

Homework I - Advanced Game Theory

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Exercise 1

(a)

We can compute the Harsanyi dividends recursively as,

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta_v(\{1\}) &= v(1) = 1 \\ \Delta_v(\{2\}) &= v(2) = 2 \\ \Delta_v(\{3\}) &= v(3) = 0 \\ \Delta_v(\{1, 2\}) &= v(\{1, 2\}) - \Delta_v(\{1\}) - \Delta_v(\{2\}) = 0 \\ \Delta_v(\{1, 3\}) &= v(\{1, 3\}) - \Delta_v(\{1\}) - \Delta_v(\{3\}) = 3 \\ \Delta_v(\{2, 3\}) &= v(\{1, 3\}) - \Delta_v(\{1\}) - \Delta_v(\{3\}) = 2 \\ \Delta_v(\{1, 2, 3\}) &= v(\{1, 2, 3\}) - \Delta_v(\{1, 2\}) - \Delta_v(\{2, 3\}) - \Delta_v(\{1, 3\}) = -1\end{aligned}\tag{1}$$

(b)

Using the definition of Shapley value with Harsanyi dividends, we can compute,

$$f_i^S = \sum_{T \in N(i)} \frac{1}{|T|} \cdot \Delta_v(T)\tag{2}$$

this yields,

$$f^S = (5/3 \quad 5/3 \quad 2/3)$$

(c)

In order to verify that the core is empty we can use the definition of the core,

$$x_i \in C(N, v) \implies \sum_{i \in S} x_i \geq v(S)$$

$$\sum_{i \in N} x_i = v(N)$$

Let $x = (x_1 \ x_2 \ x_3)$ be a candidate allocation. Then the second property requires that,

$$x_1 + x_2 + x_3 = v(N) = 4 \tag{3}$$

The first property, on the other hand, requires

$$\begin{aligned} x_1 &\geq 1 & x_1 + x_2 &\geq 3 \\ x_2 &\geq 2 & x_1 + x_3 &\geq 3 \\ x_3 &\geq 0 & x_2 + x_3 &\geq 2 \end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

Combining (3) and (4) we know that the core allocation requires

$$x_3 = 0 \implies x_1 \geq 3 \implies x_2 = 0 \Rightarrow \Leftarrow x_2 \geq 2, \tag{5}$$

hence there is no allocation x that satisfies (3) and (4) which implies that $C(N, v) = \emptyset$.

(d)

Convexity fails for $S = \{1, 3\}$ and $T = \{2\}$. Since,

$$\begin{aligned} v(S \cup T) + v(S \cap T) &< v(S) + v(T) \\ v(\{1, 2, 3\}) + v(\emptyset) &< v(\{1, 3\}) + v(2) \\ 4 &< 3 + 2 \end{aligned} \tag{6}$$

Therefore the game is not convex.

Exercise 2

The imputation set is defined as,

$$I(N, v) = \left\{ x \in \mathbb{R}^N : \sum_{i \in N} x_i = v(N) \wedge x_i \geq v(i) \ \forall i \in N \right\}. \quad (7)$$

First, notice that, starting from the definition with Harsanyi dividends, we can rewrite the Shapley, for a single player as the $v(i)$ and a residual term.

Let $N(i) = \{T : T \subseteq N \wedge i \in T\}$ and note that $\{i\} \subseteq N(i)$. Then we can write the Shapley value for i as,

$$\begin{aligned} f_i^S &= \sum_{T \in N(i)} \frac{1}{|T|} \cdot \Delta_v(T) \\ &= \sum_{T \in N(i)} \frac{1}{|T|} \cdot \left(v(T) - \sum_{S \subset T} \Delta_v(S) \right) \\ &= v(i) + \sum_{T \in N(i) \setminus \{i\}} \frac{1}{|T|} \cdot \left(v(T) - \sum_{S \subset T} \Delta_v(S) \right) \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

where $S \subset T$ implies every proper subset $S \in 2^T \setminus T$.

Consider now, for a given T , the term,

$$v(T) - \sum_{S \subset T} \Delta_v(S). \quad (9)$$

In this case $|T| \neq 1$, since the only singleton in $N(i)$ is $\{i\}$ by construction. Now consider a set $T = \{i, j\} \in N(i)$, $|T| = 2$, then, by super additivity,

$$v(T) = v(\{i\} \cup \{j\}) \geq v(i) + v(j) \implies v(T) - \sum_{S \subset T} \Delta_v(S) \geq 0 \quad (10)$$

By induction we can construct any bigger set T as union of smaller sets and show that (9) is positive. If $v(T) - \sum_{S \subset T} \Delta_v(S) \geq 0 \ \forall T \in N(i)$, then

$$f_i^S = v(i) + \sum_{T \in N(i) \setminus \{i\}} \frac{1}{|T|} \cdot \left(v(T) - \sum_{S \subset T} \Delta_v(S) \right) \geq v(i). \quad (11)$$

Exercise 3

(a)

The function v is the mapping, $v(\emptyset) = 0$, $v(\{1\}) = 0$, $v(\{2\}) = 5$, $v(\{3\}) = 0$, $v(\{1, 2\}) = 15$, $v(\{1, 3\}) = 5$, $v(\{2, 3\}) = 10$, $v(\{1, 2, 3\}) = 20$.

(b)

Using (2) we obtain,

$$f^S = (35/6 \quad 65/6 \quad 10/3) \quad (12)$$

(d)

We can check every combination of $S, T \in 2^N$, for the condition,

$$v(S \cup T) + v(S \cap T) \geq v(S) + v(T). \quad (13)$$

This is true for all sets hence the G is convex. Furthermore, convexity implies superadditivity, by taking S, T such that $S \cap T = \emptyset$, hence the game is also superadditive.