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Zendframework potential security issue in login mechanism

High severity GitHub Reviewed Published Jun 7, 2024 to the GitHub Advisory Database • Updated Jun 7, 2024

Package

composer zendframework/zendframework1 (Composer)

Affected versions

>= 1.12.0, < 1.12.4

Patched versions

1.12.4

Description

Using the Consumer component of ZendOpenId (or Zend_OpenId in ZF1), it is possible to login using an arbitrary OpenID account (without knowing any secret information) by using a malicious OpenID Provider. That means OpenID it is possible to login using arbitrary OpenID Identity (MyOpenID, Google, etc), which are not under the control of our own OpenID Provider. Thus, we are able to impersonate any OpenID Identity against the framework.

Moreover, the Consumer accepts OpenID tokens with arbitrary signed elements. The framework does not check if, for example, both openid.claimed_id and openid.endpoint_url are signed. It is just sufficient to sign one parameter. According to https://openid.net/specs/openid-authentication-2_0.html#positive_assertions, at least op_endpoint, return_to, response_nonce, assoc_handle, and, if present in the response, claimed_id and identity, must be signed.

References

Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Jun 7, 2024
Reviewed Jun 7, 2024
Last updated Jun 7, 2024

Severity

High
7.5
/ 10

CVSS base metrics

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
High
Availability
None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Weaknesses

CVE ID

No known CVE

GHSA ID

GHSA-9v78-h226-2rmq

Source code

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