



(C) TICKETWINDOW: Second Party Collection Sharing

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(S//SI//REL USA, CAN, GBR, AUS, NZL) How much data is shared with our Partners? How productive is the sharing? When Data Acquisition researched these questions, they learned that NSA collects much data that is not shared with partners due to security classifications. This inhibited the amount of reporting Partners were able to generate on their targets of interest, and put additional stress on NSA reporters to generate reports on these targets. TICKETWINDOW was developed to enable analysts/reporters to evaluate all traffic on their targets.

(U//FOUO) What is TICKETWINDOW? Simply put, TICKETWINDOW is the sharing of sensitive-source collection with Partners; the exchange of sensitive source data that had not been shared with Partners under normal circumstances. This project has made excellent SIGINT available to the International Intelligence Community, enabling many product reports to be written that would not have been otherwise available.

(S//SI//REL USA, CAN, GBR, AUS, NZL) Data Acquisition established TICKETWINDOW in 1999 to enable reciprocal data sharing with our Second Party partners without revealing sensitive collection sources and methods. In August of that year, NSA began sharing sensitive source voice data with GCHQ and has since expanded the sharing to all Second Party Partners and increased the data types exchanged. NSA also receives TICKETWINDOW collection from Second Parties that are able to participate at this time. (Each partner has indicated a willingness to participate once capabilities are developed.) All Second Party Partners are not sharing as much with NSA, but the exchanges continue to expand. Many Partners also have bi-lateral agreements with other Partners for mutual exchanges, making TICKETWINDOW truly an international effort!

(S//SI//REL USA, CAN, GBR, AUS, NZL) TICKETWINDOW is a data sharing success story. Each Second Party Partner has been able to increase the number of intelligence products written each month because of TICKETWINDOW traffic. New sources from our Partners have helped NSA be more productive, while DSD reports that more than 40% of their product reporting is now from TICKETWINDOW collection, particularly from NSA collection. Both GCHQ and CSE have doubled their output of TICKETWINDOW-based reports in the last year. This increased production is the result of improved tasking awareness made possible through the TICKETWINDOW partnerships. Continued sharing will yield even greater rewards.

(U) Organizational Roles :

(S//SI) The Current Operations Division and the Data Flow & Collection Division of the Collection Strategies and Requirements Center (CSRC) perform the tasking and data flow functions of the project.



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- The [Current Operations Division](#) performs cross-program management for TICKETWINDOW, assuring that all US sources, including sensitive collection sources, are considered for satisfying partner requirements, in addition to responding to partner questions regarding US requirements being satisfied using their resources.
- The [Data Flow & Collection Forwarding Division](#) ensures that proper data review is maintained for each data type shared, to ensure that sensitive sources and methods are not revealed.

(S//SI) The Partners are considering the of use a similar model to manage their TICKETWINDOW exchanges.

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