Security Best Practices for Amazon EKS

Hoseok Seo (he/him)
Solutions Architect




"Security is everyone's job."

Werner Vogel
AWS CTO



Containers flow







What we already know








What we already know











Containers-specific areas





Audit & forensics





Audit & forensics

Image security

- Scan your images for vulnerabilities (CVEs)
 - ECR Basic Scanning (OS packages)
 - ECR enhanced scanning (OS and programming packages)



Inspector container image findings






Image security

- Scan your images for vulnerabilities (CVEs)
 - ECR Basic Scanning (OS packages)
 - ECR enhanced scanning (OS and programming packages)
- Minimize attack surface
 - Use multi stage build
 - Create images from scratch





Image security

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 - ECR enhanced scanning (OS and programming packages)
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 - Create images from scratch
- Run the application as a non-root user
 - Lint your Dockerfiles with <u>Dockle</u> or <u>Hadolint</u>



Lint Dockerfiles

```
FROM alpine:3.16
LABEL maintainer="NGINX Docker Maintainers <docker-maint@nginx.com>"
ENV NGINX_VERSION 1.22.0
ENV PKG_RELEASE 1
RUN set -x \
# create nginx user/group first, to be consistent throughout docker variants
   && addaroup -a 101 -S nainx \
    && adduser -S -D -H -u 101 -h /var/cache/nginx -s /sbin/nologin -G nginx -g nginx nginx \
    && apkArch="$(cat /etc/apk/arch)" \
    && nainxPackages=" \
        nginx=${NGINX_VERSION}-r${PKG_RELEASE} \
# install prerequisites for public key and pkg-oss checks
    && apk add --no-cache --virtual .checksum-deps \
        openssl \
    && case "$apkArch" in \
        x86_641aarch64) \
# arches officially built by upstream
           set -x \
           && KEY_SHA512="e7fa8303923d9b95db37a77ad46c68fd4755ff935d0a534d26eba83de193c76166c68bfe7f65471bf8881004ef4aa6df3e34689c305662750c0172fca5d8552a *stdin" \
           && wget -0 /tmp/nginx_signing.rsa.pub https://nginx.org/keys/nginx_signing.rsa.pub \
           && if [ "$(openssl rsa -pubin -in /tmp/nginx_signing.rsa.pub -text -noout | openssl sha512 -r)" = "$KEY_SHA512" ]; then \
                echo "key verification succeeded!"; \
               mv /tmp/nginx_signing.rsa.pub /etc/apk/keys/; \
                echo "key verification failed!"; \
                exit 1: \
           && apk add -X "https://nginx.org/packages/alpine/v$(egrep -o '^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+' /etc/alpine-release)/main" --no-cache $nginxPackages \
        / (*
```

Image security

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 - Create images from scratch
- Run the application as a non-root user
 - Lint your Dockerfiles with <u>Dockle</u> or <u>Hadolint</u>
- "Defang" your containers
 - Remove files with the SETUID and SETGID bits from image




Image security - dive

De-fang your images

- Remove files with the SETUID and SETGID bits from the image
- Dive (https://github.com/wagoodman/dive)







Image security

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- Use endpoint policies and private endpoints with Elastic Container Registry



VPC endpoint policy

VPC > Endpoints > Create endpoint Create endpoint Info There are three types of VPC endpoints - Interface endpoints, Gateway Load Balancer endpoints, and Gateway endpoints. Interface endpoints and Gateway Load Balancer endpoints are powered by AWS PrivateLink, and use an Elastic Network Interface (ENI) as an entry point for traffic destined to the service. Interface endpoints are typically accessed using the public or private DNS name associated with the service, while Gateway endpoints and Gateway Load Balancer endpoints serve as a target for a route in your route table for traffic destined for the service. **Endpoint settings** Name tag - optional Creates a tag with a key of 'Name' and a value that you specify. my-endpoint-01 Service category Select the service category AWS services PrivateLink Ready partner services Services provided by Amazon Services with an AWS Service Ready designation AWS Marketplace services Other endpoint services Services that you've purchased through AWS Marketplace Find services shared with you by service name Services (1/5) Q Filter services search: com.amazonaws.ap-northeast-2.s3 X Clear filters search: ecr. X Service Name Owner Type com.amazonaws.ap-northeast-2.ecr.api Interface amazon Interface com.amazonaws.ap-northeast-2.ecr.dkr amazon com.amazonaws.ap-northeast-2.s3 amazon Gateway com.amazonaws.ap-northeast-2.s3 Interface amazon com.amazonaws.ap-northeast-2.s3-outposts amazon Interface

Create an endpoint policy for your Amazon ECR VPC endpoints


A VPC endpoint policy is an IAM resource policy that you attach to an endpoint when you create or modify the endpoint. If you don't attach a policy when you create an endpoint, AWS attaches a default policy for you that allows full access to the service. An endpoint policy doesn't override or replace IAM user policies or service-specific policies. It's a separate policy for controlling access from the endpoint to the specified service. Endpoint policies must be written in JSON format. For more information, see Controlling Access to Services with VPC Endpoints in the Amazon VPC User Guide.

We recommend creating a single IAM resource policy and attaching it to both of the Amazon ECR VPC endpoints.

The following is an example of an endpoint policy for Amazon ECR. This policy enables a specific IAM role to pull images from Amazon ECR.

The following endpoint policy example prevents a specified repository from being deleted.









- Use an OS that is optimized for running containers
 - Amazon EKS-optimized AL2 or <u>Bottlerocket</u>
- Upgrade to latest AMIs
 - Use Managed Node Group for rolling deployment




Infrastructure security - AMI








Infrastructure security - Managed Node Group





- Use an OS that is optimized for running containers
 - Amazon EKS-optimized AL2 or <u>Bottlerocket</u>
- Upgrade to latest AMIs
 - Use Managed Node Group for rolling deployment
- Deploy workers onto private subnets




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- Deploy workers onto private subnets
- Minimize and audit host access
 - AWS Systems Manager, Session Manager



- Use an OS that is optimized for running containers
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 - Use Managed Node Group for rolling deployment
- Deploy workers onto private subnets
- Minimize and audit host access
 - AWS Systems Manager, Session Manager
- Run kube-bench to continually assess alignment with Amazon EKS CIS benchmarks







Audit & forensics

IAM roles for service accounts

No IRSA


Worker node

Pod
a

Pod
b

Pod
n

IRSA configured






Use IAM roles for service accounts

Map IAM roles to Kubernetes service accounts

Enable least privilege for Kubernetes pods

Natively supported by Amazon EKS and available as open source



Pod and runtime security

Implement IRSA (IAM roles for service accounts)

• Run dynamic scans - Falco, Prisma Twistlock, Aqua, etc.



Pod and runtime security - Falco


```
[ec2-user@ip-10-0-1-211 wordpress]$ kubectl get pods
                                           RESTARTS
                          READY
                                 STATUS
falco-25rvh
                          1/1
                                           2
                                                       4d10h
                                  Runnina
falco-4w2ab
                          1/1
                                  Running
                                           1
                                                       4d10h
falco-nnk4f
                          1/1
                                  Runnina
                                                       4d10h
falco-rlf7i
                          1/1
                                  Runnina 2
                                                       4d10h
falco-wsv7d
                          1/1
                                  Running 1
                                                       4d10h
fluentbit-29sz8
                          1/1
                                                       4d10h
                                  Running
fluentbit-6nsw9
                          1/1
                                  Running
                                                       4d10h
fluentbit-9smna
                          1/1
                                  Runnina
                                                       4d10h
fluentbit-lxx4z
                          1/1
                                  Running 1
                                                       4d10h
fluentbit-rk45t
                          1/1
                                                       4d10h
                                  Runnina
nginx2-78848c9dcb-5ssrm
                         1/1
                                                       4d10h
                                  Runnina
nginx2-78848c9dcb-dsnch
                         1/1
                                                       4d10h
                                  Runnina
nginx2-78848c9dcb-r7z64
                         1/1
                                  Running 1
                                                       4d11h
```

```
[ec2-user@ip-10-0-1-211 wordpress]$ kubectl exec -it nginx2-78848c9dcb-5ssrm -- /bin/sh
# touch /etc/hacker
# cd /bin/; mkdir tools
# cat /etc/shadow > /dev/null 2>&1
```

```
2021-07-02T10:39:34.401+09:00
                                                             {"log":"01:39:34.377084653: Notice A shell was spawned in a container with an attached terminal (user=root user_loginuid=-1 k8s.pod=nginx2-78848c9dcb-5ssrm container=b62164264cee shell=sh parent=runc cmdline=sh terminal=34.
      "log": "01:39:34.377084653: Notice A shell was spawned in a container with an attached terminal (user=root user_loginuid=-1 k8s.ns=default k8s.pod=nginx2-78848c9dcb-5ssrm container=b62164264cee shell=sh parent=runc cmdline=sh terminal=34816
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  Copy
container_id=b62164264cee image=nginx) k8s.ns=default k8s.pod=nginx2-78848c9dcb-5ssrm container=b62164264cee\n".
       "stream": "stdout"
2021-07-02T10:39:45.128+09:00
                                                             {"log":"01:39:45.118927771: Error File below /etc opened for writing (user=root user_loginuid=-1 command=touch /etc/hacker parent=sh pcmdline=sh file=/etc/hacker program=touch gparent=\u003cNA\u003e ggparent=\u003cNA\u003e ggparent=\u003cNA\u003e ggparent=\u00.
      "loa": "01:39:45.118927771; Error File below /etc opened for writing (user=root user_loginuid=-1 command=touch /etc/hacker program=touch apparent=<NA> apparent=<NA> apparent=<NA> apparent=<NA> container_id=b62164264cee
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  Copy
image=nginx) k8s.ns=default k8s.pod=nginx2-78848c9dcb-5ssrm container=b62164264cee k8s.ns=default k8s.pod=nginx2-78848c9dcb-5ssrm container=b62164264cee\n",
2021-07-02T10:41:03.340+09:00
                                                             {"log":"01:41:03.323755803: Error Directory below known binary directory created (user=root user_loginuid=-1 command=mkdir tools directory=/bin/tools container_id=b62164264cee image=nginx) k8s.ns=default k8s.pod=nginx2-78848c9dcb-5ssrm c
       "loa": "01:41:03.323755803; Error Directory below known binary directory created (user=root user_loginuid=-1 command=mkdir tools directory=/bin/tools container_id=b62164264cee image=nginx) k8s.ns=default k8s.pod=nginx2-78848c9dcb-5ssrm
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  Copy
container=b62164264cee k8s.ns=default k8s.pod=nginx2-78848c9dcb-5ssrm container=b62164264cee\n".
       "stream": "stdout"
2021-07-02T10:41:32.865+09:00
                                                             {"log":"01:41:32.840168387: Warning Sensitive file opened for reading by non-trusted program (user=root user_loginuid=-1 program=cat command=cat /etc/shadow file=/etc/shadow parent=sh gparent=\u003cNA\u003e ggparent=\u003cNA\u003e ggparent=\u003c
      "log": "01:41:32.840168387: Warning Sensitive file opened for reading by non-trusted program (user=root user_loginuid=-1 program=cat /etc/shadow file=/etc/shadow parent=sh gparent=<NA> gggparent=<NA> gggparent=<NA> container_id=b62164264cee
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  Copy
image=nginx) k8s.ns=default k8s.pod=nginx2-78848c9dcb-5ssrm container=b62164264cee k8s.ns=default k8s.pod=nginx2-78848c9dcb-5ssrm container=b62164264cee\n".
       "stream": "stdout"
```



Pod and runtime security - Polaris by Fairwinds





Pod and runtime security

Implement IRSA (IAM roles for service accounts)

Run dynamic scans - Falco, Prisma Twistlock, Aqua, etc.

- Use Pod Security Standards or Policy as code
 - Deny privileged escalation
 - Deny running as root
 - Drop Linux capabilities
 - Implement OPA with Gatekeeper
 - Use other tools like Kyverno




Pod and runtime security - Container and pods

- Dedicate service account for each application
- Do not allow privileged escalation
- Containers must be required to run as non-root
- Restrict the containers that can run as privileged
- Drop capabilities default capabilities are not as strict as you think

```
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: security-pod
spec:
  serviceAccountName: sec-pod
  containers:
  - name: my-pod
    image: node
    securityContext:
      allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
      runAsUser: 1000
      runAsNonRoot: true
      privileged: false
      capabilities:
        drop:
          all
```







Audit & forensics


Network security

• Use security groups for pods to restrict traffic to AWS resources




Securing Pods with EC2 Security Groups

- Worker node and all its Pods share the same security group(s) attached to the primary ENI
- Assign each Pod to a dedicated ENI with its own separate set of security groups(s)



Worker Node 10.0.11.205





RDS Security Group

Туре	Protocol	Ports	Source
PostgreSQL	TCP	5432	sg-ууууууу (POD)

API Extension with new CRD

```
apiVersion: vpcresources.k8s.aws/v1beta1
kind: SecurityGroupPolicy
metadata:
   name: RDSClient
spec:
   serviceAccountSelector:
      matchLabels:
      role: RDSClient
securityGroups:
      groupIds:
      - sg-yyyyyy
```

Network security


Use security groups for pods to restrict traffic to AWS resources

Use k8s network policies to restrict traffic within cluster



Network policy example


Initial state without any network policy in effect





Network policy: Ingress rule

Network policy to allow traffic to ingress into Backend pods from Frontend pods



Network security


Use security groups for pods to restrict traffic to AWS resources

- Use k8s network policies to restrict traffic within cluster
 - Enforce using network policy engine like Calico

- Encryption in transit
 - Terminate HTTPS external traffic at ELB
 - Use service mesh like App Mesh for mTLS service-service communication








Auditing and forensics

- Enable control plane logs
- Stream logs from containers to external log aggregator
- Periodically audit control plane and AWS CloudTrail logs for suspicious activity
- Immediately isolate pods you suspect have been compromised
 - Remove/change labels
 - Create network policy to isolate the pod
- Cordon the instance (if necessary)
 - Capture volatile artifacts on the worker node, e.g., memory, disk, etc.



EKS security best practices guide



https://aws.github.io/aws-eks-best-practices/security/docs/

securing your EKS clusters. The topics do not need to be read in a particular order



Thank you!

