# EE 720 Lecture Notes

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# Table of contents

# Preface

These notes were created to support the course *EE720: An Introduction to Number Theory and Cryptography* at IIT Bombay. This course runs in the Electrical Engineering department and is offered to both undergraduate and postgraduate students.

I have taught EE720 three times (2018–2020) using the excellent textbook Introduction to Modern Cryptography by Jonathan Katz and Yehuda Lindell. Time constraints allowed me to cover only a small subset of the book's content. I used other sources to teach topics from abstract algebra in more detail.

These notes are meant to **supplement** the book by Katz & Lindell. They will contain the following.

- Proofs of some results stated without proof in the book.
- Expanded coverage of some material relevant to the course.

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> ⚠ Warning
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> These notes are a work in progress and may contain errors. Please email the author at sarva@ee.iitb.ac.in to report any errors.

# About Me

My name is Saravanan Vijayakumaran. I am an Associate Professor in the Department of Electrical Engineering at IIT Bombay. I am currently (mid 2023) interested in cryptocurrency blockchains and applications of zero-knowledge proofs.

# Chapter 1

# Perfectly Secret Encryption

## 1.1 Proof of Lemma 2.7

**Lemma 1.1.** *Encryption scheme $\Pi = (\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ is perfectly secret if and only if it is perfectly indistinguishable.*

### 1.1.1 Forward Direction

- Suppose a scheme $\Pi = (\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ is perfectly secret.
- Consider an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ who picks two messages $m_0, m_1$ and gives it to $\Pi$.
- $\Pi$ picks a bit $b$ randomly and a key $k$. It gives $c = \mathsf{Enc}_k(m_b)$ to $\mathcal{A}$.
- $\mathcal{A}$ outputs $b'$.
- We want to prove that $\Pr[b = b'] = \frac{1}{2}$. Note abuse of notation; lower case letters for random variables.

#### 1.1.1.1 Deterministic Adversary

- If $\mathcal{A}$ is deterministic, then there exists a partition $C_0, C_1$ of $\mathcal{C}$ such that $\mathcal{C}_0 \cap \mathcal{C}_1 = \emptyset$ and

$$\mathcal{A}(c) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } c \in \mathcal{C}_0, \\ 1 & \text{if } c \in \mathcal{C}_1. \end{cases}$$

Then we have

$$\Pr[b = b'] = \frac{\Pr[\mathcal{A}(C) = 0 \mid b = 0] + \Pr[\mathcal{A}(C) = 1 \mid b = 1]}{2}$$
$$= \frac{\Pr[C \in \mathcal{C}_0 \mid b = 0] + \Pr[C \in \mathcal{C}_1 \mid b = 1]}{2}$$

Consider the first term in the numerator

$$\Pr[C \in \mathcal{C}_0 \mid b = 0] = \Pr[C \in \mathcal{C}_0 \mid M = m_0]$$
$$= \sum_{c \in \mathcal{C}_0} \Pr[C = c \mid M = m_0] = \sum_{c \in \mathcal{C}_0} \Pr[C = c]$$
$$= \Pr[C \in \mathcal{C}_0]$$

Similarly, the second term in the numerator is equal to $\Pr[C \in \mathcal{C}_1]$. Plugging these back into the previous equation, we get

$$\Pr[b = b'] = \frac{\Pr[C \in \mathcal{C}_0] + \Pr[C \in \mathcal{C}_1]}{2} = \frac{1}{2}.$$

#### 1.1.1.2 Probabilistic Adversary (not exclusive from previous case)

Suppose the adversary is probabilistic.

$$\Pr[b = b'] = \frac{\Pr[\mathcal{A}(C) = 0 \mid b = 0] + \Pr[\mathcal{A}(C) = 1 \mid b = 1]}{2}$$

Consider the first term in the numerator.

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}(C) = 0 \mid b = 0] = \sum_{c \in \mathcal{C}} \Pr[\mathcal{A}(C) = 0 \mid b = 0, C = c] \Pr[C = c \mid b = 0]$$
$$= \sum_{c \in \mathcal{C}} \Pr[\mathcal{A}(C) = 0 \mid C = c] \Pr[C = c \mid b = 0]$$
$$= \sum_{c \in \mathcal{C}} \Pr[\mathcal{A}(C) = 0 \mid C = c] \Pr[C = c]$$
$$= \Pr[\mathcal{A}(C) = 0].$$

where the second equality follows because the adversary's decision is independent of the message once we condition on the ciphertext, and the third equality follows from Lemma 2.5 and the assumption of perfect secrecy.

Similarly, we have $\Pr[\mathcal{A}(C) = 1 \mid b = 1] = \Pr[\mathcal{A}(C) = 1]$. Plugging these back into the previous equation, we get

$$\Pr[b = b'] = \frac{\Pr[\mathcal{A}(C) = 0] + \Pr[\mathcal{A}(C) = 1]}{2} = \frac{1}{2}.$$

## 1.1.2   Reverse Direction

Let $A$ be perfect secrecy and $B$ be perfect indistinguishability. We have already proved $A \implies B$.

To prove $B \implies A$, we can prove $A^c \implies B^c$.

Suppose $\Pi$ is not perfectly secret. Then there exist $m, m' \in \mathcal{M}$ and $c_0 \in \mathcal{C}$ such that

$$\Pr[C = c_0 \mid M = m] \neq \Pr[C = c_0 \mid M = m'].$$

WLOG, assume

$$\Pr[C = c_0 \mid M = m] > \Pr[C = c_0 \mid M = m']$$

We need to construct an adversary who can exploit this fact. A natural choice for $m$ and $m'$ is $m_0 = m$ and $m_1 = m'$.

What should the strategy be? Consider the following strategy

$$b' = \mathcal{A}(c) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } c = c_0, \\ \text{random bit} & \text{if } c \neq c_0. \end{cases}$$

We have

$$\Pr[b = b'] = \frac{\Pr[\mathcal{A}(C) = 0 \mid b = 0] + \Pr[\mathcal{A}(C) = 1 \mid b = 1]}{2}.$$

Consider the first term in the numerator.

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pr[\mathcal{A}(C) = 0 \mid b = 0] &= \Pr[\mathcal{A}(C) = 0 \mid b = 0, C = c_0] \Pr[C = c_0 \mid b = 0] \\
&\quad + \Pr[\mathcal{A}(C) = 0 \mid b = 0, C \neq c_0] \Pr[C \neq c_0 \mid b = 0] \\
&= 1 \cdot \Pr[C = c_0 \mid b = 0] + \frac{1}{2} \Pr[C \neq c_0 \mid b = 0].
\end{aligned}$$

Consider the second term in the numerator.

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pr[\mathcal{A}(C) = 1 \mid b = 1] &= \Pr[\mathcal{A}(C) = 1 \mid b = 1, C = c_0] \Pr[C = c_0 \mid b = 1] \\
&\quad + \Pr[\mathcal{A}(C) = 1 \mid b = 1, C \neq c_0] \Pr[C \neq c_0 \mid b = 1] \\
&= \frac{1}{2} \Pr[C \neq c_0 \mid b = 1].
\end{aligned}$$

Combining these two equations, we get

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pr[b = b'] &= \frac{\Pr[C = c_0 \mid b = 0] + \frac{1}{2} \Pr[C \neq c_0 \mid b = 0] + \frac{1}{2} \Pr[C \neq c_0 \mid b = 1]}{2} \\
&> \frac{\frac{1}{2} \Pr[C = c_0 \mid b = 0] + \frac{1}{2} \Pr[C = c_0 \mid b = 1] + \Pr[C \neq c_0 \mid b = 0] + \Pr[C \neq c_0 \mid b = 1]}{2} \\
&= \frac{\Pr[C = c_0] + \Pr[C \neq c_0]}{2} = \frac{1}{2}.
\end{aligned}$$

# Chapter 2

# Private-Key Encryption

## 2.1   Proof that EAV-Security Implies Definition 3.9

Suppose that a private-key encryption scheme $\Pi = (\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ is EAV-secure.

Let $\mathsf{out}_{\mathcal{A}}\left(\mathsf{PrivK}^{\mathsf{eav}}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}(n,b)\right)$ denote the output $b'$ of $\mathcal{A}$ when $m_b$ is encrypted

We want to prove that for all PPT adversaries $\mathcal{A}$ there is a negligible function $\mathsf{negl}$ such that, for all $n$,

$$\left| \Pr\left[\mathsf{out}_{\mathcal{A}}\left(\mathsf{PrivK}^{\mathsf{eav}}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}(n,0)\right) = 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{out}_{\mathcal{A}}\left(\mathsf{PrivK}^{\mathsf{eav}}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}(n,1)\right) = 1\right] \right| \leq \mathsf{negl}(n). \qquad (2.1)$$

Since $\Pi$ is EAV-secure, we have $\Pr\left[\mathsf{PrivK}^{\mathsf{eav}}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}(n) = 1\right] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \mathsf{negl}(n)$. It follows that

$$\begin{aligned}
&\Pr\left[\mathsf{PrivK}^{\mathsf{eav}}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}(n) = 1\right] \\
&= \Pr[b' = b] \\
&= \frac{\Pr[b' = 0 \mid b = 0] + \Pr[b' = 1 \mid b = 1]}{2} \\
&= \frac{\Pr\left[\mathsf{out}_{\mathcal{A}}\left(\mathsf{PrivK}^{\mathsf{eav}}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}(n,0)\right) = 0\right] + \Pr\left[\mathsf{out}_{\mathcal{A}}\left(\mathsf{PrivK}^{\mathsf{eav}}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}(n,1)\right) = 1\right]}{2} \\
&= \frac{1 - \Pr\left[\mathsf{out}_{\mathcal{A}}\left(\mathsf{PrivK}^{\mathsf{eav}}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}(n,0)\right) = 1\right] + \Pr\left[\mathsf{out}_{\mathcal{A}}\left(\mathsf{PrivK}^{\mathsf{eav}}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}(n,1)\right) = 1\right]}{2} \\
&\leq \frac{1}{2} + \mathsf{negl}(n),
\end{aligned}$$

The final inequality gives us

$$\Pr\left[\mathsf{out}_{\mathcal{A}}\left(\mathsf{PrivK}^{\mathsf{eav}}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}(n,1)\right)=1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{out}_{\mathcal{A}}\left(\mathsf{PrivK}^{\mathsf{eav}}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}(n,0)\right)=1\right] \leq \mathsf{negl}(n).$$

But the result in Equation 2.1 has an absolute value on the left hand side. So if we can also show that

$$\Pr\left[\mathsf{out}_{\mathcal{A}}\left(\mathsf{PrivK}^{\mathsf{eav}}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}(n,0)\right)=1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{out}_{\mathcal{A}}\left(\mathsf{PrivK}^{\mathsf{eav}}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}(n,1)\right)=1\right] \leq \mathsf{negl}(n),$$

then we will be done.

**Claim**: If $\Pi = (\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ is EAV-secure, then for any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$ the following must hold: $\Pr\left[\mathsf{PrivK}^{\mathsf{eav}}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}(n)=1\right] \geq \frac{1}{2} - \mathsf{negl}(n)$.

In other words, it is not possible for a PPT adversary to fail with probability that is too far away from $\frac{1}{2}$. Let us rearrange the terms in our claim.

$$\Pr\left[\mathsf{PrivK}^{\mathsf{eav}}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}(n)=1\right] \geq \frac{1}{2} - \mathsf{negl}(n)$$

$$\Longleftrightarrow \frac{1}{2} - \Pr\left[\mathsf{PrivK}^{\mathsf{eav}}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}(n)=1\right] \leq \mathsf{negl}(n)$$

We will prove our claim by contradiction. Suppose that the function $\frac{1}{2} - \Pr\left[\mathsf{PrivK}^{\mathsf{eav}}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}(n)=1\right]$ is not negligible. Then there is an adversary $\mathcal{A}'$ and a positive polynomial $p(n)$ such that

$$\frac{1}{2} - \Pr\left[\mathsf{PrivK}^{\mathsf{eav}}_{\mathcal{A}',\Pi}(n)=1\right] > \frac{1}{p(n)}$$

for infinitely many $n$. This implies that

$$\Pr[b'=b] = \Pr\left[\mathsf{PrivK}^{\mathsf{eav}}_{\mathcal{A}',\Pi}(n)=1\right] < \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{p(n)}$$

for infinitely many $n$, where $b'$ is the output of $\mathcal{A}'$ and $b$ is the bit chosen in the experiment.

Since $\mathcal{A}'$ is good at failing in the experiment, flipping the output of $\mathcal{A}'$ will give us an adversary that will succeed with a probability that is significantly better than $\frac{1}{2}$.

Consider an adversary $\mathcal{A}''$ who uses $\mathcal{A}'$ as a subroutine and outputs the opposite of whatever $\mathcal{A}'$ outputs.

$$b'' = \mathcal{A}''(c) = 1 - \mathcal{A}'(c) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } b' = 1, \\ 1 & \text{if } b' = 0. \end{cases}$$

If $\mathcal{A}'$ is PPT, then $\mathcal{A}''$ is also PPT. Then we have

$$\Pr[b'' = b] = \Pr[b' \neq b] = 1 - \Pr[b' = b]$$

$$= 1 - \Pr[b' = b] > 1 - \left(\frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{p(n)}\right)$$

$$= \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{p(n)}$$

for infinitely many $n$. This is a contradiction. Hence our claim must be true.

We then have

$$\frac{1}{2} - \Pr\left[\mathsf{PrivK}^{\mathsf{eav}}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}(n) = 1\right] \leq \mathsf{negl}(n)$$

$$\iff \frac{1}{2} - \Pr\left[b' = b\right] \leq \mathsf{negl}(n)$$

$$\iff \frac{1 - \Pr[b' = 0 \mid b = 0] - \Pr[b' = 1 \mid b = 1]}{2} \leq \mathsf{negl}(n)$$

$$\iff \frac{\Pr[b' = 1 \mid b = 0] - \Pr[b' = 1 \mid b = 1]}{2} \leq \mathsf{negl}(n)$$

$$\iff \Pr[b' = 1 \mid b = 0] - \Pr[b' = 1 \mid b = 1] \leq 2\mathsf{negl}(n)$$

$$\iff \Pr\left[\mathsf{out}_{\mathcal{A}}\left(\mathsf{PrivK}^{\mathsf{eav}}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}(n,0)\right) = 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{out}_{\mathcal{A}}\left(\mathsf{PrivK}^{\mathsf{eav}}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}(n,1)\right) = 1\right] \leq 2\mathsf{negl}(n).$$

As $2\mathsf{negl}(n)$ is also negligible, we have the other inequality we need to prove that

$$\left|\Pr\left[\mathsf{out}_{\mathcal{A}}\left(\mathsf{PrivK}^{\mathsf{eav}}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}(n,0)\right) = 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{out}_{\mathcal{A}}\left(\mathsf{PrivK}^{\mathsf{eav}}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}(n,1)\right) = 1\right]\right| \leq \mathsf{negl}(n).$$