In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: rfcomm: Fix null-ptr-deref in rfcomm_check_security
During our fuzz testing of the connection and disconnection process at the
RFCOMM layer, we discovered this bug. By comparing the packets from a
normal connection and disconnection process with the testcase that
triggered a KASAN report. We analyzed the cause of this bug as follows:
-
In the packets captured during a normal connection, the host sends a
Read Encryption Key Size type of HCI_CMD packet
(Command Opcode: 0x1408) to the controller to inquire the length of
encryption key.After receiving this packet, the controller immediately
replies with a Command Completepacket (Event Code: 0x0e) to return the
Encryption Key Size.
-
In our fuzz test case, the timing of the controller's response to this
packet was delayed to an unexpected point: after the RFCOMM and L2CAP
layers had disconnected but before the HCI layer had disconnected.
-
After receiving the Encryption Key Size Response at the time described
in point 2, the host still called the rfcomm_check_security function.
However, by this time struct l2cap_conn *conn = l2cap_pi(sk)->chan->conn;
had already been released, and when the function executed
return hci_conn_security(conn->hcon, d->sec_level, auth_type, d->out);,
specifically when accessing conn->hcon, a null-ptr-deref error occurred.
To fix this bug, check if sk->sk_state is BT_CLOSED before calling
rfcomm_recv_frame in rfcomm_process_rx.
References
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: rfcomm: Fix null-ptr-deref in rfcomm_check_security
During our fuzz testing of the connection and disconnection process at the
RFCOMM layer, we discovered this bug. By comparing the packets from a
normal connection and disconnection process with the testcase that
triggered a KASAN report. We analyzed the cause of this bug as follows:
In the packets captured during a normal connection, the host sends a
Read Encryption Key Sizetype ofHCI_CMDpacket(Command Opcode: 0x1408) to the controller to inquire the length of
encryption key.After receiving this packet, the controller immediately
replies with a Command Completepacket (Event Code: 0x0e) to return the
Encryption Key Size.
In our fuzz test case, the timing of the controller's response to this
packet was delayed to an unexpected point: after the RFCOMM and L2CAP
layers had disconnected but before the HCI layer had disconnected.
After receiving the Encryption Key Size Response at the time described
in point 2, the host still called the rfcomm_check_security function.
However, by this time
struct l2cap_conn *conn = l2cap_pi(sk)->chan->conn;had already been released, and when the function executed
return hci_conn_security(conn->hcon, d->sec_level, auth_type, d->out);,specifically when accessing
conn->hcon, a null-ptr-deref error occurred.To fix this bug, check if
sk->sk_stateis BT_CLOSED before callingrfcomm_recv_frame in rfcomm_process_rx.
References