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Update to 19429 cables - only new cables
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Alexandre Girard
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00THEHAGUE1665 | ||
DEMARCHE ON PERUVIAN ELECTIONS | ||
Mon Jun 05 00:00:00 +0200 2000 | ||
CONFIDENTIAL | ||
Embassy The Hague | ||
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 001665 | ||
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SIPDIS | ||
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2010 | ||
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PE NL | ||
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE ON PERUVIAN ELECTIONS | ||
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REF: SECSTATE 105129 | ||
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CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR STEPHEN R. KELLY. REASONS... | ||
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id: 1104 | ||
date: 6/5/2000 15:23 | ||
refid: 00THEHAGUE1665 | ||
origin: Embassy The Hague | ||
classification: CONFIDENTIAL | ||
destination: | ||
header: | ||
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. | ||
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----------------- header ends ---------------- | ||
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C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 001665 | ||
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SIPDIS | ||
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2010 | ||
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PE NL | ||
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE ON PERUVIAN ELECTIONS | ||
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REF: SECSTATE 105129 | ||
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CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR STEPHEN R. KELLY. REASONS: | ||
1.5 (B&D). | ||
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¶1. (C) WE SHARED REFTEL POINTS JUNE 5 WITH ROELAND VAN DE | ||
GEER, A/S EQUIVALENT FOR THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE IN THE MFA. | ||
VAN DE GEER EXPRESSED SOME FRUSTRATION THAT THE EU HAD NOT | ||
YET ISSUED A STATEMENT SINCE THE SECOND ROUND OF PERUVIAN | ||
ELECTIONS. HE SAID THE DUTCH PUSHED FOR A STRONG EU | ||
STATEMENT CRITICISING THE ELECTION PROCESS EARLY IN THE WEEK | ||
OF MAY 28, BUT WERE REBUFFED BY THE PORTUGUESE PRESIDENCY. | ||
THE PRESIDENCY HAD ARGUED THAT THE EU SHOULD WAIT UNTIL THE | ||
OAS MEETING IN WINDSOR HAD BEEN CONCLUDED. | ||
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¶2. (C) VAN DE GEER SAID THE DUTCH WOULD BE LOOKING TO THE | ||
RESULTS OF THE OAS MEETING, AND, DEPENDING ON THE OUTCOME, | ||
WOULD DECIDE THE BEST WAY TO EXPRESS THEIR CONCERNS. | ||
SCHNEIDER | ||
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=======================CABLE ENDS============================ |
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01BEIJING12362 | ||
HU JINTAO: TAKING SHAPE AS CHINA´S LEADER | ||
Thu Dec 27 00:00:00 +0100 2001 | ||
CONFIDENTIAL | ||
Embassy Beijing | ||
P 270525Z DEC 01 | ||
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING | ||
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3767 | ||
INFO AMCONSUL SHANGHAI | ||
AMCONSUL SHENYANG | ||
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU | ||
AMCONSUL HONG KONG | ||
AIT TAIPEI 9368 | ||
AMEMBASSY TOKYO | ||
AMEMBASSY SEOUL | ||
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW | ||
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI | ||
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI | ||
JICPAC HONOLULU HI | ||
ZEN/AMCONSUL CHENGDUC O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 012362 | ||
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/11 | ||
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TAGS: PGOV PINR CH | ||
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SUBJECT: HU JINTAO: TAKING SHAPE AS CHINA´S LEADER | ||
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REFS: A) BEIJING 11318, B) STATE 194582 | ||
(U) CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JON | ||
ALOISI. REASON 1.5 (B) (D). | ||
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SUMMARY | ||
------- | ||
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¶1. (C) MOST CHINESE HAVE LITTLE IDEA OF HEIR-APPARENT | ||
HU JINTAO´S PERSONAL VIEWS, BUT INSIDERS DESCRIBE HU AS | ||
A TALENTED BUREAUCRATIC PLAYER WITH SOLID CREDENTIALS TO | ||
SUCCEED JIANG ZEMIN. THEY REPORT THAT HU HAS STAKED OUT | ||
A MULTI-FACETED AND SUBSTANTIVE POLICY ROLE IN IMPORTANT | ||
AREAS OF PARTY AND GOVERNMENT WORK. A MASTER AT | ||
NETWORKING, HU MAINTAINS PERSONAL TIES THAT HAVE ALREADY | ||
HELPED HIM STAVE OFF THREATS TO HIS ADVANCEMENT, WHILE | ||
EARNING "CHITS" FROM JIANG ZEMIN THAT WILL HELP ENSURE | ||
JIANG DOES NOT ACT AGAINST HIS INTERESTS IN THE | ||
COMING MONTHS. CHINESE POINT TO HU´S CLOSE ASSOCIATION | ||
WITH HU YAOBANG, AND HIS CURRENT ROLE IN ENLIVENING THE | ||
CENTRAL PARTY SCHOOL, AS EVIDENCE THAT HU MAY WELL | ||
PURSUE A REFORMIST AGENDA AFTER TAKING THE REINS OF | ||
PARTY AND STATE OVER THE NEXT 15 MONTHS. END SUMMARY. | ||
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HU TAKES ON A HUMAN FACE | ||
------------------------ | ||
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¶2. (U) HU JINTAO HAS LONG BEEN THE LEAST VISIBLE MEMBER | ||
OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY´S | ||
POLITBURO. MOST OBSERVERS EXPLAIN THIS AS A CALCULATED | ||
RESULT OF BUREAUCRATIC CAUTION. AS DENG´S SELECTION AS | ||
THE "FOURTH-GENERATION" SUCCESSOR, HE IS A NATURAL | ||
TARGET FOR THE JEALOUS AND AMBITIOUS. WITH HIS OCTOBER | ||
28-NOVEMBER 12 VISIT TO RUSSIA, BRITAIN, FRANCE, SPAIN | ||
AND GERMANY (REF A), HOWEVER, HU MADE HIS MOST PROLONGED | ||
AND PUBLIC APPEARANCE TO DATE -- AND MADE OFFICIAL THE | ||
UNDERSTANDING THAT HE IS DESTINED TO BECOME THE "CORE" | ||
OF CHINA´S FOURTH-GENERATION LEADERSHIP. | ||
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¶3. (C) CHINESE SOURCES AND OUR EUROPEAN COUNTERPARTS | ||
ALIKE AGREE THAT THE "MYSTERIOUS" HU IS, IN FACT, AN | ||
APPROACHABLE, LIKEABLE LEADER WITHOUT PRETENSIONS WHO | ||
TALKS AS EASILY WITH STAFFERS AS HE DOES WITH THEIR | ||
BOSSES. ACCORDING TO BOTH BRITISH AND FRENCH DIPLOMATS, | ||
HU WAS CONSTANTLY ENGAGED THROUGHOUT HIS TRIP, ASKING | ||
THOUGHTFUL QUESTIONS ON A VARIETY OF ISSUES. HE | ||
REPORTEDLY DISPLAYED A REMARKABLE MEMORY THAT ALLOWED | ||
HIM TO MAKE ALL HIS SPEECHES WITHOUT CUE CARDS. | ||
EUROPEAN DIPLOMATS ALSO NOTED HIS ANALYTICAL ABILITY AND | ||
COMMAND OF DETAIL, PARTICULARLY ON ECONOMIC MATTERS. ON | ||
A MORE PERSONAL LEVEL, THE BRITISH FLATLY DENIED REPORTS | ||
THAT HU COULD SPEAK ENGLISH, ALTHOUGH HE APPARENTLY HAS | ||
A LIMITED ENGLISH READING CAPABILITY. | ||
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HU´S RELATIONS WITH JIANG | ||
------------------------- | ||
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¶4. (C) MOST CHINESE CONTACTS AGREE THAT JIANG ACCEPTS | ||
HU AS HIS SUCCESSOR, DESPITE OCCASIONAL FOREIGN MEDIA | ||
REPORTS TO THE CONTRARY. SOURCES HAVE POINTED OUT THAT, | ||
SINCE 1992, JIANG HAS GRADUALLY GIVEN HU INCREASING | ||
RESPONSIBILITY IN ORDER TO PREPARE HIM TO ASSUME JIANG´S | ||
POSITIONS. HU WAS IN SUCCESSION MADE CENTRAL PARTY | ||
SCHOOL PRESIDENT (1993), HEAD OF THE CENTRAL LEADING | ||
GROUP FOR PARTY-BUILDING WORK (1994), STATE VICE | ||
PRESIDENT (1998), AND VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE CCP´S CENTRAL | ||
MILITARY COMMISSION (1999). HE HAS ALSO BEEN GIVEN | ||
POLICY LEADERSHIP OVER ISSUES AS DIVERSE AS THE | ||
MILITARY´S RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, PLANNING | ||
FOR THE 16TH PARTY CONGRESS AND, MOST RECENTLY | ||
(ACCORDING TO WHAT HU TOLD BRITISH PRIME MINISTER | ||
BLAIR), AFGHANISTAN. IN ADDITION, HU HAS HELD IMPORTANT | ||
POSITIONS IN PROVINCIAL CAPITALS. IN SUM, JIANG HAS | ||
ENSURED THAT HU HAS THE BROADEST BASE OF EXPERIENCE OF | ||
ANY MEMBER OF THE FOURTH GENERATION; THIS, IN TURN, HAS | ||
BOLSTERED HU´S POSITION AS THE INDIVIDUAL MOST CAPABLE | ||
OF SERVING AS THE NEXT LEADERSHIP´S CORE. | ||
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¶5. (C) AS JIANG´S SUCCESSOR-IN-WAITING, HU HAS LOYALLY | ||
CARRIED OUT HIS DUTIES. FOR EXAMPLE, HU HEADED THE 1995 | ||
"CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION" OF THEN-BEIJING PARTY | ||
SECRETARY CHEN XITONG, ONE OF JIANG´S STRONGEST | ||
POLITICAL OPPONENTS. IN DOING SO, HE REPORTEDLY | ||
PROTECTED MEMBERS OF DENG XIAOPING´S FAMILY WHO MAY HAVE | ||
BEEN INVOLVED IN WRONGDOING, AND PERSUADED JIANG TO | ||
REPLACE CHEN WITH THE MORE "NEUTRAL" WEI JIANXING, | ||
RATHER THAN WITH HUANG JU OR ANOTHER MEMBER OF JIANG´S | ||
SHANGHAI FACTION. HU ALSO PROVED HIS LOYALTY TO JIANG | ||
BY NOT OPPOSING THE GENERAL SECRETARY´S MOVE TO FORCE | ||
QIAO SHI´S RETIREMENT FROM THE CCP´S STANDING COMMITTEE | ||
DURING THE 1997 15TH PARTY CONGRESS -- DESPITE THE FACT | ||
THAT QIAO WAS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT INFLUENCES IN | ||
HU´S METEORIC RISE. | ||
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¶6. (C) A VICE-MINISTERIAL-RANK OFFICIAL CURRENTLY | ||
STUDYING AT THE CENTRAL PARTY SCHOOL AND KNOWS HU | ||
PERSONALLY REPORTS AN "ANHUI ANGLE" TO THE HU | ||
RELATIONSHIP WITH JIANG (AND ZHU RONGJI). THIS SOURCE | ||
RELATED THAT HU, JIANG AND ZHU COMMONLY -- AND PUBLICLY | ||
-- JOKED THAT THEY WERE AN "ANHUI TRIO." HU´S FAMILY | ||
WAS FROM THE SOUTHERN CITY OF JIXI, ZHU´S WAS ORIGINALLY | ||
FROM NORTHERN ANHUI, WHILE JIANG´S GRANDPARENTS | ||
REPORTEDLY MIGRATED TO YANGZHOU (JIANGSU PROVINCE) FROM | ||
EASTERN ANHUI. DESPITE HIS ANHUI ROOTS, "CHAIRMAN JIANG | ||
ALWAYS PUTS DOWN ´YANGZHOU´ AS HIS HOMETOWN ON HIS PARTY | ||
PERSONNEL DOCUMENTS, BUT HU JINTAO PROUDLY LISTS HIMSELF | ||
AS A PERSON FROM JIXI." THIS CONTACT ALSO ASSERTED THAT | ||
HU WAS A DISTANT RELATIVE OF FAMED CHINESE INTELLECTUAL | ||
HU SHI. | ||
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A MASTER NETWORKER... | ||
--------------------- | ||
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¶7. (C) HU HAS SUCCEEDED IN ESTABLISHING A SERIES OF | ||
RELATIONSHIP NETWORKS WHICH HAVE MADE HIM A PLAYER IN | ||
HIS OWN RIGHT WITHIN THE PARTY´S TOP HIERARCHY. THESE | ||
NETWORKS INCLUDE: | ||
-- THE QINGHUA CLIQUE. HU STUDIED AT QINGHUA, CHINA´S | ||
PREMIER SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY UNIVERSITY, BETWEEN 1959 | ||
AND 1964. QINGHUA HAS LONG TAKEN PRIDE IN DEVELOPING | ||
STUDENTS WHO ARE BOTH TECHNICALLY EXPERT AND | ||
IDEOLOGICALLY "RED" BY SELECTING PARTICULARLY PROMISING | ||
STUDENTS TO BECOME UNDERGRADUATE "POLITICAL ADVISORS." | ||
HU WAS SUCH AN ADVISOR AND, UPON GRADUATING, STAYED ON | ||
FOR THREE MORE YEARS AS A POLITICAL INSTRUCTOR. WELL- | ||
INFORMED CHINESE SOURCES CONFIRMED THAT, IN THESE | ||
POSITIONS, HU CAME TO KNOW MOST OF HIS CONTEMPORARIES AT | ||
QINGHUA WELL, INCLUDING CURRENT MINISTER OF JUSTICE | ||
ZHANG FUSEN, CCP UNITED FRONT WORK DEPARTMENT DEPUTY LIU | ||
YANDONG, MINISTER OF PUBLIC SECURITY JIA CHUNWANG, AND | ||
SHAANXI PROVINCIAL PARTY SECRETARY TIAN CHENGPING. | ||
-- THE GANSU FACTION. IN 1968, HU ESCAPED THE WORST OF | ||
THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION BY VOLUNTEERING TO "GO DOWN" TO | ||
GANSU PROVINCE, WHERE HE SERVED ON CONSTRUCTION TEAMS. | ||
HU WAS PROMOTED RAPIDLY THROUGH THE RANKS UNTIL HE CAME | ||
TO THE ATTENTION OF PARTY SECRETARY SONG PING. HU ALSO | ||
MET OTHER MEMBERS OF SONG PING´S "GANSU FACTION," | ||
INCLUDING CURRENT VICE PREMIER (AND PREMIER ZHU RONGJI´S | ||
PROBABLE SUCCESSOR) WEN JIABAO AND MINISTER OF | ||
SUPERVISION ZHANG XUEZHONG. SONG PING WAS INSTRUMENTAL | ||
IN HU´S INTRODUCTION TO HU YAOBANG AND HIS 1992 | ||
PROMOTION TO THE POLITBURO´S STANDING COMMITTEE. | ||
-- THE COMMUNIST YOUTH LEAGUE (CYL). THE CYL IS LIKE A | ||
MINIATURE COMMUNIST PARTY WITH A NATIONAL STRUCTURE THAT | ||
MIMICS THE CCP´S OWN ORGANIZATION. IT HAS BEEN A | ||
SPRINGBOARD TO PROMOTION FOR LEADERS, SUCH AS HU | ||
YAOBANG, WHO SUBSEQUENTLY ROSE TO SENIOR POSITIONS. | ||
HU´S CONTACTS FROM HIS YEARS AS CYL PRINCIPAL DEPUTY | ||
(1982-1984) AND FIRST SECRETARY (1984-1985) INCLUDED: | ||
HENAN GOVERNOR (AND ONE OF HU´S CLOSEST PERSONAL | ||
FRIENDS) LI KEQIANG, FUJIAN PROVINCIAL PARTY SECRETARY | ||
(AND ANOTHER CLOSE FRIEND) SONG DEFU, MINISTER OF PUBLIC | ||
SECURITY JIA CHUNWANG, STATE COUNCIL NATIONALITIES | ||
AFFAIRS´ COMMISSION CHAIRMAN LI DEZHU, AND XINJIANG | ||
PARTY SECRETARY WANG LEQUAN. HU YAOBANG, WHO WAS | ||
GENERAL SECRETARY WHILE HU WAS AT THE CYL, SUBSEQUENTLY | ||
INTRODUCED HU TO QIAO SHI. QIAO, IN TURN, LIKE SONG | ||
PING, WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN GIVING HU´S CAREER A NUMBER OF | ||
BOOSTS. | ||
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¶8. (C) SUCH NETWORKS ARE NOT UNUSUAL IN RELATIONSHIP- | ||
ORIENTED CHINA AND, INDEED, MOST PARTY MEMBERS NEED | ||
THESE NETWORKS FOR POLITICAL SURVIVAL AND ADVANCEMENT. | ||
WHAT IS UNUSUAL, HOWEVER, IS THE BREADTH AND VARIETY OF | ||
HU´S BACKING. HIS MULTIPLE NETWORKS, IN TURN, HAVE | ||
ALLOWED HIM TO CAPITALIZE ON HIS STATUS AS THE HEIR | ||
APPOINTED BY DENG AND HIS SKILLS AS A CONSENSUS-BUILDER, | ||
AND TO AVOID LINKING HIS FATE TOO CLOSELY TO ANY ONE | ||
FACTION WITHIN THE THIRD GENERATION. HU´S GENERAL | ||
ABILITY TO AVOID DISABLING ENTANGLEMENTS HAS, ACCORDING | ||
TO AT LEAST ONE WELL-INFORMED SOURCE, ENHANCED THE VICE | ||
PRESIDENT´S REPUTATION AS A CONSENSUS-BUILDER AND | ||
STRENGTHENED HIS SUPPORT AMONG DIVERSE FACTIONS WITHIN | ||
THE PARTY. IT WAS THIS STRENGTH, ACCORDING TO THIS | ||
SOURCE, THAT ALLOWED HU TO BLUNT JIANG´S EFFORTS DURING | ||
THE 2000 CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM TO WIN ZENG QINGHONG´S | ||
PROMOTION TO THE POLITBURO. | ||
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¶9. (C) NONETHELESS, HU´S RECORD IN GAINING THE SUPPORT | ||
OF IMPORTANT FACTIONS IS NOT PERFECT. A PARTY | ||
PRINCELING GROUP HEADED BY HE GUANGWEI REPORTEDLY | ||
ENGINEERED HU´S SUMMARY DEPARTURE FROM THE CYL IN 1985 | ||
AND HIS APPOINTMENT AS PARTY SECRETARY OF POVERTY- | ||
STRICKEN GUIZHOU PROVINCE. CONTACTS ATTRIBUTED THIS | ||
INCIDENT BOTH TO JEALOUSY OF HU AND TO THE FACTIONAL | ||
INFIGHTING THAT EVENTUALLY LED TO HU YAOBANG´S DEMISE. | ||
WHILE NONE OF THESE INDIVIDUALS HAVE SINCE RISEN ABOVE | ||
THE VICE-MINISTER LEVEL, IT IS UNCLEAR TO WHAT DEGREE | ||
THE AFTERMATH OF THIS INCIDENT COULD AFFECT HU´S FUTURE | ||
RELATIONS WITH OTHER PARTY PRINCELINGS. | ||
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IS HU A CLOSET REFORMER? | ||
------------------------ | ||
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¶10. (C) HU HAS BEEN CAREFUL SINCE 1992 NOT TO DIVERGE | ||
FROM JIANG ON THE ISSUE OF POLITICAL REFORM. YET HINTS | ||
FROM HIS PAST SUGGEST THAT HE MAY HAVE REFORMIST | ||
INCLINATIONS, SOURCES REPORT. ACCORDING TO A WELL- | ||
CONNECTED ACADEMIC, WHILE IN GUIZHOU (1985-1988), HU | ||
ENCOURAGED HIS SUBORDINATES TO EXPERIMENT WITH ECONOMIC | ||
AND LIMITED SOCIAL REFORMS. HU´S ECONOMIC POLICIES AT | ||
THAT TIME WERE IN LINE WITH THE REFORMS BEING INTRODUCED | ||
ALONG CHINA´S COASTAL REGIONS, BUT WERE CONSIDERED TO BE | ||
UNIQUE IN AN INTERIOR PROVINCE. AS CYL FIRST SECRETARY, | ||
HU WAS AT THE FOREFRONT OF DEFENDING HU YAOBANG´S | ||
REFORMS AGAINST CONSERVATIVE ATTACKS AS "SPIRITUAL | ||
POLLUTION." FURTHERMORE, AS PRESIDENT OF THE CENTRAL | ||
PARTY SCHOOL, HE HAS MOVED TO PROFESSIONALIZE THE | ||
CURRICULUM, AND ENCOURAGED THE SCHOOL TO BRING IN MORE | ||
OUTSIDE EXPERTS AND TO RESEARCH ALTERNATIVES TO | ||
TRADITIONAL SOCIALIST IDEOLOGY. MANY ALSO POINT TO THE | ||
HEAVY INVOLVEMENT BY CENTRAL PARTY SCHOOL LEADERS IN THE | ||
DEVELOPMENT OF JIANG´S "THREE REPRESENTS," AND HU´S OWN | ||
ROLE AS ONE OF THE CHIEF CHEERLEADERS FOR "JIANG | ||
THOUGHT." | ||
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¶11. (C) WHILE MOST CONTACTS CONCUR THAT HU RECOGNIZES | ||
THE NEED FOR CHANGE, THE TYPE AND PACE OF REFORM HE | ||
MIGHT FAVOR IS STILL UNCLEAR. SOME CONTACTS ASSERT | ||
WISTFULLY THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT´S SUPPORT THE | ||
FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF "JIANG THOUGHT" IS GENUINE, AND | ||
THAT HE VIEWS THOSE CONCEPTS AS STEPPING STONES TO MORE | ||
SUBSTANTIAL REFORMS. STILL OTHERS MAINTAIN THAT HU´S | ||
CULTURAL REVOLUTION EXPERIENCE HAS SENSITIZED HIM TO THE | ||
DESTABILIZING DANGERS OF TOO-RAPID CHANGE AND THAT HE | ||
WILL CONTINUE TO "GO SLOW." NO MATTER WHERE HU STANDS | ||
ON REFORM, HOWEVER, ONE SOURCE CLOSE TO HU´S FRIENDS HAS | ||
SUGGESTED THAT HU´S STRATEGIES FOR IMPLEMENTING CHANGE | ||
WILL LIKELY BE SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE HEAVY- | ||
HANDED "CAMPAIGN"-STYLE TACTICS THAT JIANG HAS FAVORED | ||
IN MOVING FORWARD HIS OWN AGENDA. | ||
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COMMENT | ||
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¶12. (C) WHILE HU JINTAO APPEARS WELL-GROOMED TO TAKE ON | ||
THE CHALLENGE OF GUIDING CHINA INTO THE 21ST CENTURY, | ||
HIS ABILITY TO AFFECT CHANGE WILL IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS | ||
DEPEND UPON HIS ABILITY TO PERSUADE THE 63 MILLION PARTY | ||
MEMBERS THAT CHANGE IS IN THEIR BEST INTEREST. AT THE | ||
VERY LEAST, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT HU WILL BE ABLE TO | ||
AFFECT ANY MAJOR CHANGES FOR SEVERAL YEARS AFTER HE | ||
TAKES OVER THE "CORE" LEADERSHIP ROLE. EVEN IF HU´S | ||
TRANSITION GOES SMOOTHLY, HE WILL STILL NEED TO SPEND | ||
SEVERAL YEARS CONSOLIDATING HIS POSITION AMONG THE | ||
PARTY´S MEMBERSHIP -- MOST OF WHOM WOULD IMMEDIATELY | ||
BLOCK ANY REFORM-ORIENTED ATTEMPTS TO ELIMINATE THE | ||
PERKS THEY HAVE COME TO TAKE FOR GRANTED. | ||
RANDT |
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