

Exercises recipe

Evolutionary Game Theory

A. Fisherman

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1 Weibull dynamics

1.1 Steps to solve

You are given a matrix $\mathbf{P} \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$ which represents the payoffs.

1.1.1 Utilities

Given a vector $\mathbf{x} = (x_1 \ x_2 \ \dots \ x_3)^T$ and \mathbf{y} compute,

$$u(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) = \mathbf{xPy} \quad (1)$$

Note that you can just set $\mathbf{x} \mapsto \mathbf{y}$ or vice-versa to get all of the utilities combinations.

1.1.2 Nash equilibria

Compute the Nash Equilibria of the symmetric game $(\mathbf{P}, \mathbf{P}^T)$. Remember the mixed strategy. To find the mixed strategy you have to look at every combination of

$$\mathbf{x} \in \left\{ \begin{pmatrix} \alpha \\ \beta \\ 1 - \alpha - \beta \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} \alpha \\ 1 - \alpha \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} \alpha \\ 0 \\ 1 - \alpha \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ \alpha \\ 1 - \alpha \end{pmatrix} \right\} \quad (2)$$


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You can also use the online Irs solver by Avis and Fukuda. Make sure to

1. Put 3 3 as dimensions on top
2. Click **Symmetric** under **type of game**
3. Input matrix \mathbf{P}
4. Only pick the symmetric Nash equilibria

1.1.3 ESS and NSS

Once you found the Nash equilibrium, for each one do,



1.1.4 Replicator dynamics

Let $\mathbf{e}^1 = (1 \ 0 \ 0)$. The replicator dynamics are

$$\dot{\mathbf{x}}_i = [u(\mathbf{e}^i, \mathbf{x}) - u(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x})] \cdot \mathbf{x}_i \quad (3)$$

The main steps to find the dynamics are,

1. Find fixed points $u(\mathbf{e}^i, \mathbf{x}) = u(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x})$
2. Find dynamics on the boundaries, so set $\mathbf{x}_j = 0$ for all j
3. Find dynamics on the bisector, like $\mathbf{x} = (\alpha \ \alpha \ 1 - 2 \cdot \alpha)$ with $\alpha < 1/2$

1.2 Example, ex. 14

Given

$$P = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \quad (4)$$

1.2.1 Utilities

$$u(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) = x_1 \cdot y_1 + x_2 \cdot \overbrace{(y_2 + y_3)}^{1-y_1} + \overbrace{(1 - x_1 - x_2)}^{x_3} \cdot y_2 \quad (5)$$

$(\mathbf{y} \mapsto \mathbf{x}), u(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}) = x_1^2 + x_2 \cdot (1 - x_1) + x_3 \cdot x_2$

1.2.2 Nash equilibria

We get

Rational Output


EE	1	P1:	(1)	1/2	1/2	0	EP=	1/2	P2:	(1)	1/2	1/2	0	EP=	1/2
EE	2	P1:	(1)	1/2	1/2	0	EP=	1/2	P2:	(2)	1/2	0	1/2	EP=	1/2
EE	3	P1:	(2)	0	1	0	EP=	1	P2:	(3)	0	1	0	EP=	1
EE	4	P1:	(2)	0	1	0	EP=	1	P2:	(4)	0	0	1	EP=	1
EE	5	P1:	(3)	1	0	0	EP=	1	P2:	(5)	1	0	0	EP=	1
EE	6	P1:	(4)	1/2	0	1/2	EP=	1/2	P2:	(1)	1/2	1/2	0	EP=	1/2
EE	7	P1:	(5)	0	0	1	EP=	1	P2:	(3)	0	1	0	EP=	1

We only want the symmetric ones so rows 1, 3, and 5, namely,

$$NE = \{(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (1/2, 1/2, 0)\} \quad (6)$$

1.2.3 ESS and NSS

The third one,



1.2.4 Replicator dynamics

Corner utilities are,

$$u(\mathbf{e}^1, \mathbf{x}) = x_1, \quad u(\mathbf{e}^2, \mathbf{x}) = (1 - x_1), \quad u(\mathbf{e}^3, \mathbf{x}) = x_2 \quad (7)$$

1. Fixed points

The fixed points here are too complex, probably not there

2. Boundaries

Remember that $\sum_i \dot{x}_i = 0$ so on the boundaries one only needs to find one \dot{x}_i .

- $\mathbf{x} = (\alpha, 0, 1 - \alpha)$ yields, $\dot{x}_1 = 1 - \alpha > 0$, we move towards (1)
- $\mathbf{x} = (0, \alpha, 1 - \alpha)$ yields $1 - 2\alpha + \alpha^2 > 0$, we move towards (2)
- $\mathbf{x} = (\alpha, 1 - \alpha, 0)$ yields $2\alpha - 1 > 0 \iff \alpha > \frac{1}{2}$, we move away from the mid point.

3. Bisector

The only interesting bisector is the one where 1 and 2 are constant since the whole system moves towards 1 and 2. That is $\mathbf{x} = (\alpha, \alpha, 1 - 2\alpha)$.

Then we can compute,

$$\begin{aligned}
\dot{x}_1 &= (\alpha - \alpha^2 - \alpha \cdot (1 - \alpha) - \alpha + 2\alpha^2) \alpha \\
&= \alpha^2 \cdot (2\alpha - 1) < 0 \\
\dot{x}_2 &= \alpha \cdot (1 - \alpha) \cdot (1 - 2\alpha) > 0 \\
\dot{x}_3 &= -(\dot{x}_1 + \dot{x}_2) = -\alpha \cdot (1 - 2\alpha)^2 < 0
\end{aligned} \tag{8}$$

When we are the bisector apart from the two edge points $\alpha = 0$ and $\alpha = \frac{1}{2}$ we are moving towards 2. This implies that the manifold is towards 1.

