



(S) NSA Implements New Policy for Sharing Data with CIA

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(S//SI) With NSA and CIA now collaborating more closely and productively than ever before, Lt Gen Hayden recently put in place a new policy to define how one aspect of this relationship will work. This new policy governs the provision of NSA-collected information to CIA under CIA's NSCID 5 ("U.S. Espionage and Counterintelligence Activities Abroad") authorities. In 1972, NSCID 5 established the authority of CIA to engage in SIGINT activities in support of its clandestine espionage and counterintelligence activities (HUMINT and Covert Operations) abroad. Deliberate and measured applications of this authority have been a key part of our relationship with CIA and have been an important part of mission success in a number of areas.

(S//SI) The power and impact of SIGINT, especially as seen in the Global War on Terrorism and most recently in Operation Iraqi Freedom, have increased the demand for SIGINT support to these HUMINT and Covert Operations. The extent of our SIGINT System's resources and capabilities makes NSA uniquely suited to collecting SIGINT on behalf of CIA. This new policy, in essence, defines how we will provide NSA-collected, unminimized** SIGINT to CIA for them to use in direct support of certain aspects of their mission. It also establishes clear procedures for how NSA and CIA will handle NSCID 5 support interactions; NSA's focal point for these requests will be the Customer Gateway organization.

(S//SI) We have been working with all concerned to document the policy on NSA's provision of NSCID 5 SIGINT support to CIA ([NSA/CSS Policy No. 2-11](#)) and the attendant procedures ([USSID 180\(P\)](#)). A few key points:

- NSA has provided--and will further provide--training, as necessary, to appropriate personnel
- CIA personnel have been briefed to ensure that those involved understand the process
- CIA will certify each NSCID 5 SIGINT support request as being related to HUMINT/Covert Operations and provide related information
- CIA will have this traffic only for its own use (e.g., lead information) and will handle the traffic in accordance with NSA classification guidelines
- NSA will continue to do all relevant foreign intelligence analysis and reporting
- NSA will follow normal processes with respect to CIA-requested reporting related to human assets and operations

(S//SI) Some may question whether NSA is surrendering its SIGINT mission to another Agency--the effective application of this NSCID over the past 30 years has demonstrated that nothing could be further from the truth. It is simply most efficient for NSA to use its existing accesses and capabilities to collect this SIGINT on CIA's behalf and for CIA to do their own analysis in support of their NSCID 5 missions. In addition, the authority to analyze and report this information as foreign intelligence remains with NSA. This policy is consistent with the kind of collaboration and information sharing we have leveraged to great effect in partnerships with a number of other intelligence agencies.

(S//SI) The new USSID delineates specific procedures and responsibilities for NSCID 5 support to CIA. Please familiarize yourselves with the provisions of the new policy and USSID. Questions and comments should be directed to SIGINT Policy (██████████), which will coordinate the development of comprehensive responses and ensure that we identify and address any unresolved issues.

*** (U) "Minimization" is a specific set of procedures adopted by the Attorney General that are reasonably designed in light of the purpose and technique of the particular surveillance to minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available*

information concerning unconsenting United States persons consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information. NSA's implementing document is [USSID 18](#).

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