

# CS132: Software Engineering HW1: UML and Risk Management

Part 1: UML Exercises (40pt)


Task 1: Who is using the system and what are the relationships among them? (10pt)




Task 2: What you can do with your campus card? (10pt)



Task 3: How do you eat in the cafeteria? (10pt)



Task 4: How do you add fund to your campus card? (10pt)



# Part2: Risk Management

## Risk analysis:

- (1) For 737-MAX:
  - 1. Angle of attack exceeds the max value
  - 2. Sensor failure or pilot negligence, this problem has not been detected
  - 3. Excessive AOA leads to staling

#### For 737-800:

- 1. Angle of attack exceeds the max value
- 2. Sensor failure or driver negligence, this problem has not been detected
- 3. Excessive AOA leads to staling

They are not the same as the reason lead the first point to occur is different.

For 737-MAX, due to the adjustment of center of gravity and new engine LEAP-1B's power increasing without overall optimization, its AOA is easy to passively raise.

But for 737-800, the system design is more reasonable and the AOA will only rise in the event of an accident, such as dangerous weather, take-off and landing accidents, etc.

(2) Assume reasonable probabilities for each of the events in the sequences, calculate the risks for both 737-MAX and 737-800.

For 737-MAX, prob for 1,2,3 are 0.5, 0.1, 0.1, risk is 0.005

For 737-800, prob for 1,2,3 are 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, risk is 0.001

## Risk Control Measures (RCM)

- 1. Preventive measures, as Reduce probability Y; Reduce severity N (Some students may select mitigate measures, it will be OK if the explanation is justified)
- 2. The first part, which makes the AOA to increase.

Hazard: Encounter an accident

Hazardous situation: aircraft stalling

Sequence of events:

- 1. Encounter extreme weather or serious aircraft breakdown
- 2. Pilot and MCAS cannot maintain a proper AOA

3. Unable to gain motivation from air, aircraft stalling

#### Harm:

- 1. Discomfort (Minor)
- 2. Unstable (Major)
- 3. Accident (Catastrophic)

In this risk analysis, if student calculate the probability or severity, the probability of the part about the new unreasonable design(gravity or engine) shoule be decreased obviously.

#### Residual Risk Evaluation

New sequence for 737-MAX:

- 1. Sensor is not working correctly
- 2. MACS always making the aircraft pitchdown
- 3. Pilot competes with MCAS for control and constantly adjusts flight angle
- 4. AOA exceeds the limit during the competition

Risk analysis:

Hazard: Sensor is not working correctly

Hazardous situation: Aircraft stalling

Sequence of events:

- 1. Sensor is not working correctly
- 2. MACS always making the aircraft pitchdown
- 3. Pilot competes with MCAS for control and constantly adjusts flight angle
- 4. AOA exceeds the limit during the competition

#### Harm:

- 1. Discomfort (Minor)
- 2. Unstable (Major)
- 3. Accident (Catastrophic)

 $P_{death} = P_{e1} \times P_{e2} \times P_{e3} \times P_{e4} \times P_{h} = 0.01 \times 0.99 \times 0.99 \times 0.5 \times 0.3 = 0.0015$ 

# $\mathbf{New} \ \mathbf{RCM}$

#### Corrective measures

Open question: Adding other ways to ensure the reliability of MCAS, the failure of sensors needs to take into account and design other solutions to avoid the corresponding risks; provide mandatory MCAS training to ensure that pilots can close MCAS easily; avoid the use of MCAS, adjust the structure Of 737-MAX aircraft.