

Production Networks and Rules of Origin: moving from NAFTA to USMCA

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Abstract

Rules of origin (RoOs) are a prevalent component of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), serving as prerequisites that firms in member countries must fulfill to qualify for tariff reductions on their intra-regional exports. I focus on the automotive sector, where regional content requirements (RCRs) increased on average by 16 p.p. relative to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)'s average of 53%. Leveraging a new dataset on Mexican firm-to-firm trade, I developed an origin calculator to show three main findings. Firstly, the Mexican value chain exhibits strong interconnectedness, with 30% of firms serving 10 or more assemblers and contributing to a third of the transaction volume. Secondly, car part producers stand out as the most affected group within the value chain, experiencing a threefold decrease in compliance rates compared to car assemblers. Thirdly, the steep increase in RCRs is ameliorated by the roll-up provision, particularly in the realm of super-core parts and components—a provision that has recently been the subject of dispute among the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) partners. Lastly, had the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA)'s dispute settlement panel ruled in favor of the US interpretation, the compliance rate would have halved, in contrast to the estimated 18% decrease when the super-core roll-up is allowed.

1 Introduction

The pursuit of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) has significantly increased in recent decades.¹ These agreements aim to facilitate the exchange of goods among its partners by granting preferential tariffs to goods produced within the FTA region. At the same time, the importance of trade in intermediate goods has risen drastically. Nowadays, many manufacturing goods are produced by value chains that span across multiple countries. Consequently, determining the origin of a product is a central aspect of FTAs; hence, large chunks of the official documents are devoted to delimiting the conditions under which a good is considered originary, i.e., produced inside the FTA territory. These conditions, known as rules of origin (RoOs), play a crucial role in preventing trade circumvention and attracting economic activity to the FTA region.

However, the complexity of these rules, which vary significantly across trade deals and industries, has presented a challenge for governments, who often design them without sufficient guidance on their overall economic impact. As highlighted by Kniahi and de Melo (2022)[17], this complexity has made it difficult for researchers to study the effects of RoO and hindered governments' ability to effectively regulate trade.

Recent research by Head et al. (2022)[13] focuses on firms' incentives to switch to non-FTA suppliers when content requirements rise. Additionally, Yang (2022)[27] has shed light on the ambiguous effects of RoOs, showing that more stringent requirements often lead to lower regional content. If regional content requirements are too high, RoOs can have consequences opposite to those intended, effectively acting as barriers to trade. However, these papers do not consider another deterrent to compliance: the complexity of RoOs, which makes it difficult for businesses to comply and results in higher costs and time delays. This can particularly affect small and medium-sized enterprises, as they may not have the resources to navigate the complex rules and may choose to avoid utilizing FTAs altogether.

Evidence from Colombia, as presented by Krishna et al. (2022)[19], supports this notion. They demonstrate that meeting RoO requirements increases production costs and imposes significant fixed costs in the form of documentation expenses. Additionally, their findings indicate that RoOs can negatively impact competition, favoring larger and more experienced firms more likely to utilize

¹See Maggi (2014)[21], for a comprehensive review of the economics of FTA, their motives, design, and evaluation.

preferential benefits.

Automotive production in North America provides a compelling case study of global value chains (GVCs) and effectively demonstrates the impact of RoOs on value chains (VCs). Over the course of NAFTA's 26 years, the automotive GVC became intricately integrated. Subsequently, with the replacement of NAFTA by USMCA in January 2020, there was a significant rise in the regional value content (RVC) requirements. These modifications have facilitated an insightful natural experiment, allowing us to evaluate compliance under both regulatory frameworks while maintaining the constancy of the VC, while isolating these effects from adjustments in firms' sourcing strategies. As a result, this approach allows for a deeper understanding of how RoOs impact origin compliance and RVC, while also enabling the isolation of these effects from adjustments in firms' sourcing strategies. Consequently, my focus is directed toward examining the Mexican auto VC, and particularly the difference in origin status of firms in the VC when using these two sets of RoOs.

A case study of Mexico

Mexico has established itself as a significant player in the global automotive industry. As the seventh-largest automobile producer in the world and the largest in Latin America², Mexico's auto sector contributes significantly to the country's economy. It represents 18% of manufacturing GDP and 3.6% of national GDP. In addition, Mexico is a crucial player in the international auto market, being a prominent exporter of automotive products: approximately 32% of the country's manufacturing exports are of automobile products. Moreover, Mexico is the fourth largest auto-part exporter globally and is the top supplier for the U.S. market. All these facts confirm the auto sector is at the core of Mexico's trade policies and is crucial to its economic growth.

As evidenced by its prominence in both NAFTA and the recently negotiated USMCA, the automotive sector holds significant importance in Mexico's trade relationships. The automotive industry is highly present; 7 out of 10 articles within the Rules of Origin chapter of the USMCA and 90 out of 270 pages in the RoO chapter outline specific rules for the automotive industry, providing further proof of its significance.

This paper makes three key contributions. The first involves the construction of a comprehensive

²These rankings are in terms of units.

dataset on the Mexican production network, specifically focusing on the auto sector in 2017. A unique aspect of this dataset is the inclusion of Mexican firm-to-firm connections inferred from value-added tax (VAT) records. By combining them with customs data and other complementary sources, I recover the domestic connections of Mexican firms and their connections abroad. While previous studies have utilized VAT data to establish firm-to-firm connections in countries like Belgium, Japan, Chile, and Costa Rica,³ this is the first paper to employ a similar approach for Mexico. Using these data, I characterize the value chain of 13 auto assemblers in Mexico, revealing the significant inter-connectivity across their value chains for the first time. Remarkably, most firms serve at least one assembler. Additionally, such well-established suppliers also possess substantial shares of the trade volume. For instance, more than half of the transaction volume is exchanged by firms that serve at least five assemblers.

The second contribution of this paper is the creation of an open-source origin calculator that evaluates a firm’s RoO compliance based on the product it exports, its inputs’ origin, and its production costs. To my knowledge, this calculator constitutes the most detailed representation of RoOs for North America, a valuable tool for any researcher that studies RoOs in NAFTA or USMCA. I outline the methodology for developing this calculator in section 4.

The third contribution regards the insights I elicit by combining the created dataset and calculator. I assess the potential differences in compliance if the USMCA’s RoOs were applied during the sample year instead of the RoOs from NAFTA, which were in force at the time. I estimate a 9.65% decrease in assemblers’ compliance rate under USMCA but, most notably, the estimated decrease for part producers is 18.33%. In subsection 6.1, I study the recent controversy surrounding the interpretation of the USMCA’s RoOs, with a specific focus on the 2022 dispute regarding auto sector RoOs. The dispute stemmed from the United States’ unilateral decision to enforce a different method for calculating the RVC of *super-core* parts in the production of passenger vehicles or light trucks. I estimate the extent of compliance changes that would have occurred under the proposed US interpretation, shedding light on roll up’s pivotal role in dampening the impact of higher RCRs. Specifically, I show that if the dispute settlement panel had ruled in favor of the US’ interpretation, the compliance rate would have decreased by 50%, in contrast to the estimated 18% decrease when

³See Dhyne et al. 2021 [8]; Kikkawa et al. 2020[16], Bernard et al. 2016[4]; Furusawa et al. 2017[11], Huneeus 2018 [14], Alfaro-Ureña et al. 2018 [1], to mention a few.

the super-core roll-up is allowed.⁴

One feature of modern supply chains is that they exhibit high levels of specialization. Therefore, suppliers often customize their products to suit specific downstream uses. Thus, increasing trade barriers between two countries with integrated GVC imposes significant and heterogeneous costs on all firms in the FTA territory and in other countries. (See De Gortari 2019 [12], Antràs and de Gortari 2019[3]). I aim to further our understanding of the effects of RoO along the value chain, specifically focusing on the Mexican automobile industry and the transition from NAFTA to USMCA.

Relation to the literature

This paper is related to the literature analyzing the economic effects of RoOs and it stands out as the first to comprehensively study the effects of RoOs along an entire value chain. Notable papers taking a theoretical approach include Rosellón (2000)[24], Falvey & Reed (2002), and Mukunoki (2017)[22], who focus on studying how RoOs can serve as policy instruments to enhance regional input use, technological development, maximize labor, FDI, among other growth objectives; Krishna (2005)[18] who presents a survey on the literature of economic effects of RoOs; and Ju & Krishna (2005)[15] who study the effects of RoOs intermediate v. final imports; and Tsirekidze (2021)[25] who takes a game theory approach to show that RoOs are essential to attain global free trade.

Due to the complexity of RoOs, most empirical research tends to focus on a specific aspect. For instance, Conconi et al.(2018)[6] delve into the change in tariff classification (CTC) portion of RoOs, while Yang (2022)[27] and Head et al.(2022)[13] concentrate on the RVC aspect of RoOs. Other papers like Freund (2019)[10] and Febelmayr et al. (2019)[9] highlight the need for improvements in the design of RoOs.

Similar to Kniahin & de Melo(2022)[17], this analysis provides a detailed characterization of RoOs, including provisions on regional value, changes in tariff classifications, cumulation, as well as product-specific allowances and exceptions. However, specific provisions related to specific processes have been excluded due to a lack of detail in the available data.

Examining the region and free trade agreements (FTAs) under study, Conconi(2018)[6] and Head

⁴Notably, the implications of cumulation in RoOs have also been investigated by Bombarda and Gamberoni (2013)[5].

et al.(2022)[13] and are the most closely related papers in the recent literature. Specifically, the latter is the closest paper to this one since it also studies the auto sector[13]. As I delve into the study of automotive RoOs, I focus on how RoOs impact firms' origin, as such, I treat firms as a discrete finite set and the value chain as a graph. Conversely, their approach revolves around modeling the effects of RoOs while factoring in firm sourcing strategy adjustments. To achieve this, they model the set of firms as a continuum and only consider the RVC component of RoOs. Given these differences, our results are not directly comparable, nevertheless, in subsection 6.2 I show how compliance is severely underestimated when we omit non-RVC components of RoOs and we assume a flat RCR across all product codes. Hence, this paper complements their results and shows there are instances where modeling all aspects of RoOs directly affects the magnitude of the estimated effects.

To sum up, this paper offers valuable insights into the intricate features of RoOs, uncovering the complexities and interplays of compliance rates and RCRs along the value chain, focusing on the context of the transition from NAFTA to USMCA regulations.

Structure of the paper

The remaining sections of this paper are structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the key concepts utilized in this paper to establish a solid foundation for the analysis. Section 3 outlines the methodology employed to identify and examine the Mexican auto value chain (VC), offering novel insights into its structure and dynamics. Section 4 presents the methodology adopted to develop the origin calculator, which serves as a crucial tool in evaluating the effects of rules of origin (RoOs). Section 5 investigates the changes in RoOs from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), shedding light on the modifications and their potential implications. Section 6 carries out an empirical exercise, unveiling the main findings and outcomes derived from the analysis. Finally, in Section 7, we conclude the paper and present our closing remarks, summarizing the key takeaways and implications of our research.

2 RoOs

In this section, we establish the key definitions needed to understand the methodology employed. We also introduce the terminology used to classify RoOs based on their structure. These definitions have been sourced from two primary references: the NAFTA and USMCA documents, and the Rules of Origin Facilitator (ROF) project. The latter is a collaborative initiative between the International Trade Centre (ITC), the World Customs Organization (WCO), and the World Trade Organization (WTO).⁵

Free Trade Agreements aim to promote international trade by eliminating barriers and extending preferential access to markets among member countries. These agreements typically cover trade in goods, services, and investment provisions. In addition, they may also include customs cooperation, trade facilitation, harmonization of standards, and regulatory cooperation measures. To ensure fair trade among member countries, preferential rules of origin are applied, preventing non-member countries from taking advantage of preferential tariffs without offering reciprocal benefits.

Harmonized System (HS) Classification, also known as the HS Nomenclature, is an international customs classification system created by the WCO. It assigns a unique 6-digit code to different groups of products. They help customs authorities identify products and determine the appropriate import duty, taxes, and trade measures. Understanding the HS classification is necessary to determine the applicable RoOs under any FTA, as different commodity codes have different rules. HS codes consist of 6 digits and are further categorized into chapters (first 2 digits), headings (first 4 digits), and subheadings (full 6 digits). In the case of USMCA partners, these codes are further divided into 8-digit items, also known as commodity codes or national tariff line (NTL).

Rules of origin To determine eligibility for preferential tariffs offered under a trade agreement, goods must comply with a set of criteria known as *rules of origin*. These criteria are used to establish if a good is considered to have originated in the territory of the trade agreement. The rules are specific to each product and are typically based on the HS classification. This means that every HS

⁵To ensure conciseness and relevance, some details have been excluded if they are not directly relevant to NAFTA or USMCA. For a complete understanding of the concepts discussed in the following sections, please consult the official website of the ROF at findrulesoforigin.org.

code eligible for preferential tariff under a trade agreement has its own unique rule of origin. These rules can be set at different levels, ranging from an entire chapter to a specific product within an HS or NTL. They are negotiated and included as part of the main agreement between trading partners, usually in the form of a protocol or annex. Because they are specific to each FTA, the rules of origin can vary significantly.

The origin of goods in the FTA region can be determined in two ways. The first way is by being entirely obtained within the region. Examples in this category are livestock, agricultural products, or extracted minerals. Goods in this group are originary if produced entirely within the FTA region without adding non-originary materials. The second way is by undergoing a substantial transformation within the FTA territory. In the auto sector, all rules of origin fall into the latter category.

Substantial transformation Substantial transformation is a type of RoO that requires a good to go through a specific process in order to be considered originating in a particular country.

There are three main rule types in which substantial transformation can be expressed. The first is known as change in tariff classification (CTC), which requires that the final good is classified under a tariff classification group that is different from that of all non-originating materials used in the production process. The classification group can be a chapter, a heading, a subheading, or an item, which corresponds to the HS codes at two, four, six, and eight digits, respectively. The second is the RVC calculation, which requires a percentage of the total value that must be added within the FTA region; when substantial transformation conditions are defined this way, they are called regional content requirements (RCRs). Lastly, the specific processing (SP) rule stipulates a particular processing to be carried out at a certain stage of production.

For a given product, a RoO can be defined using a single type or a combination of them in determining its origin. Furthermore, there may be different exceptions and allowances within each type, specifying certain conditions for particular products and permitting relaxations under special circumstances. section 4 explains in detail how these three types are combined in NAFTA and USMCA.

De minimis. This provision allows for the use of a small amount of non-originating materials in the production of a good without impacting its originating status. Essentially, this acts as a relaxation of the strict rules of origin. The threshold for both NAFTA and USMCA is set at 10%.

Roll-up. Under this provision, a part or intermediate material that gains originating status under a FTA is considered 100% originating for further processing. This applies even if non-originating inputs were used to produce the part or intermediate material. Essentially, this means that the value of non-originating materials used in the production of the good will be disregarded. This provision serves as a leniency for rules of origin. If roll-up is not allowed, firms are required to monitor the non-original content fraction for each of their inputs.

Net cost means the total cost of production minus sales promotion, marketing and after-sales service costs, royalties, shipping and packing costs, and non-allowable interest costs that are included in the total cost.

Transaction value means the customs value as determined in accordance with the Customs Valuation Agreement, that is, the price actually paid or payable for a good or material.

Regional value content In the case of NAFTA and USMCA's chapter related to automobile products, the regional value content can be calculated following two methods

- Net cost

$$RVC = \frac{NC - VNM}{NC} \times 100 \quad (1)$$

where NC is the net cost of the good, and VNM is the value of non-originating materials.

- Transaction Value

$$RVC = \frac{TV - VNM}{TV} \times 100 \quad (2)$$

where TV is the transaction value of the good.

In the automotive industry, the majority of product-specific RoOs only permit the use of the net cost method. Therefore, in our origin calculator, we will exclude the transaction value method.

3 Identifying the Value Chain

The identification of the Mexican VC marks a significant and original contribution of this paper. To this end, we conceptualize the world economy as a production network, where a directed weighted graph is used to represent the relationships among firms. In this network, the nodes represent individual firms, the edges symbolize input purchases, and the weight of each edge indicates the trade volume between the buyer and the seller. Each firm specializes in producing a distinct product, allowing us to visualize the value chains as paths or sets of paths within this production network.

Although one may feel tempted to think of value chains linearly, value chains look more like a tree where the root node represents the final good’s producer, and all edges point towards the root instead of away from it.⁶ A value chain can be classified as global when it extends across multiple countries, highlighting the interconnectedness of economies on a global scale. Lastly, we can view the production network as the union of all the value chains within the economy. These value chains overlap and intertwine, creating intricate patterns, such as cliques and cycles, and giving rise to complex interactions within the network.

3.1 Identifying auto assemblers

Our initial dataset captures a comprehensive network that illustrates interactions among all Mexican manufacturing firms, including their domestic exchanges and interactions with foreign firms. The foreign interactions are consolidated at the country-product level, ensuring that a thorough understanding of domestic manufacturing activity is maintained. It is important to note that this dataset represents a cross-section of the network and specifically covers the year 2017, a period during which the NAFTA was in effect. To construct this dataset, four different sources of information were combined. The first source is VAT receipts that contain connections between Mexican firms. The second source is the firms’ annual tax declarations, which provide details about the firms’ sales revenue, production costs, administrative costs, profits, and main activity. The third source is custom records that provide information about imports and exports at the product level. These three datasets are linked using anonymized firm identifiers provided by the *Secretaría de Hacienda y*

⁶Pol Antràs notoriously referred to these structures as snakes and spiders, respectively, in his 2018 Ohlin Lecture. [2]

Crédito Público (SHCP, Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit). Lastly, the Mexican Economic Census of 2019, conducted by the *Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía* (INEGI, National Statistics and Geography Institute), provides information about firms' production labor. For a more in-depth description of the data, please refer to Appendix A in the document.

We begin by identifying the nodes of auto assemblers within the dataset. Initially, we focus on firms with North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes beginning with 3361, which corresponds to "Motor Vehicle Manufacturing." From this category, we further analyze two subcategories: 336210," corresponding to "Automobile and Light Duty Motor Vehicle Manufacturing," and 336120," which corresponds to "Heavy Duty Truck Manufacturing." A total of 61,028 firms are assigned with these specific activity codes. To conduct a comprehensive analysis of compliance under different sets of RoOs, we specifically concentrate on assemblers that export (at least) a portion of their production. We exclude firms classified as retailers from our analysis due to the inability to trace the exact stage of the VC at which the vehicles were completed. When exporting, companies are required to report the NTL code and provide a description of the goods being shipped, which assists us in validating these firms as assemblers. To avoid the inclusion of any misclassified firms, we only consider those that exported more than 500 units in 2017. This criterion appears reasonable, as the company just above this threshold exports 732 vehicles, while the one just below exports only 93 vehicles. Applying this filtering process, we are left with a total of thirteen auto assemblers, ten of which are engaged in light-duty vehicle production, accounting for 58.77% of the light vehicle exports reported in the official statistics for 2017. The remaining three assemblers produce heavy-duty vehicles and contribute to 45.91% of 2018's exports in the heavy truck segment.⁷⁸ Table 10 shows the assemblers exports by NTL (product) code.

⁷Source: INEGI's *Registro Administrativo de la Industria Automotriz de Vehículos Ligeros* (RAIAVL, Administrative Registry of the Automotive Industry for Light Vehicles) and *Registro Administrativo de la Industria Automotriz de Vehículos Pesados* (RAIAVP, Administrative Registry of the Automotive Industry for Heavy Vehicles)).

⁸It is important to note that heavy vehicle statistics are only available for 2018 onward. However, when comparing the light vehicle production figures for 2018 with those of 2017, they are nearly identical, with the former representing 99.63% of the latter.

Table 1: Identified Assemblers

| Assembler | Vehicle Type | Exports | Avg. Price | Units |
|-----------|--------------|----------|------------|---------|
| Alpha | light | 5,738.13 | 14,516.51 | 483,154 |
| Beta | light | 5,569.27 | 22,364.24 | 308,810 |
| Gamma | light | 4,533.09 | 24,659.12 | 232,011 |
| Delta | light | 3,371.91 | 15,931.40 | 194,483 |
| Epsilon | light | 2,199.79 | 14,635.18 | 174,174 |
| Zeta | light | 3,178.02 | 24,520.22 | 169,828 |
| Theta | light | 907.26 | 12,325.55 | 87,206 |
| Iota | light | 2,515.52 | 59,277.46 | 73,792 |
| Kappa | light | 1,274.90 | 30,175.20 | 65,328 |
| Lambda | heavy | 5,202.56 | 70,124.87 | 55,302 |
| Mu | heavy | 772.60 | 131,664.97 | 9,579 |
| Nu | heavy | 370.11 | 100,136.57 | 3,629 |
| Xi | light | 44.79 | 69,273.66 | 732 |

Note: Exports are reported in million dollars.

After pinning down the assemblers, the next step is to trace back their value chain. This involves recording the providers of the assemblers, their providers' providers, and so on. Throughout the remainder of this section, we will refer to an illustrative example of a production network depicted in Figure 1. To guide the analysis, I outline the steps to identify each value chain, providing a visual representation in Figure 2.




Figure 1: A production network example

While this task may seem straightforward in principle, there are two factors that contribute to its complexity. Firstly, the sheer size of the data. Even after filtering the dataset to include only manufacturing firms and their connections, there are still 174,261 nodes and 3,043,287 edges. Manually tracing each value chain is not feasible due to scalability issues. To address this, the network is first reduced by retaining only the nodes that belong to the in-component of at least one assembler. An in-component in a directed graph refers to the set of vertices that can be reached by following directed edges in an inward direction from a given vertex, in this case, an assembler. It represents the subset of firms that are part of the assembler's value chain. In panel 2 of Figure 2, the highlighted orange nodes indicate the firms within the in-component of vertex a . Note that firm k is excluded from this set, as it is part of firm j 's downstream but is not part of the value chain of assembler a . Component-finding algorithms are widely used in computer science and readily available in various programming languages. They are known for their efficiency, as they determine the components of a finite graph in linear time in terms of its number of nodes and edges, using either breadth-first search (BFS) or depth-first search (DFS) approaches. These algorithms start at a specified node (root) and examine its edges, initiating a new search whenever an unlabeled node is

encountered.⁹ Since these search algorithms were designed to recognize tree structures in graphs, and as trees are inherently directed and acyclic, labeling the in-component of the VC alone cannot fully trace the entirety of the VC¹⁰. The search for edges will overlook cycles and thus cannot be considered exhaustive. I use Python’s graph-tool library[23] for labeling assemblers’ in-component as well as for the remaining steps in this section.




Figure 2: Value chain trace back procedure

The presence of cycles in production networks poses our second challenge due to several reasons.

⁹In BFS, the search covers all nodes within a depth level before progressing to the next level. In DFS, the search extends as far as possible along each branch before initiating a new search.

¹⁰See Figure 24 for examples of search algorithms and how they perform in our production network example.

Firstly, cycles can complicate our analysis and interpretation of the value chain. They create interdependencies among firms that can be difficult to disentangle and understand. This can lead to feedback loops and self-reinforcing effects, which hinder our ability to identify the impact of different RoOs on compliance. Hence, addressing the presence of cycles is crucial for our analysis.

Previous work in the computer science literature has addressed this issue through various strategies and techniques. One commonly used approach involves aggregating the network into a directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), transforming cyclic dependencies into sequential ones. This aggregation process includes identifying and eliminating cycles by collapsing interconnected nodes, thereby simplifying the network structure. For instance, Coscia (2018)[7] introduced a method that analyzes strongly connected components (SCCs) within the network, revealing the underlying hierarchical structure. While these strategies are useful in many applications, the interpretation of a collapsed cycle in the context of RoOs remains unclear. I propose an alternative approach better suited to our analysis. Instead of removing or collapsing cycles, we *unfold them* by identifying the edge within the cycle that is furthest from the root, duplicating the source node, and transferring the edge origin to the duplicated node. These are the pink edges in Figure 2’s panels 2 and 3, and the duplicated nodes are labeled a^* , b^* , and c^* in panel 3. This method yields a tree representation of the value chain, where the node copies function as leaf nodes. Given this characteristic, I have termed this approach *sprouting*. Appendix C describes the algorithm used to simultaneously back-trace and sprout the value chain.

Since we cannot observe the sourcing decisions of foreign firms, back-tracing along a path stops whenever a foreign node is reached. Consequently, any nodes located upstream from this point are excluded from our analysis. The algorithm stops whenever all edges collected as part of the value chain are either foreign or have no supplying nodes.

After successfully identifying the nodes and edges within the VC, our final step involves arranging the nodes in sequential order from the most upstream to the most downstream. This ordering is crucial as it directly impacts suppliers’ compliance, determining their origin and subsequently affecting their clients’ RVC. Consequently, it has a direct bearing on the RoO compliance of the clients themselves. To accomplish this, we employ graph-tool’s `topological_sort` function on a modified version of the VC, where the edges have been reversed. The topological sort algorithm establishes a

linear ordering of the vertices in a DAG, ensuring that if an edge (u, v) is present in the graph, u precedes v in the ordering. As we aim to evaluate origin in an upstream-downstream direction, we need to reverse the direction of edges before sorting them to ensure that the origin of assemblers is assessed last. This step is depicted in Figure 2's panel 4.

3.2 Auto VC Features


The high degree of interconnectedness in the value chain is immediately apparent. Here, a firm is considered to 'serve' an assembler if it is part of its in-component, meaning it is positioned upstream of the assembler. As shown in Table 2, 93.38% of the value chain firms serve more than one assembler, with 80% of the firms serving five or more assemblers. Remarkably, 10% of the firms serve nearly all assemblers. It is noteworthy that popular providers also hold significant trade volume shares. For example, firms that serve at least eleven assemblers collectively account for 21% of the trade volume in the value chain

Table 2: Firms present in multiple VCs

| Assemblers Served | Mean Sales Revenue | Firms in Value Chain | | | Trade Volume | |
|-------------------|--------------------|----------------------|--------|--------|--------------|--------|
| | | Count | % | Cum. % | % | Cum. % |
| 13 | 1 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 17.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| 12 | 315 | 10.42 | 10.45 | 32.41 | 5.87 | 5.88 |
| 11 | 998 | 33.01 | 43.46 | 37.34 | 21.42 | 27.30 |
| 10 | 244 | 8.07 | 51.53 | 31.90 | 4.47 | 31.77 |
| 9 | 77 | 2.55 | 54.08 | 43.76 | 1.94 | 33.71 |
| 8 | 86 | 2.84 | 56.92 | 44.08 | 2.18 | 35.89 |
| 7 | 89 | 2.94 | 59.86 | 40.49 | 2.07 | 37.96 |
| 6 | 148 | 4.90 | 64.76 | 76.73 | 6.53 | 44.49 |
| 5 | 448 | 14.82 | 79.58 | 60.70 | 15.63 | 60.12 |
| 4 | 100 | 3.31 | 82.89 | 65.15 | 3.74 | 63.86 |
| 3 | 291 | 9.63 | 92.52 | 91.39 | 15.29 | 79.15 |
| 2 | 26 | 0.86 | 93.38 | 114.47 | 1.71 | 80.86 |
| 1 | 200 | 6.62 | 100.00 | 166.56 | 19.15 | 100.00 |


Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of firms at each level of assemblers upstream. On the x axis, are the assemblers listed in Table 1. The numbers in each cell indicate the firm count at a specific level of a given assembler. One notable observation is the emergence of a funnel pattern within the value chain; broadly speaking, the number of firms directly serving assemblers is smaller, followed by a larger count at levels two to four and then a decrease in the subsequent upstream layers.

Figure 3: Upstream Distribution by Source



We segregate the distribution based on domestic and foreign provenance to delve deeper into this characteristic. What becomes apparent is the consistent existence of this pattern. The funnel shape likely signifies that these firms are vertically integrated, and the densely populated zones in the value chain possibly represent the juncture at which the integration begins. It is plausible that certain tax IDs are assigned to part manufacturing while others are designated for assembly within the same administration. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that conclusive verification would require additional data analysis or corroborative evidence beyond the existing dataset.

Figure 4: Upstream Distribution by Source



Now that we have reviewed some key features of the auto value chain in Mexico, our next step involves characterizing the products manufactured at different stages of the value chain. This characterization will aid in narrowing down the set of RoOs to be programmed into the origin calculator.

In this context, a product is considered if it appears in the VC or if it is subject to an auto sector-specific RoO. Table 3 provides an overview of the distribution of tariff item codes (products) considered in this project. Notably, columns 3 and 7 showcase the share of trade volume in the VC, while columns 4 and 8 highlight the share of Mexican exports to the US and Canada by product category.¹¹

Several insightful observations arise from this data. For instance, column 8 indicates that 19% of Mexican exports to its North American partners consist of products in the auto sector, with the majority of these exports being parts. If we were to analyze the impact of RoOs on Mexican firms and we only considered their effect on auto assemblers, we would be significantly underestimating their effects.

Furthermore, half of the auto part exports are classified as super-core parts, which are crucial

¹¹It should be noted that the former pertains only to firms within the studied VC, whereas the latter encompasses all Mexican exports, including those from firms not contained within the studied subset.

components within the value chain. Notably, all vehicle and super-core parts are subject to RoOs under either NAFTA or USMCA. This finding likely underscores the significance of the recent controversy surrounding within-firm super-core roll-up.

An additional insight from columns 3 and 7 is that the majority of products in the value chain are subject to RoOs, emphasizing the pervasive influence of RoOs across various stages of production. Moreover, despite the predominance of non-auto firms within the auto VC, they contribute a modest 23% of the VC trade volume, as indicated in columns 6-7.

Table 3: Product Distribution by Type

| Product type | Not subject to RoOs | | | | Subject to RoOs | | | |
|-------------------|---------------------|-----------|------|------|-----------------|-----------|-------|-------|
| | Product Count | Product % | VC % | EX % | Product Count | Product % | VC % | EX % |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| Vehicles: | - | - | - | - | 48 | 0.38 | 52.89 | 14.82 |
| passenger vehicle | - | - | - | - | 7 | 0.06 | 40.41 | 7.64 |
| light truck | - | - | - | - | 5 | 0.04 | 1.06 | 4.64 |
| heavy truck | - | - | - | - | 6 | 0.05 | 10.54 | 2.27 |
| other vehicle | - | - | - | - | 30 | 0.24 | 0.89 | 0.27 |
| Parts: | 1 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 436 | 3.48 | 23.58 | 18.89 |
| super-core | - | - | - | - | 159 | 1.27 | 15.20 | 9.48 |
| other parts | 1 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 280 | 2.24 | 8.37 | 9.41 |
| Non-auto: | 406 | 3.24 | 0.08 | 2.83 | 11632 | 92.89 | 23.44 | 25.84 |

4 Origin Calculator

This section describes the creation of an origin calculator that streamlines the process of assessing RoO compliance for firms. In what follows, we will use the terminology in Table 4 to describe the structure of the auto sector RoOs found in NAFTA and USMCA:

The terms in Table 4 are explained in detail in Kniahin & de Melo (2022)[17], along with other “building blocks” not present in the sector and agreements studied here.

Table 4: The building blocks present in NAFTA and USMCA

| Rule | Definition |
|------|---|
| CC | The originating status is conferred to a good classified in a different HS chapter than the non-originating inputs. |
| CTH | The originating status is conferred to a good classified in a different HS heading than the non-originating inputs. |
| CTSH | The originating status is conferred to a good classified in a different HS subheading than the non-originating inputs. |
| CTI | The originating status is conferred to a good classified in a different HS tariff item than the non-originating inputs. |
| ALW | The originating status is allowed to be conferred from non-originating inputs of specific HS codes. |
| ECT | The originating status cannot be conferred to a good if the non-originating inputs are from HS codes listed under exception. |
| RVC | A good obtains originating status if a defined regional value content percentage has been reached. |
| SP | A good originates in the country where a defined technical requirement, i.e., a specified working or processing, has taken place. |

The calculator was created in two main steps and can assess compliance with NAFTA and USMCA RoOs. The objective is to transform the PDF documents defining the rules of origin into an R function that computes compliance.

First, I scrape each document and extract all product-specific RoOs into a text file containing one RoO per line. Leveraging the uniform format in RoO statements, I transform them into a structured table. Specifically, I use phrases as markers and organize the statements into a spreadsheet. To better illustrate, consider USMCA’s RoO for HS code 8701.10, which pertains to single axle tractors:

“A change to a good of subheading 8701.10 from any other heading, provided there is a regional value content of not less than 60 percent under the net cost method.”

The statement consists of two parts: the first states that non-originary inputs must be from a different HS heading; the second states that a regional value content of at least 60 percent is required.

Now consider USMCA’s RoO for subheading 8701.20:

“A change to a good of subheading 8701.20 from any other heading, provided there is

a regional value content of not less than 70 percent under the net cost method.”

Where the highlighted parts in the statement are identical to those for subheading 8701.10. There are six other RoOs with this same pattern. Below, we can see the tokenized statements, where phrases used as markers are highlighted, and the delimiter “|” separates each token:

“A change to | a good of subheading 8701.10 | from any other heading, | provided there is a regional value content | of not less than 60 percent | under the net cost method.”

“A change to | a good of subheading 8701.20 | from any other heading, | provided there is a regional value content | of not less than 70 percent | under the net cost method.”

I use the markers as patterns that let me introduce the delimiters in the intended position using *regular expressions*. Regular expressions, or regex/regexp, are match patterns interpreted by string-searching algorithms, often used in “find and replace” operations.¹²

By tokenizing each statement and using regular expressions, we can summarize them as follows:

“CTC | 8701.10 | heading | VC | 60 | net cost”

“CTC | 8701.20 | heading | VC | 70 | net cost”

Then, using “|” as delimiters, I collect all RoO statements into a CSV file. Using R, we further process and rearrange the information on each RoO statement.

I identified thirteen different RoO types for NAFTA and twenty for USMCA through this process. Tables 5 and 6 summarize these findings.

¹²See <https://regexr.com> for learning, building and testing regular expressions.

Table 5: NAFTA RoOs

| | rule | RVC | RCR | comb | CTC | level | ECT | ALW | count | EX % | VC % |
|----|---------------|-----|-------|------|-----|---------|-----|-----|-------|------------|--------|
| 1 | CC & RVC60 | yes | 60.00 | AND | yes | chapter | no | no | 1 | 0 % | 0.08 % |
| 2 | CC + ALW50 | yes | 50.00 | . | yes | chapter | no | yes | 5 | 0.14 % | 0.79 % |
| 3 | CTH | no | . | . | yes | heading | no | no | 11 | 5.56e-05 % | 2.8 % |
| 4 | CTH & RVC60 | yes | 60.00 | AND | yes | heading | no | no | 24 | 7.2 % | 11 % |
| 5 | CTH & RVC62.5 | yes | 62.00 | AND | yes | heading | no | no | 27 | 43 % | 43 % |
| 6 | CTH + ALW50 | yes | 50.00 | . | yes | heading | no | yes | 130 | 16 % | 11 % |
| 7 | CTH + ALW60 | yes | 60.00 | . | yes | heading | no | yes | 9 | 2.1 % | 0.65 % |
| 8 | CTH + ECT | no | . | . | yes | heading | yes | no | 55 | 2.6 % | 1.2 % |
| 9 | CTH + ECT50 | yes | 50.00 | . | yes | heading | yes | no | 60 | 8.4 % | 2.1 % |
| 10 | CTH + ECT50 | yes | 50.00 | . | yes | heading | no | no | 11 | 2 % | 2.1 % |
| 11 | CTH RVC50 | yes | 50.00 | OR | yes | heading | no | no | 26 | 3.5 % | 2.7 % |
| 12 | CTH RVC60 | yes | 60.00 | OR | yes | heading | no | no | 38 | 8 % | 7.6 % |
| 13 | CTSH + ALW50 | yes | 50.00 | . | yes | heading | no | yes | 2 | 6.6 % | 1.4 % |

Note: Column **EX %** shows the share of Mexican auto exports to US and Canada for which a given RoO applies. Similarly, Column **VC %**, shows the auto VC trade volume share.

The names of these types follow a pattern: following the terminology in Table 4, if a RoO requires a change in classification, the name will start with CC, CTH, CTSH, or CTI indicating whether the change is required at the chapter, heading, subheading or tariff item-level, respectively. Similarly, if it requires a value-added calculation, the name will start with "RVC" followed by two digits indicating the RCR. If the RoO contains a RVC and a CTC part, they are separated by "&" or "|" to indicate how these rules are combined.

Table 6: USMCA RoOs

| | rule | RVC | RCR | comb | CTC | level | ECT | ALW | count | EX % | VC % |
|----|---------------|-----|-------|------|-----|---------|-----|-----|-------|------------|-------|
| 1 | CC RVC70 | yes | 70.00 | OR | yes | chapter | no | no | 1 | 0.085 % | . |
| 2 | CTH & RVC50 | yes | 50.00 | AND | yes | heading | no | no | 2 | 1.57e-04 % | 0 % |
| 3 | CTH & RVC60 | yes | 60.00 | AND | yes | heading | no | no | 17 | 0.12 % | 11 % |
| 4 | CTH & RVC62.5 | yes | 62.00 | AND | yes | heading | no | no | 6 | 0.069 % | 43 % |
| 5 | CTH & RVC70 | yes | 70.00 | AND | yes | heading | no | no | 4 | 7.3 % | . |
| 6 | CTH & RVC75 | yes | 75.00 | AND | yes | heading | no | no | 19 | 40 % | . |
| 7 | CTH + ALW70 | yes | 70.00 | - | yes | heading | no | yes | 32 | 4.3 % | . |
| 8 | CTH + ECT | no | - | - | yes | heading | yes | no | 44 | 1 % | 1.2 % |
| 9 | CTH + ECT65 | yes | 65.00 | - | yes | heading | yes | no | 66 | 3.9 % | . |
| 10 | CTH + ECT70 | yes | 70.00 | - | yes | heading | yes | no | 8 | 3.8 % | . |
| 11 | CTH RVC65 | yes | 65.00 | OR | yes | heading | no | no | 45 | 6.4 % | . |
| 12 | CTH RVC70 | yes | 70.00 | OR | yes | heading | no | no | 45 | 4.7 % | . |
| 13 | CTH RVC75 | yes | 75.00 | OR | yes | heading | no | no | 38 | 8.2 % | . |
| 14 | CTI | no | - | - | yes | heading | no | no | 14 | 0.27 % | . |
| 15 | CTSH | no | - | - | yes | heading | no | no | 27 | 1.9 % | 0 % |
| 16 | CTSH + ECT | no | - | - | yes | heading | yes | no | 5 | 1.5 % | . |
| 17 | CTSH + ECT65 | yes | 65.00 | - | yes | heading | yes | no | 2 | 6.8 % | . |
| 18 | CTSH + ECT70 | yes | 70.00 | - | yes | heading | yes | no | 11 | 0.25 % | . |
| 19 | CTSH RVC75 | yes | 75.00 | OR | yes | heading | yes | no | 1 | 0.24 % | . |
| 20 | RVC75 | yes | 75.00 | - | yes | - | no | no | 64 | 9.2 % | . |

Note: Column **EX %** shows the share of Mexican auto exports to US and Canada for which a given RoO applies. Similarly, Column **VC %**, shows the auto VC trade volume share.

In addition, certain types include the “ECT” term to indicate exceptions to the CTC rule. However, these types also include a caveat; if a listed input falls under the exception, a good may still be considered ordinary if its RVC is above the RCR indicated by the two digits next to it. If the RoO just has “ECT” with no RCR, it means a good won’t be considered ordinary if it falls under the exceptions, regardless of its RVC.

There are some instances where a rule includes details that cannot be observed in the data. For example, it may include different RCRs for two goods within the same NTL code ¹³. See Appendix E for a list of simplifying assumptions in programming the calculator.

The RoO types in tables 5 and 6 can be further aggregated into groups to simplify the calculator algorithm. Such groups are shown in tables 7 and 8.

Table 7: NAFTA RoO Groups

| | Group | Count | EX % | VC % |
|---|-------------|-------|---------|-------|
| 1 | CTC | 11 | 6e-05 % | 2.8 % |
| 2 | CTC & RVCXX | 52 | 51 % | 53 % |
| 3 | CTC + ALWXX | 146 | 25 % | 14 % |
| 4 | CTC + ECT | 55 | 2.6 % | 1.2 % |
| 5 | CTC + ECTXX | 71 | 10 % | 2.1 % |
| 6 | CTC RVCXX | 64 | 11 % | 10 % |

Note: Column **EX %** shows each group’s share of Mexican auto exports to the US and Canada. Column **VC %** shows the share of trade volume in the VC in each group.

Table 8: USMCA RoO Groups

| | Group | Count | EX % | VC % |
|---|-------------|-------|-------|-------|
| 1 | CTC | 41 | 2.2 % | 2.8 % |
| 2 | CTC & RVCXX | 48 | 48 % | 53 % |
| 3 | CTC + ALWXX | 32 | 4.3 % | 14 % |
| 4 | CTC + ECT | 49 | 2.5 % | 1.2 % |
| 5 | CTC + ECTXX | 87 | 15 % | 2.1 % |
| 6 | CTC RVCXX | 130 | 20 % | 10 % |
| 7 | RVCXX | 64 | 9.2 % | . % |

Note: Column **EX %** shows each group’s share of Mexican auto exports to the US and Canada. Column **VC %** shows the share of trade volume in the VC in each group.

After scraping the agreements’ PDFs and organizing the statements into a table, I moved on to the second step, which involved creating a mapping between product codes and their corresponding RoO group for each agreement. The resulting pseudo-code in Appendix F illustrates how each RoO group is mapped into the origin calculator algorithm to assess firms’ compliance.

Coding RoO statements at the group level offers a more efficient and accurate approach than converting each RoO into an if/then statement. While an alternative compliance calculator is publicly available on the Mexican Economy Secretariat’s website¹⁴, it is not suitable for research purposes as

¹³In 2020, the Mexican government published the *Ley de los Impuestos Generales de Importación y de Exportación* (LIGIE, Import and Export General Tax Law), which adds two new digits to the NTL code called *Número de Identificación Comercial* (NICO, Commercial Identification Number). Such an addition will enable the removal of most simplifications in future calculator implementations.

¹⁴For more information visit: <https://www.snice.gob.mx/cs/avi/snice/hce.calc.origen2020.html>

it requires manual input and cannot be used on a large scale. However, this tool has helped test the accuracy of my algorithm.

5 RoOs: from NAFTA to USMCA

The implementation of the USMCA has brought about significant changes in RoOs for the automotive industry. Under NAFTA, automobiles and their parts were required to have at least 50% of their content made by member countries in order to qualify for zero tariffs. However, the new RoOs under USMCA have significantly increased this requirement, with an average of 62% now being mandated. This is likely to have a strong impact on Mexican auto exports, with 95% of these now required to have a regional content of 70% or higher.

Table 9: Changes to RCR

| USMCA NAFTA | 50 | 60 | 62.5 | 65 | 70 | 75 | No RoO |
|----------------|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|--------|
| 50 | . | . | . | 2.89 | 3.26 | 2.85 | 2.89 |
| 60 | 0.00 | 0.04 | 0.02 | . | 10.54 | 8.33 | . |
| 62.5 | . | . | 0.00 | . | . | 41.99 | 0.53 |
| No RoO | . | . | 0.30 | 0.28 | 0.72 | . | 1.83 |

Note: values in each cell show the VC trade volume share for each RCR pair.

The structural changes in RoOs between NAFTA and USMCA are outlined in Table 9. A closer look reveals that the majority of modifications involved an increase in RCR, from 50, 60, or 62.5 percent to either 60, 62.5, 65, 70, or 75 percent. Additionally, the USMCA introduced new RoOs for HS classifications that previously had none and also replaced Chapter-specific CTC rules with new RVC, set at a high RCR of 75 percent.

Another significant modification in RoOs regards the rollup of super-core parts and components. This provision gives producers the option to assess the RVC of super-core systems separately and roll up their content. That is, if the system satisfies the RCR, then 100% of its value can be counted as originary for the value calculation of the vehicle. Although the provision allowing producers to roll-up super-core parts was present under NAFTA, it underwent expansion under USMCA: whilst the RCR for super-core parts and their components rose from 62.5% to 75%, the scope of the systems

Figure 5: Value Chain Trade Volume: Distribution by RoOs

| | | NAFTA | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------|--------|-------|------|------|----|------|-----|-----|------|------|-----|------|-----|------|------|----|------|--------|---|
| USMCA | | CC | | CTH | | | | | | | | | | CTI | CTSH | | | No RoO | |
| | | | | & | | | | | + | | | | | | | + | | | |
| | | RVC | | | | | ALW | ECT | | | RVC | | ECT | | RVC | | | | |
| | | 75 | 70 | 50 | 60 | 62.5 | 70 | 75 | 70 | 65 | 70 | 65 | 70 | 75 | 65 | 70 | 75 | | |
| | CC | & | RVC | 60 | 0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | + | ALW | 50 | 0 | 0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| CTH | | | | | | | | | | | | | 0 | | | | | | |
| | & | RVC | 60 | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.11 | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | 62.5 | | | | | 0 | 0.42 | | | | | | | | 0.01 | | |
| | + | ALW | 50 | 0.03 | | | | | 0.01 | 0 | | 0.02 | 0 | | 0 | 0 | | 0 | |
| | | | 60 | 0.01 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | ECT | | 50 | | | | | | | 0.01 | 0 | | | | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | 60 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 0 | |
| | | RVC | 50 | | | | | | | 0.01 | 0 | 0 | | | | | | 0.02 | |
| | | | 60 | | | | | | | | | | | 0.08 | | | | | |
| | CTSH | + | ALW | 50 | | | | | | | | | | | | | 0 | | |
| | No RoO | | | | | | 0 | | | | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 0.01 | 0 | 0.01 | | 0 |

to which these rules apply expanded. Previously, these rules only applied to engines and transmission systems; however, under USMCA, they were extended to include axle, suspension, steering, body, and battery systems. section 6, discusses this provision in detail.

As RoOs become increasingly stringent, the issue of enforcement gains significant prominence. Specifically, the enforcement of RCRs poses a substantial challenge for governments due to their reliance on self-reported documents. In order to certify their origin, firms present a certificate of origin, which is not bound by a prescribed format as long as it contains a minimum amount of information to identify the certifier's identity (which can be the producer, the importer or the exporter), the product tariff item, the criteria it satisfies for origin, and supporting documentation¹⁵. By default, there is no additional check, but authorities in the importing country may request supplementary documentation and are required to “maintain criminal, civil, or administrative penalties for violations of its laws and regulations related to [the Origin procedures].” In essence, firms self-report their origin and

¹⁵refer to Appendix G for a detailed description of these requirements


may face audits by the importing country, yet there is no standardized approach to enforcement. This introduces an inherent risk of inaccuracies and misrepresentations, further complicating the regulatory oversight process. The significance of relying on self-reported origin certificates is especially apparent in the case of the US since it does not collect VAT unlike Canada and Mexico. VAT systems play a critical role in tax collection because they integrate into the production and distribution process, thereby bolstering transparency and compliance. If all member countries were to adopt a VAT system, the origin could be authenticated through VAT records. Consequently, alternative mechanisms for ensuring accurate reporting and compliance are imperative in this context.

6 Compliance Exercise

Equipped with the VC data and the origin calculator, I conduct the first exercise. The objective is to evaluate the origin of all products within the value chain under both sets of RoOs: those defined in NAFTA and those specified in USMCA. This stage is where the topological sort method, described in section 3, proves to be useful. Employing this approach, we ensure that at each stage of production, firms in the upstream have previously been assessed for their origin.


The baseline exercise involves evaluating compliance under both sets of rules for the value chain formed by our group of assemblers. It is important to note that we utilized data from 2017, a period during which NAFTA was in force. Therefore, the nature of this exercise can, at best, emulate the scenario that would have unfolded if accountants of each firm were required to assess the same production structure under two sets of rules. Despite our current omission of changes in the network, this exercise yields insightful outcomes and contributes to our understanding of how RoOs across products and along the VC interact within the production network, taking into account its topological characteristics. Figures 6 and 7 show the how compliance and RVC differ with NAFTA and USMCA RoOs. This implementation of the calculator closely aligns with both agreements to the extent that the available data permits. Assumptions and simplifications are delineated in detail in Appendix E. We then contrast these outcomes across three distinct sets: the complete VC, solely firms within the VC engaged in the production of either a car part or a vehicle (i.e. the assemblers), and a subset comprising the thirteen auto assemblers identified in section 3.

Figure 6: Compliance Rate



As anticipated, compliance levels are lower under the USMCA RoOs, with a nearly 10 p.p. decrease observed for assemblers. However, the impact on parts producers is notably more pronounced, as their compliance decreases almost twofold. It's worth noting that, as discussed in subsection 3.2, nearly 20% of Mexican exports to its partners comprise vehicle parts. Notice that, as a result of the super-core provision expansion, the RVC under USMCA is higher than that under NAFTA, although not sufficient to drive compliance rates upward.

Figure 7: Regional Content Requirement



6.1 The Roll-up dispute


In May 2021, the Mexican government requested formal discussions on the interpretation of the accumulation provision for super-core systems in the new rules of origin. This was due to the US unilaterally changing the way regional value content is calculated, deducting any foreign content from the RVC calculation. After a controversy-resolution panel conducted its review in December of 2022, it was concluded that automakers may continue to "roll up" the value of super-core parts and their components, allowing the whole of a system to count as originating in the region if it contains the required percentage of regional content. While the increase in regional content requirements has made the rules of origin stricter, the roll-up provision has also granted more flexibility, making the overall effect of the new RoOs ambiguous ex-ante. In this section, we delve into the controversy implications.

According to USMCA regulations, these parts must originate for the vehicle or truck to be considered originating. Moreover, Canada and Mexico contended that the agreement permitted the

inclusion of rolled-up content for originating super-core parts in the final vehicle RVC calculation. Conversely, the US argued that the overall vehicle RVC calculation and the core parts origination requirement were distinct and separate calculations.

Mexico and Canada argued that the USMCA negotiations indicated that once an essential auto part is considered originating (by meeting a minimum of 75% RVC), its regional value incorporated into the total RVC of the vehicle must be 100%, having already fulfilled the requirements. Contrastingly, the US interpretation suggested that even when an essential auto part qualifies as originating, its regional value when incorporated into the total RVC of the vehicle, should not necessarily be 100%, but rather the percentage that allowed it to meet the originating part requirements (which can be between 75% and 100%); Thus, making compliance with RoOs more challenging for producers on the Mexican side of the border.[26] As Head et al. (2022)[13] show, stricter RoOs affect Mexico and Canada more than the US due to the fact that most of Mexico's and Canada's output is exported to the US while the US auto output is mainly sold domestically.


Figure 8: Super-core Roll-up effect on Compliance Rate



Tables 8 and 9 show the result from my estimated compliance rates, assuming opposite resolution

panel rulings. Upon comparison of the compliance rates for both USMCA scenarios, it becomes evident that the super-core provision crucially dampened the effect of higher RCRs. While the compliance rate for auto assemblers would have experienced a twofold decrease, comparing compliance rates for auto firms under both scenarios leads to the conclusion that the parts producers benefited the most from the panel’s resolution. Finally, we also note that when we consider all the firms in the value chain, the effect on auto-specific firms doesn’t appear as pronounced.

Figure 9: Super-core Roll-up effect on Regional Value Content



The findings in Figure 9 serve to reinforce the notion that the super-core roll-up provision significantly influences compliance rates through the RVC of firms. This observation leads us to consider the possibility that policymakers dedicate a considerable amount of resources to formulating intricate regulations, which, in practice, appear to have far less impact on practical outcomes compared to a single paragraph discreetly situated in an appendix within each agreement.

6.2 Alternative RoO specifications

We examine four hypothetical scenarios to further understand how each component of RoOs interacts and translates into firms' outcomes. In the baseline scenario, we maintain the RoOs unchanged but remove the roll-up option. The second scenario involves assessing the compliance of all firms in the value chain under the assumption that a producer located in the region automatically satisfies the origin criteria. This approach is referred to as "no upstream compliance." The third scenario focuses exclusively on the RVC portion of the rules of origin and assumes a uniform RCR equal to the mean requirement specified in the agreements while also maintaining the "no upstream compliance" assumption. Finally, the fourth scenario entails evaluating the compliance of upstream firms while retaining RVC-only rules of origin with a flat RCR.

Figure 10: Compliance Rate Under Alternative Specifications
Entire Value Chain




Figure 11: Compliance Rate Under Alternative Specifications
Auto Firms





Figure 12: Compliance Rate Under Alternative Specifications
Only Assemblers



Figures 10-12 display the compliance rate results for the entire value chain, auto firms, and assemblers, respectively. Similarly, Figures 13-15 illustrate the variations in RVC for the three sets of firms. Notably, the absence of roll-up surprisingly has no significant impact on the outcome for any group, except for a modest 1.4 p.p. (6.8 p.p) decrease in the regional content of auto firms under NAFTA(USMCA) rules (See Figure 14). This unanticipated observation may be inferred from the similarity of outcomes under the no-upstream compliance scenario. This suggests that upstream

compliance had limited influence on downstream firms under NAFTA, possibly due to lower RCRs and fewer systems being eligible for super-core roll-up.

Figure 13: RVC Under Alternative Specifications
Entire Value Chain




Figure 14: RVC Under Alternative Specifications
Auto Firms





Figure 15: RVC Under Alternative Specifications
Only Assemblers



Interestingly, the elimination of the roll-up provision mostly affects only the auto-firms. When comparing this group with the assemblers' group, we find that the impact is mainly influenced by part producers. It is worth noting that the reduction in the average RVC from NAFTA to USMCA for auto firms is just under 10%, yet this adjustment holds significant implications for the origin of the firms, as it positions the average auto firm content below the 75% baseline, which coincides with the super-core RCR under USMCA.

7 Concluding Remarks

This paper introduces innovative tools for analyzing RoOs, made feasible by the recent availability of new firm-to-firm trade datasets. Leveraging this data, I investigate the patterns within the automotive industry value chain, which is a central sector for the Mexican economy. The study reveals three primary findings: Firstly, the auto value chain demonstrates extensive interconnectedness, with the majority of firms serving multiple assemblers, and approximately half of these firms servicing ten or more assemblers. This inter-connectivity is not only reflected in the firm count but also in trade volume, with a third of the VC's trade volume concentrated among firms serving ten or more assemblers. Secondly, the most significant changes to RoOs, in terms of their trade shares, were increases of RCR while preserving the underlying RoO type, while the group of firms that are affected

the most by these changes are not car assemblers, but rather the part producers. Furthermore, as RCRs become more stringent, the significance of upstream compliance escalates. Thirdly, the recent dispute between USMCA partners centered on one of the most pivotal provisions in the agreement: the super-core systems roll-up. The compliance rate of auto firms without this provision is nearly three times lower than the rate estimated when the super-core roll-up is permitted. In conclusion, this work aims at advancing our knowledge of global value chains and their relationship to trade policy. In combination with the origin calculator, it offers potential avenues to improve policy design and evaluation efforts. It also prompts further exploration of numerous research questions using the methodologies presented here.

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Appendices

A Data Sources

In this section, I describe the construction of the dataset used in our analysis. I combine four sources to reconstruct the Mexican auto VC for 2017. I defer a discussion of the imputation of firms’ production labor to Appendix B.

(i) *Domestic Firm-to-firm Linkages*.— We retrieve connections among Mexican firms from Online Tax Receipts provided by the SHCP, called commercial CFDI for their acronym in Spanish, CFDIs. We use the *commercial* prepend to distinguish these receipts from payroll CFDIs. The unit of observation in commercial CFDIs is a month and a pair of firms, the buyer and the seller. For each entry in the dataset, we observe the monthly value of transactions, the number of receipts issued in that month, and the taxes retained, one of them being the VAT. Firms source different inputs at different periodicities based on the nature of the inputs, supplier availability, market conditions, business needs, and external factors. This and the fact that firms declare taxes annually impose a natural yearly restriction on what constitutes one realization of the production network. Therefore we aggregate all monthly data at the yearly level. Thus, an observation in this dataset is characterized by a buyer, a seller, and a (yearly) transaction value.

(ii) *State and Main Activity.*— This dataset specifies the state where the firms’ tax ID is registered and the product 6-digit NAICS code for the firm’s main activity, obtained from the firms’ annual tax declarations. The main activity of a firm is defined by the product accounting for the largest share of the firm’s sales revenue.

(iii) *Imports and Exports.*— We retrieve firms’ foreign linkages from custom records, which include all imports and exports at the product level (NTL code). The unit of observation is given by each transaction at the product level and the corresponding importer-seller or exporter-buyer firm pairs; however, to ensure consistency and mitigate the impact of noisy recording of foreign firm identities, I consolidate all foreign transactions into annual country-product pairs.

The datasets in (i)-(iii) can be linked using anonymized firm identifiers. I use (i)-(ii) to measure firms’ sales revenue and materials purchases.

Production Labor.— The last data source is the Mexican Economic Census of 2019, which I use to infer firms’ production labor. I compute the mean ratio of input purchases to production labor for firms within each 6-digit NAICS code. Then, I utilize these ratios to estimate the production labor for each firm by multiplying it with their materials purchases.¹⁶

Constructing an appropriate dataset to characterize the Mexican production network poses one of the key challenges. This is primarily due to the vast size of the datasets involved, such as the commercial CFDI data and the customs records. In 2017 alone, the commercial CFDI data consisted of a staggering 1,719,086,142 observations, with each observation containing 21 fields of information. Similarly, the customs records comprised over 110,235,291 transactions at the product level, spread across 14 different tables, and encompassing more than 150 fields of data.

Furthermore, before being able to generate descriptive statistics of the network, a significant amount of cleaning and validation of these datasets was necessary. The intricate details of this process are outlined comprehensively in LopezEspino (2022)[20]. Due to the sheer volume of data, handling, and processing, it necessitated the use of an high-performance computing (HPC) cluster, along with an Apache Spark engine. R served as the main programming interface for this stage of the analysis.

To minimize the impact of purchases that are not directly utilized in production, I adopt a

¹⁶An objective for future projects is to merge the Economic Census with the other firm-level datasets, which will allow the investigation of a broader set of economic questions.

reasonable assumption and focus solely on manufacturing firms and their transactions. By doing so, I create a refined network dataset that comprises 174261 nodes and 3043287 edges, representing a subset of firms and their inter-dependencies within the production network.

Table 10: Assemblers' exports by product code

| NTLC | Vehicle Type | Duty | Exports |
|-------------|---------------------|-------------|----------------|
| 87012001 | heavy truck | heavy | 5,276,988 |
| 87012002 | heavy truck | heavy | 3,000 |
| 87032101 | passenger vehicle | light | 300,163 |
| 87032102 | passenger vehicle | light | 58 |
| 87032199 | passenger vehicle | light | 352,685 |
| 87032201 | passenger vehicle | light | 5,412,845 |
| 87032202 | passenger vehicle | light | 125 |
| 87032301 | passenger vehicle | light | 23,378,731 |
| 87032302 | passenger vehicle | light | 1,597 |
| 87032401 | passenger vehicle | light | 1,097,565 |
| 87032402 | passenger vehicle | light | 1,064 |
| 87042104 | light truck | light | 65 |
| 87042199 | light truck | light | 4,944 |
| 87042299 | heavy truck | heavy | 169,450 |
| 87042399 | heavy truck | heavy | 778,797 |
| 87043199 | light truck | light | 767,499 |
| 87043299 | heavy truck | heavy | 117,031 |

Note: exports are reported in thousand dollars.

Table 11: Manufacturing sectors in the Auto Value Chain

| NAICS Subsector | Description | Value Chain Trade Volume | | | Firms in Value Chain | | |
|--------------------|--|--------------------------|---------|---------------|----------------------|---------|---------------|
| | | USD | Share | Cum. Share | Count | Share | Cum. Share |
| 336 | Transportation equipment manufacturing | 1.72e+10 | 30 % | 30% | 515 | 9.94 % | 9.94% |
| 468 | Retail trade of motor vehicles, parts, fuels and lubricants | 3.2e+09 | 5.6 % | 36% | 259 | 5 % | 14.94% |
| 435 | Wholesale trade of agricultural, industrial, commercial and services machinery, equipment and furniture, and other general purpose machinery and equipment | 2.92e+09 | 5.1 % | 41% | 670 | 12.93 % | 27.87% |
| 326 | Plastic and rubber industry | 2.59e+09 | 4.5 % | 45% | 180 | 3.47 % | 31.34% |
| 335 | Electric appliances, accessories and electric power generation equipment manufacturing | 2.11e+09 | 3.7 % | 49% | 134 | 2.59 % | 33.93% |
| 332 | Metal products manufacturing | 2.08e+09 | 3.6 % | 53% | 363 | 7 % | 40.93% |
| 434 | Wholesale trade of agricultural, forestry and industrial raw materials, and waste materials | 1.36e+09 | 2.4 % | 55% | 444 | 8.57 % | 49.50% |
| 327 | Nonmetallic mineral products manufacturing | 1.32e+09 | 2.3 % | 57% | 41 | 0.79 % | 50.29% |
| 333 | Machinery and equipment manufacturing | 1.03e+09 | 1.8 % | 59% | 289 | 5.58 % | 55.87% |
| 331 | Basic metal industry | 9.55e+08 | 1.7 % | 61% | 100 | 1.93 % | 57.80% |
| 339 | Other manufacturing industries | 9.25e+08 | 1.6 % | 62% | 157 | 3.03 % | 60.83% |
| 334 | Manufacturing of computer, communications, and measuring equipment, and other electronic equipment, components and appliances manufacturing | 1.9e+08 | 0.33 % | 63% | 54 | 1.04 % | 61.87% |
| 325 | Chemical industry | 1.67e+08 | 0.29 % | 63% | 30 | 0.58 % | 62.45% |
| 436 | Wholesale trade of trucks and new parts for automobiles, pickup trucks and trucks | 1.13e+08 | 0.2 % | 63% | 13 | 0.25 % | 62.70% |
| 467 | Retail trade of hardware and glass | 4.45e+07 | 0.077 % | 63% | 40 | 0.77 % | 63.47% |
| 314 | Textile products manufacturing, except apparel | 2.85e+07 | 0.049 % | 63% | 3 | 0.06 % | 63.53% |
| 211 | Oil and gas extraction | 2.55e+07 | 0.044 % | 63% | 5 | 0.1 % | 63.63% |
| 337 | Furniture, mattresses and blinds manufacturing | 2.09e+07 | 0.036 % | 63% | 32 | 0.62 % | 64.25% |
| 324 | Petroleum and coal products manufacturing | 2.04e+07 | 0.035 % | 63% | 1 | 0.02 % | 64.27% |
| 313 | Textile inputs manufacturing, and textiles finishing | 7,774,067 | 0.014 % | 63% | 2 | 0.04 % | 64.31% |
| 321 | Wood industry | 6,782,282 | 0.012 % | 63% | 7 | 0.14 % | 64.45% |

B Imputation of Production Labor and Robustness Checks

The potential source of measurement error in this analysis is limited to the net costs. As the labor costs associated with production are not directly observable in the dataset, I employ summary

statistics from the 2019 Mexican Economic Census to estimate the net cost.

From the economic census, I derive the input purchase-to-net cost ratio for all firms at the activity code level (six-digit NAICS). Subsequently, I utilize these ratios to infer the approximate net costs for individual firms.

To validate the accuracy of this approximation method, I cross-verify it using an alternative data source. Some firms in the value chain are required to present annual tax declarations, allowing me to estimate net costs by leveraging the accounting structure of these declarations.





Figure 16: Accounting Items in Annual Tax Declarations

I calculate the net cost as the difference between sales and the sum of indirect production costs. In Figure 23, I present the distribution of net costs derived from both sources, as well as a third approach. In this third method, I obtain the input purchase-to-net cost ratio from firms' declarations and then utilize it to estimate net costs based on their manufacturing input purchases. Upon examining the subset of firms for which data is available from both sources, the distributions closely resemble each

Figure 17: Sales Revenue by Data Source



other. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that the distribution of net costs from annual tax declarations is marginally skewed to the right, given that only larger firms are mandated by law to submit an annual tax declaration.

By comparing figures 22 and 23, we see that the source of discrepancy for net costs stems from input purchases. This is due to the fact that I only consider manufacturing purchases, to reduce the likelihood of accounting for non-production related purchases inside the net costs. See Table 11 for a list of sectors considered.




Figure 18: Sales Revenue by Data Source, intersecting firms

Figure 19: Production Labor by Data Source




Figure 20: Production Labor by Data Source, intersecting firms




Figure 21: Input Purchases by Data Source




Figure 22: Input Purchases by Data Source, intersecting firms





Figure 23: Net Cost Comparison



C Trace-back and Sprout Algorithm


Algorithm 1 Sprouting function

```
1: function SPROUT( $G, branch$ )  $\triangleright G:graph, branch:edge$ 
2:    $s \leftarrow$  source of edge  $branch$ 
3:    $t \leftarrow$  target of edge  $branch$ 
4:    $t^* \leftarrow$  copy node  $t$  of graph  $G$ 
5:   target of  $branch \leftarrow t^*$ 
6:    $G \leftarrow$  remove node  $t$  form graph  $G$ 
7:   return  $G$ 
8: end function
```


Algorithm 2 Traceback function

```
1: function TRACEBACK( $G, root$ )  $\triangleright G:graph, root:node (assembler)$ 
2:    $ic \leftarrow$   $root$ 's in-component in graph  $G$ 
3:    $g \leftarrow$  filter  $G$  to keep only nodes in  $ic$ 
4:   while  $g$  is not DAG do
5:      $c \leftarrow$  get a cycle in graph  $g$ 
6:      $branch \leftarrow$  find the edge furthest away from  $root$ 
7:      $g \leftarrow$  SPROUT( $g, branch$ )
8:   end while
9:   return  $g$ 
10: end function
```


Figure 24 shows how this is the case, with BFS, as well as other popular search and tree finding algorithms.




(a) BFS



(b) A^* algorithm



(c) Predecessor tree



(d) Dominator tree

Figure 24: Back tracing with alternative algorithms

D Additional Statistics

Figure 25: VC Intersections




Figure 26: Domestic Firm Level Distribution: Auto Parts




Figure 27: Foreign Firm Level Distribution: Auto Parts




Figure 29: Mexican Exports to FTA partners: Distribution by RoOs





Figure 28: RoO Transition Matrix



E RoO simplifying assumptions

Table 12: Origin calculator’s simplifying assumptions

| TC | Assumption |
|---|---|
| 8702.10, 8702.90 | A change to a motor vehicle for the transport of 16 or more persons |
| 8703.21-8703.90 | A change to a passenger vehicle |
| 8704.21, 8704.31 | A change to a light truck |
| 8704.22, 8704.23 | A change to a heavy truck |
| 8704.32, 8704.90 | A change to a vehicle that is solely or principally for off-road |
| 87.06, 87.07 | A good for use in a passenger vehicle or light truck |
| 8708.10, 8708.21, 8708.70, 8708.93, 8708.95 | A good for use in a passenger vehicle, light truck, or heavy truck |
| 8708.29 | A good, different from body stamping, for use in a passenger vehicle, light truck, or heavy truck |
| 8708.30 | A good for use in a passenger vehicle, light truck or heavy truck |
| 8708.40, 8708.50, 8708.80, 8708.94 | A good for use in a passenger vehicle or light truck |
| 8708.91 | A good for use in a passenger vehicle, light truck or heavy truck |
| 8708.92 | A change to silencers (mufflers) or exhaust pipes for use in a passenger vehicle, light truck, or heavy truck |
| 8708.99 | Chassis frames are for use in a passenger vehicle or light truck |

F Origin Calculator Algorithm

Algorithm 3 Regional Value Content Function

```

1: function CONTENT( vnm , nc)
2:   rvc  $\leftarrow (nc - \text{sum}(\text{vn}\text{m}\$value))/nc$ 
3:   return rvc
4: end function

```

Algorithm 4 de Minimis Function

Require: $ect, alw \in \{\text{true}, \text{false}\}$

```
1: function MINIMIS( $ntlc, vmn, tv, roo, ect, alw$ )
2:    $ctclist \leftarrow \text{substring}(HS \$code, 1, roo \$level) == \text{substring}(ntcl, 1, roo \$level)$ 
3:   if  $ect == alw$  then
4:      $exlist \leftarrow ctclist$ 
5:   else if  $alw$  then
6:      $from \leftarrow roo \$from$   $\triangleright from$  is a list of allowed NTL codes
7:      $alwlist \leftarrow \text{filter } HS \$code \text{ where}$ 
8:        $HS \$code == \text{substring}(ntcl, 1, level)$ 
9:      $exlist \leftarrow ntlc \in ctclist \setminus alwlist$ 
10:  else  $\triangleright$  list of NTL code exceptions
11:     $except \leftarrow roo \$except$ 
12:     $exlist \leftarrow ntlc \in except \cup ctclist$ 
13:  end if
14:   $vmn\_exc \leftarrow \text{filter } vmn \text{ where}$ 
15:     $\text{substring}(vmn \$pcode, 1, roo \$level) \in exlist$ 
16:   $m \leftarrow 1 - (tv - \text{sum}(vmn\_exc \$value))/tv$ 
17:  return  $m$ 
18: end function
```

Algorithm 5 origin calculator

```
1: function CALCULATOR(ntlc, fta, inputs, nc, tv, flat)
Require: flat ∈ {true, false}
2:   IMPORT(roos_nafta, roos_usmca)
3:   region ← “CAN”, “MEX”, “USA”
4:   if fta == “NAFTA” then
5:     rooi ← roos_nafta where ntlc == roos_nafta$.product
6:   else
7:     rooi ← roos_usmca where ntlc == roos_usmca$.product
8:   end if
9:   vmn ← inputs where inputs$.country ∉ region
10:  rvc ← RVC(vmn, nc)
11:  if flat or rooi$.type == “RVCXX” then
12:    if rvc > rooi$.rcr_flat then
13:      roo ← 1
14:    else
15:      roo ← 0
16:    end if
17:  else if rooi$.type ∈ {“CTC”, “CTC + ECT”} then
18:    min ← MINIMIS(ntlc, vmn, vc, roo, ect, alw)
19:    if min < 0.1 then
20:      roo ← 1
21:    else
22:      roo ← 0
23:    end if
24:  else if rooi$.type ∈ {“CTC + ECTXX”} then
25:    min1 ← MINIMIS(ntlc, vmn, vc, rooi, rooi$.ect, false)
    State min2 ← MINIMIS(ntlc, vmn, vc, rooi, false, rooi$.alw)
26:    if min1 < 0.1 then
27:      roo ← 1
28:    else if min2 < 0.1 and rvc > rooi$.rcr then
29:      roo ← 1
30:    else
31:      roo ← 0
32:    end if
33:  else ▷ rooi$.type ∈ {“CTC & RVCXX”, “CTC | RVCXX”}
34:    min ← MINIMIS(ntlc, vmn, vc, roo, ect, alw)
35:    if rooi$.comb == “OR” then
36:      if min < 0.1 or rvc > rooi$.rcr then
37:        roo ← 1
38:      else
39:        roo ← 0
40:      end if
41:    else
42:      if min < 0.1 and rvc > rooi$.rcr then
43:        roo ← 1
44:      else
45:        roo ← 0
46:      end if
47:    end if
48:  end if
49:  return roo
50: end function
```

G Certificate of Origin

Under NAFTA, there were official documents that producers had to fill out to certify their product's origin.¹⁷ In an attempt to reduce red tape and modernize compliance, member countries have included three main modifications to USMCA. First, in addition to producers, exporters, and importers can now present the CO. Second, these formats are no longer required as long as a minimum amount of information is included. These are:

1. whether the certifier is the exporter, producer, or importer.
2. certifier's name, title, address (including country), telephone number, and email address
3. exporter's name, address (including country), e-mail address, and telephone number if different from the certifier
4. producer's name, address (including country), e-mail address, and telephone number, if different from the certifier or exporter or, if there are multiple producers
5. importer's name, address, e-mail address, and telephone number. The address of the importer shall be in a Party's territory
6. description and HS Tariff Classification
7. origin criteria under which the good qualifies.
8. blanket period: the period of the certification covers multiple shipments of identical goods for a specified period of up to 12 months
9. the certification must be signed and dated by the certifier and accompanied by the following statement:

I certify that the goods described in this document qualify as originating and that the information contained in this document is true and accurate. I assume responsibility for proving such representations and agree to maintain and present, upon request or to make available during a verification visit, documentation necessary to support this certification.

¹⁷Such formats are available for all partners in the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) website: <https://www.cbp.gov/trade/nafta/nafta-certificate-origin>

H List of Abbreviations

BFS breadth-first search

CBP Customs and Border Protection

CFDI *Comprobante Fiscal Digital por Internet* (Online Digital Tax Receipt)

CTC change in tariff classification

DAG directed acyclic graph

DFS depth-first search

FTA Free Trade Agreement

FTA Free Trade Agreement

GDP gross domestic product

GVC global value chain

HPC high-performance computing

HS Harmonized System

INEGI *Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía* (National Statistics and Geography Institute)

ITC International Trade Centre

LIGIE *Ley de los Impuestos Generales de Importación y de Exportación* (Import and Export General Tax Law)

NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement

NAICS North American Industry Classification System

NICO *Número de Identificación Comercial* (Commercial Identification Number)

NTL national tariff line

RAIAVL *Registro Administrativo de la Industria Automotriz de Vehículos Ligeros* (Administrative Registry of the Automotive Industry for Light Vehicles)

RAIAVP *Registro Administrativo de la Industria Automotriz de Vehículos Pesados* (Administrative Registry of the Automotive Industry for Heavy Vehicles)

RCR regional content requirement

ROF Rules of Origin Facilitator

RoO rule of origin

RVC regional value content

SCC strongly connected component

SHCP *Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público* (Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit)

SP specific processing

USMCA United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement

VAT value-added tax

VC value chain

WCO World Customs Organization

WTO World Trade Organization