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Rack vulnerable to ReDoS in content type parsing (2nd degree polynomial)

Low severity GitHub Reviewed Published Feb 28, 2024 in rack/rack • Updated Feb 29, 2024

Package

bundler rack (RubyGems)

Affected versions

>= 3.0.0, < 3.0.9.1
>= 0.4, < 2.2.8.1

Patched versions

3.0.9.1
2.2.8.1

Description

Summary

module Rack
  class MediaType
    SPLIT_PATTERN = %r{\s*[;,]\s*}

The above regexp is subject to ReDos. 50K blank characters as a prefix to the header will take over 10s to split.

PoC

A simple HTTP request with lots of blank characters in the content-type header:

request["Content-Type"] = (" " * 50_000) + "a,"

Impact

It's a very easy to craft ReDoS. Like all ReDoS the impact is debatable.

References

@tenderlove tenderlove published to rack/rack Feb 28, 2024
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Feb 28, 2024
Reviewed Feb 28, 2024
Published by the National Vulnerability Database Feb 29, 2024
Last updated Feb 29, 2024

Severity

Low

Weaknesses

CVE ID

CVE-2024-25126

GHSA ID

GHSA-22f2-v57c-j9cx

Source code

Credits

Checking history
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