# 3-4. Stationary Equilibrium

Adv. Macro: Heterogenous Agent Models

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2025

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Today and next week: use those methods to solve the steady-state of a simple heterogeneous-agent model.

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### **Documentation:** See GEModelToolsNotebooks

Many examples in repo, so look if you have issues

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- Literature: Aiyagari (1994)

### Outline of this lecture

- 1. Recap of the Ramsey (Neo-Classical) model
- 2. Overview of the Heterogeneous-Agent Neo-Classical model (HANC)
- 3. How to compute the stationary equilibrium
- 4. Some economic properties of the HANC stationary equilibrium

Ramsey-recap

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- Now: Recap of the Ramsey model

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- Profits:  $\Pi_t = Y_t w_t L_t r_t^K K_{t-1}$
- Profit maximization:  $\max_{K_{t-1}, L_t} \Pi_t$ 
  - 1. Rental rate:  $\frac{\partial \Pi_t}{\partial K_{t-1}} = 0 \Leftrightarrow r_t^K = F_K(\Gamma_t, K_{t-1}, L_t)$
  - 2. Real wage:  $\frac{\partial \Pi_t}{\partial L_t} = 0 \Leftrightarrow w_t = F_L(\Gamma_t, K_{t-1}, L_t)$

With CRS we get zero profits:  $\Pi_t = 0 \Rightarrow$ 

 $Y_t = w_t L_t + r_t^K K_{t-1}$  [functional income distribution]

### Introduce mutual fund

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Balance sheet:

$$A_{t-1} = K_{t-1}$$

### Ramsey: Households

Utility maximization:

$$v_0(A_{-1}^{hh}) = \max_{\{C_t^{hh}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(C_t^{hh})$$

s.t.

$$C_t^{hh} + A_t^{hh} = (1 + r_t)A_{t-1}^{hh} + w_t L_t^{hh}$$

Exogenous labor supply:  $L_t^{hh} = 1$ 

Euler-equation (implied by Lagrangian):

$$u'(C_t^{hh}) = \beta(1 + r_{t+1})u'(C_{t+1}^{hh})$$

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- Walras: Capital and labor market clears ⇒ goods market clears.
   Start from

$$C_{t}^{hh} + A_{t}^{hh} = (1 + r_{t})A_{t-1}^{hh} + w_{t}L_{t}^{hh})$$

$$\Leftrightarrow C_{t}^{hh} + I_{t} = \left[ (1 + r_{t})A_{t-1}^{hh} + w_{t}L_{t}^{hh} - A_{t}^{hh} \right] + (K_{t} - (1 - \delta)K_{t-1})$$

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$$= Y_{t}$$

- Note: Means that we can check if we have solved the numerical model correctly by:
  - Impose two of the market clearing conditions
  - Then check the third market clearing condition (should be zero)

#### Ramsey: Summary

#### Simplified form:

$$u'(C_t^{hh}) = \beta(1 + F_K(\Gamma_t, K_t, 1) - \delta)u'(C_{t+1}^{hh})$$

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Extended form:

$$\begin{aligned} r_t^K &= F_K(\Gamma_t, K_{t-1}, L_t) \\ w_t &= F_L(\Gamma_t, K_{t-1}, L_t) \\ r_t &= r_t^K - \delta \\ A_t &= K_t \\ A_t^{hh} &= (1 + r_t) A_{t-1}^{hh} + w_t L_t^{hh} - C_t^{hh} \\ u'(C_t^{hh}) &= \beta (1 + r_{t+1}) u'(C_{t+1}^{hh}) \\ A_t &= A_t^{hh} \\ L_t &= L_t^{hh} \end{aligned}$$

## Ramsey: As an equation system

Eqs. system with unknowns  $\left\{K_t, L_t, r_t^K, w_t, r_t, A_t, A_t^{hh}, C_t^{hh}\right\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$  and eqs:

$$\begin{bmatrix} r_t^K - F_K(\Gamma_t, K_{t-1}, L_t) \\ w_t - F_L(\Gamma_t, K_{t-1}, L_t) \\ r_t - (r_t^K - \delta) \\ A_t - K_t \\ A_t^{hh} - ((1 + r_t)A_{t-1}^{hh} + w_t L_t^{hh} - C_t^{hh}) \\ u'(C_t^{hh}) - \beta(1 + r_{t+1})u'(C_{t+1}^{hh}) \\ A_t - A_t^{hh} \\ L_t - L_t^{hh} \\ \forall t \in \{0, 1, \dots\}, \text{ given } K_{-1} \end{bmatrix} = \mathbf{0}$$

## Ramsey: Steady state

• **Euler-equation** can be solved for  $r_{ss}$  and hence  $K_{ss}$ :

$$u'(\mathcal{C}_{ss}) = \beta(1 + F_{\mathcal{K}}(\Gamma_{ss}, \mathcal{K}_{ss}, 1) - \delta)u'(\mathcal{C}_{ss}) \Leftrightarrow$$

$$F_{\mathcal{K}}(\mathcal{K}_{ss}, 1) = \frac{1}{\beta} - 1 + \delta$$

Accumulation equation + goods mkt. clearing then implies
 C<sub>ss</sub>:

$$K_{ss} = (1 - \delta)K_{ss} + F(\Gamma_{ss}, K_{ss}, 1) - C_{ss} \Leftrightarrow C_{ss} = (1 - \delta)K_{ss} + F(\Gamma_{ss}, K_{ss}, 1) - K_{ss}$$

Important thing to note: the steady-state asset supply is completely inelastic!

# HANC

#### Model blocks:

- 1. **Firms:** Rent capital from mutual fund and hire labor from the households, produce with given technology, and sell output goods
- 2. **Zero-profit mutual funds:** Own capital and rent it to firms, take deposits and pay return to household
- Households: Face idiosyncratic productivity shocks, supplies labor exogenously and makes consumption-saving decisions
- 4. Markets: Perfect competition in labor, goods and capital markets

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- 1. The Aiyagari-model
- 2. The Aiyagari-Bewley-Hugget-Imrohoroglu-model
- 3. The Standard Incomplete Market (SIM) model

Utility maximization for household i:

$$\begin{aligned} v_0(z_{it}, a_{it-1}) &= \max_{\{c_{it}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_{it}) \\ \text{s.t.} \\ \ell_{it} &= z_{it} \\ a_{it} &= (1 + r_t) a_{it-1} + w_t \ell_{it} - c_{it} \\ \log z_{it+1} &= \rho_z \log z_{it} + \psi_{it+1}, \ \psi_{it} \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_{\psi}, \sigma_{\psi}), \ \mathbb{E}[z_{it}] &= 1 \\ a_{it} &\geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

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  - 1. Ex post due to stochastic productivity,  $z_{it}$
- Incomplete markets due to borrowing constraint (fancy words: partial self-insurance, lack of Arrow-Debreu securities)

#### **Recursive formulation**

Value function (at decision)

$$v(z_{it}, a_{it-1}) = \max_{c_t} u(c_t) + \beta \mathbb{E} [v(z_{it+1}, a_{it})]$$
s.t.
$$\ell_{it} = z_{it}$$

$$a_{it} = (1 + r_t)a_{it-1} + w_t\ell_{it} - c_{it}$$

$$\log z_{it+1} = \rho_z \log z_{it} + \psi_{it+1}$$

$$a_{it} \ge 0$$

- Household policy function  $x^*$  where  $x \in \{a, c, \ell\}$  function of:
  - Individuals states  $(z_{it}, a_{it-1})$
  - Aggregates  $(w_t, r_t)$

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- $\Rightarrow$  If we know aggregates  $(w_t, r_t)$  can calculate aggregate household behavior (consumption or savings)

$$\begin{bmatrix} r_t^K - F_K(\Gamma_t, K_{t-1}, L_t) \\ w_t - F_L(\Gamma_t, K_{t-1}, L_t) \\ r_t - (r_t^K - \delta) \\ A_t - K_t \\ A_t - A_t^{hh} \\ L_t - L_t^{hh} \\ A_t^{hh} - \int a_t dD_t \\ L_t^{hh} - \int \ell_t dD_t \\ \underline{D}_{t+1} - \Lambda_t' \Pi_z' \underline{D}_t \\ a_t - a_t^* \\ \forall t \in \{0, 1, \dots\}, \text{ given } \underline{D}_0 \end{bmatrix} = \mathbf{0}$$

Note: Much larger system compared to Ramsey due to last 2 eqs.

$$\begin{bmatrix} r_t^K - F_K(\Gamma_t, K_{t-1}, L_t) \\ w_t - F_L(\Gamma_t, K_{t-1}, L_t) \\ r_t - (r_t^K - \delta) \\ A_t - K_t \\ A_t - A_t^{hh} \\ L_t - L_t^{hh} \\ A_t^{hh} - \int a_t dD_t \\ L_t^{hh} - \int \ell_t dD_t \\ \underline{D}_{t+1} - \Lambda_t' \Pi_z' \underline{D}_t \\ a_t - a_t^* \\ \forall t \in \{0, 1, \dots\}, \text{ given } \underline{D}_0 \end{bmatrix} = \mathbf{0}$$

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  - D<sub>t</sub>, a<sub>t</sub>\* define mass and optimal savings policy at the individual level
  - Standard Ramsey model: 8 eqs. per period

$$\begin{bmatrix} r_t^K - F_K(\Gamma_t, K_{t-1}, L_t) \\ w_t - F_L(\Gamma_t, K_{t-1}, L_t) \\ r_t - (r_t^K - \delta) \\ A_t - K_t \\ A_t - A_t^{hh} \\ L_t - L_t^{hh} \\ A_t^{hh} - \int a_t dD_t \\ L_t^{hh} - \int \ell_t dD_t \\ \underline{D}_{t+1} - \Lambda_t' \Pi_z' \underline{D}_t \\ a_t - a_t^* \\ \forall t \in \{0, 1, \dots\}, \text{ given } \underline{D}_0 \end{bmatrix} = \mathbf{0}$$

- Note: Much larger system compared to Ramsey due to last 2 eqs.
  - D<sub>t</sub>, a<sub>t</sub>\* define mass and optimal savings policy at the individual level
  - Standard Ramsey model: 8 eqs. per period
  - HANC with  $N_z = 7$ ,  $N_a = 300 : 8 + 7 \times 300 = 2108$  per period

### Market clearing

- Capital market:  $K_t = A_t = \int a_t^*(z_{it}, a_{it-1}) d\mathbf{D}_t$
- Labor market:  $L_t = \int \ell_t^*(z_{it}, a_{it-1}) d\mathbf{D}_t = \int z_{it} d\mathbf{D}_t = 1$
- Goods market:  $Y_t = \int c_t^*(z_{it}, a_{it-1}) d\mathbf{D}_t + I_t$
- Walras: Capital and labor market clears ⇒ goods market clears (using Euler's theorem)

$$C_t^{hh} + I_t = \int c_{it}^* d\mathbf{D}_t + [K_t - (1 - \delta)K_{t-1}]$$

$$= \int [(1 + r_t)a_{it-1} + w_t z_{it} - a_{it}] d\mathbf{D}_t$$

$$= [(1 + r_t)K_{t-1} + w_t L_t - K_t] + [K_t - (1 - \delta)K_{t-1}]$$

$$= r_t^K K_{t-1} + w_t L_t$$

$$= Y_t$$

**Computing the Stationary** 

**Equilibrium** 

## Stationary equilibrium - equation system

The **stationary equilibrium** satisfies

$$\begin{bmatrix} r_{ss}^{K} - F_{K}(\Gamma_{ss}, K_{ss}, L_{ss}) \\ w_{ss} - F_{L}(\Gamma_{sst}, K_{ss}, L_{ss}) \\ r_{ss} - (r_{ss}^{K} - \delta) \\ A_{ss} - K_{ss} \\ A_{ss} - A_{ss}^{hh} \\ L_{ss} - L_{ss}^{hh} \\ A_{ss}^{hh} - \int a_{ss} d\mathbf{D}_{ss} \\ L_{ss}^{hh} - \int \ell_{ss} d\mathbf{D}_{ss} \\ D_{ss} - \Lambda_{ss}' \Gamma_{z}' D_{ss} \\ a_{ss} - a_{ss}^{*} \end{bmatrix} = \mathbf{0}$$

Note: Households still move around <code>winside</code> the distribution due to idiosyncratic shocks. Does not affect aggregates due to <code>wlaw</code> of large <code>numbers</code>  $^{\alpha}$ 

## Stationary equilibrium - more verbal definition

#### Given technology $\Gamma_{ss}$

- 1. Quantities  $K_{ss}$  and  $L_{ss}$ ,
- 2. prices  $r_{ss}$  and  $w_{ss}$  (always  $\Pi_{ss} = 0$ ),
- 3. the distribution  $D_{ss}$  over  $\beta_i$ ,  $z_{it}$  and  $a_{it-1}$
- 4. and the policy functions  $a_{ss}^*$ ,  $\ell_{ss}^*$  and  $c_{ss}^*$

#### are such that

- 1. Households maximize expected utility (policy functions)
- 2. Firms maximize profits (prices)
- 3.  $D_{ss}$  is the invariant distribution implied by the household problem
- 4. Mutual fund balance sheet is satisfied
- 5. The capital market clears
- 6. The labor market clears
- 7. The goods market clears

#### How do we solve the household block in practice?

The hard part is to solve the household block! How do we do it?

- Use EGM to obtain the policy functions  $a_{ss}$ ,  $c_{ss}$  for a given r, w
  - The »backward« step

Time to code!

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  - The »backward« step
- Use the histogram method to obtain the stationary distribution  $oldsymbol{D}_{ss}$ 
  - The »forward« step
- Aggregate policy:

$$A_{ss}^{hh}(\{r_{ss},w_{ss}\})=\int a_{ss}^*(z_{it},a_{it-1},\{r_{ss},w_{ss}\})d\mathbf{D}_{ss}$$

#### Time to code!

## Direct implementation (K guess)

**Technology:**  $F(K, L) = \Gamma K^{\alpha} L^{1-\alpha}$ 

**Root-finding problem** in  $K_{ss}$  with the objective function:

- 1. Set  $L_{ss} = 1$  (and  $\Pi_{ss} = 0$ )
- 2. Calculate  $r_{ss} = \alpha \Gamma_{ss} (K_{ss})^{\alpha-1} \delta$  and  $w_{ss} = (1 \alpha) \Gamma_{ss} (K_{ss})^{\alpha}$
- 3. Solve infinite horizon household problem backwards, i.e. find  $a_{ss}^*$
- 4. Simulate households forwards until convergence, i.e. find  $\boldsymbol{D}_{ss}$
- 5. Return  $K_{ss} \boldsymbol{a}_{ss}^{*\prime} \boldsymbol{D}_{ss}$

Note:  $a_{ss}^{*\prime}D_{ss} = \sum_i a_{i,ss}^*D_i$ 

## Direct implementation (r guess)

**Technology:**  $F(K, L) = \Gamma K^{\alpha} L^{1-\alpha}$ 

**Root-finding problem** in  $r_{ss}$  with the objective function:

- 1. Set  $L_{ss}=1$  (and  $\Pi_{ss}=0$ )
- 2. Calculate  $K_{ss} = \left(\frac{r_{ss} + \delta}{\alpha \Gamma_{ss}}\right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha 1}}$  and  $w_{ss} = (1 \alpha)\Gamma_{ss}(K_{ss})^{\alpha}$
- 3. Solve infinite horizon household problem backwards, i.e. find  $\boldsymbol{a}_{ss}^*$
- 4. Simulate households forwards until convergence, i.e. find  $oldsymbol{D}_{ss}$
- 5. Return  $K_{ss} \boldsymbol{a}_{ss}^{*\prime} \boldsymbol{D}_{ss}$

# Indirect implementation

**Technology:**  $F(K, L) = \Gamma K^{\alpha} L^{1-\alpha}$ 

#### Consider $\Gamma_{ss}$ and $\delta$ as »free« parameters:

- 1. Choose  $r_{ss}$  and  $w_{ss}$
- 2. Solve infinite horizon household problem backwards, i.e. find  $a_{ss}^*$
- 3. Simulate households forwards until convergence, i.e. find  $D_{ss}$
- 4. Set  $K_{ss} = \boldsymbol{a}_{ss}^{*\prime} \boldsymbol{D}_{ss}$
- 5. Set  $L_{ss}=1$  (and  $\Pi_{ss}=0$ )
- 6. Set  $\Gamma_{ss} = \frac{w_{ss}}{(1-\alpha)(K_{ss})^{\alpha}}$
- 7. Set  $r_{ss}^K = \alpha \Gamma_{ss}(K_{ss})^{\alpha-1}$
- 8. Set  $\delta = r_{ss}^k r_{ss}$

# Direct implementation (calibration)

Set 
$$r_{ss} = r^{target}$$
,  $K_{ss} = K^{target}$ ,  $Y_{ss} = Y^{target}$ , and back out

- 1.  $\Gamma_{ss} = Y^{target}/(L_{ss}^{1-\alpha}K_{ss}^{\alpha})$
- 2.  $\delta = \alpha Y^{target} / K^{target} r^{target}$

We know that  $w_{ss} = (1 - \alpha)Y^{target}$ . Then find the  $\beta$  that clears the market

#### **Root-finding problem** in $\beta$ with the objective function:

- 1. Set  $L_{ss} = 1$  (and  $\Pi_{ss} = 0$ ),
- 2. Solve infinite horizon household problem *backwards*, i.e. find  ${\pmb a}_{ss}^*$  for a given  $\beta$
- 3. Simulate households forwards until convergence, i.e. find  $D_{ss}$
- 4. Return  $K_{ss} \boldsymbol{a}_{ss}^{*\prime} \boldsymbol{D}_{ss}$
- 5. Update  $\beta$

#### How to choose parameters?

 External calibration: Set subset of parameters to the standard values in the literature or directly from data estimates (e.g. income process)

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  - 1. Informal: Roughly match targets by hand
  - 2. Formal:
    - 2a. Solve root-finding problem
    - 2b. Minimize a squared loss function
  - Estimation: Formal with squared loss function (think GMM) or likelihood function + standard errors

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    - 2a. Solve root-finding problem
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  - Estimation: Formal with squared loss function (think GMM) or likelihood function + standard errors
- Complication: We must always solve for the steady state for each guess of the parameters to be calibrated

# Calibration at the quarterly level

- $r_{ss} = 0.05/4$  to match 5% annual interest rate
- $Y_{ss} = 1$  as a normalization
- $K_{ss} = 16$  to match annual wealth-to-output ratio of 4
- $\alpha = 1/3$  to match labor share of roughly 2/3
- $\sigma_{\psi}=$  0.5, ho= 0.9: data on income inequality and risk

Some Properties of the HANC


steady-state


# **Consumption function**

• Euler-equation still necessary for  $a_{it} > 0$ :

$$c_{it}^{-\sigma} = \beta_i (1 + r_{t+1}) \mathbb{E}_t \left[ c_{it+1}^{-\sigma} \right]$$


- Precautionary saving:
  - 1. Low consumption for low cash-on-hand  $\rightarrow$  buffer-stock target
  - 2. Steep slope for low cash-on-hand  $\rightarrow$  high MPC





# Some amount of inequality

- Productivity: Marginal distribution over only z<sub>it</sub>
- **Savings:** Marginal distribution over  $a_{it}$  cond. on  $\beta_i$




Drivers of wealth inequality here: income shocks

# Steady state interest rate

#### Representative agent / complete markets:

Derived from aggregate Euler-equation

$$C_t^{-\sigma} = \beta (1 + r_{t+1}) C_{t+1}^{-\sigma} \Rightarrow C_{ss}^{-\sigma} = \beta (1 + r_{ss}) C_{ss}^{-\sigma} \Leftrightarrow \beta = \frac{1}{1 + r_{ss}}$$




### Steady state interest rate

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
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
Heterogeneous agents: No such equation exists




### Risk drives wealth accumulation



# Marginal Propensity to Consume



#### Tradeoff between matching aggregate wealth and MPCs



# Exercises

# Exercise 1: HANC with ex-ante heterogeneity

Add permanent  $\beta$  heterogeneity to the HANC model:

$$\begin{aligned} v_t(\beta_i, z_{it}, a_{it-1}) &= \max_{c_{it}} \frac{c_{it}^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} + \beta_i \mathbb{E}_t \left[ v_{it+1}(z_{it+1}, a_{it}) \right] \\ \text{s.t. } a_{it} + c_{it} &= (1+r_t) a_{it-1} + w_t z_{it} \geq 0 \\ &\log z_{it+1} = \rho_z \log z_{it} + \psi_{it+1} \ , \psi_{it} \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_{\psi}, \sigma_{\psi}), \ \mathbb{E}[z_{it}] = 1 \end{aligned}$$

Assume that we have three types of households:

$$\beta_i \in (\beta - \delta, \beta, \beta + \delta)$$
. Find  $\delta$  such that  $MPC = 0.27$  and  $K/Y = 16$ .

#### Exercise 2: HANCGovModel

- No production. No physical savings instrument
- Households: Get stochastic endowment z<sub>it</sub> of consumption good
- Government:
  - 1. Choose government spending
  - 2. Collect taxes,  $\tau_t$ , proportional to endowment
  - 3. Bonds: Pays 1 unit of the consumption good next period. Price is  $p_t^B < 1$

$$p_t^B B_t + \int \tau_t z_{it} d\mathbf{D}_t = B_{t-1} + G_t$$
$$\tau_t = \tau_{ss} + \eta_t + \varphi \left( B_{t-1} - B_{ss} \right)$$

where  $\eta_t$  is a tax-shifter

Market clearing:

$$egin{aligned} B_t &= A_t^{hh} \ C_t^{hh} + G_t &= \int z_{it} dm{D}_t = 1 \end{aligned}$$

#### **Exercise 2: Households**

#### Households:

$$\begin{aligned} v_t(z_{it}, a_{it-1}) &= \max_{c_{it}} \frac{c_{it}^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[ v_{it+1}(z_{it+1}, a_{it}) \right] \\ \text{s.t. } p_t^B a_{it} + c_{it} &= a_{it-1} + (1-\tau_t) z_{it} \geq 0 \\ &\log z_{it+1} = \rho_z \log z_{it} + \psi_{it+1} \ , \psi_{it} \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_{\psi}, \sigma_{\psi}), \ \mathbb{E}[z_{it}] = 1 \end{aligned}$$

#### **Euler-equation**:

$$c_{it}^{-\sigma} = \beta \frac{\underline{v}_{a,t+1}(z_{it}, a_{it})}{p_t^B}$$

#### **Envelope condition:**

$$\underline{v}_{a,t}(z_{it-1},a_{it-1})=c_{it}^{-\sigma}$$

#### **Exercise 2: Questions**

- 1. Define the stationary equilibrium
- 2. Solve and simulate the household problem with  $p_{ss}^B=0.975$  and  $\tau_{ss}=0.12$ .
- 3. Find the stationary equilibrium with  $G_{ss}=0.10$  and  $\tau_{ss}=0.12$ .
- 4. What happens for  $\tau_{ss} \in (0.11, 0.15)$ ?
- 5. When is average household utility maximized?

**Note:** Full solution in repository folder GEModelToolsNotebooks/HANCGovModel