



# Animoca Brands – MetaTX & ERC20 Token Smart Contract Security Audit

Prepared by: Halborn

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## DOCUMENT REVISION HISTORY

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0.2	Draft Review	11/09/2022	Kubilay Onur Gungor
0.3	Draft Review	11/10/2022	Gabi Urrutia
1.0	Remediation Plan	11/22/2022	Luis Arroyo
1.1	Remediation Plan Review	12/02/2022	Gabi Urrutia

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# EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW

## 1.1 INTRODUCTION

Animoca Brands engaged Halborn to conduct a security audit on their `MetaTX` and `ERC20 Token` smart contracts beginning on October 24th, 2022 and ending on November 11th, 2022. The security assessment was scoped to the `MetaTX` and `ERC20 Token` smart contracts provided in the GitHub repository [animoca/ethereum-contracts](https://github.com/animoca/ethereum-contracts) with commit ID `4b4cf4535be8367ef67b2827b32ea48a2d70e79c`.

## 1.2 AUDIT SUMMARY

The team at Halborn was provided three weeks for the engagement and assigned a full-time security engineer to audit the security of the smart contract. The security engineer is a blockchain and smart-contract security expert with advanced penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of this audit is to:

- Ensure that smart contract functions operate as intended
- Identify potential security issues within the smart contracts

In summary, Halborn identified some security risks that were acknowledged by the `Animoca Brands` team.

## 1.3 TEST APPROACH & METHODOLOGY

Halborn performed a combination of manual and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of this audit. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of the code and can quickly identify

items that do not follow the security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used during the audit:

- Research into architecture and purpose
- Smart contract manual code review and walkthrough
- Graphing out functionality and contract logic/connectivity/functions ([solgraph](#))
- Manual assessment of use and safety for the critical Solidity variables and functions in scope to identify any arithmetic related vulnerability classes
- Manual testing by custom scripts
- Scanning of solidity files for vulnerabilities, security hotspots or bugs. ([MythX](#))
- Static Analysis of security for scoped contract, and imported functions. ([Slither](#))
- Testnet deployment ([Brownie](#), [Remix IDE](#))

#### RISK METHODOLOGY:

Vulnerabilities or issues observed by Halborn are ranked based on the risk assessment methodology by measuring the **LIKELIHOOD** of a security incident and the **IMPACT** should an incident occur. This framework works for communicating the characteristics and impacts of technology vulnerabilities. The quantitative model ensures repeatable and accurate measurement while enabling users to see the underlying vulnerability characteristics that were used to generate the Risk scores. For every vulnerability, a risk level will be calculated on a scale of **5 to 1** with **5** being the highest likelihood or impact.

#### RISK SCALE - LIKELIHOOD

- 5 - Almost certain an incident will occur.
- 4 - High probability of an incident occurring.
- 3 - Potential of a security incident in the long term.
- 2 - Low probability of an incident occurring.
- 1 - Very unlikely issue will cause an incident.

#### RISK SCALE - IMPACT

- 
- 5 - May cause devastating and unrecoverable impact or loss.
  - 4 - May cause a significant level of impact or loss.
  - 3 - May cause a partial impact or loss to many.
  - 2 - May cause temporary impact or loss.
  - 1 - May cause minimal or un-noticeable impact.

The risk level is then calculated using a sum of these two values, creating a value of **10** to **1** with **10** being the highest level of security risk.

CRITICAL	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	INFORMATIONAL
----------	------	--------	-----	---------------

- 10** - CRITICAL
- 9** - **8** - HIGH
- 7** - **6** - MEDIUM
- 5** - **4** - LOW
- 3** - **1** - VERY LOW AND INFORMATIONAL

## 1.4 SCOPE

### IN-SCOPE:

The security assessment was scoped to the following smart contracts:

- MetaTX:
  - ForwarderRegistry.sol
  - ForwarderRegistryContext.sol
  - ForwarderRegistryContextBase.sol
  - ForwarderRegistryContextFacet.sol
  - IERC2771.sol
  - IForwarderRegistry.sol
  - ERC2771Calldata.sol
- ERC20 Token:
  - ERC20.sol
  - ERC20BatchTransfers.sol
  - ERC20Burnable.sol
  - ERC20Detailed.sol
  - ERC20Metadata.sol
  - ERC20Mintable.sol
  - ERC20Permit.sol
  - ERC20Receiver.sol
  - ERC20SafeTransfers.sol
  - ERC20Base.sol
  - ERC20BatchTransfersBase.sol
  - ERC20BurnableBase.sol
  - ERC20DetailedBase.sol
  - ERC20MetadataBase.sol
  - ERC20MintableBase.sol
  - ERC20PermitBase.sol
  - ERC20SafeTransfersBase.sol
  - ERC20BatchTransfersFacet.sol
  - ERC20BurnableFacet.sol
  - ERC20DetailedFacet.sol
  - ERC20Facet.sol

# EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW

```
-ERC20MetadataFacet.sol  
-ERC20MintableFacet.sol  
-ERC20PermitFacet.sol  
-ERC20SafeTransfersFacet.sol  
-IERC20.sol  
-IERC20Allowance.sol  
-IERC20BatchTransfers.sol  
-IERC20Burnable.sol  
-IERC20Detailed.sol  
-IERC20Metadata.sol  
-IERC20Mintable.sol  
-IERC20Permit.sol  
-IERC20Receiver.sol  
-IERC20SafeTransfers.sol  
-ERC20DetailedStorage.sol  
-ERC20MetadataStorage.sol  
-ERC20PermitStorage.sol  
-ERC20Storage.sol
```

## 2. ASSESSMENT SUMMARY & FINDINGS OVERVIEW

CRITICAL	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	INFORMATIONAL
0	0	0	0	2

LIKELIHOOD



# EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW

SECURITY ANALYSIS	RISK LEVEL	REMEDIATION DATE
HAL01 - POSSIBLE OVERFLOW DUE TO NONCE DOWNCASTING	Informational	ACKNOWLEDGED
HAL02 - DIFFERENT PRAGMA VERSIONS USED	Informational	ACKNOWLEDGED



# FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS



### 3.1 (HAL-01) POSSIBLE OVERFLOW DUE TO NONCE DOWNCASTING - INFORMATIONAL

#### Description:

The `ForwarderRegistry` smart contract uses an internal struct called `Forwarder`, which contains the `nonce`, and if the address is `approved` as a forwarder, this `nonce` is declared as `uint248` but the `nonce` received as a parameter in some functions like `_setForwarderApproval()` is `uint256`. In this function, the `nonce` parameter is downcasted to fit in the `Forwarder` struct, but this casting could occasionally create an overflow.

#### Code Location:

**Listing 1: ForwarderRegistry.sol (Lines 169,173)**

```
164 function _setForwarderApproval(
165     Forwarder storage forwarderData,
166     address sender,
167     address forwarder,
168     bool approved,
169     uint256 nonce
170 ) private {
171     forwarderData.approved = approved;
172     unchecked {
173         forwarderData.nonce = uint248(nonce + 1);
174     }
```

#### Risk Level:

**Likelihood** - 1

**Impact** - 1

## Recommendation:

Solidity 0.8 introduces type checking for arithmetic operations, but not for type casting. It is recommended to change the `nonce` type in the `Forwarder` struct to `uint256` to avoid these possible overflows.

## Remediation Plan:

**ACKNOWLEDGED:** The Animoca Brands team added the following note about this issue:

“This scenario cannot happen. It would require that a single account sets or unsets an approval max(uint248) times, calling a SSTORE operation every time. Both the time and amount of tokens it would require are impossible to reach in any configuration of an EVM blockchain.”.

## 3.2 (HAL-02) DIFFERENT PRAGMA VERSIONS USED - INFORMATIONAL

Description:

The `metatx` and `ERC20` smart contracts use floating pragma and different pragma versions, like `0.8.17`. The latest pragma version, `0.8.17`, released on September 8, 2022, is used in some contracts, but `^0.8.8` is also used. Avoid using floating pragmas is recommended as best practice.

Reference: [Solidity Releases](#)

Code Location:

### Listing 2

```
1 - 0.8.17 (contracts/metatx/ForwarderRegistry.sol#2)
2 - ^0.8.8 (contracts/metatx/ForwarderRegistryContext.sol#2)
3 - ^0.8.8 (contracts/metatx/base/ForwarderRegistryContextBase.sol
↳ #2)
4 - 0.8.17 (contracts/metatx/facets/ForwarderRegistryContextFacet.
↳ sol#2)
5 - ^0.8.8 (contracts/metatx/interfaces/IERC2771.sol#2)
6 - ^0.8.8 (contracts/metatx/interfaces/IForwarderRegistry.sol#2)
7 - ^0.8.8 (contracts/metatx/libraries/ERC2771Calldata.sol#2)
8
9 - ^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#2)
10 - ^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20BatchTransfers.sol#2)
11 - ^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20Burnable.sol#2)
12 - ^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20Detailed.sol#2)
13 - ^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20Metadata.sol#2)
14 - ^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20Mintable.sol#2)
15 - ^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20Permit.sol#2)
16 - ^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20Receiver.sol#2)
17 - ^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20SafeTransfers.sol#2)
18 - ^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/base/ERC20Base.sol#2)
19 - ^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/base/ERC20BatchTransfersBase.sol
↳ #2)
20 - ^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/base/ERC20BurnableBase.sol#2)
21 - ^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/base/ERC20DetailedBase.sol#2)
```

```
22 - ^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/base/ERC20MetadataBase.sol#2)
23 - ^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/base/ERC20MintableBase.sol#2)
24 - ^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/base/ERC20PermitBase.sol#2)
25 - ^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/base/ERC20SafeTransfersBase.sol#2)
26 - 0.8.17 (contracts/token/ERC20/facets/ERC20BatchTransfersFacet.sol#2)
27 - 0.8.17 (contracts/token/ERC20/facets/ERC20BurnableFacet.sol#2)
28 - 0.8.17 (contracts/token/ERC20/facets/ERC20DetailedFacet.sol#2)
29 - 0.8.17 (contracts/token/ERC20/facets/ERC20Facet.sol#2)
30 - 0.8.17 (contracts/token/ERC20/facets/ERC20MetadataFacet.sol#2)
31 - 0.8.17 (contracts/token/ERC20/facets/ERC20MintableFacet.sol#2)
32 - 0.8.17 (contracts/token/ERC20/facets/ERC20PermitFacet.sol#2)
33 - 0.8.17 (contracts/token/ERC20/facets/ERC20SafeTransfersFacet.sol#2)
34 - ^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/interfaces/IERC20.sol#2)
35 - ^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/interfaces/IERC20Allowance.sol#2)
36 - ^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/interfaces/IERC20BatchTransfers.sol#2)
37 - ^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/interfaces/IERC20Burnable.sol#2)
38 - ^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/interfaces/IERC20Detailed.sol#2)
39 - ^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/interfaces/IERC20Metadata.sol#2)
40 - ^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/interfaces/IERC20Mintable.sol#2)
41 - ^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/interfaces/IERC20Permit.sol#2)
42 - ^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/interfaces/IERC20Receiver.sol#2)
43 - ^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/interfaces/IERC20SafeTransfers.sol#2)
44 - ^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/libraries/ERC20DetailedStorage.sol#2)
45 - ^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/libraries/ERC20MetadataStorage.sol#2)
46 - ^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/libraries/ERC20PermitStorage.sol#2)
```

Risk Level:

**Likelihood** - 2

**Impact** - 1

## Recommendation:

It is recommended to update the pragma versions used in the `metatx` and `ERC20` smart contracts and lock all of them on the used version `0.8.17`.

## Remediation Plan:

**ACKNOWLEDGED:** The `Animoca Brands` team added the following note about this issue:

“The design is intended. As a library, the project is open to different compilation options when re-usable contracts are concerned (abstract contracts, libraries, interfaces). The solidity version is the minimum version which allows to compile and passes the tests. The concrete contracts are designed to be directly deployed, in this case the latest solidity version is enforced.”.

# GAS OPTIMIZATION

## 4.1 CHANGE THE VISIBILITY OF A FUNCTION

Description:

The `ForwarderRegistry.sol` contract contains a function that could be marked as external instead of public to save gas.

**Listing 3: ForwarderRegistry.sol (Line 76)**

```
70     function setForwarderApproval(
71         address sender,
72         address forwarder,
73         bool approved,
74         bytes calldata signature,
75         bool isEIP1271Signature
76     ) public {
```

Risk Level:

**Likelihood - 2**

**Impact - 1**

Recommendation:

It is recommended to change the `public` visibility of the mentioned function to `external` in order to save gas.

Remediation Plan:

The Animoca Brands team added the following note about this issue:

“`setForwarderApproval` is used in another function of the contract, which is why it is public and not external. Redesigning the code to make it external would not provide runtime gas optimization.”.

# MANUAL TESTING

Halborn performed several manual tests in the following contracts:

- ForwarderRegistry.sol
- ForwarderRegistryContext.sol
- ERC20.sol
- ERC20Base.sol
- ERC20BatchTransfersBase.sol
- ERC20BurnableBase.sol
- ERC20DetailedBase.sol
- ERC20MetadataBase.sol
- ERC20MintableBase.sol
- ERC20PermitBase.sol
- ERC20SafeTransfersBase.sol
- ERC20DetailedStorage.sol
- ERC20MetadataStorage.sol
- ERC20PermitStorage.sol
- ERC20Storage.sol

The manual tests were focused on testing the main functions of these contracts:

- `setForwarderApproval()`
- `forward()`
- `approveAndForward()`
- `_requireValidSignature()`
- `_setForwarderApproval()`

- approve()
- increaseAllowance()
- decreaseAllowance()
- transfer()
- transferFrom()
- batchTransfer()
- batchTransferFrom()
- safeTransfer()
- safeTransferFrom()
- mint()
- batchMint()
- burn()
- burnFrom()
- batchBurnFrom()

```

FR tests
bob is approved?: false
bob is approved now?: true
✓ setForwarderApproval
  1) forward with wrong data
    ✓ forward ok
  2) forward with wrong signature
  3) approveAndForward with wrong signature
  4) approveAndForward with wrong data
    ✓ approveAndForward ok

testing erc20 token
bob is approved?: false
bob is approved now?: true
✓ approve
prev allowance: 0
post allowance: 100
✓ increaseAllowance
prev allowance: 100
post allowance: 0
✓ decreaseAllowance
  5) transfer without allowance
  6) transferFrom without allowance
  7) transfer err1
  8) transfer err2
    ✓ transfer
  9) transferFrom err1
  10) transferFrom err1
    ✓ transferFrom
  ✓ minting
  11) minting too much
    ✓ burning
  12) burning too much

```

```

at ForwarderRegistry._requireValidSignature (contracts/metatx/ForwarderRegistry.sol:160)
at ForwarderRegistry.setForwarderApproval (contracts/metatx/ForwarderRegistry.sol:80)
at ForwarderMock.functionCallWithValue (@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol:135)
at ForwarderMock.functionCallWithValue (@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol:136)
at ForwarderMock.functionCallWithValue (@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol:119)
at ForwarderMock.forward (contracts/mocks/metatx/ForwarderMock.sol:20)
at processTicksAndRejections (node:internal/process/task_queues:96:5)
at HardhatNode._mineBlockWithPendingTxs (node_modules/hardhat/src/internal/hardhat-network/provider/node.ts:1815:23)
at HardhatNode.mineBlock (node_modules/hardhat/src/internal/hardhat-network/provider/node.ts:504:16)
at EthModule._sendTransactionAndReturnHash (node_modules/hardhat/src/internal/hardhat-network/provider/modules/eth.ts:18)
at HardhatNetworkProvider.request (node_modules/hardhat/src/internal/hardhat-network/provider/provider.ts:118:18)
at EthersProviderWrapper.send (node_modules/hardhat-deploy-ethers/src/internal/ethers-provider-wrapper.ts:13:20)

2) Meta Transactions
  FR tests
    forward with wrong signature:
      Error: VM Exception while processing transaction: reverted with custom error 'WrongSigner()'
      at ForwarderRegistry._requireValidSignature (contracts/metatx/ForwarderRegistry.sol:160)
      at ForwarderRegistry.setForwarderApproval (contracts/metatx/ForwarderRegistry.sol:80)
      at ForwarderMock.functionCallWithValue (@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol:135)
      at ForwarderMock.functionCallWithValue (@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol:136)
      at ForwarderMock.functionCallWithValue (@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol:119)
      at ForwarderMock.forward (contracts/mocks/metatx/ForwarderMock.sol:20)
      at processTicksAndRejections (node:internal/process/task_queues:96:5)
      at HardhatNode._mineBlockWithPendingTxs (node_modules/hardhat/src/internal/hardhat-network/provider/node.ts:1815:23)
      at HardhatNode.mineBlock (node_modules/hardhat/src/internal/hardhat-network/provider/node.ts:504:16)
      at EthModule._sendTransactionAndReturnHash (node_modules/hardhat/src/internal/hardhat-network/provider/modules/eth.ts:18)
      at HardhatNetworkProvider.request (node_modules/hardhat/src/internal/hardhat-network/provider/provider.ts:118:18)
      at EthersProviderWrapper.send (node_modules/hardhat-deploy-ethers/src/internal/ethers-provider-wrapper.ts:13:20)

```

Notable case scenarios tested (i.e. prefix operator) were also discussed with [Animoca Team](#).

**Listing 4:** `gasTest.js`

```

1 it("test Default", async () => {
2     let tx1 = await test.testDefault(4);
3     let tx2 = await tx1.wait();
4     console.log('Cost:', tx2.gasUsed)
5 });
6
7 it("test Prefix", async () => {
8     let tx1 = await test.testPrefix(4);
9     let tx2 = await tx1.wait();
10    console.log('Cost:', tx2.gasUsed)
11});

```

No issues other than those mentioned have been found during manual testing.

# AUTOMATED TESTING

## 6.1 STATIC ANALYSIS REPORT

### Description:

Halborn used automated testing techniques to enhance the coverage of certain areas of the smart contracts in scope. Among the tools used was Slither, a Solidity static analysis framework. After Halborn verified the smart contracts in the repository and was able to compile them correctly into their ABIs and binary format, Slither was run against the contracts. This tool can statically verify mathematical relationships between Solidity variables to detect invalid or inconsistent usage of the contracts' APIs across the entire code-base.

### Slither results:

#### Slither results for the Smart Contracts:

```
IERC20 is re-used:
- IERC20 (contracts/token/ERC20/interfaces/IERC20.sol#7-70)
IERC20Permit is re-used:
- IERC20Permit (contracts/token/ERC20/interfaces/IERC20Permit.sol#8-56)
ForwarderRegistry._forwarders (contracts/metax/ForwarderRegistry.sol#32) is never initialized. It is used in:
- ForwarderRegistry.removeForwarderApproval(address) (contracts/metax/ForwarderRegistry.sol#56-59)
- ForwarderRegistry.setForwarderApproval(address,address,bool,bytes,bool) (contracts/metax/ForwarderRegistry.sol#70-82)
- ForwarderRegistry.forward(address,bytes) (contracts/metax/ForwarderRegistry.sol#88-92)
- ForwarderRegistry.getNonce(address,address) (contracts/metax/ForwarderRegistry.sol#130-132)
- ForwarderRegistry.isApprovedForwarder(address,address) (contracts/metax/ForwarderRegistry.sol#135-137)
ERC20Storage.batchMint(ERC20Storage.Layout,address[],uint256[]).totalValue (contracts/token/ERC20/libraries/ERC20Storage.sol#404) is a local variable never initialized
ERC20Storage.batchTransfer(ERC20Storage.Layout,address,address[],uint256[]).i (contracts/token/ERC20/libraries/ERC20Storage.sol#216) is a local variable never initialized
TokenRecoveryBase.recoverERC20s(address[],IERC20[],uint256[]).i (contracts/security/base/TokenRecoveryBase.sol#58) is a local variable never initialized
ERC20Storage.batchTransferFrom(ERC20Storage.Layout,address,address,address[],uint256[]).i (contracts/token/ERC20/libraries/ERC20Storage.sol#272) is a local variable never initialized
ERC20Storage.batchBurnFrom(ERC20Storage.Layout,address,address[],uint256[]).i (contracts/token/ERC20/libraries/ERC20Storage.sol#499) is a local variable never initialized
ERC20Storage.batchMint(ERC20Storage.Layout,address[],uint256[]).i (contracts/token/ERC20/libraries/ERC20Storage.sol#406) is a local variable never initialized
ERC20Storage.batchBurnFrom(ERC20Storage.Layout,address,address[],uint256[]).totalValue (contracts/token/ERC20/libraries/ERC20Storage.sol#497) is a local variable never initialized
ERC20Storage.batchTransfer(ERC20Storage.Layout,address,address[],uint256[]).totalValue (contracts/token/ERC20/libraries/ERC20Storage.sol#213) is a local variable never initialized
ERC20Storage.batchTransfer(ERC20Storage.Layout,address,address[],uint256[]).selfTransferTotalValue (contracts/token/ERC20/libraries/ERC20Storage.sol#214) is a local variable never initialized
ERC20Storage.batchTransferFrom(ERC20Storage.Layout,address,address,address[],uint256[]).totalValue (contracts/token/ERC20/libraries/ERC20Storage.sol#269) is a local variable never initialized
ERC20Storage.batchTransferFrom(ERC20Storage.Layout,address,address,address[],uint256[]).selfTransferTotalValue (contracts/token/ERC20/libraries/ERC20Storage.sol#270) is a local variable never initialized
ForwarderRegistry.forward(address,bytes) (contracts/metax/ForwarderRegistry.sol#88-92) ignores return value by target.functionCallWithValue(abi.encodePacked(data, sender), msg.value) (contracts/metax/ForwarderRegistry.sol#91)
```



```
Pragma version 0.8.17 (contracts/token/ERC20/facets/ERC20PermitFacet.sol#2) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider dep  
loying with 0.6.12/0.7.6/0.8.  
Pragma version 0.8.17 (contracts/token/ERC20/facets/ERC20SafeTransfersFacet.sol#2) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consi  
der deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6/0.8.  
Pragma version^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/interfaces/IERC20.sol#2) is known to contain severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html)  
Pragma version^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/interfaces/IERC20Allowance.sol#2) is known to contain severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html)  
Pragma version^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/interfaces/IERC20BatchTransfers.sol#2) is known to contain severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html)  
Pragma version^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/interfaces/IERC20Burnable.sol#2) is known to contain severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html)  
Pragma version^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/interfaces/IERC20Detailed.sol#2) is known to contain severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html)  
Pragma version^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/interfaces/IERC20Metadata.sol#2) is known to contain severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html)  
Pragma version^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/interfaces/IERC20Mintable.sol#2) is known to contain severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html)  
Pragma version^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/interfaces/IERC20Permit.sol#2) is known to contain severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html)  
Pragma version^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/interfaces/IERC20Receiver.sol#2) is known to contain severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html)  
Pragma version^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/interfaces/IERC20SafeTransfers.sol#2) is known to contain severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html)  
Pragma version^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/libraries/ERC20DetailedStorage.sol#2) is known to contain severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html)  
Pragma version^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/libraries/ERC20MetadataStorage.sol#2) is known to contain severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html)  
Pragma version^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/libraries/ERC20PermitStorage.sol#2) is known to contain severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html)  
Pragma version^0.8.8 (contracts/token/ERC20/libraries/ERC20Storage.sol#2) is known to contain severe issues (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bugs.html)  
Function ForwarderRegistry.DOMAIN_SEPARATOR() (contracts/metax/ForwarderRegistry.sol#116-124) is not in mixedCase  
Variable ForwarderRegistryContextBase._forwarderRegistry (contracts/metax/base/ForwarderRegistryContextBase.sol#11) is not in mixedCase  
Function ERC20PermitBase.DOMAIN_SEPARATOR() (contracts/token/ERC20/base/ERC20PermitBase.sol#35-37) is not in mixedCase  
Function ERC20PermitStorage.DOMAIN_SEPARATOR() (contracts/token/ERC20/libraries/ERC20PermitStorage.sol#87-102) is not in mixedCase  
Variable ForwarderRegistryContextBase._forwarderRegistry (contracts/metax/base/ForwarderRegistryContextBase.sol#11) is too similar to F  
orwarderRegistryContext.constructor(IFForwarderRegistry).forwarderRegistry_ (contracts/metax/ForwarderRegistryContext.sol#12)  
onERC20Received(address,address,uint256,bytes) should be declared external:  
    - ERC20Base.allowance(address,address) (contracts/token/ERC20/base/ERC20Base.sol#60-62)
```

- No major issues found by Slither.

## 6.2 AUTOMATED SECURITY SCAN

### Description:

Halborn used automated security scanners to assist with detection of well-known security issues and to identify low-hanging fruits on the targets for this engagement. Among the tools used was MythX, a security analysis service for Ethereum smart contracts. MythX performed a scan on the smart contracts and sent the compiled results to the analyzers in order to locate any vulnerabilities.

### MythX results:

#### MythX results for MetaTX.

Report for ForwarderRegistryContext.sol  
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/b4ec6fd3-5b90-4f48-a7ef-4a407f7e32bc>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
2	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.

Report for base/ForwarderRegistryContextBase.sol  
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/b4ec6fd3-5b90-4f48-a7ef-4a407f7e32bc>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
21	(SWC-115) Authorization through tx.origin	Low	Use of "tx.origin" as a part of authorization control.
39	(SWC-115) Authorization through tx.origin	Low	Use of "tx.origin" as a part of authorization control.

#### MythX results for ERC20 Token.

Report for contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol  
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/8fd95268-12e6-4a48-bc09-1a0594db4d6a>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
2	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.

Report for contracts/token/ERC20/base/ERC20Base.sol  
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/a18914fb-524e-4939-b568-4a4fe492d53a>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
2	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.

Report for contracts/token/ERC20/libraries/ERC20Storage.sol  
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/3067dd35-2231-4ae9-b2db-6f0854f250e4>  
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/6aa8b350-81b9-4bf9-b3d7-98e4074f63c7>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
2	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
573	(SWC-123) Requirement Violation	Low	Requirement violation.

Report for contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20BatchTransfers.sol  
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/d3e7a015-e4b7-4023-8cf9-43b65bf6a92e>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
2	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.

Report for contracts/token/ERC20/base/ERC20BatchTransfersBase.sol  
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/e9367350-088b-40eb-b660-00db8bc879f2>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
2	(SWC-103) FloatingPragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.

Report for contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20Burnable.sol  
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/50b6223d-a317-494d-833c-d089e0e44328>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
2	(SWC-103) FloatingPragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.

Report for contracts/token/ERC20/base/ERC20BurnableBase.sol  
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/68becea7-bcbd-4a67-8dbf-17d5afde8a1a>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
2	(SWC-103) FloatingPragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.

Report for contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20Detailed.sol  
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/6a554f87-b839-4238-9963-20ea94136b79>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
2	(SWC-103) FloatingPragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.

Report for contracts/token/ERC20/base/ERC20DetailedBase.sol  
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/f2479446-4872-41ba-90c4-7795b3edc29a>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
2	(SWC-103) FloatingPragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.

Report for contracts/token/ERC20/libraries/ERC20DetailedStorage.sol  
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/0408136e-79c1-41d8-8cd4-6f85eec5b6d8>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
2	(SWC-103) FloatingPragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.

Report for contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20Metadata.sol  
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/082a83d8-ab4b-4b2f-8a72-3795b9940d18>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
2	(SWC-103) FloatingPragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.

Report for contracts/token/ERC20/base/ERC20MetadataBase.sol  
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/d4f1c20a-1b3c-42e1-868c-4c606dcc5a17>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
2	(SWC-103) FloatingPragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.

Report for contracts/token/ERC20/libraries/ERC20MetadataStorage.sol  
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/a1c8f28e-a397-4008-8280-a3c02f5daef2>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
2	(SWC-103) FloatingPragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.

Report for contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20Mintable.sol  
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/babe1fc5-b7c6-4fd0-8249-79c63698f310>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
2	(SWC-103) FloatingPragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.

Report for contracts/token/ERC20/base/ERC20MintableBase.sol  
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/82ac5056-6e7c-4535-a558-473965ef5523>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
2	(SWC-103) FloatingPragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.

Report for contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20Permit.sol  
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/84c57c88-b7f2-4fc4-81c0-c99d12892766>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
2	(SWC-103) FloatingPragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.

Report for contracts/token/ERC20/base/ERC20PermitBase.sol  
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/b9f08534-5bb9-4968-ad85-61d7b64a4714>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
2	(SWC-103) FloatingPragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.

Report for contracts/token/ERC20/libraries/ERC20PermitStorage.sol  
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/f2e7ab5d-4dff-4ec1-9a62-da5853b756e6>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
2	(SWC-103) FloatingPragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.

Report for token/ERC20/ERC20Receiver.sol  
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/37abeab2-fc98-46d8-aa72-14b78106d512>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
2	(SWC-103) FloatingPragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.

Report for contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20SafeTransfers.sol  
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/c35b4cd3-b071-4d31-84dd-74b75d4cf73>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
2	(SWC-103) FloatingPragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.

Report for contracts/token/ERC20/base/ERC20SafeTransfersBase.sol  
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/51b64610-4ac6-4b0b-a082-e61638c93f18>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
2	(SWC-103) FloatingPragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.

Report for contracts/token/ERC20/facets/ERC20SafeTransfersFacet.sol  
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/6aa8b350-81b9-4bf9-b3d7-98e4074f63c7>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
14	(SWC-123) RequirementViolation	Low	Requirement violation.

THANK YOU FOR CHOOSING  
HALBORN