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# Kademlia: A Peer-to-peer Information System Based on the XOR Metric

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**Abstract.** We describe a peer-to-peer distributed hash table with provable consistency and performance in a fault-prone environment. Our system routes queries and locates nodes using a novel XOR-based metric topology that simplifies the algorithm and facilitates our proof. The topology has the property that every message exchanged conveys or reinforces useful contact information. The system exploits this information to send parallel, asynchronous query messages that tolerate node failures without imposing timeout delays on users.

## 1 Introduction

This paper describes Kademlia, a peer-to-peer distributed hash table (DHT). Kademlia has a number of desirable features not simultaneously offered by any previous DHT. It minimizes the number of configuration messages nodes must send to learn about each other. Configuration information spreads automatically as a side-effect of key lookups. Nodes have enough knowledge and flexibility to route queries through low-latency paths. Kademlia uses parallel, asynchronous queries to avoid timeout delays from failed nodes. The algorithm with which nodes record each other's existence resists certain basic denial of service attacks. Finally, several important properties of Kademlia can be formally proven using only weak assumptions on uptime distributions (assumptions we validate with measurements of existing peer-to-peer systems).

Kademlia takes the basic approach of many DHTs. Keys are opaque, 160-bit quantities (e.g., the SHA-1 hash of some larger data). Participating computers each have a node ID in the 160-bit key space.  $\langle \text{key}, \text{value} \rangle$  pairs are stored on nodes with IDs “close” to the key for some notion of closeness. Finally, a node-ID-based routing algorithm lets anyone efficiently locate servers near any given target key.

Many of Kademlia's benefits result from its use of a novel XOR metric for distance between points in the key space. XOR is symmetric, allowing Kademlia participants to receive lookup queries from precisely the same distribution of

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nodes contained in their routing tables. Without this property, systems such as Chord [5] do not learn useful routing information from queries they receive. Worse yet, asymmetry leads to rigid routing tables. Each entry in a Chord node's finger table must store the precise node preceding some interval in the ID space. Any node actually in the interval would be too far from nodes preceding it in the same interval. Kademlia, in contrast, can send a query to any node within an interval, allowing it to select routes based on latency or even send parallel, asynchronous queries to several equally appropriate nodes.

To locate nodes near a particular ID, Kademlia uses a single routing algorithm from start to finish. In contrast, other systems use one algorithm to get near the target ID and another for the last few hops. Of existing systems, Kademlia most resembles Pastry's [1] first phase, which (though not described this way by the authors) successively finds nodes roughly half as far from the target ID by Kademlia's XOR metric. In a second phase, however, Pastry switches distance metrics to the numeric difference between IDs. It also uses the second, numeric difference metric in replication. Unfortunately, nodes close by the second metric can be quite far by the first, creating discontinuities at particular node ID values, reducing performance, and complicating attempts at formal analysis of worst-case behavior.


## 2 System description

Our system takes the same general approach as other DHTs. We assign 160-bit opaque IDs to nodes and provide a lookup algorithm that locates successively "closer" nodes to any desired ID, converging to the lookup target in logarithmically many steps.


Kademlia effectively treats nodes as leaves in a binary tree, with each node's position determined by the shortest unique prefix of its ID. Figure 1 shows the position of a node with unique prefix 0011 in an example tree. For any given node, we divide the binary tree into a series of successively lower subtrees that don't contain the node. The highest subtree consists of the half of the binary tree not containing the node. The next subtree consists of the half of the remaining tree not containing the node, and so forth. In the example of node 0011, the subtrees are circled and consist of all nodes with prefixes 1, 01, 000, and 0010 respectively.

The Kademlia protocol ensures that every node knows of at least one node in each of its subtrees, if that subtree contains a node. With this guarantee, any node can locate any other node by its ID. Figure 2 shows an example of node 0011 locating node 1110 by successively querying the best node it knows of to find contacts in lower and lower subtrees; finally the lookup converges to the target node.

The remainder of this section fills in the details and makes the lookup algorithm more concrete. We first define a precise notion of ID closeness, allowing us to speak of storing and looking up  $\langle \text{key}, \text{value} \rangle$  pairs on the  $k$  closest nodes to the key. We then give a lookup protocol that works even in cases where no



**Fig. 1: Kademlia binary tree.** The black dot shows the location of node 0011... in the tree. Gray ovals show subtrees in which node 0011... must have a contact.



**Fig. 2: Locating a node by its ID.** Here the node with prefix 0011 finds the node with prefix 1110 by successively learning of and querying closer and closer nodes. The line segment on top represents the space of 160-bit IDs, and shows how the lookups converge to the target node. Below we illustrate RPC messages made by 1110. The first RPC is to node 101, already known to 1110. Subsequent RPCs are to nodes returned by the previous RPC.

node shares a unique prefix with a key or some of the subtrees associated with a given node are empty.

## 2.1 XOR metric

Each Kademlia node has a 160-bit node ID. Node IDs are currently just random 160-bit identifiers, though they could equally well be constructed as in Chord. Every message a node transmits includes its node ID, permitting the recipient to record the sender's existence if necessary.

Keys, too, are 160-bit identifiers. To assign  $\langle \text{key}, \text{value} \rangle$  pairs to particular nodes, Kademlia relies on a notion of distance between two identifiers. Given two 160-bit identifiers,  $x$  and  $y$ , Kademlia defines the distance between them as their bitwise exclusive or (XOR) interpreted as an integer,  $d(x, y) = x \oplus y$ .


We first note that XOR is a valid, albeit non-Euclidean metric. It is obvious that that  $d(x, x) = 0$ ,  $d(x, y) > 0$  if  $x \neq y$ , and  $\forall x, y : d(x, y) = d(y, x)$ . XOR also offers the triangle property:  $d(x, y) + d(y, z) \geq d(x, z)$ . The triangle property follows from the fact that  $d(x, y) \oplus d(y, z) = d(x, z)$  and  $\forall a \geq 0, b \geq 0 : a + b \geq a \oplus b$ .

We next note that XOR captures the notion of distance implicit in our binary-tree-based sketch of the system. In a fully-populated binary tree of 160-bit IDs, the magnitude of the distance between two IDs is the height of the smallest subtree containing them both. When a tree is not fully populated, the closest leaf to an ID  $x$  is the leaf whose ID shares the longest common prefix of  $x$ . If there are empty branches in the tree, there might be more than one leaf with the longest common prefix. In that case, the closest leaf to  $x$  will be the closest leaf to ID  $\tilde{x}$  produced by flipping the bits in  $x$  corresponding to the empty branches of the tree.

Like Chord's clockwise circle metric, XOR is *unidirectional*. For any given point  $x$  and distance  $\Delta > 0$ , there is exactly one point  $y$  such that  $d(x, y) = \Delta$ . Unidirectionality ensures that all lookups for the same key converge along the same path, regardless of the originating node. Thus, caching  $\langle \text{key}, \text{value} \rangle$  pairs along the lookup path alleviates hot spots. Like Pastry and unlike Chord, the XOR topology is also symmetric ( $d(x, y) = d(y, x)$  for all  $x$  and  $y$ ).

## 2.2 Node state

Kademlia nodes store contact information about each other to route query messages. For each  $0 \leq i < 160$ , every node keeps a list of  $\langle \text{IP address}, \text{UDP port}, \text{Node ID} \rangle$  triples for nodes of distance between  $2^i$  and  $2^{i+1}$  from itself. We call these lists  $k$ -buckets. Each  $k$ -bucket is kept sorted by time last seen—least-recently seen node at the head, most-recently seen at the tail. For small values of  $i$ , the  $k$ -buckets will generally be empty (as no appropriate nodes will exist). For large values of  $i$ , the lists can grow up to size  $k$ , where  $k$  is a system-wide replication parameter.  $k$  is chosen such that any given  $k$  nodes are very unlikely to fail within an hour of each other (for example  $k = 20$ ).



**Fig. 3: Probability of remaining online another hour as a function of uptime. The  $x$  axis represents minutes. The  $y$  axis shows the the fraction of nodes that stayed online at least  $x$  minutes that also stayed online at least  $x + 60$  minutes.**

When a Kademlia node receives any message (request or reply) from another node, it updates the appropriate  $k$ -bucket for the sender's node ID. If the sending node already exists in the recipient's  $k$ -bucket, the recipient moves it to the tail of the list. If the node is not already in the appropriate  $k$ -bucket and the bucket has fewer than  $k$  entries, then the recipient just inserts the new sender at the tail of the list. If the appropriate  $k$ -bucket is full, however, then the recipient pings the  $k$ -bucket's least-recently seen node to decide what to do. If the least-recently seen node fails to respond, it is evicted from the  $k$ -bucket and the new sender inserted at the tail. Otherwise, if the least-recently seen node responds, it is moved to the tail of the list, and the new sender's contact is discarded.

$k$ -buckets effectively implement a least-recently seen eviction policy, except that live nodes are never removed from the list. This preference for old contacts is driven by our analysis of Gnutella trace data collected by Saroiu et. al. [4]. Figure 3 shows the percentage of Gnutella nodes that stay online another hour as a function of current uptime. The longer a node has been up, the more likely it is to remain up another hour. By keeping the oldest live contacts around,  $k$ -buckets maximize the probability that the nodes they contain will remain online.

A second benefit of  $k$ -buckets is that they provide resistance to certain DoS attacks. One cannot flush nodes' routing state by flooding the system with new nodes. Kademlia nodes will only insert the new nodes in the  $k$ -buckets when old nodes leave the system.

### 2.3 Kademlia protocol

The Kademlia protocol consists of four RPCs: PING, STORE, FIND\_NODE, and FIND\_VALUE. The PING RPC probes a node to see if it is online. STORE instructs a node to store a  $\langle \text{key}, \text{value} \rangle$  pair for later retrieval.

FIND\_NODE takes a 160-bit ID as an argument. The recipient of a the RPC returns  $\langle \text{IP address}, \text{UDP port}, \text{Node ID} \rangle$  triples for the  $k$  nodes it knows about

closest to the target ID. These triples can come from a single  $k$ -bucket, or they may come from multiple  $k$ -buckets if the closest  $k$ -bucket is not full. In any case, the RPC recipient must return  $k$  items (unless there are fewer than  $k$  nodes in all its  $k$ -buckets combined, in which case it returns every node it knows about).

FIND\_VALUE behaves like FIND\_NODE—returning  $\langle \text{IP address, UDP port, Node ID} \rangle$  triples—with one exception. If the RPC recipient has received a STORE RPC for the key, it just returns the stored value.

In all RPCs, the recipient must echo a 160-bit random RPC ID, which provides some resistance to address forgery. PINGS can also be piggy-backed on RPC replies for the RPC recipient to obtain additional assurance of the sender's network address.

The most important procedure a Kademlia participant must perform is to locate the  $k$  closest nodes to some given node ID. We call this procedure a *node lookup*. Kademlia employs a recursive algorithm for node lookups. The lookup initiator starts by picking  $\alpha$  nodes from its closest non-empty  $k$ -bucket (or, if that bucket has fewer than  $\alpha$  entries, it just takes the  $\alpha$  closest nodes it knows of). The initiator then sends parallel, asynchronous FIND\_NODE RPCs to the  $\alpha$  nodes it has chosen.  $\alpha$  is a system-wide concurrency parameter, such as 3.

In the recursive step, the initiator resends the FIND\_NODE to nodes it has learned about from previous RPCs. (This recursion can begin before all  $\alpha$  of the previous RPCs have returned). Of the  $k$  nodes the initiator has heard of closest to the target, it picks  $\alpha$  that it has not yet queried and resends the FIND\_NODE RPC to them.<sup>1</sup> Nodes that fail to respond quickly are removed from consideration until and unless they do respond. If a round of FIND\_NODES fails to return a node any closer than the closest already seen, the initiator resends the FIND\_NODE to all of the  $k$  closest nodes it has not already queried. The lookup terminates when the initiator has queried and gotten responses from the  $k$  closest nodes it has seen. When  $\alpha = 1$ , the lookup algorithm resembles Chord's in terms of message cost and the latency of detecting failed nodes. However, Kademlia can route for lower latency because it has the flexibility of choosing any one of  $k$  nodes to forward a request to.

Most operations are implemented in terms of the above lookup procedure. To store a  $\langle \text{key, value} \rangle$  pair, a participant locates the  $k$  closest nodes to the key and sends them STORE RPCs. Additionally, each node re-publishes  $\langle \text{key, value} \rangle$  pairs as necessary to keep them alive, as described later in Section 2.5. This ensures persistence (as we show in our proof sketch) of the  $\langle \text{key, value} \rangle$  pair with very high probability. For Kademlia's current application (file sharing), we also require the original publisher of a  $\langle \text{key, value} \rangle$  pair to republish it every 24 hours. Otherwise,  $\langle \text{key, value} \rangle$  pairs expire 24 hours after publication, so as to limit stale index information in the system. For other applications, such as digital certificates or cryptographic hash to value mappings, longer expiration times may be appropriate.

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<sup>1</sup> Bucket entries and FIND replies could be augmented with round trip time estimates for use in selecting the  $\alpha$  nodes.

To find a  $\langle \text{key}, \text{value} \rangle$  pair, a node starts by performing a lookup to find the  $k$  nodes with IDs closest to the key. However, value lookups use `FIND_VALUE` rather than `FIND_NODE` RPCs. Moreover, the procedure halts immediately when any node returns the value. For caching purposes, once a lookup succeeds, the requesting node stores the  $\langle \text{key}, \text{value} \rangle$  pair at the closest node it observed to the key that did not return the value.

Because of the unidirectionality of the topology, future searches for the same key are likely to hit cached entries before querying the closest node. During times of high popularity for a certain key, the system might end up caching it at many nodes. To avoid “over-caching,” we make the expiration time of a  $\langle \text{key}, \text{value} \rangle$  pair in any node’s database exponentially inversely proportional to the number of nodes between the current node and the node whose ID is closest to the key ID.<sup>2</sup> While simple LRU eviction would result in a similar lifetime distribution, there is no natural way of choosing the cache size, since nodes have no *a priori* knowledge of how many values the system will store.

Buckets are generally kept fresh by the traffic of requests traveling through nodes. To handle pathological cases in which there are no lookups for a particular ID range, each node refreshes any bucket to which it has not performed a node lookup in the past hour. Refreshing means picking a random ID in the bucket’s range and performing a node search for that ID.

To join the network, a node  $u$  must have a contact to an already participating node  $w$ .  $u$  inserts  $w$  into the appropriate  $k$ -bucket.  $u$  then performs a node lookup for its own node ID. Finally,  $u$  refreshes all  $k$ -buckets further away than its closest neighbor. During the refreshes,  $u$  both populates its own  $k$ -buckets and inserts itself into other nodes’  $k$ -buckets as necessary.

## 2.4 Routing table

Kademlia’s basic routing table structure is fairly straight-forward given the protocol, though a slight subtlety is needed to handle highly unbalanced trees. The routing table is a binary tree whose leaves are  $k$ -buckets. Each  $k$ -bucket contains nodes with some common prefix of their IDs. The prefix is the  $k$ -bucket’s position in the binary tree. Thus, each  $k$ -bucket covers some range of the ID space, and together the  $k$ -buckets cover the entire 160-bit ID space with no overlap.


Nodes in the routing tree are allocated dynamically, as needed. Figure 4 illustrates the process. Initially, a node  $u$ ’s routing tree has a single node—one  $k$ -bucket covering the entire ID space. When  $u$  learns of a new contact, it attempts to insert the contact in the appropriate  $k$ -bucket. If that bucket is not full, the new contact is simply inserted. Otherwise, if the  $k$ -bucket’s range includes  $u$ ’s own node ID, then the bucket is split into two new buckets, the old contents divided between the two, and the insertion attempt repeated. If a  $k$ -bucket with a different range is full, the new contact is simply dropped.

One complication arises in highly unbalanced trees. Suppose node  $u$  joins the system and is the only node whose ID begins 000. Suppose further that the

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<sup>2</sup> This number can be inferred from the bucket structure of the current node.






**Fig. 4: Evolution of a routing table over time. Initially, a node has a single  $k$ -bucket, as shown in the top routing table. As the  $k$ -buckets fill, the bucket whose range covers the node's ID repeatedly splits into two  $k$  buckets.**

system already has more than  $k$  nodes with prefix 001. Every node with prefix 001 would have an empty  $k$ -bucket into which  $u$  should be inserted, yet  $u$ 's bucket refresh would only notify  $k$  of the nodes. To avoid this problem, Kademlia nodes keep all valid contacts in a subtree of size at least  $k$  nodes, even if this requires splitting buckets in which the node's own ID does not reside. Figure 5 illustrates these additional splits. When  $u$  refreshes the split buckets, all nodes with prefix 001 will learn about it.

## 2.5 Efficient key re-publishing

To ensure the persistence of key-value pairs, nodes must periodically republish keys. Otherwise, two phenomena may cause lookups for valid keys to fail. First, some of the  $k$  nodes that initially get a key-value pair when it is published may leave the network. Second, new nodes may join the network with IDs closer to some published key than the nodes on which the key-value pair was originally published. In both cases, the nodes with a key-value pair must republish it so as once again to ensure it is available on the  $k$  nodes closest to the key.

To compensate for nodes leaving the network, Kademlia republishes each key-value pair once an hour. A naïve implementation of this strategy would require many messages—each of up to  $k$  nodes storing a key-value pair would perform a node lookup followed by  $k - 1$  STORE RPCs every hour. Fortunately, the republishing process can be heavily optimized. First, when a node receives a STORE RPC for a given key-value pair, it assumes the RPC was also issued to the



**Fig. 5:** This figure exemplifies the relaxed routing table of a node whose ID is 00...00. The relaxed table may have small (expected constant size) irregularities in its branching in order to make sure it knows all contacts in the smallest subtree around the node that has at least  $k$  contacts.

other  $k - 1$  closest nodes, and thus the recipient will not republish the key-value pair in the next hour. This ensures that as long as republishing intervals are not exactly synchronized, only one node will republish a given key-value pair every hour.

A second optimization avoids performing node lookups before republishing keys. As described in Section 2.4, to handle unbalanced trees, nodes split  $k$ -buckets as required to ensure they have complete knowledge of a surrounding subtree with at least  $k$  nodes. If, before republishing key-value pairs, a node  $u$  refreshes all  $k$ -buckets in this subtree of  $k$  nodes, it will automatically be able to figure out the  $k$  closest nodes to a given key. These bucket refreshes can be amortized over the republishing of many keys.

To see why a node lookup is unnecessary after  $u$  refreshes buckets in the subtree of size  $\geq k$ , it is necessary to consider two cases. If the key being republished falls in the ID range of the subtree, then since the subtree is of size at least  $k$  and  $u$  has complete knowledge of the subtree, clearly  $u$  must know the  $k$  closest nodes to the key. If, on the other hand, the key lies outside the subtree, yet  $u$  was one of the  $k$  closest nodes to the key, it must follow that  $u$ 's  $k$ -buckets for intervals closer to the key than the subtree all have fewer than  $k$  entries. Hence,  $u$  will know all nodes in these  $k$ -buckets, which together with knowledge of the subtree will include the  $k$  closest nodes to the key.

When a new node joins the system, it must store any key-value pair to which it is one of the  $k$  closest. Existing nodes, by similarly exploiting complete knowledge of their surrounding subtrees, will know which key-value pairs the new node should store. Any node learning of a new node therefore issues STORE RPCs to transfer relevant key-value pairs to the new node. To avoid redundant STORE RPCs, however, a node only transfers a key-value pair if it's own ID is closer to the key than are the IDs of other nodes.

### 3 Sketch of proof

To demonstrate proper function of our system, we need to prove that most operations take  $\lceil \log n \rceil + c$  time for some small constant  $c$ , and that a  $\langle \text{key}, \text{value} \rangle$  lookup returns a key stored in the system with overwhelming probability.

We start with some definitions. For a  $k$ -bucket covering the distance range  $[2^i, 2^{i+1})$ , define the *index* of the bucket to be  $i$ . Define the *depth*,  $h$ , of a node to be  $160 - i$ , where  $i$  is the smallest index of a non-empty bucket. Define node  $y$ 's *bucket height* in node  $x$  to be the index of the bucket into which  $x$  would insert  $y$  minus the index of  $x$ 's least significant empty bucket. Because node IDs are randomly chosen, it follows that highly non-uniform distributions are unlikely. Thus with overwhelming probability the height of a any given node will be within a constant of  $\log n$  for a system with  $n$  nodes. Moreover, the bucket height of the closest node to an ID in the  $k$ th-closest node will likely be within a constant of  $\log k$ .

Our next step will be to assume the invariant that every  $k$ -bucket of every node contains at least one contact if a node exists in the appropriate range. Given this assumption, we show that the node lookup procedure is correct and takes logarithmic time. Suppose the closest node to the target ID has depth  $h$ . If none of this node's  $h$  most significant  $k$ -buckets is empty, the lookup procedure will find a node half as close (or rather whose distance is one bit shorter) in each step, and thus turn up the node in  $h - \log k$  steps. If one of the node's  $k$ -buckets is empty, it could be the case that the target node resides in the range of the empty bucket. In this case, the final steps will not decrease the distance by half. However, the search will proceed exactly as though the bit in the key corresponding to the empty bucket had been flipped. Thus, the lookup algorithm will always return the closest node in  $h - \log k$  steps. Moreover, once the closest node is found, the concurrency switches from  $\alpha$  to  $k$ . The number of steps to find the remaining  $k - 1$  closest nodes can be no more than the bucket height of the closest node in the  $k$ th-closest node, which is unlikely to be more than a constant plus  $\log k$ .

To prove the correctness of the invariant, first consider the effects of bucket refreshing if the invariant holds. After being refreshed, a bucket will either contain  $k$  valid nodes or else contain every node in its range if fewer than  $k$  exist. (This follows from the correctness of the node lookup procedure.) New nodes that join will also be inserted into any buckets that are not full. Thus, the only way to violate the invariant is for there to exist  $k + 1$  or more nodes in the range of a particular bucket, and for the  $k$  actually contained in the bucket all to fail with no intervening lookups or refreshes. However,  $k$  was precisely chosen for the probability of simultaneous failure within an hour (the maximum refresh time) to be small.

In practice, the probability of failure is much smaller than the probability of  $k$  nodes leaving within an hour, as every incoming or outgoing request updates nodes' buckets. This results from the symmetry of the XOR metric, because the IDs of the nodes with which a given node communicates during an incoming

or outgoing request are distributed exactly compatibly with the node's bucket ranges.

Moreover, even if the invariant does fail for a single bucket in a single node, this will only affect running time (by adding a hop to some lookups), not correctness of node lookups. For a lookup to fail,  $k$  nodes on a lookup path must each lose  $k$  nodes in the same bucket with no intervening lookups or refreshes. If the different nodes' buckets have no overlap, this happens with probability  $2^{-k^2}$ . Otherwise, nodes appearing in multiple other nodes' buckets will likely have longer uptimes and thus lower probability of failure.

Now we consider a  $\langle \text{key}, \text{value} \rangle$  pair's recovery. When a  $\langle \text{key}, \text{value} \rangle$  pair is published, it is populated at the  $k$  nodes, closest to the key. It is also re-published every hour. Since even new nodes (the least reliable) have probability  $1/2$  of lasting one hour, after one hour the  $\langle \text{key}, \text{value} \rangle$  pair will still be present on one of the  $k$  nodes closest to the key with probability  $1 - 2^{-k}$ . This property is not violated by the insertion of new nodes that are close to the key, because as soon as such nodes are inserted, they contact their closest nodes in order to fill their buckets and thereby receive any nearby  $\langle \text{key}, \text{value} \rangle$  pairs they should store. Of course, if the  $k$  closest nodes to a key fail and the  $\langle \text{key}, \text{value} \rangle$  pair has not been cached elsewhere, Kademlia will fail to store the pair and therefore lose the key.

## 4 Implementation notes

In this section, we describe two important techniques we used to improve the performance of the Kademlia implementation.

### 4.1 Optimized contact accounting

The basic desired property of  $k$ -buckets is to provide LRU checking and eviction of invalid contacts without dropping any valid contacts. As described in Section 2.2, if a  $k$ -bucket is full, it requires sending a PING RPC every time a message is received from an unknown node in the bucket's range. The PING checks to see if the least-recently used contact in the  $k$ -bucket is still valid. If it isn't, the new contact replaces the old one. Unfortunately, the algorithm as described would require a large number of network messages for these PINGS.

To reduce traffic, Kademlia delays probing contacts until it has useful messages to send them. When a Kademlia node receives an RPC from an unknown contact and the  $k$ -bucket for that contact is already full with  $k$  entries, the node places the new contact in a *replacement cache* of nodes eligible to replace stale  $k$ -bucket entries. The next time the node queries contacts in the  $k$ -bucket, any unresponsive ones can be evicted and replaced with entries in the replacement cache. The replacement cache is kept sorted by time last seen, with the most recently seen entry having the highest priority as a replacement candidate.

A related problem is that because Kademlia uses UDP, valid contacts will sometimes fail to respond when network packets are dropped. Since packet loss often indicates network congestion, Kademlia locks unresponsive contacts and

avoids sending them any further RPCs for an exponentially increasing backoff interval. Because at most stages Kademlia's lookup only needs to hear from one of  $k$  nodes, the system typically does not retransmit dropped RPCs to the same node.

When a contact fails to respond to 5 RPCs in a row, it is considered stale. If a  $k$ -bucket is not full or its replacement cache is empty, Kademlia merely flags stale contacts rather than remove them. This ensures, among other things, that if a node's own network connection goes down temporarily, the node won't completely void all of its  $k$ -buckets.

## 4.2 Accelerated lookups

Another optimization in the implementation is to achieve fewer hops per lookup by increasing the routing table size. Conceptually, this is done by considering IDs  $b$  bits at a time instead of just one bit at a time. As previously described, the expected number of hops per lookup is  $\log_2 n$ . By increasing the routing table's size to an expected  $2^b \log_{2^b} n$   $k$ -buckets, we can reduce the number of expected hops to  $\log_{2^b} n$ .

Section 2.4 describes how a Kademlia node splits a  $k$ -bucket when the bucket is full *and* its range includes the node's own ID. The implementation, however, also splits ranges not containing the node's ID, up to  $b - 1$  levels. If  $b = 2$ , for instance, the half of the ID space not containing the node's ID gets split once (into two ranges); if  $b = 3$ , it gets split at two levels into a maximum of four ranges, etc. The general splitting rule is that a node splits a full  $k$ -bucket if the bucket's range contains the node's own ID *or* the depth  $d$  of the  $k$ -bucket in the routing tree satisfies  $d \not\equiv 0 \pmod{b}$ . (The depth is just the length of the prefix shared by all nodes in the  $k$ -bucket's range.) The current implementation uses  $b = 5$ .

Though XOR-based routing resembles the first stage routing algorithms of Pastry [1], Tapestry [2], and Plaxton's distributed search algorithm [3], all three become more complicated when generalized to  $b > 1$ . Without the XOR topology, there is a need for an additional algorithmic structure for discovering the target within the nodes that share the same prefix but differ in the next  $b$ -bit digit. All three algorithms resolve this problem in different ways, each with its own drawbacks; they all require secondary routing tables of size  $O(2^b)$  in addition to the main tables of size  $O(2^b \log_{2^b} n)$ . This increases the cost of bootstrapping and maintenance, complicates the protocols, and for Pastry and Tapestry complicates or prevents a formal analysis of correctness and consistency. Plaxton has a proof, but the system is less geared for highly fault-prone environments like peer-to-peer networks.

## 5 Summary

With its novel XOR-based metric topology, Kademlia is the first peer-to-peer system to combine provable consistency and performance, latency-minimizing

routing, and a symmetric, unidirectional topology. Kademlia furthermore introduces a concurrency parameter,  $\alpha$ , that lets people trade a constant factor in bandwidth for asynchronous lowest-latency hop selection and delay-free fault recovery. Finally, Kademlia is the first peer-to-peer system to exploit the fact that node failures are inversely related to uptime.

## References

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