Judicial Favoritism of Politicians: Evidence from Small Claims Courts

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Abstract

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Tables and Figures

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Case Level					
Case Duration (in days)	5,262	361	433	1	5,416
Amount Claimed (in R$)	5,262	11,830	10,671	35	40,000
Judge Level					
Male	518	.610	.488	0	1
Tenure (in days)	518	4,378	2,882	13	12,987
Compensation (in R$)	518	35,110	10,772	13,156	145,616
Candidate Level					
Age	2,969	44	10.3	18	78
Male	2,969	.901	.298	0	1
Political Experience	2,969	.246	.430	0	1
Elected to Office	2,969	.486	.500	0	1
Campaign Expenditures (in R$)	2,969	54,963	621,757	11	29,958,454