

October 13, 2025

p-token

Solana Program Patch Review

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About Zellic

Zellic is a vulnerability research firm with deep expertise in blockchain security. We specialize in EVM, Move (Aptos and Sui), and Solana as well as Cairo, NEAR, and Cosmos. We review L1s and L2s, cross-chain protocols, wallets and applied cryptography, zero-knowledge circuits, web applications, and more.

Prior to Zellic, we founded the [#1 CTF \(competitive hacking\) team](#) worldwide in 2020, 2021, and 2023. Our engineers bring a rich set of skills and backgrounds, including cryptography, web security, mobile security, low-level exploitation, and finance. Our background in traditional information security and competitive hacking has enabled us to consistently discover hidden vulnerabilities and develop novel security research, earning us the reputation as the go-to security firm for teams whose rate of innovation outpaces the existing security landscape.

For more on Zellic's ongoing security research initiatives, check out our website zellic.io and follow [@zellic_io](https://twitter.com/zellic_io) on Twitter. If you are interested in partnering with Zellic, contact us at hello@zellic.io.



1. Introduction

We were asked to review three different pull requests to p-token, which added a new instruction to p-token as well as improved CU usage by implementing a custom entry point as well as simplifying some math operations.

1.1. Scope

The engagement involved a review of the following targets:

p-token Modules

Type Rust

Platform Solana

Target token

Repository <https://github.com/solana-program/token/>

Version ae4630eade05ee3176acb814e72ec1bb2d9a356e

Programs p-interface/src/instruction.rs
p-token/src/entrypoint.rs
p-token/src/processor/batch.rs
p-token/src/processor/mod.rs
p-token/src/processor/unwrap_lamports.rs

Target token

Repository <https://github.com/solana-program/token/>

Version 2769f3bac969e56e2221dea2371bfec1775397ed

Programs p-token/src/entrypoint.rs

Target	token
Repository	https://github.com/solana-program/token/ ↗
Version	9949dee8619b5d51ee3e1c9e23311e1bdd3c2cf0
Programs	p-token/src/processor/close_account.rs p-token/src/processor/shared/burn.rs p-token/src/processor/withdraw_excess_lamports.rs

Contact Information

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1.2. Disclaimer

This assessment does not provide any warranties about finding all possible issues within its scope; in other words, the evaluation results do not guarantee the absence of any subsequent issues. Zellic, of course, also cannot make guarantees about any code added to the project after the version reviewed during our assessment. Furthermore, because a single assessment can never be considered comprehensive, we always recommend multiple independent assessments paired with a bug bounty program.

For each finding, Zellic provides a recommended solution. All code samples in these recommendations are intended to convey how an issue may be resolved (i.e., the idea), but they may not be tested or functional code. These recommendations are not exhaustive, and we encourage our partners to consider them as a starting point for further discussion. We are happy to provide additional guidance and advice as needed.

Finally, the contents of this assessment report are for informational purposes only; do not construe any information in this report as legal, tax, investment, or financial advice. Nothing contained in this report constitutes a solicitation or endorsement of a project by Zellic.

1.3. Project Timeline

The key dates of the engagement are detailed below.

October 7, 2025 Start of primary review period

October 9, 2025 End of primary review period

2. Patch Review

As no issues have been identified, the purpose of this section is to document the changes made by each individual pull request that was part of this patch review.

2.1. PR 83: Simplify math operations

This patch replaces several occurrences of checked_add / checked_sub with unchecked equivalents.

In process_close_account and process_withdraw_excess_lamports, the destination account balance cannot overflow because the total supply is guaranteed not to exceed $2^{64} - 1$. In process_burn, the supply cannot underflow since the supply exceeds the sum of the amounts.

2.2. PR 85: Add custom entry point

This patch defines an entrypoint function manually instead of using Pinocchio's program_entrypoint! macro to wrap process_instruction. It includes a fast path that handles the TransferChecked and Transfer instructions, before falling back to calling process_instruction in the same way as the previous program_entrypoint!.

On the fast path, it checks first for the number of accounts (which is four for TransferChecked and three for Transfer) and validates the account layout in memory before checking the instruction discriminators. It then casts the account data to the corresponding types and calls the underlying process_transfer_checked or process_transfer functions.

2.3. PR 87: Add unwrap_lamports instruction

This patch adds an unwrap_lamports instruction that withdraws lamports from a native token account. It is handled by its discriminator 45 in inner_process_remaining_instruction.

If unwrap_lamports is used in a batch instruction, process_batch will ensure that the source account to unwrap_lamports is owned by the token program.

In process_unwrap_lamports, it checks that the source account is a native account, that the source account signed the transaction, and that the source account has sufficient balance for the transfer. If the destination account differs from the source account, the source account's balance is decremented and the destination account's balance is incremented by the amount of the transfer with unchecked operations that cannot overflow due to the invariant on the total supply.