. Taboos, gender norms and cultural norms, as well as trauma, might lead people to engage in self-censorship and to use hard-to-decipher euphemisms and indirect descriptions of acts of sexual violence (Leiby, 2009). In places where sexual violence is so common that it is an everyday occurrence, we might also find that the practice is not sufficiently covered by the news media or others. In yet other places, we expect to find fewer critical sources that report on abuses by state agents because information is tightly controlled by some authoritarian regimes. Although we can, to some extent, control for this, it is likely to remain a concern. Yet despite these and related concerns about access to information about sexual violence, the present study suffers less from the typical problems associated with having biased or insufficient data (meaning data that is not representative of the full extent of violations occurring in any place or time) than other studies, as we are focused on the reactions that the public might have to reports of violations taking place. Using data on public and well-known sources, the available reports of abuse—notwithstanding their likely underreporting of reality—represent the available information that the public typically, but not always, has access to.

To conclude, using a new dataset on SSR, this paper offers a systematic analysis of the consequences of reports of such behavior on dissent. Furthermore, the paper adds a gender dimension to the study of repression and dissent that is often missing from existing studies. More research is needed to map out the mechanisms and further explore the confrontations between the state, women and the general public.

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Appendix Paper I

Table A.1. Dependent variables coding procedure.

Civil liberties (CL): We created an additive index, Women's civil liberties index, based on freedom of discussion, access to justice and women's CSO participation, all taken from the V-Dem Codebook and explained in the scheme below. The index was rescaled to range from 0 to 100. V-Dem presents their indicators in two different forms: 1) as an ordinal scale and 2) as interval scales. We employ the interval scales, which is recommended by V-Dem. The interval scales originally have values ranging from approximately -3 to 3. To make interpretation and comparison easier, they were rescaled to range from 0 to 100, before doing the same with the index.
Political representation (PR): The index Women's political representation consists of two variables, female legislators and political power distributed by gender, both taken from V-Dem and presented in the table below. These two variables are in V-Dem indexed to what they refer to as 'Women political participation Index', and it is formed by taking the average of the indicators for lower chamber female legislators (standardized) and power distributed by gender (v2pepwrgen)". We use this index, which originally ranges from 0 to 1, and rescale it to range from 0 to 100. As explained in the methods part, the dependent variables are in the regression models defined as the change from year t-1 to year t.

Women's civil liberties (Range: 0-100)

Variable name and question	Responses	Specification
Freedom of discussion "Are women able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces?"	0: Not respected. Hardly any freedom of expression exists for women. Women are subject to immediate and harsh intervention and harassment for expression of political opinion. 1: Weakly respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are frequently exposed to intervention and harassment. 2: Somewhat respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are occasionally exposed to intervention and harassment. 3: Mostly respected. There are minor restraints on the freedom of expression in the private sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to soft sanctions. But as a rule there is no intervention or harassment if women make political statements. 4: Fully respected. Freedom of speech by women in their homes and in public spaces is not restricted.	"the extent to which women are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces (restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work etc.) without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities" (Coppedge et al., 2017, p. 218).

Continued on next page

Table A.1 – continued from previous page

Access to justice "Do women enjoy equal, secure, and effective access to justice?"	0: Secure and effective access to justice for women is non-existent. 1: Secure and effective access to justice for women is usually not established or widely respected. 2: Secure and effective access to justice for women is inconsistently observed. Minor problems characterize most cases or occur rather unevenly across different parts of the country. 3: Secure and effective access to justice for women is usually observed. 4: Secure and effective access to justice for women is almost always observed.	"the extent to which women can bring cases before the courts without risk to their personal safety, trials are fair, and women have effective ability to seek redress if public authorities violate their rights, including the rights to counsel, defense, and appeal" (Coppedge et al., 2017, p. 225).
CSO women's participation "Are women prevented from participating in civil society organizations (CSOs)?"	0: Almost always. 1: Frequently. 2: About half the time. 3: Rarely. 4: Almost never.	"(A) whether women are prevented from participating in civil society organizations (CSOs) because of their gender and (B) whether CSOs pursuing women's interests are prevented from taking part in associational life" (Coppedge et al., 2017, p. 248).
Women's civil liberties (Range: 0-100)		
Power distributed by gender "Is political power distributed according to gender?"	0: Men have a near-monopoly on political power 1: Men have a dominant hold on political power. Women have only marginal influence 2: Men have much more political power but women have some areas of influence 3: Men have somewhat more political power than women 4: Men and women have roughly equal political power.	"the extent that they [women]: (a) actively participate in politics (by voting, etc. et al.), (b) are involved in civil society organizations, (c) secure representation in government, (d) are able to set the political agenda, (e) influence political decisions, and (f) influence the implementation of those decisions"
Lower chamber female legislators What percentage (%) of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature is female?		The variable used in the Index is standardized.

Table A.2. Summary statistics

	N	Mean	St.Dev	Min	Max
CL	6131	.3031564	2.63129	-41.48637	37.12484
PR	6131	.3964357	2.716188	-30.26627	36.93787
CL level (t-1)	6131	63.75264	18.00053	0	100
PR level (t-1)	6131	51.63384	18.02031	0	100
Major conflict ending	6131	.0349694	.1450976	0	1
Minor conflict ending	6131	.0319561	.1340597	0	1
Conflict ending w/ PA	6131	.0102722	.0788053	0	1
Conflict ending w/o PA	6131	.0576448	.1784846	0	1
PA ending w/ gender	6131	.0050705	.0558069	0	1
PA ending w/o gender	6131	.0052017	.0546412	0	1
Major conflict ongoing	6131	.0437123	.2044709	0	1
Minor conflict ongoing	6131	.08351	.2766742	0	1
Conflict ongoing	6131	.1272223	.333249	0	1
Time	6131	23.58473	12.64048	1	44
GDP per capita (t-1)	6131	8.802299	1.262124	5.508054	12.13143
Education (t-1)	6131	7.701185	3.746894	.01	14.97
Cumulative BRD (fixed)	6131	3.647615	4.167627	0	13.43133
Cumulative BRD	6131	1.091485	2.979625	0	13.43133
Major conflict ending (4 year decay)	6131	.0349694	.1450976	0	1
Minor conflict ending (4 year decay)	6131	.0319561	.1340597	0	1
Conflict ending w/ PA (4 year decay)	6131	.0102722	.0788053	0	1
Conflict ending w/o PA (4 year decay)	6131	.0576448	.1784846	0	1
PA ending w/ gender (4 year decay)	6131	.0050705	.0558069	0	1
PA ending w/o gender (4 year decay)	6131	.0052017	.0546412	0	1
Major conflict ending (6 year decay)	6131	.0387049	.1514184	0	1
Minor conflict ending (6 year decay)	6131	.0360437	.1406736	0	1
Conflict ending w/ PA (6 year decay)	6131	.0114895	.0826543	0	1
Conflict ending w/o PA (6 year decay)	6131	.0645485	.1862931	0	1
PA ending w/ gender (6 year decay)	6131	.0056636	.058521	0	1
PA ending w/o gender (6 year decay)	6131	.0058258	.0573928	0	1
Major conflict ending (8 year decay)	6131	.0425565	.1577401	0	1
Minor conflict ending (8 year decay)	6131	.0403914	.1473474	0	1
Conflict ending w/ PA (8 year decay)	6131	.0127626	.0865698	0	1
Conflict ending w/o PA (8 year decay)	6131	.0718009	.1940667	0	1
PA ending w/ gender (8 year decay)	6131	.0062837	.0612847	0	1
PA ending w/o gender (8 year decay)	6131	.0064789	.0602247	0	1
Major conflict ending (10 year decay)	6131	.0462252	.1635892	0	1
Minor conflict ending (10 year decay)	6131	.0446593	.1535711	0	1
Conflict ending w/ PA (10 year decay)	6131	.0139877	.0902542	0	1
Conflict ending w/o PA (10 year decay)	6131	.0788328	.201218	0	1

PA ending w/ gender (10 year decay)	6131	.0068802	.063889	0	1
PA ending w/o gender (10 year decay)	6131	.0071076	.0629129	0	1
Major conflict ending (12 year decay)	6131	.0496764	.1689521	0	1
Minor conflict ending (12 year decay)	6131	.0487875	.1593174	0	1
Conflict ending w/ PA (12 year decay)	6131	.0151475	.0936852	0	1
Conflict ending w/o PA (12 year decay)	6131	.0855557	.2077345	0	1
PA ending w/ gender (12 year decay)	6131	.0074449	.0663173	0	1
PA ending w/o gender (12 year decay)	6131	.0077026	.0654327	0	1
Major conflict ending, 2 year dummy	6131	.0194096	.1379708	0	1
Minor conflict ending, 2 year dummy	6131	.0179416	.1327501	0	1
Conflict ending w/ PA, 2 year dummy	6131	.0058718	.0764086	0	1
Conflict ending w/o PA, 2 year dummy	6131	.0322949	.1767966	0	1
PA ending w/ gender, 2 year dummy	6131	.0027728	.0525886	0	1
PA ending w/o gender, 2 year dummy	6131	.003099	.0555869	0	1
Major conflict ending, 4 year dummy	6131	.0194096	.1379708	0	1
Minor conflict ending, 4 year dummy	6131	.0342522	.181891	0	1
Conflict ending w/ PA, 4 year dummy	6131	.0058718	.0764086	0	1
Conflict ending w/o PA, 4 year dummy	6131	.0322949	.1767966	0	1
PA ending w/ gender, 4 year dummy	6131	.0027728	.0525886	0	1
PA ending w/o gender, 4 year dummy	6131	.003099	.0555869	0	1
Major conflict ending, 6 year dummy	6131	.0194096	.1379708	0	1
Minor conflict ending, 6 year dummy	6131	.0490948	.2160835	0	1
Conflict ending w/ PA, 6 year dummy	6131	.0058718	.0764086	0	1
Conflict ending w/o PA, 6 year dummy	6131	.0322949	.1767966	0	1
PA ending w/ gender, 6 year dummy	6131	.0027728	.0525886	0	1
PA ending w/o gender, 6 year dummy	6131	.003099	.0555869	0	1
Access to justice	6131	.223043	2.776169	-54.70374	36.18763
Freedom of discussion	6131	.3372301	4.114526	-37.65994	49.30338
CSO activity	6131	.3061794	2.741452	-36.5593	43.16461
Discussion level (t-1)	6131	59.00264	21.91507	0	100
Justice level (t-1)	6131	58.97115	18.52557	0	100
CSO level (t-1)	6131	64.85651	15.74637	0	100
Democracy (t-1)	6112	.4656135	.2891253	.014	.943
(max) conflictdummy	6131	.5698907	.4951316	0	1
Post year 2000	6131	.4697439	.4991244	0	1

Table A.3. Correlation matrix

	CL	PR	Major conflict ending	Minor conflict ending	Conflict ending w/ PA	Conflict ending w/o PA	PA ending w/ gender	PA ending w/o gender	Major conflict ongoing	Minor conflict ongoing	Time	GDP per capita (t-1)	Education (t-1)	CL level (t-1)	PR level (t-1)
CL	1.000														
PR	0.281	1.000													
Major conflict ending	0.072	0.044	1.000												
Minor conflict ending	0.026	0.011	-0.054	1.000											
Conflict ending w/ PA	0.105	0.048	0.412	0.091	1.000										
Conflict ending w/o PA	0.029	0.024	0.600	0.668	0.002	1.000									
PA ending w/ gender	0.076	0.053	0.377	-0.020	0.721	-0.023	1.000								
PA ending w/o gender	0.074	0.015	0.208	0.151	0.706	0.027	0.018	1.000							
Major conflict ongoing	-0.019	0.008	-0.012	-0.028	-0.028	-0.020	-0.019	-0.020	1.000						
Minor conflict ongoing	-0.014	0.005	0.083	0.004	0.030	0.069	0.002	0.041	-0.065	1.000					
Time	-0.089	-0.054	0.005	-0.049	0.044	-0.050	0.032	0.030	-0.045	-0.010	1.000				
GDP per capita (t-1)	-0.052	-0.012	-0.172	-0.111	-0.127	-0.171	-0.085	-0.097	-0.190	-0.182	0.185	1.000			
Education (t-1)	-0.048	-0.019	-0.137	-0.126	-0.075	-0.173	-0.070	-0.037	-0.224	-0.174	0.371	0.772	1.000		
CL level (t-1)	-0.118	-0.032	-0.165	-0.100	-0.032	-0.197	-0.017	-0.029	-0.219	-0.188	0.305	0.485	0.614	1.000	
PR level (t-1)	-0.060	-0.106	-0.110	-0.074	-0.003	-0.146	0.017	-0.022	-0.163	-0.101	0.323	0.283	0.467	0.748	1.000
Observations	6131														

Table A.4. Battle-related deaths and change in female empowerment, 1975 to 2017

	(A1) CL	(A2) PR	(A3) CL	(A4) PR
Cumulative BRD decay	0.100**	0.0684*	0.0642	0.0524
	(3.46)	(2.41)	(0.96)	(0.76)
Cumulative BRD	-0.0385*	-0.00415	-0.0383*	-0.00377
	(-2.46)	(-0.32)	(-2.41)	(-0.29)
Time	-0.0160**	-0.00818	-0.0169**	-0.00859
	(-2.81)	(-1.58)	(-2.96)	(-1.65)
GDP per capita (t-1)	-0.102*	-0.0453	-0.0832	-0.0377
	(-2.17)	(-1.11)	(-1.80)	(-0.92)
Education (t-1)	0.0699**	0.0528**	0.0687**	0.0519**
	(3.15)	(2.94)	(3.12)	(2.90)
CL level (t-1)	-0.0195**		-0.0206**	
	(-4.24)		(-4.51)	
PR level (t-1)		-0.0177**		-0.0180**
		(-4.46)		(-4.59)
Conflict ending w/ PA			3.024**	1.368
			(4.25)	(1.80)
Conflict ending w/o PA			-0.328	-0.150
			(-0.66)	(-0.30)
Constant	2.277**	1.465**	2.218**	1.434**
	(4.60)	(3.78)	(4.48)	(3.70)
R^2	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02
N	6131	6131	6131	6131

Note: OLS coefficients with t-scores based on panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. CL is civil liberties; PR is political representation. The conflict ending variables are specified as decay functions of time since the last year of the conflict. *p $<$ 0.05; **p $<$ 0.01.

Table A.5. Main models with alternative decay function (halflife=4), 1975 to 2017

	(A5) CL	(A6) PR	(A7) CL	(A8) PR	(A9) CL	(A10) PR
Major conflict ending	1.059**	0.720*	0.346	0.321	0.339	0.143
	(3.62)	(2.41)	(0.99)	(0.85)	(0.98)	(0.37)
Minor conflict ending	0.347	0.181				
	(1.28)	(0.71)				
Major conflict ongoing	-0.527*	-0.00303				
	(-2.37)	(-0.01)				
Minor conflict ongoing	-0.380**	-0.0173				
	(-2.65)	(-0.12)				
Time	-0.0159**	-0.00836	-0.0167**	-0.00873	-0.0167**	-0.00878
	(-2.79)	(-1.62)	(-2.93)	(-1.68)	(-2.93)	(-1.68)
GDP per capita (t-1)	-0.103*	-0.0441	-0.0845	-0.0362	-0.0846	-0.0419
	(-2.15)	(-1.08)	(-1.81)	(-0.89)	(-1.81)	(-1.04)
Education (t-1)	0.0671**	0.0523**	0.0671**	0.0517**	0.0672**	0.0547**
	(3.02)	(2.90)	(3.03)	(2.85)	(3.02)	(3.03)
CL level (t-1)	-0.0197**		-0.0208**		-0.0208**	
	(-4.27)		(-4.53)		(-4.54)	
PR level (t-1)		-0.0176**		-0.0179**		-0.0182**
		(-4.45)		(-4.56)		(-4.63)
Conflict ending w/ PA			3.295**	1.564*		
			(5.80)	(2.53)		
Conflict ending w/o PA			-0.0376	0.0592	-0.0336	0.162
			(-0.14)	(0.23)	(-0.12)	(0.62)
Conflict ongoing			-0.418**	-0.00496	-0.418**	0.00400
			(-3.30)	(-0.04)	(-3.29)	(0.04)
PA ending w/ gender					3.343**	2.789**
					(4.10)	(3.09)
PA ending w/o gender					3.256**	0.559
					(4.67)	(0.83)
Constant	2.329**	1.456**	2.261**	1.418**	2.262**	1.458**
	(4.64)	(3.79)	(4.52)	(3.69)	(4.51)	(3.81)
R^2	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02
N	6131	6131	6131	6131	6131	6131

Note: OLS coefficients with t-scores based on panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. CL is civil liberties; PR is political representation. Decay function: Half-life parameter is set to 4 years. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.

Table A.6. Main models with alternative decay function (halflife=6), 1975 to 2017

	(A11) CL	(A12) PR	(A13) CL	(A14) PR	(A15) CL	(A16) PR
Major conflict ending	0.979**	0.660*	0.344	0.328	0.342	0.166
	(3.48)	(2.32)	(1.03)	(0.92)	(1.03)	(0.45)
Minor conflict ending	0.306	0.134				
	(1.18)	(0.55)				
Major conflict ongoing	-0.531*	-0.00718				
	(-2.39)	(-0.03)				
Minor conflict ongoing	-0.386**	-0.0211				
	(-2.69)	(-0.15)				
Time	-0.0159**	-0.00836	-0.0168**	-0.00877	-0.0168**	-0.00882
	(-2.79)	(-1.62)	(-2.94)	(-1.68)	(-2.94)	(-1.69)
GDP per capita (t-1)	-0.102*	-0.0442	-0.0840	-0.0361	-0.0841	-0.0417
	(-2.15)	(-1.09)	(-1.80)	(-0.88)	(-1.79)	(-1.03)
Education (t-1)	0.0672**	0.0522**	0.0672**	0.0516**	0.0672**	0.0546**
	(3.02)	(2.89)	(3.03)	(2.84)	(3.01)	(3.03)
CL level (t-1)	-0.0198**		-0.0209**		-0.0209**	
	(-4.27)		(-4.54)		(-4.54)	
PR level (t-1)		-0.0176**		-0.0179**		-0.0182**
		(-4.46)		(-4.57)		(-4.64)
Conflict ending w/ PA			2.975**	1.414*		
			(5.45)	(2.39)		
Conflict ending w/o PA			-0.0546	0.0120	-0.0533	0.107
			(-0.21)	(0.05)	(-0.21)	(0.43)
Conflict ongoing			-0.419**	-0.00664	-0.419**	0.00262
			(-3.30)	(-0.06)	(-3.31)	(0.02)
PA ending w/ gender					2.990**	2.514**
					(3.82)	(2.91)
PA ending w/o gender					2.963**	0.517
					(4.43)	(0.81)
Constant	2.329**	1.460**	2.261**	1.422**	2.261**	1.461**
	(4.63)	(3.80)	(4.51)	(3.70)	(4.50)	(3.81)
R^2	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02
N	6131	6131	6131	6131	6131	6131

Note: OLS coefficients with t-scores based on panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. CL is civil liberties; PR is political representation. Decay function: Half-life parameter is set to 6 years. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.

Table A.7. Main models with alternative decay function (halflife=8), 1975 to 2017

	(A17) CL	(A18) PR	(A19) CL	(A20) PR	(A21) CL	(A22) PR
Major conflict ending	0.908**	0.606*	0.342	0.332	0.344	0.185
	(3.35)	(2.23)	(1.07)	(0.98)	(1.09)	(0.53)
Minor conflict ending	0.274	0.0933				
	(1.10)	(0.40)				
Major conflict ongoing	-0.535*	-0.0110				
	(-2.41)	(-0.05)				
Minor conflict ongoing	-0.391**	-0.0243				
	(-2.72)	(-0.17)				
Time	-0.0159**	-0.00836	-0.0169**	-0.00881	-0.0169**	-0.00886
	(-2.79)	(-1.62)	(-2.95)	(-1.69)	(-2.95)	(-1.69)
GDP per capita (t-1)	-0.102*	-0.0444	-0.0838	-0.0362	-0.0838	-0.0415
	(-2.15)	(-1.09)	(-1.80)	(-0.89)	(-1.78)	(-1.03)
Education (t-1)	0.0672**	0.0521**	0.0672**	0.0515**	0.0672**	0.0545**
	(3.02)	(2.88)	(3.03)	(2.84)	(3.01)	(3.02)
CL level (t-1)	-0.0198**		-0.0209**		-0.0209**	
	(-4.27)		(-4.54)		(-4.54)	
PR level (t-1)		-0.0176**		-0.0180**		-0.0183**
		(-4.46)		(-4.59)		(-4.65)
Conflict ending w/ PA			2.683**	1.282*		
			(5.11)	(2.26)		
Conflict ending w/o PA			-0.0681	-0.0286	-0.0692	0.0593
			(-0.27)	(-0.12)	(-0.28)	(0.24)
Conflict ongoing			-0.420**	-0.00795	-0.420**	0.00153
			(-3.31)	(-0.07)	(-3.32)	(0.01)
PA ending w/ gender					2.672**	2.269**
					(3.54)	(2.74)
PA ending w/o gender					2.693**	0.481
					(4.21)	(0.79)
Constant	2.329**	1.465**	2.264**	1.427**	2.263**	1.464**
	(4.63)	(3.81)	(4.51)	(3.71)	(4.50)	(3.82)
R^2	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02
N	6131	6131	6131	6131	6131	6131

Note: OLS coefficients with t-scores based on panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. CL is civil liberties; PR is political representation. Decay function: Half-life parameter is set to 8 years. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.

Table A.8. Main models with alternative decay function (halflife=10), 1975 to 2017

	(A23) CL	(A24) PR	(A25) CL	(A26) PR	(A27) CL	(A28) PR
Major conflict ending	0.848**	0.561*	0.339	0.334	0.344	0.200
	(3.23)	(2.14)	(1.11)	(1.03)	(1.13)	(0.60)
Minor conflict ending	0.249	0.0609				
	(1.04)	(0.27)				
Major conflict ongoing	-0.539*	-0.0142				
	(-2.43)	(-0.07)				
Minor conflict ongoing	-0.394**	-0.0266				
	(-2.74)	(-0.19)				
Time	-0.0159**	-0.00836	-0.0169**	-0.00884	-0.0169**	-0.00889
	(-2.79)	(-1.61)	(-2.96)	(-1.69)	(-2.96)	(-1.70)
GDP per capita (t-1)	-0.102*	-0.0447	-0.0839	-0.0364	-0.0837	-0.0415
	(-2.15)	(-1.10)	(-1.80)	(-0.89)	(-1.78)	(-1.03)
Education (t-1)	0.0672**	0.0520**	0.0673**	0.0514**	0.0672**	0.0544**
	(3.02)	(2.88)	(3.03)	(2.83)	(3.01)	(3.01)
CL level (t-1)	-0.0198**		-0.0209**		-0.0209**	
	(-4.27)		(-4.54)		(-4.54)	
PR level (t-1)		-0.0176**		-0.0180**		-0.0183**
		(-4.47)		(-4.60)		(-4.66)
Conflict ending w/ PA			2.438**	1.174*		
			(4.81)	(2.15)		
Conflict ending w/o PA			-0.0774	-0.0608	-0.0803	0.0205
			(-0.32)	(-0.26)	(-0.34)	(0.09)
Conflict ongoing			-0.421**	-0.00887	-0.422**	0.000757
			(-3.32)	(-0.08)	(-3.32)	(0.01)
PA ending w/ gender					2.406**	2.067**
					(3.30)	(2.59)
PA ending w/o gender					2.465**	0.453
					(4.01)	(0.78)
Constant	2.329**	1.471**	2.267**	1.434**	2.266**	1.468**
	(4.62)	(3.83)	(4.51)	(3.73)	(4.50)	(3.83)
R^2	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02
N	6131	6131	6131	6131	6131	6131

Note: OLS coefficients with t-scores based on panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. CL is civil liberties; PR is political representation. Decay function: Half-life parameter is set to 10 years. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.

Table A.9. Main models with alternative decay function (halflife=12), 1975 to 2017

	(A29) CL	(A30) PR	(A31) CL	(A32) PR	(A33) CL	(A34) PR
Major conflict ending	0.797**	0.523*	0.335	0.333	0.343	0.210
	(3.13)	(2.07)	(1.14)	(1.07)	(1.17)	(0.66)
Minor conflict ending	0.231	0.0351				
	(1.00)	(0.16)				
Major conflict ongoing	-0.542*	-0.0169				
	(-2.44)	(-0.08)				
Minor conflict ongoing	-0.397**	-0.0284				
	(-2.76)	(-0.20)				
Time	-0.0159**	-0.00835	-0.0170**	-0.00887	-0.0170**	-0.00892
	(-2.79)	(-1.61)	(-2.97)	(-1.70)	(-2.96)	(-1.70)
GDP per capita (t-1)	-0.102*	-0.0449	-0.0841	-0.0366	-0.0839	-0.0415
	(-2.14)	(-1.11)	(-1.80)	(-0.90)	(-1.79)	(-1.03)
Education (t-1)	0.0672**	0.0519**	0.0674**	0.0514**	0.0672**	0.0543**
	(3.02)	(2.87)	(3.03)	(2.83)	(3.00)	(3.01)
CL level (t-1)	-0.0198**		-0.0210**		-0.0210**	
	(-4.27)		(-4.54)		(-4.54)	
PR level (t-1)		-0.0177**		-0.0181**		-0.0183**
		(-4.47)		(-4.61)		(-4.67)
Conflict ending w/ PA			2.234**	1.086*		
			(4.55)	(2.06)		
Conflict ending w/o PA			-0.0832	-0.0864	-0.0878	-0.0108
			(-0.36)	(-0.38)	(-0.38)	(-0.05)
Conflict ongoing			-0.422**	-0.00949	-0.423**	0.000221
			(-3.32)	(-0.08)	(-3.33)	(0.00)
PA ending w/ gender					2.185**	1.901*
					(3.09)	(2.47)
PA ending w/o gender					2.273**	0.431
					(3.84)	(0.77)
Constant	2.330**	1.476**	2.272**	1.440**	2.270**	1.473**
	(4.62)	(3.84)	(4.51)	(3.74)	(4.50)	(3.84)
R^2	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02
N	6131	6131	6131	6131	6131	6131

Note: OLS coefficients with t-scores based on panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. CL is civil liberties; PR is political representation. Decay function: Half-life parameter is set to 12 years. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.

Table A.10. Main model w/ alternative post-conflict specification (2 year dummy), 1975 to 2017

	(A35) CL	(A36) PR	(A37) CL	(A38) PR	(A39) CL	(A40) PR
Major conflict ending, 2 year dummy	-0.0664	0.281	-0.534	-0.0322	-0.553	-0.0932
	(-0.23)	(0.90)	(-1.83)	(-0.10)	(-1.90)	(-0.29)
Minor conflict ending, 2 year dummy	0.419	0.373				
	(1.55)	(1.50)				
Major conflict ongoing	-0.573**	-0.0133				
	(-2.58)	(-0.06)				
Minor conflict ongoing	-0.354*	0.00502				
	(-2.44)	(0.04)				
Time	-0.0151**	-0.00798	-0.0159**	-0.00831	-0.0159**	-0.00831
	(-2.64)	(-1.54)	(-2.80)	(-1.60)	(-2.80)	(-1.59)
GDP per capita (t-1)	-0.121*	-0.0544	-0.101*	-0.0443	-0.102*	-0.0490
	(-2.53)	(-1.32)	(-2.15)	(-1.08)	(-2.18)	(-1.21)
Education (t-1)	0.0682**	0.0526**	0.0683**	0.0528**	0.0689**	0.0551**
	(3.07)	(2.92)	(3.14)	(2.93)	(3.17)	(3.08)
CL level (t-1)	-0.0210**		-0.0207**		-0.0207**	
	(-4.56)		(-4.54)		(-4.56)	
PR level (t-1)		-0.0179**		-0.0178**		-0.0180**
		(-4.55)		(-4.52)		(-4.59)
Conflict ending w/ PA, 2 year dummy			4.309**	1.776**		
			(8.24)	(3.12)		
Conflict ending w/o PA, 2 year dummy			0.320	0.456*	0.324	0.469*
			(1.41)	(2.11)	(1.43)	(2.18)
Conflict ongoing			-0.388**	0.0265	-0.385**	0.0346
			(-3.07)	(0.24)	(-3.05)	(0.31)
PA ending w/ gender, 2 year dummy					4.874**	3.587**
					(6.07)	(4.32)
PA ending w/o gender, 2 year dummy					3.814**	0.189
					(5.75)	(0.29)
Constant	2.587**	1.572**	2.381**	1.465**	2.390**	1.501**
	(5.14)	(4.06)	(4.78)	(3.81)	(4.80)	(3.93)
R^2	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02
N	6131	6131	6131	6131	6131	6131

Note: OLS coefficients with t-scores based on panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. CL is civil liberties; PR is political representation. Post-conflict phase is coded as 2 year dummy. *p $<$ 0.05; **p $<$ 0.01.

Table A.11. Main model w/ alternative post-conflict specification (4 year dummy), 1975 to 2017

	(A41) CL	(A42) PR	(A43) CL	(A44) PR	(A45) CL	(A46) PR
Major conflict ending, 4 year dummy	-0.0705	0.271	-0.534	-0.0322	-0.553	-0.0932
	(-0.24)	(0.87)	(-1.83)	(-0.10)	(-1.90)	(-0.29)
Minor conflict ending, 4 year dummy	0.142	-0.0132				
	(0.71)	(-0.07)				
Major conflict ongoing	-0.579**	-0.0281				
	(-2.60)	(-0.13)				
Minor conflict ongoing	-0.359*	-0.00689				
	(-2.46)	(-0.05)				
Time	-0.0151**	-0.00797	-0.0159**	-0.00831	-0.0159**	-0.00831
	(-2.63)	(-1.53)	(-2.80)	(-1.60)	(-2.80)	(-1.59)
GDP per capita (t-1)	-0.121*	-0.0554	-0.101*	-0.0443	-0.102*	-0.0490
	(-2.53)	(-1.35)	(-2.15)	(-1.08)	(-2.18)	(-1.21)
Education (t-1)	0.0677**	0.0516**	0.0683**	0.0528**	0.0689**	0.0551**
	(3.05)	(2.87)	(3.14)	(2.93)	(3.17)	(3.08)
CL level (t-1)	-0.0210**		-0.0207**		-0.0207**	
	(-4.56)		(-4.54)		(-4.56)	
PR level (t-1)		-0.0180**		-0.0178**		-0.0180**
		(-4.57)		(-4.52)		(-4.59)
Conflict ending w/ PA, 4 year dummy			4.309**	1.776**		
			(8.24)	(3.12)		
Conflict ending w/o PA, 4 year dummy			0.320	0.456*	0.324	0.469*
			(1.41)	(2.11)	(1.43)	(2.18)
Conflict ongoing			-0.388**	0.0265	-0.385**	0.0346
			(-3.07)	(0.24)	(-3.05)	(0.31)
PA ending w/ gender, 4 year dummy					4.874**	3.587**
					(6.07)	(4.32)
PA ending w/o gender, 4 year dummy					3.814**	0.189
					(5.75)	(0.29)
Constant	2.596**	1.600**	2.381**	1.465**	2.390**	1.501**
	(5.15)	(4.13)	(4.78)	(3.81)	(4.80)	(3.93)
R^2	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02
N	6131	6131	6131	6131	6131	6131

Note: OLS coefficients with t-scores based on panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. CL is civil liberties; PR is political representation. Post-conflict phase is coded as 4 year dummy. *p $<$ 0.05; **p $<$ 0.01.

Table A.12. Main model w/ alternative post-conflict specification (6 year dummy), 1975 to 2017

	(A47) CL	(A48) PR	(A49) CL	(A50) PR	(A51) CL	(A52) PR
Major conflict ending, 6 year dummy	-0.0737	0.268	-0.534	-0.0322	-0.553	-0.0932
	(-0.25)	(0.86)	(-1.83)	(-0.10)	(-1.90)	(-0.29)
Minor conflict ending, 6 year dummy	0.0559	-0.0445				
	(0.33)	(-0.28)				
Major conflict ongoing	-0.583**	-0.0316				
	(-2.63)	(-0.15)				
Minor conflict ongoing	-0.362*	-0.00971				
	(-2.48)	(-0.07)				
Time	-0.0151**	-0.00797	-0.0159**	-0.00831	-0.0159**	-0.00831
	(-2.63)	(-1.53)	(-2.80)	(-1.60)	(-2.80)	(-1.59)
GDP per capita (t-1)	-0.122*	-0.0558	-0.101*	-0.0443	-0.102*	-0.0490
	(-2.55)	(-1.36)	(-2.15)	(-1.08)	(-2.18)	(-1.21)
Education (t-1)	0.0675**	0.0514**	0.0683**	0.0528**	0.0689**	0.0551**
	(3.04)	(2.85)	(3.14)	(2.93)	(3.17)	(3.08)
CL level (t-1)	-0.0210**		-0.0207**		-0.0207**	
	(-4.56)		(-4.54)		(-4.56)	
PR level (t-1)		-0.0180**		-0.0178**		-0.0180**
		(-4.57)		(-4.52)		(-4.59)
Conflict ending w/ PA, 6 year dummy			4.309**	1.776**		
			(8.24)	(3.12)		
Conflict ending w/o PA, 6 year dummy			0.320	0.456*	0.324	0.469*
			(1.41)	(2.11)	(1.43)	(2.18)
Conflict ongoing			-0.388**	0.0265	-0.385**	0.0346
			(-3.07)	(0.24)	(-3.05)	(0.31)
PA ending w/ gender, 6 year dummy					4.874**	3.587**
					(6.07)	(4.32)
PA ending w/o gender, 6 year dummy					3.814**	0.189
					(5.75)	(0.29)
Constant	2.607**	1.608**	2.381**	1.465**	2.390**	1.501**
	(5.17)	(4.16)	(4.78)	(3.81)	(4.80)	(3.93)
R^2	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02
N	6131	6131	6131	6131	6131	6131

Note: OLS coefficients with t-scores based on panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. CL is civil liberties; PR is political representation. Post-conflict phase is coded as 6 year dummy. *p $<$ 0.05; **p $<$ 0.01.

Table A.13. Conflict endings and change in women's freedom of discussion, 1975 to 2017

	(A53) Discussion	(A54) Discussion	(A55) Discussion
Major conflict ending	1.376**	-0.363	-0.356
	(3.13)	(-0.67)	(-0.67)
Minor conflict ending	0.726		
	(1.71)		
Major conflict ongoing	-0.521		
	(-1.68)		
Minor conflict ongoing	-0.856**		
	(-4.16)		
Time	-0.0179*	-0.0211**	-0.0211**
	(-2.21)	(-2.63)	(-2.63)
GDP per capita (t-1)	-0.152	-0.0948	-0.0946
	(-1.95)	(-1.26)	(-1.26)
Education (t-1)	0.0987**	0.105**	0.105**
	(3.01)	(3.24)	(3.25)
Discussion level (t-1)	-0.0274**	-0.0272**	-0.0272**
	(-4.73)	(-4.75)	(-4.76)
Conflict ending w/ PA		6.558**	
		(7.08)	
Conflict ending w/o PA		0.306	0.302
		(0.72)	(0.72)
PA ending w/ gender			6.511**
			(5.13)
PA ending w/o gender			6.596**
			(5.49)
Constant	2.975**	2.392**	2.391**
	(4.11)	(3.41)	(3.41)
R^2	0.03	0.04	0.04
N	6131	6131	6131

Note: OLS coefficients with t-scores based on panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. *p $<$ 0.05; **p $<$ 0.01.

Table A.14. Conflict endings and change in women's access to justice, 1975 to 2017

	(A56) Justice	(A57) Justice	(A58) Justice
Major conflict ending	0.788**	0.715	0.743
	(2.59)	(1.80)	(1.83)
Minor conflict ending	-0.0434		
	(-0.14)		
Major conflict ongoing	-0.658**		
	(-2.89)		
Minor conflict ongoing	-0.218		
	(-1.35)		
Time	-0.0144**	-0.0158**	-0.0158**
	(-3.24)	(-3.57)	(-3.56)
GDP per capita (t-1)	-0.0597	-0.0436	-0.0428
	(-1.19)	(-0.88)	(-0.86)
Education (t-1)	0.0675**	0.0722**	0.0718**
	(3.25)	(3.46)	(3.42)
Justice level (t-1)	-0.0198**	-0.0187**	-0.0187**
	(-4.60)	(-4.43)	(-4.43)
Conflict ending w/ PA		1.783**	
		(2.84)	
Conflict ending w/o PA		-0.382	-0.398
		(-1.24)	(-1.27)
PA ending w/ gender			1.593
			(1.82)
PA ending w/o gender			1.940*
			(2.51)
Constant	1.759**	1.506**	1.501**
	(4.12)	(3.59)	(3.58)
R^2	0.02	0.02	0.02
N	6131	6131	6131

Note: OLS coefficients with t-scores based on panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. *p $<$ 0.05; **p $<$ 0.01.

Table A.15. Conflict endings and change in women's CSO participation, 1975 to 2017

	(A59) CSO	(A60) CSO	(A61) CSO
Major conflict ending	0.679*	0.321	0.220
	(2.49)	(0.91)	(0.61)
Minor conflict ending	0.268		
	(1.07)		
Major conflict ongoing	-0.421		
	(-1.85)		
Minor conflict ongoing	-0.0913		
	(-0.59)		
Time	-0.00892	-0.00969	-0.00973
	(-1.79)	(-1.95)	(-1.95)
GDP per capita (t-1)	-0.103*	-0.0916	-0.0949
	(-1.96)	(-1.73)	(-1.79)
Education (t-1)	0.0661**	0.0705**	0.0720**
	(3.20)	(3.47)	(3.53)
CSO level (t-1)	-0.0292**	-0.0294**	-0.0295**
	(-5.76)	(-5.81)	(-5.83)
Conflict ending w/ PA		1.474**	
		(2.72)	
Conflict ending w/o PA		0.0524	0.111
		(0.21)	(0.44)
PA ending w/ gender			2.175**
			(2.62)
PA ending w/o gender			0.897
			(1.49)
Constant	2.803**	2.677**	2.701**
	(4.71)	(4.48)	(4.51)
R^2	0.02	0.02	0.02
N	6131	6131	6131

Note: OLS coefficients with t-scores based on panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. *p $<$ 0.05; **p $<$ 0.01.

Table A.16. Main models with control for democracy, 1975 to 2017

	(A62) CL	(A63) PR	(A64) CL	(A65) PR	(A66) CL	(A67) PR
Major conflict ending	1.057**	0.740*	0.357	0.343	0.337	0.168
	(3.62)	(2.47)	(1.02)	(0.91)	(0.98)	(0.43)
Minor conflict ending	0.352	0.201				
	(1.29)	(0.79)				
Major conflict ongoing	-0.603**	0.00295				
	(-2.60)	(0.01)				
Minor conflict ongoing	-0.395**	0.00468				
	(-2.73)	(0.03)				
Time	-0.0157**	-0.00834	-0.0166**	-0.00871	-0.0166**	-0.00878
	(-2.80)	(-1.64)	(-2.96)	(-1.70)	(-2.96)	(-1.71)
GDP per capita (t-1)	-0.102*	-0.0669	-0.0846	-0.0593	-0.0851	-0.0654
	(-2.17)	(-1.62)	(-1.83)	(-1.42)	(-1.84)	(-1.59)
Education (t-1)	0.0654**	0.0426*	0.0652**	0.0422*	0.0655**	0.0452*
	(2.97)	(2.42)	(2.98)	(2.39)	(2.98)	(2.57)
CL level (t-1)	-0.0269**		-0.0279**		-0.0279**	
	(-4.50)		(-4.70)		(-4.70)	
Democracy (t-1)	0.508*	0.657**	0.509*	0.645**	0.508*	0.647**
	(1.97)	(3.69)	(1.97)	(3.64)	(1.97)	(3.66)
PR level (t-1)		-0.0235**		-0.0237**		-0.0240**
		(-5.19)		(-5.25)		(-5.31)
Conflict ending w/ PA			3.389**	1.523*		
			(5.91)	(2.42)		
Conflict ending w/o PA			-0.0371	0.0849	-0.0256	0.186
			(-0.14)	(0.33)	(-0.09)	(0.71)
Conflict ongoing			-0.454**	0.00997	-0.453**	0.0184
			(-3.52)	(0.09)	(-3.51)	(0.16)
PA ending w/ gender					3.535**	2.811**
					(4.21)	(2.99)
PA ending w/o gender					3.277**	0.536
					(4.72)	(0.79)
Constant	2.553**	1.726**	2.487**	1.686**	2.490**	1.731**
	(5.17)	(4.31)	(5.05)	(4.20)	(5.04)	(4.32)
R^2	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.02
N	6112	6112	6112	6112	6112	6112

Note: OLS coefficients with t-scores based on panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. *p $<$ 0.05; **p $<$ 0.01.

Table A.17. Main models, non-conflict countries excluded, 1975 to 2017

	(A68) CL	(A69) PR	(A70) CL	(A71) PR	(A72) CL	(A73) PR
Major conflict ending	1.067**	0.634*	0.244	0.227	0.217	0.0255
	(3.58)	(2.06)	(0.68)	(0.59)	(0.61)	(0.06)
Minor conflict ending	0.492	0.221				
	(1.76)	(0.85)				
Major conflict ongoing	-0.610*	-0.0809				
	(-2.55)	(-0.36)				
Minor conflict ongoing	-0.365*	-0.0157				
	(-2.50)	(-0.11)				
lag_polyarchy	0.266	0.383	0.245	0.358	0.242	0.357
	(0.67)	(1.20)	(0.62)	(1.12)	(0.61)	(1.12)
Time	-0.00450	-0.00323	-0.00595	-0.00380	-0.00597	-0.00383
	(-0.62)	(-0.54)	(-0.82)	(-0.62)	(-0.82)	(-0.63)
GDP per capita (t-1)	-0.126	-0.193**	-0.0932	-0.179*	-0.0948	-0.194**
	(-1.62)	(-2.58)	(-1.22)	(-2.38)	(-1.23)	(-2.62)
Education (t-1)	0.0628*	0.0672*	0.0618*	0.0665*	0.0625*	0.0723**
	(2.14)	(2.55)	(2.11)	(2.51)	(2.12)	(2.73)
CL level (t-1)	-0.0308**		-0.0319**		-0.0319**	
	(-4.04)		(-4.24)		(-4.25)	
PR level (t-1)		-0.0296**		-0.0298**		-0.0306**
		(-4.25)		(-4.33)		(-4.41)
Conflict ending w/ PA			3.496**	1.536*		
			(6.02)	(2.44)		
Conflict ending w/o PA			0.0925	0.101	0.108	0.216
			(0.33)	(0.38)	(0.39)	(0.80)
Conflict ongoing			-0.439**	-0.0312	-0.437**	-0.0225
			(-3.26)	(-0.27)	(-3.25)	(-0.20)
PA ending w/ gender					3.692**	2.978**
					(4.33)	(3.16)
PA ending w/o gender					3.346**	0.433
					(4.80)	(0.64)
Constant	2.754**	2.882**	2.589**	2.801**	2.600**	2.930**
	(3.78)	(4.09)	(3.57)	(3.99)	(3.57)	(4.17)
R^2	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.02
N	3475	3475	3475	3475	3475	3475

Note: OLS coefficients with t-scores based on panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. Only countries that experienced at least one year of civil conflict included. *p $<$ 0.05; **p $<$ 0.01.

Table A.18. Main models with interaction between the end of conflict and post-2000, 1975 to 2017

	(A74) CL	(A75) PR	(A76) CL	(A77) PR	(A78) CL	(A79) PR
Major conflict ending	1.221**	0.832*	0.356	0.325	0.341	0.148
	(3.14)	(2.15)	(1.02)	(0.87)	(0.98)	(0.38)
Post 2000	-0.212	-0.0626	-0.213	-0.0641	-0.244	-0.0535
	(-0.79)	(-0.26)	(-0.81)	(-0.27)	(-0.92)	(-0.23)
Post 2000* Major conflict ending	-0.435	-0.284				
	(-0.76)	(-0.46)				
Minor conflict ending	0.328	0.176				
	(1.21)	(0.69)				
Major conflict ongoing	-0.535*	-0.00584				
	(-2.40)	(-0.03)				
Minor conflict ongoing	-0.387**	-0.0190				
	(-2.70)	(-0.14)				
Time	-0.00817	-0.00592	-0.00889	-0.00626	-0.00809	-0.00633
	(-0.77)	(-0.61)	(-0.84)	(-0.65)	(-0.76)	(-0.65)
GDP per capita (t-1)	-0.102*	-0.0441	-0.0815	-0.0353	-0.0809	-0.0388
	(-2.14)	(-1.09)	(-1.76)	(-0.86)	(-1.74)	(-0.97)
Education (t-1)	0.0662**	0.0519**	0.0654**	0.0510**	0.0654**	0.0530**
	(2.99)	(2.89)	(2.98)	(2.83)	(2.97)	(2.96)
CL level (t-1)	-0.0198**		-0.0208**		-0.0209**	
	(-4.30)		(-4.56)		(-4.56)	
PR level (t-1)		-0.0175**		-0.0179**		-0.0182**
		(-4.45)		(-4.58)		(-4.63)
Conflict ending w/ PA			4.606**	2.175*		
			(4.89)	(2.16)		
Post 2000*Conflict ending w/ PA			-2.336*	-1.089		
			(-2.17)	(-0.93)		
Conflict ending w/o PA			-0.0597	0.0522	-0.0584	0.155
			(-0.22)	(0.20)	(-0.22)	(0.59)
Conflict ongoing			-0.421**	-0.00515	-0.424**	0.00741
			(-3.32)	(-0.05)	(-3.35)	(0.07)
PA ending w/ gender					4.569**	5.088**
					(3.31)	(3.78)
Post2000*PA ending w/ gender					-2.100	-3.908*
					(-1.31)	(-2.36)
PA ending w/o gender					3.284**	0.599
					(4.66)	(0.88)
Constant	2.250**	1.431**	2.168**	1.388**	2.157**	1.410**
	(4.43)	(3.67)	(4.29)	(3.55)	(4.27)	(3.63)
R^2	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.02
N	6131	6131	6131	6131	6131	6131

Note: OLS coefficients with t-scores based on panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. *p $<$ 0.05; **p $<$ 0.01.

Table A.19. Main models with year dummies, 1975 to 2017

	(A80) CL	(A81) PR	(A82) CL	(A83) PR	(A84) CL	(A85) PR
Major conflict ending	0.977	0.678	0.392	0.355	0.382	0.162
	(1.68)	(1.81)	(0.65)	(0.81)	(0.60)	(0.36)
Minor conflict ending	0.210	0.0980				
	(0.50)	(0.32)				
Major conflict ongoing	-0.595*	-0.0122				
	(-2.36)	(-0.06)				
Minor conflict ongoing	-0.435**	-0.0466				
	(-2.65)	(-0.35)				
Time	-0.00640	0.00854	-0.00691	0.00834	-0.00693	0.00815
	(-0.52)	(0.97)	(-0.57)	(0.95)	(-0.57)	(0.93)
GDP per capita (t-1)	-0.0905*	-0.0314	-0.0727	-0.0237	-0.0730	-0.0294
	(-2.03)	(-0.73)	(-1.54)	(-0.54)	(-1.56)	(-0.68)
Education (t-1)	0.0649**	0.0475**	0.0649**	0.0469**	0.0651**	0.0500**
	(3.73)	(3.18)	(3.70)	(3.22)	(3.67)	(3.53)
CL level (t-1)	-0.0210**		-0.0220**		-0.0220**	
	(-7.28)		(-7.46)		(-7.40)	
PR level (t-1)		-0.0177**		-0.0181**		-0.0184**
		(-7.23)		(-7.26)		(-7.41)
Conflict ending w/ PA			3.187*	1.490		
			(2.51)	(1.89)		
Conflict ending w/o PA			-0.168	-0.0176	-0.161	0.0931
			(-0.41)	(-0.06)	(-0.38)	(0.30)
Conflict ongoing			-0.477**	-0.0275	-0.477**	-0.0177
			(-3.85)	(-0.29)	(-3.84)	(-0.19)
PA ending w/ gender					3.261	2.809
					(1.53)	(1.95)
PA ending w/o gender					3.126*	0.406
					(2.38)	(0.60)
Constant	1.618**	0.956**	1.553**	0.919**	1.555**	0.960**
	(2.93)	(2.84)	(2.79)	(2.70)	(2.81)	(2.85)
R^2	0.06	0.04	0.07	0.04	0.07	0.04
N	6131	6131	6131	6131	6131	6131

Note: OLS coefficients with t-scores based on panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. Year dummies included. *p $<$ 0.05; **p $<$ 0.01.

Table A.20. Main models with country fixed effects, 1975 to 2017

	(A86) CL	(A87) PR	(A88) CL	(A89) PR	(A90) CL	(A91) PR
Major conflict ending	1.645**	1.155**	0.681	0.657	0.666	0.432
	(5.95)	(4.02)	(1.77)	(1.64)	(1.70)	(1.06)
Minor conflict ending	0.447	0.261				
	(1.67)	(0.94)				
Major conflict ongoing	-0.620**	-0.0924				
	(-2.94)	(-0.42)				
Minor conflict ongoing	-0.386*	-0.0614				
	(-2.52)	(-0.39)				
Time	0.0138*	0.0356**	0.0133*	0.0354**	0.0133*	0.0360**
	(2.24)	(5.34)	(2.16)	(5.31)	(2.17)	(5.40)
GDP per capita (t-1)	-0.390**	-0.273*	-0.349**	-0.259*	-0.350**	-0.280*
	(-3.44)	(-2.30)	(-3.09)	(-2.18)	(-3.09)	(-2.36)
Education (t-1)	0.0708	0.0247	0.0668	0.0236	0.0669	0.0250
	(1.43)	(0.48)	(1.35)	(0.46)	(1.36)	(0.49)
CL level (t-1)	0.923**		0.921**		0.921**	
	(191.44)		(191.50)		(191.36)	
PR level (t-1)		0.907**		0.907**		0.906**
		(164.19)		(164.06)		(163.75)
Conflict ending w/ PA			3.586**	1.432**		
			(6.74)	(2.58)		
Conflict ending w/o PA			0.0704	0.177	0.0777	0.290
			(0.27)	(0.64)	(0.29)	(1.04)
Conflict ongoing			-0.460**	-0.0719	-0.460**	-0.0619
			(-3.28)	(-0.49)	(-3.28)	(-0.43)
PA ending w/ gender					3.680**	2.896**
					(5.04)	(3.81)
PA ending w/o gender					3.507**	0.202
					(5.17)	(0.29)
Constant	7.757**	6.514**	7.568**	6.432**	7.580**	6.636**
	(7.48)	(6.06)	(7.34)	(5.99)	(7.34)	(6.17)
R^2	0.91	0.90	0.91	0.90	0.91	0.90
N	6131	6131	6131	6131	6131	6131

Note: OLS coefficients with t-scores in parentheses. All models run with country fixed effects. *p $<$ 0.05; **p $<$ 0.01.

Table A.21. Conflict endings and change in female empowerment, 1960-2017

	(A92) CL	(A93) PR
Major conflict ending	0.969**	0.624*
	(3.93)	(2.46)
Minor conflict ending	0.0619	-0.220
	(0.27)	(-1.02)
Major conflict ongoing	-0.354	-0.00111
	(-1.77)	(-0.01)
Minor conflict ongoing	-0.369**	-0.0649
	(-2.94)	(-0.53)
Time	-0.00235	-0.000590
	(-0.57)	(-0.16)
GDP per capita (t-1)	-0.0452	-0.0171
	(-1.01)	(-0.43)
Education (t-1)	0.0551**	0.0466**
	(2.82)	(2.78)
CL level (t-1)	-0.0184**	
	(-4.70)	
PR level (t-1)		-0.0165**
		(-4.83)
Constant	1.440**	1.003**
	(3.28)	(2.79)
R^2	0.02	0.01
N	7608	7608

Note: OLS coefficients with t-scores based on panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. *p $<$ 0.05; **p $<$ 0.01.

Appendix Paper II

Models with Indicators of Government Censorship and International Media coverage

The models below include two measures capturing aspects of the media environment at the country year level. The first is "Government Censorship Effort" from the VDEM dataset (Coppedge et al., 2019a). Low values indicate that the media is highly censored while higher values indicate higher levels of media freedom. The second is a count of the number of Agence France Press and Associated Press newswire hits that are obtained with the country name in the headline or lead paragraph over a country-year. Chad is not included in these models because we were unable to create a search string that reliably separated the country 'Chad' from the personal name Chad. The results for other variables in the model are very similar to those in the main text, and we have excluded them from the table to focus on the media-related variables.

Table A.22. Correlates of Organizational Participation, Media Variables

	Political Parties	Trade Unions	Rel. Orgs	Student/Youth	Fronts	Rebel Groups	Other CSOs	Others
								(0.19)
Count of FACTIVA newswire hits	0.00	−0.00**	0.00	−0.00	0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Media Freedom from Censorship	−0.09	0.55	−0.50	−0.01	−0.02	0.44***	0.08	−0.94
	(0.14)	(0.29)	(0.44)	(0.43)	(0.16)	(0.09)	(0.21)	(0.58)
AIC	1790.60	576.89	333.12	261.24	709.52	1413.08	973.53	166.32
BIC	1901.20	687.50	443.73	371.85	820.13	1523.69	1084.13	276.93
Log Likelihood	−872.30	−265.45	−143.56	−107.62	−331.76	−683.54	−463.76	−60.16
Deviance	563.27	190.93	86.41	123.25	300.15	593.42	316.11	71.55
Num. obs.	906	906	906	906	906	906	906	906

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Coding the Religious Diversity Measure in the Main text

Next, we show indicators of religious diversity over the years 2003-2015 in Egypt. These variables were generated from the ARC data with text-matching in R (version 4.0.2) on the organization goals variable according to the rules in the table below. The organization goals variable matches the text-matching pattern if any one of the listed strings matches with the words in the organization goals variable. For example, if any of the text in the organization goals variable matched the strings *secula* OR *antiislam* then this would return a positive match for the *Secularist* variable. White space and punctuation was removed from the words before the text-matching was used.

Table A.23. Organization Size Estimate

Category	Coding Rule
Islamist	islam OR sharia OR jihad OR emirat OR salaf OR caliphat OR sunni OR muslim
Moderate Islamist	Islamist = TRUE and Liberal Moderate = TRUE
Moderate Liberal	liberal OR moderat OR centr OR center OR democra OR civilandlegalrights OR multiparty OR egalitarian OR electionintegrity OR civilsociety OR equality OR humanrights OR freedom OR plural OR freeelections OR fairelections OR libert OR suffrage OR freepress OR progressive OR humanist OR inclus AND Islamist = FALSE AND Moderate Islamist = FALSE AND Secular = FALSE AND Leftist=FALSE AND Christian = FALSE
Leftist	left OR anticapitalist OR socialis OR marx OR lenin OR trotsky OR communis OR class OR redistribution OR anticapital OR nationalization OR nationalizedeconomy
Secularist	secula OR antiislam AND Leftist = FALSE
Christian	christ OR evangel OR catholic OR gospel OR prosel OR biblic OR coptic
Other	Does not match any of the above patterns

Visualisations of the main results

Below are two figures that visualise the main results from Table 4 in the main text. Figure A.1 plots the predicted number of organizations of a given type for different values of the structural variables in the model. These estimates were generated using the `ggeffects` package in `R`. Figure A.2 visualises organization types that tend to participate together with a network graph, based on the results in Table 4 regarding how the participation of organization types is associated with the participation on other organization type. Organization-types have ties between them where we found a positive and statistically significant average marginal effect between the participation of organization type i and organization type j. The width of the ties is proportional to the size of the average marginal effects. Figure A.2 shows that rebel groups and "other" organizations tend to act alone, while fronts are most strongly associated with political party, trade union and "Other CSO" participation. Trade Unions tend to participate with CSOs, which in turn have relatively strong associations with the participation of religious groups and student/youth organizations.



Figure A.1. Visualizations: Main Results in the Text, Structural Variables



Figure A.2. Visualizations: Clustering of Organization Types in Country-Years

Appendix Paper III

Codebook for ARC-Women

1. Women in top leadership [fem.lead.high]: Did the organization have any women represented in the top leadership?

   Note: The top leadership of an organization could typically be a national board. For political parties, the top leadership would often be the executive committee. For any decentralized organizations, for example trade unions, it must be a national, not regional board. Some organizations, like fronts, are sometimes explicitly leaderless, but you can still code this variable as a 1 if there are reports mentioning that women were central among the activists or initiative-takers. Code the highest level that applies.

   0 = No women in high level leadership.

   1 = Women represented in the top leadership.

   2 = Women is leader or executive leader.

   -99 = Missing value/No basis for judgment.

2. Women's committee [wom.com]: Did the organization have a women's committee?

   Note: When searching for this variable, you can also look for the words 'women's league', 'women's council', 'women's branch', etc. If the codesheet contains information on most of the other variables not related to gender, yet there is no evidence as to whether they had a women's committee, this variable should be coded as 0 and not -99.

   0 = No evidence of a women's committee.

   1 = The organization has a women's committee.

   -99 = Missing value/No basis for judgment.

3. Gender composition of membership [gender.comp.a] [gender.comp.b]: What was the proportion of female membership in the organization?

Note: We are interested in capturing the extent to which the organization can mobilize a female constituency and this variable measures the share of formal female membership. However not all organizations have institutionalized membership, and in these cases, we can rely on self-identifying membership. For political parties, the share of female candidates in elections can be used as an indication. If you find a concrete estimate of female membership, include it here as the proportion of the membership (expressed in percentage in its decimal form). If you could not find concrete estimates, code this as a -99. Even if you are unable to identify a concrete number of female membership, please try to estimate the female membership. Qualitative descriptions of the organization (i.e "men dominated the organization at all levels" or "women ran the organization yet were excluded from top leadership positions") or other general descriptions can be used as evidence. For political parties, the number can be based on the share of women who ran in national elections.

a) A number between 0 and 1, denoting the exact share of female membership. -99 if no specific number could be found.

b) An estimated number of the female proportion:

1 = LOW: Women made up 0 - 19 % of the membership.

2 = MEDIUM: Women made up 20 - 49 % of the membership.

3 = HIGH: Women made up more than 50 % of the membership.

-99 = Missing value/No basis for judgment.

4. Gender ideology [gender.ideo]: Did the organization have a gender ideology?

Note: There must be an explicit gender ideology (the existence of a women's committee or female leaders is not enough to code gender inclusive ideology). We are interested in public statements on gender equality. The gender ideology does not have to reflect the organization's gender practices. If most of the other variables in the codebook are not missing, such as the organization's goals, code this as a 0.

0 = No evidence that the organization has an explicit gender ideology.

1 = The organization has a gender-exclusive ideology.

2 = The organization has a gender-inclusive ideology.

-99 = Missing value/No basis for judgement.

Coding process and decisions

The variables in ARC-Women were coded based on information from news sources (Factiva), NGO reports, scholarly work and organizations' websites. Open searches in Google were important for identifying, for example, organizations' websites or NGO reports. In addition, Factiva searches in French and English language were performed. A typical search would be: "Organization name + (femme* or wom?n or gender or female) + country name". If there were many hits, more specific keywords would be used. Social media profiles of organizations were also consulted when appropriate.

A first version of the gender variables were coded as part of the ARC project (Butcher et al., 2022), including open-ended questions on gender and female participation, as it was unclear *a priori* what kind of information it would be possible to find. In the second round, the gender variables were re-coded with a more specified set of variables on female participation, as described in the codebook above. In the new round, all organizations were coded by the author with some help of a research assistant. Some of the coding decisions were based on information from the first round, but additional and more specific searches were necessary to exhaust the potential information available. We were only two coders, and we made sure we made the same decisions by frequently meeting and discussing cases. Also, the author went through a substantial sample of the codesheets coded by the research assistant for quality checks.

Some general coding decisions were applied. One of them concerned how to deal with lack of evidence. When there was a lack of concrete evidence, it was hard to establish if women were in fact absent from that organization, or if there just was not sufficient information. In these cases, the coding was based on inferences: If most of the other variables in ARC were missing, the gender variables would also typically be coded as missing. But if the codesheet for an organization contained information on most other variables (not related to gender), in the absence of clear positive or negative evidence female participation would be coded 0 and not -99. In other words, based on the assumption that if information was publicly available on other features of the organization, and nothing came up in searches on female participation, then female participation was unlikely. Data limitations are also the reason why most variables are binary. For a variable like leadership, there is clearly a difference between having one woman in leadership, and having a share of fifty percent. But this types of nuances were not possible to capture across organizations with the available evidence.

Another coding decision relates to the variation over time. Capturing variation from year to year in levels of women's participation was challenging as there was not an abundance of available information on these dimensions. Therefore, some simplifications

were necessary. First, I made the assumption that once a positive gender ideology and women's committee was in place, I assumed that this would continue to exist. There could be exceptions from this rule, but it is more likely that women retain their place once there, especially if institutionalized, which is the case with a women's committee. Furthermore, for women's leadership, which is perhaps less likely to persist, information for a specific year was applied to that organization in year t, t-1, t+1 and t+2. Generally there is a tradeoff between being strict and only looking for clear positive or negative evidence, and interpreting the available information and making reasonable inferences or best guesses. Still, users of the data should be aware that even if the variables are time-variant, the information from year to year might not be 100 % precise.

There are some sources of potentially systematic biases. These are biases that should be controlled for in analyses, and they mostly pertain to the availability, or rather *lack of*, information. For countries that receive less attention by international news bureaus, or are ignored in the academic literature, it was more difficult to find information on organizational features. Furthermore, the press is more likely to report on sizable organizations than small organizations, and probably also better at covering political parties than CSOs. Also of importance is the regime's respect for civil liberties; in highly repressive contexts, dissident or human rights organizations are unlikely to share information on their leadership or structure, while in more open societies organizations would sometimes include the names of every single person in the executive bureau on their own website. Thus, scholars who use the data for analyses should control for i.a. media coverage of a country, a country's general respect for human rights, the size of the organization, and the type of organization.

Missing values

Missing information was a problem for some organizations. Where there are severe restrictions on the ability of organizations to operate freely, organizations would typically not include detailed information on the people in leadership on their websites. Moreover, some countries are poorly covered by the media and in academic research. These potentially systematic biases should be controlled for, for example by including variables capturing media attention or media censorship.

I provide one dataset with the original data, and one dataset with imputed values replacing missing values. This was achieved via multiple imputation, where I included a wide range of indicators measuring development, conflict, and regime characeteristics, as well as the other organizational variables available in the ARC dataset. I used the package 'amelia' in R to generate the imputed datasets, which resulted in five different

datasets. Across these datasets, I calculated the mean value for continuous variables and the median value for integers. In addition, I ran the main models with each of the imputed datasets to make sure that the results were not different across the imputed datasets. The results are shown in Table A.47, A.48, A.49, A.50 and A.51.

Independent variables

Leftist and liberal organizations

Organizations with liberal goals/idelogy were captured by matching any of the strings in this pattern: *liberal, democra, civilandlegalrights, multiparty, egalitarian, electionintegrity, civilsociety, equality, humanrights, freedom, liberal, plural, freeelections, fairelections, multiparty, liberties, liberty, transparency, suffrage, freepress, progressive, humanist, inclusion, inclusive.*

Leftist goals were captured by matching any of the strings in the following pattern: *left, anticapitalist, socialis, marx, lenin, trotsky, communis, class, redistribution, liberatethepeas, anticapital, economicrights, landcentraliz, nationalization, nationalizedeconomy, lumumbist, nasser, sankarism, nkrumahist.*

Additional variables tested in robustness checks

The variable mesuring a country's democracy score in Table A.35 is 'polyarchy', taken from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset.

Given research on gender and political systems specifically (Bjarnegård, 2013), which shows that clientielism is particularly detrimental to women's inclusion, I control for the degree of clientelism in Table A.36. The variable is an index provided by V-Dem, ranging from low degrees of clientielism (0) to high (1). Clientelism refers to "the targeted, contingent distribution of resources (goods, services, jobs, money, etc) in exchange for political support" (Coppedge et al., 2019b).

I control for GDP per capita (logged) in Table A.37, numbers taken from the World Bank.

In Table A.38, I control for state repression by including the Political Terror Scale (Wood and Gibney, 2010), where higher values denote higher levels of repression.

Media freedom is another variable taken from V-Dem, used in Table A.39 (Coppedge et al., 2019a). I also test the effect of news coverage in A.40, measured as the number of hits in the newswire database Factiva, variable taken from the replication dataset from Butcher et al. (2022).

To account for women's organizational resources, I rely on an indicator measuring the number of women's international NGO's (WINGO), accessed through the replication dataset by Murdie and Peksen (2015).

Finally, the additional organization-level variables included all come from the ARC dataset (Butcher et al., 2022): The total number of organizations in dissent is summarized over each country-year. Organization types are already described, the age of the organization is expressed in numbers, while the size is an ordinal scale ranging from small (1) to big (6).

Descriptive Statistics

Table A.24. Correlation between variables in ARC-women

	Leadership	Inclusive ideology	Exclusive ideology	Women's wing	>20 % fem.memb.
Leadership	1.00	0.39	-0.17	0.37	0.41
Inclusive ideology	0.39	1.00	-0.18	0.23	0.40
Exclusive ideology	-0.17	-0.18	1.00	-0.04	-0.13
Women's wing	0.37	0.23	-0.04	1.00	0.25
>20 % fem.memb.	0.41	0.40	-0.13	0.25	1.00

Table A.25. Summary statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
WIO dummy	3,411	0.25	0.43	0	1
WIO ordinal	3,411	0.87	1.13	0	4
WIO dummy alt.	3,411	0.19	0.40	0	1
Women education	3,362	5.69	3.13	0.45	11.93
Women work	3,362	26.34	24.65	0.65	95.32
Fertility	3,362	5.07	1.57	1.97	7.77
Wom. civ. lib.	3,362	0.50	0.22	0.04	0.92
Fem. empow. values	3,362	2.41	0.18	1.80	3.18
Leftist	3,411	0.15	0.35	0	1
Liberal	3,411	0.41	0.49	0	1
Population (log)	3,362	16.64	1.25	13.32	19.01
Year scaled	3,404	0.001	0.99	−5.76	3.57
Polyarchy	3,362	0.32	0.14	0.07	0.78
Polyarchy sq.	3,362	0.12	0.12	0.01	0.61
GDP per capita	3,362	7.08	0.89	5.10	9.73
Political Terror Scale	3,362	3.52	1.01	1.00	5.05
Media freedom	3,362	−0.04	1.00	−2.52	2.31
Factiva scaled	3,358	0.00	0.99	−3.19	4.45
WINGOs	3,411	34.88	16.67	−2	82
N. of orgs	3,404	0.00	0.99	−2.68	2.14
Size	3,411	2.80	1.24	1	6
Age	3,138	11.71	15.54	0.00	178.00
Rebel group	3,411	0.29	0.46	0	1
Political party	3,411	0.34	0.47	0	1
CSO	3,411	0.17	0.37	0	1
Student/ youth	3,411	0.02	0.14	0	1
Front	3,411	0.08	0.27	0	1
Religious	3,411	0.03	0.17	0	1
Women education sq.	3,362	42.20	38.83	0.20	142.30
Women work sq.	3,362	1,301.44	2,050.54	0.42	9,086.66
Fertility sq.	3,362	28.15	15.50	3.88	60.37
Wom. civ. lib. sq.	3,362	0.30	0.22	0.001	0.85

Table A.26. Correlation matrix

	Wom. education	Wom. work	Fertility rates	Wom. civ. lib.	Empow. norms	Leftist goals	Liberal goals	Population	Year	WIO dummy	WIO ordinal
Wom. education	1.000										
Wom. work	0.788	1.000									
Fertility rates	-0.879	-0.830	1.000								
Wom. civ. lib.	-0.070	-0.097	0.067	1.000							
Empow. norms	0.116	0.069	-0.119	0.519	1.000						
Leftist goals	0.145	0.163	-0.192	0.057	0.027	1.000					
Liberal goals	0.048	0.012	-0.083	0.045	0.032	0.117	1.000				
Population	0.107	-0.024	-0.066	-0.103	-0.082	-0.056	-0.070	1.000			
Year	0.201	0.050	-0.206	0.079	0.260	-0.081	-0.039	0.111	1.000		
WIO dummy	0.203	0.132	-0.175	0.114	0.185	0.099	0.151	-0.001	0.099	1.000	
WIO ordinal	0.228	0.140	-0.201	0.121	0.210	0.145	0.207	0.020	0.105	0.890	1.000
Observations	3358										

Table A.27. Data structure

Country	Year	Name	Type	WIO ordinal	WIO dummy	Leftist	Women work
Nigeria	1992	National Association of Nigerian Students	Student/ youth	0	0	1	11.461
Nigeria	1992	Association of Democratic Lawyers	CSO	0	0	0	11.461
Nigeria	1993	National Association of Nigerian Students	Student/ youth	0	0	1	11.467
Nigeria	1993	Association of Democratic Lawyers	CSO	0	0	0	11.467
Nigeria	1993	Concerned Citizens of Sokoto State	CSO	0	0	0	11.467
Nigeria	1994	National Association of Nigerian Students	Student/ youth	0	0	1	11.480
Nigeria	1994	Association of Democratic Lawyers	CSO	0	0	0	11.480
Nigeria	1998	National Association of Nigerian Students	Student/ youth	0	0	1	11.802
Nigeria	1998	Association of Democratic Lawyers	CSO	1	0	0	11.802
Nigeria	1998	People's Labour Movement	CSO	1	0	0	11.802
Nigeria	2004	National Association of Nigerian Students	Student/ youth	0	0	1	12.790
Nigeria	2007	National Association of Nigerian Students	Student/ youth	0	0	1	13.261
Zimbabwe	1998	Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights	CSO	2	1	0	22.220
Zimbabwe	1998	Zimbabwe National Students Union	Student/ youth	0	0	0	22.220
Zimbabwe	1999	Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights	CSO	2	1	0	22.666
Zimbabwe	1999	Zimbabwe National Students Union	Student/ youth	0	0	0	22.666
Zimbabwe	2000	Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights	CSO	2	1	0	22.879
Zimbabwe	2000	Zimbabwe National Students Union	Student/ youth	0	0	0	22.879
Zimbabwe	2003	Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights	CSO	3	1	0	23.084
Zimbabwe	2008	Zimbabwe National Students Union	Student/ youth	1	0	0	22.820

Table A.28. Full model with all main variables

	(A1)
Women education level (t-1)	0.11 (0.09)
Women workforce part. (t-1)	0.01 (0.01)
Fertility rates (t-1)	0.12 (0.17)
Women civil lib. (t-1)	0.90 (0.58)
Female empowerment norms (t-1)	0.53 (0.36)
Org. with leftist goals	0.54 (0.13)***
Org. with liberal goals	0.66 (0.10)***
Population (t-1)	0.29 (0.16)
Year (scaled)	0.21 (0.07)**
AIC	3158.64
BIC	3225.95
Log Likelihood	−1568.32
Num. obs.	3358
Num. groups: ccode	46
Var: ccode (Intercept)	1.26

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.29. Collinearity test of Model A1

Term	VIF	SE_factor
Women education level (t-1)	3.91	1.98
Women workforce part. (t-1)	2.32	1.52
Fertility rates (t-1)	3.38	1.84
Women civil lib. (t-1)	1.24	1.11
Female empowerment norms (t-1)	1.29	1.14
Org. with leftist goals	1.01	1.01
Org. with liberal goals	1.01	1.01
Population (t-1)	1.24	1.11
Year (scaled)	2.11	1.45

Robustness

Table A.30. Dependent variable as ordinal scale, multilevel ordered logit regression

	(A2)	(A3)	(A4)
Wom. education	0.121**		
	(0.058)		
Wom. work		0.016**	
		(0.007)	
Fertility rates			-0.103
			(0.111)
Wom. civ. lib.	0.681	0.598	0.602
	(0.500)	(0.502)	(0.504)
Empow. norms	0.398	0.379	0.391
	(0.290)	(0.291)	(0.292)
Leftist goals	0.803***	0.801***	0.805***
	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.104)
Liberal goals	0.768***	0.767***	0.764***
	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.078)
Population	0.450***	0.506***	0.475***
	(0.165)	(0.167)	(0.172)
Year	0.110*	0.164***	0.154***
	(0.058)	(0.047)	(0.056)
/			
cut1	10.265***	10.837***	9.445***
	(2.678)	(2.725)	(2.978)
cut2	11.416***	11.989***	10.596***
	(2.680)	(2.727)	(2.980)
cut3	12.461***	13.034***	11.640***
	(2.681)	(2.728)	(2.981)
cut4	14.043***	14.617***	13.223***
	(2.683)	(2.730)	(2.983)
var(_cons[ccode])	1.612***	1.636***	1.736***
	(0.425)	(0.430)	(0.473)
N	3358	3358	3358

Table A.31. Alternative operationalization of WIO (ideology excluded)

	(A5)	(A6)	(A7)
Women education level (t-1)	0.17 (0.06)**		
Women workforce part. (t-1)		0.02 (0.01)*	
Fertility rates (t-1)			−0.26 (0.12)*
Women civil lib. (t-1)	0.85 (0.62)	0.78 (0.63)	0.75 (0.62)
Female empowerment norms (t-1)	0.66 (0.39)	0.65 (0.39)	0.64 (0.39)
Org. with leftist goals	0.29 (0.14)*	0.29 (0.14)*	0.30 (0.14)*
Org. with liberal goals	0.70 (0.10)***	0.70 (0.10)***	0.69 (0.10)***
Population (t-1)	0.16 (0.16)	0.23 (0.16)	0.18 (0.16)
Year (scaled)	0.16 (0.07)*	0.24 (0.06)***	0.20 (0.07)**
AIC	2790.49	2792.75	2793.78
BIC	2845.57	2847.82	2848.86
Log Likelihood	−1386.25	−1387.38	−1387.89
Num. obs.	3358	3358	3358
Num. groups: ccode	46	46	46
Var: ccode (Intercept)	1.28	1.42	1.37

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.32. Main models, rebel groups excluded

	(A8)	(A9)	(A10)
Women education level (t-1)	0.10 (0.05)		
Women workforce part. (t-1)		0.01 (0.01)*	
Fertility rates (t-1)			−0.23 (0.11)*
Women civil lib. (t-1)	0.53 (0.61)	0.54 (0.61)	0.49 (0.61)
Female empowerment norms (t-1)	0.66 (0.39)	0.62 (0.39)	0.61 (0.39)
Org. with leftist goals	0.29 (0.13)*	0.28 (0.13)*	0.28 (0.13)*
Org. with liberal goals	0.45 (0.10)***	0.45 (0.10)***	0.45 (0.10)***
Population (t-1)	0.24 (0.14)	0.29 (0.14)*	0.26 (0.14)
Year (scaled)	0.28 (0.07)***	0.32 (0.06)***	0.27 (0.07)***
AIC	2697.51	2695.24	2696.33
BIC	2749.46	2747.19	2748.28
Log Likelihood	−1339.76	−1338.62	−1339.17
Num. obs.	2373	2373	2373
Num. groups: ccode	44	44	44
Var: ccode (Intercept)	0.97	0.95	1.01

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.33. Main models, political parties excluded

	(A11)	(A12)	(A13)
Women education level (t-1)	0.22 (0.07)**		
Women workforce part. (t-1)		0.03 (0.01)**	
Fertility rates (t-1)			−0.23 (0.15)
Women civil lib. (t-1)	1.41 (0.75)	1.40 (0.78)	1.32 (0.77)
Female empowerment norms (t-1)	0.39 (0.46)	0.38 (0.46)	0.41 (0.46)
Org. with leftist goals	0.28 (0.25)	0.28 (0.25)	0.29 (0.25)
Org. with liberal goals	0.51 (0.13)***	0.51 (0.13)***	0.50 (0.13)***
Population (t-1)	0.12 (0.18)	0.20 (0.19)	0.16 (0.19)
Year (scaled)	−0.01 (0.08)	0.08 (0.07)	0.06 (0.08)
AIC	1859.46	1857.51	1865.78
BIC	1910.83	1908.89	1917.16
Log Likelihood	−920.73	−919.76	−923.89
Num. obs.	2227	2227	2227
Num. groups: ccode	46	46	46
Var: ccode (Intercept)	1.58	1.82	1.83

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.34. Alternative model with random intercept for country AND year

	(A14)	(A15)	(A16)
Women education level (t-1)	0.23 (0.05)***		
Women workforce part. (t-1)		0.02 (0.01)**	
Fertility rates (t-1)			−0.37 (0.10)***
Women civil lib. (t-1)	1.04 (0.58)	1.10 (0.60)	0.96 (0.59)
Female empowerment norms (t-1)	0.62 (0.36)	0.73 (0.37)*	0.63 (0.37)
Org. with leftist goals	0.53 (0.13)***	0.52 (0.13)***	0.53 (0.13)***
Org. with liberal goals	0.65 (0.10)***	0.64 (0.10)***	0.63 (0.10)***
Population (t-1)	0.37 (0.16)*	0.59 (0.18)**	0.42 (0.17)*
AIC	3163.16	3173.05	3171.30
BIC	3218.23	3228.12	3226.37
Log Likelihood	−1572.58	−1577.52	−1576.65
Num. obs.	3358	3358	3358
Num. groups: year_scaled	634	634	634
Num. groups: ccode	46	46	46
Var: year_scaled (Intercept)	0.00	0.02	0.02
Var: ccode (Intercept)	1.33	1.50	1.37

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.35. Main models, control for democracy

	(A17)	(A18)	(A19)
Women education level (t-1)	0.15 (0.06)*		
Women workforce part. (t-1)		0.02 (0.01)**	
Fertility rates (t-1)			−0.18 (0.12)
Women civil lib. (t-1)	0.78 (0.63)	0.74 (0.63)	0.68 (0.64)
Female empowerment norms (t-1)	0.52 (0.37)	0.46 (0.37)	0.50 (0.37)
Org. with leftist goals	0.55 (0.13)***	0.55 (0.13)***	0.55 (0.13)***
Org. with liberal goals	0.66 (0.10)***	0.66 (0.10)***	0.66 (0.10)***
Population (t-1)	0.24 (0.15)	0.29 (0.16)	0.25 (0.16)
Year (scaled)	0.15 (0.07)*	0.22 (0.06)***	0.19 (0.07)**
Polyarchy (t-1)	1.97 (2.36)	2.71 (2.33)	2.31 (2.35)
Polyarchy sq. (t-1)	−2.12 (2.75)	−3.05 (2.72)	−2.47 (2.74)
AIC	3160.14	3158.74	3163.86
BIC	3227.45	3226.05	3231.17
Log Likelihood	−1569.07	−1568.37	−1570.93
Num. obs.	3358	3358	3358
Num. groups: ccode	46	46	46
Var: ccode (Intercept)	1.24	1.29	1.35

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.36. Main models, control for clientelism

	(A20)	(A21)	(A22)
Women education level (t-1)	0.16 (0.06)**		
Women workforce part. (t-1)		0.02 (0.01)**	
Fertility rates (t-1)			−0.18 (0.12)
Women civil lib. (t-1)	0.93 (0.59)	0.89 (0.60)	0.84 (0.59)
Female empowerment norms (t-1)	0.41 (0.37)	0.36 (0.37)	0.43 (0.37)
Org. with leftist goals	0.55 (0.13)***	0.55 (0.13)***	0.55 (0.13)***
Org. with liberal goals	0.65 (0.10)***	0.65 (0.10)***	0.65 (0.10)***
Population (t-1)	0.27 (0.16)	0.34 (0.16)*	0.29 (0.16)
Year (scaled)	0.18 (0.07)**	0.25 (0.06)***	0.22 (0.07)***
Clientelism (t-1)	−0.68 (0.50)	−0.78 (0.51)	−0.51 (0.50)
AIC	3157.01	3155.65	3161.77
BIC	3218.20	3216.84	3222.96
Log Likelihood	−1568.50	−1567.82	−1570.88
Num. obs.	3358	3358	3358
Num. groups: ccode	46	46	46
Var: ccode (Intercept)	1.36	1.41	1.45

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.37. Main models, control for GDP per capita

	(A23)	(A24)	(A25)
Women education level (t-1)	0.18 (0.08)*		
Women workforce part. (t-1)		0.02 (0.01)*	
Fertility rates (t-1)			−0.14 (0.15)
Women civil lib. (t-1)	0.93 (0.58)	0.87 (0.59)	0.79 (0.59)
Female empowerment norms (t-1)	0.54 (0.36)	0.51 (0.36)	0.52 (0.36)
Org. with leftist goals	0.55 (0.13)***	0.55 (0.13)***	0.55 (0.13)***
Org. with liberal goals	0.66 (0.10)***	0.66 (0.10)***	0.65 (0.10)***
Population (t-1)	0.24 (0.15)	0.32 (0.16)*	0.28 (0.16)
Year (scaled)	0.16 (0.07)*	0.24 (0.06)***	0.21 (0.06)**
GDP per capita log (t-1)	−0.12 (0.23)	−0.10 (0.22)	0.11 (0.22)
AIC	3158.57	3157.82	3162.57
BIC	3219.76	3219.01	3223.76
Log Likelihood	−1569.28	−1568.91	−1571.29
Num. obs.	3358	3358	3358
Num. groups: ccode	46	46	46
Var: ccode (Intercept)	1.22	1.28	1.39

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$

Table A.38. Main models, control for state repression

	(A26)	(A27)	(A28)
Women education level (t-1)	0.14 (0.06)*		
Women workforce part. (t-1)		0.02 (0.01)**	
Fertility rates (t-1)			−0.17 (0.12)
Women civil lib. (t-1)	0.80 (0.60)	0.75 (0.60)	0.69 (0.60)
Female empowerment norms (t-1)	0.50 (0.36)	0.47 (0.36)	0.48 (0.36)
Org. with leftist goals	0.55 (0.13)***	0.54 (0.13)***	0.55 (0.13)***
Org. with liberal goals	0.65 (0.10)***	0.66 (0.10)***	0.65 (0.10)***
Population (t-1)	0.26 (0.15)	0.32 (0.16)*	0.28 (0.16)
Year (scaled)	0.17 (0.07)**	0.24 (0.06)***	0.22 (0.06)***
Political Terror Scale (t-1)	−0.05 (0.07)	−0.05 (0.07)	−0.06 (0.07)
AIC	3158.46	3157.54	3162.07
BIC	3219.65	3218.73	3223.26
Log Likelihood	−1569.23	−1568.77	−1571.04
Num. obs.	3358	3358	3358
Num. groups: ccode	46	46	46
Var: ccode (Intercept)	1.24	1.29	1.34

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$

Table A.39. Main models, control for media freedom

	(A29)	(A30)	(A31)
Women education level (t-1)	0.15 (0.06)**		
Women workforce part. (t-1)		0.02 (0.01)**	
Fertility rates (t-1)			−0.18 (0.12)
Women civil lib. (t-1)	0.66 (0.65)	0.67 (0.66)	0.58 (0.66)
Female empowerment norms (t-1)	0.51 (0.36)	0.49 (0.36)	0.49 (0.36)
Org. with leftist goals	0.55 (0.13)***	0.54 (0.13)***	0.55 (0.13)***
Org. with liberal goals	0.66 (0.10)***	0.66 (0.10)***	0.66 (0.10)***
Population (t-1)	0.25 (0.15)	0.31 (0.16)*	0.27 (0.16)
Year (scaled)	0.16 (0.07)*	0.23 (0.06)***	0.20 (0.06)**
Media freedom (t-1)	0.07 (0.09)	0.05 (0.09)	0.07 (0.09)
AIC	3158.28	3157.70	3162.27
BIC	3219.47	3218.89	3223.46
Log Likelihood	−1569.14	−1568.85	−1571.13
Num. obs.	3358	3358	3358
Num. groups: ccode	46	46	46
Var: ccode (Intercept)	1.24	1.30	1.35

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$

Table A.40. Main models, control for news coverage

	(A31)	(A32)	(A33)
Women education level (t-1)	0.15 (0.06)**		
Women workforce part. (t-1)		0.02 (0.01)**	
Fertility rates (t-1)			−0.18 (0.12)
Women civil lib. (t-1)	0.87 (0.58)	0.82 (0.59)	0.79 (0.59)
Female empowerment norms (t-1)	0.51 (0.36)	0.48 (0.36)	0.50 (0.36)
Org. with leftist goals	0.55 (0.13)***	0.55 (0.13)***	0.55 (0.13)***
Org. with liberal goals	0.66 (0.10)***	0.66 (0.10)***	0.65 (0.10)***
Population (t-1)	0.25 (0.15)	0.31 (0.16)*	0.27 (0.16)
Year (scaled)	0.16 (0.07)*	0.23 (0.06)***	0.20 (0.06)**
Factiva hits (t-1)	0.03 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)
AIC	3158.38	3157.26	3162.29
BIC	3219.57	3218.45	3223.48
Log Likelihood	−1569.19	−1568.63	−1571.14
Num. obs.	3358	3358	3358
Num. groups: ccode	46	46	46
Var: ccode (Intercept)	1.26	1.31	1.36

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$

Table A.41. Main models, control for the number of women's international NGOs (WINGO)

	(A34)	(A35)	(A36)
Women education level (t-1)	0.07 (0.06)		
Women workforce part. (t-1)		0.01 (0.01)*	
Fertility rates (t-1)			−0.07 (0.11)
Women civil lib. (t-1)	0.44 (0.58)	0.43 (0.57)	0.38 (0.58)
Female empowerment norms (t-1)	0.48 (0.36)	0.44 (0.36)	0.47 (0.36)
Org. with leftist goals	0.54 (0.13)***	0.53 (0.13)***	0.54 (0.13)***
Org. with liberal goals	0.66 (0.10)***	0.66 (0.10)***	0.66 (0.10)***
Population (t-1)	−0.07 (0.16)	−0.05 (0.16)	−0.08 (0.16)
Year (scaled)	0.09 (0.07)	0.11 (0.06)	0.10 (0.07)
WINGO (t-1)	0.04 (0.01)***	0.04 (0.01)***	0.04 (0.01)***
AIC	3144.95	3141.25	3146.14
BIC	3206.14	3202.44	3207.33
Log Likelihood	−1562.48	−1560.62	−1563.07
Num. obs.	3358	3358	3358
Num. groups: ccode	46	46	46
Var: ccode (Intercept)	1.06	1.00	1.08

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.42. Main models, control for the total number of organizations in dissent

	(A37)	(A38)	(A39)
Women education level (t-1)	0.14 (0.06)*		
Women workforce part. (t-1)		0.02 (0.01)**	
Fertility rates (t-1)			−0.17 (0.12)
Women civil lib. (t-1)	0.91 (0.58)	0.87 (0.58)	0.84 (0.59)
Female empowerment norms (t-1)	0.54 (0.36)	0.51 (0.36)	0.52 (0.36)
Org. with leftist goals	0.55 (0.13)***	0.55 (0.13)***	0.56 (0.13)***
Org. with liberal goals	0.64 (0.10)***	0.64 (0.10)***	0.63 (0.10)***
Population (t-1)	0.25 (0.15)	0.30 (0.16)	0.27 (0.16)
Year (scaled)	0.17 (0.07)*	0.23 (0.06)***	0.20 (0.06)**
N. of orgs in dissent	0.08 (0.05)	0.09 (0.05)	0.09 (0.05)*
AIC	3155.68	3154.52	3158.84
BIC	3216.88	3215.71	3220.03
Log Likelihood	−1567.84	−1567.26	−1569.42
Num. obs.	3358	3358	3358
Num. groups: ccode	46	46	46
Var: ccode (Intercept)	1.26	1.30	1.36

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.43. Main models, control for organization types

	(A43)	(A44)	(A45)
Women education level (t-1)	0.05 (0.06)		
Women workforce part. (t-1)		0.01 (0.01)*	
Fertility rates (t-1)			−0.11 (0.12)
Women civil lib. (t-1)	0.12 (0.61)	0.12 (0.60)	0.09 (0.61)
Female empowerment norms (t-1)	0.54 (0.37)	0.50 (0.37)	0.52 (0.38)
Org. with leftist goals	0.41 (0.14)**	0.40 (0.14)**	0.41 (0.14)**
Org. with liberal goals	0.35 (0.10)***	0.35 (0.10)***	0.34 (0.10)***
Population (t-1)	0.21 (0.15)	0.24 (0.15)	0.22 (0.15)
Year (scaled)	0.25 (0.07)***	0.26 (0.06)***	0.24 (0.07)***
Political party	0.10 (0.36)	0.10 (0.36)	0.09 (0.36)
Trade union	0.34 (0.39)	0.33 (0.39)	0.34 (0.39)
Religious	−0.34 (0.43)	−0.34 (0.43)	−0.34 (0.43)
Student/youth	−0.68 (0.47)	−0.69 (0.47)	−0.69 (0.47)
Resistance front	−0.58 (0.40)	−0.58 (0.40)	−0.58 (0.40)
Rebel group	−2.36 (0.41)***	−2.35 (0.41)***	−2.37 (0.41)***
CSO	0.35 (0.37)	0.35 (0.37)	0.35 (0.37)
AIC	2954.52	2951.45	2954.37
BIC	3052.43	3049.36	3052.28
Log Likelihood	−1461.26	−1459.73	−1461.19
Num. obs.	3358	3358	3358
Num. groups: ccode	46	46	46
Var: ccode (Intercept)	1.23	1.18	1.23

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.44. Main models, control for organization age

	(A46)	(A47)	(A48)
Women education level (t-1)	0.15 (0.06)*		
Women workforce part. (t-1)		0.02 (0.01)**	
Fertility rates (t-1)			−0.14 (0.12)
Women civil lib. (t-1)	0.99 (0.60)	0.93 (0.61)	0.91 (0.61)
Female empowerment norms (t-1)	0.36 (0.38)	0.32 (0.38)	0.36 (0.38)
Org. with leftist goals	0.42 (0.13)**	0.42 (0.13)**	0.43 (0.13)**
Org. with liberal goals	0.76 (0.10)***	0.76 (0.10)***	0.75 (0.10)***
Population (t-1)	0.20 (0.15)	0.27 (0.16)	0.23 (0.16)
Year (scaled)	0.17 (0.07)*	0.24 (0.06)***	0.22 (0.07)***
Age of organization	0.03 (0.00)***	0.03 (0.00)***	0.03 (0.00)***
AIC	2879.97	2878.71	2884.64
BIC	2940.32	2939.06	2945.00
Log Likelihood	−1429.98	−1429.35	−1432.32
Num. obs.	3089	3089	3089
Num. groups: ccode	46	46	46
Var: ccode (Intercept)	1.26	1.32	1.39

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$

Table A.45. Main models, control for organization size

	(A40)	(A41)	(A42)
Women education level (t-1)	0.17 (0.06)**		
Women workforce part. (t-1)		0.02 (0.01)**	
Fertility rates (t-1)			−0.23 (0.12)
Women civil lib. (t-1)	1.29 (0.62)*	1.23 (0.62)*	1.20 (0.62)
Female empowerment norms (t-1)	0.64 (0.37)	0.60 (0.38)	0.61 (0.38)
Org. with leftist goals	0.51 (0.13)***	0.51 (0.13)***	0.52 (0.13)***
Org. with liberal goals	0.65 (0.10)***	0.65 (0.10)***	0.65 (0.10)***
Population (t-1)	0.31 (0.17)	0.39 (0.17)*	0.33 (0.17)
Year (scaled)	0.15 (0.07)*	0.22 (0.06)***	0.19 (0.07)**
Size of organization	0.54 (0.04)***	0.54 (0.04)***	0.54 (0.04)***
AIC	2991.37	2987.96	2995.30
BIC	3052.56	3049.15	3056.49
Log Likelihood	−1485.69	−1483.98	−1487.65
Num. obs.	3358	3358	3358
Num. groups: ccode	46	46	46
Var: ccode (Intercept)	1.49	1.55	1.59

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$

Table A.46. Exploring curvilinear effects of the country-level variables

	(A49)	(A50)	(A51)	(A52)	(A53)
Women education level (t-1)	0.36 (0.14)*				
Women education level sq. (t-1)	−0.02 (0.01)				
Women workforce part. (t-1)		0.02 (0.02)		0.02 (0.01)**	0.02 (0.01)**
Women workforce part. sq. (t-1)		−0.00 (0.00)			
Fertility rates (t-1)			0.62 (0.50)		
Fertility rates sq. (t-1)			−0.08 (0.05)		
Women civil lib. (t-1)	0.84 (0.58)	0.85 (0.59)	0.80 (0.58)	2.11 (2.19)	0.83 (0.59)
Women civil lib. sq. (t-1)				−1.30 (2.17)	
Female empowerment norms (t-1)	0.50 (0.36)	0.50 (0.36)	0.51 (0.36)	0.50 (0.36)	2.29 (5.14)
Female empowerment norms sq. (t-1)					−0.36 (1.03)
Org. with leftist goals	0.55 (0.13)***	0.54 (0.13)***	0.55 (0.13)***	0.55 (0.13)***	0.54 (0.13)***
Org. with liberal goals	0.65 (0.10)***	0.66 (0.10)***	0.65 (0.10)***	0.66 (0.10)***	0.66 (0.10)***
Population (t-1)	0.23 (0.15)	0.31 (0.16)*	0.27 (0.15)	0.31 (0.16)*	0.32 (0.16)*
Year (scaled)	0.17 (0.07)**	0.23 (0.06)***	0.20 (0.06)**	0.24 (0.06)***	0.23 (0.06)***
AIC	3156.38	3158.04	3160.24	3157.68	3157.93
BIC	3217.57	3219.23	3221.43	3218.87	3219.12
Log Likelihood	−1568.19	−1569.02	−1570.12	−1568.84	−1568.96
Num. obs.	3358	3358	3358	3358	3358
Num. groups: ccode	46	46	46	46	46
Var: ccode (Intercept)	1.25	1.30	1.29	1.27	1.30

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$

Table A.47. Main models, first imputation dataset

	(A54)	(A55)	(A56)
Women education level (t-1)	0.13 (0.05)*		
Women workforce part. (t-1)		0.02 (0.01)*	
Fertility rates (t-1)			−0.17 (0.11)
Women civil lib. (t-1)	0.81 (0.56)	0.78 (0.57)	0.74 (0.57)
Female empowerment norms (t-1)	0.36 (0.34)	0.33 (0.34)	0.34 (0.34)
Org. with leftist goals	0.63 (0.12)***	0.63 (0.12)***	0.64 (0.12)***
Org. with liberal goals	0.57 (0.09)***	0.57 (0.09)***	0.57 (0.09)***
Population (t-1)	0.22 (0.15)	0.28 (0.15)	0.24 (0.15)
Year (scaled)	0.17 (0.06)**	0.23 (0.05)***	0.20 (0.06)**
AIC	3271.76	3270.99	3274.76
BIC	3326.82	3326.06	3329.82
Log Likelihood	−1626.88	−1626.50	−1628.38
Num. obs.	3354	3354	3354
Num. groups: ccode	46	46	46
Var: ccode (Intercept)	1.13	1.19	1.21

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$

Table A.48. Main models, second imputation dataset

	(A57)	(A58)	(A59)
Women education level (t-1)	0.14 (0.06)*		
Women workforce part. (t-1)		0.02 (0.01)**	
Fertility rates (t-1)			−0.15 (0.12)
Women civil lib. (t-1)	1.09 (0.58)	1.05 (0.58)	1.03 (0.58)
Female empowerment norms (t-1)	0.32 (0.35)	0.28 (0.35)	0.30 (0.35)
Org. with leftist goals	0.57 (0.13)***	0.57 (0.13)***	0.58 (0.13)***
Org. with liberal goals	0.65 (0.09)***	0.65 (0.09)***	0.65 (0.09)***
Population (t-1)	0.26 (0.15)	0.33 (0.16)*	0.29 (0.16)
Year (scaled)	0.14 (0.06)*	0.21 (0.05)***	0.19 (0.06)**
AIC	3251.02	3249.47	3255.43
BIC	3306.08	3304.54	3310.49
Log Likelihood	−1616.51	−1615.74	−1618.71
Num. obs.	3354	3354	3354
Num. groups: ccode	46	46	46
Var: ccode (Intercept)	1.29	1.34	1.41

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$

Table A.49. Main models, third imputation dataset

	(A60)	(A61)	(A62)
Women education level (t-1)	0.12 (0.05)*		
Women workforce part. (t-1)		0.02 (0.01)**	
Fertility rates (t-1)			−0.17 (0.11)
Women civil lib. (t-1)	0.87 (0.56)	0.85 (0.56)	0.81 (0.56)
Female empowerment norms (t-1)	0.54 (0.34)	0.52 (0.35)	0.52 (0.35)
Org. with leftist goals	0.53 (0.13)***	0.52 (0.13)***	0.53 (0.13)***
Org. with liberal goals	0.61 (0.09)***	0.62 (0.09)***	0.61 (0.09)***
Population (t-1)	0.28 (0.15)	0.33 (0.15)*	0.29 (0.15)
Year (scaled)	0.16 (0.06)**	0.21 (0.05)***	0.19 (0.06)**
AIC	3290.20	3287.96	3292.26
BIC	3345.26	3343.02	3347.32
Log Likelihood	−1636.10	−1634.98	−1637.13
Num. obs.	3354	3354	3354
Num. groups: ccode	46	46	46
Var: ccode (Intercept)	1.14	1.15	1.18

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$

Table A.50. Main models, fourth imputation dataset

	(A63)	(A64)	(A65)
Women education level (t-1)	0.13 (0.06)*		
Women workforce part. (t-1)		0.02 (0.01)**	
Fertility rates (t-1)			−0.13 (0.12)
Women civil lib. (t-1)	0.84 (0.58)	0.79 (0.58)	0.76 (0.58)
Female empowerment norms (t-1)	0.53 (0.35)	0.50 (0.35)	0.52 (0.35)
Org. with leftist goals	0.58 (0.13)***	0.58 (0.13)***	0.58 (0.13)***
Org. with liberal goals	0.62 (0.09)***	0.62 (0.09)***	0.61 (0.09)***
Population (t-1)	0.22 (0.15)	0.28 (0.15)	0.24 (0.16)
Year (scaled)	0.13 (0.06)*	0.19 (0.05)***	0.18 (0.06)**
AIC	3216.58	3214.89	3220.31
BIC	3271.64	3269.95	3275.37
Log Likelihood	−1599.29	−1598.45	−1601.15
Num. obs.	3354	3354	3354
Num. groups: ccode	46	46	46
Var: ccode (Intercept)	1.29	1.32	1.42

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$

Table A.51. Main models, fifth imputation dataset

	(A66)	(A67)	(A68)
Women education level (t-1)	0.18 (0.06)**		
Women workforce part. (t-1)		0.02 (0.01)**	
Fertility rates (t-1)			−0.17 (0.12)
Women civil lib. (t-1)	0.77 (0.58)	0.72 (0.58)	0.69 (0.58)
Female empowerment norms (t-1)	0.63 (0.34)	0.62 (0.34)	0.63 (0.35)
Org. with leftist goals	0.51 (0.13)***	0.51 (0.13)***	0.52 (0.13)***
Org. with liberal goals	0.65 (0.09)***	0.65 (0.09)***	0.64 (0.09)***
Population (t-1)	0.31 (0.16)*	0.38 (0.16)*	0.33 (0.16)*
Year (scaled)	0.10 (0.06)	0.19 (0.06)***	0.17 (0.06)**
AIC	3228.12	3229.42	3235.62
BIC	3283.18	3284.48	3290.68
Log Likelihood	−1605.06	−1605.71	−1608.81
Num. obs.	3354	3354	3354
Num. groups: ccode	46	46	46
Var: ccode (Intercept)	1.32	1.35	1.41

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$

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Table A.52

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Women's rights org.	391	0.12	0.32	0	1
3 year change in emp.	391	0.01	0.02	−0.05	0.20
5 year change in emp.	391	0.01	0.02	−0.03	0.12
10 year change in emp.	390	0.01	0.01	−0.01	0.06
No. conservative org.	391	0.37	1.22	0	13
No patriarchal org.	391	2.90	4.74	0	44
Total no. orgs	391	6.46	8.81	1	73
WINGO (t-1)	391	31.89	16.66	4	82
Factiva count (t-1)	391	675.12	779.62	4	5,324
GDP per capita (t-1)	391	7.03	0.95	5.19	9.81
Population (t-1)	391	16.39	1.31	13.40	19.01
Year	391	2,004.10	8.06	1,990	2,015
% patriarchal org.	391	0.47	0.39	0.00	1.00
% conservative org.	391	0.07	0.20	0	1
Major civil conflict (t-1)	391	0.09	0.29	0	1
% muslim	391	39.61	35.51	0.05	99.75
% catholic	391	17.31	17.73	0.001	76.84

Table A.53. Correlation matrix

	Women's rights org.	Conserv. org.	Patria. org.	Total no. orgs	3-year emp.	5-year emp.	10-year emp.	WINGO (t-1)	Polyarchy (t-1)	Pop. log (t-1)	GDPpc log (t-1)	Factiva (t-1)	Year
Women's rights org.	1.000												
Conserv. org.	0.171	1.000											
Patria. org.	0.282	0.565	1.000										
Total no. orgs	0.520	0.546	0.867	1.000									
3-year emp.	-0.079	-0.121	-0.143	-0.148	1.000								
5-year emp.	-0.092	-0.096	-0.100	-0.128	0.864	1.000							
10-year emp.	-0.064	-0.144	-0.113	-0.121	0.637	0.735	1.000						
WINGO (t-1)	0.319	0.236	0.101	0.280	-0.115	-0.168	-0.165	1.000					
Polyarchy (t-1)	0.071	-0.060	-0.044	0.031	-0.118	-0.094	0.071	0.325	1.000				
Population log (t-1)	0.133	0.217	0.122	0.167	-0.019	-0.037	-0.063	0.584	0.083	1.000			
GDPpc log (t-1)	0.120	0.191	0.051	0.108	0.065	0.056	-0.027	0.167	-0.030	-0.172	1.000		
Factiva (t-1)	0.143	0.452	0.257	0.311	-0.014	-0.036	-0.075	0.608	0.013	0.531	0.224	1.000	
Year	0.134	0.182	0.002	0.082	-0.267	-0.295	-0.206	0.373	0.392	0.100	0.178	0.198	1.000
Observations	370												

Table A.54. Determinants of women's rights organizations in resistance (alternative sample)

	Model A1	Model A2	Model A3	Model A4	Model A5	Model A6
3-year change in emp.	0.70					
	(1.03)					
5-year change in emp.		0.52				
		(1.55)				
10-year change in emp.			2.59			
			(2.54)			
No. conservative orgs.					−0.04*	−0.02
					(0.02)	(0.02)
No. patriarchal orgs.				−0.03***		−0.03***
				(0.01)		(0.01)
No. orgs total	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.03***	0.02***	0.03***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
WINGO (t-1)	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01**	0.01***	0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
News coverage (t-1)	−0.00***	−0.00***	−0.00***	−0.00**	−0.00**	−0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Log GDP per capita (t-1)	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Log of population (t-1)	0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.02	0.01	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Year	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
AIC	140.86	141.22	137.67	120.27	136.86	120.87
BIC	172.11	172.47	168.88	151.52	168.11	155.60
Log Likelihood	−61.43	−61.61	−59.83	−51.13	−59.43	−50.44
Deviance	23.35	23.39	22.99	21.41	22.96	21.29
Num. obs.	238	238	237	238	238	238

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.55. Determinants of women's rights organizations in resistance (fronts only)

	Model A7	Model A8	Model A9	Model A10	Model A11	Model A12
3-year change in emp.	2.67					
	(1.83)					
5-year change in emp.		3.13				
		(2.87)				
10-year change in emp.			5.68			
			(3.94)			
No. patriarchal orgs.				−0.03		−0.02
				(0.01)		(0.01)
No. conservative orgs.					−0.02	−0.00
					(0.02)	(0.02)
No. orgs total	0.01*	0.01	0.01	0.03**	0.01	0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
WINGO (t-1)	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
News coverage (t-1)	−0.00***	−0.00***	−0.00**	−0.00**	−0.00***	−0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Log GDP per capita (t-1)	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.10*	0.10	0.10*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Log of population (t-1)	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.06	0.04	0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Year	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
AIC	124.15	125.13	121.50	122.37	125.85	124.33
BIC	149.89	150.87	147.17	148.10	151.59	152.92
Log Likelihood	−53.07	−53.56	−51.75	−52.18	−53.93	−52.16
Deviance	17.20	17.33	16.82	16.96	17.43	16.96
Num. obs.	129	129	128	129	129	129

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.56. Interaction between changes in empowerment and no. conservative/patriarchal organizations

	Model A13	Model A14
Interaction empowerment:patriarchal	0.15	
	(0.20)	
Interaction empowerment:conservative		0.72
		(0.79)
Change in empowerment	−0.38	−0.12
	(1.06)	(1.03)
% patriarchal orgs.	−0.04***	
	(0.01)	
% conservative orgs.		−0.04**
		(0.01)
No. orgs total	0.04***	0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
WINGO (t-1)	0.00*	0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
News coverage (t-1)	−0.00*	−0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Log GDP per capita (t-1)	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Log of population (t-1)	0.01	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.02)
Year	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
AIC	46.32	81.24
BIC	89.37	124.28
Log Likelihood	−12.16	−29.62
Deviance	23.14	25.42
Num. obs.	370	370

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.57. Alternative independent variables: the share of patriarchal/conservative orgs.

	Model A15	Model A16	Model A17
% patriarchal orgs.		−0.03	−0.03
		(0.04)	(0.04)
% conservative orgs.	−0.07		−0.08
	(0.07)		(0.07)
No. orgs total	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
WINGO (t-1)	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
News coverage (t-1)	−0.00***	−0.00**	−0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Log GDP per capita (t-1)	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Log of population (t-1)	0.00	−0.00	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Year	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
AIC	84.80	85.25	86.10
BIC	120.02	120.47	125.24
Log Likelihood	−33.40	−33.62	−33.05
Deviance	25.95	25.98	25.90
Num. obs.	370	370	370

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.58. Control for major civil conflict

	Model A18	Model A19	Model A20	Model A21	Model A22	Model A23
Major civil conflict (t-1)	0.13*	0.13*	0.13**	0.11*	0.12*	0.11*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
3-year change in emp.	0.49					
	(0.61)					
5-year change in emp.		0.32				
		(0.93)				
10-year change in emp.			1.22			
			(1.53)			
No. conservative orgs.					−0.04**	−0.02
					(0.01)	(0.01)
No. patriarchal orgs.				−0.04***		−0.04***
				(0.01)		(0.01)
No. orgs total	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.04***	0.02***	0.04***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
WINGO (t-1)	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.00**	0.01***	0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
News coverage (t-1)	−0.00***	−0.00***	−0.00***	−0.00**	−0.00**	−0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Log GDP per capita (t-1)	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Log of population (t-1)	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	0.00	−0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Year	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
AIC	82.19	82.71	77.58	34.96	75.62	35.41
BIC	121.87	122.40	117.24	74.65	115.31	79.06
Log Likelihood	−31.09	−31.35	−28.79	−7.48	−27.81	−6.70
Deviance	26.84	26.88	26.47	23.79	26.39	23.69
Num. obs.	391	391	390	391	391	391

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.59. Control for religious demographics

	Model A24	Model A25	Model A26	Model A27	Model A28	Model A29
% muslim population	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
% catholic population	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
3-year change in emp.	0.30					
	(0.62)					
5-year change in emp.		0.09				
		(0.93)				
10-year change in emp.			0.76			
			(1.54)			
No. conservative orgs.					−0.04**	−0.02
					(0.01)	(0.01)
No. patriarchal orgs.				−0.04***		−0.04***
				(0.01)		(0.01)
No. orgs total	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.04***	0.02***	0.04***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
WINGO (t-1)	0.01***	0.00***	0.00***	0.00*	0.00**	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
News coverage (t-1)	−0.00**	−0.00**	−0.00**	−0.00*	−0.00*	−0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Log GDP per capita (t-1)	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Log of population (t-1)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Year	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
AIC	90.14	90.37	85.81	42.99	82.64	43.03
BIC	133.80	134.03	129.44	86.64	126.30	90.66
Log Likelihood	−34.07	−34.19	−31.90	−10.49	−30.32	−9.52
Deviance	27.25	27.27	26.89	24.16	26.73	24.03
Num. obs.	391	391	390	391	391	391

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Appendix Paper V

Table A.60. Frequency of SSV and physical integrity rights

	SSV victim number above mean	SSV victim number below mean
Low respect for physical integrity rights; values 0 to 4	879	574
High respect for physical integrity rights; values 5 to 8	380	1453

Table A.61. Summary statistics

	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Antigov. protest	2,809	2.94	4.87	0	60
Antigov. protest (t-1)	2,809	2.89	4.76	0	60
Female protest	2,809	1.17	2.90	0	34
Female protest (t-1)	2,809	1.20	2.93	0	34
Antigov. female protest	2,809	0.27	0.84	0	11
Antigov. female protest (t-1)	2,809	0.27	0.84	0	11
SSR (log) (t-1)	2,809	1.47	1.83	0.00	11.78
CIRI phys. int. rights (t-1)	2,809	4.66	2.21	0	8
Women's INGOs (t-1)	2,809	37.90	25.49	0	152
Population loghed (t-1)	2,808	16.17	1.43	13.00	21.02
GDP per capita (log) (t-1)	2,809	8.15	1.49	5.10	11.42
Polyarchy (t-1)	2,809	0.51	0.27	0.01	0.92
Armed conflict (t-1)	2,809	0.15	0.36	0	1
Time (year - 1990)	2,809	12.36	5.99	2	22
SSV dummy (t-1)	2,809	0.53	0.50	0	1
SSV prevalence (t-1)	2,809	0.79	0.91	0	3
Female empowerment values (t-1)	2,698	2.64	0.28	1.89	3.64
WiRE Women frontline role	2,809	0.02	0.15	0	1
Year 2000	2,809	0.60	0.49	0	1

Table A.62. Correlation matrix

	SSR (t-1)	Protest	Wom. protest	Wom. antigov.	Protest (t-1)	Wom. protest (t-1)	Wom. antigov. (t-1)	Phys. int. rights (t-1)	WINGO (t-1)	Pop. (t-1)	GDP (t-1)	Polyarchy (t-1)	Armed conflict (t-1)	Time (year-1990)
SSR (t-1)	1.000													
Protest	0.057	1.000												
Wom. protest	0.141	0.319	1.000											
Wom. antigov.	0.110	0.222	0.754	1.000										
Protest (t-1)	0.066	0.555	0.302	0.196	1.000									
Wom. protest (t-1)	0.150	0.278	0.736	0.515	0.327	1.000								
Wom. antigov. (t-1)	0.116	0.201	0.522	0.382	0.232	0.755	1.000							
Phys .int. rights (t-1)	-0.522	-0.078	-0.126	-0.123	-0.094	-0.133	-0.133	1.000						
WINGO (t-1)	0.029	0.224	0.282	0.184	0.230	0.292	0.196	0.152	1.000					
Pop. (t-1)	0.401	0.256	0.427	0.329	0.260	0.436	0.333	-0.459	0.459	1.000				
GDP (t-1)	-0.282	0.080	0.145	0.073	0.084	0.142	0.076	0.488	0.504	-0.050	1.000			
Polyarchy (t-1)	-0.253	0.153	0.072	0.033	0.159	0.081	0.036	0.506	0.622	0.020	0.525	1.000		
Armed conflict (t-1)	0.359	0.009	0.109	0.066	0.023	0.116	0.082	-0.551	-0.045	0.293	-0.275	-0.225	1.000	
Time	0.101	0.033	-0.169	-0.137	0.030	-0.160	-0.126	-0.029	0.207	0.011	0.092	0.072	-0.018	1.000
Observations	2809													

Table A.63. Effect of SSR on protest when SSR specified as dichotomous variable

	(A1) General antigov. protest	(A2) Female protest	(A3) Female protest, antigov.
main			
SSR (log) (t-1)	-0.0250	0.0644	-0.0451
	(-0.39)	(0.79)	(-0.34)
CIRI phys. int. rights (t-1)	-0.0689***	-0.0591*	-0.0932*
	(-3.48)	(-2.19)	(-2.09)
Women's INGOs (t-1)	-0.00318	0.0112***	0.0118***
	(-1.61)	(5.25)	(3.45)
Population (log) (t-1)	0.167***	0.387***	0.432***
	(5.88)	(9.96)	(8.30)
GDP per capita (log) (t-1)	-0.0983***	0.344***	0.253***
	(-3.30)	(10.02)	(4.63)
Polyarchy (t-1)	1.147***	-1.383***	-1.025***
	(6.63)	(-7.11)	(-3.38)
Armed conflict (t-1)	-0.282**	0.348**	-0.0200
	(-3.20)	(3.20)	(-0.12)
Time (year-1990)	0.0105	-0.0770***	-0.0887***
	(1.90)	(-10.43)	(-8.24)
General antigov. protest (t-1)	0.121***	0.0200**	0.0233**
	(17.90)	(3.29)	(2.89)
Female protest (t-1)		0.102***	
		(9.32)	
Female antigov. protest (t-1)			0.235***
			(5.55)
Constant	-1.667**	-8.462***	-9.561***
	(-3.22)	(-12.52)	(-10.32)
/			
lnalpha	0.175**	-0.0303	0.473**
	(3.01)	(-0.30)	(3.09)
Observations	2809	2809	2809

t statistics in parentheses

Negative binomial regression with White robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.64. Effect of SSR on protest when SSR specified as prevalence levels

	(A4) General antigov. protest	(A5) Female protest	(A6) Female protest, antigov.
main			
SSR prev=0	0	0	0
	(.)	(.)	(.)
SSR prev=1	-0.0139	0.0442	-0.0833
	(-0.21)	(0.50)	(-0.59)
SSR prev=2	-0.0315	0.193	0.147
	(-0.31)	(1.71)	(0.83)
SSR prev=3	-0.110	-0.0334	-0.134
	(-0.83)	(-0.25)	(-0.59)
CIRI phys. int. rights (t-1)	-0.0692***	-0.0555*	-0.0849*
	(-3.47)	(-2.07)	(-1.99)
Women's INGOs (t-1)	-0.00317	0.0113***	0.0120***
	(-1.61)	(5.31)	(3.50)
Population (log) (t-1)	0.170***	0.385***	0.428***
	(5.86)	(9.78)	(7.86)
GDP per capita (log) (t-1)	-0.100***	0.345***	0.251***
	(-3.39)	(9.82)	(4.51)
Polyarchy (t-1)	1.142***	-1.397***	-1.040***
	(6.59)	(-7.18)	(-3.42)
Armed conflict (t-1)	-0.277**	0.357***	-0.00682
	(-3.13)	(3.32)	(-0.04)
Time (year-1990)	0.0108	-0.0778***	-0.0902***
	(1.95)	(-10.58)	(-8.26)
General antigov. protest (t-1)	0.121***	0.0206***	0.0240**
	(17.99)	(3.38)	(2.97)
Female protest (t-1)		0.101***	
		(9.16)	
Female antigov. protest (t-1)			0.232***
			(5.52)
Constant	-1.686**	-8.455***	-9.506***
	(-3.24)	(-12.46)	(-10.10)
/			
lnalpha	0.175**	-0.0376	0.455**
	(2.99)	(-0.36)	(2.93)
Observations	2809	2809	2809

t statistics in parentheses

Negative binomial regression with White robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.65. The effect of sexualized state repression on protest before/after year 2000

	(A7) General antigov. protest	(A8) Female protest	(A9) Female protest, antigov.
SSR (log) (t-1)	-0.0818***	-0.0151	0.0194
	(-3.41)	(-0.52)	(0.45)
After year 2000=1	-0.306*	-0.293*	-0.0954
	(-2.26)	(-2.01)	(-0.38)
After year 2000=1 × SSR (log) (t-1)	0.0921**	0.0515	-0.00944
	(2.93)	(1.44)	(-0.17)
CIRI phys. int. rights (t-1)	-0.0683***	-0.0605*	-0.0891*
	(-3.43)	(-2.27)	(-2.07)
Women's INGOs (t-1)	-0.00299	0.0114***	0.0117***
	(-1.52)	(5.37)	(3.42)
Population (log) (t-1)	0.173***	0.388***	0.425***
	(6.06)	(9.96)	(7.97)
GDP per capita (log) (t-1)	-0.0992***	0.345***	0.256***
	(-3.36)	(9.77)	(4.56)
Polyarchy (t-1)	1.131***	-1.388***	-1.016***
	(6.61)	(-7.15)	(-3.29)
Armed conflict (t-1)	-0.261**	0.339**	-0.0412
	(-2.97)	(3.12)	(-0.24)
Time (year-1990)	0.0238*	-0.0620***	-0.0814***
	(2.30)	(-5.01)	(-4.33)
General antigov. protest (t-1)	0.122***	0.0195**	0.0236**
	(17.98)	(3.18)	(2.94)
Female protest (t-1)		0.103***	
		(9.34)	
Female antigov. protest (t-1)			0.231***
			(5.53)
Constant	-1.734***	-8.488***	-9.561***
	(-3.35)	(-12.58)	(-10.25)
/			
lnalpha	0.167**	-0.0304	0.475**
	(2.88)	(-0.30)	(3.10)
Observations	2809	2809	2809

t statistics in parentheses

Negative binomial regression with White robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$



Figure A.3. The effect of SSR on female protest before/after year 2000



Figure A.4. The effect of SSR on antigov. female protest before/after year 2000



Figure A.5. The effect of SSR on antigov. protest before/after year 2000

Table A.66. Effect of SSR on protest, interaction with female empowerment norms

	(A10) General antigov. protest	(A11) Female protest	(A12) Female protest, antigov.
SSR (log) (t-1)	-0.434**	0.0471	0.0922
	(-2.65)	(0.29)	(0.36)
Empow values (t-1)	-0.643***	-0.276	-0.570
	(-3.30)	(-1.19)	(-1.40)
SSR (log) (t-1) × Empow values (t-1)	0.161*	-0.0140	-0.0297
	(2.56)	(-0.22)	(-0.30)
CIRI phys. int. rights (t-1)	-0.0773***	-0.0600*	-0.0865*
	(-4.06)	(-2.23)	(-2.03)
Women's INGOs (t-1)	-0.00157	0.0118***	0.0125***
	(-0.80)	(5.22)	(3.47)
Population (log) (t-1)	0.145***	0.370***	0.398***
	(5.07)	(9.30)	(7.44)
GDP per capita (log) (t-1)	-0.0545	0.384***	0.334***
	(-1.76)	(9.77)	(5.46)
Polyarchy (t-1)	1.244***	-1.371***	-0.883*
	(6.52)	(-5.76)	(-2.50)
Armed conflict (t-1)	-0.268**	0.329**	-0.0597
	(-2.98)	(2.97)	(-0.34)
Time (year-1990)	0.0106*	-0.0753***	-0.0876***
	(2.02)	(-10.00)	(-8.10)
General antigov. protest (t-1)	0.117***	0.0198**	0.0232**
	(17.47)	(3.29)	(2.94)
Female protest (t-1)		0.102***	
		(9.50)	
Female antigov. protest (t-1)			0.228***
			(5.58)
Constant	-0.00257	-7.791***	-8.341***
	(-0.00)	(-8.62)	(-6.16)
/			
lnalpha	0.134*	-0.0529	0.440**
	(2.27)	(-0.51)	(2.90)
Observations	2697	2697	2697

t statistics in parentheses

Negative binomial regression with White robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$



Figure A.6. The effect of SSR on female protest across different levels of female empowerment



Figure A.7. The effect of SSR on antigov. female protest across different levels of female empowerment



Figure A.8. The effect of SSR on antigov. protest across different levels of female empowerment

Table A.67. Sexualized state repression and protest same year, 1991-2012

	(A13) General antigov. protest	(A14) Female protest	(A15) Female protest, antigov.
SSR (log) (t-1)	0.023	0.013	0.025
	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.034)
CIRI phys. int. rights (t-1)	-0.062***	-0.061**	-0.086**
	(0.020)	(0.027)	(0.043)
Women's INGOs (t-1)	-0.003*	0.011***	0.012***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Population (log) (t-1)	0.159***	0.386***	0.420***
	(0.028)	(0.040)	(0.055)
GDP per capita (log) (t-1)	-0.094***	0.344***	0.258***
	(0.030)	(0.036)	(0.057)
Polyarchy (t-1)	1.164***	-1.373***	-1.012***
	(0.174)	(0.196)	(0.307)
Armed conflict (t-1)	-0.284***	0.344***	-0.037
	(0.089)	(0.109)	(0.170)
Time (year-1990)	0.010*	-0.077***	-0.090***
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.011)
General antigov. protest (t-1)	0.122***	0.020***	0.024***
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Female protest (t-1)		0.103***	
		(0.011)	
Female antigov. protest (t-1)			0.233***
			(0.042)
Constant	-1.634***	-8.434***	-9.484***
	(0.521)	(0.680)	(0.936)
/			
lnalpha	0.174***	-0.030	0.472***
	(0.058)	(0.103)	(0.154)
Observations	2809	2809	2809

Standard errors in parentheses

Negative binomial regression with White robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.68. The effect of sexualized state repression on protest, jackknife standard errors included

	(A16) General antigov. protest	(A17) Female protest	(A18) Female protest, antigov.
SSR (log) (t-1)	-0.0234	0.00976	0.0140
	(-1.26)	(0.47)	(0.40)
CIRI phys. int. rights (t-1)	-0.0718***	-0.0612*	-0.0880
	(-3.53)	(-2.24)	(-1.96)
Women's INGOs (t-1)	-0.00313	0.0113***	0.0118***
	(-1.55)	(5.18)	(3.35)
Population (log) (t-1)	0.173***	0.388***	0.424***
	(5.89)	(9.78)	(7.77)
GDP per capita (log) (t-1)	-0.101***	0.344***	0.257***
	(-3.32)	(9.62)	(4.43)
Polyarchy (t-1)	1.138***	-1.378***	-1.027**
	(6.43)	(-6.99)	(-3.28)
Armed conflict (t-1)	-0.276**	0.345**	-0.0304
	(-3.06)	(3.11)	(-0.17)
Time (year-1990)	0.0113*	-0.0768***	-0.0896***
	(2.00)	(-10.21)	(-8.14)
General antigov. protest (t-1)	0.121***	0.0201**	0.0235**
	(17.57)	(3.23)	(2.85)
Female protest (t-1)		0.102***	
		(9.17)	
Female antigov. protest (t-1)			0.233***
			(5.43)
Constant	-1.712**	-8.451***	-9.507***
	(-3.22)	(-12.27)	(-10.04)
/			
lnalpha	0.174**	-0.0300	0.472**
	(2.94)	(-0.29)	(2.97)
Observations	2809	2809	2809

t statistics in parentheses

Negative binomial regression with Jackknife standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.69. Models when years of armed conflict excluded

	(A19) General antigov. protest	(A20) Female protest	(A21) Female protest, antigov.
SSR (log) (t-1)	0.00188	0.0161	0.0181
	(0.09)	(0.63)	(0.43)
CIRI phys. int. rights (t-1)	-0.0675**	-0.110***	-0.0972*
	(-3.03)	(-3.75)	(-1.96)
Women's INGOs (t-1)	-0.00182	0.0173***	0.0193***
	(-0.82)	(7.69)	(5.25)
Population (log) (t-1)	0.158***	0.328***	0.368***
	(4.93)	(7.51)	(6.06)
GDP per capita (log) (t-1)	-0.126***	0.355***	0.244***
	(-3.79)	(8.62)	(3.70)
Polyarchy (t-1)	1.169***	-1.630***	-1.488***
	(6.09)	(-7.52)	(-4.26)
Time (year-1990)	0.00835	-0.0947***	-0.111***
	(1.31)	(-11.80)	(-9.00)
General antigov. protest (t-1)	0.119***	0.0232***	0.0268**
	(16.18)	(3.46)	(2.94)
Female protest (t-1)		0.0968***	
		(7.76)	
Female antigov. protest (t-1)			0.219***
			(4.24)
Constant	-1.348*	-7.272***	-8.332***
	(-2.27)	(-9.54)	(-8.06)
/			
lnalpha	0.201**	0.00639	0.597**
	(3.10)	(0.05)	(3.27)
Observations	2372	2372	2372

t statistics in parentheses

Negative binomial regression with White robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.70. Effect of SSR on protest, control for regions

	(A22) General antigov. protest	(A23) Female protest	(A24) Female protest, antigov.
SSR (log) (t-1)	-0.0175	0.0151	0.0150
	(-0.96)	(0.69)	(0.42)
CIRI phys. int. rights (t-1)	-0.0607**	-0.0773**	-0.116**
	(-2.82)	(-2.85)	(-2.59)
Women's INGOs (t-1)	-0.00294	0.00976***	0.0108*
	(-1.23)	(3.37)	(2.41)
Population (log) (t-1)	0.191***	0.347***	0.381***
	(6.21)	(8.12)	(6.33)
GDP per capita (log) (t-1)	-0.0947**	0.225***	0.104
	(-2.80)	(5.12)	(1.53)
Polyarchy (t-1)	0.826***	-1.056***	-0.635
	(4.51)	(-4.85)	(-1.80)
Armed conflict (t-1)	-0.222*	0.210	-0.187
	(-2.51)	(1.91)	(-1.10)
Time (year-1990)	0.0135*	-0.0746***	-0.0887***
	(2.35)	(-9.18)	(-7.40)
General antigov. protest (t-1)	0.120***	0.0213***	0.0262***
	(17.56)	(3.55)	(3.38)
Eastern Europe	0.168	0.0722	0.271
	(1.56)	(0.37)	(0.98)
Lat.Am. and Caribbean	0.237**	0.100	0.0333
	(2.73)	(0.73)	(0.14)
MENA	-0.204	0.630***	0.798***
	(-1.34)	(4.14)	(3.31)
Sub-Saharan Africa	0	0	0
	(.)	(.)	(.)
North Am./Australia/West. Eur.	0.140	0.672***	0.838**
	(0.77)	(3.43)	(2.65)
Asia	-0.0520	0.415**	0.436*
	(-0.50)	(3.29)	(2.08)
Female protest (t-1)		0.0954***	
		(8.87)	
Female antigov. protest (t-1)			0.194***
			(4.94)
Constant	-2.066***	-7.119***	-7.925***
	(-3.65)	(-9.64)	(-7.66)
/			
lnalpha	0.163**	-0.0879	0.399*
	(2.74)	(-0.82)	(2.56)
Observations	2809	2809	2809

t statistics in parentheses

Negative binomial regression with White robust standard errors in parentheses. Region dummies included: YES.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.71. DV=onset of resistance campaign with female frontline participation

	(A25) General antigov. protest	(A26) Female protest
SSR (log) (t-1)	-0.00426	0.0613
	(-0.13)	(1.55)
SSR squared (log) (t-1)	-0.00366	-0.00906
	(-0.75)	(-1.55)
CIRI phys. int. rights (t-1)	-0.0708***	-0.0586*
	(-3.55)	(-2.18)
Women's INGOs (t-1)	-0.00317	0.0114***
	(-1.61)	(5.32)
Population (log) (t-1)	0.174***	0.385***
	(6.01)	(9.95)
GDP per capita (log) (t-1)	-0.101***	0.347***
	(-3.40)	(10.02)
Polyarchy (t-1)	1.135***	-1.399***
	(6.55)	(-7.16)
Armed conflict (t-1)	-0.275**	0.349**
	(-3.11)	(3.22)
Time (year-1990)	0.0112*	-0.0776***
	(2.02)	(-10.51)
General antigov. protest (t-1)	0.121***	0.0200**
	(17.80)	(3.29)
Female protest (t-1)		0.102***
		(9.22)
Constant	-1.729***	-8.458***
	(-3.32)	(-12.47)
/		
lnalpha	0.174**	-0.0323
	(2.98)	(-0.32)
Observations	2809	2809

t statistics in parentheses

Negative binomial regression with White robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$