

Advanced Topics in Software Engineering
CSE - 6324 - Section 001

TEAM 4

ITERATION 1
(Written Deliverable)

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I. Project Objective

Slither is a static analysis framework that provides rich information about Ethereum smart contracts [1]. Slither's plugin architecture lets you integrate new detectors from the command line [2].

We propose to add three new detectors using the Python API [3].

The first detector will be targeted toward the improper usage of the `ecrecover()` function in solidity smart contracts [4]. The `ecrecover` function can be used to process meta transactions in smart contracts and verifies signed data coming from someone other than the transaction signer [5], but due to the nature of public key private key signatures, this function is vulnerable to replay attacks [11]. The proposed detector will detect usage of the `ecrecover` function without nonce or chain id and flag it as a security vulnerability. The detector will also check the validity of the ECDSA signature based on the conditions defined in the Ethereum yellow paper [16]. This detector is based on the pull request ([#2015](#)) [17] which checks for nonce protection. Chain ID and ECDSA signature verification are being added to this detector to expand its use cases.

The second detector will detect API Keys stored as plain text within the solidity code (SWC 136) [6]. Hardcoded credentials present a grave security risk and compromise the security setup associated with the keys [6].

The third detector will detect passwords hardcoded into the solidity code (SWC 136) [6]. Hardcoded passwords in solidity smart contracts are not private and can be seen by third parties due to the public nature of smart contracts [7] [8].

II. Project Plan

Task	Start	End	Current Status	Risk Associated
Setup Development Environment	Inception	Inception	Completed	Changing Solidity Standards
Define rules for improper use of ecrecover() detector	Iteration 1	Iteration 1	Completed	Incomplete rule definition
Build improper use of ecrecover() detector (SWC-121)	Iteration 1	Iteration 1	Completed	1. Incomplete rule definition 2. False Positives 3. False Negatives 4. Change in security standards
Test and iterate improper use of ecrecover() detector	Iteration 1	Iteration 2	In Progress	Change in security standards
Define Rules for hardcoded API Key detector	Iteration 1	Iteration 2	In Progress	Change in security standards
Define Rules for hardcoded password detector	Iteration 1	Iteration 2	In Progress	Change in security standards
Review and implement feedback from Iteration 1	Iteration 2	Iteration 2	Not Started	
Build hardcoded API Key detector	Iteration 2	Final Iteration	Not Started	1. False Positives 2. False Negatives
Build hardcoded Password detector	Iteration 2	Final Iteration	Not Started	1. False Positives 2. False Negatives
Review and implement feedback from Iteration 2	Final Iteration	Final Iteration	Not Started	
Generate Report	Final Iteration	Final Iteration	Not Started	

III. Risk Mitigation Plan

Risk	Risk Description	Mitigation Plan	Risk Exposure
Incomplete rule definition	Rules for detectors could miss edge cases	Iteratively build and test the detectors with rules defined.	There is a 30% probability that this issue might occur, and we would need 10 hours to fix it. Hence, risk exposure would be 3 extra hours.
Changing Solidity Standards	Changing standards in solidity and Ethereum could make the detector and its recommendations obsolete.	Use the latest standards in solidity with long-term support like EIP-712 or EIP 155	There is a 20% probability that this issue might occur, and we would need 10 hours to fix it. Hence, risk exposure would be 2 extra hours.
Missing Slither User's needs from the detector's	Rules defined in the detector may not meet the slither user needs for analyzing smart contracts	Thoroughly research the issue and interact with slither users to better understand detector needs	There is a 10% probability that this issue might occur, and we would need 10 hours to fix it. Hence, risk exposure would be 1 extra hour.
False Positive	The detector might detect that there is a data leak that does not exist.	Test with multiple negative scenarios	We need 4 hours to resolve this problem, which has a 20% chance of happening. Thus, 0.8 hours of risk exposure.
False Negatives	The detector may not detect that there is a data leak that exists.	Test with multiple positive scenarios	There is a 10% chance that this problem would arise, and it would take 4 hours to fix. Hence, risk exposure would be 0.4 extra hours.

IV. Specification and Design

In this iteration, we are checking for the improper usage of the `ecrecover()` function, which checks for certain conditions. The conditions are:

- i. ECDSA check: checks the validity of the signature based on the conditions defined in the Ethereum yellow paper [16].
- ii. ChainId check: By adding chain ID into the payload, replay attacks by sending a transaction from a different network as a valid transaction can be prevented [18].

We are using a solidity smart contract as input to our detector. For this iteration, we have written the code into ‘`ecrecover.sol`’ which was created in the pull request #2015 [17]. To analyze and detect the improper usages we have defined various functions that satisfy either of these conditions, or none of them, or satisfy both in our file. A few code snippets of the ‘`ecrecover.sol`’ are given below.

```

52 //Missing Chain ID or Nonce and valid ECDSA singature validation
53 function bad_missingChainId_missingNonce_withECDSACheck(
54     Info calldata info,
55     uint8 v,
56     bytes32 r,
57     bytes32 s
58 ) external {
59     bytes32 data = keccak256(
60         abi.encodePacked(
61             "\x19Ethereum Signed Message:\n32",
62             keccak256(abi.encode(info))
63         )
64     );
65     if((r>0 && s>0 && (v==0 || v==1))){
66         address receiver = ecrecover(data, v, r, s);
67         require(receiver != address(0), "ECDSA: invalid signature");
68         mint(info.tokenId, receiver);
69     }
70 }
71

```

```

110
111 //Valid with Chain Id and ECDSA singature validation
112 function good_withChainId_withECDSACheck(
113     Info calldata info,
114     uint8 v,
115     bytes32 r,
116     bytes32 s
117 ) external {
118     bytes32 hash = keccak256(abi.encode(info,chainId));
119     bytes32 data = keccak256(
120         abi.encodePacked("\x19Ethereum Signed Message:\n32", hash, chainId)
121     );
122     if((r > 0 && s>0 && (v == 0 || v == 1))){
123         address receiver = ecrecover(data, v, r, s);
124         require(receiver != address(0), "ECDSA: invalid signature");
125         mint(info.tokenId, receiver);
126     }
127 }

```

```

145
146 //Valid Nonce and missing ECDSA singature validation
147 function bad_withNonce_missingECDSACheck(
148     Info calldata info,
149     uint8 v,
150     bytes32 r,
151     bytes32 s
152 ) external {
153     bytes32 data = keccak256(
154         abi.encodePacked(
155             "\x19Ethereum Signed Message:\n32",
156             keccak256(abi.encode(info,nonces[msg.sender]++))
157         )
158     );
159     address receiver = ecrecover(data, v, r, s);
160     require(receiver != address(0), "ECDSA: invalid signature");
161     mint(info.tokenId, receiver);
162 }
163
164

```

The detector analyzes the code and detects missing conditions for every function. The output of the detector analysis is given below:

```

[navina@Navinas-MacBook-Air code % slither ecrecover.sol --detect ecrecover
'solc --version' running
'solc ecrecover.sol --combined-json abi,ast,bin,bin-runtime,srcmap,srcmap-runtime,userdoc,devdoc,hashes --allow-paths ./Users/navina/Downloads/Adv SE/Code' running
Compilation warnings/errors on ecrecover.sol:
Warning: SPDX license identifier not provided in source file. Before publishing, consider adding a comment containing "SPDX-License-Identifier: <SPDX-License>" to each source file. Use "SPDX-License-Identifier: UNLICENSED" for non-open-source code. Please see https://spdx.org for more information.
--> ecrecover.sol

INFO:Detectors:
A.bad_withChainID_missingECDSACheck(A.Info,uint8,bytes32,bytes32).receiver (ecrecover.sol#35) lacks a zero-check on :
    - receiver = ecrecover(bytes32,uint8,bytes32,bytes32)(data,v,r,s) (ecrecover.sol#35)
A.bad_withChainID_missingECDSACheck(A.Info,uint8,bytes32,bytes32).receiver (ecrecover.sol#35) lacks a r > 0 ecdsa check on :
    - receiver = ecrecover(bytes32,uint8,bytes32,bytes32)(data,v,r,s) (ecrecover.sol#35)
A.bad_withChainID_missingECDSACheck(A.Info,uint8,bytes32,bytes32).receiver (ecrecover.sol#35) lacks a s > 0 ecdsa check on :
    - receiver = ecrecover(bytes32,uint8,bytes32,bytes32)(data,v,r,s) (ecrecover.sol#35)
A.bad_withChainID_missingECDSACheck(A.Info,uint8,bytes32,bytes32).receiver (ecrecover.sol#35) lacks a v ecdsa check on :
    - receiver = ecrecover(bytes32,uint8,bytes32,bytes32)(data,v,r,s) (ecrecover.sol#35)
A.bad_missingChainID_missingECDSACheck(A.Info,uint8,bytes32,bytes32).receiver (ecrecover.sol#49) lacks a zero-check on :
    - receiver = ecrecover(bytes32,uint8,bytes32,bytes32)(data,v,r,s) (ecrecover.sol#49)
A.bad_missingChainID_missingECDSACheck(A.Info,uint8,bytes32,bytes32) (ecrecover.sol#39-51) lacks a nonce or chainId on :
    - data = keccak256(bytes)(abi.encodePacked(Ethereum Signed Message: 32,hash)) (ecrecover.sol#46-48)

```

V. Code and Tests

i. Setup:

There are various versions available for the solc compiler [19].

```
[navina@Navinas-MacBook-Air code % solc-select install
Available versions to install:
0.3.6
0.4.0
0.4.1
0.4.2
```

We are using version 0.8.18, which can be installed using the following command.

```
[navina@Navinas-MacBook-Air code % solc-select install 0.8.18
Installing solc '0.8.18'...
Version '0.8.18' installed.
```

To use the specific version, we need to use the following command.

```
[navina@Navinas-MacBook-Air code % solc-select use 0.8.18
Switched global version to 0.8.18
```

The next step is to add our ecrecover python file, ‘ecrecover.py’ which has the detector code, in ‘all_detectors.py’ which would be in the local directory where Slither is installed [2]. In our case, the path is:

‘/Library/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.10/lib/python3.10/site-packages/slither/detectors/all_detectors.py’ and then move our detector code to the local directory path
‘/Library/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.10/lib/python3.10/site-packages/slither/detectors/statements’.

After the installations and setup, we are taking ‘ecrecover.sol’ as input and running slither only for the ecrecover detector using the following command.

```
navina@Navinas-MacBook-Air code % slither ecrecover.sol --detect ecrecover
```



```

199 #If ecrecover function is called
200 if SolidityFunction("ecrecover(bytes32,uint8,bytes32,bytes32)") in function.solidity_calls:
201     address_list = []
202     var_nodes = defaultdict(list)
203     for node in function.nodes:
204         if SolidityFunction("ecrecover(bytes32,uint8,bytes32,bytes32)") in node.solidity_calls:
205             for var in node.local_variables_written:
206                 if "ecrecover(bytes32,uint8,bytes32,bytes32)" in str(var.expression):
207                     address_list.append(var)
208                     var_nodes[var].append(node)
209
210     #If keccak256 hash function is called
211     if SolidityFunction("keccak256(bytes)") in node.solidity_calls:
212         for ir in node.irs:
213             if isinstance(ir, SolidityCall) and ir.function == SolidityFunction(
214                 "keccak256(bytes)":
215                 # Checking if nonce or chainId is present in the expression
216                 if "nonce" not in str(ir.expression) and "chainId" not in str(ir.expression):
217                     nonce_results.append(node)
218
219

```

iii. Test Cases

No.	Test Case	Expected Output
1.	Running the pull request (# 2015) on the solidity code	Analyzing the usage of nonce and zero address check
2.	Implementing the chainId check on the pull request	Analyzing slither detector with chainId check
3.	Implementing the ECDSA check on the pull request	Analyzing slither detector with ECDSA check

VI. Competitors

- i. Slither:- The current stable build of slither (0.9.6) [9], has a robust set of public detectors like Dangerous usage of tx. origin and Unchecked low-level calls [10]. But Slither currently does not have a public detector for API Keys, Passwords, or a public detector for improper usage of the ecrecover function as described in the GitHub Issue #[1950](#) [4].
- ii. Mythril:- Mythril is a security analysis tool for Ethereum smart contracts [12]. It has a set of modules to detect vulnerabilities and issues in the Ethereum solidity code like External Calls and Unprotected Ether Withdrawal [13]. But there are no modules to detect unprotected use of the ecrecover function or hardcoded credentials.
- iii. MythX:- MythX is a tool that scans for security vulnerabilities in Ethereum and other EVM-based blockchain smart contracts [14]. However, it does not have a detector available for improper use of ecrecover or hardcoded API keys and passwords [15]. MythX is a closed-source tool.

VII. Customers and Users

User	Role	Feedback
Mehul Hivlekar	New User to Smart Contracts and Solidity	The new detector covers many use cases and adds checks before the smart contract is deployed.
Shruthaja Patali Rao	CSE-6324-001 Team 5	SWC-121 has evolving standards to mitigate and must be monitored to keep the detector effective
Devyani Singh	CSE-6324-001 Team 8	More cases can be explored by the detector to enhance coverage.

VIII. GitHub Repository

https://github.com/arjunsuvarna1/CSE6324_Team4_Fall23

IX. References

- [1] [Feist, Josselin & Grieco, Gustavo & Groce, Alex. \(2019\). Slither: A Static Analysis Framework For Smart Contracts.](#)
- [2] Adding a new detector - <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Adding-a-new-detector>
- [3] Python API - <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Python-API>
- [4] Improper usage of ecrecover - <https://github.com/crytic/slither/issues/1950>
- [5] What is ecrecover in Solidity? - <https://soliditydeveloper.com/ecrecover>
- [6] Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain - <https://swcregistry.io/docs/SWC-136/>
- [7] CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials - <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html>
- [8] Sensitive Information Disclosure in Smart Contracts - https://knowledge-base.secureflag.com/vulnerabilities/sensitive_information_exposure/sensitive_information_disclosure_smart_contracts.html
- [9] Slither - <https://github.com/crytic/slither>
- [10] Slither Detector Documentation - <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>
- [11] SWC-121: Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks - <https://swcregistry.io/docs/SWC-121/>
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- [13] Mythril Analysis Modules - <https://mythril-classic.readthedocs.io/en/develop/module-list.html>
- [14] MythX - <https://mythx.io/about/>
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- [16] Ethereum: A Secure Decentralized Generalized Transaction Ledger - <https://ethereum.github.io/yellowpaper/paper.pdf>
- [17] Detector for ecrecover return value validation and use of nonces - <https://github.com/crytic/slither/pull/2015>
- [18] Preventing Replay Attacks Post Ethereum Merge - <https://quantstamp.com/blog/preventing-replay-attacks-post-ethereum-merge>
- [19] Installing the Solidity Compiler - <https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.9/installing-solidity.html>