Judicial Favoritism of Politicians: Evidence from Small Claims Courts

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June 21^{st} , 2019

${\bf Abstract}$

TBU

Keywords: judicial politics; judicial bias; political economy of development; law and social science.

JEL classification: D73; K42; P48; H83.

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- 1 Introduction
- 2 Institutional Background
- 3 Data
- 4 Theory
- 4.1 Application to Special Civil Tribunals of São Paulo
- 5 Empirical Strategy
- 5.1 Are Cases Assigned at Random?
- 5.2 Heterogeneous Convictions Across Judges
- 5.3 Testing Causality of Holding Office on Court Outcomes: RD
- 6 Robustness Checks
- 7 Prediction of Court Outcomes
- 8 Conclusion

Tables and Figures

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Case Level					
Case Duration (in days)	5,262	361	433	1	5,416
Amount Claimed (in R\$)	5,262	11,830	10,671	35	40,000
Judge Level					
Male	518	.610	.488	0	1
Tenure (in days)	518	4,378	2,882	13	12,987
Wage (in R\$)	518	$35{,}110$	10,772	$13,\!156$	$145,\!616$
Candidate Level					
Age	2,969	44	10.3	18	78
Male	2,969	.901	.298	0	1
Political Experience	2,969	.246	.430	0	1
Elected to Office	2,969	.486	.500	0	1
Campaign Expenditures (in R\$)	2,969	54,963	621,757	11	29,958,454

Figure 1: Interquartile Range of Candidate Age by Judge




Figure 2: Interquartile Range of Favorable Ruling by Judge




Figure 3: RD Point Estimates and 95% CIs




Figure 4: Mean Candidate Age by Judge




Figure 5: Mean Favorable Ruling by Judge

