

# Notes from the literature

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## **Abstract**

This is a document for keeping notes from what I read in one place. Section headers are works (books or articles etc.), and should contain the reference. Sections describe, chapter or heading from the source, and the page number. Paragraphs are individual quotes, except when written in bold font, which is commentary by me.

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# **1 Nation Building - Why Some Countries Come Together While Others Fall Apart (Wimmer 2018)**

## **1.1 Introduction, p. 3**

Locals might resist a national government that intruded more into their daily lives than did its colonial predecessor. Political elites competed over who controlled the new center of power. Economic poverty, artificially drawn boundaries, the legacies of colonial divide-and-rule policies, and the weakness of postcolonial states made national political integration difficult.

## **1.2 Introduction, p. 8**

Such voluntary organizations facilitate building alliances across ethnic communities and regions, I will argue. They bundle individual interests, as it were such that politicians or state agencies can respond to them more easily. In patronage systems, by contrast, each alliance needs to be managed separately: a patron needs to provide political protection or government favors to each of his clients on an individual basis.

How far such voluntary organizations have developed matters especially in early years after a country transitions to the nation-state - when an absolutist monarchy is overthrown or when a former colony becomes independent. If a dense web of such organizations has already emerged, the new power holders can tap into these networks to extend relationships of authority and support across the country.

### 1.3 Introduction, p. 17

Rather, .I both high diversity and low capacity to provide public goods emerge in societies without a historical legacy of centralized states, as argued throughout the preceding chapters.

### 1.4 Chapter 1, p. 31

The reach of political alliance networks-rather than communication in a shared language per se - turns out to be crucial. Where these networks were confined by political boundaries such as imperial provinces, nationalists divided the space of a shared language, as in Latin America. Where language barriers within imperial domains hampered the establishment of such ties, linguistic communities were imagined as nations. This happened in Romanov Russia. Where civil societies flourished early, as in Switzerland, or where states were exceptionally capable of providing public goods, political networks stretched across ethnic divides and the nation was imagined as polyglot. In other words, the contours of political alliance networks determine which communities emerge as nations.

### 1.5 Chapter 1, p. 66

Because voluntary associations facilitate horizontal linkages across a territory, the more associational networks have developed during the period leading to the creation of a nation-state the easier it will be for the new governing elites to build alliances across ethnic divides by relying on these networks.

**Conversely, HSE's create "*vertical networks*." Potentially facilitating both mobilization of said networks, but also patronage networks.**

## **1.6 Chapter 2, p. 97**

The administrative footprint, however, of both the Ottoman Empire and the Zanzibari Sultanate was extremely light and consisted of a handful of representatives and tax collectors per town only. The city-states never managed to due the nomads of the hinterland. These could mobilize tens of thousands of warriors against which the feebly fortified coastal cities stood little chance (Lewis 1988:34-35). Only the Majeerteen Sultanate (a clan of the Darood family) situated at the Horn managed to gain effective control over the interior and represented a territorial state comparable to some of the more powerful and populous Tswana kingdoms. It remained independent from both the Ottoman Empire and the Oman Sultanate by signing a treaty with Britain in 1839. In the 1920s , Italy ended its long-lasting sovereignty through military conquest.

## **1.7 Chapter 3, p. 103**

This fragmented, embryonic, politicized administration had virtually no tax base beyond the tariffs it collected from imports and exports-a legacy of the resistance that the interior clans had mounted against any form of taxation, in turn the consequence of long centuries of living without a state. Somalia therefore became one of the most aid-dependent countries in Africa

## **1.8 Chapter 3, p. 105**

The expanded political arena also offered incentives to found new parties with both northern and southern clan elements, as the short-lived Somali Democratic Union and the more stable Somali National Congress show (Lewis 1988: 176. The latter included northern Dir and Isaaq clans bu also important Hawiye elements from the former Italian parts of the country-all united in the attempt to counter the dominance of Darood, particularly Majeerteen politicians during the first decade of independence. Indeed, it seems that

the politically dominant clans during that first decade were the Hawaiye from central Somalia, the Isaaq from the north and especially the Majeerteen from the former eponymous sultanate on the Horn (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 92), who supplied one out of two presidents and two prime ministers out of three.

### **1.9 Chapter 3, p. 105**

Further fragmentation followed. In the 1969 elections 62 parties, most of which represented narrower clan interests, competed with each other. The more broadly based SYL won again. Indicating the opportunistic nature of politics in independent Somalia, all but one member of the opposition parties defected after the election to join the government party SYL, hoping to get a piece of the pie and distribute it to their clan supporters.

### **1.10 Chapter 4, p. 148**

Third, the memories of independent statehood provided politically ambitious Polish noblemen with a model for the future. They thus confined their networks of alliances to other Polish nobles (who made up as much as 20% of the population in order to one day achieve the dream of renewed independent statehood, a dream first couched in terms of rights to dynastic succession rather than modern nationalist discourse. The peasant population, whether speaking Polish, Belorussian, Lithuanian, or Ukrainian, as well as Jewish town dwellers, remained largely excluded from these networks of agitation and mobilization and thus indifferent to the proto-nationalist cause of the Polish nobility.



## 2 How State Presence Leads to Civil Conflict (Ying 2020)

### 2.1 Abstract

Argues that conflict occurs when states attempt to penetrate areas or groups it has not controlled previously.

He tests both at *province* and "*ethnic group*" level, using the accuracy of census data in the first and global ground transportation data in the second analysis.

### 2.2 State Weakness and Civil Conflict

Two concepts are crucial in understanding state power: (1) state capacity, i.e. the overall power of a nation-state to administrate its territory (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985), and (2) state presence, i.e. the allocation of state power at the -national level. The lower the state-capacity the more likely is state presence to be insufficient and uneven across regions. Existing literature terms this phenomenon as limited statehood (Risse 2011) or incomplete sovereignty/inefficient governance (Lee 2018).

### 2.3 From State Capacity to Civil Conflict

Similar to Koren and Sarbahi 2018 but focuses on low intensity state-based violence instead of civil war.

### 3 A Short History of the Cartography of Africa (Stone 1995)

#### 3.1 Chapter 5 The Nineteenth Century: Golden Age of the Cartography of Imperialism, p. 47-48

The 19th century is a transition period leading up to the revolution of the 20th century cartography of colonialism.

Cartography in Africa is still a mix of measurement, less accurate observations, word of mouth, previous maps and sources, educated guesses and pure conjecture. Nevertheless a distinct improvement on the maps of previous periods.

Maps are generally published in the year following the return of an expedition. However, expeditions could last for years, so observations could be several years after the fact by the time they met print.

#### 3.2 Southern Africa, p. 49-50

It was the use of instruments, including a sextant, an artificial horizon, chronometer, compass and measuring chain for traversing but corrected by means of daily observation of latitude and occasional observation of longitude (de Smidt 1896), which resulted in John Barrow's influential *"General chart of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope"*, accompanying his *"Travels into the Interior of Southern Africa"*, published in 1801 (Penn 1994).

The missionary thrust northwards through the eastern Kalahari was continued by Robert Moffat, whose map of SOUTH AFRICA *"compiled for the Revd. R. Moffat's work by James Wyld"*, published in Moffat's *"Missionary Labours and Scenes in Southern Africa"* (1842) improved considerably on Campbell's depiction in the amount of geographical and ethnographic information and its accuracy. **While our data do not include the maps in**

question, we do have two maps by James Wyld among our sources.

The information which was forthcoming in the aftermath of the Great Trek duly made its appearance in contemporary maps, notably in the maps of John Arrowsmith (Schrive 1965). **Our data includes four maps by John Arrowsmith.**

### **3.3 East Africa, p. 53**

A "*Sketch Map of Eastern Africa*" accompanied Speke's journal, engraved by W. & A.K. Johnston. It contained much less of the detail which he had recorded and which was contained in the map accompanying Burton's account, with one significant difference. It showed the 'Mountains of the Moon 6000 to 8000 feet by estimation' as a horseshoe forming the catchment at the north end of Lake Tanganyika. **Our data includes a map of Africa by the same Johnstons from 1961 (two years after the first publication from Bruton and Speke's expedition). The map is clearly based on the one mentioned by Stone (1995), and includes the infamous Mountains of the Moon, as described above, and with Speke's name attached. In our next map by the Johnstons (from 1879) the erroneous mountains have been removed. In total our data contains five maps by one or more of the Johnston's.**

### **3.4 East Africa, p. 58**

Further detailed observations by sequent explorers followed, in turn to be compiled into route maps which could be used as sources by the great nineteenth century atlas publishers such as W. & A.K. Johnston, John Bartholomew and the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, but the hydrographical framework had now been provided for east and central Africa. **As mentioned previously, our data contains five Johnston maps. We also have one map by John Bartholomew and two maps by the Society**

for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge.

### 3.5 West Africa, p. 59-60

The map which accompanies Denham and Clapperton's *Narrative of Travels and Discoveries in Northern and Central Africa* (1826) extends from the Gulf of Sirtees to the Bight of Benin and is a typical explorer's transect, with comments about wells, oases, wadis and villages. The western shores of Lake Chad are firmly mapped, but the northeast shores are shown tentatively and the lower course of the Niger is speculative. The map made an immediate impact with those searching for source material to update their maps of Africa, as can be seen in John Cary's *New Map of Africa Exhibiting the Recent Discoveries constructed from the most recent travels*, published in 1828. Denham, Clapperton and Oudney's route stands out by comparison with the scarcity of information elsewhere in the Sahara, as it does on Sidney Hall's map of Africa of 1829. **Our data contains one map by Cary and one by Hall. However, not they are not the ones mentioned here.**

### 3.6 The Momentum Sustained, p. 61-62

The published findings of the explorers of West Africa fed rapidly into the mainstream of map and atlas publishing. In larger scale maps which carried forward much of the detail of the explorer's originals, the task of combining a large number of sources into a single mosaic at the selected scale was clearly a major work of cartographic compilation. This is very well seen in the atlas of *Maps of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge* (1844), which contains a small scale map of the African continent, supplemented by larger scale maps of parts of the continent. West Africa is divided into two sheets (I and II) at a scale of c.1:5,600,000 extending from Timbuktu to the Guinea Coast and from Cape Verde to Lake Chad. The extremely detailed content of the two maps includes the routes of more than twenty explorers, includ-

ing Beaufort, Gray, Mollien, Winterbottom, Caillié, Park O'Byrne, Liang, Dupuis, Bowdien, Dochart, Houghton, Dickson, Clapperton, Denham, Oudney, Lander, Hornemann, Laird, Allen, Oldfield, Coulthurst and Toole. **Not one of the two included in our data.**

### **3.7 The Momentum Sustained, p. 62**

The maps were published in 1839, (earlier then the atlas) and the explorers' dates range from Houghton in 1791 to Oldfield in 1836. **The atlas referred to is the one in the above subsection, published in 1844. In other words, in this illustrative case, maps were published three years after the expedition and was published in an atlas after eight.**

### **3.8 The Momentum Sustained, p. 63**

These 'stay-at-home scholars' (Bridges 1987b) re-examined the classical sources, and they sought to learn from anyone with recent experience of Africa. The maps of armchair geographers such as William Desborough Cooley, James McQueen and A.G. Findlay were published by the RGS and are properly part of the evolving map of the African interior in the 1850s.

### **3.9 The Momentum Sustained, p. 65**

By the End of the nineteenth century, mapping by military personnel had been instituted elsewhere in Africa, not only by French and British military authorities. However, in the context of the nineteenth century as a whole, it was peripheral in its location and limited in its extent, by comparison with the work of the explorers.

### **3.10 The Characteristics of the Cartography of Imperialism, p. 69**

The imperial relationship with Africa was essentially international in character, in the sense that the European powers shared a common purpose in the continuation of access to trade at the coast of Africa. ... On the other hand, the colonial period which was to follow can be differentiated by parochial exclusivity and nationalism within colonial boundaries in a continent partitioned among seven European powers, in contrast to the common attitudes and access among European powers which characterised the previous imperial relationship. The Europeans who made maps of Africa prior to colonial partition scribed to common attitudes of the imperial powers. The subject matter of their maps cannot easily be differentiated by their particular European country of origin. They were a part of an imperial relationship which was international in character.

### **3.11 The Characteristics of the Cartography of Imperialism, p. 70**

Professor Bridges (1982) is able to talk about unofficial planning amongst Europeans for direct intervention in East Africa by 1876, interventions which would amount to interference in the lives of Africans. Such actions were thought of as part of a laudable civilizing process involving European organizational and technological skills. It was in this context that the compilation of maps of the highest possible scientific calibre, using instrumentally determined data to measure and locate places with optimum accuracy, contributed to legitimizing European penetration and even Interference in Africa. This background situation influenced the form of the growing number of explorer's maps in the late nineteenth century.

**The rest of the page is very relevant as well, but I cannot rewrite the whole thing here.**

### **3.12 The Nineteenth Century Atlas Map of Africa, p. 72-73**

The picture of Africa which atlas publishers were presenting at the beginning of the nineteenth century was not consistent. For example, de la Rochette's *Africa* dated 1803, published by W. Faden (Tooley 1969) incorporates recent explorations in West Africa. It shows an eastward flowing upper Niger (but not the as yet undiscovered outlet to the Gulf of Guinea) and the sources of the Blue Nile. South of the Equator, it continues to rely heavily on the long standing Portuguese sources for the lower Congo and Zambezi basin, with extensive intervening otherwise blank areas containing a curious mix of textual descriptions, either of an ethnographic nature or about potential routs. On the other hand, James Cundee's *New Royal Atlas Engraved from the best modern authorities*, of 1810, includes a map of Africa *Engraved for the Revd. Mr. Evans's New Geographical Grammar* in 1809, which is much more concerned with ethnic names distributed evenly across the entire face of the continent, albeit with the recent knowledge of the drainage of West Africa as a part of the background information.

**The map published by W. Faden is not in our data, but two later ones are. Cundee is not in our data.**

### **3.13 The Nineteenth Century Atlas Map of Africa, p. 73-74**

Nevertheless, the great weight of new information becoming available from explorers' maps was clearly making an impact. This is particularly well seen in the four maps compiled in 1839 under the auspices of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, founded in 1826 to promote 'the moral improvement of the great body of the population', in part by means of publishing and distributing suitable books (Smith 1974). Their atlas entitled *Maps of the Society...* published by Chapman and Hall in 1844, contained

four maps of Africa mostly dated to 1839, one of the entire continent, one of South Africa (dated 1834), plus cover of West Africa at a larger scale in two maps. The contents of the two maps of West Africa have already been described in the context of the exploration of West Africa, but an aspect worthy of mention is their total reliance on recent explorers as their sources. This is also true of the relatively large scale maps of South Africa but less so in the case of the map of the continent on a single sheet.

**This map of the whole continent is in our data.**

### **3.14 Additional comments by me**

Stone (1995) builds the chapter covering the 19th century by covering a selection of ‘a few influential or characteristic maps. ... The choice of maps has been influenced by the valuable summary history of African exploration by Professor R.C. Bridges (1991).’ I interpret this to mean that the emphasis is on quality and the maps drawn by the explorers themselves. The overlap between our data and the maps covered by Stone (1995) should therefore give an indication of the quality of our data. At least in terms of including quality sources.

Of the 47 maps referred to in Stone (1995) only six are included in the GeoISD. However, given Stone (1995)’s emphasis on maps published by explorers and our reliance on compiled atlases this is no surprise. A different way to reckon would be to include maps by the same author or drawn by, compiled by, engraved by or published by the same author across Stone (1995) and the GeoISD. This count should be able to capture some of the maps as they have “trickled down” to atlas compilation. It is additionally a further “fuzzy” measure of quality as the quality of maps varied far more between mapmakers than between maps by the same author. By this more inclusive count close to half the maps are “partially



included” in the GeoISD (22/47).

## 4 The Art of Not Being Governed (Scott 2009)

### 4.1 State Space, p.42

The realpolitik behind this elective affinity is evident in the fact that “for European governors and Southeast Asian rulers alike, large settled populations supported by abundant amounts of food were seen as the key to authority and power.” Land grants in ninth- and twentieth-century Java, for which we have inscriptional evidence, were made in the understanding that the recipient would clear the forest and convert shifting, swidden plots into permanent irrigated rice fields (sawah). The Logic, as Jan Wisseman Christie notes, is that “sawah ... had the effect of anchoring populations and increasing their visibility, and making the size of the crop relatively stable and easy to calculate.”

**An extension of this logic would be that where once states existed, conditions for re-incorporation into a state are likely better, *ceteris paribus*.** Taken together with Ying (2020) there should be less resistance to incorporation and thus less civil conflict in pre-colonial state areas.

### 4.2 State Space, p. 53

One might emphasize with Edmund Leach the fact that “the riceland stayed in one place” and thus represented a potential ecological and demographic strong point, which a clever and lucky political entrepreneur might exploit to create a new, or revived, state space.

### 4.3 Ethnogenesis, p. 251

Much of what passes as the ethnic particularity and distinctiveness of the Shan, Burmese, and Thai cultures is closely tied to the basic devices for statebuilding. Put in another way, “stateness” is built into the foundations of ethnicity. Reciprocally, in the Shan, Burmese, and Thai view, much of the ethnicity of those populations in the hills, those not-yet-gathered-in, consists precisely of their statelessness.

### 4.4 Ethnogenesis, p. 259

The political entrepreneurs—official or not—who endeavor to mark out an identity based on supposed cultural differences are not so much discovering a social boundary as selecting one of innumerable cultural differences on which to base group distinctions. Whichever of these differences is emphasized (dialect, dress, diet, mode of sustenance presumed descent) leads to the stipulation of a different cultural and ethnographic boundary distinguishing an “us” from a “them.” This is why the invention of the tribe is best understood as a political project. The chosen boundary is a strategic choice because it is a political device for group formation.

Once overcome, conquered or incorporated into a state, pre-colonial states should be easier to govern effectively and peacefully according to Scott’s logic. However, in times of central state weakness (economic collapse, successive coups, chaotic colonial hand-over) or otherwise opportunity-costs favoring rebellion (access to lootable goods like oil or diamonds) prior state centers can reemerge or become viable alternatives to the central government. Perhaps like Somaliland or South Sudan. Not necessarily struggles for independence. More likely increased autonomy or privileged access to resources or power. I expect this to happen in PCS-areas because (1) the legitimizing effect of prior statehood, (2) these areas

have local elites on top of hierarchical social structures (Scott 2009) and (3) often have access to relatively large concentrated population. This last point however, also makes these areas vulnerable to state crack-down. This could lead these areas to remain relatively peaceful until the central government is especially weak.

A contrast could be to other, non-PCS ethnic groups. According to Scott (2009) these groups should be more numerous, more likely to be minorities, more likely to be excluded from power, more geographically dispersed and more likely to live in terrain chosen to avoid the state. For all these reasons they should be more likely to violently resist state integration (Ying 2020, Scott 2009).

The resulting different patterns of conflict should be something like the following for PCS areas/groups relative to Non-PCS groups/areas:

- Fewer conflict onsets

Conflict resolution institutions/mechanisms

Better integrated in the state already

Easy target for repression (before onset, and deterrence)

“Pacified by earlier exposure to statehood and state monopoly of violence (Pinker 2012)

Intermediate in terms of economic development at the national level? (Less than capital, more than peripheries?)

- Shorter but deadlier conflicts?

Easier to target due to more concentrated urban population, not located in geography chosen to avoid state capture. I.e. conflict more closely resembling “conventional warfare”, as opposed to guerilla warfare, than for non-PCS groups/areas.

State targeting urban centers is likely to cause more deaths.

- The most conflict events occur somewhere between the PCS area and the state capital. (As opposed to inside, or close to the core of the PCS area)?

By the time fighting has reached either the core of the PCS area either side should recognize defeat?

## **5 A History of Borno (Hiribarren 2017)**

### **5.1 Introduction, p. 14**

Its main argument is that Borno had a relatively structured territorial framework in the nineteenth century. Disputing Jeffrey Herbst's assumption that political domination was not territorial in pre-colonial Africa, this first chapter emphasises the territorial singularity of Borno by analysing its borders and the spatial structure of the kingdom. It argues that Borno was a bounded territory with a codified relationship with its vassals.

### **5.2 The Territory of Borno in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, p.30**

**The explorer Nachtigal quoted:**

Where there is no sharply defined natural frontier, such as the Chad and Shari, these boundaries are indeterminate as towards the desert, or arbitrary and fluctuating, as in the regions of Pagan and semi-Pagan tribes who have not been brought completely under control. Where the Muhammadan inhabitants of two such comparatively well-ordered states as Bornu and the Hausa country are adjacent, the boundary can be fixed fairly exactly, though encroachments on either side and boundary disputes are not lacking. Where, however, between the two lie more or less independent regions as along a great pan of the western and southern frontier of Bornu, the contours of the empire fluctuate according to the measure of military success against tribes which are kept in subjection only by force. This is the situation especially

with the regions of the Bedde, Ngizzem, Kerrikerri, Babir and Musgo, while the position in the Margin country, where the proximity of Adamawa to the south has a decisive influence, is somewhat more stable. Because of their more solid state organisation, Mandara and Logon are also in a more regular relationship of dependence upon Bornu.

**Based on what I have read, Nachtigal's description is plausible.**

### **5.3 The Territory of Borno in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, p.35**

Notions of 'space' and 'limits' are therefore present in Borno and Hausaland as much as in Europe in the nineteenth century. Thus, even if the explorers had a Eurocentric vision of the African continent, the Bornoan boundaries could have been very similar to some European ones. Indeed, the whole kingdom of Borno was a territory imagined not only by its inhabitants but also by the European travellers.

### **5.4 The Territory of Borno in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, p.37**

Cohen also quoted the case of the ruler of Zinder who was nominally under the domination of the rulers of Borno but who rebelled in the 1830s and 1840s. Every time, the Shehu of Borno had to re-establish his authority with an army. He even left a consul in Xinder to represent the Bornoan power. In the 1870s, the ruler of Xinder annexed another vassal of Borno, Muniyo. Maïkorema Zakari argued that this invasion was possible because of the weakness of Borno at the end of the nineteenth century. Thus, the relationship between Borno and its vassals depended also on the political situation in Kukawa. The distance between Borno 'proper\*' and its vassals certainly played a role but was not essential as the political situation in Kukawa seemed to be altogether more important.

## **5.5 The Territory of Borno in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, p.41**

The Europeans defined the boundaries as lines which could be closed if needed. They applied their own vision of the boundaries to the kingdom of Borno but also reminded the readers of the frontier policy used in this part of Africa. Barth by this comment revealed his knowledge of the local geopolitics but also patronised the ‘vizier’ of Borno who, according to Barth, could not properly manage his northern boundary. This last showed how tenuous the power of Borno must have been in this area.

It is clear that the traveller’s narratives were largely influenced by theories of statehood which were widespread in Europe in the nineteenth century. However, their narratives also gave precious information about the borders of nineteenth century Borno. They showed that Borno had a spatial structure which could be sometimes precisely bounded. Nineteenth century Borno was thus more than a network. Despite their fledging authority at the end of the century, the Shehus exerted their authority over a territory. It does not mean that their authority was supreme over the whole of Borno throughout the century; it rather indicates that territorial rule was one of the attributes of statehood in nineteenth-century Borno.

## **5.6 All Paths Lead to Borno, p. 47**

**A Bornoan pilgrim quoted in a French intelligence report:** The name of Borno was extended to the whole of the Empire of the Dunama which consisted for the rest, in separated states, governed by vassal dynasties; the vassality link becoming looser when these states were situated far from the center of the Empire.

## **5.7 All Paths Lead to Borno, p. 58**

The will to preserve the unity of the nineteenth-century polities was linked to the fact that they would be easier to colonise and, later, administer. Thus, if

the British and French wanted to preserve the unity of Borno, it was because it served their interests. This was the reason for which they conceptualised its territory in their negotiations.

## **5.8 The Quest for a Territorial Framework, p.72**

At the end of the nineteenth-century, the European conquest of Borno clearly displayed the ambivalent European attitudes to African polities. On the one hand, these considerations could be discarded to carve out colonies in Africa.

## **5.9 The Quest for a Territorial Framework, p.85**

Therefore, the newly created boundary of Borno was a paradox as the Westphalian boundary created in 1893 by the Germans and British divided the territory which possessed delimited boundaries. Thus, the nineteenth-century boundaries, even if blatantly ignored by the Europeans, still existed in Germany and British Borno. From 1902 to 1914, the European-made boundary became the limit of the Shehus' authority, thus recreating Borno within each colonial territory. It can be argued that the Europeans were eager to transfer the concept of nineteenth-century Borno to the newly created colonial territory. Thus, even if, as seen in the previous chapter, the nineteenth-century limits of Borno were ignored by the British and Germans in 1893, the concept of the territory of Borno was re-used as it conveyed legitimacy to each European colonial territory.

## **5.10 The Quest for a Territorial Framework, p.88**

The need for a legitimate ruler forced the British to bring Shehu Garbai into their sphere of influence as their Northern Nigerian territories through their hereditary leaders was at the centre of the British ambitions. Moreover, if the French assertions were well founded, a Kanemi ruler could have claimed suzerainty over the whole of Borno, British and German, despite the presence

of the Anglo-German boundary. In 1903 and at the start of 1904, both Shehus were still trying to levy taxes in some border-villages located on the other side of ‘their’ borders.

### **5.11 The Quest for a Territorial Framework, p.91-92**

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Borno was not an ethnic group but a kingdom.

...

Thus, for two reasons, the maps representing Borno differed from other early colonial maps of Africa. First, they represented a territory and not an ethnic group. Secondly, the kingdom of Borno was an identified and prestigious landmark for European cartographers.

### **5.12 The Resurrection of Borno: (1902-1960), p.100**

As seen previously for Machina, historical reasons were more relevant to the first colonial officers than ethnic ones. The main interest of British colonial rule was not ethnic consistency but colonial efficiency. Preserving the pre-conquest administrative framework was the key to this efficiency.

### **5.13 The Resurrection of Borno: (1902-1960), p.103**

As the authors of the maps were still European and their source information was still Bornoan, they reproduced the same image of Borno ruling over its distant peripheries. This would not be the first time the Europeans gave one of their rulers more land than he had before the European conquest. For example, when the British created the protectorate of Uganda, they transferred the southern part of the kingdom of Bunyoro to Buganda.



#### **5.14 The Resurrection of Borno: (1902-1960), p.104**

This fact could be compared with the French situation where, in theory, the French are supposed to have created new political entities based on a Cartesian and equalitarian conception of space. Actually, the administrative subdivisions in the French African colonies, the *cantons*, were based on a loose conception of the nineteenth-century territorial structures. Robert Delavignette, a French colonial administrator, stressed the inherited territoriality of these divisions: ‘The canton is in most cases a former feudal province turned into an administrative district’. In a chapter of his book *Freedom and Authority in French West Africa*, he also emphasised the role of the African chiefs in the territorial framework of the French sub-Saharan colonies. French rule was partly based on the assumption that strong pre-colonial strictures were a sound basis for their own power. For example, in what is now Burkina Faso, the French used the Mossi kingdoms as a basis for their colonial administrative division. Even after different attempts at reform in the first decade of the twentieth century, the structure of these kingdoms was preserved in the colonial administration.

#### **5.15 Re-writing the History of Borno, p.121-122**

This personal sense of belonging enabled them to administer Borno more as a ruler than as a colonial officer. Two factors were responsible for such an attitude. Firstly, the geographical distance between the administrative capitals of Northern Nigeria, Zungeru and later Kaduna, and the capital of colonial Borno. As a result Borno was particularly isolated from the rest of the colony of Northern Nigeria – arguably, the residents in charge of Sokoto never developed such a strong autonomous attitude. Secondly, it could be argued that the British colonial officials were directly influenced by the strong political framework of Borno.

### **5.16 Re-writing the History of Borno, p.129**

Furthermore, a British version of Bornoan history was also transmitted in schools. The successors of the nineteenth-century rulers of Borno also supported the teaching of Bornoan history. The monarch of Borno from 1922 to 1937, Shehu Sanda Kura, was particularly involved in this production of history books. The joint work of the colonial officers and the local elite was thus taught to the minority of young Bornoans who attended school.

### **5.17 The Reunion of Dikwa and Borno: (1916-1959), p.138-139**

The historian Michael Callahan studied the impact of the creation of mandates on European colonial policies. He revealed how the ideals of the American President Woodrow Wilson pervaded the foreign policy of Britain and France towards their mandates.

...

This mandate spirit, Callahan argues, created an obligation for the Europeans to care for the populations living in the former German colonies. By stressing that ethnic identities should not be split by colonial boundaries the British and French governments recognised a legal right for Borno to be reunited. This right was expressed in ethnic, cultural and religious terms by the colonial administration and the press.

### **5.18 Postcolonial Borno, p.165**

For example, Nigeria is supposed to be one of the best examples of an African failed state. The British amalgamation of Nigeria in 1914 is thought to be one of the culprits explaining this failure.

### **5.19 Postcolonial Borno, p.170**

In a similar vein, in 2011, a Sudanese provincial border created by the British became the international boundary separating North Sudan and South Sudan. The current dispute over the Sudanese province of Abyei shows to what extent the question of the regional borders is fundamental.

### **5.20 Postcolonial Borno, p.173-174**

The official position was that to facilitate the development of its western half, Borno was split into two parts. The creation of Yobe State was not officially triggered by ethnic strife, but the choice of the capital of the new state seemed to reveal underlying local conflicts. In 1991 the main city of the new state, Potiskum, was mainly inhabited by Ngizim, Bole and Karekare populations. The preference for Damaturu, mainly inhabited by Kanuries, as the state capital of the new state can be explained by the pressure of members of the political elite of Borno State to preserve a Kanuri grip on Yobe. The Shehu of Borno, Mustapha Amin, was particularly displeased with the creation of Yobe. As he inherited the Kanemi throne, he was the main spiritual and political authority wishing to safeguard the territorial integrity of his legacy. The choice of Damaturu can be seen as a compromise from the Babangida administration willing to offer some form of compensation to the defenders of Borno State. The Emir of Damaturu, like his counterpart in Maiduguri, is also an heir to the nineteenth-century rulers of the kingdom of Borno and styles himself Shehu; titles from the Shehus' court in Maiduguri were even duplicated in Damaturu.

The similarity between Borno and Sokoto in 1991 is striking. When confronted with the threat of having Sokoto State divided, the Sultan of Sokoto opposed the Babangida regime. The Sultan was not the only opponent of this new state but his intervention contributed to the victory of the unitary movement.

## 5.21 Postcolonial Borno, p.179

Politicians eager to obtain support from their voters did not hesitate to call on Kanuri feelings. The most striking example is the Governor of Yobe state who, in 2001, desired the rise of a Kanuri nation. The Lagos newspaper *This Day* reported:

...

Governor Bukar Abba Ibrahim said the unity he envisaged would accord due recognition to the Kanuri heritage of a superior civilisation, bequeathed by the Kanem-Borno Empire which should fire the spirit of the descendants and promote the socio-economic advancement of the Kanuri nation of today, and of generations unborn.

## 5.22 Postcolonial Borno, p.180

This phenomenon, which was already widely studied in 1950s Nigeria, reinforced some of the pre-existing ethnic identities. The Borno Youth movement mentioned before was an example of these ethnic politics. Political parties could only hope to obtain power if they based their discourse on ethnicity.

Bounded territoriality was never totally substituted for ethnicity. Indeed, some Kanuri-speaking inhabitants of Niger and Cameroon tend also to recognise themselves in these transnational cultural identity. The term ‘identity’ is used here on purpose for its vague meaning as the Kanuri-speakers present in the neighbouring countries recognise cultural links with Borno. For example, in 2009, Kanuri delegates from Cameroon, Chad and Niger attended the coronation of the new Shehu of Borno and recognised Shehu Abubakar Ibn Garbai as their historical overlord. The transborder links evoked above always refer to a vague and distant past when the kings of Kanem-Borno ruled over the whole Lake Chad basin.

...

The vague memory of a glorious distant past is thus entertained by

Cameroonian, Chadian and Nigérien citizens regardless of the nineteenth-century history of Borno. As they were once part of the kingdom, the ancient political links can be re-activated in the name of a common history and culture. The fact that these regions were no longer part of the Kanemi kingdom during the nineteenth century is not relevant. Borno is no longer a region or a state but has become a cultural area with all the vagueness that entails. A certain form of ahistorical territoriality is thus promoted across the twenty-first century borders.

Twentieth-century examples of cooperation across international borders among Kanuris would tend to demonstrate that Borno still has an influence on its former empire. The Kanuris and Kanembus living in the area once dominated by the empire of Kanem-Borno have a clear sense of belonging to an assumed Kanuri nation. Ade Adefuye, Nigerian historian, found that a certain ‘Kanuri factor’ is responsible for explaining the Nigerian interventions during the Chadian civil war. Indeed, Nigeria supported a Kanuri Chadian, Aboubakar Abdel Rahman, in 1977 when the latter founded the ‘Third Liberation Army’. According to Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, Maiduguri’s airport was even used by Gaddafi’s planes to bomb N’Djamena in 1980. For Thompson and Adloff, the Nigerian authorities were unaware of this military help.

### **5.23 Postcolonial Borno, p.186**

The Kanuris seem to have provided Nigeria with more statesmen than their share of the Nigerian population would indicate. As mentioned above, in the context of the ‘Northernisation’ of politics in the 1950s, numerous Bornoans were part of the civil service. How can we explain the disproportion between the relatively high number of Kanuris holding positions in Nigeria and their minor demographic importance? The first explanation offered by Paden was that the presence of Kanuri civil servants endured the continued loyalty of Borno to the ‘North’ of Ahmadu Bello. The presence of Bornoans in the

Nigerian administration and army was not only a phenomenon in the 1950s. Other Kanuris from Borno such as Kashim Ibrahim, Ibrahim Imam and Baba Gana Kingibe, and Shuwa Arabs such as Musa Daggash, distinguished themselves in the recent history of Nigeria. It is clear that a statesmanship tradition exists in Borno because of the prolonged existence of a state in the Chad basin. The infamous dictator Sani Abacha was a Kanuri from Kano. However, in the absence of detailed studies of these politicians, this argument only remains a hypothesis.

## **6 Freedom and Authority in French West Africa (Delavignette 1968)**

### **6.1 The Native Chiefs, p.74-75**

## **7 Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War (Cederman 2013)**

### **7.1 Inequality, and Grievances in the Civil War Literature, p.23-24**

Our starting point is a Weberian conception of ethnicity that views it as any subjectively experienced sense of commonality based on the belief in common ancestry and shared culture (Weber 1978, pp. 385-98; see also Cederman 2013, p. 533). Ethnic groups, then, are cultural communities based on a common belief in putative descent. Rather than assuming that ethnic groups remain constant over long historical periods, we treat them as sufficiently stable to enable us to exogenize their properties in the shorter time scales that are relevant to onset analysis.

## **7.2 Inequality, and Grievances in the Civil War Literature, p.25**

Ethnic identities are seen as convenient “focal points” that serve as coordination devices in mobilization processes (Hardin 1995), as convenient boundary markers that support distributional claims (Posner 2005), or as cost-reducing arrangements that boost interethnic trust (Fearon and Laitin 1996).

## **7.3 Inequality, and Grievances in the Civil War Literature, p.26**

In other cases, especially those characterized by state failure, the state is not merely neutral, but even absent, as in Posen’s (1993) theory of the “emerging security dilemma.” Drawing on the notion of anarchy from international relations theory, this well-known explanation of internal conflict stipulates that state collapse opens the doors to interethnic fighting.

# **8 Explaining Interethnic Cooperation (Fearon & Laitin 1996)**

## **8.1 Empirical illustrations and assessment, p.727**

...despite greater tensions, peaceful interethnic relations are by far more common than violence or complete avoidance, which we explain as a result of institutional mechanisms that moderate cross-group problems of opportunism and so allow people to avoid the costs of violence and capture the benefits of peace.

Specifically, we should be able to find evidence that asymmetric information creates problems of opportunism in interethnic interactions and that institutional mechanisms mimicking or paralleling in-group policing and spiral equilibria have evolved to deal with them.

## **8.2 Asymmetric Information and Tension, p.727**

“If an Albanian was killed by a Slav, any Albanian would kill any Slav in revenge,” whereas within Albanian settlements, more focused retaliation was both possible and enjoined by norms.

In this example as in several others given below, the ethnographer links the specific tensions that mark interethnic relations to an inability to distinguish among individuals and types of people in the other group.

## **8.3 The Evolution of Institutional Mechanisms, p.727**

When it is not possible to identify the guilty party as an individual, one feasible strategy for policing cooperation is collective liability, or group punishment. All members of the other ethnic group are held equally responsible for the actions of any one of them.

While this mechanism addresses the problem of low information, it fosters spirals of violence, as we discussed more formally above, and it also may systematically enrage a wider circle of innocent victims.

### **8.3.1 p.728**

The Israeli government grants some autonomy to the Palestinian Authority on the condition that Arafat develop effective in-group policing.

Another problem is that many of the examples of in-group policing developed under imperial authority, so we cannot rule out the possibility that the inducements of a central state are necessary for their smooth operation.

Examples of institutionalized in-group policing are abundant under conditions of imperial rule.

### **8.3.2 p.729**

In fact, Lederhendler emphasizes that “informing” on the treasonous behavior of fellow Jews was common practice from the kahal period onward / (1989,



12-4, 28-9, 88-92). Reciprocally, state authorities policed the non-Jewish communities to prevent attacks on Jews, which largely contained pogroms for more than three centuries, despite persistent local anti-Semitism. It was not until 1881 and the chaos following the assassination of Czar Alexander II that hostilities against Jews went unchecked.

Smaller ethnic groups within a larger society have a great percentage of interactions with outsiders—nearly all Hausa transactions in the kola and cattle trades were with Yorubas—and therefore suffer greatly from a breakdown of relations.

### **8.3.3 p.730**

We stipulated in our model that one reason interethnic conflict has a high propensity to spiral is that members of one group have low information about past behavior of members of the out-groups. By lumping all outsiders together, it is more difficult in prisoner's dilemma matching games to restore cooperation when it breaks down.

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