

<https://github.com/aguayro>

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Nos llega un correo electrónico con un pdf adjunto un tanto sospechoso, preparamos un entorno con Windows 7 y abrimos el correo electrónico y procedemos a realizar un volcado de memoria ram para su estudio.

1.- Realizo el cálculo del hash de la imagen.

Obtengo con el comando sha1sum el hash del fichero que se ha entregado para su comprobación con el documento de custodia.

\$ sha256sum memdump.mem

```

$ sha256sum win7-malware.raw
350335781ad44c022574c355d90164a530651de54de977fb20e8d1f61d85f3d2 win7-malware.raw

```

2.- Averiguo el sistema operativo de la memoria:

Ejecuto el comando siguiente:

\$ volatility -f memdump.mem imageinfo

```

$ volatility -f win7-malware.raw imageinfo
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
INFO : volatility.debug : Determining profile based on KDBG search
      Suggested Profile(s) Win7SP1x64, Win7SP0x64, Win2008R2SP0x64, Win2008R2SP1x64_23418, Win2008R2SP1x64, Win7SP1x64_23418
      AS Layer1 : WindowsAMD64PagedMemory (Kernel AS)
      AS Layer2 : FileAddressSpace (/home/kali/Documents/forense/memory_case03/win7-malware.raw)
      PAE type : No PAE
      DTB : 0x187000L
      KDBG : 0xf8000283b0a0L
      Number of Processors : 1
      Image Type (Service Pack) : 1
      KPCR for CPU 0 : 0xfffff8000283cd00L
      KUSER_SHARED_DATA : 0xfffff80000000000L
      Image date and time : 2023-08-16 21:35:48 UTC+0000
      Image local date and time : 2023-08-16 22:35:48 +0100

```

Volatility nos indica que el sistema de la imagen es un Windows 7 sp1 x64

3.- Veamos que procesos se están ejecutando, la estructura de los procesos así como si hay procesos sospechosos.

\$ volatility -f win7-malware.raw --profile=Win7SP1x64 psscan

```

$ volatility -f win7-malware.raw --profile=Win7SP1x64 psscan
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Offset(P)      Name      PID      PPID      PDB      Time created      Time exited
-----
0x0000000070cc040 System      4         0 0x000000000187000 2023-08-16 21:29:15 UTC+0000
0x0000000071a17c0 BraveCrashHand 1456      1700 0x0000000008f184000 2023-08-16 21:31:45 UTC+0000
0x0000000071cb30 ProcessHacker. 1932      1548 0x00000000090634000 2023-08-16 21:31:40 UTC+0000
0x000000011e2cd7c0 taskhost.exe 1600      468 0x00000000097942000 2023-08-16 21:30:00 UTC+0000
0x000000011e30eb30 spssvc.exe 1808      468 0x0000000009645c000 2023-08-16 21:30:15 UTC+0000
0x000000011e357b30 explorer.exe 1548      1656 0x000000000866fc000 2023-08-16 21:31:17 UTC+0000
0x000000011e4b29e0 svchost.exe 1048      468 0x0000000009bb0a000 2023-08-16 21:29:37 UTC+0000
0x000000011e4d3b30 armsvc.exe 1160      468 0x0000000009b3fa000 2023-08-16 21:29:41 UTC+0000
0x000000011e6788d0 svchost.exe 596      468 0x000000000a1e5a000 2023-08-16 21:29:25 UTC+0000
0x000000011e67cb30 svchost.exe 672      468 0x000000000a1d5b000 2023-08-16 21:29:29 UTC+0000
0x000000011e758060 dwm.exe 1452      840 0x00000000091d1a000 2023-08-16 21:31:04 UTC+0000
0x000000011e75b2d0 svchost.exe 800      468 0x0000000009fea8000 2023-08-16 21:29:31 UTC+0000
0x000000011e75fb30 svchost.exe 840      468 0x0000000009f270000 2023-08-16 21:29:32 UTC+0000
0x000000011e78f740 svchost.exe 880      468 0x0000000009f479000 2023-08-16 21:29:32 UTC+0000
0x000000011e79db30 svchost.exe 912      468 0x0000000009f37f000 2023-08-16 21:29:32 UTC+0000
0x000000011e7bdb30 spoolsv.exe 532      468 0x0000000009bedd000 2023-08-16 21:29:37 UTC+0000
0x000000011e7fb30 svchost.exe 876      468 0x0000000009c857000 2023-08-16 21:29:36 UTC+0000
0x000000011e95cb30 wininit.exe 372      316 0x000000000a3dbb000 2023-08-16 21:29:23 UTC+0000
0x000000011e9688e0 csrss.exe 324      316 0x000000000a4675000 2023-08-16 21:29:22 UTC+0000
0x000000011e973060 csrss.exe 384      364 0x000000000a394a000 2023-08-16 21:29:23 UTC+0000
0x000000011e986910 winlogon.exe 424      364 0x000000000a3450000 2023-08-16 21:29:23 UTC+0000
0x000000011e9d9810 services.exe 468      372 0x000000000a3136000 2023-08-16 21:29:23 UTC+0000
0x000000011e9e4910 lsass.exe 484      372 0x000000000a2c1c000 2023-08-16 21:29:23 UTC+0000
0x000000011e9eab30 lsm.exe 492      372 0x000000000a2d63000 2023-08-16 21:29:23 UTC+0000
0x000000011ec9b250 BraveCrashHand 768      1700 0x00000000091cbc000 2023-08-16 21:31:33 UTC+0000
0x000000011f06ab30 taskeng.exe 1636      912 0x0000000009710a000 2023-08-16 21:30:00 UTC+0000 2023-08-16 21:37:10 UTC+0000
0x000000011f14d630 svchost.exe 1208      468 0x0000000009ac2b000 2023-08-16 21:29:46 UTC+0000
0x000000011f194770 smss.exe 248      4 0x000000000a9040000 2023-08-16 21:29:15 UTC+0000
0x000000011fa25060 taskeng.exe 1460      912 0x0000000005f930000 2023-08-16 21:39:40 UTC+0000
0x000000011faddb30 RdrCEF.exe 4032      3044 0x0000000001de17000 2023-08-16 21:33:41 UTC+0000 2023-08-16 21:33:45 UTC+0000
0x000000011faff630 WmiPrivSE.exe 3416      596 0x0000000001a7be000 2023-08-16 21:33:52 UTC+0000

```

ANÁLISIS FORENSE MEMORIA WINDOWS 7 CASO 03

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\$ volatility -f win7-malware.raw --profile=Win7SP1x64 pslist

```

$ volatility -f win7-malware.raw --profile=Win7SP1x64 pslist
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6

```

Offset(V)	Name	PID	PPID	Thds	Hnds	Sess	Wow64	Start	Exit
0xfffffa80036cc040	System	4	0	80	534		0	2023-08-16 21:29:15 UTC+0000	
0xfffffa8004794770	smss.exe	248	4	2	29		0	2023-08-16 21:29:15 UTC+0000	
0xfffffa8004f688e0	csrss.exe	324	316	9	382	0	0	2023-08-16 21:29:22 UTC+0000	
0xfffffa8004f5cb30	wininit.exe	372	316	3	74	0	0	2023-08-16 21:29:23 UTC+0000	
0xfffffa8004f73060	csrss.exe	384	364	9	255	1	0	2023-08-16 21:29:23 UTC+0000	
0xfffffa8004f86910	winlogon.exe	424	364	3	111	1	0	2023-08-16 21:29:23 UTC+0000	
0xfffffa8004fd9810	services.exe	468	372	9	198	0	0	2023-08-16 21:29:23 UTC+0000	
0xfffffa8004fe4910	lsass.exe	484	372	8	699	0	0	2023-08-16 21:29:23 UTC+0000	
0xfffffa8004feab30	lsm.exe	492	372	10	144	0	0	2023-08-16 21:29:23 UTC+0000	
0xfffffa80050788d0	svchost.exe	596	468	9	348	0	0	2023-08-16 21:29:25 UTC+0000	
0xfffffa800507cb30	svchost.exe	672	468	6	257	0	0	2023-08-16 21:29:29 UTC+0000	
0xfffffa800515b2d0	svchost.exe	800	468	21	532	0	0	2023-08-16 21:29:31 UTC+0000	
0xfffffa800515fb30	svchost.exe	840	468	25	520	0	0	2023-08-16 21:29:32 UTC+0000	
0xfffffa800518f740	svchost.exe	880	468	20	525	0	0	2023-08-16 21:29:32 UTC+0000	
0xfffffa800519db30	svchost.exe	912	468	35	1145	0	0	2023-08-16 21:29:32 UTC+0000	
0xfffffa80051fbb30	svchost.exe	876	468	15	386	0	0	2023-08-16 21:29:36 UTC+0000	
0xfffffa80051bdb30	spoolsv.exe	532	468	12	278	0	0	2023-08-16 21:29:37 UTC+0000	
0xfffffa80052b29e0	svchost.exe	1048	468	17	306	0	0	2023-08-16 21:29:37 UTC+0000	
0xfffffa80052d3b30	armsvc.exe	1160	468	4	63	0	1	2023-08-16 21:29:41 UTC+0000	
0xfffffa800474d630	svchost.exe	1208	468	20	296	0	0	2023-08-16 21:29:46 UTC+0000	
0xfffffa80054cd7c0	taskhost.exe	1600	468	7	157	1	0	2023-08-16 21:30:00 UTC+0000	
0xfffffa800550eb30	sppsvc.exe	1808	468	4	149	0	0	2023-08-16 21:30:15 UTC+0000	
0xfffffa8005158060	dwm.exe	1452	840	6	81	1	0	2023-08-16 21:31:04 UTC+0000	
0xfffffa8005557b30	explorer.exe	1548	1656	23	920	1	0	2023-08-16 21:31:17 UTC+0000	
0xfffffa8004a9b250	BraveCrashHand	768	1700	5	99	0	1	2023-08-16 21:31:33 UTC+0000	
0xfffffa80037a17c0	BraveCrashHand	1456	1700	5	93	0	0	2023-08-16 21:31:45 UTC+0000	
0xfffffa8003890740	svchost.exe	1880	468	15	318	0	0	2023-08-16 21:31:47 UTC+0000	
0xfffffa800388c060	SearchIndexer.	1892	468	11	648	0	0	2023-08-16 21:31:48 UTC+0000	
0xfffffa800390ab30	wmpnetwk.exe	1340	468	9	203	0	0	2023-08-16 21:31:59 UTC+0000	
0xfffffa800398a2b0	svchost.exe	2220	468	10	349	0	0	2023-08-16 21:32:07 UTC+0000	
0xfffffa8003a53b30	notepad.exe	2984	1548	2	77	1	0	2023-08-16 21:32:42 UTC+0000	
0xfffffa8003a5eb30	AcroRd32.exe	3044	1548	16	529	1	1	2023-08-16 21:32:49 UTC+0000	
0xfffffa8003a62b30	AcroRd32.exe	1956	3044	13	340	1	1	2023-08-16 21:32:49 UTC+0000	

\$ volatility -f win7-malware.raw --profile=Win7SP1x64 pstree

```

$ volatility -f win7-malware.raw --profile=Win7SP1x64 pstree
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6

```

Name	Pid	PPid	Thds	Hnds	Time
0xfffffa8004f73060:csrss.exe	384	364	9	255	2023-08-16 21:29:23 UTC+0000
0xfffffa8004f86910:winlogon.exe	424	364	3	111	2023-08-16 21:29:23 UTC+0000
0xfffffa8004a9b250:BraveCrashHand	768	1700	5	99	2023-08-16 21:31:33 UTC+0000
0xfffffa80037a17c0:BraveCrashHand	1456	1700	5	93	2023-08-16 21:31:45 UTC+0000
0xfffffa80036cc040:System	4	0	80	534	2023-08-16 21:29:15 UTC+0000
0xfffffa8004794770:smss.exe	248	4	2	29	2023-08-16 21:29:15 UTC+0000
0xfffffa8004f688e0:csrss.exe	324	316	9	382	2023-08-16 21:29:22 UTC+0000
0xfffffa8004f5cb30:wininit.exe	372	316	3	74	2023-08-16 21:29:23 UTC+0000
0xfffffa8004fd9810:services.exe	468	372	9	198	2023-08-16 21:29:23 UTC+0000
0xfffffa80052d3b30:armsvc.exe	1160	468	4	63	2023-08-16 21:29:41 UTC+0000
0xfffffa80051fbb30:svchost.exe	876	468	15	386	2023-08-16 21:29:36 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800519db30:svchost.exe	912	468	35	1145	2023-08-16 21:29:32 UTC+0000
0xfffffa8003c25060:taskeng.exe	1460	912	4	15 ...	2023-08-16 21:39:40 UTC+0000
0xfffffa80051bdb30:spoolsv.exe	532	468	12	278	2023-08-16 21:29:37 UTC+0000
0xfffffa80052b29e0:svchost.exe	1048	468	17	306	2023-08-16 21:29:37 UTC+0000
0xfffffa80038bd060:svchost.exe	2676	468	5	21 ...	2023-08-16 21:41:39 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800507cb30:svchost.exe	672	468	6	257	2023-08-16 21:29:29 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800474d630:svchost.exe	1208	468	20	296	2023-08-16 21:29:46 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800390ab30:wmpnetwk.exe	1340	468	9	203	2023-08-16 21:31:59 UTC+0000
0xfffffa80054cd7c0:taskhost.exe	1600	468	7	157	2023-08-16 21:30:00 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800515b2d0:svchost.exe	800	468	21	532	2023-08-16 21:29:31 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800515fb30:svchost.exe	840	468	25	520	2023-08-16 21:29:32 UTC+0000
0xfffffa8005158060:dwm.exe	1452	840	6	81	2023-08-16 21:31:04 UTC+0000
0xfffffa8003890740:svchost.exe	1880	468	15	318	2023-08-16 21:31:47 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800388c060:SearchIndexer.	1892	468	11	648	2023-08-16 21:31:48 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800550eb30:sppsvc.exe	1808	468	4	149	2023-08-16 21:30:15 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800518f740:svchost.exe	880	468	20	525	2023-08-16 21:29:32 UTC+0000
0xfffffa800398a2b0:svchost.exe	2220	468	10	349	2023-08-16 21:32:07 UTC+0000
0xfffffa80050788d0:svchost.exe	596	468	9	348	2023-08-16 21:29:25 UTC+0000
0xfffffa8003cfff630:WmiPrvSE.exe	3416	596	6	112	2023-08-16 21:33:52 UTC+0000

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\$ volatility -f win7-malware.raw --profile=Win7SP1x64 psxview -R

```

└─$ volatility -f win7-malware.raw --profile=Win7SP1x64 psxview -R
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6

```

Offset(P)	Name	PID	pslist	psscan	thrdproc	pspcid	csrss	session	deskthrd	ExitTime
0x000000011fe90740	svchost.exe	1880	True	True	True	True	True	True	False	
0x000000011fc62b30	AcroRd32.exe	1956	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	
0x000000011e9e4910	lsass.exe	484	True	True	True	True	True	True	False	
0x00000000071ccb30	ProcessHacker.	1932	False	True	True	True	True	False	False	
0x000000011ff0ab30	wmpnetwk.exe	1340	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	
0x000000011e7fbb30	svchost.exe	876	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	
0x000000011e9eab30	lsn.exe	492	True	True	True	True	True	True	False	
0x000000011e986910	winlogon.exe	424	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	
0x000000011e7bdb30	spoolsv.exe	532	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	
0x000000011faff630	WmiPrvSE.exe	3416	True	True	True	True	True	True	False	
0x000000011e30eb30	sppsvc.exe	1808	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	
0x000000011ff8a2b0	svchost.exe	2220	True	True	True	True	True	True	False	
0x00000000071a17c0	BraveCrashHand	1456	True	True	True	True	True	True	False	
0x000000011e4b29e0	svchost.exe	1048	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	
0x000000011fbd1b30	Magnet ram cap	3712	True	True	True	True	True	True	False	
0x000000011e2cd7c0	taskhost.exe	1600	True	True	True	True	True	True	False	
0x000000011e758060	dwm.exe	1452	True	True	True	True	True	True	False	
0x000000011fc53b30	notepad.exe	2984	True	True	True	True	True	True	False	
0x000000011e6788d0	svchost.exe	596	True	True	True	True	True	True	False	
0x000000011e95cb30	wininit.exe	372	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	
0x000000011f14d630	svchost.exe	1208	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	
0x000000011e357b30	explorer.exe	1548	True	True	True	True	True	True	False	
0x000000011fe8c060	SearchIndexer.	1892	True	True	True	True	True	True	False	
0x000000011e9d9810	services.exe	468	True	True	True	True	True	True	False	
0x000000011e67cb30	svchost.exe	672	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	
0x000000011e79db30	svchost.exe	912	True	True	True	True	True	True	False	
0x000000011fc8e5a0	ielowutil.exe	2484	True	True	True	True	True	True	False	
0x000000011fc5eb30	AcroRd32.exe	3044	True	True	True	True	True	True	False	
0x000000011ec9b250	BraveCrashHand	768	True	True	True	True	True	True	False	
0x000000011e75fb30	svchost.exe	840	True	True	True	True	True	True	False	
0x000000011e75b2d0	svchost.exe	800	True	True	True	True	True	True	False	
0x000000011e78f740	svchost.exe	880	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	

Nos muestra el proceso processhacker como False, no hay nada que sospechar pues es una aplicación que monitoriza todos los procesos que se han arrancado en el equipo, así como las conexiones abiertas.

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4.- Consultemos que ejecutada cada proceso en la línea de comandos a ver si vemos alguna cosa atípica.

\$ volatility -f win7-malware.raw --profile=Win7SP1x64 cmdline

```
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
*****
System pid: 4
*****
smss.exe pid: 248
Command line : \SystemRoot\System32\smss.exe
*****
csrss.exe pid: 324
Command line : \SystemRoot\System32\csrss.exe ObjectDirectory=\Windows SharedSection=1024,20480,768 Windows=On SubSystemType=Windows ServerDll=basesrv,1 ServerDll=winsrv:UserServerDllInitiali
zation,3 ServerDll=winsrv:ConServerDllInitialization,2 ServerDll=xssrv,4 ProfileControl=Off MaxRequestThreads=16
*****
wininit.exe pid: 372
Command line : wininit.exe
*****
csrss.exe pid: 384
Command line : \SystemRoot\System32\csrss.exe ObjectDirectory=\Windows SharedSection=1024,20480,768 Windows=On SubSystemType=Windows ServerDll=basesrv,1 ServerDll=winsrv:UserServerDllInitiali
zation,3 ServerDll=winsrv:ConServerDllInitialization,2 ServerDll=xssrv,4 ProfileControl=Off MaxRequestThreads=16
*****
winlogon.exe pid: 424
Command line : winlogon.exe
*****
services.exe pid: 468
Command line : C:\Windows\system32\services.exe
*****
lsass.exe pid: 484
Command line : C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe
*****
lsn.exe pid: 492
Command line : C:\Windows\system32\lsn.exe
*****
svchost.exe pid: 596
Command line : C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch
*****
svchost.exe pid: 672
Command line : C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k RPCSS
```

Aquí tenemos dos procesos que debemos investigar, no sólo porque ya está puesto como MALWARE



```
AcroRd32.exe pid: 3044
Command line : "C:\Program Files (x86)\Adobe\Acrobat Reader DC\Reader\AcroRd32.exe" "C:\temp\hotelpaymentproof-MALWARE.pdf"
*****
AcroRd32.exe pid: 1956
Command line : "C:\Program Files (x86)\Adobe\Acrobat Reader DC\Reader\AcroRd32.exe" --type-renderer "C:\temp\hotelpaymentproof-MALWARE.pdf"
*****
```

Hay dos procesos con se han ejecutado doblemente, pid 3044 y pid 1956.

```
-# cat psscan.txt | grep 3044
0x000000011faddb30 RdrCEF.exe 4032 3044 0x00000001de17000 2023-08-16 21:33:41 UTC+0000 2023-08-16 21:33:45 UTC+0000
0x000000011fc5eb30 AcroRd32.exe 3044 1548 0x0000000077738000 2023-08-16 21:32:49 UTC+0000
0x000000011fc62b30 AcroRd32.exe 1956 3044 0x000000007624a000 2023-08-16 21:32:49 UTC+0000
```

\$ volatility -f win7-malware.raw --profile=Win7SP1x64 psxview -R

```
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Scanning for registries...
Gathering shellbag items and building path tree...
*****
Registry: \??\C:\Users\numis\ntuser.dat
Key: Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\Bags\1\Desktop
Last updated: 2023-08-16 12:55:18 UTC+0000
Value File Name Modified Date Create Date Access Date File Attr Unicode Name
-----
ItemPos800+600+96(1) ACROBA-1.LNK 2023-08-16 12:51:14 UTC+0000 2023-08-16 12:51:14 UTC+0000 2023-08-16 12:51:14 UTC+0000 ARC Acrobat Reader.lnk
ItemPos800+600+96(1) ANALIS-1 2023-06-16 07:44:46 UTC+0000 2023-06-16 07:44:08 UTC+0000 2023-06-16 07:44:46 UTC+0000 DIR Analisis Dinamico
ItemPos800+600+96(1) ANALIS-2 2023-06-16 07:47:10 UTC+0000 2023-06-16 07:44:54 UTC+0000 2023-06-16 07:47:10 UTC+0000 DIR Analisis Estatico
ItemPos800+600+96(1) HOTELP-1.PDF 2023-08-16 12:44:06 UTC+0000 2023-08-16 12:44:04 UTC+0000 2023-08-16 12:43:46 UTC+0000 ARC hotelpaymentproof-MALWARE.pdf
ItemPos800+600+96(1) MAGNET-1.EXE 2023-08-09 13:14:36 UTC+0000 2023-08-09 13:14:06 UTC+0000 2023-08-09 13:14:02 UTC+0000 ARC Magnet ram capture.exe
ItemPos800+600+96(1) NEWTEX-1.TXT 2023-08-16 12:21:04 UTC+0000 2023-08-16 12:20:58 UTC+0000 2023-08-16 12:20:58 UTC+0000 ARC New Text Document.txt
*****
Registry: \??\C:\Users\numis\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat
Key: Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\BagMRU
Last updated: 2023-08-16 21:36:10 UTC+0000
Value Mru Entry Type GUID GUID Description Folder IDs
-----
1 4 Folder Entry 26ee0668-a00a-44d7-9371-beb064c98683 {Unknown CSIDL} EXPLORER, MY_COMPUTER, RECYCLE_BIN, UNKNOWN
0 1 Folder Entry 28d04fe0-3aea-1069-a2d8-08002b30309d My Computer EXPLORER, MY_COMPUTER
3 3 Folder Entry 59031a47-3f72-44a7-89c5-5595fe6b30ee Users EXPLORER, USERS
2 2 Folder Entry 031e4825-7b94-4dc3-b131-e94b044c8dd5 Libraries EXPLORER, LIBRARIES
5 7 Folder Entry 323ca680-c24d-4099-b94d-446dd2d7249e Unknown GUID EXPLORER, MY_GAMES
4 8 Folder Entry f02c1a0d-be21-4350-88b0-7367fc96ef3c Network EXPLORER, MY_DOCUMENTS, MY_COMPUTER, NETWORK
```

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El último fichero que se ha accedido es un documento en pdf, que está abierto con el adobe reader y está relacionado con un proceso sospechoso con pid 3044 y pid 1956.

Veámos que nos devuelve el plugin malfind

\$ volatility -f win7-malware.raw --profile=Win7SP1x64 malfind

```

└─$ volatility -f win7-malware.raw --profile=Win7SP1x64 malfind
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Process: svchost.exe Pid: 800 Address: 0xd30000
Vad Tag: VadS Protection: PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE
Flags: CommitCharge: 16, MemCommit: 1, PrivateMemory: 1, Protection: 6

0x00d30000 41 ba 80 00 00 00 48 b8 38 a1 f5 fd fe 07 00 00 A.....H.8.....
0x00d30010 48 ff 20 90 41 ba 81 00 00 00 48 b8 38 a1 f5 fd H...A.....H.8...
0x00d30020 fe 07 00 00 48 ff 20 90 41 ba 82 00 00 00 48 b8 ....H...A.....H.
0x00d30030 38 a1 f5 fd fe 07 00 00 48 ff 20 90 41 ba 83 00 8.....H...A...

```

Nos detecta varios procesos como sospechosos de tener código malicioso, veamos cuáles son y haremos un volcado de los mismos.

```

└─$ cat malfind.txt | grep Process:
Process: svchost.exe Pid: 800 Address: 0xd30000
Process: svchost.exe Pid: 880 Address: 0xce0000
Process: explorer.exe Pid: 1548 Address: 0x3e90000
Process: explorer.exe Pid: 1548 Address: 0x4590000
Process: svchost.exe Pid: 1880 Address: 0x24d0000
Process: svchost.exe Pid: 1880 Address: 0x4d70000
Process: Magnet ram cap Pid: 3712 Address: 0x4a10000
Process: Magnet ram cap Pid: 3712 Address: 0x4a00000

```

Muestra varios procesos de servicios de red svchost.exe con pid 800, pid 880, pid 1880, además de proceso pid 1548 explorer.exe. Del proceso pid 3712 es una aplicación que use para hacer el volcado de memoria por lo que lo descargamos.

Volcamos los ejecutables al disco para su análisis con pid 800, pid 880 pid 1880 y pir 1548

\$ volatility -f win7-malware.raw -p 800,880,1548,1880 --profile=Win7SP1x64 procdump --dump-dir ./

```

└─$ volatility -f win7-malware.raw -p 800,880,1548,1880 --profile=Win7SP1x64 procdump --dump-dir ./
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6

```

Process(V)	ImageBase	Name	Result
0xfffffa800515b2d0	0x00000000ff320000	svchost.exe	OK: executable.800.exe
0xfffffa800518f740	0x00000000ff320000	svchost.exe	OK: executable.880.exe
0xfffffa8005557b30	0x00000000ffe20000	explorer.exe	OK: executable.1548.exe
0xfffffa8003890740	0x00000000ff320000	svchost.exe	OK: executable.1880.exe

Volcamos los procesos al disco para su análisis con pid 800, pid 880 pid 1880 y pir 1548

\$ volatility -f win7-malware.raw -p 800,880,1548,1880 --profile=Win7SP1x64 memdump --dump-dir ./

<https://github.com/aguayro>

@9v@yr0

Una vez volcado el contenido de los procesos a disco, veamos que accesos a url o ips contienen los distintos procesos. Veamos primero los pid 800, pid 880.


\$ strings 800.dmp | grep '<www\....>'

```

# strings 800.dmp | grep '<www\....>'
www.esn.com
[{"r":{"f":"^http://(?:www\\.)?wpi\\.edu/","t":"https://www.wpi.edu/"},"f":"^http://my\\.wpi\\.edu/","t":"https://my.wpi.edu/"}]}
[{"r":{"f":"^http://(?:www\\.)?wpi\\.edu/","t":"https://www.wpi.edu/"},"f":"^http://my\\.wpi\\.edu/","t":"https://my.wpi.edu/"}]}

(root@kali)-[/home/.../Documents/forense/Memoria/case_03]
# strings 880.dmp | grep '<www\....>'
[{"r":{"f":"^http://(?:www\\.)?wpi\\.edu/","t":"https://www.wpi.edu/"},"f":"^http://my\\.wpi\\.edu/","t":"https://my.wpi.edu/"}]}
[{"r":{"f":"^http://(?:www\\.)?wpi\\.edu/","t":"https://www.wpi.edu/"},"f":"^http://my\\.wpi\\.edu/","t":"https://my.wpi.edu/"}]}

```



Dicho proceso no tiene nada malicioso, veamos el pid 1880.


\$ strings 1880.dmp | grep '<www\....>'

```

# strings 1880.dmp | grep '<www\....>'
https://www.ver
://www.ver
/www.ver
www.a-d-w-a-r-e.com
http://www.now.cn/?SCPMCID=
www.win-spy.com
www.avp.ch
www.avp.ru

```

Parece que tenemos algo, nos devuelve muchas url de dominios .ru .br verificamos la url www.win-spy.com en virustotal.com



<https://github.com/aguayro>

@9v@yr0

Vamos a volver a revisar el volcado de memoria correspondiente con el pid 1880.

En el listado de url, hay una que me llama la atención pues para que ejecuta algún código en php

```

└─$ strings 1880.dmp | grep 'www\131377\com' -B 10
pDI T
]JS!V6
baiduba.DLL
C:\WINDOWS\system32\ieset.ini
refurl=
exid=
regURL=
seo=
smsid=
=aiyu
www.131377.com?accect
asiafind.com/go/g
shop.7cv.com/index.php?asstfrom=
cnt.zhaopin.com/Market/whole_counter.jsp?sid=
f=http://www.netxboy.com/
http://go.58.com/?f=
http://www.now.cn/?SCPMCID=
www.joyo.com/default.asp?source=ad4all
union.99jk.com/xf200/click.asp?u=1&uname=
www.131377.com?accect=

```

Todas las url que contiene dicha strings los cataloga como malware.

Vamos a ver los ficheros que hay en en equipo a ver si encontramos algo anómalo, la llamada a un dominio .cn me hace sospechar sobre algún malware de dicho origen.

\$ volatility -f win7-malware.raw --profile=Win7SP1x64 filescan

```

└─$ volatility -f win7-malware.raw --profile=Win7SP1x64 filescan
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Offset(P)      #Ptr  #Hnd Access Name
-----
0x00000000706f330 16    0 RW --- \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\AppCompat\Programs\RecentFileCache.bcf
0x00000000706f500 16    0 R--r-d \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\SysWOW64\tzres.dll
0x00000000706f650 11    0 R--r-d \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\notepad.exe
0x00000000706f7a0 18    0 RW-rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Directory
0x00000000706f8f0 12    0 R--r-d \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\SysWOW64\api-ms-win-crt-runtime-l1-1-0.dll
0x00000000708c070 8     0 R--r-d \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\negoexts.dll
0x0000000070d15e0 15    0 R--r-d \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\Sens.dll

```


<https://github.com/aguayro>

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\$ volatility -f win7-malware.raw --profile=Win7SP1x64 filescan | grep -P '\[p{Han}]'

```

$ volatility -f win7-malware.raw --profile=Win7SP1x64 filescan | grep -P '\[p{Han}]'
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
0x000000011e3d5f20 16 0 R--rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\...
0x000000011e660b60 14 0 R--rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\...
0x000000011f1fa4b0 12 0 R--rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\...
0x000000011fa24530 31 0 R--rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\...
0x000000011fa24bb0 10 0 R--r-d \Device\HarddiskVolume2\...
0x000000011fa255e0 16 0 R--r-d \Device\HarddiskVolume2\...
0x000000011fa2a1f0 15 0 R--rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\...
0x000000011fa65790 16 0 R--r-d \Device\HarddiskVolume2\...
0x000000011fa8d5b0 13 0 R--rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\...
0x000000011fa9e130 16 0 R--r-d \Device\HarddiskVolume2\...
0x000000011faa4130 1 1 R--rw- \Device\HarddiskVolume2\...
0x000000011facdf20 16 0 R--rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\...
0x000000011fba4dd0 2 1 ---rw- \Device\NamedPipe\...
0x000000011fbadade 1 1 R--rw- \Device\HarddiskVolume2\...
0x000000011fc65ae0 11 0 R--rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\...
0x000000011fd2c5d0 15 0 R--rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\...
0x000000011fd99f20 16 0 R--rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\...
0x000000011fde8d10 15 0 R--rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\...
0x000000011fddfbb0 13 0 R--rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\...
0x000000011fe04170 15 0 R--rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\...
0x000000011fe1e4d0 1 1 R--rw- \Device\HarddiskVolume2\...
0x000000011fe71620 3 0 R--r-d \Device\HarddiskVolume2\...
0x000000011fedf2b0 1 1 R--rw- \Device\HarddiskVolume2\...
0x000000011ffaacd0 13 0 R--rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\...
0x000000011ffd7840 1 1 ---rw- \Device\NamedPipe\...
0x000000011fff3f20 16 0 R--rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\...
0x000000011fff41d0 16 0 R--rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\...

```

Veamos que ficheros se hayan descargado

\$ volatility -f win7-malware.raw --profile=Win7SP1x64 filescan | grep -i Download

```

$ volatility -f win7-malware.raw --profile=Win7SP1x64 filescan | grep -i Download
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
0x000000011e3203b0 19 1 RW-r-- \Device\HarddiskVolume2\ProgramData\Microsoft\Network\Downloader\qmgr0.dat
0x000000011fd1ca00 30 0 R--rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\numis\Downloads\Regshot-1.9.0\Regshot-x64-ANSI.exe
0x000000011f84c4a0 16 0 R--rw- \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\numis\AppData\Local\BraveSoftware\Brave-Browser\User Data\Default\Download\Metadata
0x000000011faa1280 3 0 R--rw- \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\numis\AppData\Local\BraveSoftware\Brave-Browser\User Data\FileTypePolicies\61\download_file_types.p
b
0x000000011fd17cc0 18 1 RW-r-- \Device\HarddiskVolume2\ProgramData\Microsoft\Network\Downloader\qmgr1.dat
0x000000011fe77b40 16 0 R--rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\numis\Links\Downloads.lnk
0x000000011fedf160 16 0 R--rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\numis\Downloads\desktop.ini

```

Vuelco los ficheros a disco para analizarlos, pero no veo nada anormal en ellos.

Descargamos el fichero pdf hotelpaymentproof-MALWARE.pdf

\$ volatility -f win7-malware.raw dumpfiles -Q 0x000000011e2695f0 -n -D ./

```

$ volatility -f win7-malware.raw --profile=Win7SP1x64 dumpfiles -Q 0x000000011fc89550 -n -D ./
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
DataSectionObject 0x11fc89550 None \Device\HarddiskVolume2\temp\hotelpaymentproof-MALWARE.pdf
SharedCacheMap 0x11fc89550 None \Device\HarddiskVolume2\temp\hotelpaymentproof-MALWARE.pdf

```

El volcado nos ha generado dos ficheros:

```

$ ls file.None* -al
-rw-rw-r-- 1 root root 262144 Aug 29 04:13 file.None.0xfffffa800398be00.hotelpaymentproof-MALWARE.pdf.vacb
-rw-rw-r-- 1 root root 32768 Aug 29 04:13 file.None.0xfffffa80047ff7a0.hotelpaymentproof-MALWARE.pdf.dat

```


<https://github.com/aguayro>

@9v@yr0

Analizamos el pdf

\$ pdf-parser -a file.None.0xfffffa800398be00.hotelpaymentproof-MALWARE.pdf.vacb

```
pdf-parser -a file.None.0xfffffa800398be00.hotelpaymentproof-MALWARE.pdf.vacb
This program has not been tested with this version of Python (3.11.9)
Should you encounter problems, please use Python version 3.11.1
Comment: 3
XREF: 0
Trailer: 0
StartXref: 1
Indirect object: 16
Indirect objects with a stream: 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 28, 29, 38, 40, 42, 44, 52, 1, 55
  7: 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 40, 54
/Catalog 1: 2
/ObjStm 1: 1
/XObject 6: 28, 29, 38, 42, 44, 52
/XRef 1: 55
Unreferenced indirect objects: 1 0 R, 11 0 R, 12 0 R, 13 0 R, 14 0 R, 15 0 R, 28 0 R, 29 0 R, 38 0 R, 40 0 R, 52 0 R, 55 0 R
Unreferenced indirect objects without /ObjStm objects: 11 0 R, 12 0 R, 13 0 R, 14 0 R, 15 0 R, 28 0 R, 29 0 R, 38 0 R, 40 0 R, 52 0 R, 55 0 R
Search keywords:
/OpenAction 1: 2
/AcroForm 1: 2
```

La estructura nos indica que ha una acción OpenAction en el objeto 2, veámos que contiene.

\$ pdf-parser -o 2 -f file.None.0xfffffa800398be00.hotelpaymentproof-MALWARE.pdf.vacb

```
pdf-parser -o 2 -f file.None.0xfffffa800398be00.hotelpaymentproof-MALWARE.pdf.vacb
This program has not been tested with this version of Python (3.11.9)
Should you encounter problems, please use Python version 3.11.1
obj 2 0
Type: /Catalog
Referencing: 4 0 R, 5 0 R, 6 0 R

<<
  /OpenAction 4 0 R
  /Pages 5 0 R
  /Type /Catalog
  /AcroForm 6 0 R
  /Version /1.5
>>

[(1, '\n'), (2, '<<'), (1, '\n'), (2, '/OpenAction'), (1, ' '), (3, '4'), (1, ' '), (3, '0'), (1, ' '), (3, 'R'), (1, '\n'), (2, '/Pages'), (1, ' '), (3, '5'), (1, ' '), (3, '0'), (1, ' '), (3, 'R'), (1, '\n'), (2, '/Type'), (1, ' '), (2, '/Catalog'), (1, '\n'), (2, '/AcroForm'), (1, ' '), (3, '6'), (1, ' '), (3, '0'), (1, ' '), (3, 'R'), (1, '\n'), (2, '/Version'), (1, ' '), (2, '/1#2E5'), (1, '\n'), (2, '>>'), (1, '\n')]
```

El estudio del pdf se encuentra en otro documento en el que me encuentro trabajando.

Software:

Volatility 2

Pdf-parser