

Proof of Less Work

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1 Introduction

This paper is about PoLW to reduce the energy consumption of Nakamoto PoW[1] without sacrificing security. Surprisingly, in practice, transition from PoW to PoLW could lead to security gain.

This paper is inspired by the recent and great paper from Itay, Alexander and Ittay [2] which describes several algorithms with reduced external costs in the physical world. It's also inspired by the white paper of Alephium project [3] which introduces dynamic mining rewards with lockup. We propose two algorithms (linear PoLW and exponential PoLW) which could reduce the energy consumption of Nakamoto PoW. In particular, exponential PoLW could in theory reduce the energy consumption by an arbitrary factor.

The key point is as the *IncentivizedInternalExpenses* algorithm in [2] to keep high block generation costs by encouraging the miners to spend funds in a way internal to the network. In PoLW, the miners are able to give up part of the coinbase rewards so as to get a weight (> 1) for the work (block hash) they have done. In some sense, the miners do both actual mining by finding better hashes and virtual mining by burning part of the coinbase rewards. When the work weight gets higher, the actual mining done in the physical world would be less, though the cost in total would not decrease.

From Section 2 to Section 6 we discuss first about our linear PoLW. Then in Section 7 we generalize it to other PoLWs. Discussions about practical applications starts from Section 8.

2 Linear PoLW

Let W be the amount of work (block hash) needed for one block. Let the maximal block reward be 1 coin. The miner could choose to get only α coin as reward ($0 < \alpha \leq 1$) in order to get a work weight.

If the actual work of the new block is W' , then the weighted work is $\left(1 + \frac{1-\alpha}{\gamma}\right)W'$, where $\gamma \leq 1$ is a system parameter that could vary in different blocks. Each miner could choose a different α to ample it's mining work. The idea is that the $1 - \alpha$ coin is burnt for some amount of weighted work.

W	amount of work needed for a regularly mined block
W'	actual work the miner produces
$\alpha \leq 1$	actual block rewards. maximal is 1 coin
β	cost for regular block mining
$\gamma \leq 1$	system parameter for weight calculation

Table 1.

3 Mining Strategy

The question arises that which α should a miner use to maximize its return. Let's say a miner M has x coin to use for mining the block. Let β coin be the resource cost of W work for the regular Nakamoto mining. Then in the equilibrium case, the probability of M getting the block is

$$p_M = \frac{x \{1 + (1 - \alpha_M) / \gamma\}}{\beta}$$

The expected return is

$$p_M \alpha_M - x = \left(1 + \frac{1 - \alpha_M}{\gamma}\right) \alpha_M \frac{x}{\beta} - x$$

The maximized return is

$$\max (p_M \alpha_M - x) = \max \left(\left(1 + \frac{1 - \alpha_M}{\gamma} \right) \alpha_M \right) \frac{x}{\beta} - x$$

We could easily deduce that

$$\alpha_M = \frac{1 + \gamma}{2}$$

Therefore, the long term strategy \mathcal{S} for a miner is to set α to be $\frac{1 + \gamma}{2}$ to mine new blocks. However, in short term, the miner could adjust its α for better expected return. We show that strategy \mathcal{S} is an equilibrium strategy by an ideal analysis in the next section.

Note that even if the Miner M 's mining algorithm or machine is more efficient than the others, the optimal value of α_M is still $\frac{1 + \gamma}{2}$.

4 Equilibrium Strategy

Let's assume that all the miners work together and use the same α to try to maximize the return of mining. In order to make the weighted work reach the target work W , the miners need to cost $\frac{\beta}{1 + (1 - \alpha)/\gamma}$ coin in the physical world. The actual return of the miners is

$$R(\alpha) = \alpha - \frac{\beta}{1 + (1 - \alpha)/\gamma}$$

With some calculation, we get the following result

$$\max R(\alpha) = \begin{cases} 1 + \gamma - 2\sqrt{\beta\gamma} & \text{when } \gamma \leq \beta \leq \frac{(1 + \gamma)^2}{4\gamma}, \text{ with } \alpha = 1 + \gamma - \sqrt{\beta\gamma} \\ 1 - \beta & \text{when } \beta < \gamma, \text{ with } \alpha = 1 \\ 0 & \text{when } \beta > \frac{(1 + \gamma)^2}{4\gamma}, \text{ donot mine} \end{cases}$$

We see here that when the mining cost is very low, the miners will set $\alpha = 1$ and it degenerates to the classic Nakamoto mining. However, as the mining cost goes up, the miners will have to set $\alpha = 1 + \gamma - \sqrt{\beta\gamma}$ to maximize its return. Therefore, we see that in the non-equilibrium case, the miners could set α to be different from $\frac{1 + \gamma}{2}$ for better mining return.

Equilibrium Case. In equilibrium, $\max R(\alpha)$ should be equal to 0. In such case, we have $\beta > \gamma$ and $1 + \gamma - 2\sqrt{\beta\gamma} = 0$. Therefore

$$\begin{aligned} \beta &= \frac{(1 + \gamma)^2}{4\gamma} \\ \alpha &= 1 + \gamma - \sqrt{\beta\gamma} = \frac{1 + \gamma}{2} \end{aligned}$$

We have shown that α will be $\frac{1 + \gamma}{2}$ for all the miners in the equilibrium case. Therefore, \mathcal{S} is the equilibrium strategy in the case where mining profit is negligible to be 0.

5 Security Analysis

We only compare our algorithm to the classic Nakamoto PoW algorithm to see the security differences. In Nakamoto PoW, an attacker needs to first invest 1 coin to mine a new block and then get the reward back in the equilibrium case.

In our new algorithm, the cost for an attacker A to mine a new block with α_A is

$$\text{Cost}_A = 1 - R_A = 1 - \alpha_A + \frac{\beta}{1 + (1 - \alpha_A)/\gamma}$$

In equilibrium where $\beta = \frac{(1+\gamma)^2}{4\gamma}$, $\alpha = \frac{1+\gamma}{2}$, the cost of the attacker is $2\sqrt{\beta\gamma} - \gamma = 1$. Therefore, we show that our new PoLW algorithm has same security as Nakamoto PoW in terms of new block generation cost.

We ignore the other metrics analysis similar to that of paper [2], which should be intuitive.

6 Energy consumption.

The actual work done by the miner is $\frac{\beta}{1+(1-\alpha)/\gamma}$ coin. In equilibrium where $\beta = \frac{(1+\gamma)^2}{4\gamma}$, $\alpha = \frac{1+\gamma}{2}$, the work amount is equal to the mining reward $\frac{1+\gamma}{2}$, less than 1 coin. Therefore, it costs less energy compared to Nakamoto PoW.

7 Generalization & Exponential PoLW

Let's assume now that the weights of work is calculated by $1 + f(1 - \alpha)$. In linear PoLW, $f = \frac{1-\alpha}{\gamma}$. Similarly, let's first find out the optimal α for a Miner M in long term.

$$p_M = \frac{x\{1 + f(1 - \alpha_M)\}}{\beta}$$

The expected return is

$$p_M \alpha_M - x = \{1 + f(1 - \alpha_M)\} \alpha_M \frac{x}{\beta} - x$$

The maxmized return is

$$\max(p_M \alpha_M - x) = \max(\{1 + f(1 - \alpha_M)\} \alpha_M) \frac{x}{\beta} - x$$

The optimal mining parameter would be to satisfy the following equation:

$$1 - f'(1 - \alpha_M) \alpha_M + f(1 - \alpha_M) = 0$$

We want to choose good function f such that $0 < \alpha_M < 1$. As in the equilibrium case, the energy cost would be close to α_M , we also want the optimal α_M to be small if possible. There might be many ways to choose such kind of functions. We focus on this following simple case.

Exponential PoLW. Here we take $f(1 - \alpha) = e^{\gamma(1-\alpha)} - 1$ ($\gamma \geq 1$), i.e. the weight of work becomes $e^{\gamma(1-\alpha)}$. In this case, we have

$$\max(\{1 + f(1 - \alpha_M)\} \alpha_M) = \max(\alpha_M e^{\gamma(1-\alpha_M)})$$

With simple calculation, we know that the optimal $\alpha_M = \frac{1}{\gamma}$.

In the following, we apply the similar analysis as previous sections, without repeating all the details.

Equilibrium. The actual return of miners is

$$R(\alpha) = \alpha - \beta e^{-\gamma(1-\alpha)}$$

$$R'(\alpha) = 1 - \beta \gamma e^{-\gamma(1-\alpha)}$$

$$\max R(\alpha) = \begin{cases} 1 - \frac{\lg(\beta\gamma)}{\gamma} - \frac{1}{\gamma} & \text{when } \beta \geq \frac{1}{\gamma}, \text{ with } \alpha = 1 - \frac{\lg(\beta\gamma)}{\gamma} \\ 1 - \beta & \text{when } \beta < \frac{1}{\gamma}, \text{ with } \alpha = 1 \end{cases}$$

In equilibrium, we have $1 - \frac{\lg(\beta\gamma)}{\gamma} - \frac{1}{\gamma} = 0$ and $\alpha = 1 - \frac{\lg(\beta\gamma)}{\gamma}$, therefore

$$\alpha = \frac{1}{\gamma}$$

Therefore, miners using $\alpha = \frac{1}{\gamma}$ is an equilibrium mining strategy.

Security. The cost for an attacker A is

$$\text{Cost}_A = 1 - R_A = 1 - \alpha_A + \beta e^{-\gamma(1-\alpha_A)}$$

In equilibrium, the reward $R_A = 0$, the cost is 1 coin.

Energy consumption. In equilibrium, the actual mining cost (i.e. energy consumption mostly) is $\frac{1}{\gamma}$. If we choose γ to be large enough, the energy consumption could be close to 0.

8 Parameter Selection

In linear PoLW, we could choose γ close to zero so that the energy cost could be reduced to close to $\frac{1}{2}$. However, when γ is small, the weight $1 + \frac{(1-\alpha)}{\gamma}$ to the actual mining work would be huge, this will make double spending more feasible with less actual mining work.

Same in exponential PoLW, we could choose γ large so that the energy cost could be reduced to close to 0. However, when γ is big, the weight $e^{\gamma(1-\alpha)}$ to the actual mining work would be huge, this will make double spending more feasible as well.

One way to ease this issue is to set the lower bound of α to be the optimal α . When mining is in equilibrium, the attackers could not get better weight than the other miners.

The issue is still serious before mining reaching a equilibrium state. One possible solution is to adjust γ when the blockchain evolves, so that the weights are lower from the beginning, but getting higher eventually. For example, we could adjust γ based on the currently actual work level without weights.

Now let's analyze concrete cases. Let $\pi(\leq 1)$ coin be the actual mining cost of the equilibrium mining state of each cases in the following discussion. We will discuss both linear PoLW and exponential PoLW.

Linear PoLW. Based on our previous analysis, we have the following equations in equilibrium:

$$\begin{aligned}\beta(\geq \gamma) &= \pi \left(1 + \frac{1-\alpha}{\gamma} \right) \\ \alpha &= 1 + \gamma - \sqrt{\beta\gamma}\end{aligned}$$

With simple calculation, we got

$$\gamma + 1 - \alpha = \pi$$

The return of miners is $R = \alpha - \pi$. Let assume that $R = p\pi$, i.e. miners will make p profits in equilibrium (e.g. p could be 0 or 10%). Taking this and the formulas for α and β , we could get

$$\begin{aligned}\alpha &= (1+p)\pi \\ \beta &= \pi^2/\gamma \\ \gamma &= (2+p)\pi - 1 \\ \pi &\leq \frac{1}{1+p}\end{aligned}$$

We could use these to calculate γ . For example, in the ideal case that miners make 0 profits with $p=0$, if we want the external costs in equilibrium to be 0.6 coin, then we would like γ to be 0.2. In the case that miners make 10% profits with $p=0.1$, if we want the external costs in equilibrium to be 0.6, then we would like γ to be 0.26.

Exponential PoLW. Based on our previous analysis, we have the following in equilibrium state:

$$\begin{aligned}\beta\left(\geq \frac{1}{\gamma}\right) &= \pi e^{\gamma(1-\alpha)} \\ \alpha &= 1 - \frac{\lg(\beta\gamma)}{\gamma}\end{aligned}$$

Same as before, let the return of miners is $R = \alpha - \pi = p\pi$. We could get

$$\begin{aligned}\alpha &= (1+p)\pi \\ \beta &= \pi e^{\gamma(1-\alpha)} \\ \gamma &= \frac{1}{\pi} \\ \pi &\leq \frac{1}{1+p}\end{aligned}$$

These are the formulas to compute γ . For example, if $p=0$ and we want the external cost in equilibrium to be 0.25, then we would like γ to be 4. In the case that miners make 10% profits with $p=0.1$, if we want the external costs in equilibrium to be 0.25, then we would like γ to be 4.

Bitcoin/Ethereum/Now PoW Systems. Once the project figures out which π is proper for its network in long term, we could use formulas above to compute the system parameter γ . However, the transition from PoW to PoLW must be smooth in order to avoid too much dynamics for miners. We could set an evolving lower bound for α . This lower bound starts from 1, and then gradually decreases to $(1+p)\pi$. The network could update the lower bound based on the actual mining difficulty instead of the weighted mining difficulty. Note that one option could be that the target π is very close to 0 using exponential PoLW, but the lower bound of α converges slowly to 0. In this case, we expect the coin value to raise high in long term, so that the actual value of external cost still increases, though the percentage of external cost in the total cost will get low.

Security Gains. In equilibrium, PoLW and PoW have the same security property in terms of cost of block generation. In practice, since mining is still very profitable, we would expect costs of block generation to be higher once the transition from PoW to PoLW happens. The reason is that PoLW could make the mining game converge to the final equilibrium state quicker than PoW due to the mix of external costs and internal costs.

9 Implementation considerations.

The only thing to change in the algorithm part is to use weighted work instead of the classic work. Therefore, there is negligible implementation overhead. However, in order to validate hash difficulty using solely block header, the value of declared coinbase reward would be included in the header. It could be just 1-2 bytes if we discretize γ properly.

10 Discussion.

It would be good to analysis PoLW in more complicated models. The author thanks all the feedback received from friends and anonymous people.

Bibliography

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