

## (U//FOUO) Counterterrorism's IMT Forges Ahead

FROM: The CT IMT

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(U//FOUO) By now you have all heard of Issue Management Teams and hopefully have a general understanding of their roles and responsibilities. As members of the Counterterrorism IMT, we want to share some of the things we are doing, to further educate you about IMTs in general, but more importantly for us, to make you aware of some of the challenges we face, and if at all appropriate, invite you to the corporate CT table.

(U//FOUO) The SIGINT Director has challenged the CT IMT to be the corporate conscience and advocate for all that the United States SIGINT System (USSS) can bring to bear in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). In this context, we are no different from the other IMTs. We have been charged to optimize the USSS for our mission areas, to synchronize CT-related activities by working to improve processes and fostering collaborative partnerships, and by striving to meet the Agency's broader goals as defined by Transformation 2.0 and other initiatives. There is a natural fit between the goals of infosharing and horizontal integration and the CT IMT's objectives; they are, in fact, prerequisites for winning the GWOT.

(S//SI) To ensure the USSS is maximized to win the War on Terror, the CT IMT must collaborate with myriad groups, organizations, and individuals. We are discovering that collaboration and the sharing of information is critical for doing business. Not only must we strive for "joined at the hip" partnerships with the organizations that have obvious CT roles to play, but we must also make every effort to include, when appropriate, other partners whose roles may not be so obvious. We have been challenged to make compelling cases for change by working with and through the existing traditional organizational framework. We must partner with leaders across SID on ways to improve our CT capabilities without undermining existing authorities or decision-making responsibilities. To ensure that expertise and energy are applied effectively for maximum benefit to the mission the CT IMT created the Counterterrorism Planning Group (CTPG). With representatives from across SID, IAD, and the Foreign Affairs Directorate (FAD) the CTPG has the capability to reach far across and deep into the Enterprise. It is poised to get the right experts and leaders together quickly to define and resolve CT-related issues, to recognize challenges, and to break down barriers in order to seize opportunities and implement creative solutions.

(S//SI) The CT IMT is currently working on an Operations Plan (OPLAN) to capture all the excellent and worthwhile efforts that were underway in the CT arena before the IMT was established. We are also working with the SIGINT Director and SID Staff to follow up on CT-related issues that surfaced during the recent Site Commanders Operational Review (SCOR); getting involved in understanding and representing SID and NSA in CT budget-related processes; working with FAD to identify key CT gaps that could lead to new or changed foreign partnerships; and supporting and steering corporate activities as they relate to Counterterrorism (a recent CT assessment requested by the Pentagon is one example).

(U//FOUO) It is the global nature of the terrorist threat that makes it such a challenge for the SIGINT system. How do we posture the best SIGINT collection capability in the world to win this war? How can we better support our extraordinarily talented cadre of SIGINT Developers, language analysts and analyst-reporters so they can stop "sprinting" (as many of them have been doing since 9/11) and poise themselves to win the long haul "marathon" the GWOT demands? How can we better partner with support organizations in the GWOT as they struggle to meet their own constantly-changing set of competing priorities? These and many other questions are what challenge the CT IMT every day.

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