

CORE STUDY – WORLD WAR ONE

1. WAR ON THE WESTERN FRONT - 8 MARKERS

1.1. REASONS FOR STALEMATE

Explain the reasons for stalemate on the Western Front

- **Failed implementation of the Schlieffen Plan**
- i. Based on strict tactical assumptions that never came to fruition (contrast assumptions with prevailing realities)
 - a. Russia wouldn't mobilise
 - b. France defeat in 6 weeks
 - c. Britain inactive
 - d. Strong 7:1 right flank
- ii. Realities:
 - a. Bottleneck = Belgian (13 days at Liege) + BEF resistance (125,000) at Mons
 - b. Russia mobilised
 - c. Right flank only 3:1
 - d. Failure of rail networks
 - e. Forced the plan's subsequent modification
- **Allied Offensive War of Movement unsuitable – technology**
- i. Advances in defensive technology in particular the machine gun and artillery advantaged those defending fortified positions.
 - a. Rendered cavalry and infantry charges largely ineffective
 - b. Despite this, Allied Generals + “spirit of the offensive” remained central to the strategy.
 - i. ‘Elan’ of the soldiers would be enough - August 1914 Battle of the Ardennes = French casualties
- **‘Race for the Sea’**
- i. Created near impenetrable trench lines b/w English Channel and Swiss Frontier
- ii. Battle of Ypres

1.2. THE NATURE OF TRENCH WARFARE AND LIFE IN THE TRENCHES FOR SOLDIERS

Outline how the experiences of trench warfare changed soldiers' attitudes to the war over time. (Link to 1.4)

- **Role of Trenches**
- i. Late 1914/Early 1915 – trenches seen as a temporary expedients.
 - a. Improve over time
 - b. German trenches were better developed than Allied.
- ii. Artillery was used to ‘soften up’ enemy trenches before an attack e.g. the Somme (July 1916) → week long bombardment
- iii. Machine Guns were the most important weapon in modern, defensive warfare → inflicted heavy casualties.
- **Conditions in Trenches**
- i. Mud – Passchendaele (July 1917)
- ii. Sickness and Disease: Transmitted by lice and rats.
- iii. Cold/Frostbite
- iv. Shellshock: Constant artillery fire, demoralising.
- v. Constant Risk of Death: Enemy snipers, going over the top, no-mans land, machine gun fire, artillery.

1.3. STRATEGIES AND TACTICS TO BREAK STALEMATE

Outline the strategies and tactics used to break the stalemate on the Western Front.

Each side attempted to break, but the return of Offensive movement only came with improved technology and US entrance

- **Battles**
 - i. The Somme (July 1916)
 - a. General Haig wanted to break through the German lines
 - b. Artillery bombardment - 1.6 million shells.
 - c. Failed to soften up well fortified German trenches → 1 million Allied Casualties
 - ii. Passchendaele (July 1917)
 - a. Aimed to wear down the German army.
 - b. Achieved some territorial gains, however these gains provided no opportunity for further advance.
- **Tactics**
 - i. Gas (from 1915)
 - a. Attempted to clear out enemy trenches, however became less effective as more sophisticated gas masks were introduced by 1918.
 - b. Still a useful psychological weapon.
 - ii. Attempts to negate effect of No Man's Land
 - a. FR: Joffre offense – reduce the threat of No Man's Land (1915 onwards)
 - b. GR: Storm-trooper actions – small, highly mobilised units
 - c. BR: Bite and Hold
 - iii. Tanks
 - a. Initially unreliable in 1916.
 - b. However the technology would improve. Tanks were very effective at crossing no-mans land and enemy trenches
 - c. En-masse tank tactics effective = Battle of Cambrai Nov 1917
 - d. Tanks were essential in breaking the stalemate → over 600 used in Allied counteroffensive → allowed the war of movement
 - iv. Co-ordinated Attack/Creeping Barrage
 - a. July 1918 Battle of Hamel – General Monash
 - b. Creeping barrage of tanks supported by infantry, artillery, air cover, light machine guns and chlorine gas
- **Other**
 - i. Dardanelles Campaign (1915)
 - a. Soft underbelly of the Central Powers
 - b. Aimed to knock out Turkey but failed by December 1915
 - ii. Naval Warfare
 - a. Allies through a naval blockade of Germany → aimed to weaken the homefront so it could no longer support the war.
 - b. Germany counter = unrestricted submarine warfare (U-boats) from 1916.
 - iii. Diplomatic attempts e.g. Stockholm Conference 1917
- **Spring Offensive (March 1918) + Counter-Offensive**
 - i. Ludendorff attempted to achieve victory before the full force of the arriving American support would be felt.
 - ii. Made significant territorial gains (70km from Paris) however Ludendorff could not sustain these gains, the army had advanced unevenly and formed a large, indefensible salient.

- iii. 1 million casualties. Left Germans in a weak position to face the Allied counteroffensive.

1.4. CHANGING ATTITUDES OF SOLDIERS TO THE WAR OVER TIME

Outline the variety of attitudes to the war and how they changed over time in Britain and Germany.

While initially the response was overwhelmingly positive, soldiers from both sides of the war underwent incredible emotional and psychological turmoil. This volatility remained until the end of the war in 1918.

- **1914**
 - i. Overwhelmingly positive. Demonstrated in Britain by huge sign-ups = ‘Spirit of 1914’
 - ii. Propaganda most effective now, because it had nothing negative to work against it
 - iii. Belief war would be over by Christmas, truce etc.
- **1916**
 - i. War weariness – psychological trauma etc.
 - ii. Huge battles at Verdun + Somme (600,000 casualties) = war futility
 - iii. In Britain, made worse by conscription in May
 - iv. Gas – 2nd Ypres
- **1917**
 - i. Fluctuated – French mutinies (Nivelle)
 - ii. German blockade = defeatism
 - iii. American declaration of war boosts morale, promises quick resolution – Germans morale down
- **1918**
 - i. Eastern Front goes to Germany – Russian withdrawal – allies down, Germans up
 - ii. Spring Offensive initially very successful
 - iii. Total breakdown of German morale when it fails + counter-offensive begins → Kiel Mutiny in November

2. HOMEFRONTS IN BRITAIN AND GERMANY - 8 MARKERS

2.1. TOTAL WAR AND ITS SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACT ON CIVILIANS

Discuss the impact of total war on civilians during WWI

- i. Total War: Instance in which the social, political and economic agenda of a country shifts in a way that its resources may be directed to winning a war of attrition – development of two fronts (Battle and Home)
 - **Germany**
- iii. Managed to maintain two-front war given their preparation (e.g. 50% of raw materials already imported)
- iv. Authoritarian state meant less radical as control of civilian life increased
- v. War Food Office (1916) and Imperial Grain Office (1915) imposed restrictions + introduction of Ersatz goods to combat food shortages (e.g. Turnip Winter)
- vi. 1916 Supreme War Office created – direct control of labour, manufacturing and transport
- vii. Hindenburg Program from Aug 1916 – huge pressures on agricultural production to fund the war
- viii. Allied blockade
 - **Britain**
- ii. Unlike Germany, Did not engage in total war until mid-1915

- iii. Nonetheless, pretext laid by Defence of the Realm Act DORA in 1914
- iv. Nationalised coal mines, enforced curfew, increased police powers
- v. Encouraged to limit food consumption from 1916 onward – not as drastic famine as Gr
- vi. Requisition of factories + working hours increased – munitions shortage

2.2. RECRUITMENT, CONSCRIPTION, CENSORSHIP AND PROPAGANDA

Recruitment and Conscription

- **Britain**
 - i. BEF comparatively small
 - ii. War was an attractive proposition initially – employment, wage, patriotism, adventure etc.
 - iii. Jan 1915 1.3m men had voluntarily enlisted
 - iv. The need for conscription became apparent after recruitment numbers fell parallel to enthusiasm
 - v. May 1916- Second Military Service Act – men 18-40 could be called up
 - vi. Conscientious objectors lacking justification of exemption were imprisoned
- **Germany**
 - iv. Militaristic country – large standing army + reserve forces
 - v. Conscription in place, unnecessary due to initial enthusiasm
 - vi. Auxiliary Services Act of 1916 allowed gov to direct men to service where need be

Censorship and Propaganda

- i. Used together to maintain support for war (boost morale + justify war + exclude negative depictions of war = distorted depiction of reality)
- **Britain**
 - i. Ministry of Information from 1918 onwards
 - ii. Aimed to;
 - Encourage recruitment prior to conscription – patriotism
 - Encourage support for war – total war
 - Boost morale – inspiring language
 - Anti-German sentiment – barbaric, inhumane etc.
 - Convey info – save food etc.
 - Targets: young men, women, families
 - iii. Censorship employed under DORA using press
- **Germany**
 - i. Justified war + demonised Brits
 - ii. Didn't really need to boost recruitment at any point
 - iii. Tried to boost morale + glorify wins – ineffective due to elitist imagery
 - iv. C'ship - News from the front heavily censored

2.3. ATTITUDES TO THE WAR IN BR + GR

Outline the variety of attitudes to the war and how they changed over time in Britain and Germany.

Early stages (1914-15)

- **Britain**
 - i. Despite minor opposition, the majority of people supported the war
 - ii. This was hyperbolised by media portrayal
 - iii. Britain's home front further away from battlefield, navy maintained food supplies in early years
 - iv. Lloyd George negotiated with unions to control food prices + passed Rent Restrictions Bill in 1915
- **Germany**
 - i. Paralleled by the 'spirit of 1914' in Germany
 - ii. Propaganda convinced public that Gr was not an aggressor – was a defensive war
 - iii. Burgfrieden politics in the Reichstag ensured minimal volatility among working class

Growth of Opposition (1916-17)

- **Britain**
 - i. Public uncertainty emerged due to news of unprecedented losses (esp. at Somme in mid-late 1916)
 - ii. Coupled with introduction of conscription in May 1916 – polarised public opinion w/ opposition (despite this weren't many conscientious objectors)
 - iii. Unrestricted submarine warfare from Germans starting in Feb 17 = food shortages e.g. bread
 - iv. Voiced through media, free press + intellectual expression (e.g. poetry – Owen)
- **Germany**
 - i. Far more prone to effects of total war – more rapid emergence of war weariness
 - ii. Steady economic decline + British blockage from 1914 + 'turnip winter' of 1916 = food shortages
 - iii. Rising inflation + increased demands on working class = **industrial strikes (e.g. Jan 18 1 mil)**
 - iv. Left wing supported peace – largely ignored by still caused polarisation of opinion

2.4. IMPACT OF WAR ON WOMEN'S LIVES

Explain the role of World War One in the change of the role of women in Britain

- i. While very significant, not as radical as is purported
- ii. Postponed suffragette movement
- iii. **Employment rose from 3.2m to 4.8m** between 14 and 18
- iv. Mass unemployment at outbreak of war
- v. July 1915 began war work – role as Munitionettes – dangerous work, long hours, little pay – by July 18, **80% of Br munitions produced by women**
- vi. Women's Land Army in 1917 + worked as nurses, cooks, clerks and mechanics on front line
- vii. Long term – value in society + change in conservative dress, expectations etc. + accelerate suffragette movement post WWI

3. TURNING POINTS - 8 MARKERS

Discuss the impact of the US entry and Russian withdrawal as turning points in the War

3.1. US ENTRANCE

- i. Naval blockade meant they traded with Allies, therefore relations were better with allies
 - a. 1/3 British shells made in North America
- ii. By 1917, however, when Americans declared war, the Allies were no longer dependent on the US for their resources
- iii. Troops impact was NOT significant until 1918 when they actually fought
 - a. Did incur huge morale boost
 - b. American Navy immediate impact → the convoy system → ensured that the British homefront did not collapse before US troops arrived.
- iv. Significant at Second Battle of Marne which ended Spring Offensive + started Counter-Offensive
 - a. September 1918 Battle of Saint Mihiel where the combined force of three hundred thousand American soldiers and one hundred thousand French soldiers triumphed over the Germans.

3.2. RUSSIAN WITHDRAWAL

- i. Russia withdraws March 1918 – Treaty of Brest-Litovsk
- ii. Germany is no longer fighting a war on two fronts.
- iii. Allows Ludendorff to transfer a large number of troops and resources to the Western Front for the Spring Offensive.
 - a. Nov 1917: 150 German Divisions in the West
 - b. March 1918: 192 Divisions in the West.
 - c. However, not taken advantage of quickly enough.

4. ALLIED VICTORY - 8 MARKERS

4.1. REASONS FOR ALLIED VICTORY AND GERMAN COLLAPSE

Outline reasons for the Allied victory and German collapse in 1918.

Frame around Allied victory/German collapse depending on Question

By the time the Germans sued for peace in late 1918, the Allies had successfully capitalised on the failure of German tactics in the Spring Offensive, as well as the involvement of the US in order to obtain decisive victory.

- **Failure of Spring Offensive**
 - i. Indefensible salient
 - ii. Not enough troops
- **Rapid decline of German homefront**
 - i. Many of the gains could never be adequately supported
 - a. Blockade
 - ii. Logistical flow better for Allies → convoys, etc.
- **Arrival of the US**
 - i. Troops + morale made the Allies an effective fighting force. They basically stopped spring offensive at Second Battle of the Marne + numbers important
 - a. Amiens 'black day of the German army'
 - b. Failure to capitalise on Russian withdrawal fast enough
- **Leadership**

- i. Allies now unified under Foch, could co-ordinate more effectively. Flexible defence, etc. → attacks on weak points
- ii. July 1918 Battle of Hamel. General Monash's coordination of a creeping barrage of tanks supported by infantry, artillery, air cover, light machine guns and chlorine gas
 - **Tanks + supplies (US)**
 - i. Battle of Cambrai 1917
 - ii. 600 tanks in counter-offensive meant that attrition didn't happen again. Also technologically better

4.2 THE ROLES AND DIFFERENCING GOALS OF THE BIG THREE IN CREATING THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

Explain the roles and differing goals of Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Wilson in creating the Treaty of Versailles

As a consequence of the conflicting aims of Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Wilson, the result at Versailles was a major compromise between these aims.

- **Clemenceau**
 - i. Punitive
 - ii. Two German invasions in 40 years – don't want Germany to be a threat
 - iii. Believed Germans should be economically crippled
 - iv. Goals:
 - a. Permanently weaken Gr
 - b. Germany to cover the cost of all damage to French property, war pensions and war debts.
 - c. Wanted the Rhineland and A-L
- **Lloyd-George**
 - i. The Pragmatist
 - ii. He tried to negotiate the divergent views of Clemenceau and Wilson
 - iii. Goals:
 - a. Believed Germans should pay, but only within their means so they could rebuild their economy/not fall to communism
 - b. Wanted them to pay for physical damage + war pensions
- **Wilson**
 - i. Idealistic – misguided vision due to misconceptions and misunderstandings of European diplomatic tradition
 - a. 14 point plan was dodgy
 - ii. Goals:
 - a. Insisted on the 'national self-determination of peoples'
 - b. Believed that Germany should pay based on their capacity to do so (they did want the war debt from Britain to be paid
 - i. Like Lloyd George, did not want Gr eco to collapse
- **Results**
 - i. France was placated when both others guaranteed military support to France in event of invasion
 - ii. Poland was given Danzig to have free access to the Sea
 - iii. League of Nations established in line with Wilson's idealistic diplomatic outlook

HO CHI MINH

RISE TO PROMINENCE

Describe the rise to prominence of the personality you have studied.

To 1954?

P1: Historical context/Background

- Province
- Confucian + Mother + sister
- Father + Karnow quote
- Phan Boi
- Quoc Hoc

P2: Experiences abroad + in China

- Anti-colonialism – Lenin + Africa
- Socialism in Soviet Union + France – Le Paria, FCP
- Foundations – Uni for PE, communist cells
- Comintern in China – skills + Mao, Zhao
- Road to Revo in 26 – seminal
- Student in cadre program – Asian + Bolshevism
- Brocheux quote

P3: Formation of the ICP

- United factions = VCP then ICP (shaped by ^)
- Failed nationalists
- Duiker quote + 2 stage revo
- Rural support – nationalism + literacy
- Name change – Chinese influence + broad appeal

P4: Development of Viet Minh + Propaganda Units

- VM in May 41 as a united front
- Propaganda units – language, education, indoctrination in N.T
- US OSS Team trains + supplies VM
- “Unite together!”
- Military force under Giap
- Relief work in 44 famine

P5: Declaration of Independence Resistance to Japanese occupation

- Encouraged action – VM in Hanoi in Aug 45
- Jap occupation from 41 = nationalism
- Independence in Sept in front of 400k
- Brocheux quote
- Supports US b/w 41-45 – tactical decision to help in FIW
- FIW victory in 54

P1: Historical context/Background

The childhood and broader historical context of Ho Chi Minh laid the foundations for his rise to prominence, most considerably for its nationalist influences.

- i. Born in province of Nghe Ahn – revolutionary activities
- ii. Confucian upbringing + Mother sang him nationalistic folk songs + sister imprisoned for revo activities
- iii. Father dismissed for criticising French in Annam– **Karnow** argued Ho inherited “**his father’s rebellious bent**”
- iv. Family friend of nationalist Phan Boi Chau
- v. Expelled from French Quoc Hoc Academy in 1908 for aiding peasant dissidents by acting as a translator

Thus, Ho’s early exposure to nationalistic sentiment within a broader historical context that advocated Asian self-actualisation laid the foundations for his future rise to prominence.

P2: Experiences abroad + in China

Ho Chi Minh rose to prominence as an international advocate for Vietnamese independence, fundamentally shaped by his travels in Europe and experiences in China as Ho developed an anti-colonial sentiment.

- i. Anti-colonial worldview (later informed by Lenin’s Theses on colonialism) from experiences in Africa – “the observations...lay the basis for the rare breadth and depth of [Ho’s] outlook” (Burchett)
- ii. Influenced by his exposure to socialism in Russia and in France (contributed to *Le Paria* and the formation of the FCP in 1920) – early socialist activism + raised his status in both France + Vietnam
- iii. Learnt important skills for his eventual rise to prominence through revolutionary activity;
 - Tertiary education in Moscow at University for the Peoples of the East
 - Communist cells and connections
 - Comintern Agent in China in 1925
 - Espionage skills
 - Guerrilla warfare tactics
 - Support of Zhao Lai, Mao + Chinese communists
- iv. Publication of Road to Revolution in 1926 – seminal text of revolutionary intentions
- v. Student in the advanced cadre programme in China – develops vision for an Asian revolution distinct from Bolshevism – “**Asian spirit with Western know-how**” – **Brocheux**

P3: Formation of the ICP

Ho’s forming of the ICP in 1930 established a political basis from which he built his future nationalist vision, thus contributing to his rise.

- i. United disparate communist factions in V establish VCP, late renamed ICP (Ho was aware of international attention and support)
- ii. ICP shaped by ideology and skills developed during his travels
- iii. Failed attempts by the Nationalists in 1930 – ICP became the leading party for national revolution
- iv. Was acutely aware that he had to wait for “**classical revolutionary conditions**” as Duiker notes and thus understood the nationalist then subsequent socialist stages of his revolutionary vision

- v. Gathered support throughout the 1930s in rural communities
 - Looked to gain peasant support by emphasising nationalistic struggle + promoting literacy
- vi. Changes name to Ho Chi Minh in 1940 – ‘bringer of light’ as symbolic of his ardent Vietnamese identity mixed with Chinese influences – broader appeal to non-communist, peasants etc.

P4: Development of Viet Minh + Propaganda Units

Ho’s ambitions gained traction with the establishment of various political arms and factions aimed at spreading the appeal of nationalistic revolution

- i. Establishes the Viet Minh in May 1941 as a ‘united front’ coalition (to minimise communist affiliations) - led to exponential rise in prominence + evidence of the emerging opportunity for political action
- ii. Propaganda units spread message by learning local language, educating remote peasantry, indoctrinating with propaganda in northern Tonkin
- iii. Supported by US OSS team – forces trained and weapons supplied
- iv. In these ways, he managed to begin to appeal to various classes to **“Unite together!”**
- v. Set about establishing a military force under Vo Nguyen Giap – thus the ICP began to serve both a political and military function
- vi. Relief work during famine in 1944 – demonised the French as the cause for peasantry’s suffering

P5: Declaration of Independence Resistance to Japanese occupation

As a power vacuum began to emerge in the aftermath of WWII, Ho encouraged action and the Viet Minh entered Hanoi in mid August 1945, which contributed significantly to his place in that period of Indochinese history.

- i. Vietnam’s continued suffering under Japanese occupation from 1941 onwards strengthened nationalist convictions
- ii. Declared Vietnamese independence in September in front of a crowd of 400,000 – by this point was a key political figure in Vietnam
- iii. Brocheux argues he had **“a magnetic appeal that literally mobilised nationalistic feelings”**
- iv. Supports US office of Strategic Services b/w 1941-45 = effective tactical decision in assisting the overthrow of Japanese
- v. Laid support that would facilitate subsequent victory in FIW

SIGNIFICANCE AND EVALUATION

Assess the contribution of the personality you have studied to their period of national and/or international history.

1. Background

Bent academic Lenins journal know-how

2. Communism

The party Indian cadres the classic

3. Opportunism

The force of Patti never declares literacy

4. Symbolism

Elephant phu accepts the currency on your back

5. Flaws

The land and peoples history NLFs the prestige of Duan

6. Inspiration

The decline in mythical radio points internationally

While by his death in 1969 Ho Chi Minh had only partially achieved his ambition of a liberated and unified Vietnam, his flexible leadership role as a political figure from 1930 onwards was crucial to the process of Vietnamese independence by 1975. As such, it was Ho's distinctive leadership characteristics that facilitated his changing leadership role, and thus he had an indelible impact on the development of modern Vietnam.

P1: Background + Travels =

- **Anti-colonialism + communism lay foundations for a lens through which we understand his influence**

The childhood and broader historical context of Ho Chi Minh laid the foundations for his rise to prominence, most considerably for its nationalist influences.

- vi. Born in province of Nghe Ahn – revolutionary activities + **Karnow** argued Ho inherited “**his father’s rebellious bent**”
- vii. Expelled from French Quoc Hoc Academy in 1908 for aiding peasant dissidents by acting as a translator
- viii. Anti-colonial worldview (later informed by Lenin’s Theses on colonialism)
- ix. Influenced by his exposure to socialism in Russia and in France (contributed to *Le Paria* and the formation of the FCP in 1920) – early socialist activism + raised his status in both France + Vietnam
- x. Publication of Road to Revolution in 1926 – seminal text of revolutionary intentions
- xi. Student in the advanced cadre programme in China – develops vision for an Asian revolution distinct from Bolshevism – “**Asian spirit with Western know-how**” – **Brocheux**

Thus, Ho’s early exposure to nationalistic sentiment within a broader historical context that advocated Asian self-actualisation laid the foundations for his contribution to Vietnamese national history as well as his international prominence.

P2: 1930s –

- **Application of pragmatism in initial efforts to garner support**

Ho’s leadership role in the 1930s was centred on the political pragmatism aimed at garnering support for a revolution that would overthrow French colonialism.

- i. Nationalistic leadership of the ICP
- ii. Indian political theorist M N Roy described his politics as “**nationalism painted red**” = means to an end + but ensured not to isolate the peasantry
- iii. Used communist cells and cadres – indoctrinated peasants by learning local languages + marrying local women
- iv. 2 stage revolution – Duiker: “**classical revolutionary conditions**” - levelled pragmatism

Thus, as he applied communist methodology to his nationalistic aims, Ho’s capacity to balance such influences = base of V independence

P3: WW2 + Independence

- **Political opportunism in post-war vacuum**

- i. Shift as the unequivocal leader of Vietnamese resistance forces
- ii. Managed to secure support of OSS under General Patti

- iii. “Never underestimated America” and waited, subsequent political opportunism in power vacuum = August Revolution 1945
- iv. Leadership shift from revolutionary to more formal leader as President of the DRV + declaration of independence on 2nd Sep 1945
- v. Literacy programs – 2 million literate by 1946 – peasant upbringing

P4: First Indochina War + Geneva

- **Symbolism/Inspiration – skilful relationship w/ peasantry**
- **Diplomatic role**
 - i. Increasingly symbolic revolutionary spirit in his leadership in First Indochinese War
 - ii. ‘Elephant and Tiger’ rhetoric – inspiring orator accelerated nationalist struggle
 - iii. Resignation of responsibility to Vo Nguyen Giap + victory at Diem Bien Phu on May 7 1954
 - iv. Accepted Russian + Chinese pressure Geneva Accords April 54 – diplomatic role here
 - v. Increasingly important diplomatic and administrative role – public figurehead appeared on currency + 800 pages in public books
 - vi. Constructs to ‘Bac Ho’ cult personality – inspirational figure that drags the rest of his life and his impact on Vietnam

P5: Flaws in leadership + Second Indochina War

- **Flaws**
- **Transition to symbol role – telling of his influence + legacy**
 - i. Not without flaws however – Land Reform law in Feb 53 – class war in the countryside
 - ii. Brutality and violence characteristic of the People’s Courts in 1953 – estimated 50,000 killed
 - iii. Vietnamese historians Yen Ahn and Huang Phong to criticise Ho for using life as a political tactic which was shown when 1 500 prisoners were executed in the construction of the Hanoi-Lang railway.
 - iv. Established the NLF 1960 – effectively undermined Diem + US efforts in the South
 - v. Ultimately however, Duiker acknowledges that his “prestige as an all-knowing and all-caring leader had been severely damaged” despite these policies not being entirely his own constructions = symbolic role + subsequent apology
 - vi. This led to his appointment of Le Duan as Acting Secretary General – Duan had a central role from then on

P6: Role as a symbolic leader

- i. Decline in power in the Politburo from the 50s - essentially became senior diplomat, foreign policy advisor (w/ moderating voice) and the spiritual father of the Vietnamese people – Duiker – “mythical bearer of Vietnamese national identity”
- ii. Radio broadcasting – Radio Hanoi in 1961 – weekly show demonstrated capacity to continue to engage the Vietnamese people
- iii. Three Point Strategy 1965 developed by Ho
- iv. International recognition – interactions with Bertrand Russell and his peace foundation + diplomatic collaboration with China during Second Indochina War

Other quotes:

Duiker: “Part Lenin, part Ghandi, part Confucius, but all Vietnamese” – Communist, and nationalist who fought successfully, pragmatically and opportunistically for the liberation of his people.

Duiker: “enduring legacy”

Aiming at 650 words

Aims shape his behaviour

What's your interpretation of Ho's personality? – historical figure

Characteristics of him as a historical figure – leader for independence, reunification

- Pragmatic
- Opportunistic

- nationalist – link to upbringing
- peasant
- communist – link to education/FCP/Moscow
- inspiration/symbolic

Styles of leadership

- Communist
- Nationalist
- Inspirational – how has his inspiration shaped how Vietnam operated and how the Vietnamese people thought?
-

Was he a patriot Confucian 'Bac Ho' that liberated and unified the nation or is he a communist agent that became a brutal dictator of an oppressive regime? – duality of historiography?

LOOK AT WHO HE WAS AND HOW HE WAS RECEIVED BY THE PEOPLE

SHAPED BY CERTAIN EVENTS + SHAPES CERTAIN EVENTS

Gair's Feedback – 2010 Trial for Ho Part B

Remember;

1. You must establish at the very beginning what Ho's mark on History was (i.e., his role in History- Nationalist leader for Vietnam? Leader for Vietnam's Independence etc.)
2. You must outline your judgement of Ho in relation to the statement. You do not have to totally agree or disagree but you must define your judgement
3. You must discuss and then account for events in his life and in his 'role' where his planning and/or good fortune (depending on your judgement) were evident
4. You must then account for how this planning/fortune had an effect on the overall outcome of that event and how this contributed to his mark made on history (which you have established at the beginning)

Essay Microsummaries

1. Germany 1918-1939

Assess the role of the German army in the Weimar Republic between 1918 and 1933 (2012 CSSA Trial)

1. Pre-Weimar Germany and the role of the Army

- Influence in past
- Right-wing authoritarianism

- *Dolchstoßlegende*
2. Army founding role but subsequent rejection
 - Urge Kaiser to abdicate
 - But, remain autonomous
 3. Influence on politics - co-operation with Ebert
 - EB Pact – state within a state
 - Political function
 4. Desire to Subvert Versailles Restrictions
 - Seeckt
 - Rapallo
 - Budget increase
 5. Despite concessions, Army remained ideologically opposed to democracy and sought to remove it.
 - Crisis worsens
 - ToV + the NSDAP
 - Influence on political intrigue + Kolb
 6. Impact on Nazi Party – facilitate the NSDAP's rise
 - Rohm to SA
 - Blomberg supports NSDAP
 - Hitler quote

To what extent was the Great Depression responsible for the collapse of the Weimar Republic? HSC 2013

1. Exposes Fragility of the Golden Years
 - Dawes Plan
 - Sozialstaat
 - ST investment

P2: Economic hardship

- Evans
- Collapse of Bank
- US + u/e
- Psychological

P3: Weimar response was weak

- 4 demo govs
- Welfare state reversed
- Coalition policy division

P4: Abuse of Art 48 undermined democracy

- Faux democracy – self-interest

- Past success = float
- 37 decrees
- Cabinet of Barons

P5: Elites (optional)

- Army
- Evans
- Harzburg

P6: Rise of extremism

- Widespread look to extremes
- 15 to 50%

P7: Appeal of Nazi ideology

- Volkspartei – nationalism
- Autarky + lebensraum
- Specific groups of people examples
- Stats
- Volksfiends

P8: Effectiveness of NSDAP

- Campaigning
- Propaganda terror escalated – 86 deaths
- Authoritarian leadership
- Bullock quote

Rise of NSDAP contingent on atmosphere of despondency + social disillusionment

P9: Political Intrigue

- 'Back door' politics
- Papen + Schelicher – communist threats
- Dislike of H, but appointment

Explain how and why German social and cultural life changed?
To what extent did Nazism influence German social and cultural life?
To what extent did the Nazis bring about radical social change?

P1: VGS + WEIMAR LIBERALISM

- Dismantle progressive = VGS
- *Weltanschauung* vs. 'degenerate' Weimar
- *Reichskulturkammer* in Sep 33
- Blood and soil
- *Entartete Kunst* replaced
- Music replaced

- Architecture w/ Albert Speer

P2: PROPOGANDA

- Free media replaced by Goebbels
- Controlled news + info in 3 ways
- Restrictions on FoS – terror
- Evans quote

P3: SOCIAL/ECONOMIC

- TU replaced by DAF in 33
- StJ breaks down classes + BoL
- Working conditions
- ‘*Blut und Boden*’
- Hjalmar Schacht – u/e in 2 ways
- 4 year + autarky – Hitler quote

P4: WOMEN

- Away from Weimar (35%) to Goebbels quote
- VGS – *Kinder, Kirche und Küche*
- Law for Reduction of Unemployment in 33
- 1934 Law for Promotion of Marriage + *Mutterkreuz*
- Later difficulty + Birth rate

P5: YOUTH/EDUCATION

- Indoctrination– future role
- Nazi ideals – HJ (compulsory)
- 7.2 million boys by 39 + other youth groups
- (LGG) – LINK TO WOMEN
- Education system – Dr. Bernhard Rust = Nazi ideology – syllabus
- Opposition

P6: JEWS

- 1933 Law - non-Aryans resign
- Nuremburg Laws
- *Kristallnacht* + pretext

P7: RELIGION

- NSDAP quasi-religious
- Concordat of 33 – violated
- Evangelical Reich Church + 25 points
- Arrest of Dietrich Bonhoeffer
- Stat - 65% in 35 to 5% in 37
- Bullock quote

2. Conflict in Indochina

Account for the changes in American policy in Vietnam from 1954 to 1973. 2012 CSSA

INTRO

- Changed but remained
- Establish demo
- Actions + reactions
- 3 factors
- Hawkish then PWH

P1: EISENHOWER

- Stable
- Type of support
- Ideology
- Role of aid
- Nation building = \$1bn + 900
- Minimal opp

P2: JFK

- Flexible to worsening scenario
- Elections + insurgency
- JFK refuses
- 400 Green Beret
- Ranch Hand + Agrovilles
- WHAM = Limited success (VC)
- Coup + Maclear quote

P3: LBJ AIR

- GoT + “soft on communism” = hawk
- Division = Westmoreland
- GoT– “all necessary measures” = Kolko
- VC tactics -> 3
- Flaming Dart - reaction
- Rolling Thunder

P4: LBJ GROUND

- Containment = villages
- Memorandum – 70%
- Americanisation – 400k
- Phoenix – escalation
- Grab belt buckle
- S + D tactics –fail in LT

P5: TET

- Psycho + political ramifications of Tet = no but victory
- US media
- Anti-war = widespread
- Middle-class
- Suspends + re-election

P6: NIXON

- Vietnamisation. + 500k
- Moratorium
- One War
- Menu + Line-backers
- Pentagon Papers t/f Bergerud quote

P7: FORD

- Rigged election
- Aid reduced
- Fall of S

Evaluate the effectiveness of the strategies and tactics used by the opposing sides during the Second Indochina War. HSC 2010

P1: Ideological support of the Vietnamese people – Strategy of Indoctrination

- Ho quote
- Peoples' War/Oath/Propaganda
- NFL soldier/cadres states
- Maclear

P2: Kennedy's reaction – attempts to prevent ideological spread and maintain support for Diem fail

- Ranch Hand/Agrovilles
- WHAM fails
 - VC Membership

P3: Guerrilla Warfare

- Tactics
- Mines/booby traps
- Assassinations
- Hamlets infiltration
- HCMT
- Cu Chi

P4: Inapplicability of Conventional Warfare

- Big unit
- Adaptability – Ia Drang
 - Plei Mei 67
- Mines
- SnD – Binh Dong
- Drugs

P5: Accelerated bombing campaigns fail

- GoT
- HCMT – Barrel Roll 65 fail
- Strengthens resolve

P6: Success of the Tet Offensive

- Mass uprisings – 36/44
- Fail but success
- Embassy + 28k

P7: Nixon + Vietnamisation = reflects success of VM tactics = subsequent victory

- 500k + conscription
- My Lai + KSS
- DC
- Creighton

- 3 bombings
- Pentagon
- Bergerud

Assess the impact of the Vietnam War on civilians in Vietnam

P1: Fear of ideological persecution

- 10000 imprisoned under Diem
- Chinese model + leftist influences – show trials, executions etc.
- Religious persecution

P2: Land reforms and other policies

- Agrovilles + Hamlets = rural workers to slums
- Politburo refuses to import rice = famine
- Babylift 75 – 3300 orphans evacuated
- 2.5t of bombs = uncultivable

P3: Impact on South Vietnam

- 60 onwards, intensified in South – 843k
- Defoliants – birth defects, PTSD
- SnD – 10k homeless following Cedar Falls in Binh Dong
- Military Juntas – instability
- Westernised – drugs, corruption, breakdown of village structures

P4: SV at the end of the war

- ARVN dependent on civilians for enlistments post-de-escalation
- Collapse of economy
- Environmental impact – 20% of SV jungle
- Operation New Life – 100k displaced persons (April 75)

P5: North Vietnamese

- Never in ground conflict
- Aerial bombings – 182k killed
- Evacuate but adapt

P6: Spread of bombing to Cambodia

- East most affected
- Cedar Falls + Menu
- 150k Cambodian civilians

P7: Political impact + Rise of KR

- Lon Nol's overthrown
- Discuss knowledge of impact of PP on Cambodia

Account for the Communist victory in the Second Indochina War. HSC 2012

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- Drug users

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- Mass uprisings – 36/44
- Fail but success
- Embassy + 28k

P4: Impact of Tet on public opinion

- 40-26%
- Chicago Firestorm
- Doesn't stand for re-elective
- Guam Doctrine

P6: Nixon + Vietnamisation

- 500k + conscription
- My Lai + KSS
- DC
- Creighton
- 3 bombings
- Pentagon
- Bergerud

P7: Diplomacy

- Ho introduced people's diplomacy
- International support for VM liberation (foreign activists)

To what extent were the anti-war movements in the United States responsible for communist victory in the Second Indochina War? HSC 2009

P1: Initial Effectiveness

- Fringe groups – hippies, students, pacifists, Quakers
 - “Silent majority”
- Post-GoT = 85% support
- 65 Teach-in + 67 Pentagon rally – not enough to deter 400k increase in 67

P2: Gradual growth of opposition

- Expand to mainstream
- Cost of war – 10% tax
- 67 1000 Business Executives Move
- \$12bn in 67

P3: Effectiveness of TET for NVM

- Mass uprisings – 36/44
- Fail but success
- Embassy + 28k

P4: Impact of Tet on public opinion

- 40-26%
- Chicago Firestorm
- Doesn't stand for re-elective
- Guam Doctrine

P5: Nixon

- 500k + conscription
- My Lai + KSS
- DC
- Creighton
- 3 bombings
- Pentagon
- Bergerud

Account for the rise to power of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. HSC 2013

P1: Failure of Sihanouk administration

- Erratic policies
- Conditions
 - Widening of war
 - Public opinion
- Sihanouk rejects US in 65 for NVM but brings back in 68
- Cambodian Civil War – failed to prevent communist insurgency

P2: Effects of US intervention (i.e. Operation Menu, 1968)

- Livelihood – agriculture/refugees/environmental
- Political dislocation
- Anti-west
- Lon Nol coup d'état

P3: Unpopularity of the Lon Nol Regime

- Effects of Lon Nol Regime
- US support
- Attempts to fight communists fail

P4: Increasing legitimacy and appeal of Khmer Rouge and its Ideology

- FUNK legitimised Khmer Rouge
- Nationalistic cadres
- KR membership

P5: Overthrow of Lon Nol and the eventual rise of Khmer Rouge

- Used allies effectively (Sihanouk/NVM)
- 1975 coup + Year 0

Discuss the nature, aims and methods of Pol Pot's Regime.

P1: Ideological independence from Western Influence

- Agrarian primitivism
- Khmer Nationalism
 - Embassies, minority exiled, racial superiority
- Foreigners expelled
- Aid rejected – cholera, hospitals
- Year 0 proclaimed

P2: Total economic independence

- Absolute collectivism
- Rice production + industrial production targets = child labour
- Cities evacuated in 75
 - Private property abolished
 - 7 zones often divided families
- These reforms failed

P3: Social Reform

- AIM: Isolate Kampuchea from external world
 - Establish autocratic rule over all civilians in Kampuchea
 - Ensure counter-revolutionary activity is suppressed
- Religious persecution
- 'The Killing Fields' → 1.3m
- Social class enemies
- 1.8 million - (24%)

P4: Maintaining dictatorial control

- Tuol Sleng → 20,000
- Internal party purges.
- Mystery + brother no.1
- Terror and fear of interrogation → fear of informants and spies.
- Sought support from the Chinese.

P5: Foreign Policy

- AIM: Overcome traditional rival in Vietnam
 - Upon assuming power (April 1975) Pol Pot sent soldiers to Vietnamese border
- METHODS:
 - Aid from communist Chin
 - Vietnam did not respond to border raids

Introductions

1. Germany 1918-1939

Assess the role of the German army in the Weimar Republic between 1918 and 1933 (2012 CSSA Trial)

While there were a variety of socio-political factors that eroded the legitimacy of pre-Nazi democracy and hence facilitated the NSDAP's rise to power, the self-interested agenda of the right-wing military in Weimar Germany was particularly significant. Indeed despite the political attempts of successive Weimar governments to promote stable democracy, the ability of the army to exercise considerable political influence during these years was facilitated by their nationalistic presence in post-Bismarkian Germany. Insofar as they both disapprove of

liberal democracy and were firmly focused on their own domestic and foreign policy objectives, such influence ensured ongoing political instability. Despite its declining influence as the Nazi regime accelerated their control, it is because very little could be achieved in the political life of the Weimar Republic without the army's support that it was paramount to the collapse of German democracy.

To what extent was the Great Depression responsible for the collapse of the Weimar Republic? HSC 2013

With the Enabling Act of March 1933, democracy within Weimar Germany had ceased to exist. Although there were a variety of factors that eroded the legitimacy and popularity of successive Weimar governments, the radical political upheaval and that occurred was by no means inevitable. Indeed, the NSDAP and Hitler could not have come to power were it not for the sudden political and social chaos that was born from the economic crisis from 1929 onwards as it ensured that the political stability of the 'Golden Years' since 1924 degenerated rapidly. While the Weimar Republic was vulnerable during the pre-Depression years, in the midst of the social despondency and rising needs of post-1929 German society, the Republic was poorly positioned to handle the rapid rise and natural appeal of the NSDAP. Ultimately, the Depression prompted the period of political intrigue that would culminate in the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor in March 1933 – a position of power from which he would be able to dismantle Weimar's vulnerable democracy.

Explain how and why German social and cultural life changed
To what extent did Nazism influence German social and cultural life?
To what extent did the Nazis bring about radical social change?

Despite sporadic instances of resistance, by 1939 the Nazi party had, to a significant extent, successfully altered almost all aspects of German civilian life. Beginning the process of *Gleichschaltung* almost immediately after gaining power in 1933, Hitler and the NSDAP radically altered the social and cultural fabric of the Nazi state as consistent with their vision of *Volksgemeinschaft*. In doing so, they maintained a balance between both appeasing their genuine support base and using propaganda and terror to alter the very composition of German society through the re-education or elimination of undesirable minorities, religions and races. Having established an authoritarian regime in 1933, the Nazi Party were able to orchestrate radical social change with the aim of coordinating all pure Germans towards their vision of the Third Reich.

2. Conflict in Indochina

Account for the changes in American policy in Vietnam from 1954 to 1973. 2012 CSSA

While American foreign policy in Indochina changed significantly over time, its overarching aim to contain the spread of communism was maintained. In light of the Cold War context, US policy-makers sought to establish a stable and viable democratic government within South Vietnam. As such, the policy can be understood as a series of actions and reactions to the deteriorating situation in Vietnam. Successive US Presidents consequently accelerated America's influence, both financially and militarily, as they were faced with a determined NLF opposition, a politically unstable South Vietnam, and shifting domestic concerns. However, as the US public showed increasing concern for and opposition to President

Johnson's 'hawkish' Americanisation of the war, particularly following the 1968 Tet Offensive, these domestic concerns were the catalyst for successor President Nixon's subsequent intention to Vietnamise the war and pursue peace with honour.

Evaluate the effectiveness of the strategies and tactics used by the opposing sides during the Second Indochina War. HSC 2010

Given the considerable fluctuations in military dominance between each side during the Second Indochina War, the strategies and tactics employed can be understood as a series of responses to the evolving strategies and tactics. Indeed, the escalation of US involvement came, to a large extent, as a result of the considerable success of the communist guerrilla tactics. Not only was the increased military presence and conventional firepower of the Americans effectively adapted to by the Vietnamese, but the capacity for the communists to foster considerable ideological support for the nationalist goal ensured the ongoing success of their successful tripartite approach of combined military, political and diplomatic strategies and tactics. By contrast, as the US began to decelerate their involvement having failed to establish stable democracy, it became evident that the communist strategies and tactics prevailed as more effective than those of the US-ARVN coalition.

Assess the impact of the Vietnam War on civilians in Vietnam

Although the Vietnam War had a devastating impact on the people of Indochina, the degree to which the war impact civilians was largely depends on the region in which they lived. Although experiences were similar for the North and South Vietnamese until 1960, differences in civilian experiences were clarified as a result of the accelerating American military presence from 1960 onwards. Not only did massive civilian casualties provoke hostility towards America and thus undermine popular support, the spread of the conflict to eastern Cambodia in 1969 allowed for the rise of Pol Pot's genocidal regime. Ultimately, in addition to the systemic political and cultural changes caused by the war, the unparalleled loss of life and physical devastation had an indelible impact on Indochinese society broadly.

Account for the Communist victory in the Second Indochina War. HSC 2012

By 1975 the North Vietnamese communist forces had successfully dismantled the South Vietnamese government through their successful tripartite approach of combined military, political and diplomatic strategies and tactics. Indeed, as the effectiveness of the Viet Cong's guerrilla warfare eroded the applicability of traditional 'Big War' tactics of the US, the American-ARVN coalition struggled to maintain military dominance. Equally, the capacity for the North Vietnamese to foster considerable ideological and nationalistic support for the War was a stark contrast to successive US governments as they found themselves increasingly accountable to the emerging anti-war sentiment of the American public. Ultimately, it is because Presidents Johnson and subsequently Nixon were forced to decelerate US military involvement, culminating with the withdrawal of troops in 1973, that the Second Indochina War resulted in communist victory.

To what extent were the anti-war movements in the United States responsible for communist victory in the Second Indochina War? HSC 2009

While anti-war sentiment had little bearing on the 'hawkish' US foreign policy until 1968, the psychological impact of the communist Tet Offensive facilitated the widespread deterioration of public support. As the opposition of counter-culture and disorganised fringe groups slowly began to influence the majority of middle America, Presidents Johnson and subsequently

Nixon became increasingly accountable to the considerable domestic political pressure. Such concerns ultimately led to Nixon's intention to 'Vietnamise' the war so as to achieve peace through honour, however it is significant to note that the policy ignored outcry for an immediate withdrawal and rather Nixon intensified the bombing campaign. Notwithstanding, with the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam, the communist forces were effectively able to capitalise upon an increasingly weak and disillusioned ARVN force to effectively destabilise the South.

Account for the rise to power of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. HSC 2013

As a direct consequence of the widening of the Vietnam War, the considerable social and economic damage experienced by Cambodia directly facilitated civilian disillusionment. Indeed the inability of both the Sihanouk administration and subsequent Lon Nol regime to adequately address the concerns and needs of the Cambodian people allowed for the rise of the Khmer Rouge as an increasingly popular alternative to established political structures. In conjunction with the increased American military presence and hence anti-US sentiment, the Khmer Rouge effectively capitalised on widespread societal despondency so as to establish their regime by March 1975. Therefore, the rise of the Khmer Rouge can be understood as a consequence of the ongoing political failures of Cambodian political platforms to redress the substantial devastation that came as a natural extension of the accelerating violence between 1970 and 1975.

Discuss the nature, aims and methods of Pol Pot's Regime.

The aims of Pol Pot's genocidal regime can arguably be attributed to a combination of communism, nationalism and anti-colonialism. At the heart of Pol Pot's methods were radical attempts to systemically change the very fabric of society in attempts to install vision for a Radical Agrarian Marxist ideology. This ideology was inherent in Pol Pot's overarching desire to create a Democratic Kampuchea that would be economically 'self-reliant'. In reality, Pol Pot only achieved his radical vision to a very limited extent. However, in the process of attempting to establish his puritanical, utopian vision, Pol Pot would cause the death of an estimated 1.7million Cambodian civilians. Ultimately, the aims and consequent methods of the Khmer Rouge's regime attempted to radically change the social and economic profile of Cambodia to install a nationalistic self-reliant utopia.

Essay Overviews

1. Germany 1918-1939

Assess the role of the German army in the Weimar Republic between 1918 and 1933 (2012 CSSA Trial)

Intro

While there were a variety of socio-political factors that eroded the legitimacy of pre-Nazi democracy and hence facilitated the NSDAP's rise to power, the self-interested agenda of the right-wing military in Weimar Germany was particularly significant. Indeed despite the political attempts of successive Weimar governments to promote stable democracy, the ability

of the army to exercise considerable political influence during these years was facilitated by their nationalistic presence in post-Bismarkian Germany. Insofar as they both disapprove of liberal democracy and were firmly focused on their own domestic and foreign policy objectives, such influence ensured ongoing political instability. Despite its declining influence as the Nazi regime accelerated their control, it is because very little could be achieved in the political life of the Weimar Republic without the army's support that it was paramount to the collapse of German democracy.

P1: Pre-Weimar Germany and the role of the Army

It was as a result of the inextricable link between an effective military structure and German nationalism that the Army had an unparalleled influence on the political machinations of Germany. As such, such a legacy ensured not only their ongoing influence, but their own desire to maintain it, facilitated by their self-interested agenda.

- i. Preservation of military honour as primary consideration given post-unification history and legacy of German militarism
- ii. Hindenburg and Ludendorff – political and economic leaders during the course of the war – signalled political stability
 - a. Right-wing focus – big business and big-labour – mediator between the two
 - b. This meant German idealisation and Germans perceived stability to be something directly associated with strong, autocratic, right-wing governance
- iii. Dolchstoßlegende → actively distances itself from the negotiations it had itself recommended and shifts defeat from army to republican system of government
- iv. Manipulates political life in order to defend their respected position.

P2: Army's Founding Role in Weimar Democracy but subsequent rejection of it

Although the Army had an active role in dismantling the Kaiser's imperial control, they had no interest in actively supporting the prevailing democratic structures, instead they pursued their independent agenda and hence Weimar democracy struggled from its establishment.

- i. When defeat is unavoidable, the High Command urges the Kaiser to Abdicate.
- ii. Richard Evans suggests that this is far from a coincidence → by allowing civilian politicians to sue for peace the Army/Kaiser avoided the humiliation of defeat.
- iii. But as a result of all this, democracy could not function.
 - a. Army maintained Imperial flag – distinguishing between the Germany state, and the Reichswehr. It was not an army of the German Republic.
 - b. Louis L Snyder "The Republic was naturally incapable of incorporating the Reichswehr... It was unable either to control it or to win its unqualified allegiance."
 - c. Kapp Putsch of 1920 – General von Seeckt permits Freikorps coup.
 - i. Example of army following own, independent policy

P3: Influence on politics - co-operation with Ebert

In any democracy the function of the army is to protect and support the government and the community of that country, and not to interfere in its political processes. However, the political concessions and negotiations aimed at ensuring the army's political support, in actuality, hindered the function of stable democracy in the Weimar republic.

- i. While ideologically opposed to democracy the army was pragmatic and tolerated the Republic when it suited their own objectives
- ii. Ebert-Groener Pact (Nov. 1918) → support the govt. on the condition that they maintain '**state within a state status**'

- iii. As a result of their military dominance, they served a political function
 - a. Spartacist uprising (1919) quashed but dominance of right-wing military preserved
 - b. Ebert would have struggled to suppress Communist uprisings in Thuringia and Saxony in October 1923 without the army.
 - c. Munich Putsch (1923): Leniency towards Hitler and conspirators caused later instability
- iv. Anthony Read → “the army would ultimately follow its military commander not its head of state.” – allowed for the maintenance of right-wing interests

P4: Desire to Subvert Versailles Restrictions

- i. The army under Hans Von Seeckt actively garnered the support of Weimar politicians between 1920-1926
- ii. Pressure from high command → led to Walter Rathenau signing the Treaty of Rapallo (April 1922)
- iii. Andreas Hillgruber → “Kurt Von Schleicher as the ‘military-political’ head of the Reichwehr.”
- iv. Military budget increased by 250 million marks between 1926 and 1928

P5: Despite concessions, Army remained ideologically opposed to democracy and sought to remove it.

- i. Economic crisis worsens → Nazis become most popular party. Army command recognise Hitler’s potential to restore order and eliminate democracy.
- ii. Hitler’s plan to overturn the Versailles Restrictions and achieve Lebensraum through an expansionist military foreign policy resonated strongly with the High Commands own aims.
- iii. Political influence enjoyed by military powerbrokers vengeful Von Papen persuades Hindenburg to appoint Hitler as Chancellor.
- iv. Eberhard Kolb – foremost influences on Hindenburg appointing Hitler.

P6: Impact on Nazi Party – facilitate the NSDAP’s rise

- i. Recruitment of Ernst Rohm to the S.A. brought closer ties between the army’s hierarchical structure and the NSDAP
- ii. Army began to support the Nazi Party, especially with the promise to disband the ToV.
- iii. General Werner von Blomberg – 1933 – moved army from political neutrality into open support for Nazism.
- iv. Former soldiers filled the ranks of the SA.
- v. Right-wing military sympathetic to Nazis, which supported re-armament and non-compliance with Treaty of Versailles
 - a. ‘If ... the Army had not stood on our side, then we should not be standing here today’ Hitler
- vi. Reasoning heavily involved in Hindenburg’s decisions => political intrigue centered around fears of communism and concerns of army power.

The Weimar Republic was therefore, as argued by Bullock, “openly and unashamedly based upon the support of the president and the army”,

To what extent was the Great Depression responsible for the collapse of the Weimar Republic? HSC 2013

With the Enabling Act of March 1933, democracy within Weimar Germany had ceased to exist. Although there were a variety of factors that eroded the legitimacy and popularity of successive Weimar governments, the radical political upheaval and that occurred was by no means inevitable. Indeed, the NSDAP and Hitler could not have come to power were it not for the sudden political and social chaos that was born from the economic crisis from 1929 onwards as it ensured that the political stability of the 'Golden Years' since 1924 degenerated rapidly. While the Weimar Republic was vulnerable during the pre-Depression years, in the midst of the social despondency and rising needs of post-1929 German society, the Republic was poorly positioned to handle the rapid rise and natural appeal of the NSDAP. Ultimately, the Depression prompted the period of political intrigue that would culminate in the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor in March 1933 – a position of power from which he would be able to dismantle Weimar's vulnerable democracy.

P1: Exposes Fragility of the Golden Years

The Great Depression of 1929 exposed the fragility of Germany's ostensibly prosperous economy and in doing so lessened support for democracy.

- i. During the Golden Years Industrial production exceeded pre-war levels, exports doubled, reparations were revised down by the [Dawes Plan \(1924\)](#)
- ii. Unemployment was relatively low → [Sozialstaat](#) → good living standards
- iii. A significant proportion of society, particularly the working class, became reconciled to democracy → anti democratic parties [only won 14% of the vote in the Reichstag elections between 1924 and 1928](#)
- iv. **BUT...**this prosperity was entirely dependent on short-term foreign investment → international financial crisis (viz. the Depression) meant that Germany could no longer sustain a Welfare State that accounted for [26% GDP](#).
- v. Brüning implements a deflationary budget in July 1930 → working class support for democracy decline.

P2: Economic hardship

- i. Psychological + sociocultural impacts = foundation of collapse b/w 29-33
- ii. Fragile eco reliant on foreign trade + US short-term loans + hyperinflation = economic hardship dating back
 - a. Somewhat a recovery – 'built on sand' – Richard Evans
- iii. US recall 23bn Marks + unemployment from 650,000 in 28 to 6.1mil in 33
- iv. Collapse of *Darmstadter und Nationalbank* in July 31
 - a. Living standards drop
- v. Self-belief and pride down b/c unemployment + wages down – psychological reaction threatens survival of coalition democracy

P3: Weimar response was weak

In response, weak policies + leadership = criticism + opposition legitimised

- i. 4 demo govs between 1929-33 showed no decisive leadership – faith lost + outlet for national blame
 - a. Failed to provide stability
- ii. Historically welfare generous, now govs of Muller then Brüning adopted deflationary policies – up taxes and down spending – suffocated eco recovery
- iii. Coalition govs w/ PR – particularly problematic during crisis – policy making

- a. 21 govs all coalitions b/w 21-33
- b. E.g.: austerity measures – right-wing wanted spending cuts, left-wing wanted higher taxes in Brüning's coalition

P4: Abuse of Art 48 undermined democracy

While Hitler did not ascend to the chancellorship until March 1933, the prolonged state of rule by presidential decree that began during the Great Depression meant that parliamentary democracy had essentially collapsed in March 1930 with the fall of Müller's Grand Coalition.
+ atmosphere led to political self-interest and chaos

- i. In itself Article 48 not necessarily a flaw = useful, temporary mechanism for implementing key legislation during times of national emergency.
 - a. E.g.: Gustav Stresemann's float Rentenmark in November 1923 – necessary currency b/c of hyperinflation crisis of 1922-1923.
- ii. But, in Depression, desperation to consolidate parliamentary process
- iii. 37 Article 48 decrees in 1st half of 33
- iv. Hindenburg's self interest + Cabinet of Barons 1932
 - a. Created its own inevitable collapse
- v. By consequence, required support of conservative elites

P5: Elites (optional)

TS: undermining of conservative elites + **Militarism** = long term

- i. Freikorps put down 19 Spartacist, yet tolerated 20 Kapp Putsch = justified w/ power of Ebert-Groener of 18
- ii. Evans suggests the Republic was 'weakened by its failure to win support of the army'
- iii. Cons elites – e.g. 1931 Harzburg Front – criticise Brüning's gov of being pro-Young Plan and coping ToV

undermined attempts to create stability

P6: Rise of extremism

In light of emerging despondency toward existing democratic structures, the German populace expressed such concern through their gravitation toward political extremes, for which Weimar governments were poorly positioned to handle.

- i. Look to extremes en masse in desperation
- ii. Different to 18-23 (more violent, more narrow opposition to centrism) – widespread discontent now
- iii. Acceleration of KDP + NSDAP – 15% in 28 to 50% in 32, with unemployment at 40%

Ultimately, by 1932, parties opposed to democracy held the majority of power in the Reichstag, and hence democracy was merely an illusion until its eventual collapse.

P7: Appeal of Nazi ideology

TS: in the context, ideological appeal + practical organisation = NSDAP success
Ideological framework resonated w/ needs of Gr people

- i. *Volkspartei* – challenged weak demo system that yearned for authoritarian leadership – united Gr w/ *Volkgemeinschaft* – grounded in **Nationalism**

- ii. Centralised gov, autarky + *lebensraum* tapped into economic hardship to legitimise brand of extremist politics
- iii. Appeal to certain classes;
 - a. Land ownership – farmers
 - b. Jobs – unemployed
 - c. Ripe eco conditions – industrialists
 - d. Rearmament – cons elites
 - e. Rejection of ToV – everyone
 - f. Gregor Strasser – Nazis stood for the ‘opposite of what exists today’
- iv. Nov 32 – 33% to March 33 with 44% votes – gained traction as a legitimate opposition
- v. Established volksfiends (Jews, leftists, ‘November Criminals’ etc.) – undermined Weimar + provided legitimate alternative

P8: Effectiveness of NSDAP

TS: effectiveness of campaigning, terror and propaganda + role of Hitler – existed beyond mere abstraction to challenge democracy

- i. Campaigning;
 - a. Perpetual campaigning in early 30s
 - b. Attention to detail, or *Kleinarbeit*, ensured broad appeal
- ii. Propaganda led by Goebbels + SA terror escalated (86 deaths in July 32)
 - a. Led to Reichstag increase to 230 seats in August 32 elections
- iii. Charismatic + authoritarian leadership – Fuhrer myth reminiscent of Wilhelm II
 - a. Reminded Gr people of hyperinflation + *Dolchstoßlegende* – long term failure of democracy = political opportunism
- iv. Alan Bullock – ‘Nazism was a phenomenon which thrived only in conditions of disorder and insecurity’

Rise of NSDAP contingent on atmosphere of despondency + social disillusionment

P9: Political Intrigue

Emergence of extremism + political chaos/volatility = political intrigue presided over parliamentary process

- i. Desperate attempts to reconcile personal interests w/ Weimar’s survival – ‘back door politics’ using Article 48
- ii. Political power brokers e.g.; von Papen and von Schleicher fed speculation on the growing communist threat + rumour-mongering
- iii. Hindenburg, despite initially disliking Hitler, eventually convinced to appoint Chancellorship due to populism and rumour

Explain how and why German social and cultural life changed?

To what extent did Nazism influence German social and cultural life?

To what extent did the Nazis bring about radical social change?

Intro

Despite sporadic instances of resistance, by 1939 the Nazi party had, to a significant extent, successfully altered almost all aspects of German civilian life. Beginning the process of *Gleichschaltung* almost immediately after gaining power in 1933, Hitler and the NSDAP radically altered the social and cultural fabric of the Nazi state as consistent with their vision

of *Volksgemeinschaft*. In doing so, they maintained a balance between both appeasing their genuine support base and using propaganda and terror to alter the very composition of German society through the re-education or elimination of undesirable minorities, religions and races. Having established an authoritarian regime in 1933, the Nazi Party were able to orchestrate radical social change with the aim of coordinating all pure Germans towards their vision of the Third Reich.

P1: Volksgemeinschaft & Nazi ideology required a dismantling of Weimar Liberalism

Almost immediately after achieving absolute power by March 1933, the Nazi Regime dismantled the progressive cultural landscape of the Weimar years in order to implement their vision of a *Volksgemeinschaft*. Indeed the political and racist ideologies stemming from Hitler's *Weltanschauung* could not co-exist with the 'degenerate' and 'un-German' expressionist Bohemian culture of the Weimar Republic.

- i. Established the *Reichskulturkammer* in Sep 1933 – seven sub chambers responsible for various areas of cultural/artistic expression
- ii. Nazi notion of 'blood and soil' as a literary concept pervaded art, film and literary fiction
- iii. Abstract movement banned in favour of Nazi realism (landscapes, Volk, Aryan *Übermensch* etc.) – '*Entartete Kunst*'
- iv. Jewish musicians such as Mendelsohn + jazz music banned replaced by Nazi music such as the nationalistic '*Horst-Wessel Lied*' + Wagner = allowed Hitler to reinforce notions of racial purity, militarism and obedience
- v. Bauhaus architecture school in Dessau closes in April 1933 –replaced by neoclassical architecture under Albert Speer (e.g. Reich Chancellery)

Hence, the Nazi regime radically dismantled liberal artistic expression and replaced it with a narrow, ideologically driven by a Nazified cultural blueprint.

P2: Propaganda

Alongside changing artistic subject matter, the Nazis used art as a form of propaganda, as well as terror and persuasion, to solidify their control over the social and cultural fabric of Germany. In doing so, they limited opposition while simultaneously re-directing their genuine supporters towards their vision of a purified *Volksgemeinschaft*.

- i. Free media of Weimar Germany replaced with Joseph Goebbels's Ministry for Propaganda and Enlightenment exercising media control
- ii. Controlled news via *Deutsch Nachrichtenbüro* + *Beobachter* and mass production of the *Volksempfänger* allowed Nazis to control flow of information and sustain relentless propaganda
- iii. Legislative restrictions on freedom of speech + fear of these instruments of terror (esp. SS and Gestapo) ensured adherence to new blueprint because it ...
- iv. **Richard Evans – “reached down even to the smallest units of everyday life”**

Ultimately, the pervasiveness of both propaganda and terror ensured a wide acceptance of a reformed German civilian life.

FROM HERE LINK EVERYTHING BACK TO V/SCHAFT + PROPA

P3: Social Life + Economy

Vital to the Nazi vision of a reconstructed Germany was their economic reform and hence its impact on the civilian life of the country.

- i. Abolition of trade unions and establishment of *Deutsche Arbeitsfront* (DAF) in 1933 – expansion of Nazi control
- ii. Control over leisure – state-controlled ‘Strength through Joy’ organisation facilitated a breakdown of class divides by making tourism, leisure activities etc. accessible to the masses + ‘*Schönheit der Arbeit*’ or Beauty of Labour – appeases the common man
- iii. Also improved working conditions – working class support
- iv. Notion of ‘*Blut und Boden*’ attempted to elevate rural classes as a paragon of the Nazi ideal
- v. Use of economist Hjalmar Schacht – reduced unemployment through autobahn construction projects + expanded German raw materials production
- vi. Nazi vision of autarky – 4-year plan in 1936 – Hitler’s aim to bring “Germany to the point of political and economic self-sufficiency”

P4: Women

Through both obstructive legislation and financial incentives the NSDAP encouraged a conservative restructuring of women’s role in society so as engender conformity consistent with the framework established by propaganda.

- i. Reversion of the steps towards inequality made during the Weimar years (35% of workforce were women) given Goebbels believed their role was “to be beautiful and to bring children into the world”
- ii. Nazi vision of Volksgemeinschaft proposed ‘*Kinder, Kirche und Küche*’ as highest goals for future of thousand-year Reich
- iii. Law for Reduction of Unemployment (1933) as legislative obstruction (men given jobs before women)
- iv. 1934 Law for the Promotion of Marriage + *Mutterkreuz* Scheme provided a financial incentive for childbirth
- v. Effective – how? Later difficulty to reintegrate into workforce post-WWII + birth rate increased from 14.7 to 20.4 per 1000 between 33 and 39

Thus, while radical by modern standards, the restructuring to the role of women in society was widely accepted in the context of 1930s Nazi Germany.

P5: Education/Youth

The indoctrination of youth, through both the education system and the Hitler-Jugend, was a priority of the Nazis given their future role in the expansion of Lebensraum and more broadly in the thousand-year Reich.

- i. Focus on physical skills, brutality and loyalty in the compulsory Hitler Youth from 1935-39
- ii. Successful – 7.2 million boys by 1939 + abolished other forms of youth groups
- iii. Extended influence to girls through the *Bund Deutscher Mädel* (League of German Girls) – focus on aforementioned domesticated roles
- iv. Equally, influence of Nazi ideology through the education system, in that, under Minister for Education Dr. Bernhard Rust, from 1934 all syllabus content explicitly reflected Nazi ideals such as anti-Semitism, eugenics and militarism (e.g. ‘Science of the Races’)

- v. Impact not universal – 1936 opposition - Edelweiss Pirates and the Swing Movement – generally limited, subdued + implicit

The Nazi Party was therefore successful in changing the civilian life of German youth by 1939, whom they considered equally important to the realisation of Volksgemeinschaft as women.

P6: Jews (combine w/ religion optional?)

One of the most radical and lasting social changes was the rapid increase in state-sanctioned anti-Semitism. Indeed, as a racial minority considered an embodiment of the decadent leftist liberalism Hitler abrogated, Jews could not exist with the Nazi vision of Volk.

- i. 1933 Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service - forced non-Aryans to resign
- ii. Nuremberg Laws accelerated the discrimination – revocation of citizenship of Jewish Germans + criminalisation of interracial marriages
- iii. Nazi-endorsed *Kristallnacht* pogrom later that year was a turning point from legislative discrimination to overt violence that became the pretext for eventual mass extermination

Thus, the escalating state-endorsed discrimination was symptomatic of the Nazis' narrow vision of the social fabric of Germany that would facilitate a realisation of Volksgemeinschaft.

P7: Religion (include Jews here optional)

While under escalated state-endorsed anti-Semitism the Jewish faith undoubtedly suffered persecution to the greatest extent, other religious faiths were also subjected to radical social change under Nazi control.

- i. Identifiable as quasi-religious, the Nazis adopted religious imagery in propaganda predominantly to affirm the role of spirituality in Volk while deifying the personal mythology surrounding Hitler
- ii. The Concordat of 1933, later violated, suggests how Nazis simply viewed religions as obstructing ideological institutions
- iii. Evangelical Reich Church established under Bishop Ludwig Mueller + presentation of 'Twenty-Five Points of the German Religion' in 1934
- iv. Arrest of Dietrich Bonhoeffer in 1937 after forming Pastors' Emergency League
- v. Number of students in religious schools drops from 65% in 1935 to 5% in 1937

Despite being aware of the considerable role religion held, in that Hitler "restrained his anti-clericalism", as Alan Bullock argues, the Nazis incrementally dismantled religion in civilian life, particularly in the their escalating isolation of Jews

1150 words = 120 on intro, 60 on concl., and 970 left to divide between roughly 6 paragraphs of 160 words each

OTHER

- i. German historian Detlev Peukert- "any attempt at nonconformist behaviour, or even any hint or intention of such behaviour, would be visited with terror"

2. Conflict in Indochina

Account for the changes in American policy in Vietnam from 1954 to 1973. 2012 CSSA

While American foreign policy in Indochina changed significantly over time, its overarching aim to contain the spread of communism was maintained. In light of the Cold War context, US policy-makers sought to establish a stable and viable democratic government within South Vietnam. As such, the policy can be understood as a series of actions and reactions to the deteriorating situation in Vietnam. Successive US Presidents consequently accelerated America's influence, both financially and militarily, as they were faced with a determined NLF opposition, a politically unstable South Vietnam, and shifting domestic concerns. However, as the US public showed increasing concern for and opposition to President Johnson's 'hawkish' Americanisation of the war, particularly following the 1968 Tet Offensive, these domestic concerns were the catalyst for successor President Nixon's subsequent intention to Vietnamise the war and pursue peace with honour.

1. Eisenhower – Containment + 'Domino Theory' = \$ + Aid

In light of the Geneva Accords, the policy of the Eisenhower Government towards Vietnam was to create and maintain a stable South Vietnamese government, so as to contain the spread

of communism through South-East Asia. Insofar as direct military intervention may have sparked geopolitical tensions with Soviet Russia and China, Eisenhower's policy consisted of aid, financial support and advisors.

- i. The Truman Doctrine, essentially the pretext to Eisenhower's 'Domino' analogy, laid the ideological foundations of the US interests to 'contain' and 'rollback' communism
- ii. National Security Council Aug 1954 – “the situation must be stabilised...to prevent further losses to Communism”
- iii. Aid mechanism to allow reforms to placate the South Vietnamese people+ sustain ARVN
- iv. Eisenhower employed the strategy of 'Nation Building' in South Vietnam through the instalment of Ngo Dinh Diem as South Vietnamese Prime Minister in 1954.
- v. Attempted to stabilise SV's fledgling democracy by providing over \$1bn and 900 advisors to Ngo Dinh Diem's regime
- vi. Anti-communist sentiments in US = minimal public opposition

P2: Kennedy – Self-determination + flexible policy

Despite US intentions to install a functioning democracy and to promote the self-determination of the people of South Vietnam, the installation of Diem as Prime Minister in 1954, in actuality, inhibited such aims and thus initiated President Kennedy's pursuit of a flexible response to a worsening political scenario.

- i. Diem's refusal to hold elections in 1956 as stipulated by the Geneva Accords and the PLAF's accelerated insurgency with the intention to destroy oppression through guerrilla warfare
- ii. Despite this, Kennedy refuses full scale military intervention as requested by his advisors (13,000 combat troops requested in 1961)
- iii. Instead, favours flexible response in counterinsurgency – 400 Green Beret Special Advisors to train ARVN
- iv. Operation Ranch Hand (1962) – defoliants used to stem flow of insurgents + supplies through HCM Trail – fails b/c trail simply moves West
- v. Agroville reform (1959-60) under Diem – unpopular + religious segregation between Buddhists + Catholics -> US had to change strategy
- vi. **WHAM** – counter Communist propaganda, Strategic Hamlet Program (1961-63) physically protect villagers from the NLF – pacification
- vii. Limited success – physical barriers could not prevent ideological spread = Viet Cong membership rose to 300,000 by 1962
- viii. Unpopularity of Hamlets, agrovilles + defoliants = 1963 ARVN coup overthrow Diem + Canadian journalist Michael Maclear – “attempts to win the population's support were undermined by antagonistic US strategy”

P3: Johnson – Bombings + Gulf of Tonkin as turning point

Given the failure of Kennedy's tentative response, President Johnson, rather than withdraw, increased US bombing strategies. Insofar as Gulf of Tonkin Incident on the 2nd August 1964 laid the foundations for such an increase, LBJ, in the 1964 election against Republican Barry Goldwater, could not appear “soft on communism” and as such pursued a 'hawkish' foreign policy.

- i. Division between Hawks and Doves (realpolitik objectives vs. diplomatic negotiation -> advisors) - Johnson rejects Robert Kennedy + appoints General Westmoreland as General of US forces
- ii. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in August 1964 – LBJ given power by Congress to take “all necessary measures” – essentially “a blank cheque” as historian Gabriel Kolko notes
- iii. Success of VC guerrilla tactics -> punji sticks + booby traps + jungle warfare = US tactical response
- iv. Operation Flaming Dart (1965) – retaliation against attacks on US air bases e.g.: Bien Hoa = example of reaction to insurgency
- v. March 1965 – Operation Rolling Thunder = 6.7 million tonnes of bombs dropped on North Vietnam with 700 aircraft

P4: Johnson – Ground attacks

Despite sustained bombing campaigns, US aims of containment and now political interests rested on the deployment of ground troops to regain control of villages in the South.

- i. Assistant Secretary of Defence John McNaughton’s memorandum to McNamara in 1965 suggests 70% of American aim is “to avoid a humiliating US defeat”
- ii. ‘Americanisation’ – 400,000 marines deployed
- iii. Operation Phoenix (b/w 1967-72) – CIA operatives torture/assassinate those suspected of co-operating with the PLAF – escalation + desperation
- iv. Leadership of Giap – Vietnamese forces learn to overcome American firepower – Grab by the belt buckle – Move close to American forces to prevent use of air strikes + artillery – Guerrilla tactics
- v. Search and Destroy tactics + airborne operations (from 1967 onwards) – attempted to eradicate communist influences from villages – failed as evidenced by Operation Cedar Falls + Junction City (1967) b/c, for example, US regained Binh Dong Province, then reoccupied by VC two months later
- vi. Becoming war of attrition

P5: Tet as a turning point

The height of America’s struggle to maintain military dominance and contain the spread of communist influence in the South was revealed to the US public through the psychological and political ramifications of the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive of January 1968.

- i. NLF General Van Tra sought ‘to combine attacks by military units with mass urban uprisings’, to destroy US will to continue war, attacking 36 of 44 provincial capitals
- ii. While the communists did not achieve their objective of causing a Third Phase General uprising + US regained lost ground within weeks, the event was a major propaganda victory for NV
- iii. Images of US embassy in Saigon being overrun + 28000 allied casualties through American media
- iv. Anti-war movement in the US no longer confined to the fringes of the social and political spectrum (e.g. New Left) – now widespread
- v. Middle-class support for LBJ’s interventionist policies fell from 40% to 26% = reconsiders policy
- vi. Suspends bombing campaigns immediately + does not stand for re-election

P6: Nixon + Vietnamisation

Following the Tet Offensive and US election in 1968, President Nixon sought to decelerate US involvement while simultaneously not losing or suddenly withdrawing, and hence favoured peace with honour for the US. Acutely aware of the decline in US popular support for the war, his policy to 'Vietnamise' the war led to the gradual **withdrawal of 500,000 ground troops** and in 1973 conscription was abolished.

- i. Anti-war movement accelerated following Tet, as did media coverage – My Lai massacre, Kent Street massacre = Guam Doctrine
- ii. Moratorium march – **Washington DC 750,000 people**
- iii. Under Creighton W. Abrams' new 'One War' policy the American effort centred on the takeover of the fighting by the South Vietnamese, the pacification of the countryside, and the destruction of communist logistics
- iv. Change in policy in 1969 – Congress withdrew GoT Resolution
- v. In conjunction with intensified bombings:
 - a. The covert Operation Menu in 1969 – destroyed communist strongholds in Laos and Cambodia
 - b. Operation Linebacker I and Linebacker II – attempted to force diplomatic negotiations from a strong military position
- vi. NY Times publication of the Pentagon papers by Daniel Ellsberg in 1971 = public outcry
- vii. Nixon t/f attempted to **“pacify the anti-war public but increase America’s diplomatic capacity”** according to historian Eric Bergerud

P7: Brief - Ford

- i. 1971- rigged election claimed 92% of the vote for Thieu. Any pretence of SV democracy was completely undermined, in 1967 he only received 35% of the vote – its untenable democracy was revealed in 1975 when soon after the US pull out the country is occupied under socialism
 - ii. US continue to provide some financial aid (**reduced from \$1bn to \$700m**) in 1974
- Fall of Saigon in 1975 – Ford declares end to war + all US aid

Evaluate the effectiveness of the strategies and tactics used by the opposing sides during the Second Indochina War. HSC 2010

Given the considerable fluctuations in military dominance between each side during the Second Indochina War, the strategies and tactics employed can be understood as a series of responses to the evolving strategies and tactics. Indeed, the escalation of US involvement came, to a large extent, as a result of the considerable success of the communist guerrilla tactics. Not only was the increased military presence and conventional firepower of the Americans effectively adapted to by the Vietnamese, but the capacity for the communists to foster considerable ideological support for the nationalist goal ensured the ongoing success of their successful tripartite approach of combined military, political and diplomatic strategies and tactics. By contrast, as the US began to decelerate their involvement having failed to establish stable democracy, it became evident that the communist strategies and tactics prevailed as more effective than those of the US-ARVN coalition.

P1: Ideological support of the Vietnamese people – Strategy of Indoctrination

Insofar as the Vietnam War was from the outset ideological, the capacity for the communists to foster considerable civilian support for their nationalistic Phase One 'People's War' laid the foundations for their subsequent military and political successes.

- i. John Stoessinger → the secret to Ho's success was his ability to "walk humbly among his own people" = c/f to Ngo Dinh Diem, Ky, Thieu → unpopular oligarchs
- ii. The US seriously underestimated the strength of VNM's tradition of resisting foreign occupiers → bombing the North only strengthened their resolve
- iii. People's War: within forces, cadres indoctrinated to maintain will and morale
- iv. Propaganda: American involvement encouraged propaganda portraying the Americans as imperialist, exploiting odium of people towards Chinese imperialism
- v. PLAF Oath of Discipline: 'All things of the people and for the people'
- vi. Appeal amongst youths suggested by average age of NLF soldier in 1968 19
- vii. 300 PAVN cadres, soldiers in 1959, 33,300 in 1965
- viii. By contrast, unpopularity of Hamlets, agroville + defoliants = 1963 ARVN coup overthrow Diem + Canadian journalist Michael Maclear – "attempts to win the population's support were undermined by antagonistic US strategy"

P2: Kennedy's reaction – attempts to prevent ideological spread and maintain support for Diem fail

The US counter-strategy to the communist indoctrination was to employ comparable tactics in attempts to both destroy the Ho Chi Minh Trail and foster civilian support for a democratic South Vietnam.

- i. Operation Ranch Hand (1962) – defoliants used to stem flow of insurgents + supplies through HCM Trail – fails b/c trail simply moves West
- ii. Agroville reform (1959-60) under Diem – unpopular + religious segregation between Buddhists + Catholics → US had to change strategy
- iii. **WHAM** – counter Communist propaganda, Strategic Hamlet Program (1961-63) physically protect villagers from the NLF – pacification
- iv. Limited success – physical barriers could not prevent ideological spread = Viet Cong membership rose to 300,000 by 1962

P3: Guerrilla Warfare

- i. Tactical superiority, with tactics drawn from guerrilla warfare, including surprise, basic planning, speed in action, rapid withdrawal
- ii. Neutralised the threat of superior US airpower through ambush and attacking at night and in poor weather.
- iii. Laying mines and booby traps (punji stake pits) were very effective for two reasons → inflicted casualties and had a psychological impact → soldiers reluctant to go on patrol
- iv. Assassinations in the South (such as Diem in 1963) helped create political instability
- v. PLAF attempt to liberate areas under Diem's rule by attacking ARVN → very successful in infiltrating strategic Hamlets
- vi. **HCMT** - Construction of the Ho Chi Minh Trail enabled cadres to avoid demilitarised zone, harnessing broader disaffection with Diem's regime into a single front
- vii. Cu Chi Tunnels → used to launch the Tet Offensive undetected

P4: Inapplicability of Conventional Warfare

In addition to being successful in guerrilla warfare, the North Vietnamese Army under the direction of General Giap was also effective in conventional warfare and by extension capable of countering US' such tactics.

- i. Big Unit War of the US not applicable to the specific conditions, both physical and military, of the Vietnam War
- ii. Adaptability of the communists - Ia Drang Valley November 1965 – Viet Cong defeat, learn ‘grab by belt buckle’
- iii. This counteracted US artillery and airpower → effectiveness was evident in the Battle of Plei Mei (1967) which had a 60% casualty rate
- iv. Able to withstand US bombing raids under Rolling Thunder through re-building programmes
- v. Tactical use of land mines, with 11% of US deaths, 17% of casualties in traps
- vi. Search and Destroy tactics + airborne operations (from 1967 onwards) – attempted to eradicate communist influences from villages – failed as evidenced by Operation Cedar Falls + Junction City (1967) b/c, for example, US regained Binh Dong Province, then reoccupied by VC two months later

Thus, effectiveness of both guerilla and conventional military endeavours manifested itself as both military and psychological gains, evidenced by the fact that by 1971 30% of US soldiers were drug users

P5: Accelerated bombing campaigns fail

- i. Responds to the Gulf of Tonkin incident.
- ii. Failed attempt to close the HCM Trail (Barrel Roll 1965)
- iii. Bombing raids over the North under LBJ strengthened the communist resolve

P6: Success of the Tet Offensive

The height of America’s struggle to maintain military dominance and contain the spread of communist influence in the South was revealed to the US public through the psychological and political ramifications of the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive of January 1968.

- i. Tet Offensive (1968): NLF General Van Tra sought ‘to combine attacks by military units with mass urban uprisings’, to destroy US will to continue war, attacking 36 of 44 provincial capitals
- ii. While the communists did not achieve their objective of causing a Third Phase General uprising + US regained lost ground within weeks, the event was a major propaganda victory for NV
- iii. Images of US embassy in Saigon being overrun + 28000 allied casualties through American media

P7: Nixon + Vietnamisation = reflects success of VM tactics = subsequent victory

The psychological impacts of the successful Tet Offensive manifested themselves through the rapidly declining US public support for the war, and hence the communists’ effective strategies forced the subsequent deceleration of US-ARVN coalition’s military presence. Acutely aware of the decline in US support, Nixon’s strategy to ‘Vietnamise’ the war, through to the gradual withdrawal of 500,000 ground troops and the abolition of conscription in 1973, ultimately failed to prevent the collapse of South Vietnamese democracy.

- i. Anti-war movement accelerated following Tet, as did media coverage – My Lai massacre, Kent Street massacre = Guam Doctrine
- ii. Moratorium march – Washington DC 750,000 people

- iii. Under Creighton W. Abrams' new 'One War' policy the American effort centred on the takeover of the fighting by the South Vietnamese, the pacification of the countryside, and the destruction of communist logistics
 - a. Failed to prevent
- iv. In conjunction with intensified bombings:
 - a. The covert Operation Menu in 1969 – destroyed communist strongholds in Laos and Cambodia
 - b. Operation Linebacker I and Linebacker II – attempted to force diplomatic negotiations from a strong military position
 - c. These didn't achieve their ultimate aims + allowed communists to spread throughout Indochina – accelerated influence and support
- v. NY Times publication of the Pentagon papers by Daniel Ellsberg in 1971 = public outcry
- vi. Nixon t/f attempted to “pacify the anti-war public but increase America's diplomatic capacity” according to historian Eric Bergerud

Assess the impact of the Vietnam War on civilians in Vietnam

Although the Vietnam War had a devastating impact on the people of Indochina, the degree to which the war impact civilians was largely depends on the region in which they lived. Although experiences were similar for the North and South Vietnamese until 1960, differences in civilian experiences were clarified as a result of the accelerating American military presence from 1960 onwards. Not only did massive civilian casualties provoke hostility towards America and thus undermine popular support, the spread of the conflict to eastern Cambodia in 1969 allowed for the rise of Pol Pot's genocidal regime. Ultimately, in addition to the systemic political and cultural changes caused by the war, the unparalleled loss of life and physical devastation had an indelible impact on Indochinese society broadly.

P1: Fear of ideological persecution

Despite the ideological differences between North and South from 1954, civilians in both halves of Vietnam lived in constant fear of persecution.

- i. 10,000 imprisoned or executed under President Diem's Communist Denunciation Campaign from late 1955
- ii. From 1953 in the North leftist influences within the Politburo including Party Secretary Truong Chinh adopted the Chinese revolutionary model which would see thousands of landlords, intellectuals and ex-colonial oppressors sentenced to death or re-education in show trials
- iii. Religious persecution → Buddhist majority in the South by Ngo Dinh Diem
 - a. 1 million Catholic refugees from the North

P2: Land reforms and other policies

Policies employed by both US-ARVN coalition and the communists from 1955, particularly land reform programs, caused tens of thousands of civilians to be separated from their traditional villages and their ancestors as well as famine.

- i. Diem's Agrovilles and later US Hamlet's cause an influx of rural workers to slums in urban areas.
- ii. Northern Land reform + Politburo's refusal to import rice → famine in the North
- iii. Land reforms programmes were motivated by very different ideologies yet had a similar dislocating effect on civilians on both sides.

- iv. Operation Babylift (1975): 3,300 orphans evacuated from Vietnam, many half American
- v. Massive bombing produced cratered landscape unable to be cultivated, with 2.5 million tonnes dropped in North Vietnam

P3: Impact on South Vietnam

- i. From 1960 onwards, as the conflict between communist insurgents and US supported ARVN forces intensified in the South, civilians in this region suffered greatly.
 - a. 843,000 South Vietnamese civilians were killed in the conflict
 - b. Tens of thousands more wounded or left homeless.
- ii. Defoliants
 - a. Post-traumatic stress disorder, birth defects widespread due to use of defoliant Agent Orange
- iii. Exacerbated by Search and Destroy operations under President Johnson → Cedar Falls Binh Dong Province → 10,000 civilians homeless
 - a. US suspicious and hostile of the villages
- iv. Operation Phoenix (1965) → CIA tortured and killed villages thought to have information on PLAF movements.
- v. Post-Diem; Military Juntas: 7 different governments in 1964
 - a. USA failed to maintain political stability.
- i. South Vietnamese society, esp. Saigon, westernised by US military presence, with breakdown of traditional village structures
 - a. Rapid urbanisation across Vietnam, influx of Western goods, prostitution, drugs, leading to increased corruption, with amphetamines introduced from US
 - b. South Vietnamese officials ensured supply of drugs for soldiers, with heroin addictions maintained for US\$2/day

P4: SV at the end of the war

- i. Americanisation of the war under Nixon from 1972 → ARVN dependent on civilians for enlistments
- ii. Collapse of the economy that had thrived on black market goods, prostitution and the American drug culture.
 - a. B52 bombing destroyed irrigation systems, flooding crops, precipitating 23% decline in agricultural output from 1963 to 1966
- iii. Environmental impact
 - a. 20% of jungle in SVM destroyed due to defoliation
- iv. Those civilians that had supported the US feared reprisal in the wake of withdrawal. 100,000 of refugees were fled unable to return → Operation New Life

P5: North Vietnamese

- i. Never directly exposed to the ground conflict.
- ii. However Johnson's to Americanise the war post-Tonkin meant that Northern civilians were subjected to sustained aerial bombing raids.
 - a. US estimated that Rolling Thunder (1965) had killed 182,000 civilians.
- iii. Forced to evacuate major cities and live in tunnels or caves
 - a. However those in the North adapt → bombing strengthens their resolve
 - b. Leadership of Ho

P6: Spread of bombing to Cambodia

Despite Sihanouk's attempt to maintain neutrality, the lives of Cambodian civilians were increasingly affected as the conflict spread from neighbouring Vietnam.

- i. Civilians in the East were initially most affected → Sihanouk allowed the NVA to establish bases along the Cambodian border from 1965
- ii. Johnson began covertly bombing Cambodia from 1965
 - a. Operation Cedar Falls (1967) → HCM trail shifts into Cambodia
 - b. Vietnamese communists in Vietnam prompts made it the target for bombing raids → e.g. Menu 1969
- iii. The US bombing of Cambodia, as well as the 1970 Cambodia Incursion, killed 150,000 Cambodian civilians while also destroying arable land and causing crippling rice shortages
 - a. Bombing undermined Cambodian economy, with rice production falling from 3.814 million tonnes to 762 thousand between 1969 and 1974

P7: Political impact + Rise of KR

In addition to causing widespread physical destruction and death, the spread of the Vietnam conflict to Cambodia also provided the political climate in which Pol Pot would be able to rise to power and implement a Radical Agrarian Marxist (RAM) revolution that would dramatically alter the lives of civilians throughout Cambodia

- i. Lon Nol's support of US bombing raids, alienated him from the majority of Cambodian civilians who in turn became more supportive of the Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge → civil war = civilian casualties
- ii. Conditions become worse from 1975 as Pol Pot declares Democratic Kampuchea → revolution kills 1.7million civilians.
 - a. Forced labour, separation of the family unit. People live in age and gender groups.
 - b. Western medicines banned → increased death toll.
- iii. 1979 invasion of Cambodia by VNM → civilians pleased to be liberated yet wary of being occupied by their traditional enemies.

Account for the Communist victory in the Second Indochina War. HSC 2012

By 1975 the North Vietnamese communist forces had successfully dismantled the South Vietnamese government through their successful tripartite approach of combined military, political and diplomatic strategies and tactics. Indeed, as the effectiveness of the Viet Cong's guerrilla warfare eroded the applicability of traditional 'Big War' tactics of the US, the American-ARVN coalition struggled to maintain military dominance. Equally, the capacity for the North Vietnamese to foster considerable ideological and nationalistic support for the War was a stark contrast to successive US governments as they found themselves increasingly accountable to the emerging anti-war sentiment of the American public. Ultimately, it is because Presidents Johnson and subsequently Nixon were forced to decelerate US military involvement, culminating with the withdrawal of troops in 1973, that the Second Indochina War resulted in communist victory.

P1: Ideological support of the Vietnamese people – Strategy of Indoctrination

Insofar as the Vietnam War was from the outset ideological, the capacity for the communists to foster considerable civilian support for their nationalistic goal laid the foundations for their subsequent military and political successes.

- i. the secret to Ho's success was his ability to "walk humbly among his own people" = c/f to Ngo Dinh Diem, , Thieu → unpopular oligarchs
- ii. The US seriously underestimated the strength of VNM's tradition of resisting foreign occupiers → bombing the North only strengthened their resolve
- iii. People's War: within forces, cadres indoctrinated to maintain will and morale
- iv. Propaganda: American involvement encouraged propaganda portraying the Americans as imperialist, exploiting odium of people towards Chinese imperialism
- v. PLAF Oath of Discipline: 'All things of the people and for the people'
- vi. Appeal amongst youths suggested by average age of NLF soldier in 1968 19
- vii. According to RVN estimates, 300 PAVN cadres, soldiers in 1959, 33,300 in 1965
- viii. By contrast, unpopularity of Hamlets, agroville + defoliants = 1963 ARVN coup overthrow Diem + Canadian journalist Michael Maclear – "attempts to win the population's support were undermined by antagonistic US strategy"

P2: Guerrilla Warfare

- i. Tactical superiority, with tactics drawn from guerrilla warfare, including surprise, basic planning, speed in action, rapid withdrawal
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- iii. Laying mines and booby traps (punji stake pits) were very effective for two reasons → inflicted casualties and had a psychological impact → soldiers reluctant to go on patrol
- iv. Assassinations in the South (such as Diem in 1963) helped create political instability
- v. PLAF attempt to liberate areas under Diem's rule by attacking ARVN → very successful in infiltrating strategic Hamlets
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- vii. Cu Chi Tunnels → used to launch the Tet Offensive undetected

P3: Inapplicability of Conventional Warfare

In addition to being successful in guerrilla warfare, the North Vietnamese Army under the direction of General Giap was also effective in conventional warfare and by extension capable of countering US' such tactics.

- i. Big Unit War of the US not applicable to the specific conditions, both physical and military, of the Vietnam War
- ii. Adaptability of the communists - Ia Drang Valley November 1965 – Viet Cong defeat, learn 'grab by belt buckle'
- iii. This counteracted US artillery and airpower → effectiveness was evident in the Battle of Plei Mei (1967) which had a 60% casualty rate
- iv. Able to withstand US bombing raids under Rolling Thunder through re-building programmes
- v. Bombing raids over the North under LBJ strengthened the communist resolve
- vi. Tactical use of land mines, with 11% of US deaths

- vii. Search and Destroy tactics + airborne operations (from 1967 onwards) – attempted to eradicate communist influences from villages – failed as evidenced by Operation Cedar Falls + Junction City (1967) b/c, for example, US regained Binh Dong Province, then reoccupied by VC two months later

Thus, effectiveness of both guerilla and conventional military endeavours manifested itself as both military and psychological gains, evidenced by the fact that by 1971 30% of US soldiers were drug users

P4: Success of the Tet Offensive

The height of America's struggle to maintain military dominance and contain the spread of communist influence in the South was revealed to the US public through the psychological and political ramifications of the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive of January 1968.

- i. Tet Offensive (1968): NLF General Van Tra sought 'to combine attacks by military units with mass urban uprisings', to destroy US will to continue war, attacking 36 of 44 provincial capitals
- ii. While the communists did not achieve their objective of causing a Third Phase General uprising + US regained lost ground within weeks, the event was a major propaganda victory for NV
- iii. Images of US embassy in Saigon being overrun + 28000 allied casualties through American media

P5: Anti-War movements and public opinion in the US = policy changes

- i. The fact that the US is a democracy means that the extent to which a government is able to fight a war is limited by the sentiment of the electorate.
- ii. Anti-war movement in the US no longer confined to the fringes of the social and political spectrum (e.g. New Left) – now widespread
- iii. Middle-class support for LBJ's interventionist policies fell from 40% to 26% = reconsiders policy
- iv. Suspends bombing campaigns immediately + does not stand for re-election
- v. High casualty rates were very unpopular → Nixon is prompted to withdraw ground troops.
- vi. By contrast the North have time on their side → Ho Chi Minh claimed that the war would last for as long as necessary.
- vii. Nixon did not have this luxury → the electoral imperative prompted him to seek a negotiated peace → which would ultimately allow the North to achieve victory

P6: Nixon + Vietnamisation

President Nixon sought to decelerate US involvement while simultaneously not losing or suddenly withdrawing, and hence favoured peace with honour for the US. Acutely aware of the decline in US popular support for the war, his policy to 'Vietnamise' the war led to the gradual withdrawal of 500,000 ground troops and abolition of conscription in 1973, thus facilitating communist victory.

- i. Anti-war movement accelerated following Tet, as did media coverage – My Lai massacre, Kent Street massacre = Guam Doctrine
- ii. Moratorium march – Washington DC 750,000 people
- iii. Under Creighton W. Abrams' new 'One War' policy the American effort centred on the takeover of the fighting by the South Vietnamese, the pacification of the countryside, and the destruction of communist logistics
 - a. Failed

- iv. NY Times publication of the Pentagon papers by Daniel Ellsberg in 1971 = public outcry
- v. Nixon t/f attempted to “pacify the anti-war public but increase America’s diplomatic capacity” according to historian Eric Bergerud
 - a. Failed to crush communist resolve

P7: Diplomacy

- i. From 1964 Ho introduced a policy of people’s diplomacy to help generate anti-war sentiment.
- ii. The effectiveness of this policy - by inviting foreign activists to visit the North and by sending NVM representatives overseas, Ho attracted international support for VNM liberation.

To what extent were the anti-war movements in the United States responsible for communist victory in the Second Indochina War? HSC 2009

While anti-war sentiment had little bearing on the ‘hawkish’ US foreign policy until 1968, the psychological impact of the communist Tet Offensive facilitated the widespread deterioration of public support. As the opposition of counter-culture and disorganised fringe groups slowly began to influence the majority of middle America, Presidents Johnson and subsequently Nixon became increasingly accountable to the considerable domestic political pressure. Such concerns ultimately led to Nixon’s intention to ‘Vietnamise’ the war so as to achieve peace through honour, however it is significant to note that the policy ignored outcry for an immediate withdrawal and rather Nixon intensified the bombing campaign. Notwithstanding, with the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam, the communist forces were effectively able to capitalise upon an increasingly weak and disillusioned ARVN force to effectively destabilise the South.

P1: Initial Effectiveness

Throughout the early 1960s the Johnson administration essentially ignored the anti-war movement’s calls for withdrawal.

- i. A conglomerate of non-unified fringe groups of pacifists, ‘hippies’, university students and Quakers who did not reflect the views of the “*silent majority*” of mainstream American society.
- ii. Karnow → opinion poll after GoT Resolution shows 85% of Americans support escalation
- iii. The National Teach-In (1965) and the public rallies such as that at the Pentagon in 1967 (students for democratic society) did little to deter LBJ from his Hawkish policy → increases ground troops to 400,000 by 1967

P2: Gradual growth of opposition

As the commitment to the war grew in the later half of the 1960s, the mainstream desire for withdrawal gradually grew.

- i. Begins to expand from uni students and pacifists to some sections of mainstream middle class society
- ii. Growing cost of the war was unpopular → LBJ attempted to introduce a 10% income tax surcharge for the war in 1967

- iii. September 1967 → 1000 business executives join the Business Executives Move for VNM Peace
- iv. However LBJ retains the support of congress → approves a further \$12 billion for the war in 1967

P3: Effectiveness of TET for NVM

The first real steps towards de-escalation and withdrawal would be prompted by the shock and outrage felt by an even broader cross section of American society in the wake of the January 1968 Tet Offensive.

- i. NLF General Van Tra sought 'to combine attacks by military units with mass urban uprisings', to destroy US will to continue war, attacking 36 of 44 provincial capitals
- ii. While the communists did not achieve their objective of causing a Third Phase General uprising + US regained lost ground within weeks, the event was a major propaganda victory for NV
- iii. Bounding mines designed to maim rather than kill used to increase return of amputee veterans – tactically effective to undermine domestic political support for wa
- iv. Images of US embassy in Saigon being overrun + 28000 allied casualties through American media

P4: Impact of Tet on public opinion

- i. Anti-war movement in the US no longer confined to the fringes of the social and political spectrum (e.g. New Left) – now widespread
- ii. Middle-class support for LBJ's interventionist policies fell from 40% to 26% = reconsiders policy
- iii. Chicago Firestorm (1968): Large-scale demonstrations, violence at Democratic National Convention for 1968 election, revealing antagonism towards ongoing war
- iv. Effect → Johnson immediately ceased bombings, attempts to organise peace talks and does not contend the 1968 November elections.
- v. Nixon wins the election by a significant margin on a platform of 'bringing the boys home' and achieving a 'just peace' – Guam Doctrine

P5: Nixon

Acutely aware of the decline in US popular support for the war, Nixon's policy to 'Vietnamise' the war led to the gradual withdrawal of 500,000 ground troops and in 1973 conscription was abolished. However, while the anti-war sentiment that pervaded post-Tet America undoubtedly prevented any further commitment of ground troops, it did not immediately prompt total withdrawal, as the war continued for a further four years.

- i. 'Silent majority' speech (3 November 1969): recognition by Nixon that public had capacity to undermine success <Karnow>
- ii. Continues the war despite the two Nixon moratoria (1969)
- iii. Public pressure is also intensified as a result of damaging leaks during 1969;
 - a. NY Times publication of the Pentagon papers by Daniel Ellsberg in 1971 = public outcry
 - b. My Lai Massacre in the media → reveal a credibility gap
- iv. Despite this he does not abolish the draft – renews it for a further two years in 1971
- v. In conjunction with intensified bombings in spite of anti-war movements:
 - c. The covert Operation Menu in 1969 – destroyed communist strongholds in Laos and Cambodia
 - d. Operation Linebacker I and Linebacker II – attempted to force diplomatic negotiations from a strong military position

- e. An air war caused less casualties
- vi. Nixon t/f attempted to “pacify the anti-war public but increase America’s diplomatic capacity” according to historian Eric Bergerud
- vii. Not only influenced by anti-war movement → also influenced by détente (triangulation)

Account for the rise to power of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. HSC 2013

As a direct consequence of the widening of the Vietnam War, the considerable social and economic damage experienced by Cambodia directly facilitated civilian disillusionment. Indeed the inability of both the Sihanouk administration and subsequent Lon Nol regime to adequately address the concerns and needs of the Cambodian people allowed for the rise of the Khmer Rouge as an increasingly popular alternative to established political structures. In conjunction with the increased American military presence and hence anti-US sentiment, the Khmer Rouge effectively capitalised on widespread societal despondency so as to establish their regime by March 1975. Therefore, the rise of the Khmer Rouge can be understood as a consequence of the ongoing political failures of Cambodian political platforms to redress the substantial devastation that came as a natural extension of the accelerating violence between 1970 and 1975.

P1: Failure of Sihanouk administration

- i. Exploitation of the disillusionment with the erratic policies of Sihanouk
- ii. Conditions within Cambodia that Sihanouk’s government failed to prevent
 - a. The widening of the war – difficult political scenario
 - b. Sihanouk: pragmatic in that he tried to balance the demands of US/South Vietnamese and communists (North Vietnamese) – in actuality a weakness
 - c. Strong public opinion and it angered people that he attempted to remain neutral
 - d. Tensions between Vietnam and Cambodia - divergence of culture, historical tensions, nationalist suspicions
 - e. Increasingly the Vietnamese were encroaching upon Cambodian territory through HCMT: American bombings
- iii. 1965: Sihanouk ejects the US in order to increase relation with the North Vietnamese
 - a. 1968: He brings the US back – this facilitates Operation Menu - Caused widespread social issues
- iv. Cambodian Civil War (1968-1975): Sihanouk did little to prevent nation-wide communist insurgency

P2: Effects of US intervention (i.e. Operation Menu, 1968)

- i. Destruction of Livelihood: Initial American reluctance to be involved in Cambodia abandoned due to HCM Trial
 - a. Bombing devastates Cambodian society, with 200,000 refugees fleeing from eastern Cambodia, 700,000 dead and rice production falling from 3.814 million tonnes to 762 thousand between 1969 and 1974
 - b. rice production falling from 3.814 million tonnes to 762 thousand between 1969 and 1974
 - c. Operation Junction City (1967): airborne search and destroy along Cambodian border, with land captured by US, but rapidly recaptured by PAVN/NLF

- d. Destruction land – forcing widespread evacuation and large numbers of refugees into the towns: by 1970 2 million out of a population of 9 million were refugees in Phnom Penh
- ii. Furthered political dislocation in Cambodia: causing a growth in support for Khmer Rouge as the cadres promoted communist ideology and there was a dramatic growth in anti-US sentiments
 - a. Bombings drove Vietnamese further into Cambodia
 - b. US angered the Cambodians - Sihanouk supports the US causing greater support for the Khmer Rouge
- iii. Continued involvement of the US particularly in bombings missions (Linebacker 1970 and Linebacker II 1972)
 - a. Perpetuated anti-western sentiments, disillusionment with the system and caused a destabilisation of economic and social life in Cambodia
- iv. Removal of Sihanouk and replacement with Lon Nol = coup
 - a. Sihanouk's failure to protect popular interests 1970

P3: Unpopularity of the Lon Nol Regime

- i. Effects of Lon Nol's regime
 - a. Cracked down very harshly on dissenters disillusionment
 - b. Failure to connect with people, took on feudal features of Sihanouk regime; by August 1973, Lon Nol's government controlled one third of Cambodia
- ii. Lon Nol identified as US puppet, responsible for US bombing
 - a. Lon Nol benefited from US aid (\$US1.85 billion from 1970 to 1975); as in South Vietnam, aid contributed to corruption
 - b. **Bombing: forced 200,000 refugees from their homes in eastern Cambodia**
- iii. Lon Nol attempts to exploit anti-communist sentiments by drawing connections to the North Vietnamese
 - a. Attempts instill nationalism by fighting the Vietnamese but Nol's army is considerably smaller and so was defeated causing greater humiliation and disillusionment
- iv. Conditions in Cambodia limited the extent to which Lon Nol had control of the country (growing disillusionment amongst the people)
 - a. US refused intervene because US congress was opposed to any form of intervention that would require an escalation of involvement as it had in Vietnam

All meant that there was limited support for the political system and that the country experienced instability, which was exploited by the communist cadres of the Khmer Rouge to gain greater communist sympathies and was later exploited to by the KR to gain greater power.

P4: Increasing legitimacy and appeal of Khmer Rouge and its Ideology

- i. During this period Sihanouk is in Moscow he established FUNK, a government in exile – political party, most important thing is that Khmer Rouge are allowed to be part of it
 - o Purpose of FUNK was to overthrow Lon Nol
 - a. Political foundation to spread ideological appeal
 - b. Khmer Rouge's alliance with Sihanouk, more acceptable and credible as party of Cambodia; propaganda made successful by association with 'the father of the country'
 - c. Kelvin Rowley: 'CPK propaganda had always relied on nationalist rather than revolutionary appeals'>
 - i. Use of cadres
- ii. Khmer Rouge adopted recommendations from Khieu Samphan's 1959 doctoral

- dissertation, with currency abolished and commerce conducted through barter only
 - a. Lon Nol's political failures contrasted poorly with apparent selflessness of Khmer Rouge seeking to remove corrupt government and create the 'most beautiful and most pure' communal society
- iii. Khmer Rouge membership increased from 35,000 to 150,000 from beginning to end of 1970

P5: Overthrow of Lon Nol and the eventual rise of Khmer Rouge

- i. Khmer Rouge used political allies to gain greater support
 - a. Sihanouk's popular appeal particularly with the peasants, but did not allow him to influence policies
 - b. Also, for a time, used the North Vietnamese for support (mostly financial and military) b/c Lon Nol was supported by the US
- ii. **Khmer Rouge: by 1973, army numbered over 30,000**
 - a. **Seemed like a viable alternative to Lon Nol's regime**
- iii. 17 April 1975 Khmer Rouge mount a coup against the powerless Lon Nol and official took control of Cambodia
 - o Almost immediately sending the people back into the countryside to farm with the implementation of the policy "year zero"

Discuss the nature, aims and methods of Pol Pot's Regime.

The aims of Pol Pot's genocidal regime can arguably be attributed to a combination of communism, nationalism and anti-colonialism. At the heart of Pol Pot's methods were radical attempts to systemically change the very fabric of society in attempts to install vision for a Radical Agrarian Marxist ideology. This ideology was inherent in Pol Pot's overarching desire to create a Democratic Kampuchea that would be economically 'self-reliant'. In reality, Pol Pot only achieved his radical vision to a very limited extent. However, in the process of attempting to establish his puritanical, utopian vision, Pol Pot would cause the death of an estimated 1.7million Cambodian civilians. Ultimately, the aims and consequent methods of the Khmer Rouge's regime attempted to radically change the social and economic profile of Cambodia to install a nationalistic self-reliant utopia.

P1: Ideological independence from Western Influence

Central to Pol Pot's nationalistic vision was the isolation of Cambodia from Western and colonial influences.

- i. Agrarian primitivism: basic, rural lifestyles preferred to corrupted, consumerist urban dwelling
- ii. Khmer nationalism: hostility towards other races, particularly the Vietnamese
 - International trade was ceased.
 - a. Embassies were closed in all countries except North Korea and China
 - b. Vietnamese minority exiled
 - c. Khmer racial superiority was integral
- iii. All foreigners were expelled
- iv. International aid was rejected
 - a. Western medicine was rejected → 100,000 people die of a cholera epidemic
 - b. Hospitals forcibly evacuated → 400,000 deaths.
- v. Abolition of Western calendar → Year Zero proclaimed

P2: Total economic independence

In order to achieve total independence from the outside world, Pol Pot implemented a Radical Agrarian Marxist reforms.

- i. Absolute collectivism: all individuals subordinated to the Angkar Loeu, individuals within the ruling authority kept concealed
- ii. Rice production quotas were set to 3 tonnes/hectare → 3 times higher than pre-war output.
 - a. In order to achieve such ambitious industrial production targets radical social change was enacted.
 - E.g. child labour
- iii. Cities were evacuated in 1975 → forced migration to the countryside. Deurbanisation → power and water supplies cut.
 - a. Private property was abolished
 - b. the country was divided into 7 zones. Within each zone, families were often separated into cooperatives → fracturing of the family unit.
- iv. These reforms failed to increase rice production → by the end of the first year (1975) there was a national famine.
 - a. Cambodia was in a famine: starvation, disease and overwork killed many people – 100 000 people died in cholera epidemic

P3: Social Reform

- i. AIM: Isolate Kampuchea from external world
 - a. Establish autocratic rule over all civilians in Kampuchea
 - b. Ensure counter-revolutionary activity is suppressed
- ii. Religious persecution
 - a. Buddhists forced to work in the fields.
 - b. Defrocking of all Buddhist monks and put to work in rice planting
 - c. Recasting values → banned religion and books class-less society (de-urbanisation)
- iii. Intellectuals and those with a Western education were eradicated → ‘the Killing Fields’ → 1.3 million killed in the Killing Fields
- iv. Educated adults targeted. Young farmers (men and women) controlled the cooperatives.
- v. Social class enemies;
 - a. Victims included such class enemies as rich capitalists, professionals, intellectuals, police and government employees (including most of Lon Nol's leadership), along with ethnic minorities such as Chinese, Vietnamese, Lao, and Cham.
- vi. In total about 1.8 million Cambodians were killed (24% of the population)

P4: Maintaining dictatorial control

- i. Tuol Sleng → civilians suspected of being disloyal were interrogated, tortured and killed
 - a. Up to 20,000 people were killed there between 1975 and 1978
- ii. Internal party purges.
- iii. Maintained mystery surrounding his own identity → brother number one
- iv. Terror and fear of interrogation → fear of informants and spies.

- v. Sought support from the Chinese.

P5: Foreign Policy

- i. AIM: Overcome traditional rival in Vietnam
 - a. Provoke antagonism in Vietnamese neighbour
 - b. Third Indochina War 1978-1979
- ii. Unsuccessful as it would prompt Vietnam to invade which would ultimately see the collapse of the Khmer Rouge
- iii. Upon assuming power (April 1975) Pol Pot sent soldiers to Vietnamese border to reclaim territory that he said had been taken (ruse to gain more power)
- iv. METHODS:
 - a. Aid from communist China
 - b. Border raids between 1977 and 1978, despite Kampuchea having a population of 7 million
 - c. Raids due to his strident nationalism & his desire to return to glorious Angkor years
- v. Vietnam did not respond to border raids
 - a. October 1977: launched a counter-attack but immediately withdrew
 - b. Kampucheans continued to invade
 - c. The Vietnamese offered diplomatic solutions – rejected by Pol Pot
 - d. January 6, 1979 Pol Pot fled into the jungles of Kampuchea.