

Retos CTF C1B3RWALL 2.024**Reto: Amenaza de bajo perfil**

Un caso policial está en juego. Un correo electrónico con un archivo de imagen podría contener la clave para resolver el caso. Investiga el contenido del correo y examina el archivo adjunto. La información que necesitas para descifrar el misterio se esconde dentro del archivo de imagen.

Veamos que tenemos en el correo electrónico

`$ emlAnalyzer -i challenge.eml`

```
tsurugi@tsurugi:/media/tsurugi/New Volume/CTF/C1b3rwall/2024/Amenaza de bajo perfil$ emlAnalyzer -i challenge.eml
=====
|| Structure ||
-----
- multipart/mixed
  |- text/plain
  |- image/jpeg [secret.jpg]

=====
|| URLs in HTML part ||
=====
[!] Email contains no HTML

=====
|| Reloaded Content (aka. Tracking Pixels) ||
=====
[!] Email contains no HTML

=====
|| Attachments ||
-----
[1] secret.jpg image/jpeg attachment
```

Tenemos un correo electrónico en formato de texto, sin html con una imagen jpg como adjunto.

<https://github.com/aguayro>

@9v@yr0

Analizamos la cabecera del correo electrónico

\$ emlAnalyzer --header -i challenge.eml

```
tsurugi@tsurugi:/media/tsurugi/New Volume/CTF/Cib3rwall/2024/Amenaza de bajo perfil$ emlAnalyzer --header -i challenge.eml
=====
|| Header ||
=====
Content-Type.....multipart/mixed; boundary="=====3828735792486987228=="
MIME-Version.....1.0
From.....johndoe@example.com
To.....janedoe@example.com
Subject.....The Key to Light
X-Password.....password123
```

Aquí tenemos alguna Información importante, la cabecera X-Password no es una cabecera estándar por lo que es una pista.

\$ emlAnalyzer -i challenge.eml --text

```
tsurugi@tsurugi:/media/tsurugi/New Volume/CTF/Cib3rwall/2024/Amenaza de bajo perfil$ emlAnalyzer --text -i challenge.eml
=====
|| Plaintext ||
=====
Hi Jane,

I've attached the image you asked for. Remember, the key to letting light win over darkness is inside the head. Once you get it, use the key to open the heart and let the light extinguish the darkness.

Best,
John
```

\$ emlAnalyzer -i challenge.eml --extract-all

```
tsurugi@tsurugi:/media/tsurugi/New Volume/CTF/Cib3rwall/2024/Amenaza de bajo perfil$ emlAnalyzer --extract-all -i challenge.eml
=====
|| Structure ||
=====
|- multipart/mixed
|  |- text/plain
|  |- image/jpeg          [secret.jpg]
=====
|| URLs in HTML part ||
=====
[!] Email contains no HTML

=====
|| Reloaded Content (aka. Tracking Pixels) ||
=====
[!] Email contains no HTML

=====
|| Attachments ||
=====
[1] secret.jpg          image/jpeg          attachment

=====
|| Attachment Extracting ||
=====
+ ] Attachment [1] "secret.jpg" extracted to eml_attachments/secret.jpg
```

Lo más rápido es copiar del fichero .eml el texto en base64 y decodificarlo

\$ cat fichero.base64 | base64 -d > imagen.jpg

\$ steghide info secret.jpg -p password123

```
tsurugi@tsurugi:/media/tsurugi/New Volume/CTF/Cib3rwall/2024/Amenaza de bajo perfil/eml_attachments$ steghide info secret.jpg -p password123
'secret.jpg':
  format: jpeg
  capacity: 287,0 Byte
steghide: could not extract any data with that passphrase!
```

La clave que tenemos en la cabecera no nos sirve para obtener información de lo que oculta la imagen.

<https://github.com/aguayro>

@9v@yr0

\$ objdump -d imagen.bin | head

```
tsurugi@tsurugi:/media/tsurugi/New Volume/CTF/Cib3rwall/2024/Amenaza de bajo perfil/enl_attachments/_secret.jpg.extracted$ objdump -d imagen.bin | head
imagen.bin:      formato del fichero elf64-x86-64

Desensamblado de la sección .init:

0000000000001000 <_init>:
1000:      f3 0f 1e fa                endbr64
1004:      48 83 ec 08                sub    $0x8,%rsp
1008:      48 8b 05 09 2f 00 00       mov    0x2fd9(hrip),%rax      # 3feb <__gmon_start__@base>
```

\$ nm imagen.bin

```
tsurugi@tsurugi:/media/tsurugi/New Volume/CTF/Cib3rwall/2024/Amenaza de bajo perfil/enl_attachments/_secret.jpg.extracted$ nm imagen.bin
000000000000030c r __abi_tag
0000000000000400 B __bss_start
0000000000000400 b completed.0
0000000000000400 w __cxa_finalize@GLIBC_2.2.5
0000000000000400 D __data_start
0000000000000400 W data_start
0000000000001090 t deregister_tm_clones
0000000000001100 t do_global_dtors_aux
0000000000001d00 d do_global_dtors_aux_fini_array_entry
0000000000004000 D __dso_handle
0000000000003dc8 d _DYNAMIC
0000000000000400 D _edata
0000000000000400 B _end
0000000000001168 T _fini
0000000000001140 t frame_dummy
0000000000002d00 d __frame_dummy_init_array_entry
00000000000020f0 r __FRAME_END__
0000000000003fb0 d _GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_
0000000000000200 w __gmon_start__
0000000000002010 r GNU_EH_FRAME_HDR
0000000000001000 T _init
0000000000002000 R __IO_stdin_used
0000000000000000 w __ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable
0000000000000000 w __ITM_registerTMCloneTable
0000000000001149 U __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.34
00000000000010c0 t register_tm_clones
0000000000001000 T _start
0000000000000400 D __TMC_END__
```

Analizamos el fichero con Radare2

\$ r2 -d flag.bin

```

└─$ r2 -d flag.bin
WARN: Relocs has not been applied. Please use '-e bin.relocs.apply=true' or '-e bin.cache=true' next time
[0x7f7b9225e810]> aaa
INFO: Analyze all flags starting with sym. and entry0 (aa)
INFO: Analyze imports (af@aa)
INFO: Analyze entrypoint (af@entry0)
INFO: Analyze symbols (af@aa)
INFO: Recovering variables
INFO: Analyze all functions arguments/locals (afva@aa)
INFO: Analyze function calls (aac)
INFO: Analyze len bytes of instructions for references (aar)
INFO: Finding and parsing C++ vtables (avrr)
INFO: Analyzing methods
INFO: Recovering local variables (afva)
INFO: Skipping type matching analysis in debugger mode (aajt)
INFO: Propagate noreturn information (aanr)
INFO: Use -AA or aaaa to perform additional experimental analysis
[0x7f7b9225e810]> pdf @main
; DATA XREF from entry0 @ 0x55fb29c76078(r)
30: int main (int argc, char **argv, char **envp);
    0x55fb29c76149      f30f1efa      endbr64
    0x55fb29c7614d      55           push rbp
    0x55fb29c7614e      4889e5       mov rbp, rsp
    0x55fb29c76151      488d05ac0e.. lea rax, str.H3920392C ; 0x55fb29c77004 ; "H3920392C"
    0x55fb29c76158      4889c7       mov rdi, rax
    0x55fb29c7615b      e8f0feffff  call sym.imp.puts ; int puts(const char *s)
    0x55fb29c76160      b800000000  mov eax, 0
    0x55fb29c76165      5d          pop rbp
    0x55fb29c76166      c3          ret
[0x7f7b9225e810]>
```

Flag: H3920392C

<https://github.com/aguayro>

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Herramientas:

Binwalk

ElmAnazyler

Hexdump

Strings

Realelf

Nm

Gdb

Radare2

<https://github.com/aguayro>

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Reto: El acechador Nocturno



Hay un fichero con información sospechosa

Analizamos el contenido del fichero `secure_program`

\$ `file secure_program`

```
(root@kali) [/media/.../CTF/C1b3rwall/2024/El acechador Nocturno]
$ file secure_program
secure_program: ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2, BuildID[sha1]=e904970391d395e6ad83ae10f8ab4e447bcb00cb, for GNU/Linux 3.2.0, not stripped
```

Es un fichero binario de Linux, vamos a ejecutarlo a ver lo que nos desvela

\$ `./secure_program`

```
(root@kali) [/media/.../CTF/C1b3rwall/2024/El acechador Nocturno]
$ ./secure_program
Welcome to the calculator program!
Enter the first number: 1
Enter the second number: 2
The result is: 3
Do you want to continue? (y/n): n
The flag is: H028302C
```

Tenemos la flag: H028302C

<https://github.com/aguayro>

@9v@yr0

Vamos un poco más allá y vamos a decompilar el binario:

\$ r2 -d secure_program

```

-- r2 -d secure_program
WARN: Relocs has not been applied. Please use '-e bin.relocs.apply=true' or '-e bin.cache=true' next time
[0x7f14d2e14810]> aaa
INFO: Analyze all flags starting with sym. and entry0 (aa)
INFO: Analyze imports (af@000i)
INFO: Analyze entrypoint (af@ entry0)
INFO: Analyze symbols (af@000s)
INFO: Recovering variables
INFO: Analyze all functions arguments/locals (afva@000F)
INFO: Analyze function calls (aac)
INFO: Analyze len bytes of instructions for references (aar)
INFO: Finding and parsing C++ vtables (avrr)
INFO: Analyzing methods
INFO: Recovering local variables (afva)
INFO: Skipping type matching analysis in debugger mode (aajt)
INFO: Propagate noreturn information (aanr)
INFO: Use -AA or aaaa to perform additional experimental analysis
[0x7f14d2e14810]> pdf @main
; DATA 00000000 from entry0 @ 0x55cf49870000(r)
- 306: int main(int argc, char **argv, char **envp);
      ; var int64_t var_8h @ rbp-0x8
      ; var int64_t var_12h @ rbp-0x12
      ; var int64_t var_18h @ rbp-0x18
      ; var int64_t var_1ch @ rbp-0x1c
      ; var int64_t var_20h @ rbp-0x20
      0x55cf4987d1c9 f30f1efa endbr64
      0x55cf4987d1cd 55 push rbp
      0x55cf4987d1ce 4889e5 mov rbp, rsp
      0x55cf4987d1d1 4883ec20 sub rsp, 0x20
      0x55cf4987d1d5 64488b0425.. mov rax, qword fs:[0x28]
      0x55cf4987d1de 488045f8 mov qword [var_8h], rax
      0x55cf4987d1e2 31c0 xor eax, eax
      0x55cf4987d1e4 488d051d0e.. lea rax, str.Welcome_to_the_calculator_program_ ; 0x55cf4987e000 ; "Welcome to the calculator program!"

```

Más abajo tenemos el contenido de la flag

```

0x55cf4987d2ba 85c0 test eax, eax
0x55cf4987d2bc 0f8531ffffff jne 0x55cf4987d1f3
0x55cf4987d2c2 488d05472d.. lea rax, obj.flag ; 0x55cf49800010 ; "H028302C"
0x55cf4987d2c9 4889c6 mov rsi, rax
0x55cf4987d2cc 488d05cb0d.. lea rax, str.The_flag_is: __s_n ; 0x55cf4987e090 ; "The flag is: %s\n"
0x55cf4987d2d3 4889c7 mov rdi, rax

```

Flag: H028302C

Reto: El enigma de la Araña



Pero algo no cuadra. Las palabras Support Team podrían ser una pista falsa. El Correo electrónico es aparentemente simple, pero solo un detective digital con un ojo agudo y una mente perspicaz puede encontrar la pista crucial.

El Enigma de la Araña te desafía a descifrar el correo electrónico.

Veamos la estructura del correo

```
$ emlAnalyzer -i important_security_update.eml
```

```
└─ emlAnalyzer -i important_security_update.eml
|| Structure ||
├─ multipart/mixed
│  └─ text/plain
│     └─ text/plain [security_update.txt]
|| URLs in HTML and text part ||
[+] No URLs were found
|| Reloaded Content (aka. Tracking Pixels) ||
[!] Email contains no HTML
|| Attachments ||
[1] security_update.txt text/plain attachment
```

Email en texto plano con un fichero adjunto: security_update.txt

<https://github.com/aguayro>

@9v@yr0

\$ emlAnalyzer --header -i important_security_update.eml

```

└─$ emlAnalyzer --header -i important_security_update.eml
=====
|| Header ||
=====
From.....support@portolegs.com
To.....johndoe@portolegs.com
Subject.....Important Security Update
Date.....Thu, 06 Jun 2024 13:47:05 -0800
Message-ID.....<171771042509.6288.15841463342848526726@CTFCreationLab.myguest.virtualbox.org>
X-Flag.....H3000349069NS88C
MIME-Version.....1.0
Content-Type.....multipart/mixed; boundary="=====7496486785826446780="

```

Analizamos la cabecera, nos centramos en el Message-Id y el campo X-Flag.

Message-ID.....<171771042509.6288.15841463342848526726@CTFCreationLab.myguest.virtualbox.org>

171771042509 se corresponde con la fecha en formato timestamp.

6288 se corresponde valor aleatorio incremental.

15841463342848526726 corresponde es otro valor aleatorio numérico incremental usado entre el servidor de correo y el cliente.

CTFCreationLab.myguest.virtualbox.org corresponde con el nombre de máquina y del dominio.

La fecha no se corresponde con la cabecera del e-mail que indica: Thu, 06 Jun 2024 13:47:05 -0800

Convert epoch to human-readable date and vice versa

Supports Unix timestamps in seconds, milliseconds, microseconds and nanoseconds.

Assuming that this timestamp is in **milliseconds**:

GMT: Thursday, 12 June 1975 2:10:42.509

Your time zone: jueves, 12 de junio de 1975 2:10:42.509 GMT+00:00

Relative: 49 years ago

```

(root@kali)-[/media/.../C1b3rwall/2024/El enigma de la Araña/eml_attachments]
└─$ ls -al
total 384
drwxr-xr-x 2 kali kali 131072 Jul  2 07:33 .
drwxr-xr-x 3 kali kali 131072 Jul  2 07:33 ..
-rwxr-xr-x 1 kali kali    80 Jul  2 07:33 security_update.txt

(root@kali)-[/media/.../C1b3rwall/2024/El enigma de la Araña/eml_attachments]
└─$ cat security_update.txt
Here are the updates you requested.

No sensitive information in this document.

(root@kali)-[/media/.../C1b3rwall/2024/El enigma de la Araña/eml_attachments]
└─$

```

No hay nada relevante en el fichero adjunto.

<https://github.com/aguayro>

@9v@yr0

```
➤ emlAnalyzer --header -i important_security_update.eml

|| Header ||

From.....support@portolegs.com
To.....johndoe@portolegs.com
Subject.....Important Security Update
Date.....Thu, 06 Jun 2024 13:47:05 -0800
Message-ID.....<171771042509.6288.15841463342848526726@CTFCreationLab.myguest.virtualbox.org>
X-Flag.....H3000349069NS88C
MIME-Version.....1.0
Content-Type.....multipart/mixed; boundary="=====7496486785826446780="
```

Volviendo a la cabecera, el campo X-Flag no se corresponde con un campo válido, por lo tanto la flag es ese campo:

H3000349069NS88C

```
➤ emlAnalyzer --extract-all -i important_security_update.eml

|| Structure ||

└ multipart/mixed
  └ text/plain
  └ text/plain [security_update.txt]

|| URLs in HTML and text part ||

[+] No URLs were found

|| Reloaded Content (aka. Tracking Pixels) ||

[!] Email contains no HTML

|| Attachments ||

[1] security_update.txt      text/plain      attachment

|| Extracting All Attachments ||

[+] Attachment [1] "security_update.txt" extracted to eml_attachments/security_update.txt
```

Reto: Amenaza interna

Amenaza Interna te desafía a enfrentar un escenario de ciberseguridad real.

En la escena del cibercrimen, has encontrado un conjunto de archivos: un .pcap con el Tráfico de red del ataque, un .log con Registros del sistema.

Debes analizar los archivos proporcionados, incluyendo el Correo electrónico que te envió el departamento de IT forensics, para comprender el ataque.

Revisamos el correo electrónico con emlAnalyzer

```
$ emlAnalyzer --header -i decryption_key_zw4DzL5.eml
```

```
emlAnalyzer --header -i decryption_key_zw4DzL5.eml

|| Header ||

Content-Type.....multipart/mixed; boundary="=====3929747310002735626=="
MIME-Version.....1.0
From.....it.forensics@hospital.com
To.....user@hospital.com
Subject.....Decryption Key for Important Files
```

El correo nos viene del dominio hospital.com del usuario it.forensics. Vamos a ver que contiene el cuerpo del correo.

<https://github.com/aguayro>

@9v@yr0

\$ emlAnalyzer --text -i decryption_key_zw4DzL5.eml

```

└─$ emlAnalyzer --text -i decryption_key_zw4DzL5.eml
=====
|| Plaintext ||
=====

Dear User,

Your important files have been encrypted by ransomware. To decrypt them, you will need the following decryption key:

Decryption Key: c991f29208d4ee9e4e19cd939d64c357

Please follow these steps to decrypt your files:
1. Ensure you have the decryption script provided by the IT Forensics Department.
2. Place the encrypted file(s) and the decryption script in the same directory.
3. Open a command prompt or terminal window.
4. Navigate to the directory containing the decryption script and encrypted files.
5. Run the decryption script with the following command:
   python decrypt.py

This will display the decrypted content of the file header in the terminal. If you encounter any issues, please contact the IT Forensics Department for assistance.

Sincerely,
IT Forensics Department

```

Nos comenta desde el departamento de IT que hemos sido víctima de encriptación de ficheros.

Veamos la estructura del fichero

```

└─$ emlAnalyzer -i decryption_key_zw4DzL5.eml
=====
|| Structure ||
=====
└─ multipart/mixed
  └─ text/plain
  └─ application/octet-stream [decrypt.py]

=====
|| URLs in HTML and text part ||
=====
[+] No URLs were found

=====
|| Reloaded Content (aka. Tracking Pixels) ||
=====
[!] Email contains no HTML

=====
|| Attachments ||
=====
[1] decrypt.py      application/octet-stream      attachment

```

<https://github.com/aguayro>

@9v@yr0

Contiene un fichero adjunto decrypt.py

```

# cat decrypt.py
import os
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import Cipher, algorithms, modes
from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend

# Set the file path and key
file_path = 'urgent_data.txt.WNCRY'
key = 'c991f29208d4ee9e4e19cd939d64c357'
key = bytes.fromhex(key)

# Define the decryption function
def decrypt_file(file_path, key):
    with open(file_path, 'rb') as f:
        file_data = f.read()

    # Extract the IV from the start of the file
    iv = file_data[:16]
    # Extract the authentication tag from the end of the file
    auth_tag = file_data[-16:]
    # Extract the ciphertext
    ciphertext = file_data[16:-16]

    # Decrypt the ciphertext using AES-256-GCM
    cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(key), modes.GCM(iv, auth_tag), backend=default_backend())
    decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
    decrypted_data = decryptor.update(ciphertext) + decryptor.finalize()

    # Save the decrypted data to a new file
    decrypted_file_path = file_path[:-6] # Remove the .WNCRY extension
    with open(decrypted_file_path, 'wb') as f:
        f.write(decrypted_data)

    print(f"Decrypted file saved as: {decrypted_file_path}")

```

Wannacry Traffic Analysis (Wireshark)

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Length	Protocol	Info
377	2024-06-07 16:23:15.946397	192.168.1.10	192.168.1.179	51	NBSS	NBSS Continuation Message
685	2024-06-07 16:23:15.095618	192.168.1.10	192.168.1.132	87	NBSS	NBSS Continuation Message
667	2024-06-07 16:23:15.111954	192.168.1.10	192.168.1.204	87	NBSS	NBSS Continuation Message
863	2024-06-07 16:23:15.160304	192.168.1.10	192.168.1.223	51	NBSS	NBSS Continuation Message
911	2024-06-07 16:23:15.172182	192.168.1.10	192.168.1.235	87	NBSS	NBSS Continuation Message

Packet Details (Selected Packet 377):

- [Calculated window size: 8192]
- Checksum: 0xd5ac [unverified]
- [Checksum Status: Unverified]
- Urgent Pointer: 0
- Timestamps
 - [Time since first frame in this TCP stream: 0.000000000 seconds]
 - [Time since previous frame in this TCP stream: 0.000000000 seconds]
- SEQ/ACK analysis
 - [Bytes in flight: 11]
 - [Bytes sent since last PSF flag: 11]
 - TCP payload (11 bytes)
- NetBIOS Session Service
 - Continuation data: 534d42207472616666666663

Packet Bytes (Selected Packet 377):

```

0000 45 00 00 33 00 01 00 00
0010 c0 a8 01 4f 00 14 01 bd
0020 50 02 20 00 d5 ac 00 00
0030 66 69 63

```

<https://github.com/aguayro>

@9v@yr0

Ejecutamos el script de python

```
python decrypt.py
Decrypted file saved as: urgent_data.txt

(root@kali)-[/media/~/CTF/C1b3rwall/2024/Anenaza Interna]
cat urgent_data.txt
CRY193wW484H
```

Según el log y la captura del tráfico de red se ha propagado un ransomware por la red encriptado los ficheros. La infección empieza por la dirección ip 192.168.1.10

```
cat wannacry logs.txt | head
2024-06-07 12:22:15 - 192.168.1.10 - Initial infection by WannaCry ransomware
2024-06-07 12:22:15 - Source IP: 192.168.1.10, Destination IP: 192.168.1.152, Action: SMB connection established
2024-06-07 12:22:15 - Source IP: 192.168.1.10, Destination IP: 192.168.1.136, Action: SMB connection established
2024-06-07 12:22:15 - Source IP: 192.168.1.152, Destination IP: 192.168.1.253, Action: SMB connection established
2024-06-07 12:22:15 - Source IP: 192.168.1.253, Destination IP: 192.168.1.66, Action: SMB connection established
2024-06-07 12:22:15 - Source IP: 192.168.1.253, Destination IP: 192.168.1.14, Action: File encrypted
2024-06-07 12:22:15 - Source IP: 192.168.1.152, Destination IP: 192.168.1.243, Action: SMB connection established
2024-06-07 12:22:15 - Source IP: 192.168.1.66, Destination IP: 192.168.1.29, Action: SMB connection established
2024-06-07 12:22:15 - Source IP: 192.168.1.66, Destination IP: 192.168.1.22, Action: SMB connection established
2024-06-07 12:22:15 - Source IP: 192.168.1.136, Destination IP: 192.168.1.135, Action: SMB connection established
```

<https://github.com/aguayro>

@9v@yr0

Reto: Crimen de Guerra

El Crimen de Guerra te desafía a desentrañar los secretos de un Archivo. Debes utilizar tus habilidades de análisis de archivos y tu conocimiento de los metadatos.

\$ `pdfid classified_report.pdf`

```
PDFiD 0.2.8 classified_report.pdf
PDF Header: %PDF-1.3
obj          7
endobj       7
stream       1
endstream    1
xref         1
trailer      1
startxref    1
/Page        1
/Encrypt      0
/ObjStm       0
/JS           0
/JavaScript   0
/AA           0
/OpenAction   0
/AcroForm     0
/JBIG2Decode  0
/RichMedia    0
/Launch       0
/EmbeddedFile 0
/XFA          0
/Colors > 2^24 0
```

Tenemos un fichero pdf con 7 objetos, de los cuales sólo uno tiene stream. No hay código javascript ni OpenAction ni formularios.

Veamos que nos dice pdf-parser:

\$ `pdf-parser -a classified_report.pdf`

```
pdf-parser -a classified_report.pdf
This program has not been tested with this version of Python (3.11.9)
Should you encounter problems, please use Python version 3.11.1
Comment: 3
XREF: 1
Trailer: 1
StartXref: 1
Indirect object: 7
Indirect objects with a stream: 5
  3: 2, 5, 6
/Catalog 1: 3
/Font 1: 7
/Page 1: 4
/Pages 1: 1
```


<https://github.com/aguayro>

@9v@yr0

\$ pdf-parser -o 2 -w classified_report.pdf

```
pdf-parser -o 2 -w classified_report.pdf
This program has not been tested with this version of Python (3.11.9)
Should you encounter problems, please use Python version 3.11.1
obj 2 0
Type:
Referencing:

<<
/Producer (PyPDF2)
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